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Marinka: in the Line of Fire

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Marinka: in the Line of Fire Story of a City MARINKA: IN THE LINE OF FIRE Kyiv 2018 UDK 342.7.03 (477) BBK 67.9 (4 Ukr) 400.7 This publication is made possible by the generous support from the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) within the framework of the Human Rights in Action Program being implemented by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. The opinions and interpretations in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the USAID or the United States Gov- ernment. The contents of the publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and the UHHRU. The American people, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have provided economic and humanitarian assistance worldwide for over 55 years. In Ukraine, USAID’s assistance focuses on three areas: Health and Social Transition, Economic Growth and Democracy and Governance. USAID has provided 1.8 bln. technical and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since 1992. For additional information about USAID programs in Ukraine, please visit our website: https://www.usaid.gov/uk/ukraine or our Facebook page at www.facebook.com/USAIDUkraine. Story of a city. Marinka: in the line of fire / Melamory Maris, general editorship – O. A. Bida, O. A. Martynenko / Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. — K., 2018. - 20 p. UDK 342.7.03 (477) BBK 67.9 (4 Ukr) 400.7 Design: Viacheslav Bodnar Text proofreading: Svitlana Rybalko © Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 2018 Story of a City Marinka: in the Line of Fire CONTENTS Introduction 4 How It All Began 5 Marinka in the Thick of Action 7 The Battles for the Town in the Summer 2015 10 The Town of Phantoms 12 Life in the Grey Zone 14 Conclusions 15 Annex 1. Perished in Marinka in 2014-2018 civilians 16 Annex 2. Perished in Marinka in 2014-2018 Ukrainian military personnel 17 Annex 3. Perished in Marinka in 2014-2018 members of the illegal armed formations 19 Introduction MARINKA, before 2014, was known in Ukraine due to lo- cation in its territory of Laktis dairy, tire repairing plant, and a food and flavor factory. Situ- ated on the Osykova River, the town adjoins western outskirts of Donetsk and is the capital of the same-name Marinka Dis- trict. For 9,829 residents2, there were 2 secondary schools3, A. S. Makarenko boarding school #3, and the Golden Key kindergar- ten. Close to the town, there is Donetsk – Zaporizhzhia territo- rial highway. photo: zn.ua 1 However, Marinka became most well-known as a result of the events of 2014/15. Then, practically at the same time as the power was seized by the Kremlin-led forces in Donetsk, Marinka appeared in sight of illegal armed formations. From the tactical point of view, the town is a stronghold for further invading Kurakhove settlement and opens a direct way to Zaporizhzhia, Mariupol and other cities located alongside the Azov Sea4. The many-thousand population has practically been living in the line of fire all this time. In 2015, after the signature of the Minsk agreements, Marinka turned out to be in the grey zone which adversely affected the destiny of the town and its residents. At the end of the year, when the checking point (hereinafter, the “CP”) was made some kilometers further from Marin- ka, the town ultimately became controlled by the Ukrainian authorities. 1 https://ukranews.com/upload/news/2016/08/06/0657a59b12234ac-5780bc8689a6d-143917_crop_1200.jpg?v=1 2 Current Ukrainian population number as of January 1, 2014//State Statistics Committee of Ukraine [electronic resource] - URL: http://database.ukrcensus. gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2014/publ2014.asp 3 Information about secondary education institutions, Donetsk region//Education Management Information System [electronic resource] – URL: https:// dn.isuo.org/ru/koatuu/schools-list/id/1423300000 4 Video «The Brave Hearts. Marinka”//YouTube [electronic resource] - URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yd1Ue5581сс 4 How It All Began While the illegal armed forma- tions seized administrative build- ings and there were heard appeals from platforms, calling for declara- tion of autonomy, Marinka’s resi- dents anxiously observed all the developments. The town authorities had been aloof; there had been no official statements, though the national flag was removed from a flagpole. In her article ‘Marinka: Ukrainian town BBC WORLD SERVICE5 with divided loyalties’, the BBC News’ Sarah Rainsford wrote: “Local officials - who do ATTENTION!!! THE LEADERS OF THE DONETSK PEOPLE’S not want to be quoted directly - describe how REPUBLIC TURN ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING TOWNS: ARTEMOVSK, YASINOVATAYA AND MARINKA! masked men came to visit one evening, car- A DOUBLE-CROSS OF THE REFERENDUM TAKES PLACE THERE. ARTEMOVSK. Aleksey Aleksandrovich Reva, head rying the Russia’s flag. After some discussion, of town, supports the junta and has refused to help con- duct the referendum! His people double-cross the meet- they were allowed to raise the tricolour above ings and pretend that they prepare for the referendum though, in fact, it is not true! YASINOVATAYA. Aleksandr the building but now it has gone7. This infor- Iosifovich Rusachenko, head of town, prepares for the presidential elections on May 25. May 11 Referendum is mation is confirmed by the social network an empty phrase for him. His classical slogan is ‘We sup- port unitary and indivisible Ukraine.’ http //yasinovataya org.ua/lndex/ postings: “It is sad and disgusting. Yesterday Marinka. Roman Ivanovich Havrin, head of the district state administration, also double-crosses the May 11 (April 14, 2014 - editor’s remark), the Russia’s referendum. According to the statements, there are only preparations for the presidential elections. The rest is in flag was ran up over yet another district cen- fact ignored. 8 CONTACT INFORMATION OF THE FUCKEROES: Alek- ter of Donetsk oblast (Marinka) . The author sey Aleksandrovich Reva, head of town, 44 Artema Str., Artemovsk, Donetsk oblast, 84500, tel.(recep- of the message continued that illegal armed tion):+06274-4-01-63, fax: +06274-3-01-15. Aleksandr Iosifovich Rusachenko, head of town, 147 Ordzhoni- groups had been allowed in the police station kidze Str., Yasinovataya, Donetsk oblast, 86000, tel.:+38- 06236-4-25-14, fax: +38-062-335-67-10. Roman Iva- without striking a blow and even shown that novich Havrin, head of the district state administration, 3 Shevchenka Str., Marinka, Donetsk oblast, 85600, there had been no weapons in the room for tel.:+06278-5-17-50, +06278-5-17-51, fax: +06278-5- 19-43. their storage. Thus, there has been no forced URGENT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN. TIME IS RUN- seizure of the administrative buildings in the NING OUT! town. In the spring 2014, the local inhabitants differed in opinion as to further developments: some of them supported the idea of autonomy, while the others advocated unitary state. However, the majority strived Yuriy Sem: he will join those 3%, who will be against, for peaceful resolution of all the matters. and will be given a good kick in the butt. Such a broad range of opinions resulted in controversial steps: at the meetings taking Mikhail Denisov: Stop making people place in the town, the supporters of the crazy. Everybody who wants will go! self-proclaimed republics called to support I will not! referendum and, in the meantime, the painted yellow and blue stripes began to Facebook message posted by Elena Podchernina6 5 https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2014/05/140502_mariinka_report_yg 6 https://www.facebook.com/podchernina/posts/767874059926257 7 Sarah Rainsford. Marinka: Ukrainian town with divided loyalties //BBC News [Electronic resource] - URL: https://www.bbc.com/ Ukrainian/poli- tics/2014/05/140502_Marinka_report_yg 8 Dmitry Markovskiy, posting of 04/15/2014 [Electronic resource] - URL: https://www.facebook.com/mr.markovskiy/posts/685996248130948 5 appear of the lampposts. Anxiety was spreading throughout the town – people were afraid of the worst, the war9. The preparations for the referendum received passive resistance in Marinka. The activists, who supported the idea that Marinka should join the so-called DPR, called to intensify public outreach efforts in the town since the head of the district administration – Roman Ivanovych Havrin – “double crossed” the referendum10 and was preparing the town for holding the presi- dential elections. In order to prevent the manifestations of political activity of the local resi- dents, the representatives of the illegal armed formations took preventive measures on their part. For example, on May 24, the militants broke into the house, destroyed the documents and took hostage Valentyn Poliakov, head of territorial committee #6011. It was already in the night following the closure of the constituency election commission and, in fact, the election disrup- tion12, that the hostage was let go. In the second half of May 2014, the situation inside and around Marinka became even more serious. Mass media and social networking sites informed, from time to time, about checkpoints of illegal armed formations that appeared at the entries to Marinka13, and troops and weapons pulled in the town boundaries. The pressures had been mounting: shops, drugstores, post of- fice14 and banks’ branches began to close15. 9 Political situation in Marinka shortly before the DPR’s referendum // BBC Russian Service [Electronic service] - URL: https://www. youtube.com/ watch?v=Lm0Hhc4qlyM 10 Elena Podchernina, posting of 05/06/2014 // Facebook [Electronic resource] - URL: https://www.facebook.com/podchernina/ posts/767874059926257 11 Militants kidnapped the head of the constituency election commission in Donbas// Radio Svoboda [Electronic resource] - URL: https://www. radiosvoboda.Org/a/25396979.html 12 Oleksandr Chernenko, posting of 05/25/2014 // Facebook [Electronic resource] - URL: https://www.facebook.com/profichok/ posts/10152473711769406 13 Video “Russists’ checkpoint at the entry to Marinka from the direction of Donetsk”//YouTube [Electronic resource] - URL: https://www.youtube.
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