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WPM) Reemerged from the Secluded Spaces It Had Been Festering in for the Last 25 Years (Heim 2017; Lyons 2018; Mcauliffe 2019)

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WPM) Reemerged from the Secluded Spaces It Had Been Festering in for the Last 25 Years (Heim 2017; Lyons 2018; Mcauliffe 2019) INTRODUCTION Blood and soil. Jews will not replace us. White lives matter. Charlottesville Marchers (VICE, 2017) We talk to these young people, we give them literature . they go and they start their own white youth gangs to counter the terrorism of the black youth gangs. Skinheads USA (Keane, 1993) At 8:45 p.m. on Friday, August 11, 2017, in Charlottesville, Virginia, America’s white power movement (WPM) reemerged from the secluded spaces it had been festering in for the last 25 years (Heim 2017; Lyons 2018; McAuliffe 2019). Over the next few days, the level of vitriol, along with barefaced far- right messaging expressed by the alt- right (short for alternative right) shocked people around the world. The images of bellowing white males brandishing flaming tiki torches harkened back to a history of Ku Klux Klan (KKK) rallies (see Chalmers 1987; L. Gordon 2018; Wade 1998), while violent clashes with counterprotesters and by- standers seemed aggressively new (First Vigil 2019; McAuliffe 2019; PBS 2018a; VICE 2017). It was at this moment that the WPM blipped back onto the radar of mainstream America, creating a turning point in US history. For many, the anti- Semitism, xenophobia, and racist rhetoric combined with youthful adoption of neo- Nazi, neo- Confederate, and far- right imagery was horrifying, given the belief that this sort of blatant white supremacy had dissipated in our “post-racial” society (see Anderson 2016; Bhopal 2018; Bonilla- Silva 2015; Walton 2018; Ward 2018; Wise 2010). The fact that youth were now adopting these alt-right desig- nations was all the more disturbing. Law enforcement, policy makers, and the general public continue to be stumped trying to understand why youth are joining these groups and how to deal with them (see Reitman 2018). Yet, for those who investigate the far right, the Charlottesville protest was simply the visible face of a movement that has never disappeared (Belew 2018; Daniels 2018; Futrell & Simi 2017; Lyons 2018; Neiwert 2017). Additionally, for those who study street gangs, such alt- right youth groups and the violence they participate in are not surprising (Reid & Valasik 2018; Simi 2006, 2009; Simi, Smith & Reeser 2008; Valasik & 1 2 INTRODUCTION Reid 2018a, 2019). In fact, gang researchers, in particular, are uniquely situated to help demystify these groups. As such, the purpose of Alt- Right Gangs is twofold. First, we wish to provide a timely and necessary discussion of present- day youth- oriented groups in the WPM, which we refer to in this text as alt-right gangs, and how they need to be integrated into the current paradigm of street gang research. The goal is to provide researchers, students (graduate and undergraduate), law enforcement officials, and policy makers with knowledge aimed at understanding and, hopefully, combating membership in these groups. Second, this book pro- vides a pathway to guide future research in studying these alt- right groups and their members. Alt- Right Gangs is the first book to conceptualize alt- right youth groups and situate their appearance across a broad array of academic literature. The interdisciplinary nature of this book synthesizes research from criminology, sociology, communication studies, social movements, political science, history, cultural studies, religious studies, media and information, and computer science to underscore the need to take alt-right gangs seriously and not dismiss them as just a youthful phase or subculture (e.g., Hamm 1993). While the book is aimed at discussing the intersection of conventional street gangs and alt- right gangs, there remains a great deal of research to be done to fully understand the overlap between these groups, especially in terms of how gang prevention, intervention, and suppression programs and policies apply to these youth. The current understanding of alt-right gangs has been greatly hindered by historical decisions about who is and is not considered to be a gang mem- ber. For over three decades, gang scholars have explicitly disregarded white youth who are active in overt white power groups (e.g., neo- Nazis, racist skinheads, and white separatists) or influenced by implicit white power ideologies (e.g., Christian Identity, Creativity, manosphere, and the patriot movement). This resistance to acknowledging or discussing alt- right gangs in such foundational and accessible texts has only aggravated our lack of knowledge (e.g., Curry, Decker & Pyrooz 2014; Hamm 1993; Klein 1995). As a new wave of culture wars and identity politics continues to inundate the United States and Europe, scholars and policy makers have grown concerned over the radicalization of youth, both domestically and internationally (Dandurand 2015; Decker & Pyrooz 2011, 2015a; Pyrooz, La Free, Decker & James 2018; Valasik & Phillips 2017, 2018). The “alt-right,” a term coined, arguably, in 2008 by Rich- ard Spencer, a white supremacist, consists of young, white identitists who present themselves as a leaderless, loosely organized “fun movement, one using Internet jargon familiar to tech- savvy millennials” and who are striving to redefine the American political landscape (Hawley 2017: 20). “Free speech” demonstrations by white supremacists in cities that are seen as liberal bastions, such as Charlottes- ville, Virginia; Berkeley, California; and Portland, Oregon (see figure I.1), have resulted in hate/bias- related crimes, violence, and even murder (First Vigil 2019; INTRODUCTION 3 Figure i.1. Proud Boys among others in the far right protesting at a “free speech” rally (photo by David Neiwert). McAuliffe 2019; Stern 2019; VICE 2017) (see chapter 7). Despite the desire to treat alt- right groups as nothing more than atypical or radical youth, a substantial sub- set of alt-righters, such as racist skinheads, are also involved in delinquent, street- oriented youth groups (Woods 2017). It is these youth and their groups—alt- right gangs—that this book endeavors to understand. WHAT IS A STREET GANG? After nearly one hundred years of research examining street gangs, a universal definition for what constitutes a gang, who is considered to be a gang member, and what constitutes a gang-related incident still eludes researchers, law enforce- ment agencies, and policy makers (see Curry 2015). Howell and Griffiths (2018: 51) highlight just how challenging it has been to attempt to reach a consensus between scholars and criminal justice practitioners, with “no other deviant group [being] shrouded in more mythic and misleading attributes than gangs.” This lack of agreement in defining gangs, gang members, and gang-related crimes has often meant the explicit exclusion of white power groups in both street gang research and law enforcement’s gang databases, or at best a mere implicit acknowledgment of them (Brosseau 2016; Flores 2017; Howell 2015; Howle 2016; Reid & Valasik 4 INTRODUCTION 2018; Simi 2006; Simi et al. 2008). As such, it is important to recognize the varia- tions that exist in defining street gangs, paying particular attention to the similar- ities and differences of these descriptions. The earliest studies examining gangs were based on school surveys of youth. Sheldon (1898: 428) describes fighting gangs as “predatory organizations” and “the typical association of small boys.” The common age for youth in these predatory gangs was between 10 and 13. Puffer (1912) suggested that beyond the family and the neighborhood, the gang (i.e., the play group) is one of youth’s three primary social groups. Puffer (1912) argues that youth’s instinctive tendency to group themselves, combined with a lack of parental supervision, explains the existence of gangs. Puffer’s (1912) typical gang had a distinct name and included youth between the ages of 10 and 16, who gathered together daily in a claimed area, participated in initiation rituals, engaged in delinquent/criminal activities, and were likely to have a designated leader. According to Puffer a gang was a “social organism . with a life of its own which is beyond the lives of its members” (1912: 38), not only instilling antisocial behaviors in its members, but possibly also encouraging and reinforcing prosocial behaviors. Thrasher’s (1927) seminal work on street gangs was so thorough and detailed that it took half a century before gang researchers again raised definitional issues. Thrasher, known as the father of gang research, defined a gang as “an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously and then integrated through conflict. It is characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict and planning. The result of this col- lective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory” (1927: 57). Other renowned gang scholars have subsequently built upon Thrasher’s definition, competing to better describe the social phenomenon and failing to reach accord (see Howell & Griffiths 2018 for an in-depth discussion). Regardless of the definition embraced by gang researchers, a level of variability exists in the characteristics required for a group to be considered a street gang. This intense focus on attempting to decipher specific features that transform a group into a street gang has greatly contributed to gang researchers’ inability to achieve a universal definition of a gang. Yet, as Papachristos (2005: 644) points out, “Such distinctions mean little to the cop on the street, the victim
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