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Notes

Introduction

1. McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition xxiii–xl, 1–52. 2. Ibid. 107–8, 191–7. 3. Ibid. 54–60. 4. Coleridge draws on a tradition of similar distinctions (e.g. Goethe’s and Schelling’s; see The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 51–5). 5. Dombrowski ‘McFarland, and Panentheism’. 6. McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 54, 63. 7. Ibid. 54–70. 8. Ibid. 79–82. 9. Ibid. 130. 10. McFarland ‘Aspects of Coleridge’s Distinction Between Reason and Under- standing’ 177. 11. BL I 248n1. Taken from Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschafttslehre (SW I 444–6). 12. Gadamer ‘On the Circle of Understanding’ 68–70. 13. Gadamer discusses the history of hermeneutics in depth. Gadamer Truth and Method 173–264. 14. Gadamer Truth and Method 271–7. 15. Heidegger 153. 16. Gadamer Truth and Method 245, 302–7. 17. Gadamer Philosophical Hermeneutics 56–8, 65–6. 18. The ‘classical’ is Gadamer’s key example because it is both an interpretive result and a judgement or prejudice that establishes interpretive categories. Thus Gadamer discusses the hermeneutical significance of temporal distance itself. Gadamer Truth and Method 285–300. 19. Bloom’s theory originally focused on Coleridge. Bloom ‘Coleridge: The Anxiety of Influence’.

1 Silence and the pantheistic sublime in Coleridge’s early poetry

1. Usher 114. 2. See Burke 125–6, 144–7; Usher 107–10, 114–18; Priestley A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism 159; Blair I 48–50; Knight 361–4. 3. For discussion of the emergence of the sublime, see Cassirer 297–331; Monk The Sublime. Abrams Natural Supernaturalism 97–117; Modiano Coleridge and the Concept of Nature 101–37. 4. Knight 363–4. 5. See Everest 216–21, 258–70; Rubenstein 54–60; Harman 888–911; Christie 12–31.

211 212 Notes

6. Everest 218. 7. Rugby MS, 27v. For a facsimile, see Cheshire 22–6. 8. Rugby MS, 28r. 9. PW gives ‘Concert’, but Cheshire gives ‘concént’, pointing to its usage as ‘a musical term, derived from concinere—sing together’. Cheshire 8–9. 10. See Piper The Active Universe 43–6. Martin 173–6; Piper ‘ “The Eolian Harp” Again’ 23–5; Abrams ‘Coleridge’s “A Light in Sound”: Science, Metascience, and Poetic Imagination’ 458–76; Raiger 76–84. For discussions of Hartley, Priestley and Berkeley in relation to Coleridge’s early poetry, see Prickett 46–70; Engell ‘Imagining into Nature: this Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’ 83–4. 11. Priestley The Theological and Miscellaneous Works &c of Joseph Priestley III 241. 12. Perry emphasizes the ambivalence of the poem, seeing it as reflecting a genuine and abiding undecidedability (‘a muddle’). I think this ambiguity— or ability to accommodate intellectual tension—underlies the poem’s func- tion as a kind of spirograph for metaphysics. The poem becomes part of the way that Coleridge understands differing philosophical stances, and subsequently recasts various philosophical possibilities into its own categories. Perry 68–70, 113–16. 13. Raiger 76–84. 14. CN II 2330, 2937; CN III 3314; CN IV 5192; CN V 6876; CL I 294–5. 15. The original ordering of the effusions emphasizes the importance of faith: Effusion XXXIV (To an Infant) concludes with an address to ‘Thrice holy FAITH!’—‘Still let me stretch my arms and cling to Thee, / Meek Nurse of Souls thro’ their long Infancy!’. The final Effusion XXXVI (earlier Absence: A Poem, and later Lines on an Autumnal Evening) in turn takes up the poet’s determination to check his ‘unregenerate mind’—‘O Thou wild FANCY, check thy Wing!’ (PW II 1 100–11, 269–72). See Magnuson 3–20. 16. The Rugby MS emphasizes the connection between thinking and the guilt with the variant: ‘Nor may I unblam’d or speak or think of Him’. Rugby MS, 28r. 17. ULS 33–7 [64–8]; Leibniz 150–1; SL 390–1 [Letter LVIII]. Coleridge annotated these passages in Spinoza and Jacobi, and although critical of Spinoza he also condemns Jacobi’s criticism of Spinoza saying ‘And is Jacobi’s Theory of Freedom, at all different?’ The two passages show a more sophisticated (and conflicted) grasp of the issues than usually attributed to Coleridge. See CM III 81; CM V 204. 18. Schrickx demonstrates that Coleridge read Jacobi by April 1799. Schrickx 818. For a similar account, see McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradi- tion 296–7. 19. See Schrickx 829–38. Schrickx speculates that Coleridge wrote some of these reviews. 20. See SL 347 [Letter XXIII]. This passage attracts one of Coleridge’s most critical notes, attacking the concept of privation (CM V 202–3). However, Coleridge himself adopts a similar account in his later manuscripts (especially ODI). Although he ostensibly avoids the concept of privation (ODI 13–15) he too denies full existence to evil—defining it, confusedly, as potential or a potentialization of good (ODI 139–43). See CN IV 4998. 21. Abrams explores the philosophical connections underlying the passage. Abrams ‘Coleridge’s “A Light in Sound”: Science, Metascience, and Poetic Notes 213

Imagination’ 458–76. A number of accounts treat the passage as a prob- lematic insertion that unbalances the poem. Gérard 411–12; House 75–8; Wendling 26–42; Modiano Coleridge and the Concept of Nature 57–9.

2 Spinoza and the problem of the infinite

1. Hume A Treatise of Human Nature 240. III 651. Novalis also says ‘Der Spinotzism ist eine Übersättigung mit Gottheit’— is an over- saturation with divinity. Novalis III 649. Hegel comments that despite charges of , ‘with him there is too much God’. Hegel Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III 162–3. 2. Hegel Sämmtliche Werke XIX 372. McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradi- tion 54, 63. 3. Deleuze 28–9. 4. Bayle 288–338. 5. For discussion, see Beiser The Fate of Reason 48–61; McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 72–7, 261–6; Moreau 408–11. 6. See McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 79–106; Engell The Creative Imagination 166–7. 7. Mason problematically denies that Spinoza seeks to reach any ontological conclusions, because Spinoza does not treat God as an ‘object’, but as being without limits. Mason does not notice that this too is an ontological claim. Mason 34–8. 8. ‘the human mind, or the idea of the human body neither involves nor expresses any attributes of God save these two [thought and extension]’. SL 399 [LXIV]. 9. Wienpahl argues this, and Bennet claims that if Spinoza meant that there are more than two attributes, then ‘the extra implication is negligible because in the it is idle’. Bennet 78–9; Wienpahl 82–8. 10. Spinoza says his concept of the attributes is ‘based on the idea which we have of a Being absolutely infinite, not on the fact, that there are or may be beings possessing three, four or more attributes’. SL 399 [LXIV]. 11. The matter comes up again when Crabb Robinson writes ‘I cannot believe, that by “infinitis” He meant innumerabilis’, to which is replied in Coleridge’s hand ‘This is a mistake of mine’ (CM V 205). Whalley identifies the hand- writing; see ‘Form File’ to MS. notes on Spinoza Benedicti de Spinoza opera quae supersunt omnia. 12. There is controversy over the word ‘tanquam’ which can be translated either as ‘as’ or ‘as if’, so that the attributes could be what the intellect genuinely perceives (as), or an illusion (as if ). However, the point is trivial, since on either reading the attributes are ‘perceptions’ of God, rather than properties of God. 13. The claim that Spinoza’s attributes are different parts of substance flies in the face of the textual evidence since Spinoza defines the attributes as that which the intellect perceives as the essence of substance. Thus adherents to the objective interpretation are forced to virtually dismiss Spinoza’s definition as a mistake. Thus Bennett comments that Spinoza’s definition ‘creates a lopsidedness in Spinoza’s system which he should not have tolerated’, 214 Notes

and argues that an attribute is a ‘basic way of being’, which has the odd result that the attributes turn out to be modes (Bennett 60–2). Schaller made a similar suggestion in a letter to Spinoza, suggesting that thought and extension are infinite modes that are produced directly by God. Spinoza replied that an example of an infinite mode is not the attributes but ‘the sum of the whole extended universe ( facies totius universi ) which, though it varies in infinite modes, yet remains always the same’. SL 396–8 [LXIII], 398–400 [LXIV]. 14. Haserot 28–42. These arguments appear convincing enough that Mason simply refers to Haserot as authoritative. Wolfson and Hallett on the other hand argue that the distinction between the attributes is subjective. Mason 46–7; Wolfson 146; Hallett 16–19, 40–3. 15. Ethics I XIV, I def V, I XV Proof. 16. Thus Schopenhauer’s famous quip: ‘The main objection I have to pantheism is that it means nothing. Calling the world “God” does not explain the world; it just enriches the language with a superfluous synonym for the word “world” ’. Schopenhauer 112. 17. Goethe XVIII 851. 18. For a discussion of Kant’s use of the idea of mysticism, see Henrich 29–81. 19. Thus Schelling is scornful of the label ‘pantheism’, without denying that his thought could be so described: ‘It is an undeniably excellent invention to have such general labels by which entire perspectives can be instantly desig- nated. Once you have found the right label for a system, the rest takes care of itself, and you can save yourself the considerable effort of investigating its characteristics properly. Even the ignorant can pass judgement on the most deeply thought matter, just as soon as they are given the right label.’ (SW VII 338–9). See also SW VII 409–10. Some Spinoza commentators are equally dismissive of the label (Pollock 331–2). 20. Lloyd considers the matters in these terms, but rightly concludes that Spinoza does not identify the material world with God. Lloyd 38–41. 21. McFarland discusses Krause, and argues that there is no appreciable differ- ence between pantheism and panentheism. McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 268–71. 22. Dombrowski ‘McFarland, Pantheism and Panentheism.’ 23. Schelling explicitly defines pantheism as the of things in God, but also points out that this covers a huge range of possibilities (SW VII 339). 24. Hampshire 554–66. 25. Hallett 148–61. 26. SL 327–51 [XVIII–XXIV, XXVII]. For discussion, see Deleuze 30–43.

3 The providential wreck: Coleridge and Spinoza’s metaphysics

1. The phrases are from The Eolian Harp and Dejection: an Ode. I am indebted to Seamus Perry’s account in Coleridge and the Uses of Division for this idea of ‘double-vision’ in Coleridge’s acts of understanding. 2. See Muirhead ‘Metaphysician or Mystic?’ Notes 215

3. Many accounts mention the issue, but few deal with Spinoza in any depth (Metzger, White, Spector), or related issues (Schrickx, Brinkley, Linsay). 4. McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 54. 5. In a marginal note on the Friend. See Wordsworth 369. 6. See CM III 123, CM IV 456, OM II 266. Similarly, Coleridge attributes to Schelling the view that ‘the Ethics taken as a whole is so far from being incompatible with the doctrines of Religion that it is the Skeleton of the Truth, but lifeless, repulsive and alarming because it is only the Skeleton’ (SW&F I 623). 7. TT I 86–7, 265, BL I 153. There are numerous other examples, for example CM III 853; CM IV 408; SW&F I 399. 8. Crabb Robinson I 399–401 (3 October 1812). 9. CL V 16. From 1818–20 Coleridge sent versions of this addition to several people (see Friend I 522, CL IV 892). The precision with which this addition rehearses the main line of Jacobi’s arguments is telling: ‘The inevitable result of all consequent Reasoning, in which the Intellect refuses to acknowledge a higher or deeper ground than it can itself supply is—and from Zeno the Eleatic to Spinoza and from Spinoza to {the} Schelling{s}, Oken{s}, and the{ir} others adherents, of the present day, ever has been—PANTHEISM ’ (Friend I 522–3n1). 10. CM IV 226. Johann was the son of Hermann Reimarus whose work Lessing drew on for the infamous Wolfenbüttel Fragments. Coleridge mentions the father in his ‘Note on Spinoza’ (SW&F I 614). 11. SW&F I 610–11. Colerus published his life of Spinoza in Dutch in 1705, a translation was included in Paulus’ Jena 1802 edition, which Coleridge annotated (although he did not annotate the life). In an 1816 letter Coleridge says Colerus’ life of Spinoza was included in a German edition of Spinoza which was ‘absolutely necessary to me in an undertaking, which has occu- pied my best Thoughts for the last 10 years & more’ (CL IV 635). 12. Deleuze 3. 13. Spinoza’s works were circulated amongst unorthodox movements long before the caused the upsurge of interest in him. Colie argues that some Deist groups preferred Spinoza to figures such as Hobbes, precisely because of his reputation for personal virtue. Colie 29–33, 30n31; Moreau 411–19. 14. SW&F I 612. Coleridge makes a similar point in Biographia, saying that ‘it is too true, and too frequent, that Bacon, Harrington, Machiavel, and Spinosa, are not read, because Hume, Condilliac, and Voltaire are’ (BL I 54). See also CN II 2193. 15. Colerus 420–1. 16. Ibid. 430, 432. 17. As when he comments, ‘If Spinoza had left the doctrine of Miracles untouched, & had not written so powerfully in support of universal Tolera- tion, his Ethics would never, could never, have brought on him the charge of Atheism. His doctrine in this respect is truly & severly orthodox’ (CN I 1379). 18. Coleridge even tried to argue that Spinoza was on the path to Christianity, so that ‘a suspicion of his error was beginning to work{ing} in hims mind, that the right Track was glimmering before him, when just as it pleased Heaven 216 Notes

to remove him’ (SW&F I 610). The mental contortion needed to invent this Christian Spinoza is shown in one of his marginal notes: ‘ would thus have arrived finally not only at the clear Idea of God, as absolute Being, the Ground of all Existents but likewise at the Faith in the Living God, who hath the Ground of his own Existence in Himself and of so pure a Soul, so righteous a Spirit, as Spinoza, I dare not doubt, that this Potential Fact is received by the Eternal as Actual’ (CM V 203). 19. McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 89. 20. Coleridge The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 420n41. Also SW&F I 614, BL II 245. 21. Thus Coleridge was right to note that Spinoza saw God ‘in his Might alone and his essential Wisdom, and not likewise in his moral, intellectual, exist- ential and personal Godhead’ (SW&F I 610). 22. As he puts it in his philosophical lectures: ‘For making the Deity that which is independent beyond any other system of pantheism it divided the Deity from the creature’ (LHP 578–9). 23. MS. Note in Spinoza Benedicti de Spinoza opera quae supersunt omnia I 665–7. See also CM V 204. I follow CM normally, but in this case my reading differs at a number of points (albeit trivial): Spinoza] Spinoza; Conclusion] Conclusion—; ‘question i.e.] question, i.e.; slung like a Stone] slung like a Stone; willing] willing; mid air] midair; proceed on a] proceed on to; Convic- tion] Conviction,; “I lift my arm] “I lift my arm”,; dont] don’t; therefore I] therefore I.’. 24. Egerton 2801. f10. SW&F gives ‘avoiding the Shallows of’ which I think is clearly wrong. The ‘avoiding’ reading is attractive in that it matches the use of the image a few lines later, but I just cannot see it in the MS. I am tentatively suggesting ‘scanning’, though I am not very comfort- able with this either. Later in the quotation SW&F gives ‘in {? Trying} too eagerly {? To} avoid these Shallows’ and Metzger gives ‘in too eagerly avoid{ing} these Shallows’. Neither has any basis in the MS. SW&F I 623–4; Metzger 293. 25. Peterfreund explores the connections between immanentist thought and evil in the supernatural poetry, suggesting that in ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner and Christabel, Coleridge addresses the possible significance of there being no way to distinguish good immanence from evil immanence— or, perhaps, of there being no immanence other than evil immanence’. Peterfreund 141.

4 Understanding the pantheism controversy

1. Henrich 15–28. 2. Jacobi acknowledged that Lessing told him he never confided his Spinozism to Mendelssohn (ULS 8–9 [42–3]). Likewise, in An die Freunde Lessings Mendelssohn claimed he always knew. Beiser discusses these preliminaries. Beiser The Fate of Reason 61–4. 3. Prometheus is one of two of Goethe’s poems that Jacobi published without permission. Interestingly, Jacobi had Prometheus printed in a separate leaflet, apparently for fear it might provoke confiscation. See Altmann 699–700. Notes 217

4. The connection between the poem and Spinozism was discussed in contem- porary reviews, but has never been completely clear. Di Giovanni suggests that Jacobi personally associated it with Spinoza because of his friendship with Goethe and simply because it implies an impersonal Deity. However, if Jacobi’s story is to be believed, Lessing immediately saw Spinozism in it as well, so the emphasis on fate and the devaluation of the divine may be more important. Jacobi The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill 67–9. 5. See Beck 352–60; Allison 72–5; Cassirer 190–1. 6. Hume A Treatise of Human Nature 240; Bayle 288–338. For discussion of the anti-Spinozistic background, see Beiser The Fate of Reason 48–61; McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 72–7, 261–6; Moreau 408–13. 7. Bayle 288–338. 8. CL I 454–5; See Holmes 216, 288–9; Ashton The Life of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 146, 149, 156, 168. 9. Bayle 288–338. 10. Jacobi also argues Leibniz was effectively a Spinozist. ULS 31–40 [63–70]. 11. For discussion, see Beiser The Fate of Reason 113–18. 12. Kant VIII 133–4. 13. Wizenmann also criticized Kant, arguing that his position too relies on an anti-rational element, namely the postulation of truths such as the existence of God as the conditions of practical reason. Kant responded to this in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Kant V 143n. See Beiser The Fate of Reason 109–113, 118–22; Beck 372–4. 14. Kant VIII 133–4. 15. Ibid. 149–56.

5 Reading under a warp: Coleridge and Jacobi’s transformations of ‘Reason’

1. Jacobi über den Glauben v. 2. Jacobi Werke II 3–10. 3. Schelling heaped scorn on it, commenting that Jacobi did it ‘as though to destroy thereby, every vestige of his earlier, better aspirations’ (SW X 173). 4. Schrickx’s argument is based on Coleridge’s inclusion in a letter of a passage from Pascal which he appears to have quoted indirectly from David Hume über den Glauben, where it is printed as the epigraph (CL I 478–9; Jacobi Werke II 1). The passage is also quoted in Über die Lehre des Spinoza, but is not so prominent (ULS 237 [230]) and Coleridge’s letter argues that faith is necessary when reason fails, which Schrickx takes as reminiscent of David Hume über den Glauben. Schrickx 818–19. For a similar account, see McFar- land Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 131–3, 296–7. 5. As Beiser suggests; Beiser The Fate of Reason 90. 6. The date of this marginalia is clearly around the time of the writing of Biographia, since one of the marginal notes is expanded and incorporated into Chapter 6 of Biographia. CM III 792n5–1; BL I 111. 7. Coleridge’s annotations of Schelling’s Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit are frequent, but he hardly plagiarizes from it; whereas his notes on 218 Notes

System des transscendentalen Idealismus are sparse, but he plagiarizes from it heavily. 8. Mendelssohn Philosophical Writings 96–111. 9. See Leibniz 150–1. 10. CM III 91n21–4. This word is Coleridge’s coinage; the editors of the marginalia supply this translation.

6 Coleridge, Mendelssohn and the defence of reason

1. Burwick considers Mendelssohn but concludes his impact on Coleridge was minimal, where I argue for its ongoing importance for his later thought. Burwick ‘Mendelssohn and Coleridge on words, Thoughts, and Things’. 2. Kant VIII 131–48, 149–56. 3. As Modiano points out, this note refers to the previous one, where Mendelssohn makes the accusation that Spinoza ‘streitet er bloß in Worten’. Modiano ‘Coleridge’s Marginalia’ 260–1. 4. Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion VII 90–1. 5. For discussion, see Hedley 198–201. 6. Coleridge made similar claims about a number of authors he plagiarized from; BL I 160–4; CN II 2375 and so on. 7. Coleridge plagiarized Jacobi’s Biblical versification and indirectly quotes a Kant passage from Jacobi (BL I 201n2, 202). 8. Descartes 44–9. 9. BL I 281. Also 273 where self-consciousness is described as that in which ‘object and subject, being and knowing, are identical’. 10. Kant VIII 133–5. 11. Ibid. 152–3. 12. Ibid. 153.

7 Coleridge and Schelling: The seductions of ideal pantheism

1. SW&F I 622. Also CL IV 883 where he describes Schelling as a ‘zealous Roman-Catholic’. 2. Schelling Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen 1–3. 3. See his comment ‘Schelling an{d} Fichte impose upon themselves the Schem{e} of an expanding Surface and call i{t} Freedom. The above I wrote a year ago; but the more I reflect, the more {am} I convinced of the gross , {which lies under the whole system}’ (CM IV 412). 4. ‘Spinozism is the only consequent dogmatism’ (SW III 356). 5. CM IV 424, 427, 432, 434, 443; CL IV 883. 6. See CM IV 441–2. Note though that CM prints this as two separate notes, with some text missing. The MS is badly cropped so I have relied on Sara Coleridge’s publication of the note to supply the missing text in [] (I do not know whether she had the MS in better condition). Also, the published text reads ‘{exp}ected’ where Sara reads ‘effected’, and I prefer Sara’s reading since it makes better sense. Coleridge Biographia Literaria ed. HN. Coleridge, S. Coleridge 308. Notes 219

8 The anxiety of pantheism: Hidden dimensions of Coleridge’s transcendental deduction

1. Schelling takes up the ‘chain of knowledge’ idea in Vom Ich making the same claim—that it leads to an unconditional basis (SW VII 163–5). 2. There are numerous uses of the image, for example TT I 86–7, 265; CM III 853; CM IV 408 and SW&F 399. 3. He makes a similar point in Vom Ich (SW VII 166–7). 4. Thus Coleridge’s famous assertion, ‘Did philosophy commence with an it is, instead of an Iam, Spinoza would be altogether true’, is a distinctively Coleridgean twist on a Schellingian criticism. Crabb Robinson I 400 (Entry for 3 October 1812, dated 3 November in some editions). 5. Ferris argues that this represents a ‘radical misunderstanding of the nature and function of systematic development in Transcendental Philosophy’ (Ferris 57). Reid on the other hand argues more generally that Coleridge was rejecting Schelling’s systematic development, because of the resulting status of the will and meta-logical considerations (see Reid ‘Coleridge and Schelling: The Missing Transcendental Deduction’). Both of these accounts, assiduous as they are, are marked by their replication of the categories that govern System des transscendentalen Idealismus, and neither of them considers the broader context, or even the fact that Coleridge was simultaneously dealing with several other Schellingian texts. They are therefore limited to the assumption that any deviation away from System des transscendentalen Idealismus must be explained by some detail of Coleridge’s interaction with this same text. Most importantly neither account is able to explain why Coleridge is destabilizing, rather than redirecting, his own argument with this conceptual smudging. 6. Ferris 54–7. 7. There are many examples: ‘ not that which Spinosism, i.e. the doctrine of the Immanence of the World in God, might be improved into, but Spinosism with all it’s Skeleton unfleshed, bare Bones and Eye-holes, as presented by Spinoza himself’ (CL IV 548). ‘Spinoza’s is the only true philosophy; but it is the Skeleton of the Truth, to scare & disgust—and an imperfect Skeleton, moreover’ (marginal note on The Friend; see Wordsworth 369). Also see CM III 123; OM III 266 and SW&F 623. 8. Barbeau observes the crucial similarity of Schelling’s and Coleridge’s use of will, but does not recognize that this is compelled by their similar concerns about Jacobi. Barbeau 586–7. 9. As the editors note (BL I 185n). 10. See CL IV 728; BL I 300n3. 11. CL II 1178. Repeated at BL I 17. 12. Jacobi David Hume über den Glauben 62. 13. Hamilton’s account is the only one that succeeds in putting aside the Schellingian surface texture of Coleridge’s text—the other two seem unwilling to surrender the elements they are identifying as ‘systematic’ and ‘transcendental’. Hamilton 7–12, 79–81; Ferris 41–84; Reid ‘Coleridge and Schelling: The Missing Transcendental Deduction’ 451–79. 14. Engell notes that Coleridge later felt that his thought about the imagination ‘had betrayed him into a mistaken pantheistic attitude’. He goes on to argue 220 Notes

that Coleridge’s later comments on pantheism and Schelling are in part a result of this feeling. Engell The Creative Imagination 162–3. 15. McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 151–60. 16. Ibid. 159. 17. McFarland ‘The Origin and Significance of Coleridge’s Theory of Secondary Imagination’ 199. 18. Burwick points out that even in considering only Coleridge’s use of Schelling there is a problem since Coleridge is drawing on several texts, any one of which could have supplied a complete argument. This sets the problem of understanding what is driving his refusal to fully adopt any of these versions. Burwick ‘Perception and the “Heaven-descended KNOW-THYSELF”.’ 127–8.

9 Coleridge’s Trinity: The defence of immanence

1. See CL IV 883: ‘But as a System, it is little more than Behmenism, translated from visions into Logic and a sort of commanding eloquence: and like Behmen’s it is reduced at last to a mere Pantheism.’ 2. McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 191–255. 3. Ibid. 107–13, 191–6. 4. Reid sees Coleridge’s final disagreement with Schelling as a preference for a ‘Trinitarian logic’ over a ‘pantheistic’ one. The assumption seems to be that Coleridge’s stance is defensible if it can be shown to have a secular rather than religious motivation. Reid ‘Coleridge and Schelling: The Missing Transcendental Deduction’. 5. As Modiano points out (Coleridge and the Concept of Nature 188ff). See also Barth 85–104; Ford 20–4. 6. Modiano Coleridge and the Concept of Nature 189. Hamilton suggests that the scholarly focus on Coleridge’s antipathy to pantheism has obscured the abiding importance of Schelling for Coleridge’s later religious thought. Hamilton 189. 7. Modiano Coleridge and the Concept of Nature 189–92, 194–5. 8. Wellek 134–5; Bate 213–14. 9. This occurs frequently, for example, CN III 4427–9, 4436; OM II 191—283; annotations of Böhme (CM I 561–5, 646–7, 679); Johnson (CM III 151); Irving (CM III 15–18); Diaz (CM III 453); Oken (CM III 1051, 1055). 10. CM III 1055. See Modiano Coleridge and the Concept of Nature 189, 250n91, n92. 11. CN III 4424. Editorial glosses substituted. 12. He repeats the point in a letter to Green, where he criticizes Schelling and Zoroaster: ‘This however the Zoroastrian & Schellingian Oracles have in common—that Polarity is asserted of the Absolute, of the Monad’ (CL IV 874). 13. The potential element is a common point of objection. Reid though rightly concludes that Coleridge’s conception does not involve any unrealized potential. Coleridge The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge I 44. Barth 94–5; Bate 217; Boulger 133–5; Reid ‘The Satanic Principle in the Later Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination’ 263–5, 273. 14. Coleridge frequently insists on God’s a-temporal nature, for example, ‘All the difficulties & heretical Attacks on God derive all their apparent Notes 221

self-evidence from taking God, i.e. a Spirit, as a Thing—the subject of the Categories affirming of the falsely tho’ unavoidably imagined Intervals of Time & Space ’(CN III 3575). 15. Modiano notes this, but concludes it has little impact. Modiano Coleridge and the Concept of Nature 193. 16. The Notebook editors describe it as a ‘paraphrase into Schelling’s vocabu- lary’. CN IIIn 4428. 17. Bayle 288–338. 18. Ford problematically claims that Coleridge uses ‘perichoresis’, ‘intercircu- lation’, ‘interpenetration’ and ‘co-inherence’ synonymously. For Coleridge ‘intercirculation’ refers to God’s act; ‘interpenetration’ to the relationship between the products of that act (the figures of the Trinity); and ‘co- inherence’ is not applied to the Trinity at all since it implies a lack of distinctness. Ford 22. 19. See Coleridge’s ‘On the Trinity’, where these technical aspects are almost completely absent. SW&F II 1510–12. See Barth 93–6. 20. Given its importance this account of evil has received surprisingly little attention. Reid considers similar accounts in the later notebooks, but does not make the connection to pantheism or Schelling. Harding briefly discusses this material, and even suggests a connection between Coleridge and Schelling on evil. However, he does not explore the reasons for this, because he is more interested in the role of the imagination. Barbeau does draw a more direct connection between Coleridge and Schelling on evil, and even manages to suggest that Coleridge was resisting aspects of Schelling’s ontology, but goes astray in suggesting that for Schelling evil ‘is found in the Absolute’. McLean discusses the neo-platonic background that was informing Coleridge’s account of evil, but it seems more interesting to ask how the neo-platonic background was setting the concepts through which Coleridge in turn understands Schelling. Reid ‘The Satanic Principle in the Later Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination’ 265–73. Harding 9–13; Barbeau 587; McLean 93–104. 21. Coleridge The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 433n17. 22. One of his repeated criticisms of Schelling, who he says ‘commences by giving objectivity to Abstractions’ (CM IV 450).

10 Reason, understanding and truth

1. See Friend I 155; AR 215, 232. 2. For example, see Wellek 134–5. 3. McFarland ‘Aspects of Coleridge’s Distinction Between Reason and Under- standing’ 169. 4. Friend I 154. For the quote, see Harrington 766. 5. Jacobi Werke II 9. 6. Boulger 72. 7. Barfield discusses the understanding in depth, but I see it as a negative conception designed to protect the reason from anything that would inter- fere with its ontological functions. Barfield 92–103. 222 Notes

8. McFarland and Wellek, despite their opposed views, share this basic assump- tion. Engell on the other hand emphasizes (as I do) that the three faculties are not completely separate or opposed. See Engell The Creative Imagina- tion 335–8. 9. Wellek 135. 10. McFarland ‘Aspects of Coleridge’s Distinction Between Reason and Under- standing’ 177–80; Boulger 77–9; Perkins 142–5; Wellek 103; Orsini 142–3; Lovejoy 15. Hedley on the other hand insists on the difference between Coleridge’s account of reason and Jacobi’s, on the grounds that Coleridge sees reason as somehow immanent whereas Jacobi locates God as a ‘quasi spatially transcendent object outside the world’. With regard to Jacobi’s account of God this seems problematic, but the structural difference between Coleridge and Jacobi on reason is crucial. Hedley 221–2. 11. Kant VIII 131–48. 12. Wellek 133–5. 13. Ibid. 134. 14. The Logic was only published in the twentieth century, so the term ‘plagiarism’ assumes a presentation of material as his own that he never made. Thus Snyder argues he may not have intended to plagiarize (Snyder ‘Coleridge’s Reading of Mendelssohn’s “Morgenstunden” and “” ’ 505n6). 15. KRV 82–3. The Logic editors note this. Logic 107n3. 16. Coleridge frequently does this, as where he alters Schelling’s use of Terra del Fuego to New Zealand (see BL I 251). Fruman also notes this tendency to anglicize German materials. Fruman ‘Quizzing the World by Lyes’ 15. 17. Mendelssohn was a defender of the rationalistic philosophy Kant was attacking. Thus Kant specifically attacks Mendelssohn’s arguments for the immortality of the soul (KRV 413–26), and the ontological argument for God’s existence, a version of which Mendelssohn used (KRV 620–30). 18. BL I 255–8 plagiarized from SW III 335–43. 19. MW III/2 166–73 [XIX–XXXVII]. 20. The Logic editors failed to locate this quote in Augustine. Logic 112n1. 21. Logic 112–20. The editorial notes point to Morgenstunden. 22. Logic 120. Matt 4.4. ‘But he answered and said, It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.’ Jesus’ answer to Satan’s temptation. 23. Kant VIII 152. This plagiarism has not been previously noted. Indeed, Snyder uses this very passage to argue for the independence of Coleridge’s posi- tion. Snyder ‘Coleridge’s Reading of Mendelssohn’s “Morgenstunden” and “Jerusalem” ’ 505–9. 24. Logic 121. Cf. Kant VIII 152–3. 25. Kant VIII 153. 26. Bayle 288–338. 27. Logic 126–7. Cf. Kant VIII 153; MW III/2 60 [116]. 28. Hamilton 64–5. 29. Wellek 134–5. Bibliography

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Abrams, M.H., 212 defences of Spinoza, 44–7, 76–82, Adam, 36 92 Agamemnon, 36 Dejection: an Ode, 158, 214 anxiety desert image, 39, 56 of authorship, 162–3 The Eolian Harp, 15–23, 38, 44, 52, of influence, 10 62, 64, 68, 113, 159, 209–10, of pantheism, 114, 146, 150, 163, 212, 214 209 evil, 22, 54–6, 132–42, 179–86, 212 of Spinozism, 42–4, 163, 190 ‘heart in the head’, 39 over understandings of Spinoza, ‘It is’ vs ‘I am’, 3, 42 6, 89 letter from the friend, 145, 159–60, 209–10 Bacon, F., 200 , 167–79 Barbeau, J., 219, 221 plagiarisms, 2–3, 71, 106, 147–64, Barfield, O., 221 199–208, 217–18, 222 Baxter, R., 48 potential vs actual, 171, 175, Bayle, P., 25, 62–3, 173, 206 182–6 Beck, L., 60 principle of being and knowing, Beiser, F., 60, 213, 217 105, 156 Bennet, J., 213–14 proposed life of Lessing, 63 Berkeley, G., 19, 207–8 providential wreck, 55–6 Bhagavad-Gita, 47–8 quick-silver mines, 159 Bloom, H., 10, 211 reason vs understanding, 98–100, Böhme, J., 111, 112, 135, 167 118, 187–99, 209 Boulger, J., 191 The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, 22, Brown, T., 196 56, 89, 209–10 Burwick, F., 218, 220 sea, 15–17, 19, 22, 75 self conscious watch, 43, 72–3 Cheshire, P., 212 skeletons, 41–2, 43, 115, 157, Coleridge, S., 218 162–3, 168, 177, 215, 219 Coleridge, S.T. as transcendentalist, 2, 108–9, 142, anxiety of authorship, 162 187 anxiety over appearance of truth, 199–210 Spinozism, 42–3 warp, 43, 76, 88 anxiety over philosophical will, 50, 95–6, 156–7, 174–7, 181 originality, 10 Colerus, J., 44–6, 215 blue board, 154 Colie, R., 215 bull, making a, 160 chain of blind men, 148 Deleuze, G., 25, 45 chains, 41–2, 148–9, 152–3, 219 Descartes, R., 80, 100–2 Christabel, 22, 56, 73, 89, 209–10 di Giovanni, G., 60, 217 date of first reading Jacobi, 21, 69–70, 212, 217 Engell, J., 219–20, 222

229 230 Index

Ferris, D., 161, 219 existence as a predicate, 65, Fichte, G.J., 59, 111 97–8 Ford, S.H., 221 reason vs understanding, 191, Fruman, N., 222 197–8 synthetic vs analytic, 147 Gadamer, H.G., 7–10, 211 truth, 104, 200–4 Goethe, J.W., v, 31, 61–2, 216, 217 Keats, J., 9 Grecian urn, 9 Knight, R., 15

Hallett, H., 35, 214 Leibniz, G.W. Hamilton, P., 161, 207, compass needle, 20, 21, 80 219, 220 evil, 136 Hampshire, S., 35 pre-established harmony, 43, 72–3, Harding, A., 221 79–80, 161 Harris, J., 201 relationship to Spinoza, 21, 72–3, Hartley, D., 19, 21 79–80 Haserot, F., 28, 214 Lessing, G.E. Hedley, D., 222 Spinozism, 60–3, 79–9 Hegel, G.W.F., 24, 60 world soul, 62–3 Heidegger, M., 8–9 , 48–9, 61–3 Henrich, D., 60, 214 Lloyd, G., 214 hermeneutic circle, 7–11, 108, Lovejoy, A., 60 110 , 48–9, 61–3 Maass, J.G.E., 71–3 Hume, D., 3, 24, 62, 70, McFarland, T. 98, 105 Coleridge’s Trinitarianism, 165–6 Coleridge’s understanding of influence Spinoza, 4, 39, 46–7, 53, anxiety of, 10 55–6, 88 weakness as interpretive concept, defence of Coleridge’s plagiarisms, 1, 6, 108 2–3 ‘I am’ vs ‘it is’, 3–5, 39–40, 46–7 Jacobi, F.H. Jacobi, 5 free will, 74, 80–1 reason, 222 immediate knowledge, 82–8, Schelling, 3, 162 146–7 Spinoza, 1, 4, 40, 53 reason vs understanding, 69–71, understanding of history of 116–18, 189–91, 197 philosophy, 3–4, 39–40 salto mortale, 20, 63–4, 79, 84, 88, understanding of the pantheism 100 controversy, 1, 12 Spinoza, 76–87 Mclean, K., 221 walking on head, 160–1 Mason, R., 213, 214 Mendelssohn, M., 64–5 Kant, I. common sense, 80 categories, 72 induction, 105 criticisms of Mendelssohn, 65–6, ontological argument, 65, 97–103 97–8, 106–7, 205–8, 222 orientation, 65, 103–6 Ding an sich, 65, 72, 73, 89, 146 purified pantheism, 64 Index 231

relationship between Leibniz and Spinoza, 50, 95, 97, 114–16, 122–3, Spinoza, 72–3, 79, 161 153, 156–7 self-subsisting vs self sustaining, Ungrund, 67, 118–26, 132–41, 166, 94–5, 178 170–1, 179–80 Spinoza, 64, 91–7 will, 97, 122–3, 156–7 truth, 103–6, 200–4 Schopenhauer, A., 214 Modiano, R., 166–7, 220 Schrickx, W., 21, 69–70, 212, 217 mysticism, 32, 39, 63, 73, 109–10, Sherlock, W., 19 112, 135–6 silence, 15–23, 31, 130, 150, 209–10 Snyder, A., 222 Nero, 36, 54 Spinoza, B. New Zealander, 6–7, 10, 222 as atheist, 24, 31, 40, 62, 63 Nietzsche, F., 45 attributes and modes, 27–30, 73, Novalis, 24, 213 213–14 causality, 30–1, 49–50, 86–8, 124, Oken, L., 167, 172–3 158–9 Orestes, 36 difficulty of understanding, 24–5, 32 pantheism dog constellation, 34, 77, 103, attribution to Spinoza, 29, 33, 214 174–5 controversy, 59–67 evil, 35–7, 54–5, 119, 212 definitions of, 32–3, 64, 214 free will, 34–5, 50–4 Perry, S., 212, 214 God, 26, 32–4, 49, 76–9 Peterfreund, S., 216 infinity, 26–32, 48–51, 83, 92–4, 97 Priestley, J., 18 intuition, 78–9 Pygmalion, 115 moral character, 44–6, 215 as mystic, 26, 32, 40, 63 reason, see understanding ontological project, 27, 213 Reid, N., 161, 219, 220, 221 thrown stone, 21, 53–4 Robinson, H.C., 42, 213, 219 time, 82–6 truth, 204 Schelling, F.W.J. understanding anxiety of Spinozism, 163 understanding understanding, 6–12 causality, 124–5 understanding vs reason, 98–100, defence of pantheism, 66–7, 122–3 118, 187–99, 209 evil, 119, 132–41, 154, 179–86 evolutionary divinity, 119, 123–4, Wellek, R., 11, 196, 198–9, 209, 222 171 Wienpahl, P., 213 free will, 126–32 Wizenmann, T., 65, 66, 217 God, 119–26 Wolfson, H., 214 Jacobi, 109–18 mysticism, 109–10, 135–6 Zoroaster, 167–70