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Home , Democracy in China, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, On China

Political Reform and the Fragility of Communist Rule in

Susan L. Shirk, Ph.D. Professor of China and Pacific Affair Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies University of California – San Diego

Chinese leaders are haunted by the fear that conservatives blamed the political reforms for their days in power are numbered. President subverting the Party’s authority and enabling Jintao, like who preceded him, the . knows that he lacks the personal prestige and The lessons they drew from the Tiananmen charisma of and Xiaoping, crisis were that for rule to the founders of the People’s Republic of China survive, they must do three things: Prevent in 1949. Today’s leaders also recognize that large scale social unrest; avoid public leader- two and a half decades of economic reform ship splits that might embolden people to take and opening to the world have radically trans- to the streets; and keep the military loyal to the formed Chinese society and created latent Party.1 political challenges to communist rule. Since then, Chinese leaders have sought to The leaders’ insecurity was sharply height- sustain communist rule by enhancing the sys- ened by the events of 1989. Massive pro-democ- tem’s responsiveness to China’s increasingly racy protests in ’s diverse and pluralistic society, and managing and more than one hundred thirty other cit- elite politics so that divisions at the top do not ies—and the differences among the top leaders mobilize opposition from below. over how to deal with them—almost brought down communist rule in China. Just months after that close call, China’s leaders watched Responsiveness with foreboding as the fell and com- Devising methods to make governance more munist governments in the and responsive while avoiding any loss of Communist Eastern Europe began to collapse. No wonder Party control is a difficult challenge. The lead- China’s leaders are anxious about their own ers have shied away from elections that would political survival. make officials formally accountable to the pub- Before 1989, and other post- lic or even to rank and file Party members Mao leaders had taken some bold steps in the instead of to the Party authorities above them. direction of political reform to spur economic Communist Party appointment of government modernization and restore popular trust in officials at all levels—sometimes called the the (CCP). Most power after the Soviet practice—is notably, they cut back the Communist Party’s the cornerstone of communist rule. Chinese totalitarian domination of the government and officials and intellectuals talk a lot about society. But this trend was halted and in cer- these days—the term was invoked tain respects reversed after Tiananmen. Party more than sixty times in President ’s

1 address to the Communist Party’s National a group of elite representatives, and then the Congress last October. But they have shown no top two vote-getters are recommended to the courage to actually institutionalize it.2 Party committee at the district or county level.7 China introduced elections of village leaders Another method is to use straw polls (called under Deng Xiaoping, and they have contin- “hai xuan” or “sea election”) to winnow down ued to the present. Deng even spoke about to the most popular individuals the list of pro- the ultimate goal of national elections.3 After posed nominees passed to the upper level Party Tiananmen, however, the efforts of political organ. Party officials, as well, are supposed to reformers to extend direct elections of leaders be reviewed as part of their promotion process from the village level, which is not part of the in informal meetings of citizens. The Party government, to the township level, which is wants to identify candidates with local support responsible for many key government policies to make sure that its policies are smoothly such as tax collection, have been stymied by the implemented. timidity of Party leaders. As Jiang Zemin report- To head off social unrest, Beijing orders edly said, if direct elections of leaders in vil- local officials to fight corruption, clean up the lages today lead to electing leaders in townships terrible air and water pollution produced by tomorrow, and in counties the day after tomor- the rush to industrialization, and provide social row, very soon they would directly elect national goods like health, education and welfare. But leaders. “If things go like this,” he asked, “where the central leaders are continually frustrated would the Party’s leadership be?”4 Jiang Zemin by failures to implement these priorities at the had sought to consolidate his power in 1997 by local level. Local officials remain fixated on promising the National Party Congress that he economic growth because the growth rate is would extend the “scope of democracy” and the number one criterion for promotion, and establish a “sound system of democratic elec- growth is what creates jobs and other patronage tions.”5 But then he and his colleagues in the opportunities. One obvious answer to the prob- Politburo lost their nerve: The Congress did not lem is to empower citizen watchdogs. But how formally endorse township elections, and when is it possible to bring public opinion to bear on some localities experimented with them, they local officials without ceding the Party’s control were banned as unconstitutional in 2001. (The over these officials? constitution grants formal authority for choos- To strengthen public oversight of local gov- ing township leaders to local legislatures which ernment Beijing has passed laws and regula- typically rubber-stamp the Communist Party’s tions requiring public hearings to review the nominations. The Chinese constitution, which environmental impact of construction projects, has been revised eight times, could easily have the posting of local budgets and regulations on been modified to allow direct township elec- government websites (e-government), and open tions if the leaders had really wanted them.)6 bidding for government construction contracts. Direct elections of county or city officials have In some townships, supervisory groups made up never been seriously contemplated. of elites holding other Party and government As a substitute for elections, the CCP has posts have been established to oversee govern- come up with a variety of mechanisms to allow ment administration. And by law individuals citizens to voice their views of individual offi- are legally permitted to express their grievances cials as part of the selection process. One by petitioning.8 method is called “open recommendation and Is this managed citizen-oversight an effective selection” (gongtui gongxuan). Anyone already method of monitoring governance or a form serving as an official is allowed to apply for of faux participation that will only fuel more the post and take a written examination. The discontent?9 Recent demonstrations against top scorers are given an oral examination by the construction of a highly polluting chemi-

2 cal plant in and the high-speed mag- missible … if the abuses are in localities other lev train route in were provoked by than where their own publication is based. But objections not just to the projects themselves, when the media’s monitoring of outside locali- but also to the inadequate public notification ties (yidi jiandi, supervision in a different place) and discussion of them. The blackout of news started to endanger the careers of provincial about demonstrations also evokes a new rallying and municipal officials, these officials got the cry, “the people’s right to know.” Politburo to outlaw the practice in 2005. At One way to make citizen oversight more present, journalists find that investigations of effective would be to allow it to be collectively abuses outside their own area won’t get them organized. But the Communist Party, wary of in trouble so long as they limit their exposés to any potential organized opposition, keeps social scandals at the county level and below. organizations on a very tight leash. Every non- governmental organization, including religious Leadership Politics11 groups, must be registered with a government After Tiananmen, China’s leaders were sponsor who is responsible for its actions. And the chartering of organizations focused on pub- determined to never again let their internal lic policy, such as environmental protection, is disagreements spill out into public view. They strictly limited. In contrast to the tight restric- had learned their lesson: If they don’t hang tions on citizen groups, the Party facilitates the together, they could hang separately, as the organization of state and private businesses into Western saying goes. If the leadership group trade associations which lobby actively in their remains cohesive despite the competition that own interests.10 inevitably arises within it, then the Communist Party and the security police can keep social From the standpoint of China’s leaders, the unrest from spreading out of control and the mass media is an attractive alternative to orga- regime will survive. Unless people receive some nized citizen groups for monitoring government signal of “permission” from the top, protests are actions. The Communist Party allows the now likely to fizzle out before they grow politically commercialized mass media to serve as a watch- threatening. But if the divisions among the top dog over local politicians. A popular nationally leaders come into the open as they did in 1989, televised program Central Television people will take to the streets with little fear of called Focus showcases government responsive- punishment. ness by investigating failures on the part of local governments and reporting on how they are Beginning with Deng Xiaoping, CCP leaders remedied almost overnight as a result of the have tried to reduce the risk of destabilizing publicity. The State Environmental Protection leadership splits and the rise of another tyrant Agency actively calls on the media to help it like Mao Zedong. They regularized leader- expose local politicians who neglect environ- ship competition by introducing fixed terms mental protection. And the Party censors have of office, term limits, and a mandatory retire- opened up the issues of food and pharmaceuti- ment age to regularize leadership competition. cal quality for investigative journalism because Leadership politics have become more institu- top down methods so clearly are inadequate. tionalized and less volatile. The oligarchs do Because the editors of almost all newspapers, everything they can to prevent divisions among magazines, television stations and news websites themselves. The practice of having the top are hired and fired by government or Party leader hold three key positions—general sec- agencies, it’s less risky to empower a media out- retary of the CCP, president of the PRC, and let than a citizen association. Journalists have chairman of the Central Military Commission discovered that exposing malfeasance of local is designed to prevent destructive cleavages officials sells newspapers and is politically per- among the leaders.

3 Leadership succession is the Achilles heel of up their monopoly of power and make them- authoritarian governments, the moment when selves accountable to the larger body. it is most difficult to keep the competition for In the lead-up to the Party Congress, policy power within the black box. When Jiang Zemin, advisors and other experts publicly promoted having reached the age of seventy-seven, retired the notion of intra-party democracy as the first as Communist Party general (2002) step toward fuller democracy. They had high and President (2003), it was the first time that hopes that the Congress would provide the a leader of a large communist country had occasion for Hu Jintao, having consolidated ever peacefully handed down power while still his authority during his first term, to finally alive. Jiang managed to hang on to his job as emerge as the genuine political reformer they chairman of the Central Military Commission believed him to be. In the end, however, they because it did not require retirement at sev- were disappointed because despite all the talk, enty. But without the institutional authority the actual changes to institutions and practices of the top Party post, Jiang’s influence dimin- within the CCP were trivial.12 ished, and two years later in 2004 he retired Instead of letting the Central Committee completely. During the two years when Jiang exercise its full authority over the succession, and Hu shared power, subordinate officials felt the incumbent leaders cautiously adopted a uneasy. The last time China had two different half-way measure reminiscent of the way they voices coming from the leadership they caused have handled local elections—trying to be the near disaster of the 1989 demonstrations. responsive without risking the loss of control Anxious to prevent any threats to stability, that formal accountability would imply. Four senior and retired leaders reportedly convinced months before the Party Congress in June 2007, Jiang that the best way to preserve his legacy was they held a special expanded meeting of the to retire completely. 16th Central Committee. Hu Jintao gave an At the Communist Party National Congress important speech in the morning to try out the in October 2007, the current leaders faced themes he planned to present at the upcoming the challenge of coming to agreement over Party Congress, and in the afternoon the body the next generation of leaders, in particular held an informal straw poll (some people have who would succeed Hu Jintao as China’s top called it a hai xuan or sea election similar to the leader five years later in 2012. Although the informal votes taken at the village and township formal authority to choose China leaders—the level to determine the popularity of nominees) Politburo, Standing Committee of the Politburo, to consider the names of people who might Secretariat, Central Military Commission, and be nominated to the 17th Central Committee. general secretary—rests with the 371-member Reportedly ’s name rose to the top CCP Central Committee, the incumbent lead- which helped the oligarchs converge on him as ers hammer out the slate in secret. the likely heir apparent.13 Hu Jintao lacked the power to hand-pick his Achieving consensus among the oligarchs own successor (in contrast to Mao, Deng, or required a package deal. Four new faces were past Mexican presidents). He was forced to promoted to the Standing Committee of the choose an individual who would be acceptable Politburo. Xi Jinping, who came out on the to the other oligarchs. Everyone in the collec- stage first in the position of potential successor, tive leadership wants to avoid the risks of an does not have particularly close ties to Hu or internal power struggle. One way of settling to anyone else for that matter. Hu’s presumed the issue would have been to let the Central favorite, , had to settle for the num- Committee hold a genuine competitive elec- ber two position. Although Li or someone else tion with open nominations, as does might challenge Xi for the number one posi- now. But the leaders were not prepared to give tion over the next five years—Xi’s position may

4 not be all that solid in view of the fact that he way to bargain out their individual interests in has not yet been given a position on the Central a way that allows them to hang together and Military Commission—an open contest is some- maintain the closed politics of the Communist thing that all the leaders have an interest in Party. The intense competition among them avoiding. hasn’t yet forced them to open up the process We know very little about the political views to broader participation within the Communist of this new generation of leaders. Xi Jinping or Party (as Vietnam has done) or to the society at Li Keqiang may favor some political reform but large. We should plan on dealing with China’s they have hidden it up to now. Compared to communist leaders for some time to come. the previous generation of technocrats, more of As a rising power that wants to reassure the the new generation have been educated in law, world that it has benign intentions and isn’t a management or economics; but their graduate threat, China cares more about its international degrees were obtained in part-time executive reputation than any other country in the world programs and their knowledge may not go very today. Chinese policy makers are very attentive deep. to our views of its international behavior. When we criticize their actions in , they start to change them. But American calls for political Looking Toward the Future reform in China are likely to fall on deaf ears or, Despite the leaders’ collective interest in worse, provoke a popular nationalist backlash. preventing open splits, individual politicians One way of getting leverage on China’s have moments of temptation when an interest stalled political reforms is to press on issues in acquiring more power for oneself might lead such as food and pharmaceutical safety where one to exploit a crisis situation and reach out to our own interests are clear. The Chinese rec- mobilize a following of ordinary citizens or rank ognize our right to demand better systems of and file Party members. Large protests increase regulation and transparency to guarantee the the risk of a split by showing leaders that a fol- quality of what we import from China. China’s lowing is already in place. Social unrest actually hierarchical system has proven inadequate for can create schisms at the top. The danger is monitoring the behavior of local officials and not a matter of the particular personalities in firms without the oversight that real elections the oligarchy at any one time, but is built into and a free press would provide. International the structure of authoritarian politics. Changes demands for improved monitoring of exports in the mass media heighten the risk of the could reinforce domestic demands in China for public being drawn into elite disagreements. improved democratic accountability. Leadership splits telegraphed to the public over the Internet have triggered revolutionary upheavals in other authoritarian regimes. In a 1 This essay will address only the first two. For a fuller society undergoing explosive change, political discussion see Susan L. Shirk, China Fragile Superpower outcomes are unpredictable because the politi- (New York: , 2007). cal game is evolving too. Every day new oppor- 2 The timidity of Chinese political reforms is highlighted tunities and challenges present themselves to by comparison with the recent changes introduced in ambitious politicians in China. Keeping lead- Vietnam, see Eddy Malesky, “Vietnam through Chinese ership competition under wraps is becoming Eyes: Vertical and Horizontal Accountability in Single- increasingly difficult as the media and Internet Party Regimes,” (with Regina Abrami and Yu Zheng). compete for audiences by testing the limits of Presented Conference on Communist Resilience, what they can report. Dartmouth College, May 25-26, 2007.. But for the near term, the important news 3 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 is that China’s oligarchs have figured out a (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1993), p 220.

5 4 Lianjiang Li, “The Politics of Introducing Direct tion. Ethan J. Leib and Baogang He, eds. The Search Township ,” The China Quarterly, No. for Deliberative Democracy in China (New York: Palgrave 171 (September 2002), p 721. Macmillan, 2006).

5 Jiang Zemin, “Hold High the Great Banner of Deng 10 Scott Kennedy, The Business of Lobbying in China Xiaoping Theory for an All-Round Advancement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). of the Cause of Building with Chinese 11 This section draws on material in the author’s book, Characteristics into the ,” Beijing Review, China Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Vol. 40, No, 40 (October 6-12, 1997). Press, 2007), pp 35-78. 6 Lianjiang Li predicts a possible future clash between local legislatures who have the formal authority to 12 Local Party committees will start taking votes on major select township leaders and the CCP organization issues and appointments; the Politburo will report bureaus that actually make the selection decisions. regularly to the Central Committee and local standing One way to resolve such a conflict would be to intro- committees will do the same to local Party committees; duce direct township elections. Lianjiang Li, p 721. local Party congresses will meet more often instead of just to select Party committees. The tension between 7 Tony Saich and Xuedong Yang, “Innovation in China’s top-down control and bottom-up responsiveness within Local Governance: ‘Open Recommendation and the Party was reflected in the proposal that “candidates Selection,’” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Summer for leading positions in primary Party organizations are 2003), pp 805-208. recommended both by Party members and the public 8 Ibid. in an open manner and by the Party organization at the next higher level.” Xinhua, November 1, 2007, http:// 9 Some Chinese officials have enthusiastically embraced www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t377262.htm. the “deliberative democracy” approach developed by American political scientist James Fishkin which 13 Joseph Fewsmith, “The 17th Party Congress: Informal involves communities discussing in town meetings how Politics and Formal Institutions,” China Leadership to spend their budgets instead of electoral representa- Monitor, No. 23 (2007), p 7.

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