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Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict

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Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict A PRECARIOUS BALANCING ACT: LEBANON AND THE SYRIAN CONFLICT Middle East Report N°132 – 22 November 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. SYRIA’S SPILLOVER EFFECTS .................................................................................. 1 A. CROSS-BORDER DYNAMICS.......................................................................................................... 1 1. Increased support for the Syrian uprising .................................................................................... 1 2. A rising sectarian dimension and Sunni Islamist awakening ....................................................... 3 3. Contained violence ....................................................................................................................... 5 B. INTER-LEBANESE DYNAMICS ....................................................................................................... 6 III. LEBANON’S ACTORS AND THE SYRIAN CONFLICT .......................................... 8 A. HIZBOLLAH’S PERSPECTIVE ......................................................................................................... 8 1. A strategic partnership with Syria ................................................................................................ 8 2. A position of strength within Lebanon ...................................................................................... 11 3. Adapting to a protracted conflict ............................................................................................... 13 B. THE FUTURE CURRENT’S PERSPECTIVE ..................................................................................... 20 C. WISSAM HASSAN’S KILLING: A GAME-CHANGER?.................................................................... 21 IV. A BRITTLE STATUS QUO ........................................................................................... 24 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 28 APPENDICES A. MAP OF LEBANON ........................................................................................................................... 30 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 31 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2009 ... 32 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 34 Middle East Report N°132 22 November 2012 A PRECARIOUS BALANCING ACT: LEBANON AND THE SYRIAN CONFLICT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Syria’s conflict is leaking out of its borders, but in few to translate the ensuing regional balance of power into a places are risks higher than in Lebanon. This is not just a domestic one. Hizbollah hardly can contemplate a future matter of history, although history bodes ill: the country with a fundamentally different Syrian regime, has tied its seldom has been immune to the travails of its neighbour. fate ever more tightly to its ally’s, and will not remain idle It also is a function of recent events, of which the most should Assad be in real jeopardy. Conversely, the Sunni- dramatic was the 19 October assassination of top security dominated Future Current and its partners see no alter- official Wissam Hassan, an illustration of the country’s native to the regime’s demise, however long it will take fragility and the short-sightedness of politicians unwilling and no matter the costs. They view the uprising as doubly to address it. Lebanon’s two principal coalitions see strategic: a golden opportunity to seek revenge against events in Syria in a starkly different light – as a dream an antagonistic regime as well as a chance to challenge come true for one; as a potentially apocalyptical night- Hizbollah’s domestic hegemony. It is hard to see Leba- mare for the other. It would be unrealistic to expect Leb- non’s fragile equilibrium surviving such a winner-take-all anese actors to be passive in the face of what is unfolding mentality. next door. But it is imperative to shield the country as much as possible and resist efforts by third parties – Already, signs of Syria’s spillover effects have been un- whether allies or foes of Damascus – to drag the nation in mistakable. Border areas have been caught in the conflict, a perilous direction. In the wake of Hassan’s assassina- with weapons smuggling, refugee flows and attacks against tion, this almost certainly requires a new, more balanced Lebanese villages along the frontier coming from one side government and commitments by local and regional actors or the other, depending on the villagers’ political allegiances. not to use Lebanese soil as an arena in which to wage the Syrian struggle. The stream of refugees has had humanitarian but also political and security consequences as Lebanese Sunnis, From the Syrian crisis’s early days, there was every reason bearing witness to the increasing brutality and scorched to expect that Lebanon, traditionally under its neighbour’s earth policy of Assad’s regime, step up their involvement. strong influence, would not long remain untouched. The Solidarity with their embattled brethren has led them to two countries share a 365-kilometre, un-demarcated and turn several regions into sanctuaries and transit points for largely porous border as well as extremely close commu- the supply of weapons to, and staging ground for attacks nal ties. Syria’s regime has a history of lashing out when by, Syrian rebel forces. This has been the case in the pre- it feels under siege, coupled with a tradition of oftentimes dominantly Sunni north, notably the border regions of violent interference in Lebanese affairs. Many were con- Tripoli and Akkar, but also – to a lesser degree – in the cerned from the start that Damascus would seek to desta- eastern Bekaa Valley. Arms smuggling into Syria began as bilise its neighbour if only to weaken its foes across the an improvised, chiefly commercial affair, but has greatly border and warn the world of potential consequences of a expanded, with the Future Current appearing to use Tur- protracted fight. Important Lebanese communities har- key as the hub for supporting armed opposition groups. bour deep resentment towards the regime’s conduct over More broadly, the Syrian uprising helped Islamist groups the past decades; this is the case in particular of Sunnis in in both countries bolster their standing and mutual ties the north who feel solidarity with their Syrian brethren. that had been debilitated if not severed in the 1980s. Finally, sectarian tensions within Syria have their counter- part in Lebanon; as they rise in the former, so too do they Hizbollah too has entered the fray. It has had to balance mount in the latter. competing considerations, defending the Syrian regime while safeguarding its posture in Lebanon not only at pre- Lebanon’s factions clearly are aware of the stakes. Each sent, but also, possibly, in anticipation of eventual changes wagers on success by one Syrian side or the other, waiting in Damascus. That is why it has, on the one hand, acqui- A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict Crisis Group Middle East Report N°132, 22 November 2012 Page ii esced in Prime Minister Najib Miqati’s policies even when In the longer term, Lebanon will have to cope with the they went against the interests of the Syrian regime and, outcome of a conflict that inevitably will have huge con- on the other, provided that regime with practical support. sequences, profoundly affecting virtually every major is- There is much speculation and little hard evidence as to sue that has bedevilled the nation: relations with Israel; the scope of this assistance. Lebanon’s opposition and the status of minorities (notably Christians and Alawites); Syrian rebels long claimed that Hizbollah snipers were the Sunni-Shiite divide; Saudi-Iranian rivalry; as well as lending a hand to regime forces and killing protesters; the rise and empowerment of Sunni Islamists. Added to this U.S. officials likewise assert that Damascus, Hizbollah are the material consequences of the Syrian uprising, which and Iran are in close military cooperation, even forming has caused major strains on an already over-stretched an elite militia. What seems clear is that the Shiite move- economy. ment has intensified its involvement on the ground. How far it would go to salvage the regime is uncertain but, at a Lebanese political actors typically have turned a blind eye minimum, the message it wishes to send to outsiders is: to deep-rooted causes of the nation’s enduring instability: far enough. the nature of the power structure (a communal-based ap- portionment of power and privileges invariably leading For now, notwithstanding these developments, prospects to paralysis at best, conflict at worse); the contradictions of a renewed civil war appear relatively remote. Though of its external alliances (as some turned to the “axis of motivated by different interests, various parties have act- resistance” and others aligned themselves with the West); ed in ways that, by and large, limit the damage. Hizbollah and the nature of the economic system (in theory geared continues to enjoy a lopsided military advantage, forcing
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