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Lebanon’s Oligarchy Consolidates Control over the Security Establishment Joe Macaron March 22, 2017 Lebanon’s Oligarchy Consolidates Control over the Security Establishment Joe Macaron After an impasse of nearly four years, on March establishment since 2015 helped the country 8 the Lebanese government announced a move forward and succeed in thwarting suicide sectarian quota deal to fill the security attacks, forcing radical groups to retreat while establishment's leadership positions. Amid cutting their funding and logistical support. tensions surrounding Hezbollah’s regional Hariri had a choice to make—between coping activities, these appointments come at a critical with Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria while moment for the country’s stability and for the returning to power, or defying it politically future of US military aid to Lebanon. from the sidelines. Ultimately, he decided to What kept Lebanon immune from the spillover cope, but not without drawbacks. He had to of the Syrian war is not necessarily the quell resistance from his own camp, most dissociation policy of its consecutive notably former Minister Ashraf Rifi, who governments but, most importantly, the crucial accused him of being complacent with decision three years ago to resume coordination Hezbollah. among the country’s rival security and The latest appointments reaffirmed the three- intelligence agencies. year-long security coordination as well as the That turning point came in 2014 when the parameters of last year's deal that selected Saudi-backed Lebanese intelligence agencies General Michel Aoun as president and Saad shifted from lack of cooperation with Hariri as prime minister. Sectarian politics were Hezbollah, and not disrupting aid to groups in full display with a distribution of power fighting the Syrian regime, to the resumption of among the representatives of the three major counter-terrorism efforts. The August 2014 joint confessional communities: President Aoun attack by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq (Maronite) consolidated his control over the and the Levant (ISIL) on Arsal, a Lebanese Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by selecting village on the border with Syria, further General Joseph Aoun as commander; Prime strengthened that line of cooperation. Minister Hariri (Sunni) consolidated his control over the Internal Security Forces (ISF) by The Iranian-backed Hezbollah and the Saudi- appointing Brigadier General Imad Othman as backed Future Movement, which had bickered general director; and Hezbollah/Parliament since 2011, found themselves facing a common Speaker Nabih Berri (Shiite) kept Abbas threat in 2014. The rise of radical elements in the Ibrahim as general director of General Security Sunni areas had become a challenge for Hariri’s for another six years (as a civilian after retiring dwindling influence while Hezbollah had from the military). become vulnerable as it protected the Shiite community from an array of suicide attacks without a functional state intelligence system. Hence, scrutiny of the Lebanese security 1 Arab Center Washington DC March 2017 Selection Criteria • The principles of hierarchy and seniority were not respected. Both Joseph Aoun The "selection criteria" of these appointments and Imad Othman had to be promoted to have framed the most contentious issue in the take on their new roles, hence officers at last four years. The term is loosely used by the ISF and LAF are now compelled to salute Lebanese oligarchy to mask the decade-long younger officers who have less years of battle of influence to control the security service. At least 50 brigadier generals establishment since the Syrian regime’s grip were placed at the disposal of the ISF over Lebanon began to fade in 2005. Here are commander to promote Othman, which the main selection criteria that informed these means the career of these senior officers latest appointments: is over and all they can do now is wait their turn to retire (AR). • Each of three confessional representatives selected a list of three The Defense/Military Establishment options (by order of preference) for the A few Lebanese military commanders shaped vacancies allocated to them while the the LAF legacy; the first commander, General other two only had the right to veto. Fouad Chehab, is perhaps a breed on his own. • While the law says that the government Yet, there are two influential trends that molded is supposed to appoint only the army the Lebanese army in the last three decades: the commander and the head of ISF, the anti-Syrian attitude of General Michel Aoun ruling oligarchy recently preapproved a (who served as commander 1984-1990) and the string of senior-level appointments as pro-Syrian attitude of General Emile Lahoud part of the larger sectarian quota deal. (who served as commander 1990-1998). • All appointed commanders were new to their positions; there were no extensions The military cohorts, who served under Aoun of previous appointments, except for during the final chapter of the Lebanese civil Abbas Ibrahim. That was a win for war, suffered from the ramifications of his President Aoun, who has been arguing military defeat in 1990. When forced into exile for years against extending the mandate by the Syrian invasion, Aoun asked his troops of security commanders. to declare allegiance for his successor Lahoud to • No provocative names were put forth— save them from further bloodshed. The young all appointees were officers known for officers had the choice either to resign or their moderate stances and inclinations reluctantly integrate into the new army under to coordinate unless instructed otherwise Syrian rule. by their oligarchs. Now, after nearly 27 years, these military • Loyalty for respective sectarian leaders officers are again in a position of power: was paramount in deciding the General Joseph Aoun, Brigadier General Samir appointments. al-Hajj (Inspector General), and Brigadier 2 Lebanon’s Oligarchy Consolidates Control over the Security Establishment Joe Macaron General George Shreim (General Officer). All current formation. The Supreme Defense three serve on the six seats of the military Council met once last January since Aoun council, the highest decision-making body of became president. the armed forces. The council is entrusted with A third and last point of presidential leverage is naming commanders across the military and the expected synergy between the current hence can shape the balance of power inside the Defense Minister Yaacoub al-Sarraf (close to army for decades to come. According to the Emile Lahoud) and General Joseph Aoun. The National Defense Law, the military council is last defense minister, Samir Moqbel, was chaired by the army commander along with five outmaneuvered many times by former Army other members (as shown in the table below). Commander General Jean Kahwaji, including The vote is by simple majority and in case of a when Kahwaji enforced the decision to appoint tie, the army commander’s vote is decisive, his cohort Brigadier General Edmund Fadel as which gives President Aoun significant control head of military intelligence. Once Fadel retires over the council. in a few months, President Aoun will have yet another opportunity to appoint a loyalist in one of the most crucial intelligence agencies in the security establishment. The Internal Security Forces The assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon Indeed, presidential leverage extends to civilian altered the balance of power in the Lebanese oversight over the military. While the 1989 Taif security establishment. The three ISF directors Agreement shifted civilian command of the since then have been loyalists of the Future military from the president to the Council of Movement: Ashraf Rifi, Ibrahim Basbous, and Ministers, the Lebanese president is the chair of now Imad Othman. The emergence of the the Supreme Defense Council along with the Information Branch as a potent and prime minister as his vice chair. The remaining independent Sunni-led intelligence force five members are the ministers of defense, reflects that new dynamic. foreign affairs, interior, treasury, and economy. Since then, the Information Branch even earned The daily operations of the secretary general are the trust of Hezbollah by playing a key role in run by a military officer who reports directly to unraveling Israeli networks and agents the prime minister. Only the president is operating in Lebanon. Othman, who served as authorized to convene the Supreme Council; head of the Branch since October 2012 (after the otherwise, the prime minister needs one-third assassination of his predecessor, Wissam of the vote to do so, which Hariri lacks in the Hassan), now leads the ISF. A new 3 Arab Center Washington DC March 2017 memorandum (AR) last year stated that the indication yet if that scenario will materialize in Information Branch now directly reports to the the foreseeable future. ISF director, which likely means that the clout It is worth noting that Othman’s significant of the branch will return to normalcy compared influence on internal security agencies does not to its oversized role under Wissam Hassan. extend to the Shiite-led General Security and The second expected breakthrough is the Christian-led State Security. The General resumption of the ISF leadership council Security’s role expanded since 2005, when it meetings after a period of dysfunction and became part of the Shiite quota of security inactivity since 2007, due to infighting among positions, and it reports directly to the interior the oligarchy to replace more than half of the minister. Abbas Ibrahim’s role is widely eleven members whose terms had expired. Now recognized among the oligarchs and he is the council is fully staffed (see table below). occasionally tasked by Hezbollah to play political roles. Most recently he mediated the rapprochement between President Aoun and Speaker Berri. While technically the State Security directorate serves as an arm of the Supreme Defense Council, its role has been controversial in recent years.
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