COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 149

In Memoriam: Deng Xiaoping and the Cold War

In the final analysis, three main courts will pass judgement on the actions of our Parties. First of all, the masses, secondly, the communist parties, which in the course of their practical existence must figure out what is going on, and in the third instance, time and history, which makes the final conclusions.

General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in conversation with Soviet Ambassador S.V. Chervonenko (12 September 1960)1

By David Wolff

eng may have had something more philosophical leadership had moved to seaside Beidaihe to escape the in mind, but, his ultimate arbiter, history, is the Beijing summer heat. Therefore, Vietnamese leader, Ho D daily output of the historians. This section of the Chi Minh, joined them there and met with Mao on August Bulletin aims to provide enough archival material for 10. In referring to the Soviet Union, Mao was livid. historians of Chinese, Russian, and Communist history to begin a debate on the role of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) Khrushchev can cooperate with America, England and in Sino-Soviet relations during the years 1956-1963, a France. He can cooperate with India and Indonesia. period that witnessed both the final years of cooperation He can even cooperate with Yugoslavia, but only with between the two communist powers and the emergence of China is it impossible on the grounds that we have tensions that finally split the alliance. Although the late divergent opinions. Does that mean that his views are paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China is best identical with America, England, France and India to remembered for the tremendous, though uneven, reforms allow whole-hearted cooperation? [He] withdraws that he introduced and oversaw during the last twenty the experts from China and doesn’t transfer technol- years of his life, his earlier achievements should not be ogy, while sending experts to India and giving neglected. technology. So what if China doesn’t have experts? Within weeks of the conversation from which the Will people die, I don’t believe it. epigraph is drawn, Deng arrived in Moscow for ideologi- cal jousting at the highest levels with Mikhail Suslov, the Ho’s reaction was: “That’s a pretty strong statement.”4 Kremlin’s “gray cardinal.” And Deng always gave as In sharp contrast to this explosion, four days earlier on good as he got. Of course, by 1963, when again Deng and August 4, Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, had met Suslov headed the delegations, the level of vituperation with Ambassador Chervonenko and insisted that “speaking had risen sharply. When Deng returned from this last as one Communist to another,” a full break between the encounter, the whole CCP Politburo, headed by Mao, parties was not a possibility.5 But what does this diver- Zhou, and, Lin Biao turned out at the airport to applaud gence of messages reveal? It is possible that in light of the 2 him, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng. Vlad Zubok, in an disastrous famine that accompanied the “Great Leap insightful and provocative introductory essay, speculates Forward” and would claim upward of 15 million Chinese that the services Deng rendered Mao in his battle with the lives in 1959-61, Mao had ordered his subordinates to Soviet “older brother” may have saved his life when the show restraint and moderation in the hope of continuing Cultural Revolution swept others away. Chen Jian’s aid from the Soviets. After all, where else would it come “Rejoinder” only strengthens this impression, while from? On the other hand, it is also possible that the providing a fuller Chinese politics context. Both the 1960 Chinese leadership, influenced by the same perception of and 1963 talks, together with six memoranda of conversa- China’s dire straits, collectively opted for a moderate tions between Deng and Soviet representatives, are policy, despite Mao’s rancor and radicalism. If this is excerpted in this Bulletin. Additional materials can be indeed the case, we will find Deng among the moderates, found at the CWIHP website: cwihp.si.edu. placating the Soviets right up into 1962, if not further. But The fall of 1960 was a special time in other respects, only additional documentation, especially from the for the USSR had just withdrawn its experts from the PRC, Chinese side, can answer these critical questions. 3 occasioning bewilderment, hardship and ill-will. Al- The search for a current of moderation in a period though the Soviet Union was well enough informed about usually identified with deepening estrangement in Sino- affairs in China to sense the variety of reactions, newly Soviet relations is exactly the kind of refinement that released materials are only now making clear the depth of document-based studies of the Cold War can offer. An division. Only a few weeks after the withdrawal, the CCP October 1997 gathering on “Sino-Soviet Relations and the 150 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

Cold War” (see conference schedule below) of Russian, dokumentatsii) [Central Repository for Contemporary Documen- Chinese, West European and American scholars in Beijing tation], f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 255. 2 focused on new documentation, both Russian and Chinese, Kang Sheng’s diatribe against the Soviet treatment of Stalin is that made it possible to identify smaller positive eddies probably the most powerful piece of oratory in this Bulletin. 3 On the withdrawal of the Soviet experts, see Chen Jian, “A and swirls amidst the generally accepted trends of Sino- Crucial Step toward the Sino-Soviet Schism” in CWIHP Bulletin, Soviet divergence. Similarly, the January 1996 CWIHP 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 246ff. conference in Hong Kong examined documents from the 4 See Yang Kuisong “Toward the Breakdown, 1960-3,” p.5 early 1950s, the heyday of Sino-Soviet friendship, and (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference “Sino-Soviet found grounds for incipient strife.6 Relations and the Cold War” (Beijing, 1997)). Document-based studies can also help us to draw a 5 See Odd Arne Westad, “Who Killed the Alliance?” pp. 7-8. detailed and more human portrait of a giant of the twenti- (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War” (Beijing, 1997). eth century. What is certain is that the history of the Cold 6 War will not be complete without an archive-based More on this can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 and 8-9, where the Russian version of a message from Mao to Stalin (2 biography of Deng Xiaoping. CWIHP, together with all October 1950) suggests great tensions in the earliest phases of the scholars of the Cold War and China, looks forward to the Korean War, a supposed highpoint of socialist internationalism. speedy release and publication of Deng-related materials The previously accepted Chinese version, claiming identity of by the appropriate PRC “units” with actual archival access, views on the sending of “volunteers” to Korea, now appears to especially the Central Archives with their holdings of CCP have been a draft telegram never sent. Only declassification of documents. CWIHP is continuing its collection of materi- the document and examination of its archival context can clarify als from which to piece together the lifework of Deng this contradiction further. Xiaoping and hopes that readers with such documents will forward copies to the Project. 1 TsKhSD (Tsentral’noe khranilishche sovremennoi

Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War An International Symposium Sponsored by The Cold War International History Project, The Wilson Center; Institute of Contemporary China, CASS; Center for Oriental History Research, Chinese Association of Historians; Fairbank Center, Harvard University 22-25 October 1997, Beijing

Wednesday, October 22, 1997 Brief Introduction of Conference Organization SHEN ZHIHUA (Director, Center for Oriental History Research) DAVID WOLFF (Director, The Cold War International History Project)

Reflections on Sino-Soviet Relations Speakers: LI LIAN, ANATOLII HAZONOV, WARREN COHEN, YAN MINGFU, WU LENGXI, HUANG HUA, ZHU RUIZHEN

The Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance DIETER HEINZIG (Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, Germany) The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty Negotiations: A Reappraisal in Light of New Sources SHEN ZHIHUA (Center for Oriental History Research) The Signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1950 and Soviet Strategic Aims in the Far East XUE XIANTIAN (Modern History Institute, CASS) Soviet Strategy toward Xinjiang during the Postwar Period LEONID NEZHINSKII (Russian History Institute, Russian Academy of Science) The Changing Theoretical Foundation of Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War Discussants: LIU GUOXIN (Institute of Contemporary China);

VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC)

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Thursday, October 23, 1997 Sino-Soviet Economic Relations WILLIAM KIRBY (Harvard University) China, the Soviet Union, and East Europe: Trade Relations COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 151

ZHANG SHUGUANG (University of Maryland) Western Economic Embargo against China and Sino-Soviet Relations LEONID SHIROKORAD (St. Petersburg State University) The Cold War and Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s Discussants:LEV DELYUSIN (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science); ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History)

International Conflict and Sino-Soviet Relations KATHRYN WEATHERSBY (Independent Scholar, Washington, DC) Sino-Soviet Relations and the Korean War LI DANHUI (Institute of Contemporary China) Sino-Soviet Relations and China’s ‘Assist Vietnam and Resist America’ HOPE HARRISON (Lafayette College) China and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962 CHEN DONGLIN (Institute of Contemporary China) China’s Responses to the Soviet Union’s Military Interventions in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia: A Comparative Study Discussants: CHEN JIAN (Southern Illinois University)

BORIS KULIK (Far Eastern Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Science)

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Friday, October 24, 1997 Changing Relations Between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s MIKHAIL PROZUMENSCHIKOV (Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents, Moscow) The Year 1960 as Viewed by Soviet and Chinese Leaders NIU JUN (American Studies Institute, CASS) Changing Chinese Policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cultural Revolution ANATOLII HAZONOV (Oriental Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Science) Soviet Policy toward China during the Khrushchev Period LEV DELYUSIN (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science) Reflections on the Beginning of the Sino-Soviet Conflict Discussants: LI JINGJIE (Institute of East European and Central Asian Studies, CASS) ODD ARNE WESTAD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute)

Chinese and Soviet Leaders and Sino-Soviet Relations ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History) Mao Zedong and Sino-Soviet Relations VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC) Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split WILLIAM TAUBMAN (Amherst College) Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations

Discussants: HOPE HARRISON (Lafayette College); YANG KUISONG (Institute of Modern History, CASS) ○ ○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○

Saturday, October 25, 1997 Sino-Soviet Split and the Cold War LI JIE (CCP Central Institute of Documents) The Origins, Process and Consequences of the Sino-Soviet Polemic Debate ODD ARNE WESTAD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute) Who Killed the Alliance? An Account of Politics, Hunger, and Refugees YANG KUISONG (Modern History Institute, CASS) The Path toward the Split: How the CCP Leadership Dealt with the Crisis in Sino-Soviet Relations, 1961-63 BORIS KULIK (Far Eastern Institute, Russian Academy of Science) The Sino-Soviet Split in the Environment of the Cold War Discussants: LI HAIWEN (CCP Central Institute of Documents); DAVID WOLFF (Cold War International History Project) 152 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

“Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!” Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1963 by Vladislav M. Zubok n November 1957, on the 40th anniversary of the performed his job of ideological “terrier” well: he chal- October Revolution in Russia, a high-level Chinese lenged the Soviets, teased them, and knocked them off I delegation arrived in Moscow to take part in a major balance with a dazzling array of arguments. Besides conference of communist parties that was convoked by ideological recriminations about who better interpreted Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev to grant a new interna- Marxism-Leninism, Deng skillfully found “soft” spots in tional legitimacy to his leadership, which had already the Soviet armor, episodes of post-Stalin foreign policy weathered years of domestic power struggle following and events inside the communist camp that deeply Stalin’s death. In Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s entourage disturbed and even inwardly split Moscow echelons of were CC CCP [Central Committee of the Chinese Commu- power. nist Party] general secretary Deng Xiaoping; director of In this article I will trace Deng’s role as Mao’s agent the CC Central Administrative Office, Yang Shangkun; in struggling for China’s equal place and then for ideologi- Mao’s political secretary Hu Qiaomu; Defense Minister cal supremacy in the communist camp. I will also and Vice-Premier of the State Council Peng Dehuai; compare the emerging evidence on the main events in interpreter Li Yueran, and physician Dr. Li Zhisui. To the Sino-Soviet relations in 1956-63 and the way Deng West the Communist reunion in Moscow looked like an interpreted them in his polemics with the Soviets in July ominous triumph of enemy forces, bent on expansion and 1963. I will also reflect on the place of this episode in untroubled by inner rifts. In reality, the rivalry between Deng’s political biography. the Soviet and Chinese leadership was already in progress. The prelude to the story is Deng’s two visits to American journalist Harrison Salisbury, who inter- Moscow in 1956. The first visit was in February 1956, viewed Chinese veterans about this episode, writes that it when Deng Xiaoping and Zhu De attended the 20th CPSU was the first time Deng handled such a role and he “proved congress at which Khrushchev denounced I. V. Stalin in a tireless in fighting for Mao’s position.” Deng Xiaoping “secret speech” and declared that two systems, capitalist was the Chinese representative on the ten-nation commit- and socialist, could coexist and a world war was no longer tee that drafted the conference’s final manifesto. “China inevitable.4 In his memoirs, Shi Zhe, an interpreter to the swept the day,” Salisbury’s Chinese sources told him. Chinese delegation at the congress, recalls that the Chinese “Mao Zedong was never to forget this. It caused him to were not invited to the closed session where Khrushchev brag about his ‘little guy’ to Khrushchev—the man who ... made his famous speech, but the Soviet leader provided bested Mikhail Suslov, the tall Soviet ideologue.”1 them with a copy of its transcript on the next day. Future biographers of Deng Xiaoping will have to pay The Chinese delegation discussed the speech and was more attention to his prominent role in the drama of the not quite sure how to react. It was Deng Xiaoping who Sino-Soviet split.2 New evidence from Eastern-bloc emphasized that Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin was not an archives reveals that Deng earned many of his stripes in “internal matter” of the CPSU, but had “an international the ideological struggle for preeminence between Mao impact,” and therefore it warranted extreme caution. He Zedong and Moscow. Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi then refrained from further comments on the speech until alternated as ideological spokesmen in the relationship the delegation returned to Beijing to report to Mao with Soviet leaders. The performance in November 1957 Zedong. In the following months dramatic international was one of Deng’s first exploits in the Sino-Soviet events demonstrated the correctness of Deng’s first ideological competition. His last was his face-off with the reaction.5 Through luck and political acumen, Deng Soviets as the head of a Chinese delegation at the Sino- Xiaoping began his perilous walk across the egg-shells of Soviet consultations on 5-20 July 1963.3 After that, the de-Stalinization. tenuous dialogue between the two communist powers The second visit was in October 1956, when Deng degenerated into polemical brawl. Between these two Xiaoping together with Liu Shaoqi participated in Sino- dates were several significant episodes, including Deng’s Soviet consultations on the revolutions in Poland and participation in the Beijing “summit” between Mao Hungary. It was a key turning point in the history of Sino- Zedong and Khrushchev in July-August 1958, and his Soviet relations after Stalin’s death, because for the first participation in the Conference of the communist and time the Chinese leadership was able to play the role of workers’ parties in Moscow in November 1960. mediator between the Big Brother and its clients in Eastern As Mao Zedong passed from cautious partnership Europe. For my knowledge of this episode and Deng’s with the Kremlin to greater assertiveness, tension, and role in it, I am greatly indebted to Canadian historian Leo open rivalry, Deng’s political star continued to rise. He Gluchowski, and particularly to American-Chinese COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 153 historians Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian.6 On October 29-30, according to the Malin notes and The notes of the head of the CC CPSU General Shi Zhe, the Chinese pushed the Russians to accept the Department Vladimir Malin on the discussions in the five principles of Pancha Shila, namely equality and Kremlin reveal that Soviet leaders, even after they returned mutual noninterference between states (as postulated by from Poland and the face-off between Khrushchev and Indian Premier J. Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai), Gomulka, contemplated military pressure and insisted that as a new basis for relations between the USSR and its Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, - the Soviet citizen allies. After reporting on the situation in Hungary, installed by Moscow after World War Two as Polish Khrushchev informed the Presidium about his (and Defense Minister whose ouster the Polish communists had Molotov’s) talks with “the Chinese comrades” and told demanded - should remain the head of the Polish army. them: “We should adopt a declaration today on the Also the CC Presidium discussed inviting to Moscow withdrawal of troops from the countries of people’s “representatives from the Communist parties of Czecho- democracy” if they demand it, and “the entire CPC CC slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the GDR, and Bulgaria.”7 Politburo supports this position.”12 After the declaration However, the Polish leadership managed to appeal to the was drafted, the Chinese delegation, according to Shi Zhe, Chinese behind the Soviets back with a plea to intercede joined the session and approved of its text and publication. and prevent a possible Soviet military intervention. Later, The Chinese sources indicate that the Chinese after the fact, Mao Zedong asserted that “the CCP cat- changed their position from nonintervention to interven- egorically rejected the Soviet proposal [for intervention] tionist right at the moment when the Soviets agreed with and attempted to put forward the Chinese position directly their previous stand. As Chen Jian reconstructs these by immediately sending a delegation to Moscow with Liu events on the basis of Chinese memoirs, “on the evening Shaoqi at its head.” Mao blamed the crisis in Poland on of October 30, after receiving a report from Liu and Deng the tendency toward “great power chauvinism” in Moscow Xiaoping from Moscow that the Soviet leaders were that repeated the worst patterns of Stalin’s behavior from planning to withdraw their troops from Hungary, Mao many, including himself, had suffered so much in the past. Zedong chaired a meeting of top CCP leaders, which made The Chinese leaders told the Polish ambassador in Beijing the decision to oppose Moscow’s abandoning of Hungary on October 27 that “between 19-23 October a CCP to the reactionary forces.”13 The reversal of the Chinese delegation...in Moscow convinced Khrushchev about the position on Hungary most likely happened very late on correctness of the political changes in Poland” and warned October 30. Shi Zhe’s memoirs and the Malin notes him that the use of military force would represent a return suggest that there was an urgent night session of the to the same Stalinist methods that Khrushchev had Presidium with the Chinese. At first Pavel Iudin, the repudiated.8 Soviet ambassador to Beijing, informed the Presidium There is still ambiguity regarding the exact timetable members about “negotiating with the Chinese comrades,” and details of Sino-Soviet consultations on the Polish, and then “Com. Liu Shaoqi indicate[ed] on behalf of the CPC particularly on the Hungarian crises. It is not clear why CC that [Soviet] troops must remain in Hungary and in the Polish ambassador was misled about the dates of the Budapest.”14 Shi Zhe’s dramatic description of this event Chinese delegation’s stay in Moscow; actually it arrived has Deng Xiaoping making three proposals to the Soviets: on October 23, shortly after noon and stayed there until the the Soviet army should not withdraw from Hungary, late evening of October 31. Deng Xiaoping was still everything should be done to help the loyal Hungarian number two there after Liu Shaoqi who was considered a communists to resume political control and, together with key ideologue and theoretician of communist bloc affairs. the Soviet military, restore order. Deng stressed that the The rest of the delegation included lower-ranking officials Soviet troops had a chance “to play a model role, demon- Wang Jiaxiang and Hu Qiaomu, as well as interpreter Shi strating true proletarian internationalism.”15 Zhe (Karskii). Khrushchev met the delegation at Vnukovo Later Mao Zedong (and the Chinese leadership along airport outside Moscow and already in the car began to with him) and Khrushchev greatly diverged in the recon- talk with them about the Polish situation.9 The Malin struction of these events. Khrushchev in his memoirs did notes mention only Liu by name, but according to Shi Zhe not make a single mention of the Chinese factor when he also Deng Xiaoping and other members of the Chinese described the Polish events, and when he came to the delegation were invited to several sessions of the CC Hungarian events he insisted that the intervention in Presidium on 24, 26, the evening of 30 and the night of 30- Hungary was his own decision, taken in a sleepless night 31 October.10 On October 29 a crucial round of consulta- after serious brooding. After that, he claims, he convened tions took place between the Chinese and Khrushchev, an emergency session of the CC Presidium, announced his Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin at Stalin’s former dacha new decision and made all present go to Vnukovo airport (Lipki) near Moscow. It was there first, Khrushchev to inform the Chinese delegation about the Soviet decision recalled in his memoirs, that “we agreed upon a common to intervene.16 opinion not to use our force” in Hungary.11 Liu and Deng The differences between the Chinese and Soviet maintained regular radio-communications with Mao versions of that momentous discussion were not fortuitous. Zedong in Beijing. They, as well as zigzags in both sides’ positions on 154 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

Hungary, could be explained and understood only if we asked Deng Xiaoping. “The leadership of the CPSU at look at them from within the world in which the partici- one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of pants themselves lived and thought. In this world each fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your side maneuvered with a careful eye on three factors — one position on the matter. Such a position was practically was the legacy of Stalin, the embodiment of power and tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these unity of the communist camp; another was the power two events are well known to you and us. I do not want to struggle inside Moscow and Beijing; the third was the dwell on them too much.”18 emerging struggle between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev Yet, as an experienced orator, Deng returned to this for seniority and revolutionary legitimacy within the subject again and again, reminding the Soviets of other communist world. Mao Zedong had been outraged when “details:” “On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth Khrushchev in February had denounced Stalin without discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet consulting the Chinese leadership. Mao realized, to his Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in extreme displeasure, that this funny, bald-headed Soviet Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in leader had just undercut his, Mao’s, intention to turn Stalin Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some into a pedestal for his seniority in the world communist mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of movement — while building his own legitimacy as a mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal paragon of de-Stalinization. From 1956, Mao began to countries, and, on the other, was connected with mistakes regard himself as the potential leader of the communist committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism camp and Khrushchev as a time-server and political of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the liability. Evidently Deng Xiaoping was one of those who aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership avidly shared this new perception in Beijing. of the CPSU: the lack of an all-round analysis, the lack of In July 1963 Deng Xiaoping challenged the Soviets on self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the frater- what had happened on those fateful days. Deng Xiaoping nal countries.” said that “after the 20th congress of the CPSU, as a “It should be further noted that when the events in consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi as head of the delegation personality and the wholesale renunciation of Stalin, a of the Communist Party of China arrived in Moscow for wave of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaigns was negotiations [on 23 October 1956—VZ] during which he provoked around the whole world...The most prominent also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized com- events which took place in this period were the events in rades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes Poland and Hungary.” Deng Xiaoping was careful to during the events in Poland—mistakes of great-power indicate that the Chinese leadership had never concealed chauvinism.”19 this position from the Soviets. In fact, on 23 October 1956 On the opposite side of the table were CC CPSU when the Hungarian revolution started, Mao Zedong had Secretary Mikhail Suslov and Iurii Andropov, immediate told Soviet ambassador Pavel Iudin that the Soviets “had participants in the Hungarian events. But only Suslov had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had taken part in the CC Presidium discussions in October thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it 1956, and even he was not present at the crucial session on in order to kill us with it.” Khrushchev’s method of October 30-31. Therefore the Soviet delegation had no criticizing Stalin, Mao had implied, was “the same as if response other than to give a general rebuff and avoid a having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one’s slippery debate on details. own feet.”17 “We do not plan to examine these issues anew,” Continuing his commentary on the events of 1956, Suslov said. “We will simply note the complete lack of Deng added, “We have always considered and still foundation for your assertions to the effect that the consider that in resolving the issues connected with the decisions of the 20th congress led to the counterrevolu- events in Poland, the Communist Party of the Soviet tionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those Union took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to events, as is shown by the materials of the fraternal parties, exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them as well as the errors of the fraternal parties, is the errors of by means of coercion and even trying to resort to the use the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin’s of military force.” actions...” Deng Xiaoping then glossed over the major zigzag “You are now trying to accumulate capital by specu- that occurred in Beijing vis-à-vis the Hungarian events and lating on these events and by proving that the Soviet went right to the conclusion that underlined Mao’s Union allegedly committed errors and that by your decision on October 31 to insist on intervention: that the interference you almost managed to save the situation. Hungarian events were fundamentally different from the This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at the Polish ones since it was an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet feet of the CPSU and a more than bizarre arrogance on the counterrevolution and not merely a protest against great- part of the Chinese leaders. Did our country not pay with power chauvinism. “And what position did the CPSU take thousands of its sons’ lives in order to preserve the in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary?” socialist order in fraternal Hungary? Did it not come to COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 155 the aid of the friendly Hungarian people in its difficult meant Khrushchev, Mikoian, and Bulganin in the first hour? Why then have you found it necessary again to place) “explicitly demonstrate weakness in considering rehash the past and return to the events in Hungary and and discussing strategic and long-term issues.” The report Poland?”20 went to describe examples of Soviet “swashbuckling,” But in fact in this particular game Deng Xiaoping held internal disagreements and equivocation. Of particular a good hand of cards and Suslov knew it. After the interest was a comment apparently saved for Khrushchev: October 1956 events the influence of the CCP on the “extremely conceited, blinded by lust for gain, lacking far- political moods and the power struggle in the Kremlin was sightedness, and knowing little the ways of the world, at its peak. This influence had no precedent under Stalin some of their [Soviet—VZ] leaders have hardly improved and it declined later, when Khrushchev ousted his rivals themselves even with the several rebuffs they have met in and moved to the position of unchallenged leader of the the past year...They appear to lack confidence and suffer party and state. This phenomenon, as well as the impor- from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of tance of the Chinese pressure on the Soviets during the bluffing or threats in handling foreign affairs or relations Polish-Hungarian “October,” has not been understood by with other brotherly parties.” On the positive side, Western observers and scholars; nor was it admitted then however, Zhou’s report noted with obvious satisfaction and later by the Soviets themselves. Yet, like the events in that “now the Soviet Union and China can sit down to Hungary and Poland, the changing equation between discuss issues equally. Even if they have different ideas on Moscow and Beijing was a direct result of Khrushchev’s certain issues, they must consult with us.”22 cavalier de-Stalinization and the turmoil it caused in the Soon after Khrushchev emerged victorious from the communist movement and the ranks of the Soviet leader- power struggle, Mao’s exasperation with him began to ship itself. Internationally, Khrushchev’s revelations had show. Mao’s agreement to participate in the Moscow shattered the traditional hierarchy of the communist world, international conference of communist parties in Novem- with Moscow at the top. Internally, the Soviets weakened ber 1957 was just a lull in the growing tension. Soon themselves with internal strife and were eager to cater to Mao’s wrath was triggered by two Soviet proposals: to the Chinese in order to preserve “the unity of the socialist establish along the Chinese coast a set of long-wave radio camp.” Khrushchev, who a year earlier had attacked stations to guide Soviet submarines in the Pacific Ocean, Stalin’s and Molotov’s role in antagonizing Tito’s Yugosla- and to build a joint Sino-Soviet nuclear-powered subma- via (See Plenums section of this Bulletin), was determined rine fleet. Mao Zedong interpreted the first proposal as a to avoid the same mistakes with Communist China, Soviet attempt to gain new military bases in China and the whatever Mao said about Stalin. And Molotov and other second as a rejection of an earlier Chinese request for opponents of de-Stalinization in the Soviet leadership Soviet technology, in order to enable the PRC to build its looked at the Chinese as their potential allies against own nuclear submarines. Khrushchev. On 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong vented this rage at A majority of the Presidium secretly agreed with Soviet ambassador Pavel Iudin regarding the ostensible Chinese assessments of the situation and Khrushchev felt resumption of unequal treatment of China by the Soviet the danger of a united front between Beijing and what leadership. The transcript of this meeting, translated by would become in June 1957 “the anti-party group” of Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, highlights what hap- Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, as well as pened beneath the surface of the Sino-Soviet friendship Pervukhin, Voroshilov, and Dmitrii Shepilov. During around November 1957 and sheds new light on the role of Zhou Enlai’s visit to Moscow in January 1957 the CC Deng Xiaoping as Mao’s right-hand man. As Mao told CPSU Presidium de facto reversed the policy of de- Iudin, in Moscow in November he had “often pointed out Stalinization and Khrushchev had to name Stalin publicly [to the Soviet leaders], there had existed no such thing as “a great Marxist-Leninist.” This was Khrushchev’s forced brotherly relations among all the parties because, [your tactical concessions to the growing opposition, and as leaders] merely paid lip service and never meant it; as a Molotov sardonically observed in June 1957: “Of course, result, the relations between [the brotherly] parties can be when com. Zhou Enlai came, we began to lean over described as between father and son or between cats and backward [raspisivatsia] that Stalin is such a communist mice. I have raised this issue in my private meetings with that one wishes everyone would be like him. But when Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades....Present were Zhou Enlai left, we stopped doing it.”21 Bulganin, Mikoian, and Suslov...From the Chinese side, I In fact, the Chinese leadership preferred to abstain and Deng Xiaoping were present.” [my italics—VZ]. from the power struggle in the Kremlin, perhaps because “While in Moscow,” Mao Zedong continued, he Mao underestimated Khrushchev’s chances for political assigned “Deng Xiaoping to raise five [controversial] survival and triumph. At the same time they began to see issues. We won’t openly talk about them even in the the CCP and themselves as the central and more senior and future, because our doing so would hurt Comrade experienced “unit” in the world communist movement. Khrushchev’s [political position]. In order to help After his visit to Moscow, Zhou Enlai reported to the CC consolidate his [Khrushchev’s] leadership, we decided not Politburo and Mao Zedong that the Soviet leaders (and he to talk about these [controversies], although it does not 156 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 mean that the justice is not on our side.”23 reported that, according to Deng Xiaoping, “comrade When Khrushchev secretly flew to Beijing on 31 July Khrushchev’s report [at the Supreme Soviet, when he 1958 and tried to resolve tension during long talks with revealed that the Soviets had Francis Gary Powers in Mao Zedong around a swimming pool at his house (and captivity] made a huge impression,” and “important new even in the pool), Deng Xiaoping was at Mao’s side. measures in the area of internal policy had once again According to Salisbury’s sources, “Mao heard Khrushchev displayed the Soviet Union’s strength to the whole world.” out, then turned Deng Xiaoping loose. Deng flew at the Historians would be interested to know that Chervonenko, Soviet leader like a terrier. He accused the Russians of on Khrushchev’s instructions, informed Deng Xiaoping ‘Great Nation’ and ‘Great Party’ chauvinism.” Deng told “about the position of the Soviet Union in connection with Khrushchev that China had no objection to long-distance the summit conference.” Deng noted that Khrushchev wireless communications for the Soviet fleet, but they “acted completely correctly by going to Paris; he should must be Chinese-built, Chinese-operated, and Chinese- have gone.” He also said that the Soviet leader “fully controlled. He criticized the conduct of Soviet advisers in uncovered the true face of Eisenhower and the imperial- China.24 Chinese recollections (and apparently Deng’s ists.” monologue) repeated almost word by word Mao’s ha- What came next from Deng Xiaoping, however, could rangue to Iudin. But Deng could be even more blunt than not have pleased the Soviets. In a disingenuous twist of Mao Zedong and he did it with relish. topic, he compared Khrushchev’s denunciation of Later, during the July 1963 consultations with the Eisenhower with Zhou Enlai’s denunciation of the Indian Soviets, he told them that in April-July 1958 the CPSU had Prime Minster Nehru during Zhou’s trip to India. sought “to put China under its military control. But we “Nehru’s true face was uncovered,” said Deng Xiaoping, guessed through your intentions, and you failed to achieve knowing perfectly well that he was talking about one of this aim.” He then teased the Soviets further, claiming that Khrushchev’s great friends and allies in the third world. Khrushchev’s decision to send Soviet missiles to Cuba was The Sino-Indian border conflict would drag on, Deng dictated by the same imperialist logic. “...In shipping continued, because Nehru uses it to receive American missiles to Cuba, did you want to help her or to ruin her? economic assistance. “Many political figures in the We have become suspicious that you, in shipping missiles countries of Asia—Nasser [Egypt], Kasem [Iraq], Sukarno to Cuba, were trying to place her under your control.”25 [Indonesia], U Nu [Burma]—are taking the same positions The barbs hit their target, hurting Soviet pride. Suslov as Nehru. Nehru stands out among them; he is the apparently had to dip into Soviet archives to quote from cleverest. He did not waste the time he spent studying in the transcript of the Khrushchev-Mao conversation, in England; the English are more experienced than the order to respond to Deng’s allegations. “Com. Deng Americans in political tricks.” “The struggle with bour- Xiaoping,” he said on 10 July, “after all you were present geois figures of this sort is one of the most important at the discussion between Com. Khrushchev and Com. problems facing the international communist movement.” Mao Zedong on 31 July 1958 and took part in it. Have Chervonenko, however, preferred to conclude his you really forgotten the following statement made by memo to Moscow on a brighter note. He cited Deng as Com. Khrushchev in the course of the conversation: saying that “the issue of developing a movement in “Never have we at the CC of the CPSU ever had the support of Khrushchev’s statement [at the Supreme Soviet] thought of jointly building a fleet...We considered it was being examined in the CC CCP” “Deng Xiaoping necessary to talk about the issue of building a fleet, but we asked me to convey a warm greeting to comrade N.S. neither thought about or considered it necessary to Khrushchev and to all of the members of the Presidium of construct a joint factory or a joint fleet.” According to the CC CPSU on behalf of comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Suslov, Mao responded to these words: “If it is so, then all Shaoqi, and all of the leaders of the CC CPSU. The the dark clouds have dispersed.”26 Americans are closing ranks against us, he said, but their Documentary evidence is still lacking on Deng’s role closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and the in the Sino-Soviet disputes and meetings of 1959, particu- solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp is invio- larly during the famous confrontation between Khrushchev lable, since it is founded on a unity of ideas and goals.”27 and the Chinese leadership in Beijing in October 1959. People in the Kremlin and the Soviet embassy in Beijing The traces of Deng Xiaoping become once again visible in apparently treated this as an encouraging signal. The the first months of 1960, when he met with Soviet Ambas- Embassy’s Political Letter in July 1960 specifically sador Stepan Chervonenko. Clearly, Sino-Soviet tension referred to this conversation and mentioned there were was on both their minds. Chervonenko, the relatively new “grounds to expect” Sino-Soviet rapprochement on the Soviet man in China, did his best to tell Khrushchev and basis of a common anti-American line.28 the rest of the Politburo what they were eager to hear. It did not take long for the Soviets to see their hopes When Khrushchev denounced Eisenhower and the CIA in dashed to pieces. In early June 1960, at a meeting of the Moscow and derailed the May 1960 summit in Paris after World Federation of Trade Unions in Beijing, Deng the infamous U-2 incident, his image in the Chinese Xiaoping turned his “bad side” to them. The most recent leadership dramatically improved. The Soviet ambassador evidence on this and subsequent events in Sino-Soviet COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 157 relations comes from transcripts of CPSU plenums. delegation in Moscow that the Chinese were planning to Reporting to the plenum on 13 July 1960, Khrushchev’s give substantial means for restoration of the tomb of party deputy Frol Kozlov reported that on 5 June the Ghengis Khan and that this smacks of “yellow peril.”33 Politburo of the CC CCP “ had invited around 40 commu- For his attack on Khrushchev, Deng singled out the nists—leaders of foreign trade unions, to dinner, followed Soviet Chairman’s failed attempt to reach accommodation by a conference” of trade unionists. Liu Shaoqi opened with President Eisenhower and Khrushchev’s refusal to this conference, and then “com. Deng Xiaoping took the support China in its conflict with India in the second half floor, and his speech contained a number of absolutely of 1959-early 1960. “Why did comrade Khrushchev speak false positions, which contained an obvious distortion of with such high expectations about Eisenhower?” “We the line of the CPSU.” Deng, according to Kozlov’s story, would like to ask you with whom would you line up in the declared that the CPSU and other fraternal parties had moment of trouble? With Eisenhower, with Nehru, or with “tossed overboard the main points of the Declaration” of the fraternal socialist country, with China?”34 Then, to the communist conference of November 1957.29 Perhaps maximize the power of his attack Deng rolled out a this pushed Khrushchev over the edge leading to the complete list of complaints: Stalin’s violation of Chinese abrupt removal of Soviet advisors and technical personnel sovereignty in the treaty of 1950, the discussion of radio from China. stations and joint fleet in 1958, etc. He explained to the The trade union conference in Beijing was, as it Soviets that this was necessary to overcome “father-son” turned out, China’s preparation for the clash with the syndrome in the Sino-Soviet relationship. However, the USSR at the congress of “fraternal parties” in Bucharest in Soviets, who had heard it many times before since 1954, late June 1960, where Khrushchev and the leaders of the genuinely wondered why it was necessary to “unearth” all East European countries all participated. With Deng those issues that had been long resolved. The discussion Xiaoping absent from the Bucharest congress, the role of revolved around the same issues without making any ideological hit-men fell to Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Wu progress. Xiuquan, and Liu Xiao. It is not clear what the little Still, the Chinese did not burn their bridges to “terrier” was busy with at that time. Three years later he Khrushchev at that time: the Soviet chairman definitely explained it away with a joke. “I said [then] I was “improved” after the U-2 incident. For that reason Deng fortunate that [instead of me] went com. Peng Zhen. His Xiaoping, while criticizing Khrushchev and his foreign weight is around 80 kilograms, so he endured. If I had policy of the recent past, said words that were honey for gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I would the hearts of the Soviets: that “differences in opinions” not have endured.” Deng Xiaoping referred to the between Beijing and Moscow would be gradually over- atmosphere of heckling in Bucharest that he blamed on the come through the mechanism of periodic consultations Soviets.30 and in the interests of joint struggle against “the common This first open split at a major communist forum led enemy.” Reciprocating, Suslov asked the Chinese “to pass to the first bilateral consultations in Moscow on 17-22 most sincere greetings on behalf of our delegation and the September 1960. Deng Xiaoping headed the delegation Presidium of our CC to the Central Committee of the CC which included Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Yang of China and to comrade Mao Zedong.” He then invited Shangkun, Hu Qiaomu, Liu Zhengqi, Wu Xiuquan and Liu the Chinese delegation to lunch with the Soviet delega- Xiao. The Soviet team included Suslov (head of the tion.35 Once again, Deng was a tactical winner: he put the delegation), Khrushchev’s first deputy Frol Kozlov, Soviets on the defensive by his criticism and still kept Kuusinen, Pospelov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Il’ichev, them at bay by dangling the promise of renewed friend- philosopher Constantinov, Grishin and Ambassador ship. Chervonenko.31 The transcripts of the discussions, found Deng Xiaoping soon came to Moscow again in in the East German archives, reveal tactics and positions of October to take part in the work of a Commission and an both sides.32 Apparently the Soviet delegation’s main Editorial Group, to prepare documents for the congress of goal was to rescue the November conference and, while communist parties in November 1960—the largest ever in conducting ideological polemics with the Chinese, achieve the history of the communist movement. After the first some kind of a fraternal understanding. Deng must have two quiet days, according to Suslov’s report, Deng understood that Khrushchev and the Soviets had a vital criticized a draft declaration of the congress proposed by stake in preventing an open split. Yet he deliberately the Soviet side as “inadequate” and directed against the tested the Soviet mettle. CCP. After that the confrontational atmosphere came In one instance he drew a distinction between back. At that time the Chinese delegation acquired a first Khrushchev, who “stands at the head of Soviet comrades satellite—the Albanian delegation.36 who attack China,” and Kozlov and Suslov, from whom Mao’s terrier leaped forward again amid the work of the Chinese “have not heard [anti-Chinese] speeches.” the great Moscow congress. After Khrushchev’s major That provocative pitch evoked indignant rebuffs from address to the meeting, in the presence of communist both. In another instance, Deng told the Soviet delegation delegates from 67 countries Deng Xiaoping, according to that allegedly Khrushchev had remarked to the Vietnamese Suslov’s account, suddenly began to speak instead of Liu 158 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

Shaoqi who was announced on the list. Suslov remarked The target of the Chinese delegation at the meeting later that Deng “passed up in total silence the speech of was Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization. Kang Sheng com. Khrushchev.”37 This figure of silence was probably delivered a most unrestrained speech. “Comrades from the meant to imply how unworthy of attention were the CPSU call Stalin ‘a murderer,’ ‘a criminal,’ ‘a bandit,’ ‘a pronouncements of the Soviet leader who pretended to be gambler,’ ‘a despot like Ivan the Terrible,’ ‘the greatest the head of the world communist movement! Khrushchev dictator in the history of Russia,’ ‘a fool,’ ‘shit,’ ‘an idiot.’ swallowed the bait and had to give a rebuff to Deng All of these curses and swear words came from the mouth Xiaoping in his second, unplanned speech on 23 Novem- of Com. N.S. Khrushchev.” Kang Sheng continued ber. Deng counterattacked on the next day and this sarcastically: “Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at produced a virtual pandemonium at the conference. Each all why the leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce and every leader of an East European country, West hatred for Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most European communist party, and pro-Moscow organization malicious abuse, why it attacks him with more hatred than elsewhere rushed to the podium to voice their full and it reserves for its enemies?” unswerving support of the Soviet leader and to appeal to “Can it really be that the achievements of the national the Chinese not to break the “united” ranks. economy and the development of the newest technology in The Soviet leadership, too, was horrified by a prospect the Soviet Union in several decades have been attained of schism and preferred to offer a compromise to the under the leadership of some sort of ‘fool?’ Can it really be Chinese, particularly on the interpretation of Stalin’s role. that the bases for the development of nuclear weapons and At this point “bad cop” Deng Xiaoping receded in the missile technology in the Soviet Union have been laid shadow, and “good cop” Liu Shaoqi, much respected in down under the leadership of some sort of ‘fool’? ...Can it Moscow, met with Khrushchev on October 30 to reach a really be that the great victory of the Soviet Army during deal.38 All this division of labor on the Chinese side was World War Two was won under the command of some sort probably orchestrated in advance, with the active partici- of ‘idiot?’...Can it really be that the Communist Party of pation of Mao Zedong. But the Soviets pretended they did the Soviet Union which for a long time had the love and not understand it, hoping to paper over the growing chasm respect of the revolutionary people of the whole world had and eager to end the conference on the note of unity. a ‘bandit’ as its great leader for several decades?...Can it The consultations of July 1963 were also the really be that communists of all countries considered some byproduct of these Soviet illusions. Moscow proposed sort of ‘shit’ to be their flagbearer for several decades?” them in a CC CPSU letter of 21 February 1963. Beijing, “Let us take, for example, com. Khrushchev. He on the contrary, geared itself for ideological battle, heaped all of the errors of the period of Stalin’s publicizing its so called “25 points” (Proposal for the leadership...on Stalin alone while he presented himself as General Line of the International Communist Movement) being completely clean. Can this really convince people? on the very eve of the Sino-Soviet consultations.39 The If the memory of men is not too short, they will be able to Chinese “points” of 14 June 1963 fell with a thud on the recall that during Stalin’s leadership com. Khrushchev proceedings of the CC CPSU plenum on ideology and more than once extolled Stalin and his policy of struggling naturally became the focus of discussions there. with counter-revolutionary elements.”42 The discussion in Moscow was a bizarre event, more As we have seen, Deng Xiaoping, by comparison with reminiscent of a scholarly exercise, where each side Kang Sheng, used specific examples from recent interna- presented “a report” replete with citations from Lenin, tional history and history of the crises and tensions inside Trotsky, Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, etc. Essentially it was the communist camp in which he was often a direct just another act in the public show, where teams of speech- participant. He, as a leader of the Chinese delegation, writers, cued by instructions of their chiefs, produced found the weakest spot in Khrushchev’s defenses—his tomes of vituperative, albeit impossibly turgid polemics.40 inability to end the Cold War with the West and the Georgii Arbatov, then a scholar at IMEMO in Moscow and zigzags of his foreign policy. First, Deng Xiaoping “consultant” for the CC International Department, became implied that Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the an assistant to the Soviet delegation at the Sino-Soviet 20th Congress of the CPSU was the result of his political talks. He recalls in his memoirs that “they consisted of egotism which produced a severe crisis in the communist endless unilateral declarations intended, first, to rip the movement and alliance. other side to shreds and, second, to defend one’s own case “After the 20th congress of the CPSU, as a conse- and Marxist orthodoxy.” Each day of discussion was quence of the so-called struggle against the cult of followed by “a day off.” “As we understood it,” writes personality and the full, wholesale denial of Stalin, an anti- Arbatov, “the Chinese would then go to their embassy and Soviet and anti-Communist campaign was provoked send the text of our statement by coded telegram (probably around the whole world. Taking up a good chance, the with their comments and proposals attached) to Beijing. imperialists, Titoist clique and reactionaries of various They then would wait for the reply. We got the impression countries unleashed an offensive against the Soviet Union, that this was in the form of a final text of their statement in socialist camp and communist parties of different countries reply to ours.”41 and created grave difficulties for many parties.” “On 23 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 159

October 1956...com. Mao Zedong said that you had 15, Kennedy instructed his negotiator Averell Harriman “to completely renounced such a sword as Stalin and had elicit K’s view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese thrown this sword away. As a result, enemies had seized it nuclear development and his willingness either to take in order to kill us with it. That is the same as if, having Soviet action or to accept U.S. action aimed in this picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one’s own direction.”47 Harriman and other U.S. representatives feet.”43 who met with Khrushchev several times in the period Second, Deng Xiaoping condemned Khrushchev’s between July 15 and 27, noted that “China...is today Soviet diplomacy of detente toward the West as futile and self- overriding preoccupation” and sought to exploit it by destructive and here he rose to the height of his rhetoric: raising the issue of joint preemptive actions against “Frankly speaking, into what chaos you have plunged the China’s nuclear program. However, to the Americans’ beautiful socialist camp! In your relations with fraternal disappointment, “Khrushchev and Gromyko have shown countries of the socialist camp you do not act at all in the no interest and in fact brushed subject off on several interests of the entire socialist camp but you act from the occasions.”48 Knowing the precarious state of Sino- position of great power chauvinism and nationalist Soviet relations, it is easy to imagine how dismayed and egotism.” “When you consider that your affairs go well, fearful the Soviet leader could have been. For instance, in when you believe you grasped some kind of a straw the morning on Monday July 15 Peng Zhen talked about handed to you by Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nehru or some- “serious disagreements” between the CCP and CPSU and body else, then you are beyond yourself from joy and in all appealed to “value unity” between the two countries.49 fury against those fraternal parties and fraternal countries And only in the evening of the same day Harriman probed which do not obey your wand and do not want to be under Khrushchev on the Chinese nuclear threat! If the Chinese your sway, and then you condemn the socialist camp to had only learned about the American entreaties, they total oblivion.” would have had deadly ammunition for their attacks “When you are in trouble, when you suffer setbacks against Khrushchev. He would have been compromised in because of your erroneous policy, then you get enraged the eyes of most of his own colleagues. and vent it on fraternal parties and countries who stick to Deng Xiaoping must have been under strict instruc- principles and the truth, then you make them ‘scapegoats,’ tions not to touch on the Soviet-American test-ban then you even sacrifice the interests of the entire socialist negotiations. Only in a few instances did he let the Soviets camp in order to cater to imperialists and reactionaries and feel how displeased the Chinese were with the rapproche- to find a way out.”44 ment of the two superpowers on the grounds of mutual Some of the Soviet representatives seated on the other regulation of nuclear arms race. “On 25 August 1962,” he side of the table, particularly Suslov, a crypto-Stalinist, had said, “the Soviet government informed China that it was their own grave doubts about Khrushchev’s foreign policy ready to conclude an agreement with the USA on the that coincided with Deng’s observation. Yet, as loyal prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our apparatchiks they expressed outrage at “personal attacks view, you were pursuing an unseemly goal in coming to on com. N.S. Khrushchev.” Mikhail Suslov described such an agreement, namely: to bind China [in its attempts Khrushchev’s great leadership qualities: “By his work and to join the nuclear club—VZ] by the hands and feet struggle, unshakable faith in the cause of the working through an agreement with the USA.” In commenting on class, by flexible revolutionary tactics, com. Khrushchev the Cuban Missile Crisis, Deng Xiaoping said that deals precise blows to the imperialists, cleverly uses Khrushchev “committed two errors: in shipping the contradictions in their camp, reveals to broad masses missiles to Cuba, you indulged in adventurism, and then, methods of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, in showing confusion in the face of nuclear blackmail from for peace, democracy and socialism.”45 It was of course the USA, you capitulated.”50 the same Suslov who directed criticism of the ousted Without seeing cables and instructions from Beijing, it Khrushchev slightly more than a year later, at the October is not possible to say what prompted Deng Xiaoping on 1964 Plenum of the CPSU.46 July 20 to suggest suspension of the consultations. There was “the dog that did not bark” in the course of Researchers have long suggested it was a reaction to the the discussion. The Soviet delegation emphasized the CC CPSU open letter to the Chinese published on July 14. nuclear revolution and the danger of nuclear war as the But it is equally plausible that the start and progress of the core of their rethinking of international relations. More U.S.-Soviet test-ban talks in Moscow made Mao Zedong concretely, the Sino-Soviet meeting took place in the increasingly impatient with the consultations. Immedi- shadows of the momentous American-British-Soviet ately after the breakup of the consultations the Chinese negotiations in Moscow that began on July 15 and ended side began attacks on the talks and on three occasions, 31 on August 5 with a signing in the Kremlin of a Limited July, 15 August, and 1 September 1963, published official Test-Ban Treaty. In the background exchanges and statements condemning the Moscow treaty.51 consultations with Khrushchev, the Americans implicitly What was the significance of all these episodes for and sometimes explicitly proposed to join efforts to thwart Deng’s political career and the development of his views? the efforts of Beijing to become a nuclear power. On July The July 1963 performance of Deng Xiaoping was highly 160 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 acclaimed in Beijing. According to one biographer, “the Chinese had been right all along. Therefore, Khrushchev’s failure to shore up Sino-Soviet relations was greeted as a foreign policy errors were not criticized at the top party victory over revisionism by the CCP leadership who forum. turned out in force to welcome Deng back from Moscow.” In China the same logic worked the other way around. He was also the leader of the group of speechwriters that Mao Zedong may well have cleverly decided to direct the drafted CCP letters, probably including the ones criticizing energy of his potential critics, Deng Xiaoping and Liu the test ban.52 Salisbury concludes that Deng’s ideologi- Shaoqi, for external, foreign policy use. Deng Xiaoping cal exploits in Moscow (he mentions only one in Novem- must have been critical of Mao’s exercise of power and his ber 1957) earned him Mao’s gratitude and a relatively mild disastrous “great leap forward.” Since 1960 he and Liu treatment during the Cultural Revolution. If this version is expressed an inclination to oppose the leftist economic true, then Deng Xiaoping proved his credentials as a loyal experiments of the Chairman. But in foreign policy Deng subordinate of Mao Zedong and demonstrated his ability enthusiastically shared Mao’s goal to strive for China’s to work very successfully together with the Chairman in equality in the communist camp. As a delegation head, the area of foreign policy.53 Deng Xiaoping must have been held on an extremely short But does it mean that the “little terrier” had the same leash by Mao. In any case, Deng’s personal role in views on Stalin, Stalinism and international relations as implementing the Sino-Soviet split made him a committed Mao Zedong? There is a more complex explanation of advocate of this policy. According to his biographer, Deng’s role. According to recent revelations of Dr. Li during the early 1980s, when Mao’s role in the politics of Zhisui, Mao’s personal physician, Deng Xiaoping, as well the PRC was being reassessed, Deng was “at great pains to as Liu Shaoqi, lost Mao’s trust at the Eighth CCP Congress stress that Mao Zedong’s policy in foreign affairs had been in September 1956, when they spoke too fervently about correct and highly successful.”56 the impossibility of any cult of personality in China.54 This must be a missing part in the explanation why, in Mao Zedong considered Deng a politician with a great 1956-1963, the reformer of contemporary China had been future (as he told Khrushchev in November 1957) and the central figure fighting de-Stalinization and reform in considerable political ambitions. However, in the atmo- the Soviet Union, instead of being a reform-minded sphere of power struggle and Mao’s emerging dictatorship analyst of the damages that Stalin and the logic of his this praise could bring Deng as easily to the gallows as to tyranny had caused to the Soviet Union, China and other the pedestal: Mao, like Stalin before him, had shrinking “socialist” countries.’ tolerance for men of political ambition in his immediate vicinity. Therefore, it is only logical that Mao should have watched Deng very keenly and tried to find tasks for him Vladislav Zubok is a senior fellow at the National Security where Deng’s energy would have been utilized for Mao’s Archive, a non-governmental research institute based at the benefit rather than against his interests. According to this George Washington University in Washington, DC. He is the co- logic, Mao Zedong wanted to send Deng to Moscow not author of Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War (Harvard University because he particularly trusted his loyalty, but for the Press, 1995) and a frequent contributor to the Cold War opposite reason, because he wanted to neutralize his International History Project Bulletin. The author thanks Professor Chen Jian for his comments on a draft of this paper. potential opposition to his rising cult of personality. To understand this logic, it is perhaps useful to start 1 Harrison E. Salisbury. The New Emperors: China in the Era with the opposite pole, the Soviet one. After 1960 the of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, (Boston, Little, Brown, Chinese criticism of Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization 1992), pp. 153-154. tied the hands of the Stalinists in Moscow like Suslov. 2 See on this in the existing biographies: David Bonavia, Deng According to Georgi Arbatov’s thoughtful observation Xiaoping (Hong Kong: Longman, 1989), p. 83; David S.G. “from 1962-1964 the Chinese factor weakened the position Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography, (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 71-73. of the Stalinists in the USSR. As it developed, the conflict 3 with China had positive influences on the policy of The bound copy of the transcripts of the meeting were found in the papers of the International Department of the former Socialist Khrushchev, who had been slipping back to Stalinism only Unity Party (SED) of the GDR in the Bundesarchiv, Berlin. too often since 1962. The debate with the Chinese leaders (SAPMO Barch JIV 2/207 698, pp. 187-330 is the Russian provided the anti-Stalinists with the opportunity, while version.) The conference’s participants on the Chinese side were, defending our policies, to speak out on many political and besides Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, mayor of Beijing and ideological subjects that had lately become taboo.”55 secretary of Beijing’s Party Organization (Deputy Head of the Actually, when Khrushchev was overthrown at the CC delegation); Kang Sheng, Mao’s security specialist and probably Presidium in October 1964, Alexander Shelepin, Secretary his “eyes” and “ears” in the delegation; and Yang Shangkun, of the CC and the former head of the KGB, repeated long-time head of the CCP’s General Office. That was a senior almost verbatim Deng’s criticism of the Soviet leader’s “troika,” who had been close to Mao Zedong and knew the history of Sino-Soviet relations well. Kang Sheng and Yang “two mistakes” during the Cuban missile crisis. Yet, the Shangkun, like Deng himself, had studied and lived in Moscow. Soviet leaders were too embarrassed to repeat this criti- The delegation also included the head of the All-Chinese cism at the plenum, because it would have implied that the Federation of Trade Unions Liu Ningyi and two other CC CCP COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 161 members, Wu Xiuquan and Pang Zuli. The members of the Jian, Bulletin no. 6-7, pp. 155-156. Soviet delegation were Mikhail Suslov and Leonid Il’ichev, two 24 Salisbury, The New Emperors, p. 156. influential members of the CC CPSU Secretariat in charge of 25 Stenographic Report of the Meeting of the Delegations of the ideology; Viktor Grishin from the Moscow Party Organization; Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party Iurii Andropov, head of the CC International Department of China, 5-20 July 1963, pp. 79, 91. (socialist countries); Boris Ponomarev, head of the CC Interna- 26 Stenographic Report, p. 142. To strengthen his arguments, tional Department (capitalist countries); Pavel Satiukov, editor- Suslov cited interesting statistics on Soviet military and eco- in-chief of Pravda; and Stepan Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador nomic assistance to the PRC. “The 24 defense enterprises built in Beijing. with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union were the basis 4 David Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese for the creation of corresponding branches of Chinese industry. Revolution,p.55. The book refers to a Chinese source, Liao Yilu, Another 33 defense enterprises are being built. At one time, 60 “Deng Xiaoping zai Suliangong ershihao” in Yang Guoyu and infantry divisions were equipped with arms and military- Chen Feigin, eds. Ershiba nian jian: cong shizhengwei dao technical property supplied from the USSR, and from 1955-1956 zongshuji (Volume 3), 1992, p. 106 in claiming that Deng the modernization of the Chinese army with more modern types Xiaoping “heard” Khrushchev’s speech. However, foreign guests of armaments and materiel was carried out. In past years our were not invited to the last session of the Congress to hear the country has given the PRC a large quantity of technical and “secret speech.” technological documentation by which China was able to 5 Shi Zhe, At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin: Shi Zhe’s organize the production of the MIG-17, MIG-I9, MIG-21-F, and Memoirs, Chapter 14, “De-Stalinization, Poland, Hungary: 1956” TU-16 airplanes, MI-4 helicopters, “air-to-air,” “ground-to-air,” (being translated by Chen Jian; quoted with permission). “ground-to-ground,” “air-to-ground,” and “ship-to-ground” 6 L.W. Gluchowski, “The Struggle Against ‘Great Power missiles, naval materiel, submarines, and fast boats of various Chauvinism’: CPSU-PUWP Relations and the Roots of the Sino- types. The Soviet Union helped the PRC develop the basis of a Polish Initiative in September-October 1956, a paper presented at nuclear industry.” Stenographic Report, p. 141 the conference “New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia,” January 27 Memo of conversation with General secretary of the CC CCP, 1996, Hong Kong; Chen Jian, “Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis member of the Politburo of the CC CCP Deng Xiaoping, received of 1956,” presented at “International Conference on “Hungary at the CC on 6 June 1960. I am grateful to Odd Arne Westad and and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence,” in Budapest, to the Cold War International History Project for bringing this 26-29 September 1996. and a number of other Chervonenko-Deng memcons to my 7 Malin Notes, CWIHP Bulletin, no. 8-9 (Winter 1996/97), p. attention. [ Ed. note : Six are presented in this section of this 388 Bulletin.] 8 The documents from the Polish archives were related in Leo 28 Political letter of the embassy of the USSR in the PRC for the Gluchowski’s paper “Poland’s ‘China Card’: Sino-Polish second quarter of 1960 [no date recorded in my personal notes], Relations and the Soviet Union, September-October 1956.” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 340, l. 133. 9 Chen Jian, “Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956,” p. 9 29 Kozlov’s report at the CC CPSU Plenum, 13 July 1960, 10 Malin notes, CWHIP Bulletin, no. 8-9, pp. 389, 393; Shi Zhe, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 458, 1. 10. At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin. 30 Stenographic Report of the Meeting, p. 93. 11 “Memuary Nikiti Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” Voprosy istorii, 31 Report of Suslov to the CC CPSU Plenum, 10-18 October no. 5,(1994), p. 75 1961, p. 34. 12 Malin Notes, Bulletin, p. 392. 32 Kurze Wiedergabe der Verhandlungen, die zwischen einer 13 Quoted in Chen Jian, “Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of Delegation der KPdSU mit einer Delegation der KP Chinas 1956.” gefuehrt wurden, 17 September 1960, SAPMO Barch, JIV 2/ 14 Malin notes, Bulletin. p. 393. 202-280. The author thanks Christian Ostermann and David 15 Shi Zhe, At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin. Wolff of the CWIHP for sharing this information. [Ed. Note : 16 “Memuary” Voprosy istorii, no. 5, (1994), pp. 75-76. CWIHP, in turn, thanks Dr. Tim Trampedach of the Free 17 Stenographic Report of the Meeting of the Delegations of the University – Berlin for his aid in obtaining this document.] Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party 33 Kurze Wiedergabe, pp. 7, 13 of China, 5-20 July 1963, Moscow, part 1, 8 July, p. 75. The 34 Kurze Wiedergabe, p. 14 transcripts in Russian were sent by the CC CPSU to the leader- 35 Kurze Wiedergabe, pp. 17, 31-32 ship of the SED in the GDR, which translated them into German, 36 Report of Suslov, pp. 38, 40-41. although with some excisions. SAPMO Barch, DY 301, JIV 2/ 37 Report of Suslov, p. 53. 201, Akt 697. 38 Report of Suslov, pp. 72-73. 18 Stenographic Report of the Meeting, p. 73 39 For this chronology and the Soviet semi-official view of the 19 Stenographic Report of the Meeting, p. 75 consultations, see O.B. Borisov, B.T. Koloskov, Sino-Soviet 20 Stenographic Report of the Meeting, pp. 117-118. Relations, 1945-1973: A Brief History (Moscow : Progress, 21 “Posledniaia antipartiinaia gruppa [The last anti-party group], 1975), pp. 203-208. Minutes of the June 1957 Plenum of the CC CPSU, June 24,” 40 See, e.g., compilations of Peter Berton, The Chinese-Russian Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 4, (1993), p. 12. Dialogue of 1963. A Collection of Letters Exchanged Between 22 Report, “My Observation on the Soviet Union,” Zhou Enlai the Communist Parties of China and the Soviet Union and to Mao Zedong and the CCP Leadership, 24 January 1957 trans. Related Documents. (School of International Relations, by Zhang Shuguang and Chen Jian, Bulletin, 6-7 (Winter 1995/ University of Southern California, 1963). 96); p. 154. 41 Georgi Arbatov, The System : An Insider’s Life in Soviet 23 Minutes, Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ambassa- Politics (New York: Random House, 1992), pp. 97-98. dor Iudin, 22 July 1958, trans. by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen 42 Stenographic Report, pp. 293-295. 162 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

43 Ibid, pp. 73, 75 1995), pp. 808 and 814. I am thankful to James Hershberg and 44 Ibid, p. 178 William Burr for bringing these documents to my attention. 45 Ibid, p. 106 49 Stenographic Report, pp. 251-252. 46 “Kak snimali Khrushcheva [How Khrushchev was deposed], 50 Ibid, p. 90 the materials of the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 14 October 1964, 51 Borisov, Koloskov, op. cit., p. 226 Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 1 (1993), p. 10. 52 David Goodman, op. cit., p. 73 47 Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, 53 This is Goodman’s conclusion. op. cit., p. 64 Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California 54 Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs Press, 1981), p. 239. of Mao’s Private Physician (New York, Random House, 1994). 48 Kohler to the Department of State, Moscow, July 18 and July 55 Arbatov, The System, p. 95. 19, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961 -1963, 56 Goodman, op. cit., p. 71. vol. VII: Arms Control and Disarmament, (Washington, GPO,

Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s “Continuous Revolution,” and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder

By Chen Jian

eng Xiaoping is a legendary figure in the political symbolized in the label placed on him of “China’s Second history of modern China. During the Cultural Largest Khrushchev,” one of the main reasons for his D Revolution (1966-1976), Mao Zedong twice reemergence could be found in the fact that Mao again purged him, but did not destroy him (as the Chinese remembered that Deng was once an “anti-Soviet revision- Chairman did to Liu Shaoqi, China’s second most impor- ist” hero. On 14 August 1972, less than one year after the tant leader from 1949 to 1966, who died in disgrace in death of Marshal Lin Biao, Mao’s designated successor 1969). Early in 1973, after Deng had been absent from during the Cultural Revolution, who then betrayed Mao in China’s political scene for more than six years, Mao 1971, Mao commented on a letter Deng wrote to him pardoned him and brought him back to China’s decision- about ten days earlier: “After we entered the cities, it is not making inner circle. Three years later, when Deng was true to say that he [Deng Xiaoping] has done nothing that again expelled from the Party’s Politburo and Central is good. For example, he led the [CCP] delegation to Committee due to his alleged “unchanged reactionary Moscow to negotiate [with the Soviets]. He did not yield attitude” toward the Cultural Revolution, he retained his to the pressure of the Soviet revisionists. I have talked Party membership and was never exposed to physical about this many times in the past. Now I want to repeat it torture by the “revolutionary masses.” He would reemerge once more.”1 and eventually become China’s paramount leader after The transcripts of the meetings in Moscow between Mao’s death in 1976. Chinese and Soviet Party delegations in July 1963 will It is apparent that Deng Xiaoping’s purge and survival help us to understand why Mao’s memory of Deng’s during the Cultural Revolution were primarily Mao’s experience of “not yielding to the Soviet revisionists” was work. But Deng’s image in Mao’s mind must have been so persistent. Deng, simply put, was a fighter. As shown extremely complicated, otherwise his experience would by the meeting transcripts, he fully believed that truth was not have been so tortuous. While it will take a much more on the side of the Chinese Communists. Indeed, as far as comprehensive study to reconstruct the relationship the mentalities of the two sides are concerned, the Chinese between Deng and Mao, thanks to available Chinese exuded a strong sense of superiority. If for half a century sources one thing is certain: both Deng’s purge and the Chinese Communists had been willing to accept survival were related to Mao’s changing memories of the Moscow’s dominant position in the international commu- role he played in promoting or resisting the Chairman’s nist movement, in 1963 they acted in accordance with a grand enterprise of continuous revolution aimed at, among different underlying assumption. They obviously believed other things, preventing a Soviet-style “capitalist restora- that Beijing, rather than Moscow, should play the leader- tion” from happening in China. ship role in the world proletarian revolution. Deng Indeed, the “Soviet factor” played a crucial role in Xiaoping’s passionate performance indicated his seem- determining Deng Xiaoping’s political fate during the ingly wholehearted embrace of this belief. Cultural Revolution. If the causes of his downfall were The divergence between Beijing and Moscow, as COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 163 reflected in the transcripts, was certainly substantive. Mao and Khrushchev in particular. While de-Stalinization was Khrushchev’s most important In his essay, Vladislav Zubok has convincingly achievement as the Soviet party’s first secretary, Mao and demonstrated that Khrushchev fully understood how the CCP leadership claimed that “Khrushchev had com- intimately the legitimacy of his leadership role within the pletely renounced such a sword as Stalin and had thrown it Soviet party and state was interconnected with the Soviet away, allowing the enemy to seize it and to kill us.”2 party’s position in the world proletarian revolution. In While the Soviet leadership believed in the utility of other words, Khrushchev fully understood that his domes- pursuing détente with the West, the Chinese leaders tic programs, as well as his own position as the Soviet emphasized that the socialist camp must stick to revolu- Party’s top leader, had to be justified by maintaining and tionary principles and should have no illusions regarding enhancing Moscow’s continuous dominance of the the evil intentions of Western imperialist countries. While international communist movement. the Soviets pointed out that the danger involved in a In the case of China, Mao’s criticism of “Soviet nuclear war could never be exaggerated, Mao and his revisionism” was an integral part of his constant efforts to comrades were unconvinced by the Soviet emphasis on the enhance his “continuous revolution” as a dominant theme destructive effect of nuclear slaughter, and argued that of China’s political and social life. This was particularly communists all over the world should not shrink from true after 1958, when the disastrous consequences of the revolution because of the concerns about triggering a “Great Leap Forward” began to result in an ever increasing nuclear war. division among top Chinese leaders, while at the same But what really distanced Beijing from Moscow was time breaking up the myth of Mao’s “eternal correctness.” not just the divergence over these issues concerning The criticism of “Soviet revisionism” provided Mao with strategy and policy. The debates between Chinese and an effective weapon to combine his need to create momen- Soviet communists focused on two more fundamental and tum for continuous transformation of China’s party, state interrelated issues: how to define “equality” and how to and society with one of the Chinese revolution’s ultimate interpret history. goals—reviving China’s central position in the interna- The “equality” question had been a staple of conversa- tional community through establishing China’s centrality tions between top Chinese and Soviet leaders since the in the international communist movement. mid-1950s. As a general tendency, the Chinese leaders Under these circumstances, “equality” was given a became increasingly accustomed to accusing the Soviets of meaning much more complicated than what may be having failed to treat other fraternal parties, including the obtained in a superficial reading of the word. In actuality, Chinese party, as equals. The Soviet leaders, on the other each side talked about “equality” with an assumption that hand, used every opportunity to defend their own behavior, they were superior to the other. For Mao and his Chinese arguing that although Moscow, for historical reasons, had comrades, talking about “equality” meant that they played a central role in the international communist occupied a position from which to dictate the values and movement, it never intentionally treated other parties as codes of behavior that would dominate relations between inferior. communist parties and states. This fundamental assump- Such differences over remembering and interpreting tion made Beijing’s conflict with Moscow inevitable. the past drove almost every meeting between top Chinese Deng Xiaoping was assigned the task in 1963 of and Soviet leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s into leading the Chinese delegation to Moscow for several an extensive review of history. Indeed, the Chinese reasons. The most obvious one was that he had long been leaders, especially Mao, had endeavored to cite historical known within the CCP as a talented leader, who was able cases to argue that the Soviets (since the years of Stalin to use concise language to effectively argue on compli- and continuing after Stalin’s death) had mistakenly cated issues. As Zubok documents in his essay, the other interfered with the internal affairs of the Chinese party and reason was that by 1963 he was a veteran in representing the Chinese Communist state, as well as many other the CCP in its dealings with Khrushchev and other Soviet fraternal parties, and that such behavior proved Moscow’s leaders. But Mao’s choice of Deng to lead the CCP failure to treat communists in other countries as equals.3 delegation could also have been based on more complex The Soviets would categorically deny that the new Soviet considerations. As is well known, by 1963 Mao had leadership after Stalin’s death had continued to commit already developed a real distrust of some of his close such mistakes. The transcripts of the July 1963 Sino- colleagues, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, Soviet meetings indicate that this pattern was again because of his sense that not only were they unable to followed. follow the logic of his “continuous revolution” programs, Why, one must ask, are these two issues so important? but also that they might attempt to weaken, or even to This must be understood by keeping in mind that these challenge, Mao’s authority and power as China’s para- issues not only are closely related to the legitimacy of each mount leader. By choosing Deng to head the CCP party’s self-perceived position in the international commu- delegation, Mao would effectively use Deng’s talent to nist movement, but are also interwoven with legitimizing bolster the international legitimacy of his “continuous the domestic programs pursued by each party’s top leaders, revolution,” while at the same time further testing Deng’s 164 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 political attitude and loyalty toward his “continuous capitalist and free world in holding the initiative of revolution.”4 Here, once again, Mao demonstrated his historical development. mastery of Chinese party politics. More importantly, the great Sino-Soviet split de- Deng did not disappoint Mao. His stamina and stroyed the idea among communists and communist eloquence in Moscow, together with that of Kang Sheng sympathizers all over the world that communism was a and other members of the Chinese delegation, put the solution to the problems created in the world-wide process Soviets on the defensive. This proved both the correctness of modernization. Nothing could be more effective in of the Chinese stand and the superiority of the Chinese destroying the moral foundation of communism as an mentality. When members of the Chinese delegation ideology and a revolutionary way of transforming the returned to Beijing, they would be welcomed by Mao at world than the mutual criticism of the communists. the airport, which was a highly unusual gesture by the Therefore, the events leading to the Sino-Soviet split, in Chairman. Moreover, Mao was so confident that the which Deng Xiaoping actively participated, marked the transcripts of the meetings in Moscow would enhance his beginning of the final decline of international communism “continuous revolution” that, on 28 July 1963, he ordered as a 20th-century phenomenon. them to be printed and distributed to low- and middle-rank CCP cadres.5 This was the only time in the CCP’s history, to the best of my knowledge, that the transcripts of top Chen Jian, an Associate Professor of History at Southern Illinois Party leaders’ meetings with foreign party leaders were University and, during the 1996-1997 academic year, a senior relayed to the whole party. fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, is the author of China’s Deng Xiaoping certainly made history. His outstand- Road to the Korean War (Columbia University, 1994) and a ing performance in Moscow in July 1963, as mentioned frequent contributor to the Cold War International History earlier, had created such a strong impression in Mao’s Project Bulletin. mind, that it would contribute to his survival and reemer- 1 Mao Zedong’s comments on Deng Xiaoping’s 3 August 1972 gence during and after the Cultural Revolution. This letter, 14 August 1972. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu, vol.3, would allow his name to be linked with China’s history part 2, p.846. from the late-1970s to mid-1990s in such a dramatic way 2 Ed. Note: See the Deng-Suslov Talks, 1963 in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. that this period has become widely known as “The Deng 3 Xiaoping Era.” See, e.g., “Mao on Sino-Soviet Relations: Two Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador,” (intro. Odd Arne Westad), CWIHP Bulletin Deng Xiaoping’s debates with the Soviet leaders in 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp.164-169; Minutes, “Mao’s Conversation July 1963 represent a historical juncture in the develop- with a Yugoslav Communist Union Delegation,” September 1956, ment of Sino-Soviet relations as this was the last substan- and Minutes, “Conversations between Mao Zedong and Ambassador tive exchange of opinions between the Chinese and Soviet Yudin,” 22 July 1958, trans. Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, CWIHP Bulletin 6-7, pp.148-152, 155-159. parties. The failure of the meeting led to the great polemic 4 debates between the two parties, which would quickly Zubok is certainly correct in pointing out that “Mao Zedong must have cleverly decided to direct the energy of his potential critics, expand into a confrontation between the two communist Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, toward external, foreign policy use.” powers. Even Khrushchev’s fall from power in October 5 After returning to Beijing, both Kang Sheng and Deng Xiaoping 1964 could not reverse the trend of deteriorating relations. proposed to Mao that the transcripts of the nine meetings between the In February 1965, when Mao told Soviet Prime Minister Chinese and Soviet delegations in Moscow “be read” to party cadres A. N. Kosygin that his struggle with the Soviet “revision- “above Level 17.” Mao replied in a letter to Deng Xiaoping: “It is not sufficient only reading the transcripts [to the cadres], and it seems ists” would last for another 9,000 years, the CCP Chair- that the transcripts should be printed. Every several (such as three to man had virtually proclaimed the demise of the Sino- five) of the cadres above Level 17 should have a copy [of the Soviet alliance.6 In a few short years, Beijing and transcripts], so that they can discuss and study them. After three Moscow would proclaim the other as primary enemy, even months, all the copies must be taken back. Please consider this and worse than capitalist-imperialist America. make a decision on it.” Mao Zedong’s letter to Deng Xiaoping, 28 In a broader historical perspective, Deng Xiaoping’s July 1963, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol.10 (Mao Zedong’s [Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic], meetings with the Soviet leaders in July 1963 represented Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1996), p. 330. a defining moment in 20th-century history. Up to this 6 Kosygin was then visiting Beijing on his way back from a visit to point the communists in the world had acted under a Vietnam. He suggested to Mao that China and the Soviet Union profound belief that history and time were on their side. should stop the polemic between them, so that they could take joint The great Sino-Soviet split, to which Deng Xiaoping made steps to support the struggles of the Vietnamese people; Mao refused such a crucial contribution, drained both the material and the suggestion. He then made the statement that the struggle between the Chinese and the Soviets should go on for another 9,000 years, if spiritual resources of international communism. While the not 10,000 years. See Cong Jin, Quzhe qianjin de suiyue [The Years Soviet Union, with China emerging as a potent enemy, fell of Tortuous Development] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press, 1989), into an ever-worsening overextension of power, the pp.607-608. Communist world as a whole spent much of its resources on internal fighting. This effectively weakened, and eventually eliminated, its ability to compete with the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 165

From the Diary of avoided micromanagement and detailed elaboration on P.A. ABRASIMOV these issues and wanted the party organizations themselves SECRET to work out the Central Committee’s tactic in the course of 9 July 1957 the struggle, to understand deeply the necessity of con- ducting this tactical line and its advantages. Memorandum of Conversation Deng Xiaoping added that great courage and calm With the General Secretary of the CCP, were needed to endure the stream of abuse which the com. DENG XIAOPING rightists unleashed on the CCP both orally and in the press. Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping observed that the campaign 3 July 1957 of struggle with the rightists was proceeding unevenly. In some places, they went over to the counterattack too early On 3 July 1957, I visited Deng Xiaoping and on the and the enemy hid himself. However, to be late in this instructions of the CC CPSU gave him the full texts of the struggle would have been unforgivable. It was necessary decision of the CC CPSU’s July Plenum on the anti-party to deliver the blow before the opening of the session of the group of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov and the CC All-Chinese Convention of the People’s Representatives. CPSU’s closed letter to all party members and candidates. Of course, it would have been possible to listen to the In the conversation which ensued, Deng Xiaoping talked rightists for another ten days, but as a whole the conditions about the struggle with rightist elements in the People’s for a counter-attack had already come together. The Republic of China. He said that it was calculated that this leaders of the rightists had already shown themselves, and struggle would go on for a long time; the Chinese Commu- their views were widely known to the masses. “The big nist Party had the strength to crush the rightists in two or fish was already in the net,” Deng Xiaoping observed. three days, but there was no need for that. The rightists I noted that com. Zhou Enlai’s speech to the session of the will be given a further chance to finish stating their case, All-Chinese Convention of the People’s Representatives since by doing so they are giving the people and the CCP a was not only a report on the government’s work, but was good lesson. also the first strong blow delivered by the party against the By showing their true face, they are actually helping rightists. Having agreed, Deng Xiaoping added that the to educate the broad masses and intermediate elements. popular masses received com. Zhou’s speech in precisely Without encouragement from the CCP, they would not that way. The rightists also clearly acknowledged this side dare to open fire and begin to act on such a broad scale. of the report by the Premier of the State Council. The rightists, noted Deng Xiaoping, resemble a snake I inquired as to how the rightist elements were which has slithered out of the earth, scented danger, and behaving after the collapse of all of their attacks. wants to slither back in, but has been strongly seized by Deng Xiaoping answered that they now want to hide the tail. themselves, but they will not be able to. Squabbles and The positive side of the struggle with the rightists divisions have begun among the rightists. In Shanghai, which has unfolded is that it has given cadres the opportu- prominent representatives of the rightists denounced nity to garner experience and to be tempered. Some party ringleaders with the most reactionary tendencies. Some of workers were afraid to provide the rightist elements the the rightists have already capitulated, but others are full freedom to state their opinion. Experience, however, continuing to resist. has shown that where the rightists had the chance to The CCP is not only not crushing this resistance, but express themselves fully, the struggle with them has is even, in a certain sense, supporting it. The rightists are proceeded more successfully; in those cases, the object of unmasking themselves completely and on that basis, it will the struggle has been exposed, and a target for a be possible to teach the masses a good lesson. Zhang counterstroke has been revealed; in those cases, the masses Naige and others are not recognizing their mistakes, and were convinced of the obvious hostility of the rightists to are continuing to resist. The CCP considers that even if socialism and the party organizations have had the support they continue to hold out stubbornly for a year, the party of the overwhelming majority of the people in their will also conduct painstaking explanatory work with them conduct of the struggle. for the entire year. In some establishments and organizations, the rightist The same policy will be carried out in the country’s elements were not given the chance to speak out and institutions of higher learning. Rightist elements among thereby reveal their true face. There were even cases the students will be left in the institutions of higher where “rightists” from other places were invited to give learning, and some of them after graduation may be left in speeches. In such establishments, the struggle was aimless their respective institutions of higher learning as instruc- and did not attain its goal. tors. They will even be given the opportunity, for instance, The shortcoming of the given movement was the fact to speak their views once every three months. That will that at the necessary time, not all party organizations had help us to conduct educational work [with] object [lessons] clarified sufficiently for themselves the goals and tasks among the students. The same applies to the instructors of laid out by the CC CCP for this struggle. The CC CCP the institutions of higher learning. 166 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

To my question of approximately what percent the From the diary of rightist elements comprise among the students, Deng P.F. IUDIN Xiaoping answered that on average among the students, SECRET. Copy No. 2 the rightists comprised only one percent, and that there were many more waiverers and individuals deceived by the rightist demagogues, but that at present they were once Record of Conversation again reverting to the correct path. with member of the Standing Committee In some institutions of higher learning, the percentage of the Politburo of rightists was higher, as, for instance, at Beijing Univer- CC CCP, DENG XIAOPING sity [there were] about 3%, while in some institutions of higher learning there were up to 10%. 17 April 1958 At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping noted that this year prospects for the harvest were good, I visited Deng Xiaoping and on instructions from the but that at the end of July and the beginning of August Center informed him of the letter from the CC of the flooding often occurs. Union of Communists of Yugoslavia [UCY] to the CC In China every year, an average of 20 million people CPSU of 12 April of this year. suffer from natural disasters. In the first five-year period, During the translation of the Yugoslav letter, Deng there were strong floods three times, and each time about Xiaoping expressed his indignation at the first sentence in 40 million people suffered, and last year, 70 million people the letter in which the Yugoslavs state that they were suffered from natural disasters. “surprised” by the CC CPSU’s letter. Deng Xiaoping Having thanked com. Deng Xiaoping for the conver- reacted in the same way to some of the Yugoslavs’ sation, in my turn I told him about the progress of the arguments in the letter about their attitude toward the preparation for the Sixth Worldwide Festival of Youth and Soviet Union and the international communist movement. Students in the USSR. Referring to the Yugoslavs’ words to the effect that the The head of the chancellery of the Secretariat of the UCY’s draft program is based on a belief in the victory of CC CCP, com. Yang Shangkun, was present at the conver- socialism, Deng Xiaoping recalled that the Yugoslavs sation. believe in the victory of socialism in America through an augmentation of the role of the working class in the Chargé d’affaires of the USSR in the PRC bourgeois system of government. Deng Xiaoping noted (P. Abrasimov) that the Yugoslav draft program devotes more space to this than to many other issues. [Source: AVPRF (Arkhiv vneshnei politiki rossiiskoi federatsii) After the translation was completed, Deng Xiaoping [Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive], f. 0100, op. 50, p. said that the Yugoslav response fully accords with the 424, d. 8;. obtained by Paul Wingrove; translated by Ben Chinese comrades’ expectations. He noted that “this is a Aldrich-Moodie.] very logical step by the Yugoslavs.” It is difficult to imagine, Deng Xiaoping said, that the Yugoslavs could

easily change their positions and quickly correct the most ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○ serious mistakes contained in the program. As for chang- ing selected phrases, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that this would not change the character of the Yugoslav document since what was at issue in the given case was an entire system of erroneous views. I set out for Deng Xiaoping the CC CPSU’s decision regarding the CC UCY’s answer. Having heard out what I had to say, Deng Xiaoping said that this was without doubt a correct decision. At present, he said, we have absolutely no basis for reviewing the resolutions which we previously adopted regarding the UCY’s program and its congress. “On the whole,” Deng Xiaoping said, “it is a good thing (khoroshee delo)—I consider that the upcoming struggle in the international communist movement will be very lively and interesting, and that all communists, all fraternal parties should join in this struggle.” Having pointed out that the Yugoslavs talk a lot in their letter about the need to “develop Marxist thought,” Deng Xiaoping noted that on that point we can support the Yugoslavs. Right now, he said, we are repulsing Yugoslav COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 167 revisionism, and in the course of this fight we will develop decision on this issue. I said that I did not know whether yet further the theory of Marxism-Leninism. that party [the Swiss] was informed of the CPSU’s I noted that a collection of Lenin’s statements about position. Deng Xiaoping expressed the thought that revisionism had been published in our country. Deng several minor (melkie) parties might end up not being Xiaoping answered that he had heard about the collection abreast of things and might mistakenly send their represen- and had ordered its translation into Chinese. Deng tatives to Yugoslavia…. Xiaoping went on to comment that “we must study and compare the old Bernstein and the new Bernstein [to “You,” Deng Xiaoping said, “are catching up with determine] the similarities and differences between them.” America. At present, we do not have the strength to do I noted that the old Bernstein did not hold state power and this, but we are trying to catch up with England. However, that probably this was the essential difference between we are still thinking about how to present the following them. Deng Xiaoping agreed with this thought. [Ed. note: task to our people in some form: to catch up with the At the turn of the century, Lenin and Eduard Bernstein United States of America in 25 years or more.” Again polemicized over the correct path of social democracy. making the caveat that they were only thinking this issue Lenin labeled his opponent a “revisionist.”] over at present, Deng Xiaoping then added that such a Afterwards, I informed Deng Xiaoping about the slogan would help them to move forward…. conversation between the USSR’s ambassador in Poland and com. Gomulka as to the UCY’s answer to the CC AMBASSADOR of the USSR in the PRC CPSU. Deng Xiaoping reacted to this information with [signature] /P. Iudin/ great interest and was especially happy to hear com. Gomulka’s statement that the PZRP [Polish United [Source: TsKhSD (Tsentral’noe khranilishche sovremennoi Workers’ Party] would not send a delegation to the dokumentatsii) f.5, op.49, d.131, ll.71-74; translated by: Seventh Congress of the UCY. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.] said that the Poles had tried to persuade the Yugoslavs, but

became convinced that this was futile. Deng Xiaoping ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ noted that some interesting points had come up in the ○○○○○○○○○○ Poles’ own position in the course of the discussion about the UCY’s program, and that for that reason, he said, one could conclude that for our understanding of the PZRP’s From the diary of P.F. IUDIN position, this too “was not a wasted episode, and also SECRET Copy 1 showed us something.” 3” June 1959 Deng Xiaoping warmly expressed his thanks for the information. He noted that timely information from the Report of Conversation CC CPSU permitted them to keep abreast of these with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, DENG Yugoslav affairs. Deng Xiaoping furthermore stated that XIAOPING in connection with the most recent hostile speech by the Yugoslavs, the CC CPSU had adopted entirely correct and 27 May 1959 very good decisions. I pointed out that an article on the UCY’s draft While visiting com. Deng Xiaoping on the instruc- program would be published on 18 April in “Communist.” tions of the Center, I informed him about the course of the At this, Deng Xiaoping commented that of course the negotiations in Geneva. Yugoslavs would have to be taught a lesson, insofar as Deng Xiaoping requested that I convey great thanks to “they got themselves into this.” the CC CPSU for providing this information, and also said In the course of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping that it would be reported to Mao Zedong and other leading touched on the issue of other parties’ attitudes to the figures in the PRC forthwith. In passing, Deng Xiaoping Yugoslav congress. Having touched on the position of the said that Mao Zedong was not feeling well—was sick with Italian communist party, Deng Xiaoping stated that the the flu. Liu Shaoqi is also not quite well—his right hand Italians’ motives as set out in their letter to the CC CPSU hurts. Zhou Enlai is not in Beijing at present. were incomprehensible to the Chinese comrades. Never- Touching on the issue of a summit meeting, Deng theless, Deng Xiaoping noted, “let them, the Italians, make Xiaoping agreed with the opinion that the meeting their own decisions.” evidently would take place. He also inquired as to the Deng Xiaoping informed me that according to background (kharakteristika) of the new US Secretary of information they had received a few days ago from the State, [Christian A.] Herter. I talked about the information PRC’s ambassador in Switzerland, the Swiss comrades we have on this issue from MID [Foreign Ministry] USSR. were planning to send their delegation to the Seventh Having mentioned the upcoming visit by [Averell] Congress. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the CCP had Harriman to the Soviet Union and his intention to visit the not informed the Swiss party about their [the CCP’s] PRC, Deng Xiaoping stated that they had already dis- 168 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 cussed the issue of the expediency of Harriman’s visit to “president” for a third term. If Jiang Jieshi remains as China and came to the conclusion that at present the visit “president,” he said, that would be better for us than if would not be useful. However, he added, we are not ruling Chen Chen or even Hu Shi occupied the post. The out a visit by Harriman to China in the future. Americans would be happiest with Hu Shi; in the worst I briefed Deng Xiaoping on the basis of the informa- case, they would agree to Chen Chen. Jiang Jieshi suits tion we received from MID USSR on Sukarno’s stay in them least of all. On the Tibetan issue, Deng Xiaoping Turkey. Having displayed a great interest in this issue, noted, the views of the PRC and Jiang Jieshi coincide: Deng Xiaoping noted that, of all the nationalist countries both we and he consider that Tibet is Chinese territory and in Asia at present, Indonesia is taking the best position. that we cannot permit the Tibetan issue to be put before the This is particularly evident in the example of Indonesia’s UN. attitude toward events in Tibet. In answer to my question as to what the economic Afterwards, we touched on the issue of Yugoslavia, of situation in Taiwan was, Deng Xiaoping said that the Jiang Tito’s trip through the countries of Southeast Asia, of Jieshi-ites were living at the USA’s expense. That, he Yugoslavia’s position on the Tibet issue, and on the added, is not a bad thing. Let the Americans waste their difficult state of the Yugoslav economy. In the conversa- money. In the final analysis, Taiwan will be returned to tion, it was noted that nationalist bourgeois circles in Arab the bosom of its native land - China. However, for that to countries were accepting Yugoslav ideology. We both happen, we need time; we must wait a bit. The circum- agreed that it was necessary to strengthen our common stances are becoming more and more favorable for the propaganda in the Arab countries in the interests of PRC and less and less so for the USA. The Jiang Jieshi- exposing the Yugoslav provocational policy. ites in Taiwan are beginning to think hard about the Deng Xiaoping emphasized that in some ways the prospects which await them. There are many factors Yugoslav revisionists were now more dangerous than the contributing to this: the growing international authority of Americans and the social democrats of the Western people’s China, its economic successes, the long separa- countries, and that, as a result, it was a very important task tion from the native land, and so on. The most important to expose the Yugoslav revisionists. We are devoting a lot thing of all is that they know the Americans want to wash of attention to this issue, he said, which is the reason for their hands of them (otkazat’sia). The USA does not trust the Yugoslavs’ particular protest. Deng Xiaoping said that Jiang Jieshi, and he does not trust the United States. after a report by a Xinhua correspondent in Belgrade about Later on in the course of the conversation, several a strike by Yugoslav students protesting poor food was issues of the domestic situation of the Soviet Union and published in the Chinese press, the Yugoslav authorities China were touched on. made a statement of protest and warned the Chinese I told Deng Xiaoping about the preparation taking correspondent that if such an episode occurred again they place in our country for the CC CPSU plenum. would take appropriate action against him. Deng Xiaoping noted that at present throughout Touching on the plan thought up by Tito and Nasser China, prospects for the harvest are not bad. In some for a meeting of the leaders of four countries - Tito, regions, up to 50% more wheat will be harvested than in Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno—with the aim of “coordinat- 1958. The overall wheat harvest will probably be up to ing neutrality policies in connection with the Geneva 20% higher than the previous year’s harvest. It is some- conference,” Deng Xiaoping said that Nehru was firmly what worse with the early rice harvest. In places, crops opposing the meeting. Sukarno was showing a vague suffer from flooding—in others, from drought. If rains interest (kak-budto proiavliaet nekotoryi interes) in the come soon to the drought-affected regions, the situation plan. Foreign agents report that [Indonesian Foreign could be corrected. Minister] Subandrio has allegedly decided to communicate Deng Xiaoping went on to note as a serious shortcom- with the authors of the plan (Tito and Nasser) about the ing the fact that, of last year’s total harvest, a lot of grain concrete details of the proposal. As of yet, it is hard to say was used as free food for peasants in communes. This, he what Sukarno’s final position will be on this issue, Deng emphasized, has had a negative effect on the supply of Xiaoping noted, although it is already clear that Tito and grain to the cities. Deng Xiaoping recounted that before Nasser are very interested in calling such a meeting. the introduction of free food provision for the peasants, Having noted that the Americans need an instrument much less grain was consumed; they used it economically, like the current Yugoslav leaders and that the Americans and if the grain situation was difficult, they found a way are making fairly good use of that instrument, not econo- out. Now, 500 million mouths are constantly demanding mizing in their spending on it, Deng Xiaoping expressed cereals, are demanding plentiful and tasty food. At confidence that in the end that money would be spent in present, the biggest shortcoming, he repeated, is that the vain, as was the money spent on Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai- peasants are consuming a lot themselves and are not giving Shek]. enough grain to the state. The resolution of the Seventh I inquired as to the situation at present in Taiwan. Plenum of the CC CCP on regulating the communes Deng Xiaoping expressed the opinion that Jiang Jieshi provides for a gradual restoration of order in this important would probably not give up power and would remain matter. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 169

At the end of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping briefly From the diary of touched on the issue of the Dalai Lama. Previously, he S.V. CHERVONENKO said, Nehru calculated that the Dalai Lama would play a SECRET huge role in the Indians’ plans and that chaos would begin in Tibet without the Dalai Lama. Quite the opposite, in 8” December 1959 Tibet, things are going well without the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama has turned out to be a burden for Nehru. Memorandum of Conversation Nehru and the Americans are spending 200 thousand with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, DENG rupees monthly to maintain the Dalai Lama and his XIAOPING entourage. At present, Nehru intends to return the Dalai Lama to Tibet. If he returns, Deng Xiaoping added, we 6 November 1959 will pay him much more than the Indians and the Ameri- cans. In the past during each visit by the Dalai Lama to I had my first visit with Deng Xiaoping and had a Beijing, he was given 200 thousand yuan for minor conversation with him. Deng Xiaoping told me that he expenses. While the Dalai Lama was in Lhasa, he was had not yet fully recovered after breaking his leg. He is given 700 thousand yuan every month (for him and his going back to work in two days, but the doctors are entourage). allowing him to work for only four hours at a time. In connection with this, I noted that the Tibetan Afterwards, he asked what was my impression of the peasants, who had been freed from dependence as serfs, celebration of the tenth anniversary of the PRC. Answer- had gained the most from the Tibetan events. ing Deng Xiaoping, I noted that the celebration had been Having agreed with me, Deng Xiaoping said that the organized on a grand scale. It demonstrated the huge masses of the people in Tibet had already risen up to carry enthusiasm of the people and their solidarity. out democratic reforms. Deng Xiaoping said that he was present at the The candidate member of the secretariat of the CC celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the October CCP, com. Yang Shangkun, translator com. Yan Mingfu, Revolution. [Ed. Note: Moscow, November 1957. Due to and the first secretary of the USSR Embassy in the PRC, the Soviet government’s 1918 conversion from Julian to com. F.V. Mochul’skii, were present during the conversa- Gregorian calendars, the October Revolution was feted on tion. November 7.] In the USSR too, he added, everything had been organized well. Such round dates must be well Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC noted. The most important point was that our great holidays demonstrate our solidarity, the great progress of (P. Iudin) the socialist camp, and the solidarity of progressive forces, of the fraternal parties. [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 235, ll. 40-44; obtained by Paul I answered that the solidarity of the fraternal parties Wingrove; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.] had found clear expression during the celebration of the CCP’s tenth anniversary. During ten short years, the CCP

had achieved successes which have rocked (vskolykhnut’) ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○ the entire world, and no one is in a position to take those achievements away from the Chinese people. The solidarity of the fraternal peoples has already shown its For: great significance more than once. If, for instance, after the victory of the October Revolution, Ukraine had remained alone and had not been in the family of the other • longer memcon excerpts Soviet republics, it could have been overwhelmed and dismembered by the imperialists. Friendship is the greatest force of all and sometimes we do not fully • additional Deng memcons recognize its significance. History will show what a huge significance it has. Visit the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin at: Deng Xiaoping responded that unity and solidarity truly were the most important thing. With our solidarity, we do not fear any imperialists. “We are exerting every effort to preserve peace, and imperialism will perish in peaceful conditions. If madmen nevertheless unleash a war, they will only meet with their downfall. The entire affair consists of the fact that we are making progress, while they are being torn apart by contradictions. We have many friends, including in the USA - [those friends] are 170 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 the working people.” From the Diary of I noted that comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s visit demon- CHERVONENKO S.V. strated the great interest of the workers of America in our “/” June 1960 country and in socialism. TOP SECRET For that reason, Deng Xiaoping said, the ruling circles Copy No. 3 in the USA were afraid of that visit. They wanted to isolate comrade Khrushchev, but the people broke through Memorandum of Conversation the dike. Moreover, having agreed with [my] observation that even while making progress and augmenting With the General Secretary of the CC CCP socialism’s strength it is necessary to display great Member of the Politburo of the vigilance toward the machinations of the imperialists, CC CCP, DENG XIAOPING Deng Xiaoping said: “The imperialists especially want to undermine the unity of our countries, but that is a futile I was received on 17 May by Deng Xiaoping. The endeavor….” chief of the division on ties with fraternal parties, member of the CC and the Secretariat of the CC CCP, Wang To my observation that the most important thing in Jiaxiang also took part in the ensuing conversation…. overcoming every difficulty is the presence of the leading role of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping said that both the one and In connection with the instructions from the Center, I the other were important, the leadership of the CCP and gave Deng Xiaoping the text of a letter of the CC CPSU help from the Soviet Union. “At present,” he went on, with an official invitation to the party-governmental “we are in a better position than you were right after the delegation of the PRC to visit the USSR. Deng Xiaoping October Revolution. If a new socialist country arises, it said that the delegation of the PRC would be certain to go will, given the existence of the entire socialist camp, be in to the Soviet Union, and that the CC CCP without a doubt an even better position than we are. We are very happy would take seriously the wishes expressed by the Soviet that the situation in the Soviet Union is good in all comrades in connection with this trip. respects. As for us, we are also not in a bad position.” After this I fulfilled the Center’s instruction regarding I noted that even in a situation where our affairs are informing the Chinese comrades about the position of the going well, we [always] take measures to use all our Soviet Union in connection with the summit conference. existing capacities as much as possible; we are self-critical Deng Xiaoping said that comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s of ourselves, and strive to root out all our shortcomings. speech on 16 May in Paris was a very good, strong speech, We also have shortcomings, Deng Xiaoping answered, and and noted that on 18 May it would be fully published in they will always exist. One must even on occasion heed the PRC press. We still do not know Mao Zedong’s and criticism coming from an enemy. Liu Shaoqi’s opinions, since they are absent, said Deng At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping Xiaoping, but an exchange of opinions has already taken said that we would meet again and more than once. place between the members of the CC CCP who are I thanked Deng Xiaoping for the conversation and presently in Beijing. All of these comrades fully support expressed the hope that in its work, the Embassy would N.S. Khrushchev’s address. Deng Xiaoping again empha- encounter assistance from him and from the CC CCP sized that it was a very strong address, and that in it they apparatus as before. see the CC CPSU’s firm position. That is our position and Head of the protocol division of the CCP Foreign the position of the Central Committee of the CCP, he said. Ministry, Yu Peiwen, assistant head of the division for the Touching on the USA’s aggressive actions, Deng USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe Yu Zhan, Xiaoping said: “Eisenhower did a good turn (sdelal [USSR] embassy counselor B.N. Vereshchagin and third khoroshee delo),” since by his actions he fully unmasked secretary B.T. Kulik were present during the conversation. himself in the eyes of all the world’s peoples. This has a deep educational significance. The ruling circles of the Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC USA are trying to justify themselves by any means possible, but the facts speak for themselves. The peoples (S. CHERVONENKO) of the world can compare the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that [Source: AVPRF, f. 5, op. 49, d. 235, ll. 107-110; obtained by N.S. Khrushchev’s speech in Paris and Eisenhower’s Paul Wingrove; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.] statement, with which he had also already familiarized himself, present a striking contrast. Com. Khrushchev

fully uncovered the true face of Eisenhower and the ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○ imperialists. In the course of further conversation, Deng Xiaoping said that the Soviet government’s initiative as to the summit conference was useful and necessary; he empha- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 171 size that “this was and remains our point of view.” It Deng Xiaoping noted that at present in the Chinese would be good, if as a result of pressure by peace-loving press, articles are being published which are uncovering forces, results were attained, great or small. While at Nehru’s real face. He further said that many political present, fruitful work by a summit conference is impos- figures in the countries of Asia—Nasser [Egypt], Kasem sible, the very fact that the imperialists unmasked them- [Iraq], Sukarno [Indonesia], U Nu [Burma]—are taking the selves is not a bad result. Deng Xiaoping further said that same positions as Nehru. Nehru stands out from them [in the logic of the American imperialists is the logic of that] he is the cleverest. It was not in vain that he studied robbers; however Eisenhower tries to “white wash” in England; in India he is called a half-Englishman, and (obelit’) himself, nothing more will come of it for him; the English are more experienced than the Americans in practically he is helping us. Even this result of the [playing] political tricks. meeting in Paris speaks to the fact that the victory is ours. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that the struggle with Deng Xiaoping emphasized that comrade N.S. Khrushchev bourgeois figures of this sort is one of the most important “acted completely correctly by going to Paris; he should problems facing the international communist movement. have gone.” Such figures as Nasser or Kasem unmask themselves; in Throughout the course of the conversation I noted that India this work must be done under more difficult circum- some diplomats - representatives of the capitalist countries stances. Some Indian communists even praise Nehru. But of Western Europe in Beijing, in particular the English and in the end, said Deng Xiaoping, Nehru’s behavior is the Dutch, are trying to defend the United States, and educating these communists as well. With pleasure we constantly emphasize that no great significance should be see, he continued, that at the last meeting of the National lent to the incursion by the American [U-2] airplane onto Committee of the Indian Communist Party, important the Soviet Union’s territory; that all countries behave in resolutions on internal issues were adopted, namely a this way, but that the USA got caught. Deng Xiaoping said statute about the fact that the struggle with reaction cannot that Nehru, U Nu, and almost all the political actors of the avoid a fight with the National Congress Party and with bourgeois world make the same argument. Deng Xiaoping the Congress government (materials about the resolutions told about some of Zhou Enlai’s impressions in connection of the National Committee of the Communist Party of with his trip to the countries of Asia which had just India were published on the May 17 in “The People’s finished. Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing today and told Daily” -S.Ch.). The organ of the Indian Communist Party about the negotiations with Nehru, about which he, Zhou has begun to include open public statements against Enlai, had formed a particular opinion. Deng Xiaoping Nehru. said that Zhou Enlai’s trip to India to a certain extent Returning to the meeting in Paris, Deng Xiaoping said played the same role as N.S. Khrushchev’s trip to Paris for that the issue of developing a [Chinese] movement in the summit conference. N.S. Khrushchev exposed the support of N.S. Khrushchev’s statement was being American imperialists, and as a result of Zhou Enlai and examined in the CC CCP. On May 18, the leaders of other Chinese comrades’ trip to India, Nehru’s true face social organizations in the PRC will make statements in was uncovered. Deng Xiaoping said: “Both of the trips the press on this issue, and two to three days thereafter, were necessary, correct, and yielded a [positive] result.” when the circumstances become clearer, further steps will Deng Xiaoping emphasized that Zhou Enlai’s visit to be taken in this direction. Our common position consists, India fully confirmed “our previous opinion and position he said, of exposing the imperialists and of explaining the in relation to Nehru.” First. Nehru is the central figure in correctness of the position of the countries in the socialist the anti-Chinese campaign in India. Nehru is not in a camp headed by the Soviet Union. position where rightist and other reactionaries are putting Deng Xiaoping asked me to convey a warm greeting pressure on him; he himself seeks the attainment of his to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and to all of the members of goals by all means possible. Nehru has never lost control the Presidium of the CC CPSU on behalf of comrades Mao over the situation in the country, nor has the situation ever Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and all of the leaders of the CC CCP. gotten out of hand. Nehru knows how to hold the country The Americans are closing ranks against us, he said, but firmly in his hands. Second. The trip confirmed that their closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and the Nehru does not want to solve the issue of the Chinese- solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp, is invio- Indian border under any circumstances, even for some sort lable, since it is founded on a unity of ideas and goals. of limited period. In this, he is operating on the basis of In connection with this, the great significance of the his interests, both internal and external. Nehru speaks out upcoming visit by the Chinese party-governmental against the communist party of India; for this reason, it delegation to the Soviet Union for the further development does not profit him to resolve the border issue with China. and strengthening of fraternal friendship between our Also for foreign-policy reasons it is not profitable for him peoples and parties and for the unity of the whole socialist to resolve the issue. Deng Xiaoping said that if Nehru had camp was once again emphasized by me. eliminated the conflict with China, he would not have In conclusion, Deng Xiaoping said that he would received the latest American aid, a sum of 1.2 billion convey everything that he had been informed of by me to dollars. comrades Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi. 172 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

The conversation took place in warm, friendly claim and then asks : why do you now wish to return to the circumstances. events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. We think that this The counselor to the Embassy, I.I. Safronov, and the is not done for the sake of clarifying the evaluation of First Secretary of the Embassy, B.V. Kapralov, were these events. One sees, however, that such a questioning present during the conversation. can only stoke nationalistic moods in Poland and Hungary in order to undermine the tight fraternal and heartfelt Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC relations of the USSR and the CPSU with Poland and Signature Hungary. (S. CHERVONENKO) [Third Session : 20 September 1960] [Source: AVPRF f. 0100 op.53, p.8, d. 454, ll. 165-9; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.] The next accusation by Deng: We are also very puzzled by the following fact. Following his meeting with

Comrade Khrushchev and several other leading figures in ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○ the USSR, Comrade Ho Chi Minh made a stop-over in Beijing on his way home and reported the following news: The Short Version of the Negotiations Between CPSU During the conversation with him and other Vietnamese, and CCP Delegations (September 1960) Comrade Khrushchev stated that enormous efforts were being spent in China to restore the gravesite of Genghis- CPSU Delegation: Suslov (leader), Kozlov, Kuusinen, khan and that this smelled of “yellow peril.” The creation Pospelov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Il’ichev, Konstantinov, of Genghis-khan’s empire involved three countries— Grishin, Chervonenko Mongolia, our autonomous territory, and Soviet Buriatiia. Whereas it is usually stated in your country that it was CCP Delegation: Deng (leader), Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, primarily the Europeans who had to suffer from the attack Kang Sheng, Yang Shangkun, Hu Qiaomu, Liao Chengzhi, by Genghis-khan, it was actually the Chinese who suffered Wu Xiuquan, Liu Xiao the most from the attack. Ponomarev: One should strike his grave, not cel- The first talk took place on 17 September 1960 from ebrate him. 1300 to 1500…. Pospelov: Why do they celebrate him as a progressive figure? Many nations had to suffer under his attack. In conclusion, Deng Xiaoping asked, as he said, the Peng Zhen: How could we interfere in the internal essential question: What does the CC CPSU and the Soviet affairs of the Mongolians who want to restore the gravesite government want to do with Soviet-Chinese friendship? … of their ancestors [?] You, for example, like Peter I. You Only after the clarification of this essential question made intended to erect a monument in Port Arthur to three up of many facts, can one ascertain which assumptions are Russian generals—Kuropatkin, Alekseev, and Makarov, necessary for us to solve our disagreements… who had led an aggression against China. Pospelov: This was never the case with Kuropatkin [Second Session : 19 September 1960] and Alekseev, only with Makarov; because Kuropatkin and Alekseev had betrayed the interests of Russia. First of all com. [Frol] Kozlov explained that we have Peng Zhen: And now concerning the question of the always assumed that truly fraternal relations corresponding Korean War. to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian interna- Then the entire conversation with Khrushchev on June tionalism must be established between our parties, states 22 was repeated and the attempt was made to whitewash and people… Mao Zedong of any guilt. Mao Zedong reportedly stated at the beginning of the Korean War: “If the enemy trans- Secondly, Comrade Kozlov noted that as causes of the th serious disagreements that supposedly have long existed gresses the 38 parallel, China—since it is not up to the between the two CCs, the Chinese comrades’ letter Soviet Union to send troops for the protection of North mentions events that are related to Soviet-Polish relations Korea—is prepared to protect the common interests of the as well as the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956. These socialist countries, to send its own volunteers.” questions were resolved long ago between the CC CPSU Following further discussion of the topic Deng and the CCs of the Polish party and Hungarian Socialist declared: in explaining all of these facts we would like to Workers’ Party. We have [reached] unanimity with these ask the Soviet comrades to rethink whether all that they parties in our evaluations of the events of fall 1956. have done with respect to their enemies and with respect to We do not hide that at that time the Chinese comrades their friends was appropriate. We have no doubt that really did give us advice, but this advice was completely overall you are taking a stand against imperialism. different from that now cited in the Chinese comrades’ Ponomarev: We, however, had the impression that all letter. Comrade Kozlov rebuts the Chinese comrades’ our deeds were also directed to support American imperi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 173 alism. to which China did not have the right to permit representa- Deng: But why then did Comrade Khrushchev speak tives of third countries to enter two provinces of the PRC. with such esteem about Eisenhower? These two provinces are our territories. Is it your business Suslov: One cannot mix up matters of principle with whether we permit the entry of persons from third coun- the diplomacy of the struggle. tries or not [?] These questions were discussed with Deng: Comrade Suslov, do not jump to conclusions Comrade Mikoian during his trip to the PRC, and it was too easily. You are not used to listening to others. Under resolved. We appreciate that you resolved these questions. such conditions it is difficult for us to finish our discus- Suslov: And why do you now raise these long- sion. There is no state of equality. We would like to ask resolved questions once again? What is your point? you, however, on whom you can count when difficulties Deng: Unfortunately, the proposals with regard to the will arise? On Eisenhower, on Nehru or the likes, or on a construction of a joint fleet, a long-wave radio station , fraternal socialist country, on China? and negotiations on a basis of equality [sic?] came from Kozlov: There is no such question for us. Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Mao Zedong back then Deng: It would be perfect if such questions did not had asked Comrade Khrushchev: What should we do exist. But in reality such facts exist, and they cause when you raise these issues, should we act according to concern. your proposals or according to our thoughts. If we act as Kozlov: Then you yourself want a decline in our you wish, we would have to cede our entire coast to you, relations. You yourself are pushing this line. We state that as was the case with Port Arthur [Lushunkou] and Dalnii there is no such question, but you maintain that it exists [Dalian]. Comrade Khrushchev responded: You cannot act nevertheless. We declare in the name of our country, in the like that. Where would you go? Comrade Mao Zedong name of our people that we will defend you in case of an then stated: We will go into the mountains as partisans. attack with all means [available to us]; but you doubt this. Suslov: We think this is a joke. Deng: I ask you that your actions meet your recent Deng: This was not a joke. This was a very serious statements. conversation. It must be stated that following this conver- Suslov: This statement is offensive to us. sation, you stopped delivering to us technical documenta- Deng: I declare in the name of our party, in the name tion and equipment for the construction of a nuclear of the entire Chinese people, and fully aware of the submarine fleet, while the CC CPSU communicated to the responsibility, that regardless of all the[se] circumstances CC CCP on 20 June 1959 that the USSR would terminate and the attacks on the Chinese people, the People’s the deliveries of technical documentation and necessary Republic of China and our party will take the side of the materials for the production of atomic weapons… socialist countries in all difficulties. With regard to the Chinese-Soviet border incidents, Deng Suslov: Did we not act this way when there was a stated: on this question, we will communicate our response difficult situation in the GDR in 1955 [1953?], did we not through diplomatic channels, and therefore we will not take full responsibility when we dealt a blow to the take a position at this point…. counterrevolution in Hungary? Deng: But during the Chinese-Indian border conflict Deng:…I take advantage of the opportunity to ask you you did not act that way. to transmit our greetings to your Party and to com. Suslov: But you were not threatened by a dangerous Khrushchev. At the same time, please transmit the follow- aggressor. ing wish: since last September com. Khrushchev has Deng: You unilaterally withdrew your experts from personally attacked our country and Party many times China, you transferred the ideological differences to the causing us alarm. As the leader of the Soviet party and the sphere of international-state relations, and I do not agree Soviet state, com. Khrushchev exercises powerful influ- that India did not threaten China. You declared that you ence over world affairs. Therefore, we ask you with all our took a neutral position in the question of the Sino-Indian hearts and sincerity to deliver this message [to conflict. It is news to us that a fraternal socialist country Khrushchev], asking him to pay attention to it. can take a neutral position in the conflict with bourgeois With great satisfaction, we ascertain that both sides India with regard to another socialist country. consider this meeting useful and are of the opinion that In his further remarks, Deng spoke about the disagree- this is a contribution towards gradually overcoming our ments which had occurred in the relations between China differences… and the USSR, among other things about the negotiations of the supreme command of the Far Eastern military [Source : SAPMO (former Socialist Unity Party [SED] Archive) district on joint air defense on 4 February 1955 and those JIV 2/202-280, Bd.3; provided by Tim Trampedach (Freie on air defense between the military districts of the USSR Universitat-Berlin); translated by Christian Ostermann.] and China on 27 September 1955. Peng Zhen thoroughly

explained once again the question of the construction of a ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ long-wave radio station. Deng stated in conclusion: As is ○○○○○○○○○○ well known, an extremely unequal treaty existed according 174 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

From the Diary of culmination point after which an improvement would TOP SECRET ensue. S.V. CHERVONENKO I said that for our part, we would like to share this 12 October 1961 opinion, but that the situation was not of the Soviet Copy No. 1 Union’s making (za Sovetskim Soiuzum). As for the Albanians’ most recent act, it affects the interests of all of Transcript of Conversation the Warsaw pact countries, of the whole socialist camp. with General Secretary of the CC CCP For that reason, efforts were needed which would lead to DENG XIAOPING unity on the part of all of the countries of the socialist commonwealth. 30 September 1961 In reply, Deng Xiaoping said that he was not in the mood to immerse himself in the essence of the Soviet- In connection with 27 September instructions from the Albanian differences. We have, he emphasized, a single Center, I made a request to meet with Mao Zedong. On desire—that the relations between your countries improve. September 30, the Secretariat of the CC CCP informed us In reply to my words that the CPSU had no other desire that Mao Zedong had instructed Deng Xiaoping to receive than to improve relations between the USSR and Albania, the Soviet ambassador. On the same day I met with Deng Deng Xiaoping again moved the conversation to Soviet- Xiaoping. Chinese relations. Having mentioned that relations had At the beginning of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping been very strained between the CCP and the CPSU and the by way of explaining why Mao Zedong did not receive us, PRC and the USSR, Deng Xiaoping stated the opinion that said that the “other comrades of the CC are very busy since the Moscow conference, these relations have been receiving kings” (at that time, the king and queen of Nepal developing fairly well (neplokho). Having noted that in and the Belgian queen were located in Beijing). Korea, F.R. Kozlov invited him to lunch, and he [invited] I gave information in an oral form on the Albanian F.R. Kozlov, Deng Xiaoping said: “We spoke about the issue (it is our opinion that they were already informed of importance of solidarity. I said to Kozlov that, of course, the matter). Having heard our message, Deng Xiaoping on this or that concrete issue we might not have identical said: “Bad news. Have you reached the culmination point opinions, but on the whole after the Moscow conference, of mutual relations between your two countries and two our relations have been developing fairly well. Kozlov parties?” agreed with this.” On a series of important international I answered Deng Xiaoping that as he knows from our problems, Deng Xiaoping continued, we expressed and formerly delivered letter, the Soviet government has more continue to express support for your actions. Between the than once made efforts directed at normalizing Soviet- USSR and the PRC, very good cooperation has been Albanian relations, but the Albanian leaders are taking established in the international arena; for instance, at the steps in the opposite direction. Their last step is damaging Geneva conference on Laos. Of course, on certain the security of the member-countries of the Warsaw pact questions we have not entirely identical opinions. It is true and the basic security of the entire socialist camp. that in Korea we did not speak about the Albanian issue Deng Xiaoping stated that everyone must not take with Kozlov, he added. extreme measures in order to leave room for a settlement. Further, Deng Xiaoping stated that “there are 12 I again emphasized that after the Moscow conference, countries in the socialist camp, but the issue of relations the Soviet side undertook multiple steps in order to between the USSR and Albania stands out most of all. Is eliminate misunderstanding in the relations between the there really no possibility of finding some way to resolve Soviet Union and Albania. For instance, a readiness by this issue? For our part, we hope and wish that such a path N.S. Khrushchev to meet with the Albanian leaders was be found.” Deng Xiaoping reminded [us] that Zhou Enlai expressed, although the latter, as the Chinese comrades and he (Deng Xiaoping) had earlier already stated their well know, stubbornly refused such a meeting. I added opinion on Albanian affairs. It is true, he noted, turning to that such a position by the Albanians is incomprehensible us, that you were not content, especially with my (Deng to us. Xiaoping’s) statement. We, Deng Xiaoping responded, are acquainted with On that note the conversation about the Albanian issue the correspondence over this period between the Soviet ended…. Union and Albania. Between the CCP and the CPSU there were also great disputes. It is well that both you and we At the end of the conversation, I inquired as to did not take the matter to extremes. We have always stood whether the CC CCP had received the CC CPSU’s and stand for this. We said and still say to the Albanian congratulatory telegram on the PRC’s national holiday. comrades that relations between you should improve and Having received a negative reply, I informed Deng not worsen. Xiaoping on this issue. Deng Xiaoping expressed thanks Then Deng Xiaoping thanked [me] for the message to the CC CPSU for the congratulations. Afterwards, he and expressed the hope that this bad news would be the noted that a solemn celebration dedicated to the PRC’s COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 175

12th anniversary was held in Moscow, and asked that 9 April 1962 thanks be conveyed to the CC CPSU for the attention paid to the Chinese people’s holiday. On April 5, in keeping with instructions from the The candidate of the secretariat of the CC CCP, Yang Center, I turned to the CC CCP with a request to meet with Shangkun, translators for the CC CCP apparatus, Yan Mao Zedong, or with a person to be named by him, in Mingfu and Zhu Ruizhen, as well as the counselor to the order to inform the Chinese side of the negotiations of embassy, F.V. Mochul’skii, were present during the com. A.A. Gromyko with [US Secretary of State] D[ean] conversation. Rusk on the German issue. After a silence lasting for four days, they replied to us that Deng Xiaoping had been Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC instructed by the CC CCP to meet with the ambassador. I visited Deng Xiaoping in the CC CCP building. signature In connection with Deng Xiaoping’s question about my trip to Moscow, I told him in detail about the work of the (S. CHERVONENKO) March Plenum of the CC CPSU. Deng Xiaoping then handed me a letter from the CC CCP of 7 April 1962, [Source: AVPRF f. 0100, op. 53, p. 8, d. 454, ll. 175-8; translated which is an answer to the CC CPSU letter of 22 February by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.] 1962. Since these letters by the CC CCP are long, Deng

Xiaoping stated that he would not read it. The basic ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○ content of the letter of the CC CCP to the CC CPSU, he continued, is that, no matter what, the CPSU and the CCP must close ranks and, in a spirit of unity, resolve their problems.... From The Diary Of S.V. CHERVONENKO Top Secret. Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC Copy No. 1 (S. CHERVONENKO) “28” March 1962 and “8” May 1962 [Source: AVP RF. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

Transcripts of the Conversations (Excerpts) ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ With the General Secretary of the CC CCP ○○○○○○○○○○ DENG XIAOPING Stenogram: Meeting of the Delegations of the 1 March 1962 Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, Moscow, 5-20 July 1963. At the beginning of the meeting, Deng Xiaoping and CC CCP Secretariat candidate member Yang 8 July Shangkun were cautiously reserved, noticeably nervous, and evidently ready to receive a document of a different Deng Xiaoping. By law, obviously, Com. [Comrade] character. Grishin should not object to our working? [Deng said] “...we draw your attention to the fact Grishin. Today is a work day. I don’t know what Liu that your letter talks about the necessity of improving Ningyi thinks. relations with Albania. In the end, the larger party should Kang Sheng. Liu Ningyi is silent, which means that take the initiative on such issues. Issues of prestige do not he agrees. exist for a large party and a large country. In the past we Deng Xiaoping. Well as for today, perhaps I should had disagreements with other parties and we have experi- speak? ence in resolving them, as we told com. Khrushchev. As Suslov. Please, [go ahead]... we told you earlier, we have experience in relations with Korea. The CPSU has much experience in relations with Speech by the CCP delegation head Com. Deng Xiaoping. Poland. For this reason, given a desire to improve Deng Xiaoping. First of all, I want to announce that relations, of course, a resolution will be found.” ... our delegation at the request of the CC of our party came The meeting, which continued for about an hour to this meeting in Moscow of representatives of the CCP and a half, took place in an even, calm tone. After the and USSR with the sincere intention of removing discord Chinese comrades had acquainted themselves with the and strengthening unity… contents of the CC CPSU’s letter, their reserve (skovannost’) disappeared; they acted more freely and ...It can be said with all candor that a whole series of cordially. In parting with us, Deng Xiaoping said: “Your letter calls for solidarity—and that is good.” disagreements of a fundamental character which exist

today in the international communist movement, started at ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○ the 20th Congress of the CPSU. 176 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

In the past we never spoke about this openly, because 20th Congress of the CPSU, beginning in 1956, at meet- we were taking into account the situation you were in. We ings of an internal sort [vnutrennego poryadka], the only mentioned that the disagreements which have arisen leading comrades of our party criticized your errors in a in the past few years in the international Communist moderate form more than once. In his statement comrade movement were provoked by the violation of the Declara- Suslov said that we kept quiet for 7 years. There are no tion of 1957 by comrades from several fraternal parties... grounds for [saying] that. We have always considered and still consider that the 20th In fact, both on the issue of Stalin and on the issue of Congress of the CPSU put forward positions on the issues the form of transition, that is peaceful transition, the of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful leaders of the CCP presented their views more than once to transition which went against Marxism-Leninism. Espe- the leaders of the CPSU. And these views are well known cially serious are two issues: the issue of the so called to you. “peaceful transition” and the issue of the full, groundless Back in April 1956, Com. Mao Zedong stated our denunciation of Stalin under the pretext of the so called opinion on the issue of Stalin in a discussion with Com. “struggle with the cult of personality”... Mikoian and also after that, in a discussion with Ambassa- Here I want just briefly to say the following: a dor Com. Iudin. criticism of some errors by Stalin is necessary; taking off Com. Mao Zedong emphasized that it is incorrect to the lid, so to speak, and ending superstition is a good think that “Stalin’s errors and contributions are divided thing. However this criticism must be correct both from into equal halves;” “whatever happened, all the same the point of view of principles and from the point of view Stalin’s contributions are greater than his errors. One must of methods. evaluate it as follows, that his contributions make up 70 Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the facts percent, and his mistakes30 percent. It is necessary to demonstrate that the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin make a concrete analysis and to give an all-around is a serious step undertaken by the leading comrades from [vsestoronnaya] assessment.”... In October 1956, Com. the CPSU with the aim of laying out the path to the Zhou Enlai also stated our views about Stalin in a discus- revision of Marxism-Leninism on a whole series of sion with Com. Ponamarev, who was then a member of the issues... After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, as a CPSU delegation present at the eighth Congress of our consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of [CCP] party. In discussion with Com. Ponomarev, Com. personality and the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin, Zhou Enlai criticized the mistakes by comrades from the the wave of an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign CPSU: first, “no preliminary consultation was carried out was provoked around the whole world... with fraternal parties”; secondly, “an all-around historical The most prominent events which took place in this analysis was completely lacking” in relation to Stalin; period were the events in Poland and Hungary. thirdly, the leading comrades from the CPSU “lacked self- We have always considered and still consider that in criticism”. These are the three points which Com. Zhou resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, Enlai talked about. the CPSU took a position of great-power chauvinism, On 23 October 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again talked trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordi- with Com. Iudin about the issue of Stalin. Com. Mao nate them to itself by means of coercion and even tried to Zedong then said that it was necessary to criticize Stalin, resort to military force. We consider that such a method is but that in relation to critical methods we hold to another not only evidence of great-power chauvinism in relation to opinion, and also have a different opinion about some fraternal countries and to fraternal parties, but also other issues. Com. Mao Zedong also said that you had evidence of adventurism. completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had Following this, the counterrevolutionary mutiny in thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it Hungary took place. The Hungarian events by their in order to kill us. That is the same as if, having picked up character differ from the events in Poland. In resolving the a stone, one were to throw it on one’s own feet [podniav issues associated with the events in Poland, which were kamen’ brosit’ ego sebe na nogi]. issues of an internal order [vnutrennego poriadka], On 30 November 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, the received Com. Iudin and in a conversation with him said comrades in the CPSU resorted to coercive methods, even that the basic course and line in the period of Stalin’s trying to resort to military force. leadership was correct and that one must not treat one’s And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the comrade like an enemy. counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary? The leadership of On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that against your position on the matter. Such a position was the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was con- practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and nected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by details of these two events are well known to you and to Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between us. I do not want to dwell on them greatly... After the fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 177 hand, was connected with mistakes committed by the September 1959, Com. Khrushchev began to preach to the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In whole world of a “world without arms, without armies, discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforemen- without wars”, (look good in all sorts of different ways) tioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the made the leader of American imperialism, considered CPSU: the lack of an all-around analysis, the lack of self- peaceful coexistence the task of all tasks, and propagan- criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal dized the idea that, supposedly, the American-Soviet countries. friendship decides the fate of humanity. All of this Both Com. Mao Zedong on the 29 October 1957, on practically signified a sermon to the effect that the nature the eve of his departure for Moscow, in a conversation of imperialism had already changed, that Marxism- with Com. Iudin, and Com. Zhou Enlai during the 22nd Leninism was already obsolete. Congress of the CPSU in 1961, in a conversation with During this very period you started to propagandize Com. Khrushchev, stated our opinion on the issue of the so called “spirit of Camp David” everywhere. Inciden- Stalin. tally, Eisenhower did not recognize the existence of any It should be further noted that when the events in “spirit of Camp David”. Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi, heading the delegation of During this very period you, counting on some “spirit the CCP, arrived in Moscow for negotiations, during which of Camp David,” clutched at the straw extended by he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized Eisenhower and began mounting attacks upon China in comrades from the CPSU for committing the same your statements without restraint. mistakes during the events in Polandmistakes of great- On 30 September 1959, in his speech at a banquet power chauvinism which took place during Stalin’s held by us on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the leadership as well... From that very time, you, considering creation of the PRC, Com. Khrushchev stated that one that your internal problems have already been resolved, must not test the firmness of a capitalist power with force. started to direct the cutting edge [ostrie] of your action On 6 October 1959 in his speech in Vladivostok, against Marxism-Leninism against fraternal parties Com. Khrushchev stated that allegedly we were looking defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and began for war, like cocks for a fight [kak petukhi k drake]. to engage in activities directed against the CCP, against the On 31 October 1959 in his report to the session of the PRC, and this activity is of a serious character. Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Com. Khrushchev said that What has been done by you over this period? Let us some, similarly to Trotskii, want “neither war nor peace.” cite some of the facts, so as to make things clear. On 1 December 1959 in his speech at the 7th Congress of From April to July of 1958 the CPSU put to China the the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, Com. Khrushchev issue of the creation of a long-wave radar station and a demanded “a checking of watches.” In that same speech joint fleet, trying thereby to bring China under its military he stated that “if the leadership of this or that country control. But we guessed your intentions and you were not becomes conceited, then that can play into the hands of the able to attain your goals. enemy.” Following that you started both in statements and in In February 1960 during the meeting of the Political actions to carry out anti-Chinese activities in an intensified Consultative Council of the participating countries of the manner. You continually spoke out attacking the internal Warsaw Pact, Com. Khrushchev spoke rudely using an policies of the CCP, in particular on the people’s com- expression like “old galoshes.” Meanwhile, the CC CPSU mune. in its oral presentation to the CC CCP accused China of By way of example one can refer to the conversation committing such mistakes as a “narrowly-nationalist by Com. Khrushchev with the American Congressman approach,” and of acting on “narrowly-nationalist inter- [Hubert] Humphrey in December 1958 and to the speech ests,” in relation to the issues of the Indian-Chinese border. by Com. Khrushchev in a Polish agricultural cooperative The sense of all these statements and speeches is in July 1959. understood by you and by us, and also by our enemies... In June 1959 you unilaterally annulled the agreement In such circumstances we could not remain silent any on rendering help to China in developing a nuclear longer. We published three articles”Long live Leninism!” industry and in producing atom bombs. and others, in which we defended Marxism-Leninism and Following this, on 9 September 1959, TASS made an the Moscow Declaration, and exposed some revisionist announcement about the incident on the Chinese-Indian and opportunist views to criticism. But in these three border and displayed bias in favor of the Indian reaction, articles, we as before directed the brunt of our struggle for making the disagreements between China and the Soviet the most part against imperialism and Yugoslavian Union clear to the whole world for the first time. revisionism without open criticism of comrades from the In November of that year Com. Khrushchev openly CPSU. accused China of having acted “stupidly” and “regretta- Following this, such events occurred as the intrusion bly” in a conversation with a correspondent of the Indian of the American “U-2” plane into the USSR’s airspace, the daily “New Age.” collapse of the meeting of the heads of government of the At the last meeting at Camp David which was held in four powers in Paris and the collapse of the entirely non- 178 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 existent so-called “spirit of Camp-David.” All of this your control. proved the error of the views of our comrades from the You failed to consult with fraternal countries on such CPSU and the correctness of our views... an important issue. You daily speak about the danger of In June 1960 in Bucharest, the leadership of the CPSU thermonuclear war. But in the given case you rashly mounted a sudden attack on the CCP, disseminated the played with nuclear weapons. Informational Note of the CC of the CPSU which contains You justify your actions by saying that you wanted to an all-around attack on the CCP, and organized a campaign obtain some sort of “promise” from the USA, and you say by a whole group of fraternal parties against us… that you truly received such a “promise.” On 16 July 1960 the Soviet side unilaterally decided But what are the facts? The facts are that under threat to withdraw between 28 July and 1 September over 1,300 from the United States you were obliged to remove your Soviet specialists working in China. Over 900 specialists missiles. By all sorts of means you tried to convince Cuba were recalled from [extended] business trips and contracts to agree to so-called “international inspection,” which and agreements were broken… encroaches upon their sovereignty and constitutes interfer- On 25 August 1962, the Soviet government informed ence in their internal affairs. Besides that, you also China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the conduct propaganda among the peoples of the world, USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear convincing them to believe in some sort of promise by weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly Kennedy, and thereby you adorn [priukrashivaete] goal in coming to such an agreement, namely: to bind American imperialism. China by the hands and feet through an agreement with the In his letters to Kennedy of the 27 and 28 October USA. 1962, Com. Khrushchev wrote: “You are working toward After India started a major attack on the border the preservation of peace” and “I express my satisfaction regions of China in October 1962, the Soviet Union began and recognition of your manifestation of a sense of to supply India with even larger quantities of military moderation and an understanding of the responsibility materiel, to do its utmost to give [India] an economic which now rests on you for the preservation of peace in the blood transfusion, to support Nehru by political means, whole world.” and to spur him on to the struggle against China. But the question remains did the USA in the end give Your position on the issues of the Indian-Chinese some sort of promise? Let us look at [US Secretary of border conflict received praise from the USA. The U.S. State Dean] Rusk’s statement of 11 January 1963. Rusk Assistant Secretary of State [Averell] Harriman, said: “I stated: “To whatever extent President Kennedy took on consider that the maintenance of relations that are as obligations not to encroach on Cuba at the moment of the friendly as possible between India and Moscow serves its Cuban crisis, these obligations have not come into force.” own interests well and also serves our interests well.” He further said: “In general no such obligations exist.”... Harriman made this statement on 9 December 1962. At the Congresses of these parties another strange Further, on 18 December 1962 in conversation with a phenomenon was observed: on the one hand at these Japanese correspondent, Harriman also stated that the USA Congresses they attacked the CCP and completely re- wanted to see the Soviet Union help India in the matter of moved the Albanian Workers’ Party, and on the other hand, supporting its defense capabilities. they forcibly dragged the Titoist clique in Yugoslavia into On the issue of Chinese-Indian relations you went too the ranks of the international communist movement and far. With all [bad] intention, you spoke out together with tried to rehabilitate that clique. In addition, at the Con- Kennedy and Nehru against China. Where then did the gress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, there was spirit of proletarian internationalism, which existed under noise, whistling, and stamping right at the time when our Lenin and Stalin, go? representative subjected Yugoslav revisionism to criticism In October 1962 there was a crisis in the region of the on the basis of the Moscow Declaration by citing the Caribbean Sea. During these events we consider that you Moscow Declaration verbatim. committed two errors: in shipping the missiles to Cuba you What do the facts we have cited above, which took indulged in adventurism, and then, showing confusion in place after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, testify to? the face of nuclear blackmail from the USA, you capitu- These facts testify to the fact that comrades from the lated. CPSU have taken further steps to create a split in the ranks People understandably [zakonno] ask why you began of the international communist movement, and, moreover, to ship missiles to Cuba. In this regard we have our own have done so in an increasingly sharp, increasingly experience. Judging by our experience, your actions in extreme form, in an increasingly organized [way], on an this regard remind us in their character of your efforts to increasingly large scale, trying, come what may, to crush develop a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet in others. China. For Cuba’s defense no missiles are necessary at all. I would like to note that using such methods is a And so, in shipping missiles to Cuba, did you want to help habitual affair for you. You began using such methods as her or to ruin her? We have become suspicious that you, in far back as the Bucharest conference. During the bilateral shipping missiles to Cuba, were trying to place her under meeting between the representatives of our two parties in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 179

1960, I said that it was fortunate that Com. Peng Zhen unequal rights in the relations between socialist countries went to the Bucharest meeting; he weighs approximately which took place during that period by the fault of Stalin. 80 kilograms, and for that reason he endured; if I had How could the 20th Congress, which abolished these gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I could not elements of unequal rights and fully restored the principle have endured. After that it was just as well that Com. Wu of respecting national sovereignty, be reason for dissatis- Xiuquan, who weighs more than 70 kilograms, went to the faction on the part of the Hungarian people? GDR, and was able to endure. Frankly speaking, such You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculat- methods do not help matters. You cannot prove by such ing on these events and by proving that allegedly the methods that you are in the right; you cannot prove that the Soviet Union committed errors, and that by your interfer- truth is on your side. Quite the opposite; the use of such ence you almost managed to save the situation. methods is an insult to the glorious Marxist-Leninist party. This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at Ponomarev. And Com. Grishin weighs 70 kg. After the feet of the CPSU and a more than strange pretension all, this started before Bucharest, in Beijing. That was the [pretenziia] on the part of the Chinese leaders. Did our start of and the reason for the Bucharest Conference. country not pay with thousands of its sons’ lives in order to Deng Xiaoping. I understand you. preserve the socialist order in fraternal Hungary; did it not Peng Zhen. Wait. You will have [your] time; you come to the aid of the friendly Hungarian people in its will be able to say as much as you want then. We are difficult hour?... ready to hear you out... Throughout the whole period of existence of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping. I have already taken 5 hours in my the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government invariably statement, and on that I end it. Are we going to continue gave help to China in creating and strengthening the the session today, or will we continue it tomorrow? defense of the country. The 24 defense enterprises built Suslov. We propose a break until the day after with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union were the tomorrow, at 10 AM. We must acquaint ourselves with basis for the creation of corresponding branches of your statement. Chinese industry. Another 33 defense enterprises are Deng Xiaoping. We agree. Who will speak the day being built. At one time, 60 infantry divisions were after tomorrow, you or we? equipped with arms and military-technical property Suslov. By the order it will be our turn. supplied from the USSR, and from 1955-1956 the modern- Andropov. By the principle: we, you, we, you. ization of the Chinese army with more modern types of Deng Xiaoping. That is Com. Andropov’s invention armaments and materiel was carried out. In past years our [izobretenie]... country has given the PRC a large quantity of technical July 10 and technological documentation by which China was able to organize the production of MIG-17, MIG-l9, MIG-21-F, Suslov. Again, as in 1960, you are putting in motion and TU-16 airplanes, MI-4 helicopters, “air-to-air,” the practice, which has already been condemned by “ground-to-air,” “ground-to-ground,” “air-to-ground,” and communist parties, of personal attacks on Com. N.S. “ship-to-ground” missiles, naval materiel, submarines, and Khrushchev. Such a practice in the past did not provoke cutters of various types. The Soviet Union helped the PRC anything but indignation in any true communist, and will develop the basis for a nuclear industry... do the same now. Several words on the issue you raised about the so- Com. N.S. Khrushchev is our recognized leader. called “joint construction of a naval fleet.” Com. Deng Reflecting the collective will of the CC CPSU, he has Xiaoping stated that apparently our party tried to stick gained unlimited authority for himself in our party, in the China with the joint construction of a naval fleet and that country, in the whole world through his selfless devotion by doing so we allegedly encroached upon the sovereignty to Marxism-Leninism and through his truly titanic struggle of the PRC. Com. Deng Xiaoping, after all you were to build communism in the USSR, to preserve peace in the present at the discussion between Com. Khrushchev and whole world in defense of the interests of all working Com. Mao Zedong on 31 July 1958 and took part in it. people... Have you really forgotten the following statement made by For obviously demagogic ends you are trying to Com. Khrushchev in the course of the conversation. connect the decisions of the 20th Congress with the well- “Never have we at the CC of the CPSU even had the known events in Poland and also with the counterrevolu- thought of jointly building a fleet. You know my point of tionary revolt in Hungary in 1956... We do not plan to view. During Stalin’s reign I was against the “joint examine these issues anew. We will simply note the companies [smeshannye obshchestva].” Later, N.S. complete groundlessness of your assertions to the effect Khrushchev announced: “We considered it necessary to that the decisions of the 20th Congress led to the counter- talk about the issue of building a fleet, but we neither revolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for thought about or considered it necessary to construct a those events, as is shown by materials of the fraternal joint factory or a joint fleet.” In response to this Com. parties, comes from the errors of the previous leadership of Mao Zedong stated that: “If it is so, then all the dark Hungary connected with Stalin’s actions: elements of clouds have dispersed.” There is no issue, but you have 180 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 brought it up again today. What do you need it for?... July 13 We would also like to remind our forgetful Chinese comrades about some facts and about the assistance the Suslov. Com. Ponomarev will speak today for our USSR has given to the economic development of the PRC. delegation. Do not the 198 modern industrial enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the scientific- Speech by the representative of the CPSU Com. B. N. research institutes which it set up, and the technical cadres Ponomarev: trained in the USSR, bear witness to the commitment by the CPSU to fraternal friendship with People’s China? Up Comrades, yesterday we heard the second address by until 1959 almost a half of all the cast iron was produced, the head of the Chinese delegation. Our delegation cannot more than half of all the steel was smelted, and more than hide the fact that we came out of the meeting feeling deep half of the rolled iron was made in the metallurgical sorrow and distress. Of course, this was not because the enterprises constructed in China with help from the USSR. address allegedly contained criticism, which is what Deng Such new branches of industry as the automobile, the Xiaoping had in mind when he talked about “bitter, but tractor, and the aviation industry have been developed in necessary medicine.” We communists are steadfast China with the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people, and more than once have come across not only Union gave the PRC 21 thousand sets of scientific- groundless criticism, but also malicious slander. technical documentation, including more than 1400 plans No, that was not what left us with a bitter taste. The of whole enterprises... second address by Com. Deng Xiaoping confirmed our Deng Xiaoping. Perhaps tomorrow we rest for a day? worst fears, formed toward the end of his first speech. It is The day after tomorrow we will speak according to his becoming clearer and clearer that the delegation of the CC principle. (He turns to Com. Andropov). of the CCP came here not to find agreement and to Suslov. Fine, until ten o’clock, yes? eliminate our differences. Your design, evidently, is Deng Xiaoping. Fine, we agree... different — to bring a whole load of dirt [privezti...tselyi voz griazi] to Moscow, to dump it on us, to do everything, July 12 not shying away from any tactics [ne stesniaias’ v sredstvakh], to defame the policies of the CPSU and Deng Xiaoping. Under the influence of your un- thereby further worsen the relations between our two revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the People’s parties and countries... Socialist Party of Cuba at one time fell to attacking the Ponomarev. Fabrication Number 4. You fabricated armed struggle led by Com. Fidel Castro, calling it an undoubted falsehood to the effect that the USSR did not “putschism,” “adventurism,” and “terrorism.” It accused aid the Algerian people’s war of liberation. Here are the Com. Castro of the fact that the armed struggle led by him facts. In the most decisive period of the war, from 1960- was a “total mistake” [sploshnaya oshibka], “caused by a 1962, we supplied free to the People’s Liberation Army of petty-bourgeois nature, and that its leaders do not rely on Algeria 25 thousand rifles, 21 thousand machine guns and the masses.” It even openly demanded of Com. Castro sub-machine guns, 1300 howitzers, cannons and mortars, that he renounce “putschistic activities,” and “the errone- many tens of thousands of pistols and other weapons. ous path of armed struggle, leading to a rupture with the Over 5 million rubles’ worth of clothes, provisions and people.” medical supplies were supplied to Algeria by Soviet social Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on organizations alone. Hundreds of wounded from the peaceful transition, the Algerian communist party from Algerian Liberation Army were saved and treated in the 1957 fully renounced armed struggle and, moreover, began Soviet Union. Soviet wheat, sugar, butter, conserves, to propagandize the “danger” of national-liberationist war, condensed milk, etc., streamed into Algeria. advocating the attainment of independence through Finally, Fabrication Number 5. You again and again compromise, and in doing so fully wasted its place in the repeat your lying version of Soviet policy towards Poland, political life of the country. Hungary and Cuba. Who are you [to set yourselves up] as Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on judges in these matters, if the party and governmental peaceful transition, the Communist party of Iraq re- leaders of these three countries fully, decisively and nounced the correct line, which it at one time had imple- publicly for the whole world reject your insinuations and mented, and began dreaming about the realization of a declare to you that it is impermissible for representatives peaceful transition in Iraq. This led revolution in Iraq to of a communist party to try and split the USSR, Poland serious failures and to defeat. During the counterrevolu- and Hungary through fabrications? Com. Fidel Castro in tionary coup of 8 February 1963 the Communist party of speeches in the USSR and on returning [to Cuba] clearly Iraq found itself in a condition of complete unpreparedness described the internationalist policies of the CPSU. By the and suffered heavy losses... way, why didn’t you publish these speeches? They would have shown the Chinese people that your position during the Caribbean crisis [Ed. note. This is what the Russians COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 181 call the Cuban Missile Crisis.] was erroneous and contra- state in the world to be a dictatorship of the proletariat, dicted the interests of the Cuban, Soviet and Chinese which the Soviet people shared with the peoples of the peoples… whole world, has been the Soviet people’s experience of Andropov. As for you, you long ago ceased any sort existence in the conditions of tyranny under some “dicta- of consultation with us. In 1958, the Chinese side did not tor?” inform us in a timely fashion about its intentions to carry From what you have said it appears as if the first out the shelling of the coastal islands in the Taiwan straits socialist country in the world was built thanks to the fact which was carried out soon after Com. N.S. Khrushchev that a “fool” headed the leadership. Can it really be that left Beijing. According to the later admission of Com. the achievements of the national economy and the devel- Mao Zedong, during Com. N.S. Khrushchev’s presence in opment of the latest technology in the Soviet Union during Beijing the Chinese comrades had already decided on this several decades have been attained under the leadership of operation and had prepared it, but you did not consider it some sort of “fool?” Can it really be that the basis for the necessary to inform the Soviet government about it. development of nuclear weapons and missile technology in Despite this, during a dark hour for the Chinese govern- the Soviet Union has been laid down under the leadership ment, the head of the Soviet government informed the US of some sort of “fool”? President Eisenhower that an attack on China would be From what you have said it appears as if the Supreme taken as an attack on the Soviet Union. Commander of the great Soviet Army turns out to have Over the last several years the government of the PRC been some sort of “idiot.” Can it really be that the great has completely failed to inform the government of the victory of the Soviet Army during World War II was won USSR about the Chinese-American negotiations that have under the command of some sort of “idiot”? been going on since 1955 at the ambassadorial level in From what you have said it appears as if the great Warsaw. Judging by the press reports, over 100 meetings CPSU was in the position of having some sort of “bandit” were held there. Since May 1958 you have twice sharply at the head of its leadership for 30 years. Can it really be changed your political course on relations with Japan, and, that the CPSU which for a long time had the love and in both cases, despite the Treaty of 1950, you did so respect of the revolutionary peoples of the whole world without consulting with us... had a “bandit” as its great leader for several decades? Kang Sheng. In your criticism of Stalin, you do not From what you have said it appears as if the ranks of take the position of seeking the truth and do not use the international communist movement which grew and methods of scientific analysis, but resort to demagogy, became stronger from year to year were under the leader- slanders and abusive language. ship of some sort of “shit.” Can it really be that commu- Comrades from the CPSU call Stalin “a murderer,” “a nists of all countries considered some sort of “shit” to be criminal,” “a bandit,” “a gambler,” “a despot like Ivan the their flag-bearer for several decades? Terrible,” “the greatest dictator in the history of Russia,” From what you have said it appears as if the great “a fool,” “shit,” “an idiot” [ubiitsa, ugolovnik, bandit, proletarian leader for whom imperialists and reactionaries igrok, despot tipa Ivana Groznogo, samyi bol’shoi diktator of different countries felt fierce hatred for a long time has v istorii Rossii, durak, govno, idiot]. turned out to be all-in-all some sort of “gambler.” Can it All of these curses and swear words came from the really be that the Soviet people and the revolutionary mouth of Com. N.S. Khrushchev. peoples of all countries struggling against imperialism and Trying to justify Com. N.S. Khrushchev, in your reaction considered their teacher some sort of “gam- address of 10 July you stated that allegedly he gave Stalin bler”?... an “objective and all-around assessment,” that allegedly he Comrades, you, so to speak, having picked up the adhered to the “heart of the matter” [printsipial‘noe stone, have thrown it on your own feet. How can you treat otnoshenie]. Is this not the same as telling cock-and-bull Stalin in such a way? Your actions in this regard not only stories with your eyes shut [nesti nebylitsy s zakrytymi go counter to historical reality, but also put you in a very glazami]? awkward position. Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at all why the In depicting Stalin as such a bad man, you also leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce hatred for blacken the entire leadership of the Soviet state and the Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most malicious abuse, CPSU; and, at the same time, as comrades who then took why it attacks him with more hatred then it shows its part in the leadership of the state and the party, you cannot enemies? justify yourselves by saying that you do not carry your From your statements it emerges that allegedly the portion of responsibility for the “crimes” you talk about. great Soviet people lived for thirty years under the tyranny Let us take, for example, Com. Khrushchev. He of “the greatest dictator in the history of Russia.” Can it heaped all of the errors of the period of Stalin’s leadership, really be that such a great leader who for many years especially the excesses committed on the issue of counter- enjoyed the general recognition of the Soviet people really revolutionary elements, on Stalin alone while he presented turned out to be “the greatest dictator in the history of himself as being completely clean. Can this really Russia?” Can it really be that the experience of the first convince people? If the memory of men is not too short, 182 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 they will be able to recall that during Stalin’s leadership views by both sides in this circle where the representatives Com. Khrushchev more than once extolled Stalin and the of the two parties have been meeting is very useful for policy he was then carrying out of struggling with counter- mutual understanding, for gradually finding a common revolutionary elements. language, for searching out a way to eliminate disagree- Com. Khrushchev constantly praised Stalin, calling ments and strengthen cohesion. For that reason we him “a close friend and comrade-in-arms of Lenin,” “a consider that it serves as a good start...our delegation is very great genius, teacher, great leader of humanity,” “a introducing a proposal temporarily to adjourn the current great marshal of victories,” “a friend of peoples in his meeting; the representatives of the CCP and the CPSU, simplicity,” “one’s own father” [rodnoi otets] and so on both sides, can continue their meeting at another time. The and so on. time and place of the next meeting will be set through a On 6 June 1937 in his report at the 5th party confer- consultation between the Central Committees of our two ence of the Moscow oblast’, Com. Khrushchev said: “Our parties... party will mercilessly crush the band of betrayers and Our delegation once again expresses the sincere hope traitors, will wipe all the Trotskyist-rightist carrion from of our party that we and you will not spare our efforts the face of the earth... The guarantee is the unshakable towards an all-around, repeated, and most careful discus- leadership of our CC, the unshakable leadership of our sion of the disagreements existing between our parties. If great leader, Com. Stalin... We will annihilate our enemies a single meeting is not enough for this, it is possible to without a trace to the last one and will scatter their ashes in hold a second meeting, and if two meetings do not suffice, the wind.” a third can be held... Later, for example on 8 June 1938, while speaking at the 4th party conference of the Kiev oblast’, Com. 20 July Khrushchev said: “Yakiry, balitskie, liubchenki, zatomskie” [Ed. note: Famous purge victims] and other Suslov. We will give you an answer tomorrow... bastards wanted to bring Polish nobles [Pol’she pany] to Deng Xiaoping. In conclusion I would like to say a the Ukraine, wanted to bring German fascists, landowners few words. and capitalists here... We have destroyed quite a few However great the disagreements between us may be, enemies, but not all. For that reason one must keep one’s we hope that we can gradually find the way to eliminate eyes open. We must firmly remember the words of Com. those disagreements, since unity between us is too Stalin, that as long as capitalist encirclement exists, they important. will send spies and provocateurs [diversanty] to us... Despite the fact that in the course of the discussion Frankly speaking, on the issue of criticism and self- both our sides have stated more than a few views with criticism you are inferior to Stalin. Having made mistakes, which the other side does not agree, and despite the fact Stalin sometimes still practiced self-criticism. For that you have said that our words are not pleasant to the instance, Stalin gave some mistaken advice relating to the ear, and that we have also said that your words are not Chinese revolution. After the victory of the Chinese pleasant to the ear, despite all of this, our current meeting revolution, he recognized his mistakes before Chinese will serve as a good start. Moreover, we have agreed with comrades and friends. And how are you acting? You you to publish a communiqué on the continuation of our know well that you slough off [svalivaete] all of your meetings. We consider this a good thing. mistakes onto others and ascribe all successes to yourself... We have come to the agreement that it is necessary to Suslov. Our delegation states a decisive protest continue our meetings and that the time and place of the against the distortion, falsification and slanders made in next meeting will be agreed by the Central Committees of relation to the leadership of our party and to Com. N.S. our parties. Khrushchev, against our party and the decisions of its Here I would like to express in passing the following Congresses. hope of ours: if your delegation, if the CC of the CPSU The delegation of the CPSU also states its protest agrees, then we would like to invite the delegation of the against the sort of propaganda that has begun in the last CPSU to Beijing for the continuation of the meeting. That few days on Peking radio. We consider that the entire issue, of course, could be agreed upon separately. responsibility for these actions rests with the leadership of Suslov. This is also a question for discussion between the CCP... our Central Committees. Finished [vse]. Will I see you Deng Xiaoping. Com. Suslov has expressed some [later] today? sort of protest. If we are talking about protest, then we Deng Xiaoping. At six? have an even greater basis for voicing even more pro- Suslov. Yes, at six. tests... Already two weeks have gone by since our meeting [Source : SAPMO Barch JIV 2/207 698, pp. 187-330 (in began. At the meeting both sides exchanged their views. Russian); obtained by Vladislav Zubok; translated by Benjamin Although as of yet it has been difficult to attain a unity of Aldrich-Moodie.] both sides’ views right away, still, a frank exposition of