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Chapter 4 Facts and Findings CHAPTER 4 FACTS AND FINDINGS This chapter is based on the findings of the researcher during the course of the research. This chapter has been divided into three broad parts- the first part will deal with the facts about ASEAN; the second part will deal with the relationship between Thailand and ASEAN. The third and the final part will address the ‘Results to be obtained’ which the researcher has aimed at achieving at the beginning of this research. Part 1 1.1. ASEAN Association of the Southeast Asian Nations in short ASEAN, which was founded on 8th August 1967, was the first successful attempt at a regional integration in the bigger Asian context- a joint effort by the five founding members, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand at a joint effort to promote co-operation and welfare of the people. According to Thanat Khoman, the then Foreign Minister of Thailand, who is one of the Founding Fathers of ASEAN: “After repeated unsuccessful attempts in the past, this event was a unique achievement, ending the separation and aloofness of the countries of this region that had resulted from colonial times when they were forced by the colonial masters to live in cloisons etanches, shunning contact with the neighbouring countries. In effect this historical event represents the culmination of the decolonization process that had started after World War II” (Khoman, Thanat 1992, p. xviii) 4.1.1. Facts: ASEAN The researcher has gathered the following facts about ASEAN during the course of this research: 1. ASEAN is an important sub-grouping located within the dynamic region of Southeast Asia, characterized by powerful investment and innovatory capacities of the individual nations. While ASEAN may not provide an essentially economic 1 framework at the beginning but its political function and cooperation have formed the paradigms behind its formation. 2. Unlike European Union “where the impetus for integration was generated by the wish to overcome lasting contention amongst the founding members’, the underlying motivation for the creation of ASEAN was driven by external factors, of a political and security nature” (Angresano, James 2006, p.114). Thus, we can say that ASEAN members came together due to political reasons, and were held together due to political fear rather than by a desire to benefit from economic integration. According to Thanat Khoman, “The fact that the Western powers, France and Britain, reneged on their pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia promising protection against external aggression was instrumental in drawing the attention of many countries to the credibility of assurance advanced by large powers to smaller partners. The lesson drawn from such events encouraged weak nations to rely more on neighbourly mutual support than on stronger states that serve their own national interests rather than those of the smaller partners” (Khoman, Thanat 1992) Therefore these smaller nations of Southeast Asia decided to join in hand to protect themselves from external factors like, the growing fear of a possible aggression by Vietnam, the growing trend of communism from China etc. 3. From the time of its inception, the leaders insisted that economic and political matters should be kept separate. And consequently, the economic interest of the ASEAN members basically remained national. In fact, ASEAN was not established to pursue supranational objectives. At the very first ASEAN Summit in Bali, in 1976, the members signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) - a non-aggression pact aimed at promoting regional stability. The underlying motive behind this is the determination of the founding states to prevent disputes of any kind erupting among them and in any case if such situation arises, to settle any such disputes by peaceful means. In 1993, the ASEAN Regional Forum was established in order to foster dialogue and consultation on political and security issues while building confidence and preventing diplomacy of any kind in Southeast Asia. And finally in 1995, the integration of the founding five members has been expanded to become 10 including Vietnam. 4. An important fact about ASEAN is that, it is not a military alliance. Having no common enemies actual or potential. “ASEAN is not a military alliance or defence pact, although the individual members are free to enter into military arrangements with other countries provided that they don’t threaten the security of the neighbours” (Know Your ASEAN 2007, p. 17). On this issue, S. Rajaratnam, the Foreign Minister of Singapore at the time of inception of ASEAN said that- “We are not against anything or not against anybody. We want to ensure a stable Southeast Asia and not a balkanized Southeast Asia”. 5. The policy of non-interference in the member country’s internal affairs is another important aspect of ASEAN. In fact from its inception ASEAN as an administrative body has been kept quite separately from the internal political affairs of its member nations. “ASEAN’s institutions have been consciously kept diffuse, decentralised, and 2 under national control” (Palmer and Reckford 1987, p. 109). It was actually the decision of the Founding Fathers of ASEAN not to go for any institutional framework which can give the potential superpowers a major voice in their national affairs. According to James Angresano- the lack of interest in building supranational institutions is also due to the fear that such institutions, in creating a higher level of governance, provide prime vehicles for corruption and the abuse of power. 6. ASEAN’s structure is often being described as a pure intergovernmental organization without any bureaucratic decision making body. This was in accordance with the member nations’ preference to a gradual and pragmatic change and their emphasis placed on maintaining their national sovereignty. “Each ASEAN member states has learned to respect each other’s political system and domestic affairs and appreciate the fact that no single state has the right to impose its will on fellow members” (Gramenga 1997). Thus, the decisions made on the ASEAN platform are based on consensus or unanimity and not by taking a vote. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that every decision has to be categorically and explicitly supported by every one of the member states. The basic philosophy of ASEAN decision making system is that no member opposes the decision making strongly enough so as to register its objection. As a matter of fact in certain cases, some of the ASEAN agreements have been formalized without the ratification of all the signatories. For instance, The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaty required only seven ratifications to enter into force. 7. Owing to its policy of non-interference and the renounce of the use of threat as a mode of managing relation between states, ASEAN has been particularly successful in promoting peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region. It has opposed invasion and occupation as a way of bringing about a change in the neighbouring countries. ASEAN took a leading role in bringing about a political settlement of the Cambodian conflict of 1979-91. According to Thanat Khoman- the effective and successful opposition to the implementation of Vietnam’s Grand Desire, using only diplomatic and political means, won a great deal of plaudits and international credit, lifting it from an insignificant grouping of small countries to a much courted organization with much more important states now seek to have contact and dialogue. Today, ASEAN has engaged the leading powers of the region to manage the affairs of the region in a balanced and constructive way by means of different platforms like, the system of Dialogue Partnership, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asian Summit etc. 8. The history of ASEAN shows hat for the first decade of its existence, ASEAN didn’t paid much focus on the economic aspect of the integration and people believe that the “token economic cooperation that did exists was only a cover for ASEAN’s anti- communist political intentions” (Angresano, James 2006, p. 115). However it was the Oil crisis of 1973 that stimulated the member states to think on the economic lines and it was only during the 1980s, that trade preferences and coordinated industrial policies gained impetus. 9. During the first two decade of its existence, the economic integration efforts were basically modest and fairly ineffective. The reasons behind this are: 3 a) The ASEAN member states continued having their own national policies regarding trade, agricultural production, state-owned enterprises, foreign investment and joint ventures. b) Another reason is, until very recently the ASEAN nations “still view themselves as distinct and competitive” (Letiche 2000, p. 285). It was because, the economies of these member countries though are complementary, but until the past few years they have been producing inter-industry goods, such as rubber, oil and other natural resources in an environment that is complementary in the sense of inter-industry. c) The third reason being, these member nations are all relatively small economies and their inclination is more towards the richer trading partners outside the region like Japan, USA and EU. 10. An important fact about ASEAN in these early years of its existence is that, little credit is given to the association for the dramatic improvement in terms of the standard economic indicators of its original member countries. In fact some analysts say that the economic importance of the association [ASEAN] however, could be said to derive more from rapid growth and development performance of some of its member economies, rather than the collective strength and cohesion idem)of the association itself (Angresano, James 2006). Statistics says that the intra-ASEAN trade grew from 3.2 per cent in 1980 to 4 percent in 1990. 11. However, the ASEAN influence in bringing about regional peace and security in the region to facilitate the growth and success of the individual economies can’t be denied.
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