Namibia from Colonisation to Statehood: the Paradoxical Relationship Between Law and Power in International Society
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Namibia from colonisation to statehood: The Paradoxical Relationship between Law and Power in International Society By Stephen Babatunde Idowu A Dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations Faculty of Economics London School of Economics In the candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2000 UMI Number: U615192 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615192 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 It+£S£S F 77<?/ POLITICAL AND Uj, Abstract On March 21 1990, Namibia became an independent state after 70 years of being a mandated territory under South African control. This thesis examines the dialectical relationship between power politics and international law in securing this outcome. From the beginning when South West Africa became a pawn in the European balance of power in the late 19th century, its atypical nature amongst other colonial territories reflected the ambiguous relationship between power politics and law. The Namibia conflict was essentially driven by balance of power politics. As this thesis demonstrates, it was at once a creation, a victim and a beneficiary of power politics. Nonetheless, while power drove the conflict, law constrained it. Indeed, its history paradoxically demonstrated a degree of complementarity between the two. By itself, international law was impotent to secure change in opposition to the realities of power and the interests of the great powers. On the other hand, the Namibian question was posed within the legal framework of the international arrangements for the transfer of power, i. e. mandate system, trusteeship, and decolonization regimes. At each stage, the complex and changing relationship between power and law became manifest. From the establishment of the mandate system in 1920, the ideas of self-determination and international accountability were ingrained in the consciousness of the metropolitan power. These ideas survived to influence much of the transfer of power debate. They did not stop power politics, but over the long term, they changed the legal framework within which it operated. Consequently, international law served as an institutional device for communicating the prevailing norms of the international community to the South African government and restrained South Africa from annexing Namibia. Yet international law alone could never create the optimal balance of incentives and costs necessary to resolve the Namibian issue. However, as the conflict became externalized within the Cold War, the United States, acting out of self-interest in containing Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa, discovered that a solution was an effective means of achieving this objective. Thus Namibia was a beneficiary of power politics, and the international community finally sanctioned the outcome. Acknowledgement “Divine favours were never late”. These were Machiavelli’s words to Francesco Vettori, a Florentine Ambassador to the Papal Court, and a confidant of Pope Leo X de Medici, in 1513. As it was then, so it is today. This thesis could not have been completed without the support of others, whether living or dead. I am very happy to acknowledge them here. My Mum, who against all odds before and after the death of my father, funded my education literally with her sweat. This thesis is dedicated to her. My immediate family, especially, my helpmeet, Jite, and my daughter and my son, Jessica and Jonathan, for their prayers and for providing priceless homely support. Rev. Dr. Segun Johnson and Rev. Mrs Sade Johnson, for being more than ordinary God parent. My supervisor, Prof. James Mayall, who knocked this thesis into shape through corrections, suggestions and criticisms, even after he left LSE for Cambridge. Fellow students at the Department of International Relations, in particular, the African Research Group for constant constructive criticisms at seminars. Those Nigerians that passed through either the Old Building or other London University gates before I did: Femi Akinola, C. U. Uche, Abiodun Alao, Amazu and Messrs Ladipo and Akiboye. The Librarians and staffs of the Library of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, in particular, Peter Bursey; and those of the United States Information Service, American Embassy, London. The management and staff of the BURNS International, London and the Boston University, London Programme for giving me the opportunity to work for, and with them, while studying. I must also mention Chris Pook, Mel Draper, Ben Raja and Stephen Spivey, my colleagues at DTI, for making my transition into the civil service world a smooth one. The Almighty God, for giving me good health, wisdom, and perseverance. Lastly, because any good prize has a price, thus it is fair to appreciate the sacrifice of the one, who was once familiar, but now remains unfamiliar, (puppij/. Table of Contents Abstract i Acknowledgement ii Table of Content iii Introduction 1 Chapter One: 1.1. Theoretical Analysis 14 1.2. Definition(s) of the balance of power 18 1.3. The historical development of balance of power 24 1.4. Balance of power as a policy 30 1.5. Balance of power in the post-Cold War World 34 1.6. The critique of the theory of balance of power 38 1.7. Operational definition of balance of power 43 1.8. Balance of power and international law 45 1.9. Conclusion 55 Chapter Two: South West Africa: A creation of balance of power 2.1. Introduction 60 2.2. General explanations and the origin of German Colonialism in Africa 61 2.3. Bismarck’s colonial moves in South West Africa 63 2.4. South West Africa and the Anglo-German Relations Between 1870-1884 70 2.5. Britain’s reactions to German colonialism in South West Africa 76 2.6. South Africa and its claim for South West Africa 78 2.7. The Bismarck cable and international law 82 2.8. Conclusion 86 Chapter Three: The Politics and Practice of the Mandate System 3.1. Introduction 87 3.2. South West Africa and the Military Occupation Interregnum, 1915-1919 89 3.3. The Principle and Politics of Mandate System 90 3.4. The Classification of the mandates 96 3.5. South Africa and the Class C Mandate 99 3.6. South Africa and the Trusteeship Regime 103 3.7. The 1950 and the 1955 Advisory Opinions 110 3.8. The Advisory Committee on South West Africa 113 3.9. Committee on South West Africa 115 3.10. Good Office Committee on South West Africa 118 3.11. The UN’s coercive resolution against South Africa. 122 3.12. The Special Committee of Seven 126 iii 3.13. Ethiopia and Liberia V South Africa 128 3.14. The limited personality of the United Nations 129 3.15. The 1966 Judgement 131 3.16. The international community and the 1966 judgement 133 3.17. The 1971 Opinion: a reversal of the Court’s position 138 Chapter Four: Namibia and Henry Africanus 4.1. Introduction 140 4.2. The end of the United Nations’ Regime 142 4.3. The United States and the Soviet Union and Africa, 1960-1971 147 4.4. The Angolan Crisis: A Shift in the Southern African balance of power 152 4.5. Cuba and the Angolan Conflict 153 4.6. The Soviet Union in Angola 154 4.7. The Soviet Union and the international law of wars of national liberation 156 4.8. The United States in Angola 161 4.9. South Africa and the Angolan Conflict 166 4.10. Angola and Namibia: A marriage of convenience 169 4.11. Henry Africanus 174 4.12. Kissinger and Vorster in Zurich 185 4.13. The Frontline States and Namibia ' 186 4.14. Limitations ofHenry Africanus 189 Chapter Five: The Dynamics of the Contact Group Diplomacy 5.1. Introduction 195 5.2. The Road to the first New York Proximity Talks 196 5.3. The New York Proximity Talks 197 5.4. “Strangulation by finesse” 198 5.5. The Frontline States and the Maputo Conference 201 5.6. The Post-Proximity Talks and South Africa’s Ascension Day Military Strike 206 5.7. Resolution 435 (1978): a legal and political framework on the Namibian question 219 5.8 The ceasefire deadlock 229 5.9. The Road to the Second Proximity Talks 231 5.10. London taking charge of the Contact Group 234 5.11. The Geneva Conference 237 5.12. From stage of discussion to implementation 239 5.13. The Return of Kissinger 246 5.14. The collapse of the Geneva Conference 248 5.15. The origin and the composition of the Contact Group 252 5.16. The Contact Group and international law 257 5.17. Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) 259 Chapter Six: The End Game of the Namibian Conflict 6.1. Introduction 263 6.2. The beginning of the end of the Contact Group 274 6.3. The end of the Contact Group 295 iv 6.4. The Lusaka Accord: a false optimism 301 6.5. International pressures on SWAPO 320 6.6. Resource constraints on South African military 322 6.7. The shift in the military balance in Angola 324 6.8. The Soviet Union glasnotian constructive engagement 325 6.9. Cuba: from a saviour to an over-stayer 330 Conclusion 333 Bibliography 339 v INTRODUCTION Background to the study The year 1990 was the annus mirabilis in the history of Namibia.1 On March 21, 1990, Namibia gained independence.