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9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq This Page Intentionally Left Blank 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq This page intentionally left blank 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq A CHRONOLOGY AND REFERENCE GUIDE Tom Lansford Copyright 2012 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lansford, Tom. 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq : a chronology and reference guide / Tom Lansford. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–1–59884–419–1 (hardback : acid-free paper) — ISBN 978–1–59884–420–7 (ebook) 1. September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001. 2. Terrorism—United States. 3. Afghan War, 2001– 4. Iraq War, 2003– 5. United States—Foreign relations—2001– I. Title. II. Title: Nine-Eleven and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. HV6432.7.L375 2011 973.931—dc23 2011022896 ISBN: 978–1–59884–419–1 EISBN: 978–1–59884–420–7 1615141312 12345 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America For the victims of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and their families This page intentionally left blank Contents Preface, xi Abbreviations, xiii Maps, xv Afghanistan, xv Iraq, xvi The Middle East, xvii 1. Overview: The Rise of Osama bin Laden and Global Terrorism, 1 2. The 9/11 Attacks, 19 3. Operation Enduring Freedom and the Invasion of Afghanistan, 41 4. Civil Liberties and the War on Terror, 61 5. Operation Iraqi Freedom, 81 6. The Global War on Terror, 101 7. The Insurgency in Iraq, 121 8. The Insurgency in Afghanistan, 139 9. U.S. Politics, the War on Terror, and Iraq, 157 10. The Obama Presidency and the War on Terror, 177 Chronology, 197 Biographies, 233 Ayad Allawi, 233 Osama bin Laden, 234 Tony Blair, 235 George W. Bush, 235 vii viii Contents Richard B. “Dick” Cheney, 238 Jacques Chirac, 240 Hillary R. Clinton, 241 Muammar Gaddafi, 242 Robert M. Gates, 244 Rudolph W. L. “Rudy” Giuliani, 244 John Dennis Hastert, 245 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 246 Saddam Hussein, 247 Hamid Karzai, 249 John F. Kerry, 250 Nouri al-Maliki, 252 John S. McCain, 253 Addison Mitchell “Mitch” McConnell, 255 Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, 256 Pervez Musharraf, 257 Barack H. Obama, 258 Daniel Pearl, 259 Nancy Pelosi, 259 Colin Powell, 260 Condoleezza Rice, 261 Thomas J. Ridge, 261 Donald H. Rumsfeld, 262 Gerhard F. Schro¨der, 263 George J. Tenet, 263 Paul D. Wolfowitz, 264 Abu Musab al Zarqawi, 265 Primary Documents, 267 1. The Invasion of Kuwait and UN Security Council Resolutions 660 and 678 (1990), 267 2. President Clinton’s Speech on Iraq and WMD Inspections (1998), 268 3. Regime in Iraq as U.S. Policy: The Iraq Liberation Act (1998), 269 4. Osama bin Laden’s Fatwa Urging Jihad against the United States (1998), 272 5. The 9/11 Commission Report, “Counterterrorism Evolves” (2004), 273 6. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, September 20, 2001 (2001), 275 7. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), 277 8. The USA PATRIOT ACT (2001), 280 9. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 (2002), 281 10. Preemption and the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), 283 11. The Congressional Authorization to Use Force against Iraq (2002), 286 Contents ix 12. UN Security Council Resolution 1441: Iraq and WMDs (2002), 288 13. Hans Blix’s Report on Iraqi Compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002), 289 14. Tony Blair’s Iraq War Speech (2003), 294 15. Bush’s Ultimatum to Saddam (2003), 295 16. The Iraq Survey Group’s Interim Report on Iraq’s WMD Programs (2004), 297 17. Declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2006), 299 18. The Iraq Study Group Reports on the Rise in Violence in Iraq (2006), 301 19. Obama’s Cairo Speech and U.S.-Muslim Relations (2009), 303 20. Obama: The Way Forward in Afghanistan (2009), 305 21. Obama’s National Security Strategy (2010), 308 Glossary, 311 Selected Bibliography, 319 Index, 329 This page intentionally left blank Preface The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States were the deadliest and cost- liest terrorist strikes in history. Although the nation had suffered the devastating consequences of terrorist attacks in the past, 9/11 forever undermined the sense of domestic security and invulnerability that had characterized the United States since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis during the height of the Cold War. After that September day in 2001, Americans became increasingly willing to exchange civil liberties and individual freedoms in exchange for promises of greater personal security and protection from future attacks. In response to the 9/11 attacks, the administration of Republican President George W. Bush undertook dramatic steps in both foreign and domestic policy. The United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 and defeated the Taliban regime. The Bush administration concurrently launched an international effort to suppress terrorism, naming the effort the “global war on terror.” In addition to increasing intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with nations around the globe, the United States also provided military assistance and aid, and even deployed troops in areas of Asia, Africa, and South America. In one of the most controversial components of the war on terror, in 2003 the United States led a co- alition of nations in a preemptive war against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. The war followed a period of intense diplomatic wrangling in which the Bush administration and its allies accused the Saddam regime of developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting terrorism. Although the United States and its allies quickly overthrew the Saddam government, a bloody insurgency spread throughout Iraq. The insurgency lasted more than five years and killed more U.S. troops than the initial invasion. Meanwhile, remnants of the Taliban regrouped in border areas of Pakistan and launched a rebellion against the pro-Western government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The ongoing fighting in Afghani- stan and Iraq overshadowed other successes in the war on terror. In addition, the international standing of the United States was eroded by the failure to uncover xi xii Preface weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the United States’ inability to defeat the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The war on terror also changed the politics and culture of the United States. The U.S. government undertook the largest reorganization since World War II, when the Department of Homeland Security was created from existing agencies and bureaus in 2002. In addition, new laws and regulations forever altered the way Americans traveled, attended public events, and even opened a checking account. Although the nation rallied together after the 9/11 attacks, divisions emerged over the war in Iraq and the conduct of the war on terror. Opposition to the Iraq War in the United States and other countries grew dramatically, especially after 2005. Bush’s domestic popularity declined substantially. and the president’s political party lost control of Congress in 2006. Two years later, Barack Obama, who opposed the Iraq War, was elected the nation’s first African American president. The war on terror and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq dominated Obama’s foreign policy. One chapter of the war on terror closed when U.S. special opera- tions forces killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, at a safe haven in Pakistan. The 9/11 attacks did not occur in isolation, but were the culmination of decades-old trends in international terrorism. This book analyzes the causes and impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and on the global commu- nity. The following chapters trace the rise and maturation of contemporary global terrorism from the 1970s through the 1990s and the efforts of the United States to develop effective domestic and international counterterrorism tactics and strate- gies. The work also explores the complex relationship between events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia and the rise of international terrorism. Particular attention is devoted to the causes of modern terrorism and the development of transnational terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, as well as the social, cultural, and economic impact of the 9/11 strikes. Furthermore, the book examines the intercon- nectedness between the global war on terror and U.S. domestic politics, including the development of new laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the economic, political, cultural, and social reactions to the attacks. This project would not have been possible without the help and generous sup- port of numerous people. I would like to particularly acknowledge the assistance of Matthew Williams, Brad Irvin, and Felix Rodriguez in researching and review- ing the manuscript. My sincere thanks go to Jack Covarrubias for assistance in pre- paring the work. I also wish to thank Pat Carlin for his patience and his suggestions for the manuscript. Finally, as always, my love and thanks go to the girls in my life, Gina, Ella, and Kate. Abbreviations ACLU American Civil Liberties Union ANSWER Act Now to Stop War and End Racism ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty ATF Alcohol,
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