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December 2020 i Financial Stability Review | December 2020 Financial Stability Review December 2020 ISSN 1793-3463 Published in December 2020 Macroprudential Surveillance Department Economic Policy Group Monetary Authority of Singapore https://www.mas.gov.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanised, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner except in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act (Cap. 63). Applications for the copyright owner’s written permission to reproduce any part of this publication should be addressed to: Macroprudential Surveillance Department Economic Policy Group Monetary Authority of Singapore 10 Shenton Way MAS Building Singapore 079117 ii Contents Preface vii Overview viii 1 Global Financial and Economic Environment Risks in the External Environment 1 2 Singapore Corporate Sector Risks in the Corporate Sector 11 Box A: Singapore’s Corporate Bond Market: A Growing Source of 21 Domestic Finance Chart Panel 2A: Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Financing Conditions 26 3 Singapore Household Sector Risks in the Household Sector 27 4 Singapore Financial Sector Risks in the Banking Sector 39 Risks in the Non-Bank Sector 45 Box B: Credit Conditions amid the COVID-19 Pandemic 47 Box C: MAS’ Desktop Stress Test of D-SIBs 53 Chart Panel 4A: Banking Sector: Credit Growth Trends 58 Chart Panel 4B: Banking Sector: Cross-border Lending Trends 59 Chart Panel 4C: Banking Sector: Asset Quality and Liquidity Indicators 60 Chart Panel 4D: Banking Sector: Local Banking Groups 61 Chart Panel 4E: Insurance Sector 62 Chart Panel 4F: Over-the-counter Derivatives 63 5 Special Features on Financial Stability Special Feature 1: Implications of USD Dominance on Capital Flows and Financial 65 Stability in EMEs Special Feature 2: Transitioning to a New Interest Rate Benchmark Landscape in 73 Singapore Special Feature 3: Climate Change and Financial Stability 80 Special Feature 4: S-REITs’ Performance During the COVID-19 Pandemic 91 iii Financial Stability Review | December 2020 Statistical appendix may be accessed from: https://www.mas.gov.sg/publications/financial-stability-review Disclaimer: MAS is not liable for any damage or loss of any kind, howsoever caused as a result (direct or indirect) of the use of any information or data contained in this publication, including but not limited to any damage or loss suffered as a result of reliance on the information or data contained in or available in this publication. You are reminded to observe the terms of use of the MAS website, on which this publication is made available. iv Definitions and conventions As used in this report, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis. In this report, the following groupings are used: • “ASEAN-4” comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. • “Emerging Asia” comprises Asian economies such as China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. • “EMEA” refers to Europe, Middle East and Africa. • “Euro zone” comprises Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. • “LATAM” refers to Latin America. Abbreviations used for financial data are as follows: • Currencies: Australian Dollar (AUD), British Pound (GBP), Chinese Yuan (CNY), Euro (EUR), Hong Kong Dollar (HKD), Indian Rupee (INR), Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), Japanese Yen (JPY), Korean Won (KRW), Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), New Taiwan Dollar (TWD), New Zealand Dollar (NZD), Singapore Dollar (SGD), Thai Baht (THB), US Dollar (USD). Other abbreviations: ABG Asian Bond Grant ABS Association of Banks in Singapore ABSD Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty AE Advanced Economy ATM Automated Teller Machine BdF Banque de France BIS Bank for International Settlements BoE Bank of England BTI Balance-to-income CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio CCR Core Central Region CET1 Common Equity Tier 1 COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019 CRE Commercial Real Estate DBU Domestic Banking Unit DDRS Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation Data Repository (Singapore) Pte Ltd DNB De Nederlandsche Bank DOS Department of Statistics D-SIB Domestic Systemically Important Bank v Financial Stability Review | December 2020 EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes ECB European Central Bank EDB Economic Development Board EME Emerging Market Economy ESG Enterprise Singapore EU European Union F&B Food and Beverage FCI Financial Conditions Index FI Financial Institution FRA Forward Rate Agreement FRN Floating Rate Note FSB Financial Stability Board FSR Financial Stability Review FVI Financial Vulnerability Index FX Foreign Exchange GDP Gross Domestic Product GFC Global Financial Crisis G-SIB Global Systemically Important Bank HDB Housing Development Board HQLA High Quality Liquid Assets IAM Integrated Assessment Model ICR Interest Coverage Ratio IIF Institute of International Finance IMF International Monetary Fund IP Illiquidity Premium IR Interest Rate ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association IWST Industry-Wide Stress Test JSS Jobs Support Scheme LBS Locational Banking Statistics LCR Liquidity Coverage Ratio LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate LTD Loan-to-Deposit LTV Loan-to-Value MA Matching Adjustment MAS Monetary Authority of Singapore MOM Ministry of Manpower m-o-m Month-on-Month MSD Macroprudential Surveillance Department MSR Mortgage Servicing Ratio NDF Non-deliverable Forward NGFS Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System NFC Non-financial Corporate NIM Net Interest Margin NPA Non-Performing Asset NPL Non-Performing Loan vi O&G Oil and Gas OCR Outside of Central Region OTC Over-the-counter OTP Option to Purchase PR Permanent Resident q-o-q Quarter-on-Quarter RBC Risk Based Capital RCR Rest of Central Region REIT Real Estate Investment Trust RHS Right Hand Side ROA Return on Assets SAAR Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate SBF Singapore Business Federation SC-STS Steering Committee for SOR Transition to SORA SFEMC Singapore Foreign Exchange Market Committee SFRP Special Financial Relief Programme SGX Singapore Exchange Limited SIBOR Singapore Interbank Offered Rate SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprise SOE State-Owned Enterprise SOFR Secured Overnight Financing Rate SOR SGD Swap Offer Rate SORA Singapore Overnight Rate Average S-REIT Singapore-listed Real Estate Investment Trust TSC Transport, Storage and Communications URA Urban Redevelopment Authority VA Value-Added VAR Vector autoregression VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index y-o-y Year-on-Year YTD Year-to-date vii Financial Stability Review | December 2020 Preface The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) conducts regular assessments of Singapore’s financial system, which identify potential risks and vulnerabilities, and review the capacity of the financial system to withstand potential shocks. The analyses and results are published in the annual Financial Stability Review (FSR). The FSR aims to contribute to a better understanding of issues affecting Singapore’s financial system among market participants, analysts and the public. Section 1 of the FSR provides a discussion of the risks in the external environment. This is followed by an analysis of the Singapore corporate and household sectors in Sections 2 and 3 respectively. A review of the financial sector is then provided in Section 4. The final section features in-depth analyses on various topics in financial stability. The production of the FSR was coordinated by the Macroprudential Surveillance Department (MSD) team that comprises Lily Chan, Evelyn Chen, Fan Jia Rong, Cheryl Ho, Koh Zhi Xing, Khoo Ye-Min, Kwek Kiat Cong, Wendy Lee, Aloysius Lim, Kalena Lim, Rosemary Lim, Vincent Low, Low Yen Ling, Orchi Modhurima, Satish Nagdev, Ng Heng Tiong, Desmond Ong, Alex Phua, Edward Robinson, Tan Aik Khim, Andrew Tan, Daniel Teo, Teoh Shi-Ying, Andrew Wilfred, and Wong Siang Leng. The FSR also incorporates contributions from Irineu de Carvalho Filho, Banking Departments I & II, Corporate Finance & Consumer Department, Capital Markets Intermediaries Department II, Enterprise Knowledge Department, Economic Analysis Department, Economic Surveillance & Forecasting Department, Financial Markets Development Department, Insurance Department, Monetary & Domestic Markets Management Department, Prudential Policy Department, Baskar Chinniah, and Harshitha Gooty. The FSR reflects the views of the staff of MSD and other contributors. The FSR may be accessed in PDF format on the MAS website: https://www.mas.gov.sg/publications/financial-stability-review viii Overview The COVID-19 pandemic has raised risks to global financial stability… The COVID-19 pandemic led to an unprecedented contraction in economic activity and heightened risks to global financial stability. Decisive monetary and fiscal policy measures have alleviated near-term risks by easing global financial conditions and maintaining the flow of credit to businesses and households. However, medium-term vulnerabilities have risen as a result of these measures. Corporate leverage has continued to climb from already elevated levels, increasing credit
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