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The Mufti of and the Politics of Palestine Author(s): Philip Mattar Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring, 1988), pp. 227-240 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4327735 Accessed: 28/08/2009 09:32

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http://www.jstor.org THE MUFTI OF JERUSALEMAND THE POLITICSOF PALESTINE

Philip Mattar

MUHAMMAD Amin al-Husayni (1895-1974),the most powerful leader of the Palestiniannational movement duringmost of the British rule over Palestine (1917-1948), portrayed himself in his post-1948 writings as one who vigorously opposed both British rule and the Jewish National Home. Arab contemporaries who were his supporters were eager to prove that al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalemwho was also known as al-HajiAmin, led revolts in the 1920sand 1930s but was frustratedby Britishand Zionistconspiracies. I His Zionistbiographers on the other hand, have described him as a Muslim fanatic whose extremism and intransigencewere largely responsiblefor the disaster that befell the in 1948.Ironically, Arab and Zionistauthors converge on two points: al-Husayni's political preeminencethroughout the mandate,and his pivotal role in the political violence against the British and the Zionists.2 These interpretationscontain a numberof flaws. First, accounts on both sides are so partisanand polemical that the historicalal-Husayni and the movement he led are scarcely discernible. That al-Husayni's political career has not received balanced and impartialtreatment is, of course, not remarkablein view of the

PhilipMattar is associate editorof the Journalof PalestineStudies and executivedirector of the Institutefor Palestine Studies in Washington,DC. Theviews expressedin this articleare the author'sand do not necessarilyrepresent those of the Institutefor Palestine Studies. The article is adaptedfrom Mattar's biographyof MuhammadAmin al-Husayniwhich will be publishedby ColumbiaUniversity Press in spring 1988. 1. MuhammadAmin al-Husayni, Haqa'iq 'an Qadiyyat Filastin (Truths Regarding the PalestineProblem), 2nd. ed. (Cairo:Dar al-Kitabal-Arabi bi-Masr, 1957); Emile al-Ghuri,Filastin 'abr Sittin 'Aman(Palestine over Sixty Years),vol. II, (Beirut:Dar al-Nahar, 1972). 2. Zuhayr Mardini,Alf Yawmma' al-Hail Amin (One ThousandDays with al-Haji Amin) (Beirut:Dar al-'Irfan, 1977);Moshe P. Waters,Mufti over the MiddleEast (:Barber, 1942); Maurice Pearlman,Mufti Over Jerusalem: The Story of Haj Amin el Husseini (London: Victor Gollanz, 1947);Joseph B. Schechtman,The Mufti and the Fuehrer:The Rise and Fall of Haj Amin al-Husayni(New York: ThomasYoseloff, 1965). MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL* VOLUME42, NO. 2 SPRING1988 228 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL passionhis namehas alwaysinspired. Some Arabbiographers have laudedhim andhis cause, seekingto absolvehim of any responsibilityfor the 1948disaster, whileJewish nationalists vilify him and discredit his movement.3The secondflaw is the biographers'meager use of oral and unpublishedsources. The Arab biographers,notably Zuhayr Mardini, were satisfied with interviewing al-Husayni andquarrying his memoirs;the Zionistbiographers, especially Maurice Pearlman and Joseph B. Schechtman,rely on the Westernpress; they lack even an elementaryfamiliarity with al-Husayni, , the Arabiclanguage, or Palestinian societyand its politics. The thirdproblem is the ahistoricalassumption by most authorsthat the Mufti'sbehavior and actionswere unchangedthroughout his politicalcareer. In particular,biographers and historiansassume that al-Husayni'smilitancy after 1936guided his policiesduring the earlieryears as well. But an examinationof British,Zionist, and Palestinian sources reveals a ratherdifferent portrait. Farfrom being static, al-Husayni's career went through two distinctphases: the Palestine phase, between 1917 and 1936, when he was a cautious, pragmatic, traditionalleader who cooperatedwith Britishofficials while opposingZionism; and the exile phase, after 1936, characterized by bitterness, inflexibility, and political alliances of dubious value or wisdom. This article will examine his role in the politicsof Palestineand within the Palestiniannational movement.

THE PALESTINE YEARS

The fundamentalexplanation of al-Husayni's cooperation with the British until 1936 can be traced to his formative years. Indeed, al-Husayni's role in the politicsof Palestineis incomprehensibleunless we understandthe politicsof the patricianclass from which he emerged.The Husaynis were the mostprominent of the urban notable families who, as the rulingelite of the local Ottoman adminis- tration, dominatedthe politics of Palestine.4Their traditionalinfluence, based on centuries of religious appointments,tax collection, and landholding,gave them a power base both in the countrysideand within such cities as Jerusalem,Jaffa, and -local power bases through which the Ottomans were able to exercise theirimperial authority.

3. Mardini,for example, reads like the memoirs of an official who made all the judicious decisions. Mardini tried to show that the Mufti and the Palestinians fought with tenacity and self-sacrifice; Waters (, Maurice Pearlman)and Schechtman attempted to vilify him, discredithis movement, and blame him for the misfortuneof the Palestinians.The jacket of Waters' book shows a drawing of a hook-nosed, grotesque man, ironically resembling an anti-Semitic caricatureof a Jew, with blood drippingfrom his fingernails.Schechtman's book, which is the best known in English, contains in the frontispiece the photographof a stragglybearded figure, with a turban,who is not al-Husayni,despite the claim of the caption. 4. Albert Hourani, "OttomanReform and the Politics of Notables," in WilliamR. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., Beginning of Modernizationin the Middle East: The 19th Century (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress, 1968),pp. 45-46. MUFTI OF JERUSALEM* 229

The Husaynis and other notables were, in general, the defenders of the political status quo and worked with the local and imperial government to guaranteeor enforce stability in those cities or regions in which they exercised influence. Some of them representedtheir society's interests and demandswithin officialOttoman institutions in Istanbul.On occasion, they led protests againstthe governmentover local issues, but never for movementsaimed at the overthrowof Ottoman rule in Palestine. They were, in essence, partners with their fellow Muslims in the imperialgovernment. The Husaynis represented the epitome of this kind of partnershipwith the ruling power, first with the Ottomansand then with the British, despite the fact that the Britishwere consideredforeigners. Their relations with the Britishbegan, significantlyenough, with the capture of Jerusalemby British forces in 1917; it was Salim al-Husayni, mayor of Jerusalem, who handed the key of the city to General Edmund Allenby on December 9, 1917. Cooperation with the British MilitaryAdministration (1917-1920) continued under Amin's half-brother,Kamil al-Husayni, who had succeeded his father in the powerful position of mufti of Jerusalem, the office traditionallyheld by a religious scholar who provides legal counsel. Al-Haji Amin al-Husayni also continued his family's policy of cooper- ation.

Al-Husayni as Nationalist Leader

Shortly after returningfrom Turkey, where he had served in the Ottoman duringWorld War I, al-Husaynihelped a British officerrecruit 2,000 Arabs for the last stages of the war effort against the Ottomans, believing that once Palestine was liberatedit would become part of an Arab state. He then became a clerk in the office of the British district governorof Jerusalem.It was because of this kind of cooperation, and the family name, that Sir Herbert Samuel, a prominentBritish Zionist and the first high commissionerfor Palestine, consid- ered Amin in April 1921 for the office of mufti to replace his recently deceased half-brother Kamil.5 , another British Zionist and the first attorney general of Palestine, writes of a meeting between Samuel and Amin al-Husayniin which the latter declared "his earnest desire to cooperate with the government, and his belief in the good intention of the governmenttowards the Arabs. He gave assurances that the influenceof his family and himself would be devoted to maintainingtranquility in Jerusalem. . . "6 Al-Husayni was duly appointedmufti and, in January1922, president of the Supreme Muslim Council, set up by the government of Palestine to manage Muslimaffairs. This office gave him controlover Muslimcourts, schools, religious

5. Foreign Office, 371/5121/E9397/85/44,Palin Report, p. 4. 6. Normanand Helen Bentwich,Mandate Memories, 1918-1948 (New York:Schoken Books, 1965),pp. 191-92. 230 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL endowments (awqaf), mosques, and an annualrevenue of Palestine ?50,000. No persons were in better positions to know whether al-Husayni kept his promises than Bentwich, who felt that the Muftimaintained the peace throughoutthe 1920s, and Samuel, who considered him "a moderate man."7 It is true that al-Husayniwas alreadyan avid nationalist,and in August 1922 he joined in opposing the formationof a Legislative Councilproposed by Samuel. Palestinian leaders like the Mufti feared that acceptance of the Council was tantamountto acceptance of the British Mandate, which had been approved in July by the League of Nations, and support for the establishmentof the Jewish National Home. In addition, they did not find the Council's composition or its proposed powers fair. The Council reserved 43 percent of the membership-10 seats out of 23-for the Palestinianseven though they constituted 88 percent of the population, and it forbade discussion of political matters. When the Council was rejected by the Palestinianleadership, Samuel proposed an Advisory Council with a similar composition and mandate. It, too, was rejected. The Mufti's opposition to these two proposals was not as significantin 1922 and 1923 as many historians assume. The political affairs of the Palestinian communitywere managedby the Palestine Arab Executive under the leadership of Musa Kazim al-Husayni, who had been the mayor of Jerusalem from 1918-1920.The Mufti was too new to his jobs and too busy with religious matters duringthe 1920sto have had much of an impact in the affair.It was not until 1929 that Amin al-Husayni became the political leader of the Palestinians.

Serving Two Masters

Al-Husayni's rise to leadership coincided with the decline of the Executive and with the perception that he had stood up to the Zionists during the 1929 incidents; his role in that controversy, however, has been exagger- ated by all sides. Arab historians, such as Izzat Darwaza, argue that the Mufti used the dispute to reactivate the national movement.8Israeli scholars, such as Yehoshua Porath, claim that the Muftiand his associates exploited what "seemed to them a Jewish provocation,in order to intensify the struggleagainst the ," and that "his agitation ... resulted in the disturbancesof August 1929," which took the lives of 133 Jews and 116 Palestinians.9This thesis fits nicely with the position of most Arabs, who believe that al-HajiJAmin aggressively resisted , and with the Zionist view that the Muftiwas responsiblefor most of the violence in Palestine. The thesis is particularlyattractive because the Mufti was

7. Ibid.; Eliahu Elath, "Conversationswith Musa al-'Alami," TheJerusalem Quarterly,no. 41 (Winter1987), p. 44. 8. MuhammadIzzat Darwaza,Hawl al-Harakaal 'Arabiyyaal-Haditha (On the Modem Arab Movement), vol. III, (Sidon: al-Matba'aal-Arabiyya, 1951), pp. 61-62. 9. Y. Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918-1929 (London: FrankCass, 1974), p. 266. MUFTI OF JERUSALEM* 231 the prime beneficiaryof the violence. Palestiniansbegan to view him not just as a religious dignitarybut also as a political leader who articulatedtheir national goals. There is no solid evidence to indicate that al-Husayni was involved in organizingthe outbreaksof August 23. That morninghe delivered a speech at the al--the Temple Mount-to a crowd that had heard a rumor that Jews were going to attack the Haram,Islam's thirdholiest shrine. Al-Husaynihad asked the Friday speakerto instructpeople to remaincalm. After the sermon, the Mufti urged people to return to their villages, and he sent word to the British police that they should quickly increase the numberof units at the Haram. When the crowds came out of Damascus Gate, al-Husayni himself tried to disperse them, and when violence spread later that afternoon, he issued an appeal for Arabs to arm themselves "with mercy, wisdom and patience, for (verily) God is with those who bear themselves in patience."10 His actions on August 23 are not the only evidence that he did not organize the riots. The Shaw Commission, which investigated the violence, reached the following conclusions: * The immediate cause of the violence was the revisionist Zionist demon- stration of August 15, 1929. * The violence was spontaneous-not organizedby anyone. * The violence took place in several towns, like , where the influence of the Mufti was weak, and did not take place in many towns where his influence was strong. * A written appeal that he allegedly sent out for Arabs to come and defend the Haramwas found to be a forgery, probablywritten by a non-Arab.11 From 1929to 1936, the Mufti cooperatedwith the British while, at the same time, attemptingto change Britishpolicy. He reassuredJohn Chancellor,the third high commissioner, in October 1929that he consideredhimself "one who was, in a sense, an officer of the State." Chancellorreported: The Mufti promisedto help in the maintenanceof order and to cooperate with the Government.He had always held this attitudeand he held it still and should continue to hold it even if Governmentdid not listen to his representation.He regardedthis as his duty not only to the Government,to God, and the people but also to his own conscience.12 The Mufti told Chancellorthat the Arabs were amicably disposed toward Great Britainboth out of self-interestand because they believed in Britain'stradition of

10. Great Britain, ParliamentaryPapers, Report of the Commissionon the Disturbance of August, 1929 (Shaw CommissionReport), Cmd. 3530, (London:HMSO, 1937),p. 78. 11. Ibid., pp. 73-78; For a detailed study of the Mufti's role, see PhilipMattar, "The Role of the Mufti of Jerusalemin the Political Strugglefor the Western Wall, 1928-29," Middle Eastern Studies, (London), vol. 19, no. 1 (January1983), pp. 104-118. 12. CommonwealthOffice, 733/163/67013/Il,Chancellor to Passfield,enclosure 2, October 12, 1929;733/175/67411/II/2, Chancellor to Passfield, October5, 1929. 232 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL justice. Whena militant,Shakib Wahab, approached the Muftiwith an offer"to organizebands for a guerrillacampaign," al-Husayni rejected the offer, stating thathe was seekinga politicalsolution instead. 13 The extent of the Mufti's moderationduring this period was indicatedby his willingnessto negotiateand accept compromisesolutions. He was involvedin indirectnegotiations with H. St. JohnPhilby in Septemberand October 1929 from whichemerged a draftsettlement providing for the establishmentof a parliament in which Jews and Arabswould be proportionallyrepresented and by which Palestinewould remain under the authorityof a Britishhigh commissioner who wouldsafeguard Zionist interests, including immigration. The Muftiaccepted the draftproposal but, with the exceptionof JudahMagnes, the Zionistleaders- ChaimWeizmann, David Ben Gurion,and PinhasRutenberg-rejected the plan because it would have meant the continuationof their position as a minority in Palestine.14 It was also the Muftiwho dispatchedthe secretaryof the SupremeMuslim Council and the PalestineArab Executive, Jamalal-Husayni, to London in December1929 to meetwith the colonialsecretary. Jamal's opening position was that Palestinehave "some form of representativegovernment," an elected legislaturebased on proportionalrepresentation and over whose legislationthe high commissionerwould have a veto power.The colonialsecretary, however, rejectedthe proposal.The Zionistswere opposedto a legislaturein whichthey wouldbe a minorityand through which the Palestinianscould curtail the growth of the ,the modernJewish community in Palestine.The Britishobjected becausethey fearedtheir authority in Palestinewould be reduced.A few months after his first trip, Jamal returned to London with a Palestine Arab Executive delegation which offered a proposal similar to the previous one. It, too, was rejected by the British on similargrounds.15 In the PassfieldWhite Paperof October 1930, the Britishdid meet Palestinian demands on immigrationand land purchases, but this was the result of the Shaw and Simpson commissions' recommendationsrather than the Mufti's efforts. Zionist pressure on the minority government of Ramsay MacDonald, however, forced the governmentto withdrawthese concessions in the MacDonaldletter of January 13, 1931. Partly in response to the letter, the Mufti convened a General Islamic Congress in December 1931 to unite the Arabs and Muslims against the Zionistsand to makeLondon aware that British interests lay in the Muslimand Arabworlds, not withthe Zionists.In the end,however, the effectof the congress on the Britishwas negligible.16

13. Ibid., 733/175/67411/111/583,Cabinet Paper 343, Police Summaryfor week ending Septem- ber 21, 1929. 14. Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy. Vol. 1: Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts, 1913-1931(London: Frank Cass, 1983),pp. 87-88, 209-212;Y. Porath,The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929-1939:From Riot to Rebellion (London:Frank Cass, 1977),p. 21. 15. Porath,Palestinian Arab National Movement,pp. 23-26. 16. See H.A.R. Gibb, "The Islamic Congressat Jerusalemin December 1931," in Survey of MUFTI OF JERUSALEM* 233

Indeed, a number of efforts by the Mufti and his colleagues were largely unsuccessful. A general strike and demonstrationagainst Jewish immigration, held by the Executive in October 1933 while the Mufti was out of the country, resulted in 25 deaths. Political parties were formed, private and public protests were held, but all were ineffectual in halting immigration. In fact, Jewish immigrationincreased from 4,075 in 1931, to 9,553 in 1932, to 30,327 in 1933, to 42,359 in 1934, and to 61,854 in 1935. British High Commissioner Arthur Wauchopetook notice of the Mufti's difficultiesin January1934: "I am confident that the Muftilikes me, respects me and is anxious to help me . .. but he fears that criticismof his many opponentsthat he is too Britishmay weaken his influencein the country. The fact, however, that his influenceis on the side of moderationis of definite value."'17The political situationbecame even more difficultin 1935 as reflected in a Britishintelligence report of that year. Its authorspredicted that the Palestinian political leaders "will find themselves forced to adopt an extremist policy" in order "to restore their prestige and prevent the leadership of the nationalist movement from passing out of their hands" and "to satisfy public opinion and try a new course of action, as all their previous efforts in protest, demonstrations,public meetings etc. had failed to attain their object."'18 One mightask why, over the course of two decades, did the Mufticontinue his dual policy of cooperationwith the Britishand nonviolentopposition to the Zionists when the threatto Palestiniannational existence (except for the period 1926-1928) became increasinglyominous. A numberof fundamentalreasons can be suggested. First, the Husaynis, as discussed earlier, belonged to that patricianclass in whom was deeply ingrainedthe practiceof cooperationwith the imperialpower in order to guarantee stability and the political status quo. Al-Hajj Amin al- Husayni's statements to British officials, and his actions, indicated a constant awareness of his status as an officialappointed by the Palestine government:if he were to challenge British discretionarypower, he mightlose the posts of mufti of Jerusalemand president of the SupremeMuslim Council. Second, like others of his generation and despite his nationalist views, the Mufti admired what he saw as British fairness and sense of justice-personal qualities of British officials such as Herbert Samuel and ArthurWauchope, with whom he met frequently. He repeatedly affirmedhis allegiance to the British rulers on the basis of these personal qualities, even while he was aware that British officials, regardlessof their personalpreferences, were the instrumentsof what he considered an unjust policy. Third, al-Husaynibelieved that the British were too strong for the Palestiniansto oppose successfully and that, in any case, Britain'spresence in Palestine would be transitory,as it appearedto be in , , and Transjordan.

International Affairs, 1934, edited by ArnoldT. Toynbee (London:, 1935). 17. CommonwealthOffice, 733/258, Wauchopeto Cunliffe-Lister,January 5, 1934, cited in A.W. Kayyali, Palestine: A Modern History (London:Croom Helm Ltd., 1973), p. 176. 18. Foreign Office, 371/20018,Criminal Investigation Department Report, December5, 1935. 234 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Finally, he thought that Britain's pro-Zionist Balfour policy would change when the British realized that their interests lay with the Muslim and Arab countries and not with the Zionists. He furtherbelieved that the Palestinians,with the help of fellow Muslims and Arabs, might influence the British through petitions, delegations to London, protests, and demonstrations; he opposed political violence and preparationfor revolutionaryresistance. Indeed, he surrep- titiously assisted the British authoritiesin defusing violent outbreaks.In short, he affirmed,by word and deed, a preference for nonviolent methods.

The : A TurningPoint

From 1921 to 1936, the Mufti served two masters: the British and the Palestinians. He managed to pacify the first with pledges of loyalty and cooper- ation and the second with religious and political rhetoric. By the early 1930s, escalating events and an increasingly militant anti-British public attitude had begun forcing the Mufti into choosing between the two camps. In 1932, his moderate policies and leadership were challenged by the leaders of the Istiqlal (Independence), a newly emerging party. Unlike the leaders of the Mu'aridun (Opposition), who were suspected of opportunismand collaboration,leaders of the Istiqlal were seen as dedicated nationalists who articulated the emerging militantmood. They were perceived by a frustratedpublic as the alternativeto the moderates. As such, the Mufti could not ignore them and therefore used his powerful position to underminethe Istiqlal, which had no political machinery,no money, and no press with which to fight back.19 Although the Mufti was able to fend off the Istiqlal's challenge, he could not overcome the radicalspirit that sustainedit. This sentimentfound expression in a secret religious organization led by 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam. A deeply religious shaykh and a man of integrity, social concern, and eloquence, he was also a dedicated revolutionary.In the mid-1920she had demandedthat money be spent on arms rather than on mosque repairs, causing the Mufti to deny him employment as an itinerant preacher for the Supreme Muslim Council. Al- Qassam, however, went on to found a mosque in which to preach his revolution, and he practicedwhat he preached. He not only preachedajihad against the twin "infidels," the Jew and the Briton, but also began buying arms and recruiting workers and peasants in his northernPalestine power base.20In 1933, he sent a follower to the Mufti requesting him to start a revolt in the south, while he, al-Qassam, would start one in the north. The Mufti reportedlyrefused, affirming

19. Darwaza, Hawl, pp. 108-109; Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, pp. 123-126;Commonwealth Office, 733/219/97105/2/33, High Commissioner'sdispatch to C.O., Septem- ber 16, 1932. 20. Subhi Yasin, al-Thawraal-'Arabiyya al-Kubra fi Filastin, 1936-1939 (The Great Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939)(Cairo: Dar al-Hana, 1959),pp. 19-21. MUFTI OF JERUSALEM* 235 again that he was seeking a political ratherthan a militarysolution.21 By 1935 al-Qassam was unalterably convinced that the methods of the Palestinian leader were ineffective. Jewish immigrationwas increasing at an alarming rate, and it seemed only a matter of time before the Zionists would establish a Jewish nation in Palestine. On the basis of this, and perhaps the discovery of arms shipments to Jews on October 18, al-Qassamrefused to wait any longer, and he and eleven followers left to encouragevillagers to revolt. After a few encounters with security forces, a British police detachment gave chase on November 19. Instead of escaping from or surrenderingto the British troops, al-Qassam resolved to fight to the end-an event that occurred on November 21, 1935.22 The news of al-Qassam's death sent a wave of grief and rage throughout Palestine. He became a symbol of martyrdomand self-sacrifice, embodying for the people the selflessness conspicuously absent among their leaders. His death also illuminatedthe futile tactics of the politicians,which is probablywhy they did not attend the funeral. But neither the Mufti nor leaders of the various parties could escape al-Qassam's shadow. Indeed, al-Qassam achieved more in death than he did during 15 years of preaching.He offered his people, hitherto largely peaceful and hospitable, a radicalalternative-revolution. ThroughoutPalestine, radicalyouth groups formedto take up the mantle of al-Qassam,to fight Zionism and the British Mandate.23 When violence flaredApril 15-19, 1936and a general strike began to spread, the public urgedthe Muftito assume leadershipof the protests, which were aimed against Jewish immigrationand land purchase, and to press for the establishment of a nationalgovernment. He resisted for 10 crucialdays before his propensityfor inertia and timidity gave way to political action.24 Had he remained on the sidelines, with nothing to show but a record of failure, he would have been overtaken by events as well as by more militant leaders. Because of these prospects, the Mufti accepted the leadershipof the newly organizedArab Higher Committee, which comprised all the political parties, and therefore became the leader of the general strike. This decision was the beginning of the end of his policy of cooperation, and it was also the beginning of the end of British confidence in him. He tried to contain the ensuing violence, but found that the revolt had a force of its own. Political violence, British suppression, destruction, and the rising death toll forced the Mufti to take hard-linepositions. Several events over the next few years served to radicalizethe Muftifurther. In 1937 the British submitted a plan to partitionPalestine between groups that

21. Ibid., pp. 21-27. 22. Ibid, pp. 21-27; Porath, The PalestinianArab National Movement,p. 135. 23. Bayan al-Hut, ed., Watha'iq al-Haraka al-Wataniyyaal-Filastiniyya, 1918-1939: Min AwraqAkram Zu'aytir (Documents of the PalestineNational Movement, 1918-1939:Selections from the AkramZu'aytir Papers) (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, 1979), pp. 396-402. 24. Darwaza,Hawl, p. 123. 236 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

many Palestinians saw as two outsiders: Zionists from Europe and from the Hijaz. The Mufti, like most Palestinians, rejected partition, and he continued to lead the revolt. At that point, the British decided to strip him of his offices and arrest him for his part in the violence.

THE EXILE YEARS

Al-Haj Amin escaped to Lebanon in 1937 and continued to lead the revolt from Beirut and Damascus. By the summer of 1938, many cities, including Jerusalem,had been taken by the rebels. But it was only a matterof time before Britain, whose forces outnumberedthose of the Palestinians 10-to-1, crushed the revolt. The Palestinianspaid a high price for the 1936-1939revolt in terms of their economy and their military and political structure. The British conservatively estimated that 3,074 Palestinianswere killed, that 112 were hanged, and that in 1939 alone, 6,000 were incarceratedout of a populationof 960,000. Considering the magnitude of the national calamity and the personal loss of many of al-Husayni's friends and relatives, it is no wonder that he had periods of depression and considered suicide in 1939, as reported by Gabriel Puaux, the French high commissionerfor the Levant.25 Following the revolt, al-Husaynigrew increasinglybitter and uncompromis- ing in matters vital to the future of his people. His unwillingnessto compromise is exemplifiedby his rejection of the 1939 White Paper, even though its terms- restrictingJewish immigrationto 75,000 over five years, limiting land sales, and planningfor an independentPalestine in 10 years with a Palestinianmajority of two-to-one-were obviously favorable to the Palestinians.He escaped to Iraq in October 1939, having bribed the French chief of police of Syria and Lebanon, where he had been under close observation as the result of British pressures on the French. In Iraq, he sought to encourage a pan-Arab challenge to British control there and, ultimately, over Palestine. The prospect of a revolt in Iraq alarmedthree parties with vital interests in Palestine:the Zionists,the Hashemites,and the British.Pinhas Rutenberg, a Zionist representativewho in January 1939 had been counseled by Amir Abdullah of Transjordanto eliminateal-Husayni, traveled to Londonin May 1940in an attempt to urgethe Britishto assassinatethe Palestinianleader.26 Because the ForeignOffice was not in the habitof carryingout assassinations,it foundthe proposalunattractive and, in any case, impractical.Yet, five monthslater, the Muftibecame such a grave threat to British interests that Winston Churchillapproved a plan to have him assassinated.27Members of the Irgun,a revisionistZionist underground movement,

25. Foreign Office, 37l/23240/E7113/6/31, Havard (Beirut) to Foreign Office, October 22, 1939. 26. Commonwealth Office, 733/309/75872/51, Sir Harold MacMichael to Malcolm MacDonald, January 4, 1939. 27. Foreign Office, 371/24568/E27621367/31, Leo Amery to Secretary of State, October 5, 1940. For more details, see Philip Mattar, "Amin al-Husayni and Iraq's Quest for Independence, 1939-41," MUFTI OF JERUSALEM * 237 were flown to Iraq in May 1941to carryout the assassinationwith the help of the British army, but the mission was abortedwhen the group's leader was killed by strafingfrom a Germanplane. The Mufti escaped to , and the revolt he had helped to initiatewas put down by Britishand Hashemiteforces.28 The Muftithen fled to the Axis countries,first to and then on to Germany.

The Mufti and the Axis Powers

No period in al-Husayni'slife is more controversialand distortedthan that of the war years. Zionists were so eager to prove him guilty of collaborationand war crimes that they exaggeratedhis connections with the Nazis, while al-Husayni and other Arabs were so busy justifying his statements and actions that they ignored the obvious and overwhelmingfact that the Mufti did indeed cooperate with one of the most barbaricregimes in history.29 In his only meeting with Hitler, in November 1941, al-Husayni stressed the need for a public statementby the Axis supportingfull independencefor the Arab world and rescuing Palestine from Zionism and British imperialism.In a secret pact in April 1942, both Italy and Germanyagreed "to grantto the Arab countries ... aid in their fight for liberation;to recognize their sovereignty and indepen- dence; to agree to their federation . .. ; as well as the abolition of the Jewish National Homeland in Palestine."30Once he had a commitmentfrom the Axis, al-Husaynibegan to assist in the war effort: he issued appeals to the Arab world to revolt against the British, organizedan Arab legion to fight the British in the Arab world, recruited Muslims to fight the communists in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, and coordinatedsabotage expeditions to Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan. His propagandaand militaryefforts, however, were either unsuccessful or were insignificant;calls for revolt, for example, were ignored, and the sabotage teams were either capturedor killed.31 After the war, several Jewish groups sought al-Husayni'sindictment and trial as a war criminal.The Jewish Agency in 1946provided the Britishwith evidence, consisting of unsignedletters (in draftform) from 1943and 1944and reprintedby the Agency, in which al-Husayniprotests, to a numberof countries under Axis

Arab Studies Quarterly,vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1984),pp. 267-281. 28. For informationof the Iraqi revolt of 1941, see Majid Khadduri,Independent Iraq, 1932-1958(London: Oxford University Press, 1960). 29. For Zionist works on the Mufti in Germany, see Pearlman, Mufti over Jerusalem, Schechtman,The Mufti,Lukasz Hirszowicz, The ThirdReich and the Arab East (London:Routledge and KeganPaul, 1966),and Elias Cooper, "ForgottenPalestinian: The Nazi Mufti,"American Zionist (March-April1978); for Arab works, see Amin al-Husayni'smemoirs in the Egyptiandaily Akhbar al-Yawm(1957-58), nos. 673-90, and Mardini,Alf Yawm. 30. Al-Husayni,Akhbar al-Yawm, January 4, 1958; Majid Khadduri,Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics (Baltimore,MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 78-80. 31. NationalArchives, R.G. 226, XL5487,December 27, 1944;XL5709, January 1, 1945. 238 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

control, the exchange of European Jews for Germans from Palestine. Such emigration,he proclaimed,benefited the Jewish National Home. In addition, the Zionists sent a statement to the British Foreign Office by Rudolf Kasztner, a leader of the Jewish Reserve and Relief Committee in Budapest, in which he quoted Adolf Eichmannas saying in response to a request for the emigrationof HungarianJews to Palestine: "I am a personalfriend of the GrandMufti. We have promisedhim that no EuropeanJew would enter Palestine anymore" and that he [Eichmann]"would be willing to recommendthe emigrationof a group of 1,681 HungarianJews, on conditionthat the groupshould not go to Palestine. They may get to any country but Palestine." Kasztneralso quoted a colleague of Eichmann, Dieter Wisliceny, as saying: "Accordingto my opinion, the Grand-Muftiwho has been in Berlin since 1941played a role in the decision of the GermanGovernment to exterminatethe EuropeanJews."32 The Zionists' documents, however, were not taken seriously by the British. In a minute for internalcirculation, a Foreign Officeofficial wrote: "The material in this paper is very vague and would certainly not be considered as decisive evidence against the Mufti for having participatedin any atrocities against the Jews." Otherofficials wrote that the Zionists were using this meagerevidence for propagandapurposes to discredit the Mufti and the Palestinians.33Since then, no evidence based on capturedGerman documents has emerged in the many books on the Holocaust or from the 1961 Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, during which documents concerning contacts between the Mufti and the Germans were compiled,34to show that he had participatedin war crimes. Until a more thorough and nonpartisanstudy is undertakenbased on captured German documents on al-Husayni'srole in Nazi Germany,it is safe to conclude that the Nazis wanted to use the Mufti against the British and the communistsand that he cooperatedwith the Nazis believing that they would help the Arabs expel the British from the Middle East and keep the Zionists from dominatingor displacinghis people. At the end of the war al-Husayni flew to Switzerland,but the Swiss turned him over to the French where he was put underresidential surveillance for a year while the Allies decided what to do with him. In May 1946, however, he escaped from just days before a possible assassination attempt by the Irgun and resurfacedthat same year in Cairo to continue his struggleagainst the Zionists.35 But the Mufti totally misjudgedthe balance of forces between the Arabs and the Zionists, so that when the UN GeneralAssembly passed the partitionresolution on November 29, 1947, he, like other Arab leaders, rejected the resolution because it awardedthe Zionists 55 percent of Palestine even though they owned only 7 percent, and 400,000 Palestinianswould have found themselves a minority in the Jewish state. Given the 1946-1948 secret agreements between the

32. Foreign Office, 371/52585/E1984/515/31,F.O. minute, October6, 1946. 33. Ibid. 34. State Archives, RG79, box A/3061/Febuary1961; ISA 79/9/A3024. 35. Schechtman,The Mufti, p. 178. MUFTI OF JERUSALEM* 239

Hashemitesand the Zionists to divide Palestinebetween themselves, it is doubtful that even had al-Husayni and the Arab countries accepted the partition that Palestiniannationalists, such as the Mufti, would have been allowed to rule the Arab state.36 After the 1948war, which createdabout 750,000Palestinian refugees who left to escape war conditions or were forced out by Jewish terrorismand the , Palestinian allegiance gradually shifted from al-Husayni to a GamalAbdul Nasser, who promisedthem the liberationof Palestine. Al-Husayni resided in Cairo until 1959, after which he moved to Beirut, where he spent the rest of his life as an Islamic religious leader, working especially with the World Islamic Conferenceand as head of the ,publishers of the magazine Filastin (Palestine). Initially he refused to relinquishhis leadership of the Palestinian movement to the PLO in 1964, but with the emergence of Yasir Arafatas chairmanin 1969he reconciledhimself to, and cooperatedwith, the new leadership of Palestiniannationalists, though he was uneasy about their revolu- tionary ideology. Palestinian nationalists, on the other hand, viewed him with ambivalence,with many rejectinghis traditionalism,his use of religionin politics, his tight and undemocraticleadership of the nationalmovement, and his uncom- promisingpolicies and attitudes. But despite their reservations, they admiredthe Mufti's dedication,incorruptible character, and effortson behalf of the Palestinian cause.

CONCLUSION

Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni's policies during both phases of his career were failures and unwittingly contributed to the dispossession of the Palestinians. Duringthe first period, even thoughhe understoodthe ominous threat of Zionism to Palestiniannational existence, the Mufti cooperated with the British adminis- tration in Palestine and rejected methods of national self-defense at a time when such methods might have helped his cause. He opposed the Balfour policy, but only through such ineffective methods as petitions, delegations, and strikes. To that extent, he did help awaken the national spirit, but he did not mobilize the Palestinianmasses for action. Palestinianand Zionist claims to the contrary, he did not lead a single act of political violence between 1918 and 1936. The three riots that occurred in the 1920s were spontaneous acts of violence that did not result in any sustained policy changes. The Mufti was largely quiescent, and the Yishuv had two crucial decades of growth, increasing from 50,000 in 1917 to 384,000 in 1936.

36. CentralZionist Archives, S25/9036cited in Caplan,Futile Diplomacy,vol. II, pp. 268-271, and CZA, S25/4004,pp. 277-279. For Hashemite-Zionistcontacts see the works of MaryWilson and Avi Shlaim. 240 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

The Palestinianswere considerablyweakened after the Arab Revolt was put down by the British, but instead of prudently recognizing this reality and accepting the relatively favorable 1939 White Paper, or compromisingwith the Zionists, the Mufti shifted to a policy of active and futile opposition and rejection. In short, moderation during the Palestine phase and rejection during the exile phase contributedto the ultimate defeat of the Palestinians. Yet the overridingfactors that frustratedPalestinian nationalism have less to do with the policies and actions of a single leader than with the balance of forces. It was British policy, backed by British militarymight and by international(i.e., European)support for the British Mandateand for Zionist colonization, that was primarilyresponsible for providingthe Yishuv time to grow, throughimmigration and land purchases, and time to establish quasi-governmentaland military institutions. The Palestinianswere a weak, underdeveloped,agrarian society and never a match for the British army nor, after 1939, for the Zionist forces. Their power to influence the destiny of Palestine was secondary to that of the other three parties with strategic and territorialinterests in Palestine: the British, the Zionists, and the Hashemites. In short, the ultimate cause of the Palestinian tragedy was a process that began with the Balfour promise to the Zionists in 1917-and ended in disaster for them in 1948. British and eventually Zionist and Hashemite policies, actions, and forces overwhelmed a weak society that had a traditionaland ineffective leader- ship and organization. In response to Rutenberg'ssuggestion of assassinatingthe Mufti, the head of the Eastern Departmentof the British Foreign Office wrote an observation that may apply to the Mufti's entire career: "He [Rutenberg]is mistaken in thinking that the disappearanceof the Mufti would make any difference. The Mufti is merely the man thrown up by the moment. If he had not been on the scene, someone else would have played his part,"-and the political outcome would have been the same.37

37. Foreign Office, 371/24568/E2083/367/31,minutes of Baggaley, June 7, 1940.