Introduction

Notes

Introduction

1. Given its close cultural and political ties to the Soviet Union and its Central Asian successor states, we have excluded Mongolia from our constellation of East Asian cases. 2. In the late 2000s, Freedom House had the Philippines and Bangladesh taken off its list of electoral democracies because of the deteriorating political and civil rights situation. The most recent ‘Freedom in World’ report (Freedom House, 2011a), however, classifies them as democracies again. 3. The classification of Sri Lanka and Nepal as authoritarian regimes is controver- sial. In its latest report, Freedom House (Freedom House, 2011a) categorizes both political systems as belonging to the group of non-electoral systems, whereas the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012c) classifies them as ‘highly defective democracies’. According to the Polity IV score, both political systems are considered ‘anocracies’. 4. Civil–military relations in North Korea and Brunei, however, exhibit some important, unique elements. In North Korea, the Korean People’s Army has traditionally been the ‘revolutionary armed forces of the Korean Workers’ Party’ (KWP constitution of 1980, Chapter 7, Art. 46). However, since the introduction of the ‘military-first policy’ in 1995, party control over the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has eroded, especially in defense policy-making and the military’s internal affairs, and the military has become the main political actor within the country, even though most observers agree that prior to his death, Kim Jong Il had been in command of the KPA (Gause, 2006; Kim, 2006: 72). At the moment of writing, an evaluation of Kim Jong Un’s degree of control over the KPA is not yet possible. The Royal Brunei Armed Forces have close relationships with the British Army and the Singapore Armed Forces; after independence in 1984, some British officers were entrusted with intelligence operations as well, and there is a British military base and a Singaporean training center in the country. 5. The Royal Army of Nepal was renamed Nepalese Armed Forces after the transition from a monarchy to a republic in 2006. 6. The differentiation between military and civilians is analytical. Empirically, it is sometimes difficult to delineate the boundaries of each category – even in estab- lished democracies. In Israel, for example, the practice known as ‘parachuting’, in which former military leaders join the top echelons of political parties and cabinets, is still prevalent (Etzioni-Halevy, 1996). Other examples of an apparently blurred civil–military divide are South Korea and Indonesia, where retired generals became president after the transition to democracy. However, neither the Korean president Roh Tae-woo (1988–93) nor the Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (since 2004) achieved office by means of military appointment, black- mail, or use of force, but were elected in competitive elections. We thank Hans Born (personal communication) for raising this issue.

215 216 Notes

7. The terms ‘military’ and ‘armed forces’ are used interchangeably throughout this book. 8. The ‘security sector governance’ literature focuses on the way the security sector is governed at the sub-national, national, and international levels. It reflects a comprehensive notion of security, embracing both military and non-military dimensions and encompassing both state and human security (Lambert, 2009: 201–202). In this vein, Heiner Hänggi (2004) presented the concept of ‘democratic governance of the security sector’ as an ideal-type model of security sector governance. The normative ideal of ‘democratic security sector governance’ includes not only the effective control of the military by democratically elected civilian author- ities but also, among other things, parliamentary oversight, transparent decision making, civil society participation, effectiveness and efficiency in defense policy- making, ensuring that military training is in line with the norms and values of democratic societies, and providing human security. The idea of ‘security sector reform’ conceptualizes the process of achieving this normative ideal (Beeson & Bellamy, 2008: 24; Lambert, 2009: 106, 324). 9. Nevertheless, in order for civilians to be able to successfully implement specific strategies of control over the military, they must have sufficient resources. There- fore, actors will have to take into consideration the environment in which their strategy is to be realized, as the actual choice and its outcome depend on the resources at the actor’s disposal. Civilian politicians can develop different strategies for taming the military within a given context, with each strategy requiring different resources for its implementation. Contexts themselves are ‘strategically selective’, meaning that, given a specific context, only certain courses of strategic action are likely to see actors realizing their intentions (Hay, 2002: 127).

1 Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military

1. Authors’ calculation based on data from Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell (2006), Appendix B. 2. Israel offers an example of a liberal democracy with military leaders closely involved in government policy formation within the normative framework of generally accepted civilian control (Kamrava, 2000: 75). 3. The distinction between ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ draws on Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (2002), though we use their terminology in a slightly different way. 4. In Brazil, for example, the military retained both direct and indirect influence even after it had returned to the barracks in 1985, with six active-duty military officers in the cabinet of the new democratic government of President Sarney (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 1987: 488). The military even retained three cabinet posts in the first cabinet of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). Yet despite these legacies of military rule, most political scientists have generally considered Brazil a democracy since the transition in 1985, albeit a ‘protected’ (Loveman, 1994) or ‘defective’ one (Merkel, 2004: 51).

2 Explaining Civilian Control of the Military in New Democracies

1. Bruneau (2012) summarizes Huntington’s critics into four essential points: (1) the tautological nature of Huntington’s argument about the relationship of professionalism and control; (2) the use of selective data and disparate factual evidence; Notes 217

(3) the failure of Huntington’s approach to provide either empirically valid theoretical explanations or practical guidance for the reform of civil–military relations in democratic and democratizing countries. As the fourth major shortcoming of Huntington’s work, Bruneau notes the ‘exclusive focus on civilian control of the armed forces’. Not surprisingly, we respectfully disagree with Bruneau. In our opinion, civilian control is the substantive core problem for civil–military relations in new democracies. 2. For an excellent definition and general discussion of the ‘structure and agency’ problem in the social sciences, see Dessler (1989). 3. Institutions, in our understanding, are ‘humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction’ (North, 1991: 97). This definition is widely compatible with all of the more narrow understandings in the literature belonging to ‘New Institutionalism’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996). 4. This argument is supported by the oft-recognized ‘attention deficit’ of civilians in regard to national defense and military policy in Latin America and the civilian neglect of security policy in some political transformations in postcommunist Europe (see Cottey et al., 2002; see also Pion-Berlin, 2005; Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2007). 5. Causal mechanisms are those ‘physical, social, or psychological processes through which causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities’ (George & Bennett, 2004: 137; see also Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). 6. Justifying a political role for the military will be difficult after the transition to democracy. Even though military legitimacy is not necessarily low by definition and poor performance by civilian governments can erode mass support for civilian rule (Finer, 1962; Huntington, 1968), the transition from authoritarianism to democracy shifts the principle of rule by coercion to the principle of rule by con- sent. For the military, it is difficult to reconcile democratic legitimacy with its own claims to political influence. Similarly, compensation should play a small role in the entrenchment of the institutional status quo. Given its superior coercive abil- ity to stall change, there is no need for the military to compensate civilians to prevent them from challenging existing prerogatives. Furthermore, retaining the material or ideational resources that derive from its institutional privileges is often the primary reason for resisting institutional change in the first place. 7. See Perlmutter and LeoGrande (1982), Stepan (1988), Agüero (1995a), Brömmelhörster and Paes (2003), Heper and Güney (2004) and the brief descrip- tion of civil–military relations in Asian countries in the introduction. 8. This, for example, was the case in Chile, where the conservatives had benefited from the military regime’s neoliberal economic policies, making it easier for the military to limit the scope and speed of the transition in the face of civilians split by dissent (Thiery, 2000). 9. In fact, critical junctures are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining institutional change, and the concept lacks clarity concerning its explanatory status. It can be shorthand for the observed change in the dependent variable, that is, the fact that an old path has ended and a new institutional path has begun. In this case, however, the term does not provide any explanatory content. Alter- natively, it could be merely a summarizing label for a certain constellation of entities, factors, and processes that bring about institutional change. If this is the case, however, the concept itself has no analytical value independent of the explanatory variables. 218 Notes

10. This argument borrows from the general discussion of agency and structure by Colin Hay (2002: 165–166).

3 South Korea: Purges and Presidential Prerogatives

1. In spite of the official social-revolutionary declarations, the most important under- lying factor for the non-hierarchical coup was the ‘young officer’s resentment against their delayed promotion amid the oversupply of generals, by-products of the [rapid expansion of the officer corps during and after the] Korean War’ (Moon & Kang, 1995: 173). The young turks’ anger was intensified by plans of the Chang government to cut defense expenditures and troop numbers. 2. A significant exception was the Ministry of Economy, which was reserved for civilian technocrats, who enjoyed a large degree of autonomy under Park Chung-hee’s presidency (Oh, 1999: 54). 3. On 18 May 1980, under the command of Hanahoe officers, 20,000 elite combat troops cracked down on a popular uprising in the south-western city of Kwangju. The official toll was 200 dead and thousands injured, with unofficial numbers rang- ing considerably higher. In the aftermath, the rebellion was branded as the result of Communist agitation (Han, 2005). 4. An appellate court later reduced these penalties to life in prison for Chun and 17 years for Roh (Oh, 1999: 190). 5. In fact, Kim was deeply aware of the importance of getting rid of Hanahoe for the profound changes in civil–military relations during his administration. In an interview, he stated, ‘There is no possibility at all of a coup. I have purged all the officers interested in politics. I have complete control over the army’ (cited in Roehrig, 2002: 170). 6. Public support for KYS, however, dramatically dropped to single digits toward the end of his term (Park, 1998: 4). 7. Kim was acutely aware of this, as reflected in his conviction that ‘[t]he army knows I have the overwhelming support of the people, and this is why the army has pledged its loyalty to me’ (cited in Roehrig, 2002: 170).

4 Taiwan: From Martial Law to Civilian Control

1. During the ‘228 Incident’, the army brutally suppressed an attempt to overthrow the KMT provincial administration. It is considered to be the triggering event for the sub-ethnic cleavage between the ‘Taiwanese’ born on the island and the ‘Mainlanders’, that is, the 15 per cent of Taiwan’s society who themselves or whose ancestors had come to the island with the KMT and the ROC government after the Civil War. Most of the latter were employed in the military or in the government. 2. Today, the Legislative Yuan is the single-chamber parliament of the ROC. The second chamber, the National Assembly, was abolished in 2005. 3. The only genuine civilian defense minister since 1993 was Michael M. Tsai, who held the post during the ﬁnal three months of President Chen’s presidency. 4. This is the unanimous assessment of all 28 Taiwanese experts, journalists, and military and political practitioners who were interviewed for this analysis in 2010 and 2011. Notes 219

5 Indonesia: The Democratization of Personal Control

1. Collectively known as the National Military of Indonesia (TNI) after independence, the army, navy, and air force were put under a unified command along with the national police in 1962 and the resulting organization was renamed ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). After the police was again separated from the three remaining services in April 1999, the traditional name TNI was reinstated. 2. Even though by the end of the Suharto regime less than 7000 officers were dis- patched to civilian posts, a disproportionate number of them were employed in senior positions (Said, 2006: 92). 3. Examples include the Malari protests against foreign economic influence in 1974 (Crouch, 1988: 314–315), a wave of Muslim political activism culminating in the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984 (Friend, 2003: 190–191), and the suppression of a renegade opposition party in 1996 (Aspinall, 2005: 178). 4. However, Habibie afterwards successfully vetoed Wiranto’s appointee, a Catholic, even though he had initially left the decision to the TNI commander (Habibie, 2009: 95; Mietzner, 2009b: 199). 5. Wahid was not only the first to employ a truly civilian defense minister, but he was also the first to promote navy officers to the position of TNI commander. Still, there are indications that he followed Wiranto’s recommendation in both instances (Chrisnandi, 2007: 32–33). 6. Systematic evidence from East Java province shows that the lack of centralized control after the abolishment of the sociopolitical offices in the territorial com- mands and the interior ministry led to a change in voting behavior in the military faction. Rather than always voting for the military-approved candidate, the interests of individual officers became much more important in influencing their decisions (Mahroza, 2009: 170). 7. While the old minister remained nominally in office until the end of Megawati’s term in August 2004, he had suffered a debilitating stroke in August 2003. 8. Due to the low number of standing committees, the military committee also covers information (Rüland et al., 2005: 206). 9. Yudhoyono himself hired mainly military advisors for his campaign team during the presidential elections (Sukma, 2010: 64). During the 2009 legislative election, Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat, like his opponent Prabowo’s Gerindra relied heavily on media advertising while Wiranto, the third former general in the race tried to identify popular candidates through his local connections to military officers (Hellmann, 2011: 141–142). 10. The government had tolerated the sale of profitable businesses so that the remain- der was worth a mere 230 million USD by 2009, a small fraction of the annual military budget (HRW, 2010b). 11. According to a recent poll (IFES, 2010), the TNI’s performance is perceived more positively (79 per cent) than either the president’s (66 per cent) or the police’s (58 per cent). Indonesians are especially unhappy with parliamentary performance (36 per cent) at the moment. 12. While this is not a recent institutional innovation, it did not present a problem in the absence of presidential leadership when draft laws were being debated directly between the military and parliament, as during Megawati’s tenure. 220 Notes

6 Bangladesh: From Militarized Politics to Politicized Military

1. The caretaker government is a unique feature of Bangladesh’s democracy, pro- vided for by amendment to the country’s constitution in March 1996. According to the Constitution, a non-partisan CTG will be formed within 15 days of the dis- solution of the National Assembly. The president appoints the last retired Chief Justice as Chief Adviser of the interim administration, who adopts the role of prime minister and advises the president as head of the executive branch. The caretaker government’s primary function is to guarantee the ‘holding of the general election of members of parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially’ (Art. 58D, Constitution of Bangladesh). 2. ‘Hartal’ is a Bengali term that refers to tactics of civic mass protest against unpopular, unjust, or unacceptable government actions, usually involving a total shutdown of workplaces, offices, shops, and state institutions. It includes actions of non-violent civil disobedience, but also violent strike actions (Hossain, 2000). 3. The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is an area in the country’s southeast that is inhabited by 13 different non-Bengali and non-Muslim minority groups. 4. The Ansar Bahini is administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs. It mostly assists the national police but also operates alongside the BAF. The Bangladesh Border Rifles (renamed Border Guards Bangladesh in 2011) is in charge of protecting the international border with India, maintaining law and order in trouble-prone areas like the CHT, counterterrorism, and domestic law enforcement during national emergencies. Technically under the Ministry of Home Affairs, its administration and officer corps are trained and seconded from the army; its director general is an Army major general (Uddin, 2009). 5. Khaleda Zia is the widow of military dictator Ziaur Rahman; Sheikh Hasina Wajed is the daughter of murdered prime minister Mujib. 6. Some scholars argue that this amounted to an attempted coup (Kochanek, 1997; Ghoshal, 2009). However, since their actions were not aimed at unseating the government (Powell & Thyne, 2011: 252), we do not consider this rebellion to be an actual coup attempt (Codron, 2007). 7. The International Crisis Group gives credible evidence to support this claim. In a 2008 report, it quotes a Western diplomat stationed in Dhaka admitting that ‘we [the international commuinity] [sic!] were instrumental in the events in January’. In addition, the report quotes a senior military officer saying that ‘the British, Americans, Australians, and the Canadians were heavily involved in bringing the military in’ and a New York-based UN official suggesting ‘low key support from [UN] headquarters for [the coup]’ (ICG, 2008: 7).

7 The Philippines: Civil–Military Symbiosis under the Veneer of Civilian Rule

1. Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) is the principal thoroughfare in Metro Manila; it became the main site for the mass protest against Marcos. 2. Nevertheless, two minor mutinies took place in March and October 1990. 3. For a succinct discussion of civil–military collusion and patronage, and for anecdotal evidence of military corruption, see Gloria and Rufo (2011). 4. For more details, see Landé (2001) and Querubin et al. (2004). 5. For an excellent discussion of the different interpretations, see Gatmaytan (2006). Notes 221

6. From 2003 to 2008, the Asian Human Rights Commission recorded 144 cases of extrajudicial killings and 23 cases of forced disappearances (Bertelsmann Foun- dation, 2010). Furthermore, since 1986, the National Union of Journalists in the Philippines has recorded 142 killings, of which 90 took place under of the Arroyo administration (Vogel, Grabow, Korte, & Weissenbach, 2008: 92). The largest single incident occurred when 58 individuals (among them 34 journalists) were killed by members of a military–political clan in the ‘Maguindanao Massacre’ of November 2009 (Quimpo, 2009: 346).

8 Thailand: Civilian Control Deterred

1. A complete account of the multifaceted socioeconomic, cultural, and political changes that have led to the erosion of Thailand’s ‘old’ political order is beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, the focus is on civil–military relations and, there- fore, its more modest aim is to analyze the processes of failed institutionalization of civilian control during the more general processes of political and social change which took place over the past three decades or so. The growing authoritarianism of the Thaksin government has been discussed in previous works on Thailand, especially Thitinan (2008). 2. For instance, senior police ofﬁcers were appointed to the post of the director of the National Intelligence Agency; as director-general of the Department of Spe- cial Investigation; as chief of the Election Commission; as a Constitutional Court judge; and as the chairman of the National Counter Corruption Commission (Ratanapinsiri, 2011: 109). 3. See, for more details, The Nation (2007), Wassana (2007) and Wassana (2009). 4. During the 2010 demonstrations, many lower-ranked, non-commissioned, and retired ofﬁcers sympathized with the pro-Thaksin ‘Red Shirt’ protestors (Chambers, 2010b: 836).

9 Pakistan: Military-Guided Transitions to Elected Government and the Failure of Civilian Control

1. ‘Milbus’ refers to a network of military businesses or economic activities through which individual military leaders accrue personal wealth without any central control or accountability (Siddiqa, 2007: 1; Rösel, 2011: 31–37). Widely publicized ﬁgures estimate the total value of the army’s business empire, including vast own- ership of agricultural land and control over up to 28 per cent of total agricultural output (Akhtar, 2010: 114), at approximately 19.7 billion USD (Himal, 2007). 2. This has been admitted by former Intelligence Bureau chief Brigadier (ret.) Imtiaz (Daily Times, 2009). 3. Pakistan’s three main intelligence services are the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which falls under the Ministry of Interior; the Military Intelligence (MI) under the purview of the Ministry of Defence; and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Malik, 2009: 284). The ISI draws its staff from the armed forces as well as from the civilian sector. It was originally created for purely military use, but ‘now combines many of the functions which in the USA are dealt with by the CIA and FBI, and is handling functions much beyond its scope’ (quoted in Sattar, 2001: 397). By law, the ISI acts under the direct command of the prime minister. But when tensions arise between the prime minister and the COAS or the president, the ISI usually seeks directives from the military, which is considered its ‘patron’ Grare (2009: 4). 222 Notes

4. The president is indirectly elected by an electoral college consisting of the members of the National Assembly, the Senate, and the Provincial Assemblies. 5. According to Global Security (2011), the ethnic make-up of the Pakistani Army in 1990 was as follows: Punjabis, 65 per cent; Pashtuns, 14 per cent; Sindhis and Baluchis, 15 per cent; Kashmiris, 6 per cent; and minorities, 0.3 per cent. Since then, recruitment from the formerly less well represented areas has increased. Subsequently, Punjab showed an overall decline in the recruitment of soldiers to 43.3 per cent in 2005. Despite the ethnic diversity of the corps, training in military academies has always emphasized a Pakistani national identity such that regional and ethnic cleavages existing within Pakistan’s society had never manifested in the armed forces Sattar (2001: 395). 6. Zaidi (2011)illustrates in more detail how the Pakistani military was strengthened in the war on terror.

10 Conclusion: Contours, Causes, and Consequences of Civilian Control

1. Nevertheless, the example of Bangladesh indicates that the absence of strong military factions can also help civilians as long as military ofﬁcers worry that resisting civilian control could disrupt military institutional integrity more than they worry about civilian intrusion in military affairs. Bibliography

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Abhisit Vejjajiva, 170, 213 Finer, Samuel E., 15, 25 Agüero, Felipe, 10, 14, 43–4 Fitch, Samuel, 202 Ahmed, Fakhruddin, 131 Franco, Francisco, 2 Ahmed, Iajuddin, 121, 130 Alagappa, Muthiah, 14, 43–4 Geddes, Barbara, 43 Aquino, Benigno, 138 Gilani, Yousaf Raza, 188 Aquino, Corazon, 136–45, 204 Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal, 136–7, Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf, 97, 100–4, 149–54, 213 204, 219 Avant, Deborah, 53, 208 Hasina, Sheikh, 118, 121–2, 125, 128, 131–2 Banharn Silpa-archa, 160–1 Hau, Pei-tsun, 83–7, 90 Barany, Zoltan, 10 Hunter, Wendy, 42–3 Bhumipol Adulyadej, Rama XI, 156, 158, Huntington, Samuel, 22, 42, 197, 164 216–17 Bhutto, Benazir, 175, 178–88 Bhutto, Zulﬁkar Ali, 176–7 Kayani, Ashfaq Parvez, 187 Born, Hans, 42, 215 Khan, Ayub, 176 Bruneau, Thomas C., 2, 216–17 Khan, Ghulam Ishaq, 178, 181 Bush, George H.W., 182 Khan, Yahya, 176 Kim Dae-jung, 64–5, 70–3 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 216 Kim Il–sung, 70 Chang, Myon, 60–1, 218 Kim Jong-il, 215 Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, 160 Kim, Jong-pil, 72 Chen Shui-bian, 88–93, 95 Chiang Ching-kuo, 79, 81, 83, 85–87 Kim Jong-un, 215 Chiang Kai-shek, 79–80 Kim Young-sam, 59, 64–8, 71, 76–7, 204 Chuan Leekpai, 158, 160–3 Chulalongkorn, Rama V., 157 Lee, Myung-bak, 74–5 Chun, Doo-hwan, 59, 61–8, 71 Lee Teng-hui, 83–7, 89–93, 95 Leghari, Farooq, 183 Dahl, Robert A., 13, 28 Lim, Dong-won, 72 Deng, Xiaoping, 81, 87 Linz, Juan, 36 Desch, Michael, 42, 53, 207 Loveman, Brian, 42, 51, 54, 216

Edmonds, Martin, 12, 21 Mahoney, James, 47 Enrile, Juan Ponce, 138, 141, 144 Marcos, Ferdinand, 136, 138–44, 149, Ershad, Hossain Mohammad, 118, 204, 206 120–3, 126, 129, 134 Ma Ying-jeou, 93 Estrada, Joseph “Erap” Ejercito, 136, 145, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 97, 102, 105–9 147–52 Mercado, Orlando, 149 Etzioni, Amitai, 47 Merkel, Wolfgang, 23–4, 36–7, 210

260 Name Index 261

Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh, 119–20, 125, Sonthi Boonyarathklin, 166, 132 169–70 Musharraf, Pervez, 175–6, 178, 183–92 Stepan, Alfred, 27, 36, 173 Suchinda Kraprayoon, 158, 163 Nordlinger, Eric, 36 Suharto, 97–102, 104, 116, 206 Sukarno, 98 O’Donnell, Guillermo, 24 Surayud Chulanont, 166, 169, 171

Park Chun-hee, 59–63 Tang, Fei, 88, 90 Pion-Berlin, David, 2–3 Thaksin Shinawatra, 156, 159, 165–74, Prabowo Subianto, 103, 219 204–5, 207–9 Prajadhipok, Rama VII, 157 Thelen, Kathleen, 47 Prem Tinsulanonda, 157–9, 163, 166, Tolentino, Arturo, 144 169, 174 Trinkunas, Harold, 14–15, 26, 44, 49

Ramos, Fidel V., 136, 138, 140–2, 144–9, Valenzuela, Samuel, 2 151–2, 202 Reyes, Angelo, 149 Wahid, Abdurrahman, 101–9, 116, 204 Rhee, Syngman, 60–1 Wiranto, 100, 103, 219 Roh Moo-hyun, 74–5 Roh Tae-woo, 59, 61, 63–9, Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 102, 71, 76 109–13, 117, 202, 215

Samak Sundaravej, 169–170 Zardari, Asif Ali, 187 Sarney, José, 216 Zia, Khaleda, 118, 121–3, 125, 128, Sharif, Nawaz, 175, 178, 180–5, 188–9, 130–1, 220 205, 209 Zia-ul-Haq, 175, 177–8 Somchai Wongsawat, 170 Ziaur Rahman, 120–1, 126, 134 Subject Index

228 incident, 80, 218 conflict with Pakistan, 129 9/11, see war, on terror democratization, 121 human rights, 126, 131, 133–4 Aceh, 99, 103, 106, 107, 111, 112, internal threat environment, 127–8 114–15 quality of democracy, 133–4, 210–13 acquiescence, see strategies of civilian resources, 127–30, 208–9 control strategies of civilian control, 125–7, AFD (Armed Forces Division, 203, 204–6 Bangladesh), 122–5 Bangladesh Border Rifles, 120, 124, 132, Afghanistan, 165, 176, 177, 179, 182, 220 184, 190, 207 bargaining, civil-military, 13, 17, 43, 128 AL (Awami League, Bangladesh), 118–20, Bhutan, 7, 8 121, 123, 125, 130, 131–2, 133, 134, BIN (National Intelligence Body, 135 Indonesia), 106, 111, 113 all-volunteer force, 93 Black May, 158, 163, 207 amnesty, 147, 170 BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party), 118, ANSP (Agency for National Security 121–3, 125, 130–5 Planning, Korea), see KCIA (Korean Brunei, 4, 7, 8, 215 Central Intelligence Agency) bureaucracy, 6, 31, 33, 60–1, 62, 64, 81, appeasement, see strategies of civilian 95, 98, 99, 101, 119, 126, 137, 139, control 146, 151, 158, 165, 186 appreciation, see strategies of civilian bureaucratic polity, 157 control Burma/Myanmar, 4, 9, 214 armed forces, see military arms acquisition, 35, 66, 74, 76, 85, 89, 91, 106–7, 111, 122, 164, 165, 167, cabinet, military representation in, 28, 183, 211 37, 61, 64, 70, 84, 88, 101–2, 111, ascriptive selection, see strategies of 122, 133, 137, 160, 162, 216 civilian control Cambodia, 4–5, 7, 9, 11, 161, 171 Asia Capital Garrison Command (Korea), civil-military relations in, 4–12, 199, 61–2 203 Catholic Church, 138, 149, 152 overview, 7, 197–213 cease-fire, 106, 140, 144 Asian financial crisis, 72–3, 75, 97, 100, Charter of Democracy, 188 106, 109, 115, 146, 149, 164, 206 Chief of General Staff, Taiwan, 83, 85, audit, 32–4, 74, 106, 107, 187 88, 89, 91 Autocracy, see regime, authoritarian China, People’s Republic of, 8, 80, 81, 87 autonomy, military, 2, 4, 6, 10, 13, 15, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 124, 131, 134, 27, 32, 35, 38, 45 212–13, 220 civilian control Bangladesh areas of, 26, 28–36 authoritarian regime, 119–21, 198, 206 concept, 26–8 care-taker government, 130–2 definition, 21, 25–6 civilian control, 122–5, 130–2, 199, and democracy, 23–6, 36–40 201 democratic, 4, 10, 16

262 Subject Index 263

and human rights, 133 communist institutions of, 27, 29–32, 46, 48, 139, anti, 9, 99, 152 202 insurgency, 65, 136, 144, 148–53, 158, intrusive, 51, 53, 85, 110, 143 164, 205 military acceptance/resistance, 46, 49, party, 4, 8, 10, 138, 141 52, 88, 106, 114, 130, 165 compensation, see strategies of civilian objective, 197 control personalized, 97, 101, 118, 125, 135, consolidation, democratic, 5, 9, 23, 166, 202 36–7, 40, 59, 68, 75–6, 82, 88, 90–1, strategies, see strategies of civilian 93–4, 114, 128, 154, 172, 197, 208, control 210 theory, 42–4, 46–56, 55 constitution civilianization of defense ministry constitution of Bangladesh, 119, 121, Indonesia, 111, 116–17 126, 130 South Korea, 77 constitution of South Korea, 63–5, 68 Taiwan, 95 1973 constitution (Pakistan), 178, 184, civilians 187 decision-making power of, 24, 25–6, constitution of the Republic of China, 29–32, 199 83, 90, 92 defense expertise of, 43, 74, 77, 86, 2007 constitution (Thailand), 157, 117, 122, 123, 125, 162, 201, 211 169–70, 172 definition, 12 Indonesian Constitution of 1945, 105, 107 civil-military problematique, 21, 25 Legal Framework Order of 21 August civil-military relations 2002 (Pakistan), 186 areas, see civilian control, areas of 1997 People’s constitution (Thailand), definition, 12 160, 163, 167–8 effective, 13 1987 Philippine Constitution, 139, efficient, 13, 34 143, 149 civil society, 17, 36, 38, 45, 208 control mechanism, see civilian control, in Bangladesh, 129 strategies in Indonesia, 105, 107, 109, 114, 117 co-optation, 43, 48, 62, 81, 85, 125, 128, in Pakistan, 186–90 135–36, 146, 159, 166–7, 176, 200 in the Philippines, 143, 149, 153 Corps Commanders Conference in South Korea, 63, 65, 68 (Pakistan), 177 in Taiwan, 79, 87, 91, 94 corruption, see military, corruption in civil war, 12, 119, 128, 218 counterbalancing, see strategies of see also insurgency civilian control clientelism, see patronage counterinsurgency, 99, 106–7, 109, 141, CNS (Council for National Security, 144, 147–8, 150–1, 153, 191, 205, Thailand), 169–71 212–13 COAS (Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan), coup coalition, 157, 172 175, 177, 183–5, 188 coup-ism, fallacy of, 3, 13 coercion, 10, 27, 43, 50–3, 99, 121 coup, military, 3, 5, 8, 21, 22, 200 cohesion in Bangladesh, 126, 130 civilian, 143, 173 in South Korea, 62 military, 53, 91, 98, 119, 120, 129, in Pakistan, 175, 177–8, 189, 190 138, 176, 209 in Thailand, 157, 158 colonialism, 56, 60, 98, 137, 206 in the Philippines, 136, 139, 150 264 Subject Index

Court, Constitutional, Thailand, 168, DGFI (Directorate General of Force 170 Intelligence, Bangladesh), 124, Court, Supreme 131–2 Bangladesh, 121, 132 dictatorship, see regime, authoritarian Pakistan, 185 disappearances, 76, 153, 191, 221 Philippines, 140, 149 doctrine, military, 35, 93, 137 critical juncture, see institutions, DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), 82, change of 87–8, 89, 91, 93 culturalism, see theory, paradigms DPR (People’s Representative Council, culture Indonesian parliament), 101, 110 military, 114, 207 draft, compulsory military service, 61 political, 36, 54, 118 DSC (Defense Security Command, South Korea), 61–2, 65, 76 DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program dual function (Indonesia), 99, 102 Administration, Korea), 74, 76 decision-making, 14, 25–7, 38, 46–7, Eastern Europe, 10, 47, 213 197, 199, 210 East Timor, 4, 7, 8, 11, 99, 103, 115 Defence Council (Thailand), 162 economy defense development, 42, 81, 130, 148, 207 budgets, 33–4, 85, 89, 107–8, 112, 115, military role in, 61, 64, 159, 177, 198, 120, 126, 138, 141, 146, 161, 171, 206 179–80, 187 education, 126, 180 department, 154 effectiveness, see civil-military relations, ministry, 66, 92, 95, 122, 125, 134, effective 165, 171, 187, 200–1 Eighth Amendment (Pakistan), 177–8, policy, 16–17, 31, 35, 65–6, 71, 74, 180, 181, 184 84–5, 89, 92–3, 103, 106, 111, elections 123, 140–1, 145–6, 150, 162, 171, electoral regime, see democracy, partial 179, 183–4, 187, 200 regimes posture, 35, 71, 73, 89, 93 military influence on, 60, 64, 88, 101, reform, 71, 75, 95, 200 106, 153, 157, 161, 172, 178, 186, Defense Law (Indonesia), 106, 109 211 demilitarization, 6, 64, 83 elite, 11–12, 26, 28, 45, 54, 208 democracy see also civil-military relations, areas and civil-military relations, 4, 128, 200 elite consensus, 79, 93, 109, 129, 143, defective, 25, 40, 133, 154 150, 156, 181, 188, 208–9 definition, 1, 23 elite recruitment, see civil-military embedded, 23, 24, 37, 40–1, 210 relations, areas liberal, 23 emergency decrees partial regimes, 24, 38, 40–1, 133, 191, in Bangladesh, 119–20, 130–1 210–11 in Indonesia, 106 principles of, 37 martial law, 62, 65, 79–80, 83–5, 94, quality of, 3, 27, 35, 210–11 106, 119, 138, 143–4, 162 democratization in Pakistan, 186 mode, 67–8, 86, 206 in the Philippines, 138, 143–4, 153 waves, 2–3, 11, 22, 213 state of emergency, 76, 79 Democrat Party (Thailand), 158, 161, in South Korea, 62, 65, 76, 79 168 in Taiwan, 79–80, 83–5, 94 development aid, 127, 129–30, 182, 189 in Thailand, 162, 165, 173 Subject Index 265 ethnicity, 50, 128, 134, 177, 184, 202, human rights, 98, 102, 103, 112, 114 214, 218, 222 internal threat enviroment, 99, 103, expenditures, see defense, budgets 106, 111, 115 extrajudicial killings, 133–4, 153, 191, quality of democracy, 114–16 221 reformasi, 100, 103 resources, 104–5, 108–9, 113–14 foreign policy, military influence on, 28, strategies of civilian control, 103–4, 70–1, 126, 171, 198, 207 107–8, 112–13 Freedom Fighters, 119–20 initial conditions, 10, 11, 12, 16, 44, 46, Friends of Democratic Pakistan, 189 55, 198 Bangladesh, 119–21 general staff, 85 Indonesia, 98–100 Golkar, 99–100, 104 Korea, 60–3 government, system of Pakistan, 176–7 parliamentary, 53, 56, 118, 129, 131, Philippines, 137–9 133, 134, 171–2 Taiwan, 80–2 presidential, 53, 208 Thailand, 157–9 Greece, 2 institutionalism historical, 44, 46, 48 Hanahoe theory of, 42, 53–4, 217 establishment, 62–3, 64, 66, 218 institutionalization purge of, 66–7, 68–9, 70, 76–7, 204, democratic, 5, 23, 24, 82 207 perverse, 2, 33, 37 hartal culture, 118, 128, 132, 220 under, 98, 109–11, 167 Huks, see communist, insurgency institutional legacies, see initial human rights conditions and civilian control, see civilian control, and human rights institutions violations, 33, 39, 75, 76, 94, 98, 117, change of, 62 126, 134, 140, 143, 147, 153, 172, definition, 14 188, 191, 212–13 path dependence of, 44, 46–8, 55 Human Rights Commission insurgency, 6, 11, 124, 134, 138, 140–2, Indonesia, 102, 104 145–6, 150, 151–2, 153, 165, 187, Philippines, 139, 154, 221 201, 205, 213 South Korea, 76 intelligence agencies, military control over, 33, 61–2, 65, 70, 76, 80, 104, IB (Intelligence Bureau, Pakistan), 177, 106, 109, 120, 125, 131, 177, 179, 179–80 181, 191, 204, 212 ideology, 47, 72, 80, 123, 134, 143, Internal security act (Thailand), 162, 176–7, 202, 207 171–3 impeachment, 97, 105, 136, 149, 152, internal security, see civil-military 176, 186 relations, areas implementation, 25, 28–9, 30–4, 201, intervention, see coup, military 210 Iraq, 152, 165 India, 7, 8, 11, 119–20, 123, 175, 179, ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence, Pakistan), 183–4, 185, 207, 220 177–9, 180, 183, 187 Indonesia ISOC (Internal Security Operactions authoritarian regime, 98–100 Command, Thailand), 162, 165, civilian control, 101–3, 105–7, 109–12 171–2 democratization, 100 Israel, 34, 215, 216 266 Subject Index

January 2012 incident (Bangladesh), 132 factionalization, 8, 49, 69, 83, 99–100, Japan, 1, 7, 8, 11, 60 116, 138, 142, 163, 174, 204–5; see Jatiya Party (Bangladesh), 121, 122–3 also cohesion, military judiciary, 39–40, 68, 76, 80, 91, 128, 173, hierarchy, 100, 145, 207 192, 210 and human rights, see human rights, see also Court, Supreme violations as-institution, 63, 69, 98, 109, 123, Kargil conﬂict, 175, 184, 185 131, 150, 178, 206, 211 KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence interests of, 21, 51, 69, 147; see also Agency), 61, 62, 65, 72 preferences, military Kerry-Lugar Bill, 189–90 in internal security, 30–1, 33–4, 38–9, KMT (Kuomintang), central executive 199, 200–1, 204, 206, 211–12 committee, 79–81, 82, 84, 87, 88, justice, 35, 97 198 organization, 26–7, 32, 34–6, 39–40, Kurram Agency, 179 45, 51, 199, 201, 207, 211 Kwangju massacre, 62, 63, 64–5, 75–6, politicization of, 6, 50, 86, 104, 107, 218 132, 136, 147, 204–5 prerogatives, 10, 22, 27, 30–3, 38, 43, Laos, 4, 7, 9, 161 56, 198, 205–6, 212 Latin America, 2, 10, 22, 200, 217 roles and missions, 1, 10, 33–5, 50, legislature, see parliament 121, 138, 146, 151, 162, 212 legitimation, see mechanism, of military aid, 143, 152, 181–2, 189 institutional change Military Bases Agreement (Philippines), local politics, military control over, 1, 141, 146–7 80, 88, 97–9, 100, 101, 106, 110, military dictatorship, see regime, military 113, 115–16, 131, 140–1, 150, 176 military justice bill (Indonesia), 110–11, 114, 117 Malaysia, 4, 7, 8, 164, 214 military organization, see civil-military Maoist, see communist, insurgency relations, areas martial law, see emergency decrees militia, see para-military mechanism modernization causal, 44, 47, 48, 217 military, 107, 146 of institutional change, 49–50 socioeconomic, 1, 43, 52, 157 media, 38, 76, 91, 94, 104, 115, 131, monitoring, see strategies of civilian 133, 171, 191 control military control over, 38, 61, 80, MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly, 104–5, 161, 212 Indonesia), 105–6 Milbus, 176, 191–2, 221 Muslim Mindanao, 141, 144, 150 military mutiny, see coup, military contestation, 22, 27, 30–3 corruption in, 40, 64–5, 107, 121, 150, nationalism, 6, 119, 127 210, 211, 220 National Security Council, NSC court, 94, 115, 140 Bangladesh, 131, 133 deﬁnition, 12 Pakistan, 186–7 doctrine, 35–6 Philippines, 145–6 economic activity, 107, 109, 112–13, South Korea, 70–2, 74–5 115, 117, 126, 134, 167, 181, 187, Taiwan, 81, 84, 92 206, 221 Thailand, 162 education, 35, 50, 53, 80, 112, 117, National Security Force (Bangladesh), 152 120 Subject Index 267

NCA (National Command Authority, peace accord, 112–14, 134, 148 Pakistan), 186–7 peacekeeping Nepal, 4, 7, 9, 12 Bangladesh, 121–7, 129 nepotism, 159, 182, 202 Indonesia, 112–13 network monarchy, 156, 159, 165, 207 people power/EDSA New Order, 97, 98–100, 104, 112, 116 I, 138, 153 New Paradigm (Indonesia), 104 II, 149–50 NGO (non-governmental organization), personalization 70, 76, 129, 131, 209 of civilian control, see civilian control, see also civil society personalized North Korea, 4, 8, 60, 69–70, 72, 73, 75, political power, 4, 8, 98, 149, 156, 77–8, 214 200 nuclear weapons, Pakistan, 178, 181–7 Philippines authoritarian regime, 137–9, 145 oligarchy, Philippines, 137, 143 civilian control, 139–42, 145–6, 149–50 PAD (People’s Alliance for Democracy, democratization, 138 Thailand), 168, 170, 173 human rights, 140–3, 147, 153–4 Pakistan internal threat enviroment, 137, 141, authoritarian regime, 176–80 144, 148 civilian control, 183–4, 185–7 quality of democracy, 153–4 democratization, 177, 188 resources, 143–5, 147–9, 151–3 human rights, 188, 191 strategies of civilian control, 142–3, internal threat environment, 182, 146–7, 151 192 PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League), 183, quality of democracy, 190–1 185, 192 resources, 181–3, 184–5, 188–9 PML-Q (Pakistan), 176, 186 strategies of civilian control, 180–1, PMO (Prime Ministerial Office, 184, 187–8 Bangladesh), 122–3, 124–5, 128, 135 Pakistani Taliban, 187, 190 police Papua, 103, 106, 114–15 civilian, 97, 102, 105, 109, 113, 124, para-military 141, 147, 165, 167 militia, 119, 120, 134, 141, 184 military control over, 31, 61, 76, 141, reserves, 61, 141, 191, 212 162, 176 use in counterbalancing, 8, 49, 120, political parties, 38, 127–32, 190, 177, 204 209–12 parliament populism, 36, 149, 167 accountability, 34, 93, 107, 111 Portugal, 2 and defense budget, 30–2, 34, 139, power, see mechanism, of institutional 146, 187 change defense committee, 66, 89, 91, 123 PPP (Pakistan People Party), 175, 178, military representation in, 38, 61, 101, 183, 185–6, 188, 192 110, 123, 160, 201 PPP (People’s Power Party, Thailand), oversight, 66, 85, 91, 109, 111, 187 157, 169, 170, 174 parliamentarism, see government, praetorianism, 138 system of: parliamentary preferences path dependence, see institutions, path civilian, 45–6 dependence of military, 45 patronage, 45, 98–100, 103, 121, 126, prerogative, military, see military, 139, 146, 151, 159, 200, 205 prerogatives 268 Subject Index presidentialism, see government, system sanctioning, see strategies of civilian of: parliamentary control president, powers of, 68, 86, 103, 106, sanctions, military, 182, 185, 189 121, 179, 185–7 security sector press, see media governance, 13, 34, 216 principal-agent model, of civil-military reform, 216 relations, 8, 49–51, 208 Sindh, 179, 222 Privy Council (Thailand), 159, 163–4, Singapore, 4, 7, 8, 214–15 166, 169, 171, 174 socialism, 120, 177 procurement, see arms acquisition socialization, political, see strategies of professionalism, 71, 76, 81, 86, 112, 120, civilian control 134, 138, 146, 161 southern border provinces (Thailand), criticism, 42, 216–17 162, 173, 212 definition, 197 South Korea democratic, 202 authoritarian regime, 60–3 new, 207 civilian control, 63–6, 70–1, 73–5 old, 207 democratization, 62–3 public policy, see civil-military relations, human rights, 64, 75–6 areas quality of democracy, 75–6 resources, 67–70, 72–3 strategies of civilian control, 66–7, RAM (Reform Armed Forces Movement, 71–2 Philippines), 138, 140, 142 South Waziristan, 187 rational choice, 48–51 Spain, 2 rationalism, see theory, paradigms Sri Lanka, 7, 8, 11, 215 rebellion, military, see coup, military state, 1, 12, 25, 33, 44, 205, 210 reformers strategies of civilian control, 49–51 civilian, 46, 48, 140 see also Bangladesh; Indonesia; military, 101, 105, 107–8, 113 Pakistan, strategies of civilian regime control; Philippines; South Korea; authoritarian, 8–10, 13, 42, 47–8, 54, Taiwan; Thailand 68, 75, 86, 95, 116, 157, 198, 208 structuralism, see theory, paradigms collapse, see democratization structure-agency problem, 3, 14, 42, 44, military, 5, 9, 26, 70, 123, 176–7, 205, 217 185–90 Sunshine Policy, 70, 71, 72, 73 one-party, 4, 8, 46, 80–2, 198 supremacy, civilian, see civilian control, partial, 24–5, 37–40, 210–12 definition personalist, 4, 8, 98, 138, 156 Swat Valley, 187, 191 types, 6–9, 10 resource Taiwan see also Bangladesh; Indonesia; authoritarian regime, 80–2 Pakistan, resources; Philippines; civilian control, 82–5, 88–9, 92–3 South Korea; Taiwan; Thailand democratization, 82 and civilian control strategies, 51–4, human rights, 94 205–9 quality of democracy, 93–4 ideational, 35, 44, 51, 52, 54, 55, 197 resources, 86–8, 90–2 institutional, 53–4 strategies of civilian control, 85–6, structural, 52–3 89–90 robustness, see strategies of civilian Taiwan Garrison Command, 80, 81, control 84, 94 Subject Index 269

Taiwanization, 81 transition, see democratization Tang-wai, 82, 87, 94 Troika, Rule of the (Pakistan), 177–80, territorial command (Indonesia), 6, 183 99–100, 102, 105, 107, 109, 111, 115 TRT (Thais love Thais), 166–70 terrorism, 106, 124, 128, 189 Two Defense Laws (Taiwan), 80, 83, 89, counter, 109, 111, 113, 124, 133, 150, 90, 91, 92, 95 189, 205 Thailand United Nations, 4, 81, 103, 121, 163 authoritarian regime, 157–9 see also peacekeeping civilian control, 159–63, 165–6, US (United States of America) 169–71 development aid, see development aid coup of 2006, 169 inﬂuence on civil-military relations, democratization, 158 91, 117, 137, 143, 150, 152, human rights, 172 189–90 internal threat enviroment, 164–5 inﬂuence on democratization, 63, 138, quality of democracy, 171–3 140 resources, 163–5, 167 military aid, see military aid strategies of civilian control, 163, 166 theory Vietnam, 4, 7, 8–9, 214 culturalism, 54 institutionalism, 53–4 war paradigms, 42 civil, 142, 147, 150; see also insurgency pluralism, 43–4 cold, 164 rationalism, 42–3 on drugs (Thailand), 165 structuralism, 52–53 Indo-Pakistani, 179 threat Korean, 60 external, 52 of liberation (Bangladesh), 119–20, internal, 52–3; see also Bangladesh; 128, 132 Indonesia; Pakistan, internal second world, 11 threat environment; Philippines; on terror, 149–50, 152, 189–90 Thailand World Value Survey, 129, 185, 189 TNI law (Indonesia), 106–7, 109, 112, 115 Yellow Shirts, see PAD (People’s Alliance transitional justice, 28, 64–5, 67, 117, for Democracy, Thailand) 132 Yusin system, 61