COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 149 In Memoriam: Deng Xiaoping and the Cold War In the final analysis, three main courts will pass judgement on the actions of our Parties. First of all, the masses, secondly, the communist parties, which in the course of their practical existence must figure out what is going on, and in the third instance, time and history, which makes the final conclusions. General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in conversation with Soviet Ambassador S.V. Chervonenko (12 September 1960)1 By David Wolff eng may have had something more philosophical leadership had moved to seaside Beidaihe to escape the in mind, but, his ultimate arbiter, history, is the Beijing summer heat. Therefore, Vietnamese leader, Ho D daily output of the historians. This section of the Chi Minh, joined them there and met with Mao on August Bulletin aims to provide enough archival material for 10. In referring to the Soviet Union, Mao was livid. historians of Chinese, Russian, and Communist history to begin a debate on the role of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) Khrushchev can cooperate with America, England and in Sino-Soviet relations during the years 1956-1963, a France. He can cooperate with India and Indonesia. period that witnessed both the final years of cooperation He can even cooperate with Yugoslavia, but only with between the two communist powers and the emergence of China is it impossible on the grounds that we have tensions that finally split the alliance. Although the late divergent opinions. Does that mean that his views are paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China is best identical with America, England, France and India to remembered for the tremendous, though uneven, reforms allow whole-hearted cooperation? [He] withdraws that he introduced and oversaw during the last twenty the experts from China and doesn’t transfer technol- years of his life, his earlier achievements should not be ogy, while sending experts to India and giving neglected. technology. So what if China doesn’t have experts? Within weeks of the conversation from which the Will people die, I don’t believe it. epigraph is drawn, Deng arrived in Moscow for ideologi- cal jousting at the highest levels with Mikhail Suslov, the Ho’s reaction was: “That’s a pretty strong statement.”4 Kremlin’s “gray cardinal.” And Deng always gave as In sharp contrast to this explosion, four days earlier on good as he got. Of course, by 1963, when again Deng and August 4, Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, had met Suslov headed the delegations, the level of vituperation with Ambassador Chervonenko and insisted that “speaking had risen sharply. When Deng returned from this last as one Communist to another,” a full break between the encounter, the whole CCP Politburo, headed by Mao, parties was not a possibility.5 But what does this diver- Zhou, and, Lin Biao turned out at the airport to applaud gence of messages reveal? It is possible that in light of the 2 him, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng. Vlad Zubok, in an disastrous famine that accompanied the “Great Leap insightful and provocative introductory essay, speculates Forward” and would claim upward of 15 million Chinese that the services Deng rendered Mao in his battle with the lives in 1959-61, Mao had ordered his subordinates to Soviet “older brother” may have saved his life when the show restraint and moderation in the hope of continuing Cultural Revolution swept others away. Chen Jian’s aid from the Soviets. After all, where else would it come “Rejoinder” only strengthens this impression, while from? On the other hand, it is also possible that the providing a fuller Chinese politics context. Both the 1960 Chinese leadership, influenced by the same perception of and 1963 talks, together with six memoranda of conversa- China’s dire straits, collectively opted for a moderate tions between Deng and Soviet representatives, are policy, despite Mao’s rancor and radicalism. If this is excerpted in this Bulletin. Additional materials can be indeed the case, we will find Deng among the moderates, found at the CWIHP website: cwihp.si.edu. placating the Soviets right up into 1962, if not further. But The fall of 1960 was a special time in other respects, only additional documentation, especially from the for the USSR had just withdrawn its experts from the PRC, Chinese side, can answer these critical questions. 3 occasioning bewilderment, hardship and ill-will. Al- The search for a current of moderation in a period though the Soviet Union was well enough informed about usually identified with deepening estrangement in Sino- affairs in China to sense the variety of reactions, newly Soviet relations is exactly the kind of refinement that released materials are only now making clear the depth of document-based studies of the Cold War can offer. An division. Only a few weeks after the withdrawal, the CCP October 1997 gathering on “Sino-Soviet Relations and the 150 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 Cold War” (see conference schedule below) of Russian, dokumentatsii) [Central Repository for Contemporary Documen- Chinese, West European and American scholars in Beijing tation], f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 255. 2 focused on new documentation, both Russian and Chinese, Kang Sheng’s diatribe against the Soviet treatment of Stalin is that made it possible to identify smaller positive eddies probably the most powerful piece of oratory in this Bulletin. 3 On the withdrawal of the Soviet experts, see Chen Jian, “A and swirls amidst the generally accepted trends of Sino- Crucial Step toward the Sino-Soviet Schism” in CWIHP Bulletin, Soviet divergence. Similarly, the January 1996 CWIHP 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 246ff. conference in Hong Kong examined documents from the 4 See Yang Kuisong “Toward the Breakdown, 1960-3,” p.5 early 1950s, the heyday of Sino-Soviet friendship, and (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference “Sino-Soviet found grounds for incipient strife.6 Relations and the Cold War” (Beijing, 1997)). Document-based studies can also help us to draw a 5 See Odd Arne Westad, “Who Killed the Alliance?” pp. 7-8. detailed and more human portrait of a giant of the twenti- (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War” (Beijing, 1997). eth century. What is certain is that the history of the Cold 6 War will not be complete without an archive-based More on this can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 and 8-9, where the Russian version of a message from Mao to Stalin (2 biography of Deng Xiaoping. CWIHP, together with all October 1950) suggests great tensions in the earliest phases of the scholars of the Cold War and China, looks forward to the Korean War, a supposed highpoint of socialist internationalism. speedy release and publication of Deng-related materials The previously accepted Chinese version, claiming identity of by the appropriate PRC “units” with actual archival access, views on the sending of “volunteers” to Korea, now appears to especially the Central Archives with their holdings of CCP have been a draft telegram never sent. Only declassification of documents. CWIHP is continuing its collection of materi- the document and examination of its archival context can clarify als from which to piece together the lifework of Deng this contradiction further. Xiaoping and hopes that readers with such documents will forward copies to the Project. 1 TsKhSD (Tsentral’noe khranilishche sovremennoi Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War An International Symposium Sponsored by The Cold War International History Project, The Wilson Center; Institute of Contemporary China, CASS; Center for Oriental History Research, Chinese Association of Historians; Fairbank Center, Harvard University 22-25 October 1997, Beijing Wednesday, October 22, 1997 Brief Introduction of Conference Organization SHEN ZHIHUA (Director, Center for Oriental History Research) DAVID WOLFF (Director, The Cold War International History Project) Reflections on Sino-Soviet Relations Speakers: LI LIAN, ANATOLII HAZONOV, WARREN COHEN, YAN MINGFU, WU LENGXI, HUANG HUA, ZHU RUIZHEN The Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance DIETER HEINZIG (Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, Germany) The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty Negotiations: A Reappraisal in Light of New Sources SHEN ZHIHUA (Center for Oriental History Research) The Signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1950 and Soviet Strategic Aims in the Far East XUE XIANTIAN (Modern History Institute, CASS) Soviet Strategy toward Xinjiang during the Postwar Period LEONID NEZHINSKII (Russian History Institute, Russian Academy of Science) The Changing Theoretical Foundation of Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War Discussants: LIU GUOXIN (Institute of Contemporary China); VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC) ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Thursday, October 23, 1997 Sino-Soviet Economic Relations WILLIAM KIRBY (Harvard University) China, the Soviet Union, and East Europe: Trade Relations COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 151 ZHANG SHUGUANG (University of Maryland) Western Economic Embargo against China and Sino-Soviet Relations LEONID SHIROKORAD (St. Petersburg State University) The Cold War and Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s Discussants:LEV DELYUSIN (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science); ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History) International Conflict and Sino-Soviet Relations KATHRYN WEATHERSBY (Independent Scholar, Washington, DC)