The Carter-Reagan Transition: Hitting the Ground Running Author(s): James P. Pfiffner Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4, Congress and the Presidency: Considerations on Leadership and Legislative Success (Fall, 1983), pp. 623-645 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27547983 . Accessed: 15/10/2011 09:12

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http://www.jstor.org THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION: HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING

by JAMES P. PFIFFNER Associate Professor of Political Science California State University, Fullerton

I. Introduction and functions a President performs. In Electoral mandates are made, not born. order to achieve his policy goals a Presi What a President does after his election dent must first gain control of his major and in his first several months in office tools of power: legislation, the budget, sets the tone for his administration and personnel, and administration. may determine whether or not he is able This article will analyze the early experi to deliver on his campaign promises. ence of the Reagan administration in its While President Reagan's transition was attempts to gain control of the govern marked by some successes and some fail ment in these four crucial areas. It will ures, he took office under a favorable set conclude that in achieving its legislative of circumstances. No major domestic or and budget goals the administration's foreign crises were pending, and the U.S. careful planning and consummate politi hostages had been returned from Iran. cal skills can serve as a model for future The nation had elected him in a landslide transitions. This is not to assert that it victory and had presented him with the gained these goals with no costs to other first Republican Senate in several de priorities. Early personnel choices by the cades. Although the electorate had administration put a heavy emphasis on spoken emphatically, it had not articu personal loyalty to Ronald Reagan. This lated its preferences very precisely. The was done at the cost of professional expe analysis of public opinion polls showed rience and the ability of many chief execu that the public did not necessarily support tives to choose their own management the conservative goals or drastic budget teams. The personnel process involved a cuts the Reagan administration had prom series of clearances that helped assure that ised, though it did want increased defense all bases were touched, but this was done spending, reduced taxes and overall re at the cost of time. Subcabinet personnel ductions in spending.1 appointments dragged on into the sum But in an important sense electoral mer of 1981 at the cost of administrative mandates are made in office, not born in leadership and managerial direction. This the election. President Reagan pursued extended the period of bureaucratic drift his policy priorities in his early months in that is involved in any change in top lead office and received positive approval rat ership. This article will also examine the ings in opinion polls. The electoral "man view from the bottom up, that is, what date" was an opportunity to lead the happens in the bureaucracy during a pe country in the direction he wanted to go, riod of presidential transition. and he took that opportunity to accom II. The Lame-Duck Eleven Weeks plish much of what he had set out to do in his first eight months in office. Policy direction and control can come The goals of any presidential transition to a presidential administration only after are to take over the government in order the inauguration on January 20th. But the to direct national policy toward the priori groundwork for the takeover of power ties of the new President. This article will must begin well before November, and be focus on the transition of governmental under way in earnest immediately after power rather than on the many other roles the election. The foundation for the tran

623 624 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

sition is laid during the lame-duck eleven and then issued an executive order that weeks between election and inauguration. put the personnel of the new agency under As the outgoing administration ties up the jurisdiction of the merit system and loose ends, the President-Elect scrambles under Civil Service rules. The next admin to put together a governing team, and the istration thus could not throw out the po bureaucracy slips into neutral gear while it litical appointees upon taking office, and awaits its new bosses. could remove them only for cause through cumbersome Civil Service procedures. The Administration Outgoing Most presidents since the Pendleton Act After the election new policy initiatives was passed in 1883 to World War II en stop as agencies become reluctant to make gaged in this practice to a greater or lesser agreements that may become moot on extent. January 20. The outgoing administration This option is no longer readily avail is usually sensitive to the need to give the able to presidents, but individual political incoming President as clean a slate as pos appointees can try to immunize them sible. On the other hand, there is a flurry selves from being ousted by the next ad to complete those policy decisions well ministration by getting for themselves underway so that they cannot be easily re "career status" with all the attendant pro versed by the new people. One example of cedural protections of the Civil Service. this was the litigation over the Profes This maneuver is called "burrowing in." sional and Administrative Career Exam On January 4, 1980 OPM sent out FPM ination (PACE), the professional level en (Federal Personnel Manual) Bulletin try examination that had been challenged 273-18 to remind agencies that during in court as discriminatory. The Justice election years they ought to "carefully re Department and the Office of Personnel view all personnel actions to be certain Management were handling the case, and they meet all civil service rules and regula in the final days of the Carter administra tions and also that these actions are free tion, negotiated a consent decree that of any stjgma of impropriety." The bulle committed OPM to develop Civil Service tin urged agency personnel directors to re entrance examinations that did not have a view carefully any actions that would discriminatory impact on minority place incumbents of positions in the ex groups.2 While the outgoing Carter offi cepted service in the competitive service.3 cials felt they were minimizing the cost to In a follow-up Operations Letter to OPM the government and still upholding the officials on September 17, 1980 it was re spirit of non-discrimination, the Reagan iterated that "before any competitive people felt they made an eleventh hour staffing action is initiated involving a con deal that committed the government to a version of an excepted service employee" form of reverse discrimination. it should be ascertained that there is a A major concern of all newly elected "bonafide vacancy" and that, "In no in administrations is that the outgoing ad stance should vacancies be announced ministration will attempt to seed the bu solely to convert an excepted service em reaucracy with its own people, either to ployee to a position in the competitive ser save their jobs or to leave behind people vice."4 sympathetic to the old and hostile to the Despite OPM policy there were some new administration's goals. One way this attempted conversions of political ap can be done is to have people who entered pointees to the career service. OPM inves the government as political appointees tigated 43 conversions in three agencies converted to career status in the Civil Ser during the transition period and con vice or to career Senior Executive Service cluded that 13 were improper. Conver appointments. sions are legitimate if there is a genuine In the past this could be done wholesale competitive selection process or if the em and was.called "blanketing in." It oc ployee had a prior competitive service ap curred when a President staffed a new pointment. Not all conversions are at agency with officials from his own party, tempts to "burrow in." The General Ac THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 625

counting Office did an investigation of SES employees between now and January conversion cases during the transition pe 20,1981."8 In addition to this the director riod that covered four additional agen of OPM had been carefully monitoring all cies. While it found no improper conver new SES appointments for the last several sions, it found that some attempts were months of the Carter Presidency to avoid made but stopped by OPM or the agency's even the appearance of improper political personnel monitoring system. The GAO appointments to the career ranks. In this report suggested that a more comprehen period some entirely legitimate personnel sive monitoring system be instituted for actions were held up or cancelled in order future presidential transitions.5 While the to eliminate any hint of partisan person problem of potential conversions from nel actions. political to career status is a serious one, On December 10 a Watson memo re the number of such attempts during the quested letters of resignation from presi Carter-Reagan transition was small, and dential appointees who expected to leave the OPM monitoring system seemed to the government by January 20, although pick up most improper actions. it pointed out that resignations were not President Carter named Jack Watson technically required until requested by the his deputy for the transition. On Novem new administration. It also asked for ber 10Watson sent a memo to cabinet and draft letters of appreciation from the agency heads reminding them that the pur President to the appointees and for the pose of the Presidential Transition Act of names of the officials who would be act 1963 was to provide for "the orderly trans ing in positions the presidential appoint fer of the executive power." He admon ees left.9 Some of the final acts of the Car ished those preparing materials for the in ter administration were to decide which coming transition teams not to innundate political appointees were to get what type them with excessive detail or unsolicited of gift as a token of appreciation for ser advice. "Our guideline is simply to be vice in the Carter administration. helpful and forthcoming in every way pos The Transition sible, without burying the new people Reagan Bureaucracy under mountains of briefing books and pa The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 per."6 Thus the official presidential line provides that in order "to promote the or was to be as helpful as possible to the in derly transfer of the executive power in coming administration. There were, how connection with the expiration of the term ever, some undercurrents advocating the of the office of a President and the inau minimum of help and cooperation. These guration of a new President" that the Ad probably reflected attitudes of individuals ministrator of General Services (GSA) who still felt bitter about the campaign or provide office space wherever the Presi who received less than full cooperation in dent-Elect wants as well as staff, travel, the transition from the outgoing Ford ad communication and printing expenses. ministration four years earlier. The Act, as amended in 1976, provides $2 On November 12,1980 Watson sent out million for incoming administrations and another memo reminding heads of depart $1 million for the departing President.10 ments and agencies that the President While in 1976 President Carter returned wanted to give the new administration $300,000 of his allotment to the treasury, "appropriate latitude" in filling career the Reagan administration used the full $2 SES vacancies or making transfers. Since million plus another million in private the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act pro funds. When asked about the amount hibits new agency heads from transferring spent by an administration advocating career Senior Executives until 120 days lower government spending, deputy direc after taking office, the memo instructed tor for transition administration, Verne that "the President expects all department Orr, replied "The dollar just doesn't buy and agency heads personally and carefully what it did four years ago."11 to review all recommendations for new While President-Elect Nixon chose to SES appointments and transfers of career run his transition from the Pierre Hotel in 626 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

New York City and Carter did much of veloped into a bureaucracy in itself. Tran his work from his home in Plains, Ronald sition press secretary James Brady said Reagan chose a large government office there were 588 listings in the telephone di building at 1726 M Street, several blocks rectory, but if people in agency teams from the White House.12 Reagan ap were included there could be twice as pointed Edwin Meese III to direct transi many people.14 The Carter transition had tion operations in Washington while his 312 people on the payroll.15 One of the "kitchen cabinet" of business executives problems with a staff of such size is trying met on the west coast to recommend to determine who speaks for the new ad cabinet and other high level appoint ministration. Even though transition ments. The main divisions under Meese teams had no policy authority, and public were personnel, headed by Pendleton statements were supposed to be funneled James; executive branch and Congres through the transition hierarchy; there sional relations, headed by William E. were a number of embarrassing leaks as Timmons; and policy issue groups in the representatives of various interests began foreign, budget, and domestic areas, to push their own policy preferences. headed by Richard Allen, Caspar Wein Early in the transition period members berger, and Martin Anderson, respec of the OPM transition team, Donald De tively.13 vine and R. T. McNamar, met with Timmons was in charge of about 100 agency personnel directors. The purpose transition teams sent into most federal of the meeting was to assure the career agencies. They were organized into five is Civil Service that the Reagan administra sue clusters: economic affairs, national tion would respect the integrity of the ca security, human services, resources and reer personnel system and promise there development, and legal-administrative. would be no "sweeping changes." They The function of the teams was to set up said they understood that career SES posi shop in each agency (which some did the tions were not frozen but they expected day after the election), examine ongoing that any appointments would be carefully operations and issues, report to the transi scrutinized and filled only if absolutely tion headquarters the status of agency op necessary. They said they supported the erations, and recommend changes and Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and cutbacks. Other major functions of the promised its continued implementation.16 transition teams were to test people for They asked for advice on how to make the possible appointments in the new admin transition a smooth one, but no useful istration and to reward loyal campaign comments were forthcoming from the workers who would not be kept on. group. Such advice usually got to the new While the agencies and departments administration via other channels; usually scrambled to prepare briefing books to a high level person with credibility in both acquaint the new teams with their func administrations was asked to relay by tions and operations, the team members hand any advice or suggestions from the were keeping tight lipped about their rec departing administration. ommendations. The teams had full access to budget and operation files, though not III. Taking Over the Government to individual personnel files. Members of Control the career service in general were very re Legislative sponsive to the transition teams, since any President Reagan's early successes with member might become a new boss or col the Congress have been considered com league. Some team members ended up parable to those of Woodrow Wilson, heading the agency to which they were as Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon John signed, while some teams were dismissed son. He benefitted from the sense of eco when the new boss was named (e.g. State nomic crisis felt by the public and from and Defense). his land-slide victory. And he was able to There were so many people working on overcome the fragmenting tendencies that the transition that the operation soon de frustrated his three immediate predeces THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 627

sors in their efforts with the Congress. Robert Dole, John Tower, and Strom But his success was qualified by the fact Thurmond in making his cabinet choices. that he focussed his legislative efforts on The choice of Max Friedersdorf was an his economic program to the virtual exclu important decision in the new President's sion of other Republican priorities. This legislative strategy. Friedersdorf had been section will examine the basis of the im President Ford's chief lobbyist and had pressive, early legislative victories of the worked in legislative liaison for President Reagan Administration in its courting of Nixon. He was widely respected on the Congress, legislative liaison, and legisla Hill and selected his lobbying staff from tive strategy and tactics. those with strong professional experience Ronald Reagan began the careful court with Congress. The intention was to show ing of Congress long before he became a sharp contrast with President Carter's President-Elect. In 1977 he helped set up a choice of Frank Moore who recruited a political action committee, Citizens for less experienced lobbying staff. In his the Republic, that funneled campaign dealings with Congress Reagan con money to Republican candidates. The sciously deemphasized his being ari out payoff came when 62 of those he helped sider to Washington. His advisors felt were victorious and could be expected to that the "outsider" concept had been one be grateful for his help and coattails.17 of the reasons for President Carter's lack After his nomination his aides made early of early success with the Congress. contacts with members of Congress and The main elements of the Reagan legis set up a network of advisory committees lative strategy were speed and focus. Old for the Reagan campaign that included Washington hands and academics alike 160 members of Congress.18 He made a had warned that the scope of budgetary symbolic gesture to the importance of changes sought by the new administration Congress during his campaign by staging would be virtually impossible to get on the steps of the Capitol a show of unity through the Congress, particularly the on his future legislative agenda. While not Democratic House. The Reagan strate specific in substance, itwas intended to be gists realized that if it was to be done at all an important gesture. Of more substan it had to be done quickly, both to take ad tive importance was Reagan's inclusion of vantage of public confidence and the elec Senator Paul Laxalt and Congressman tion "mandate" and to move before op Thomas B. Evans, Jr. in weekly campaign position could coalesce. During the first strategy sessions at his headquarters in months of 1981 the Democrats were in Arlington, VA. shock from the Republican electoral vic After the election Congress continued tory and were unable to unite on any co to be a major transition priority. The herent opposition to the Reagan economic President-Elect held a series of dinners to program. which he invited members of Congress. The second element of the strategy, fo With the realization that Democratic cus, was intended to avoid what they felt votes would be necessary for his legisla was the Carter mistake of sending Con tive agenda he announced that he would gress too much, too soon. Thus the Rea retain ex-Senator Mike Mansfield as am gan strategy systematically neglected bassador to Japan. He took particular other Republican priorities, particularly care to court House Majority Leader Tip "social issues," such as bussing, abor O'Neill who had chafed at perceived tion, school prayer, and crime. Since he slights from the Carter White House. He could count on the Republican Senate for and his wife were invited to a private din support, the keystone of his legislative ner at the White House, and he was also strategy was his ability to carry the block invited to the President's small 70th birth of conservative Democrats known as the day party. Republican members of Con "Boll Weevils." They were a vulnerable gress were invited to advise the transition target both because they were conserva teams in the departments. And the Presi tives and would likely be somewhat sym dent-Elect sought the advice of Senators pathetic to his program, and also because 628 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Reagan had carried many of their districts servative groups were organized, the me in the election. dia were blanketed with paid and volun The winning of the votes of the Boll tary messages, and even campaign con Weevils (and of other House members) tributors of the Representatives were mo covered the gamut of legislative tactics bilized. from softsell to hardball. To garner votes One of the most potent tactics was the for his economic package the President use of electoral leverage. There was the systematically and personally dealt with threat that big political action money wavering members. He called them re would be used against those who opposed peatedly; he invited them to the White the President's program.22 There was also House and Camp David and gave them the promise that conservative organiza small favors such as cuff links or tickets tions, such as the Committee for the Sur to the Presidential box at the Kennedy vival of a Free Congress and the Fund for Center. The President's personal ap the Conservative Majority, would not proach was understated and soft pedaled. campaign against Democrats voting the He dealt with general issues and did not right way.23 There was even a presidential get involved with the details of legislative promise not to campaign against southern horse trading. His aides would follow up Democrats who consistently supported his with specific promises and threats.19 budget program.24 Some have argued that In addition to small favors and courte these short term political victories were sies the administration made policy com purchased at the price of long term Re promises to get votes, such as the publican renewal in the south.25 "rental" of Democrat John Breaux's vote Thus by skillful courting of Congress, a in exchange for a pledge on sugar price coherent legislative strategy, and shrewd supports or a compromise on peanut price use of a wide range of lobbying tactics did supports.20 When the carrots of favors President Reagan accomplish most of the and compromises did not do the job, the legislative objectives he set in his first sticks of political hardball were brought eight months in office. He even enjoyed out. One of the main tactics was going di greater party discipline in Congress than rectly to the voters. It is ironic that Presi had his Republican predecessors Eisen dent Carter was criticized so severely on hower, Nixon, or Ford. While his early the Hill for threatening to go over the success with Congress was comparable to heads of Congress to the people if legisla those of Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and tors would not give him what he wanted. Lyndon Johnson; the range of his legisla President Reagan did not threaten, he just tive goals was narrower. President Carter did it. He put pressure on Congress by a threw a plethora of difficult issues to the series of televised speeches to the nation Congress and lost on many of them in his as well as personal appeals to groups early months (though his overall success around the country by himself and mem rate was not exceptionally low). President bers of his administration. In the battle Reagan limited his legislative agenda to a for the administration's tax bill, the Presi few important, though difficult, issues; dent in a televised speech asked people to then with the virtuosity of an old pro he call their Representatives and demand sup rolled through Congress with a battery of port for his bill. With the help of donated carrots and sticks. In order to concentrate corporate phone banks the volume of calls on the economic plan, tough issues were at the Capitol switchboard doubled.21 put off until later. One of the few set The "Southern Blitz" masterminded by backs in this early period of the Reagan Lyn Nofziger sent high administration of administration was the failure to coor ficials into the districts of 45 southern dinate with Congress the Schweiker Representatives in late April 1981 to pres Stockman proposal for Social Security re sure them to vote with the administration form, leading to its repudiation in the on the first concurrent resolution. Con Senate.26 The payoff of all the efforts that THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 629

went into the Reagan legislative program to hold Cabinet rank in 150 years.29 came in its budget victories, which are the Stockman's intimate knowledge of the subject of the next section. budgetary process, his command of bud get figures, and his lobbying abilities with Control Budget the Congress were crucial to the early Most previous incoming administra Reagan budget victories. tions asserted their budget priorities by The new administration decided to re making marginal changes in the proposed vise completely the Carter budget propo budget of the outgoing President. It used sals for Fiscal Year 1982 and submit its to be considered impossible to do much to own budget to the Congress. Before the a budget proposal that had been a year in inauguration, plans for budget cuts were the making because of the complexity of made by Reagan transition teams that the document and because of all of the were assigned to each federal agency and political bargains that had been struck in had access to internal budget and plan arriving at the totals for each program. ning documents. After January 20 Stock Yet by March 10, only 49 days after tak man was in charge of the entire OMB ma ing office, President Reagan submitted to chinery which he put to work overtime Congress a complete revision of President tearing apart the budget they had just put Carter's FY1982 budget, including large together for President Carter. The overall defense increases, large tax cuts, unprece strategy was to achieve most of the victor dented reductions in domestic programs, ies quickly in order to cow the opposition and even reductions in the then current and stampede as many members of Con FY1981 budget. Even more impressive, gress as possible on the winning band within six months he had achieved vir wagon.30 tually all of his budgetary, if not eco Immediately upon taking office the ad nomic, goals.27 The sharp reversal of po ministration took actions to implement its litical and budgetary priorities was no ac budget plans in the executive branch. cident. It was the product of a carefully OMB sent out bulletins to heads of execu laid out plan that put political and gov tive departments and agencies freezing ci ernmental machinery into high gear im vilian hiring,31 reducing travel expendi mediately upon President Reagan's taking tures,32 making reductions in consulting office. In the budgetary arena the admin and related services,33 and placing a mora istration did indeed "hit the ground run torium on the procurement of certain ning," much more so than with respect to equipment.34 On February 11 President personnel or management. Reagan sent out a memorandum stressing The Reagan budget victories of 1981 the short time that was available to revise were the result of advance planning, sin the entire Carter budget and stated that gleness of purpose, and speed of execu any disagreements with the OMB budget tion. Much of the groundwork for the plans or personnel limits had to be con specific budget cuts that the new adminis veyed to the OMB director within 48 tration would make was done by David hours of the agency's receipt of the bud Stockman during his two terms in the get revisions, a process that normally House as a Representative from Michi takes weeks.35 gan. Immediately after Reagan's victory A series of televised presidential he, along with Congressman Jack Kemp, speeches and official documents began wrote an economic plan entitled "Avoid the administration's political budget cam ing a GOP Economic Dunkirk" that be paign for Fiscal Year 1982. On February 5 came known as the "Stockman Mani in a TV address the President warned of festo."28 Stockman impressed President an "economic calamity of tremendous Elect Reagan so much that he selected him proportions" if his program were not to be his Director of the Office of Man passed. On February 18 in a speech to a agement and Budget, the youngest person joint session of Congress he presented his 630 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

"Program for Economic Recovery" having to argue against the group line. along with an inch-thick document ex And the group line is cut, cut, cut."37 Al plaining his approach to fiscal and mone though the new cabinet strongly sup tary policy. This was followed on March ported the Reagan economic program in 10 by another address to Congress and the general and probably some cuts to their release of Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revi programs in particular, they may have felt sions, the Reagan budget proposal for railroaded to go along with decisions Fiscal Year 1982, prepared by the Office made by others before they were ready to of Management and Budget. The follow take an active role in the process. Stock ing month OMB released Additional De man admitted "That's a very awkward tails on Budget Savings, a document that position for them, and you make them re specified budget projections for each pro sentful very fast. ... I have a little ner gram being cut along with the rationale vousness about the heavy-handedness for the proposed cuts. During the same with which I am being forced to act."38 time members of the Cabinet and Council But the cabinet was a small problem of of Economic Advisers were actively seek bringing along the home team compared ing appearances on TV and before various with the political challenge that faced the political, governmental, and interest administration in Congress. groups in order to promote the adminis After President Reagan sent his de tration's budget plans. tailed budget revision proposals to the One source of potential opposition to Congress on March 10, the Congress had the proposed cuts in domestic programs to take the first major step in the congres was the executive branch bureaucracies sional budget process by passing a first that were being cut. The administration concurrent budget resolution, setting used several approaches to neutralize this spending, revenue, and deficit targets for potential opposition: it delayed executive Fiscal Year 1982. The crucial strategic de appointments and carefully orchestrated cision had been made in February by the cabinet level acceptance of budget cuts. administration to use the reconciliation While some argue that the career service, process in conjunction with the first con the permanent bureaucrats, are a potent current resolution. Reconciliation was set force in opposition to cuts; they were a up in the 1974 Budget Act to enable the negligible factor in this set of circum House or Senate to require committees to stances. They might have been able to ar change reported legislation in order to gue convincingly against program cuts, conform with the second concurrent reso but no one in the administration would lution. listen to them, whereas the administration The Reagan plan was ambitious; it would have to at least listen to a Reagan called for budget cuts?$48.6 billion ini appointee. In addition, career executives tially?to be made by changes in the laws because of their role perceptions and ca authorizing programs and extended the reer interests, tend to be very responsive cuts over Fiscal Years 1983 and 1984. The to new political appointees and their pri usual budget procedure would call for a orities.36 first concurrent resolution to set spending During the first few weeks of the ad targets and then a second resolution in ministration, before the newly appointed September to make the ceilings final. In secretaries were fully able or willing to de the interim, the appropriations committee fend their organizations, small meetings would pass spending bills within the tar were held with Stockman, the President, gets of the first resolution, and if any indi and several White House aides present, vidual bill violated the final totals of the along with the cabinet secretary. The new second resolution, a reconciliation bill appointee was confronted with Stock could instruct the committees to report man's proposed cuts and given a chance out a revised bill to conform with the sec to argue against them, but that was diffi ond resolution. The Republicans, how cult because "they're in the position of ever, felt that the only way to get Con THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 631

gress to go along with the largest budget heavy guns in lobbying for the Gramm cuts in U.S. history was to put them all in Latta substitute. The President himself one bill and pass it as soon as possible. telephoned or telegraphed each of the 63 The crucial votes came in the House on Democrats who had voted with the ad May 7, when it passed the first concurrent ministration on the first budget resolu resolution and on June 26 when it passed tion.40 Compromises and concessions in the reconciliation package, including the final package were made in order to changes in existing legislation. In April win votes, some of them departures from the House Budget Committee reported the administration's earlier proposals. out a Democrat backed budget resolution For example, David Stockman promised calling for more spending but a smaller that the administration would not oppose deficit than the administration proposal. the revival of sugar subsidies. He later After several weeks of intense lobbying, said: "In economic principle, it's kind of however, sixty-three Democrats defected a rotten idea," but "they don't care, over and passed the administration backed in the White House, they want to win."41 package known as "Gramm-Latta" by The deciding vote came when the 253-176 on May 7. This vote was crucial House defeated (210-217) a motion that because it showed that President Reagan would have allowed the Democrats to could control the Democratic House and force votes on the separate pieces of the get his unprecedented budget changes reconciliation substitute package rather through the Congress. On May 14 the than yes or no on the whole package as House and Senate conference committee the Republicans wanted. The Gramm agreed to the first concurrent resolution Latta reconciliation substitute itself including reconciliation instructions re passed 232-193 on June 26. The Senate quiring authorizing committees to come had already passed a very similar bill on up with the changes in law that would June 25 by a vote of 80-15. The omnibus provide the $36 billion in budget cuts reconciliation package cut a total of $35.1 wanted by President Reagan. billion from the baseline established by Over the next few weeks authorizing CBO for FY1982 for a total savings of committees in both houses struggled to $130.6 billion for Fiscal Years 1982 make the cuts required of them in the re 1984.42 conciliation instructions. As each com The FY1982 reconciliation bill was his mittee made its changes the separate bills toric in that it was a major reversal of the were referred back to the budget commit spending priorities of the past several de tees to compile them in a package and br cades. House Budget Committee Chair ing them to the floor for a vote. In mid James Jones called it "clearly the most June each Budget Committee reported monumental and historic turnaround in out the budget cut packages. As in the fiscal policy that has ever occurred." It May vote on the first concurrent resolu provided the largest spending cut in U.S. tion, the crucial test came in the House. history, affecting hundreds of programs The House Budget Committee reported a and made some of the greatest changes bill compiled from the recommendations ever made in a single bill by the Congress. of 15 Committees that provided $37.7 bil Personnel Control lion in savings and claimed the bill in cluded 85% of the cuts wanted by Rea Each incoming administration has the gan. Republicans and conservative Demo authority to appoint a number of officials crats, however, claimed that entitlements who are responsible for the formulation, were not cut enough and not enough pro direction, and advancing of administra grams were put into block grants.39 They tion policies, or who serve in a confiden proposed a substitute called "Gramm tial relationship to policy makers. These Latta II" that conformed very closely appointees are members of the "excepted with what the administration wanted. service" since they serve at the pleasure of The administration again pulled out its the President and are not subject to the 632 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

merit system requirements of the Civil dential candidate must have people plan Service. The top cabinet and subcabinet ning future administration policy and per positions, numbering about 500, are sonnel decisions in addition to campaign ranked in the Executive Schedule levels workers who are otherwise occupied. I?III: cabinet, under, deputy, and asso The conflict arises after the electoral ciate secretaries. Executive Schedule victory when those who ran the campaign Levels IV and V, as well as General feel they ought be have priority in running Schedule levels 16-18 are now included in the government. In the Carter administra the Senior Executive Service. Ten percent, tion this conflict erupted in the battle for about 700 of 7000 (8500 are authorized) White House turf between Hamilton Jor of these are non-career members, that is, dan, who ran the campaign, and Jack political appointees. The option is also Watson, who ran the transition opera available to appoint a number of "limited tion. In the Reagan administration the term" or "limited emergency" Senior Ex conflict surfaced shortly after the in ecutives. Finally, there are Schedule C po auguration when the right wing of the Re sitions, about 1800 in number, at the GS publican Party began to complain that lo 15 level and below. Schedule C duties in yal Reagan campaigners were not getting clude policy-determining responsibilities their fair share of appointments. or a confidential relationship to key of This conflict was not salient in Presi ficials.43 dent Reagan's selection of his Cabinet Each election year the House Commit and immediate White House staff. Each tee on Post Office and Civil Service pub President clearly must make these selec lishes Policy and Supporting Positions, tions personally. The immediate staff the "Plum Book." It lists by agency each must be tuned in to the President's per administration incumbent by name, posi sonality and style and possess the com tion, and salary. During every transition plete confidence of the President.47 The there is a scramble for this committee criteria for cabinet positions are different print because it identifies those specific and include important political and sym positions that a new administration can bolic considerations. President Reagan fill and the names of the political ap made his selections with the help of his pointees who must leave.44 "kitchen cabinet" that met on the west In order to fill the top five hundred ex coast. John Ehrlichman has observed that ecutive positions as well as hundreds of Presidents begin their administrations other positions on regulatory commis with strong cabinets and weak White sions, advisory boards, etc., recent presi House staffs and end them with strong dential candidates have had personnel op staffs and weak cabinets.48 erations going well before the election. While President-Elect Reagan promised Candidate Carter set up a "Talent Inven to re-institute "cabinet government," as tory Program" before his election.45 In Carter had in 1976, the President's advi April 1980 Edwin Meese asked Pendleton sors took extraordinary measures to as James, who headed a Los Angeles "head sure that new cabinet appointees were in hunting" firm, to set up a personnel oper tune with the White House. In the first ation for the Reagan administration. few weeks of the administration, frequent James assembled a staff and organized cabinet meetings were held to set out the the "Reagan-Bush Planning Task Force" "party line." Budget cutting, as described located in Alexandria, Virginia in August above, was done from the White House 1980.46 It was funded and run entirely with little participation from newly ap separately from the campaign, and pointed cabinet officers or their staffs. therein were planted the seeds of future The White House also decided to keep discord in the Republican Party. Such tight control over subcabinet appoint conflict may be inevitable in any modern ments rather than let cabinet members presidential administration. Governing is pick their own people, as President Carter not the same as campaigning, and a presi had. Whatever President Reagan meant THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 633

by "cabinet government," it did not in properly represented. The three criteria clude the delegation of budget or person we followed were, one, was he a Reagan nel authority. man? Two, a Republican? And three, a The struggle over subcabinet positions conservative?"54 The influence of the created the greatest internal controversies kitchen cabinet diminished, however, in the early Reagan administration. Two when it lost its offices in the Old Execu main dilemmas dominate subcabinet per tive Office Building inMarch 1981. sonnel selection in any administration: It was inevitable that such an approach will selections be made primarily by the would cause some conflicts. In general, White House or by department and those cabinet secretaries that were agency heads and, what is the proper bal strongest had the best chance to win the ance between political loyalty and admin disputed cases. Alexander Haig (with the istrative competence. Most executives nat exception of his deputy, William Clark) urally want the discretion to put together got his choices through the White House their own teams; Robert McNamara said personnel process, if not through the Sen choosing his own subordinates was the ate, with dispatch. Defense Secretary most important request he had made of Weinberger is reported to have prompted John Kennedy.49 President Nixon, imme the resignation of a White House person diately after giving his new cabinet au nel staffer by saying "I will not accept any thority over appointees, said to an aide, more recommendations from the White "I just made a big mistake."50 President House, so don't bother sending them."55 Carter, as part of his approach to cabinet Other cabinet members, however, did not government, gave the primary discretion have the political or personal clout with for personnel selection to his cabinet sec the White House to be able to insist on retaries.51 their choices when they disagreed over ap The Reagan administration, in con pointments. scious contrast, made it clear from the be The question of who selected appoint ginning that subcabinet selection would ees was closely intertwined with the other be controlled from the White House. major dilemma of loyalty versus compe Meese, as Chief of Staff of the Reagan tence. At the beginning of administra transition team, was favorably impressed tions, new Presidents tend to have two with a study on organizing and staffing fears: that "the bureaucrats" will under prepared by the Center for the Study of mine their policies and that their appoint the Presidency. It pointed up the trials of ees will "go native" and become coopted the Carter administration in subcabinet by the departments they head. Thus per appointments. "Nixon, like Carter, lost sonal loyalty is a centripetal force that the appointments process," according to helps counter the centrifugal forces that Penn James.52 This time it would be dif draw presidential appointees to the pro ferent: "When the cabinet secretaries grams and colleagues in the agencies in were selected, Meese made it clear, 'Now which they work. The problem is that in look, this is how the appointment process order to have programmatic and manage is going to be run.' And they were fully ment control you need more than just aware as to how the White House was go "your guy" in the position. The person ing to handle the appointment process must also have a blend of substantive before they were appointed. That was the knowledge and administrative skill in or package that they bought."53 der to do effectively the President's bid The intent was not to make all of the se ding in the very complex and competitive lections in the White House, but to assure bureaucratic world. that all selections made were fully accept One indicator of knowledge and skill is able to the White House. The President's previous administrative experience in kitchen cabinet also played a role in the business or government. Pendleton selection: "our most crucial concern was James, as head of the White House re to assure that conservative ideology was cruitment effort, sought out executives 634 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

with proven track records who would be replaced by John S. Herrington, who was loyal to the President. "We had five cri more acceptable to the right wing interest teria all along?compatibility with the groups. James denied that any policy shift President's philosophy, integrity, tough took place, saying that loyalty was always ness, competence, and being a team a primary criterion in hiring and that the player."56 James, who had worked in the recent conservative appointees were al personnel operations of the Nixon and ready in the personnel pipeline rather Ford administrations, naturally found than the result of any policy shift. many competent people among those who To keep things in perspective, not all had served in previous Republican admin administrative positions were the focus of istrations. The problem with them, from pitched battles between Nofziger and the the perspective of the Republican right moderates, and the right wing did not al wing, was that some of them had not sup ways win. Caspar Weinberger was suc ported Ronald Reagan soon enough. cessful in getting Frank Carlucci, a distin In late January and February 1981 con guished career public servant to be his servative right wing supporters of Rea deputy, though Alexander Haig was not gan's candidacy began to complain vocif successful in preventing the appointment erously that Reagan campaigners were be of William Clark as his deputy. Clark, a ing systematically excluded from the per justice on the California Supreme Court, sonnel selection process. John Lofton in had virtually no experience in foreign af the February issue of the Conservative Di fairs. Ironically, he was later to be ap gest claimed that the Reagan administra pointed as President Reagan's national se tion was being filled with "retreads" curity advisor and was to be instrumental from the Ford and Nixon administrations in Haig's resignation. and called for James to be fired. He de The overall result of the personnel se clared, "There will be no Reaganism lection process was an administration without Reaganites."57 staffed with officials selected more sys The person carrying the conservative tematically for their personal loyalty to banner on the inside was Lyn Nofziger, the President than any other recent ad who ran White House political operations ministration. Not incidentally, it was an from his office in the Old EOB. He met administration with relatively little prior regularly with conservative groups, and in government experience, at least at the March 1981 told the President that con subcabinet level. As of June 26, 1981, of servatives were being frozen out of his ad those appointees confirmed by the Senate, ministration. His criteria for administra 76 of 112 (59%) of those in the subcab tion personnel differed significantly from inet, 18 of 23 (78%) in independent agen those of James. He felt the personnel pro cies, and 7 of 7 in independent regulatory cess should root out not only Democrats agencies had no prior government experi but Republicans who in the past had sup ence.61 ported other candidates than Reagan. "I This reflected Ronald Reagan's anti have problems with them. This, damn it, government campaign and his promise to is a Reagan Administration."58 Nofzi change "business as usual." "There's an ger's conception of competence also dif awful lot of brains and talent in people fered somewhat from that of James: "We who haven't learned all the things you have told members of the Cabinet we ex can't do."62 This should have made Sena pect them to help us place people who are tor Jesse Helms happy. One of his staff ... competent. As far as I'm concerned, complained about the early Reagan ap anyone who supported Reagan is compe pointments to the Wall Street Journal: tent."59 "All these people are the experts of the Due to Nofziger's efforts and pressure mistakes of the past. Why can't he at least from conservative groups, after the first get some new people who could have a two months the appointment process took chance to make some different mis a turn to the right, at least enough to mol takes?"63 The Reagan administration also lify right wing critics.60 James' deputy was made some unusual appointments in nam THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 635

ing to positions people who were hostile was making major appointments faster to, or at least highly critical of, the tradi than Presidents Carter and Kennedy,69 tional missions of the agencies they were The National Journal reported that after to head, for example James Watt at In ten weeks Reagan had submitted to the terior and Anne Gorsuch at the Environ Senate 95, as opposed to Carter's 142 mental Protection Agency. nominations.70 Time magazine calculated In addition to disputes over whom to that, as of the first week in May, of the an appoint to which position, there were also top 400 officials, only 55% had been complaints about the slowness of the pro nounced, 36% formally nominated, and cess itself. In the spring of 1981 there was 21% actually confirmed.71 a widespread perception that appoint In January 1977 the Civil Service Com ments were not coming as fast as they mission approved a rule allowing agencies ought to.64 There were complaints from to create another set of Schedule C posi the Hill that officials who should have tions identical to those already authorized been available to testify on administration for 120 days "in order to facilitate the or programs were not yet appointed. There derly transition of duties as a consequence were complaints from the administration of a change in Presidential Administra that the few top officials on board were tion."72 Thus during a transition each de spending all of their time testifying on the partment and agency can have twice as Hill. And there were complaints from the many Schedule C appointments as usual bureaucracy that essential program lead for its first 120 days. On June 16, 1981 ership was missing, resulting in policy OPM Director Donald Devine authorized drift and inefficiency. Pendleton James the extension of the period for another continued to deny that the pace of ap 120 days "since a number of key political to pointments was particularly slow and officials have not yet been appointed maintained that quality of personnel was federal agencies, thereby continuing the more important than speed. transition period for the new Admin Some of the delays were caused by fi istration."73 nancial disclosure requirements and con Although the slow pace of appoint some flict of interest regulations that resulted ments was disruptive in many ways, from what James called "post-Watergate administration officials saw the silver lin ar hysteria."65 Some delay was inevitable, ing, or found virtue in necessity. They due to the range of clearances built into gued that the lack of appointees made it the personnel process. Each nomination very difficult for agencies to resist the se had to run a formidable gauntlet running vere budget cuts that the White House from the cabinet secretary and the person was advocating.74 While the slowness of nel office to Nofziger to White House appointments may have helped the Presi counsel Fred Fielding, to either Martin dent's budget program, it did little to fa Anderson (domestic) or Richard Allen cilitate the transition in the administration (national security) to the triad (James of the executive branch. Baker, Michael Deaver, Edwin Meese) to Administrative Control the congressional liaison office, and fi nally to the President, himself.66 Some Most modern Presidents come to office times names of candidates would make it with an abiding distrust of the bureau most of the way through the process only cracy. They are convinced that their pol or to be vetoed at the last minute by the po icy initiatives will be delayed, ignored, litical affairs office or the kitchen even sabotoged. After two decades of cabinet.67 Once through the White House Democratic rule President Eisenhower own at the personnel process, international affairs felt the need for his people op of the nominations requiring Senate approval erational levels, not merely the top were were often held up by Senator Helms who government. Schedule C positions thought State Department nominees were created for this purpose.75 the career bu not conservative enough.68 John Kennedy felt that new initia Despite administration claims that it reaucracy was too stolid for his 636 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

tives and drew domestic policy making branch." The purpose of the freeze was into his White House staff. In one analy "controlling the size of government and sis his administrative strategy amounted stopping the drain on the economy by the to guerilla warfare with numerous "back public sector."78 An accompanying White channels" and special task forces usurp House press release said that compensa ing the powers of the career bureau tion and benefits for Federal civilian cracy.76 Richard Nixon's distrust of the workers comprised a "major" part of the bureaucracy was legendary. When his Federal budget.79 The administration saw Congressional initiatives failed to fruc the freeze as a means to show the bureau tify, he decided to "take over the bu cracy who was in charge, show the public reaucracy and take on the Congress" with it would fulfill its promises, and begin a tactics such as impounding funds and his series of broader cutbacks aimed at do responsiveness program.77 Jimmy Carter mestic spending and personnel. came to Washington as a self-proclaimed A memo of January 24, 1981 made it outsider promising to reduce the number clear that the administration intended the of federal agencies from 1900 to 200. freeze to be retroactive, when it included While this promise was quickly forgotten, in the freeze all those who had not been the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 did formally hired by election day, November create several important tools of adminis 5, 1980. Thus many (some estimate up to trative control that the White House 20,000) were caught in the freeze who had could use, particularly the SES pro duly authorized letters offering them visions. jobs, but who did not yet have formally Ronald Reagan also came to office as signed Standard Form 50's (Notification an outsider, claiming that government of Personnel Action). Several cases were was the problem with U.S. society, not brought in court challenging the retroac the solution. Aside from the administra tivity of the freeze as a breach of contract tion's budget campaign and personnel with those who had good faith offers of strategies, there did not seem to be a sep employment, though not a signed SF50. arate administrative strategy. The admin They also charged that many prospective istration, however, did make a series of employees underwent extensive personal tactical moves aimed at establishing im hardship in giving up their old jobs and mediate and unambiguous control over traveling toWashington in order to accept the executive branch. A freeze was im jobs that were then retracted by the ad posed on civilian hiring and lowered per ministration. The petitioners, however, sonnel ceilings led to the firing of lost on February 25 when U.S. District thousands of Civil Service employees. The Court Judge Charles B. Richey ruled that President also fired the striking air traffic the freeze was "not only constitutional controllers as well as the newly created and legally permissable but . . . essential inspectors general who had supposedly to the well being and general welfare of non-partisan roles. Finally, he "zeroed the American people at this time."80 out" the Community Services Adminis OMB Director Stockman explained tration, which had taken over the func that the freeze was made necessary by "a tions of President Johnson's Office of situation demanding sacrifices to help in Economic Opportunity. While each of bringing under control immediately the these actions had important immediate size and cost of government."81 While consequences, the larger purpose was the this provided little comfort to those who symbolic statement that the Reagan ad gave up jobs on the basis of letters prom ministration was in charge and there ising them positions, Director Stockman would be no more "business as usual." said cases of "severe hardship" would be In his first official act after being inau considered for exceptions to the freeze. A gurated, President Reagan signed a mem memo on January 29, 1981 specified that orandum imposing a "strict freeze on the potential exemptions had to demonstrate hiring of Federal civilian employees to be "severe and irreparable financial loss" applied across the board in the executive and at the same time had to show the per THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 637

son "was prudent in his or her actions ciency or smooth functioning of individ (for example, in terms of timing of sever ual agencies.86 ing other employment; or taking on new The Reagan administration also sought financial commitments in anticipation of to assert its control over the government a new job)."82 This catch-22 type condi by firing all of the inspectors general tion, in addition to other restrictions, whose positions were created by statute in made exceptions to the freeze few and far 1976 and 1978. The purposes of the posi between. tions were to centralize audit functions in The freeze was successful in showing major agencies and have the IG's report the public and the bureaucracy that the to Congress on their efforts to uncover administration was serious about cut fraud, waste and abuse. The IG positions backs. It was criticized by others for caus were intended to be apolitical, though the ing more disruption than it was worth in President could remove an incumbent if terms of saving money or reducing per he communicated the reasons to Con sonnel. W. Bowman Cutter, who was Ex gress. ecutive Associate Director for Budget in Some Democrats in Congress saw Rea the Carter administration, wrote that the gan's firing of all the incumbent IG's as freeze was "fake, gimmicky symbol an attempt to politicize the auditing func ism."83 He argued that in his experience tion by appointing his own people who of running three freezes for the Carter ad could then suppress any embarrassments ministration, he found that exceptions to the administration.87 The White House were always necessary (for example, in the replied that it was a conscious attempt to Defense Department which employs half establish the precedent that each Presi of the government's civilians) and that va dent could name his own IG's. After mak cancies occur randomly, rather than in ing the precedent-setting point, President positions management wants to cut. The Reagan reappointed some of the same General Accounting Office in a series of IG's he had just fired. reports has argued that the best way to Later, in the summer of 1981, the Presi manage reductions in government is dent again asserted his administrative through work force planning and budget control by firing air traffic controllers control, rather than through the imposi who had voted to go on strike. His action tion of personnel ceilings and hiring established the principle that strikes freezes. In this way the managers closest would not be tolerated and effectively to operations can decide how best to cut broke the Professional Air Traffic Con back activities without disrupting essen trollers Association (PATCO). tial services.84 GAO contended that the Finally, the administration established Carter and Reagan freezes were not suc its direction by "zeroing out," i.e. abol cessful in substantially reducing employ ishing, the Community Services Adminis ment and that it was not clear whether any tration. There was a marked contrast with money was saved.85 Richard Nixon's earlier efforts to do away In the late spring and summer of 1981 with the Office of Economic Opportunity the hiring freeze was selectively lifted in by impounding its funds. Nixon's efforts agencies for which there were established directly confronted a united Congress and personnel ceilings. For most domestic were defeated in Federal court decisions.88 agencies these ceilings were well below President Reagan was able to persuade those on board at the time. This necessar the Congress to go along with his propos ily involved the reduction of employees by als and thus avoided any question of the natural attrition (not replacing employees constitutionality of the administration's who leave voluntarily) or formal reduc appointment or spending decisions. tion in force (RIF). Both of these proce On March 18 OMB Director Stockman dures are costly and disruptive, though sent a "Dear Mr. Director" letter to CSA, the administration felt that overall reduc even though there was no appointed, or tions were more important than the effi even acting, director. The letter stated: 638 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

"we will not seek to renew the authoriza bunching similar agencies with similar tion of the Community Services Adminis functions together under one umbrella tration," and that CSA plans "should agency has the advantage of settling some provide for the separation of all personnel turf battles before they get to the Presi by the end of Fiscal Year 1981."89 CSA dent's desk. Major policy disputes, how functions were to be included in state ad ever, cannot be swept under an organiza ministered block grants proposed by the tional rug. The agency itself, its clientele administration. Although there was much groups, and Congressional committees gallows humor at CSA in the last half of will continue to dominate the action, and FY1981, under the leadership of the vet the President still will have to decide if he eran Dwight Ink, agency managers ran wants to throw his weight one way or an the shutdown professionally, and CSA other. Thus major reorganizations are closed its doors on September 30, 1981.90 usually more trouble than they are worth, While the above actions, despite their both in the Congress and in the executive drawbacks, were successful from the ad branch. ministration's viewpoint, one big hole in This does not mean that no reorganiza its approach to administrative control was tions took place, only that they were im the slowness in getting new appointees plemented at the micro-level, i.e. within into subcabinet positions. This was due to departments and agencies, where they clearance procedures and the conflicts count. While large scale reorganization is over particular appointees described often touted as a panacea, small scale re above. This helped the administration's organizations are often effective tools of budget strategy by eliminating potential good management. They engender uncer advocates for agency budgets, but it did tainty and thus inefficiency in agencies little to give the administration program when they are implemented, so they matic control of the government. should be used with sensitivity and only One of the major drawbacks in any when necessary. But in certain circum presidential transition is that bureaucratic stances they are useful in gaining control agencies and programs tend to go into of an agency and can accomplish pur neutral gear until new leadership provides poses that personnel rules and regulations policy direction. This tendency toward make difficult. In 1981 Budget cuts pro policy drift is extended by delays in ap vided useful justifications for agency pointments. Career executives do not heads to reorganize their organizations want to move too far in any direction for for their own purposes.91 fear that the new boss will not approve. A IV. The View From the consideration of this syndrome from the Bureaucracy bureaucratic perspective is provided in To career employees in the executive subsequent sections. branch, the transition period is a time of In one lesson it learned from the Carter uncertainty. The last few months before and Nixon experiences, the new Reagan an election the bureaucratic machine be administration did not dissipate its ener gins to slow until the election of a new gies pushing any grand scale reorganiza President, at which time it is in neutral tion of the government. Carter had prom gear. In sharp contrast, internal maneuv ised to reduce the number of federal agen ering increases to a high speed. The result cies from 1900 to 200. Nixon had tried to is a machine operating at a high level of consolidate twelve cabinet departments r.p.m.'s but with little direction to con into eight, but Congress would not go vert all of the energy to useful productiv along. Reagan promised to abolish the ity. Departments of Energy and Education During periods of presidential transi but he did not squander his political re tion the upper levels of the bureaucracy sources on these projects in his first two are marked by active maneuvering; ca years. reers can be made or broken. Attitudes at The general strategy of trying to reduce lower levels are marked by cynicism and the span of control of the President by the feeling that there will be arbitrary THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 639

changes of policy and organization. Each of a rumor people scurry off the tele set of attitudes results from the intense phone to contact their "inside sources" or uncertainty. This condition does not usu to Who's Who to get a fix on the new ally preclude the carrying out of routine boss. functions or the accomplishment of well The people on the new administration's established agency goals. The inefficiency transition team are in an ambiguous posi comes at the cutting edge of policy formu tion because it is never clear if they were lation and program innovation. assigned to pay off a campaign debt or if The uncertainty at the top results from they will be appointed the new leaders of a lack of leadership and direction. Senior the agency. The obvious bureaucratic executives do not want to stick their necks strategy here is to act as if they had al out too far in any one policy direction for ready been appointed and impress them fear that the new boss will come in and re with your responsiveness. One impresses verse directions. Those who had come to the new (potential) boss with a positive occupy positions of trust and power over and "can do" attitude. One must also ap the four years of the out-going adminis pear professional and not overly obsequi tration are fearful that they will be identi ous. The usual tack in briefing new ap fied as partisans of the previous discred pointees is to present one's own operation ited and rejected administration. The re as efficient and essential to the operation luctance to take any initiatives, even those of the agency. In a high risk gambit one that seem to make good political and or might offer up program or personnel cuts ganizational sense and that would be in to show that one is not the stereotypical the best interests of any new incumbent, is empire building bureaucrat. reinforced by uncertainty about who will The executive branch bureaucracy is of be appointed to run the agency. ten portrayed as a unified, monolithic le Every career executive has seen a range viathan with the sole goals of survival and of quality in presidential appointments, expansion. This leads to the expectation from the highly professional expert with a that a new political appointee will be wealth of experience in government or faced with a united front. Political ap business, to the complete neophyte who is pointees who believe this will be at a dis also a political hack. The probable future advantage, because the bureaucracy suf actions of the former can be calculated fers from the same vulnerabilities as a car a much more easily than those of the latter. tel. One small leak can easily become But people whose career depend on it tend flood and break the whole edifice. In any to minimize their maximum losses rather agency there are enough senior managers than to pursue the high risk strategy of who hold varying political, policy, and backing an initiative that may be repudi professional values that new appointees ated by the new boss. Senior executives with any sense of character judgement want to jump on the band wagon of the will not have to face a unified opposition new boss, but they do not yet know in to their policy preferences, whatever they what direction it is heading. are. This includes the anti-government The period of uncertainty can lead to and anti-welfare policy preferences of the opportunities to enhance one's career or Reagan administration. settle old scores. Old animosities can re In fact, the opposite is likely to be the emerge, and colleagues can be seen as riv situation. Senior executives can be ex als. Areas of disputed turf can be again pected to render professional and positive opened to challenge. There may be oppor support to new political appointees for rea tunities to reorganize one's bureaucratic professional as well as self-interest enemies out of existence. The focus of all sons. Career professionals accept the this maneuvering is, of course, the new democratic and constitutional legitimacy agency head who will have the power to of the incoming administration. They also as with make or break policies and careers. The see their own roles neutral respect if not with re speculation about who the new President to political party, always or institutions. Self in will appoint is intense, and at the first hint spect to programs 640 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

terest also provides a strong incentive to tion.93 Thus a strong precedent has been be responsive to the new leadership. Se set for avoiding the politicization of the nior executives are ambitious and want to SES, particularly since the Reagan cam be members of the management team. paign promised to end "business as They will only be included if they actively usual," and had sharply contrasting pol and effectively support the administra icy preferences to the preceding several tion's policies. administrations. In fact, one of the major For these reasons the typical fears of themes of the transition teams was to re new administrations that "the bureau assure the career service that the new ad crats" will try to undermine their policies ministration, despite its campaign rhet are usually exaggerated. There will prob oric, valued, and would preserve, the in ably be some dissidents, some personality tegrity of the merit system. conflicts, and some differences of opin The new Reagan administration did, ion; but there is little likelihood of bu however, make systematic efforts to re reaucratic guerilla warfare waged by new and enforce the split between politics senior executives against an administra and administration that the public admin tion's policies.92 There will undoubtedly istration community found so attractive be bureaucratic warfare, but the cleavages in the earlier decades of the 20th will flow along program, policy, and insti century.94 Often the newly appointed ad tutional lines with political appointees as ministration members of an agency would well as careerists on both sides of the bar meet to make policy decisions without any ricades. input from career executives, bringing The Reagan administration is the first them in to implement decisions only after to come to office enjoying the new flexi all important decisions had been made. bilities provided in the Civil Service Re This approach was due to the typical dis form Act of 1978. Primary among the trust of the bureaucracy felt by most new new management prerogatives are the administrations. SES provisions. These allow agency heads This did little to enhance the quality of to transfer senior executives from position management decision making. For rea to position much more easily than in the sons stated above, there is little to fear past. Rank in person rather than position from most career executives. But more provides some security to the executive importantly, the administration deprived while allowing the agency head to match itself of valuable advice as well as support the executive to the appropriate position by excluding career executives from the without being bound by the rank of the early stages of policy formulation. In usual incumbent of that position. most cases career executives are experi One of the restrictions, however, is that enced experts in their areas and have career senior executives cannot be moved many good ideas for beneficial changes. involuntarily until 120 days after the new Such potentially valuable input might be agency head is appointed. The purpose is stifled if they are systematically excluded to ensure that senior executives will have a from consultation. In addition, career ex chance to prove their competence and loy ecutives often have shrewd political alty to the new administration. During judgement as well as valuable contacts in spring in 1981, due to the Civil Service re other agencies and on the Hill. Ignoring forms, there was more than the usual these resources at their disposal can make amount of paranoia among senior execu the job of political appointees much more tives. There were newspaper reports in the difficult. No amount of consultation, Washington Post and Star that the White however, can relieve members of the ad House was planning "mass transfers" of ministration of the authority or the duty senior executives at the end of the 120 day to make final decisions.95 Each new ad waiting period. These fears proved to be ministration goes through a cycle. Grad groundless, and there is no evidence that ually, as the abilities and drawbacks of the Reagan administration abused its career executives become known and as powers over the SES during the transi trust begins to develop with the experience THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 641

of working together, the artificial barriers ties in other organizations. It is difficult of the politics/administration dichotomy to recruit bright, young managers to or break down. The sooner this happens, the ganizations that seem to be in decline. sooner any administration will be able to This was probably the major adminis mobilize fully the political and substan trative challenge the Reagan administra tive expertise of the career service to tion faced in its early years.98 achieve its policy goals. All transitions cause some uncertainty Reassurances about the integrity of the and disruption, but within departments merit system and the absence of abuse of and agencies they can be handled with the SES, however, were of little comfort more or less grace. The incoming agency to those at lower levels in the bureaucracy head can choose to handle appointees of who were facing the uncertainty of reduc the outgoing administration and career tions in force. The Reagan campaign executives who will be replaced with pro promises to cut back federal agencies and fessional respect and can make their exits personnel were always clear and were as smooth as possible. Giving them forcefully reiterated with the immediate chances to find new positions and using hiring freeze. The new reduced personnel selective options for early retirement are ceilings and the budget cuts established by ways to do this. The agency head can OMB inMarch and April 1981made it choose the least painful way to reorganize clear that personnel reductions would be the agency or separate personnel. On the necessary in most domestic agencies, other hand, the new agency head can either through natural attrition or formal come with six-guns blazing and demand reductions in force (RIF's). Either resignations of all holdovers by close of method would place government workers business that day. He can have their of in jeopardy of losing their jobs or of being fices locked and their desks cleared out. reduced in rank or position.96 The uncer He can put heavy handed pressure on ca tainty, needless to say, resulted in severe reerists to leave quickly, and can reassign morale problems. them to undesirable geographic locations Those who were not fired were never on the 121st day after his appointment. theless threatened because the programs It probably takes an executive who is they worked in were vulnerable to being confident in himself and his position in eliminated, either by outright termina the administration to take the low-key, tion, or by the slow deletion of functions gracious route. There is, after all, no and authority. One of the problems here question of who is running the agency, is that employees, particularly at mid and and there is plenty of legal power to back lower levels, perceive that the fate of their it up. Those who are insecure in them careers or their programs has nothing to selves or their positions may feel the need do with their performance. This lack of a to assert their authority through heavy sense of efficacy can easily lead to cyni handed actions and abrupt firings. They cism in which arbitrary "politics" seems will inspire fear in their subordinates to control everything. With this attitude, rather than respect. While the Machiavel why should one work hard if one's own lian approach to control through fear may to performance cannot control one's fate? enhance personal power, it will not lead Thus the cutbacks of the Reagan ad the sort of teamwork necessary to run an ministration in 1981 had the unfortunate organization in the complex and some effect of seriously undermining morale in times treacherous milieu of Washington. many domestic agencies. While morale is More importantly, it will be a disservice to difficult, if not impossible, to measure, it the administration of which the appointee is an important factor in any organiza is a member. tion.97 When it drops, people become de V. Conclusion tached from their jobs and do not see any need to work toward organizational The overwhelming fact about presiden goals. They become worried about their tial transitions from a management per personal careers and look for opportuni spective is that they are extremely costly in 642 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

terms of productivity sacrificed and mo Lyndon Johnson the fragmenting pres mentum lost. Important changes in policy sures in Congress?structural reforms, direction mean writing off sunk costs. high turnover, single interest pressure Changes in top management entail policy groups?had marked the end of the Presi drift and turf battles at the agency level. dent's role as legislative leader. President The benefits of a representative govern Reagan proved that White House control ment, however, are well worth the cost of of legislation was possible in spite of un the disruptions involved in presidential popular budget cuts and a Democratic transitions. House. But it took most of President Rea While presidential transitions are neces gan's political resources during his first sarily inefficient, they can be accom six months in office to win the budget bat plished more or less quickly and effec tle on the Hill. These victories, however, tively and can be conducted with more or did not accomplish the economic turn less grace. From this perspective, what around that supply-siders had predicted, can future presidents-elect learn from the and his budget policies led to the largest Carter/Reagan experience? First of all, deficits in U.S. history. Not until the end the transition must begin before the elec of the second year of the Reagan adminis tion and be professionally staffed. The tration did the economic recovery begin, development of policy issues and the although the stock market proved an ear search for personnel cannot be left until lier harbinger. after the election. Itmust be kept inmind, What did the elaborate presidential per however, that the governmental transition sonnel system accomplish? The White staff and the political campaign staff will House kept closer control over subcabinet battle over who will run the government. appointments than any other recent ad The President-Elect must expect such con ministration. Thus many Reagan loyalists flict and make his choices clear. were appointed, but at the cost of admin Watson and Meese both performed istrative experience and letting cabinet ably in the transition. Both are lawyers members choose their own management with good minds and experience. The teams. While the Carter and Nixon per Reagan administration must be given very sonnel systems may have been too lax in high marks for the execution of its legisla this regard, the Reagan system may have tive and budget programs. (Whether or been too strict. The delay in appointments not these programs were successful in re that was caused in major part by the ad viving the U.S. economy is another ques ministration's political clearance proce tion.99) The political personnel process dures took a toll in departmental leader gets a mixed review. It selected loyal ad ship and program development. How ministrators but sacrificed professional ever, the Reagan administration was ism and time. Administrative leadership spared the severe stress of staff vs. Cab and managerial direction were sacrificed inet which characterized the Carter ad to budget, personnel, and cutback priori ministration. Further, the Meese origi ties. Many agencies were so disrupted by nated cabinet councils provided an effec the process that their operations were seri tive system of relating Cabinet and staff ously affected in the short run, and long in policy development. term management recruitment may have The larger question to be addressed is been hurt. It is probable, however, that whether the above described actions this was not an unintended consequence, amount to administrative, policy, and as seen by the administration, but viewed programatic control of the government. as a necessary tradeoff. The Reagan transition period did provide What can future administrations learn significant budgetary cutbacks for domes from the Reagan experience in the areas tic agencies, and the personnel system en of legislation, budget, personnel and ad sured personal loyalty to the President ministration. One lesson is that Congress from the subcabinet. But there did not will still pass a President's legislative seem to be much positive policy direction package. Some had concluded that since to set the tone for the Reagan administra THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 643

tion. Even in defense, the early budget ac 12. For a treatment of transitions from Kennedy tions seemed to be the addition of more through Carter see Richard E. Neustadt, Presi dential Power(New York: Wiley, 1980), Chap money to the previous administration's ter 11: "Hazards of Transition," pp. 208-243. rather than a priorities carefully targetted For a study of transitions from Wilson through redirection of defense policy.100 Eisenhower see Laurin L. Henry, Presidential Setting a positive policy direction is dif Transitions (Washington: Brookings, 1960). For an inside of a see ficult for an administration whose view transition Richard E. Neustadt, Memorandum on "Staffing the avowed are If " goals essentially negative. President-Elect, October 30, 1960, available government is part of the problem, then in the Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. doing less is better. Major changes in do 13. Washington Post, November 16, 1980, p. A9. 14. December 1980. mestic policy were made at EPA and the Washington Post, 15, 15. December of but these were ac Congressional Quarterly, 27, 1980, Department Interior, p. 3656. complished primarily through cutbacks 16. See "Minutes of IAG Meeting on the Transi and the decision to modify enforcement tion," Office of Personnel Management, No was of regulations. In cutback situations vember 14, 1980. The author present at this meeting. where government is seen as part of the 17. Congressional Quarterly, October 4, 1980, p. problem, positive leadership is, at best, 2920. inherently difficult. Having "hit the 18. Ibid. ground running," this was the challenge 19. Hendrick Smith, "Taking Charge of New York 1981. confronting the Reagan administration. Congress," Times, August 9, 20. Ibid. Notes 21. Congressional Quarterly, August 1, 1981, p. 1372. 1. See Austin Ranney, The American Elections of 22. Smith, "Taking Charge of Congress," New 1980 (Washington: American Enterprise Insti York Times, August 9, 1981. tute, 1981), Gerald Pomper, et al., The Elec 23. See Washington Post, April 26, 1981, p. A10, tion 1980: and of Reports Interpretations Congressional Quarterly, July 25, 1981, p. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1981), Ellis 1325. Sandoz and Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., A Tide of Dis 24. Congressional Quarterly, June 13, 1981, p. content: The 1980 Elections and Their Mean 1025. ing (Washington: Congressional Quarterly 25. James MacGregor Burns has made this argu Press, 1981), and Royce Crocker, "Federal ment. See the Los Angeles Times, January 19, Government Spending and Public Opinion," 1982, Part IV, p. 1. Public Budgeting and Finance (Autumn 1981), 26. See William Greider, "The Education of Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 25-35. David Stockman," The Atlantic (December 2. See Luevano v. Campbell, Civil Action No. 1981). 79-0271. 27. For a more complete analysis of the Reagan 3. FPM Bulletin 273-18, January 4, 1980. administration's budget strategy and tactics, 4. OPM Operations Letter No. 332-246, Septem see: James P. Pfiffner, "The Reagan Budget ber 17, 1980 signed by Richard B. Post. Juggernaut: The Fiscal 1982 Budget Cam 5. GAO Report FPCD-81-51 (B-202713) May 27, paign," paper presented at the 1982 Conven 1981 signed Clifford I. Gould. The OPM in tion of the American Society for Public Ad vestigation covered the U.S. Commission on ministration, Honolulu, Hawaii. Civil Rights, the Department of Education, 28. See Washington Post, Sec. C, p. 1, December and the EEOC. The GAO investigation cov 14, 1980. ered the FTC, SBA, USDA, and DOT. 29. Walter Shapiro, "The Stockman Express," 6. Memorandum for Cabinet and Agency Heads, Washington Post Magazine, February 8, 1981, Subject: "An Orderly Transition of the Pres p. 8. idency," November 10, 1980, signed "Jack" 30. Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter in Washing Watson. ton," The New Yorker (June 8, 1981), p. 138. 7. See Richard E. Neustadt, "The Reagan Transi 31. OMB Bulletin No. 81-6 (January 24, 1981). tion," Presidency Research Group Newsletter 32. OMB Bulletin No. 81-7 (January 24, 1981). (April 1981), p. 2. 33. OMB Bulletin No. 81-8 (January 24, 1981). 8. The White House, "Memorandum for Cabinet 34. OMB Bulletin No. 81-9 (January 30, 1981), see and Agency Heads," November 12, 1981, also OMB Bulletin 81-11 (February 11, 1981). signed "Jack" Watson. 35. Memorandum for Heads of Non-Cabinet 9. Memorandum for Department and Agency Agencies, "Revisions of the 1982 Budget," Heads, Subject: "Resignation Policy," De (February 7, 1981), signed by President Rea cember 10, 1980, signed "Jack" Watson. gan. 10. Public Law 88-277, 78 Stat. 153. 36. See James P. Pfiffner, "The Challenge of Fed 11. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, De eral Management in the 1980s," Public Ad cember 27, 1980, p. 3657. ministration Quarterly (forthcoming). 644 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

37. Stockman quoted in The Atlantic, p. 33. idency study is noted in footnotes 47 and 51 38. Ibid. above. 39. Congressional Quarterly, July 4, 1981, p. 53. Quoted in Calvin MacKenzie, "Cabinet and 1167. Subcabinet Personnel Selection in Reagan's 40. Congressional Quarterly, June 27, 1981, p. First Year," paper presented at the 1981 Amer 1127. ican Political Science Association Convention, 41. Greider, The Atlantic, p. 50. New York City, p. 24. ibid. 42. Congressional Quarterly, August 1, 1981, p. 54. Henry Salvatori quoted 1377. 55. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Cleaning 43. See James P. Pfiffner, "Presidential Personnel Out the Kitchen," Washington Post (March Policy," Presidency Research Group Newslet 20, 1981). Hedrick ter (Spring 1982) Vol. IV No. 2, p. 5. 56. Pendleton James quoted by Smith, 44. The Plum Book also lists those in Schedule A "Conservatives Cite Gains in Top Posts," positions (about 100,000) and Schedule B New York Times (March 8, 1981), p. 24. a (about 17,000). These are part of the excepted 57. Dom Bonafede, "The New Right Preaches service because it is not practical to hold exam New Religion, and Ronald Reagan is its inations for the positions; they include attor Prophet," National Journal (May 2, 1981), p. neys, chaplains, National Bank examiners, and 779. See also Evans and Novak, "Reganism students in cooperative education programs. Without Reganites," Washington Post (Janu Schedules A and B do not turn over with each ary 23, 1981). incoming administration. 58. Quoted by Howell Raines, "Nofziger Thrives 45. See Bruce Adams and Kathryn Kavanagh on Tough Reputation," New York Times Baran, Promise and Performance: Carter (June 25, 1981), p. B12. Builds a New Administration (Lexington, MA: 59. Quoted by Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Lexington Books, 1979). Large," The New Yorker (March 16, 1981), 46. See Dun's Review, "Staffing the Reagan Ad pp. 91-92. ministration," (May 1981), p. 91. 60. See MacKenzie, "Cabinet and Subcabinet Per 47. For an excellent analysis of the roles of the sonnel Selection in Reagan's First Year," pp. White House staff and the cabinet, see: Brad 16, 20. See also Lou Cannon, "Appointments Patterson, The President's Cabinet: Issues and by White House Take Right Turn," Washing Questions (Washington: American Society for ton Post (June 18, 1981), pp. 1, 12, 13; Hed Public Administration, 1976), see also "Com rick Smith, "Conservatives Cite Gains in Top ments Presented at the Panel on White House Posts," New York Times (March 8, 1981), p. Staff/Cabinet Relationships," American Po 24; and Howell Raines, "White House Head York Times litical Science Association Convention, Sep hunter Feels the Heat," New (May E3. tember 1981, New York City. See also Bradley 3, 1981), p. D. Nash, with Milton S. Eisenhower, R. Gor 61. See MacKenzie, "Cabinet and Subcabinet Per don Hoxie, and William C. Spragens, Organiz sonnel Selection," p. 19. ing and Staffing the Presidency (New York: 62. Quoted by James Reston, "Reagan's Recruit Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1980). ing Philosophy," New York Times (November 48. Comments made at panel on the Presidency, 12, 1980). American Political Science Association Con 63. Quoted by James M. Perry, "Top Jobs Still vention, September 1981, New York City. See Vacant in Federal Agencies As Nominations also Witness to Power (New York: Simon and Lag," Wall Street Journal (March 13, 1981). Schuster, 1982), Chapter 7. 64. See Lou Cannon, "Reagan's Appointments 49. See Joseph Califano, Governing America 'Mess' Decried," Washington Post (March 1, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1981), pp. 1981); Philip Geyelin, "One-Man Wrecking 16-17. For an insightful and thorough treat Crew," Washington Post (April 14, 1981); a ment of presidential personnel recruitment op Dick Kirschten, "You Say You Want Sub erations and the role of the Senate in confirma Cabinet Post? Clear it with Marty, Dick, Lyn tions, see Calvin MacKenzie, The Politics of and Fred," National Journal (April 4, 1981), Presidential Appointments (New York: The p. 564; James M. Perry, "Top Jobs Still Va Free Press, 1981). cant in Federal Agencies As Nominations 50. Richard P. Nathan, The Plot That Failed (New Lag," Wall Street Journal (April 13, 1981); York: Wiley, 1975), p. 50. Howell Raines, "White House Headhunter 51. See Dick "Wanted: 275 Feels the Heat," New York Times (May 3, Kirschten, Reagan ' * on Team Players; Empire Builders Need Not Ap 1981); Time Magazine Molasses Pace Ap 19. ply," National Journal (December 6, 1980), pointments," (May 11, 1981), p. M. Jobs Still pp. 2077-79. See Hoxie, "Staffing the Ford 65. Quoted in James Perry, "Top and Carter Presidencies," in Nash, Organizing Vacant," Wall Street Journal (April 13, 1981); but cf. J. Jackson "The Ethics in and Staffing, pp. 72-75. Walker, Government Conflict of Interest Laws 52. Pendleton James quoted by Lou Cannon, Act, and Presidential Public Adminis "Appointments by White House Take Right Recruiting," trative Review Turn," Washington Post (June 18, 1981), pp. (November/December 1981), 1, 12, 13. The Center for the Study of the Pr?s pp. 659-665. THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 645

66. See diagram in MacKenzie, "Cabinet and 84. For a bibliography of GAO reports on freezes, Subcabinet Personnel Selection," 1981 APSA ceilings and personnel reductions, see: "Fed paper; Kirschten, "You Say You Want a Sub eral Work Force Planning: Time for Renewed Cabinet Post?," National Journal (April 4, Emphasis," FPCD-81-4, (December 30, 1981), pp. 564-567; and Dun's Review, "Staff 1980), pp. 46-49. ing the Reagan Administration," (May 1981), 85. "Recent Government-Wide Hiring Freezes p. 91. Prove Ineffective in Managing Federal Em 67. See Raines, "White House Headhunter Feels ployment," FPCD-82-21 (March 10, 1982). the Heat," New York Times (May 3,1981); see 86. For an analysis of the tradeoffs involved in two also Christopher T. Cross, "If the White choosing between these methods of per House Calls to Offer a Top Job, Hang Up," sonnel reductions, see: James P. Pfiffner, the Tax Washington Post (late February or early "Inflexible Budgets, Fiscal Stress, and March, 1981). Revolt," in The Municipal Money Chase 68. See Perry, "Top Jobs Still Vacant," Wall (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983). Street Journal (April 13, 1981). 87. Congressional Quarterly (February 21, 1981), 69. Lou Cannon, "Reagan's Appointments 'Mess' p. 342. Decried," Washington Post (March 1, 1981), 88. See James P. Pfiffner, The President, the Bud p. 1. get, and Congress (Boulder: Westview Press, 70. Kirschten, "You Say You Want a Sub-Cabinet 1979), pp. 116-117. Post?," National journal (April 4, 1981), pp. 89. OMB letter (March 18, 1981), signed "David 564-567. A. Stockman." 71. Time, "Molasses Pace on Appointments," 90. See Dwight Ink, "Agency Shutdown: The Ulti (May 11, 1981), p. 19. mate Challenge," PA Times (December 15, 72. 5 CFR Part 213. 1981), p. 3. 73. Federal Register, Vol. 46 No. 115 (June 16, 91. For a more complete statement of this argu 1981), p. 31405. ment, see James P. Pfiffner, "The Challenge 74. William Safire, "Of Meese and Men," New of Federal Management in the 1980s," Public York Times (February 2, 1981). Administration Quarterly (forthcoming). 75. Richard E. Neustadt, "Do What to the Bu 92. For a discussion of professionalism in very try see: reaucracy," Washington Post (November 10, ing circumstances, Dwight Ink, "Agency 1980). Shutdown," PA Times (December 15, 1981), 3. 76. See Garry Wills, The Kennedy Imprisonment p. "Effects of the Presidential Transi (Boston: Atlantic/Little Brown, 1982). 93. See GAO, 77. Richard Nathan, The Plot That Failed (New tion On the Senior Executive Service," see also Merit York: Wiley, 1975), p. 8, see also pp. 82-84. FPCD-82-29 (March 23, 1982); 78. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive De Service Protection Board, "An MSPB Special on the partments and Agencies, Subject: Hiring Study SES," (April 2, 1981). more of this issue Freeze, The White House, (January 20, 1981), 94. For a complete discussion see: of Federal Man signed "Ronald Reagan." Federal civilian em Pfiffner, "The Challenge Administration ployment had decreased from 2.94 million in agement in the 1980s," Public 1970 to 2.82 million in 1980. As a percentage Quarterly (forthcoming). be of total employment it dropped from a high of 95. For a classic treatment of the relationship career execu 3.8 percent in 1968 to 2.8 percent in 1981 and tween political appointees and relative to the U.S. population it dropped from tives, see: Hugh Heclo, A Government of 16.3 federal employees per 1000 in 1952 to 12.7 Strangers (Washington: Brookings, 1977). Fiscal per 1000 in 1980. (OMB, U.S. Budget: Special 96. See Pfiffner, "Inflexible Budgets, Analyses FY1982, pp. 286-288.) Stress, and the Tax Revolt," inManaging Mu 79. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, nicipal Money, edited by Alberta Sbragia "Fact Sheet: Hiring Freeze," (January 20, (Boulder: Westview, forthcoming). 1981). Total compensation and benefits com 97. Ibid. "The of Federal Man promise about $57 billion of a total budget of 98. See Pfiffner, Challenge about $700 billion. agement in the 1980s," Public Administration 80. Quoted by Laura A. Kiernan, "Job Freeze by Quarterly (forthcoming). 99. See James P. The President Reagan Is Upheld," Washington Post (Febru Pfiffner, editor, ISHI ary 26, 1981). and Economic Policy (Philadelphia: 81. Office of Management and Budget, Memoran Publications, forthcoming). "A in dum for Heads of Executive Departments and 100. See Elizabeth Drew, Reporter Washing The New Yorker Agencies, Subject: Federal Civilian Hiring ton," (June 8, 1981), p. 141; see also et al. Na Freeze (January 29, 1981). Joseph Pechman, Setting tional Priorities: The 1982 82. Ibid., parentheses in original. Budget (Washing ton: 83. "When a Good Symbol Is a Bad Policy," Brookings, 1981). Washington Star (January 27, 1981).