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Tibet: an Issue Between China and India Tibet: an issue between China and India Dr. Sadia Fayaz* Abstract Since India and China’s independence in 1947 and 1949 respectively, Tibet remained a cause of disagreement between the two. In history, Tibet was controlled by China but in twentieth century, China lost it to Britain. After the departure of Britain from South Asian subcontinent both China and India claimed the ownership of the area. In this article, an effort has been made to discuss some of the important problems involved in Tibetan politics of the region, history and its dynamics. Descriptive and analytical method has been used for the interpretation of secondary data. A lot of literature has been review for the article. Library based research technique of social sciences has been used in this article, in which the work of others has been thoroughly scrutinized and analyzed. Keywords: Tibet, China, India, China-India Relations. * Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University Peshawar, Email: [email protected] 29 Jhss, Vol. 10, No. 2, July to December, 2019 Introduction Tibet is one of the five administrative divisions of China known as ‘autonomous regions’ allocated for national minorities. Its population mainly consists of Buddhists. It is second largest region of China by area consisting of 1.2 million square kilometers area and a population of about 3 millions. Tibet constituting one sixth of the land mass of the whole of China. It is located in South West of China and North West of India, surrounded by Kulun Mountains in North and Himalaya Mountains in South. Tibet is one of the highest plateaus of the world with altitude of about 16000 feet, also known as ‘roof of the world’. Strategically Tibet is very important for China and India both. The control of Tibet is necessary for China; firstly to secure her western border and secondly to exploit the natural resources of Tibet.1 Historical background Tibet was occupied during Tang Dynasty (718-907 A.D) and it remained under the control until Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D). However, the China’s suzerainty on Tibet vanished with the decline of the Qing Dynasty in the nineteenth century. Then a new era started in Tibetan history when Britain arrived in South Asian subcontinent. Britain made it a buffer zone in nineteenth century to protect her South Asian colony from the expansion of Czarist Russia. Britain imposed its suzerainty over Tibet because she considered that China was unable at that time to protect it from Russia.2 Therefore, by making Tibet forcefully her northern frontier created a border problem with China3 because China never agreed with Britain measures and order of things. After WWII West recognized Chinese claim over Tibet but they changed their position after communist revolution in China. Instead, it became an opportunity for western powers to destabilize China, to stir rebellion in an inaccessible and remote part of China (Tibet), which was difficult for the new People’s Republic to handle.4 With the breakdown of colonial framework in India in 1947 and establishment of communist rule in China in 1949 the situation changed and the things were to be reevaluated. The communist leaders of China gave top priority to the demarcation of its border with the neighboring states. China traditionally claimed Tibet as part of 1 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2001 p. 35 2 Sir Olaf Careo, The Geography and Ethics of India’s Northern Frontiers, Geographical Journal, Sep. 1960, vol. 126, no. 3, p. 316 3 Dr. Mohammad Yunus, Reflection on China, Lahore, Wajid Ali Press, 1988,pp. 114-15 4 Beijing Review May 7, 2008. Retrieved from www.bjreview.com.cn/expert/txt/2008- 05/07/content_115237.htm 30 Tibet: an issue between China and India greater China. However, India continued to consider Tibet as a buffer zone by inheriting the British policy; because Tibet’s autonomous status was in India’s security interests. This contained much potential for friction and strife. It was clear that a classic pattern for a border dispute5 was inherent in the situation. Indian moves in border areas, which China claimed, had increased China’s concern about Indian intentions.6 The difference between China and India on the status of Tibet was present even before the departure of Great Britain from Indian subcontinent when China objected to the Tibet independent status in the meeting of the Indian Council of World Affairs Inter-Asia Relations Conference in March 1947. However, in July 1949 when the victory of communists in China was obvious, Tibet expelled nationalist Chinese and declared independence.7 China announced that the so-called ‘Declaration of Independence’ by Tibet was the result of intrigues of imperialists and that the communist government of China would immediately proceed to liberate Tibet.8 India urged China to let Tibet be an autonomous region. India also asked China to reduce her military presence in the area. For the settlement of the problem Tibetan delegation visited India in August 1950 to discuss the problem. The Chinese ambassador in India advised the Tibetan delegation to visit China and discuss the matter there but the Tibetan delegation wanted to discuss the matter with China in a neutral territory because of their stand that these negotiations should base on equal status not between a suzerain and a protectorate. The Tibetan delegation did not visit China and stayed in India for about two months. Which was considered by China as foreign intrigue against China and did not wait further and in a decisive move, on 7 October 1950; invaded Tibet and occupied it and assert its authority by force over what it considered its own territory.9 After the occupation of Tibet, China announced that Tibet will enjoy autonomous status under Chinese rule and China will not make any change in Tibet forcefully. China also solidified this claim in a 17-point agreement with Tibet10 but did not stand on it. The 5 Robert Trumbull, Times of India, Dec 7, 1950 6 Thien Ton That, India and Southeast Asia 1947-1960, Geneva (Switzerland), Librairie Droz Press, 1963,p. 288 7 Louis Dupree, Eden Naby, The Modernization of Inner Asia, New York, M.E. Sharpe Press, 1994,p.190 8 Op.Cit., Dr. Mohammad Yunus, pp. 114-15 9 Dinesh Lal, Indo-Tibet-China Conflict, New Dehli, Gyan Publishing House Press, 2008, p. 223 10 John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Co-Existence, New York, D.Van Nontrand Press, 1967, p. 71 31 Jhss, Vol. 10, No. 2, July to December, 2019 independent status of Tibet ended with Chinese occupation and its buffer status had been lost between China and India. At the same time, China also refused to recognize the Shimla Agreement on border demarcation between Tibet and British India, which exposed the Sino-India border to a dispute.11 This was the first test of Sino- Indian friendship. China was relatively isolated at that time and India was heard with attention in world councils but India decided to withdraw its claim on Tibet. However, India sent a letter to China and called her action most surprising and regrettable. However, China’s reply was not favourable to India in which China made it clear to India that no foreign influence will be tolerated in Tibet. She also considered that India’s attitude had been affected by foreign elements hostile to China.12 India was surprised and upset by the China’s use of force in Tibet13 but did not show its opposition to the said action. Even India did not show publicly its displeasure to the establishment of authority of Communist China in Tibet. Indian leaders adopted lenient attitude showed by Nehru’s statement in a press conference in March 1950 when he said that India would not interfere in Tibet. The Indian Ambassador to China was also clear about this policy of India as he later put on record: “I had, even before I started for Beijing, come to the conclusion that the British policy of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interest could not be maintained. The Prime Minister had also, in general, agreed with this view.” 14 Nevertheless, the animosity between India and China was present which was showed in their letters exchanged at that time between the two governments, accused each other over Tibet problem in October and November 1950.15 However, Indian position on Tibet was cleared from the statement of Nehru in the Council of States on 23 September 1953: “As between the Chinese Government and us, there are no territorial questions. The questions relate to trade, posts and telegraphic arrangements and such matters. 11 Abanti Bhattacharya, Chinese Nationalism and the Fate of Tibet: Implications for India and Future Scenario, Strategic Analysis, 2007, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 237-266 12 Girilal Jain, 1960, Panchsheela and After: A Re-appraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the Tibetan Insurrection, London, Asia Pub. House, 1960,p. 7 13 K Sarwar Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, Karachi, PIIA Press, 1966, p. 39 14 Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat, London, Allen and Unwin Press, 1955, p. 102 15 Bhavna Tripathy, The Tibetan Uprising and Indian Opinion of the Chinese, Journal of Defence Studies, 2012,vol. 6, no. 4, pp.27-54 32 Tibet: an issue between China and India Obviously, we have no desire to claim any position in Tibet which may ‘not be in keeping with the full sovereignty of China.”16 The statement of Indian ambassador also showed the Indian indifference towards the problem.
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