ISSUE 2 - 2014 Q UARTERLY
YEAR XII ISSUE 1I 2014
CeMiSS Quarterly is a review supervised by CeMiSS director, Major General Nicola Gelao. It provides a forum to promote the knowledge and understanding of international security affairs, military strategy and other topics of significant interest. The opinions and conclusions expressed in the articles are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Italian Ministry of Defence.
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
Syrian foreign fighters and the Balkans A new challenge for political Islamism in South Eastern Europe Paolo Quercia 5
LATIN AMERICA
Latin America: a deadly pandemic Alessandro Politi 11
MIDDLE EAST - PERSIAN GULF
The Sunni front and the Iraqi crisis Nicola Pedde 19
AFRICA
The fourth EU-Africa Summit Marco Massoni 25
CHINA
The end of the Third Plenum's reformist wave? Nunziante Mastrolia 33
INDIA
Introducing Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the new India he wants to shape Claudia Astarita 39 EUROPEAN DEFENCE INITIATIVES
A new deal for European Defence Industry Claudio Catalano 45
PACIFIC (JAPAN-KOREA - ASEAN COUNTRIES - AUSTRALIA
The new “drone war” in the Korean skies Stefano Felician Beccari 51
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CENTRAL ASIA COOPERATION
The crisis in Ukraine: crystallization and possible new scenarios Lorena Di Placido 57
NATO -TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
China’s Nuclear Weapons: The American view Lucio Martino 63
FOCUS
Lebanon and Afghanistan: strategic operational theatres Claudio Bertolotti 69
QUARTERLY
Military Center for Strategic Studies Department of International Relations Palazzo Salviati Piazza della Rovere, 83 00165 – ROME - ITALY tel. 00 39 06 4691 3204 fax 00 39 06 6879779 e-mail [email protected] Year XII N° II - 2014
South Eastern Europe
Syrian foreign fighters and the Balkans A new challenge for political Islamism in South Eastern Europe
Paolo Quercia
Several countries in the Western Balkans have recently increased their measures to prevent the re- turn home of jihadist fighters from Syria. Starting from the summer 2013, numerous European governments and security agencies have increased the level of attention to this phenomenon, after the number of returnees from the Syrian conflict started picking up. The alarm demonstrated its deadly relevance when, on May 24th, a French citizen, who was a former Syrian jihadist, assaulted a Jewish museum in Bruxelles. The return of jihadists from the Syrian battlefield in the first se- mester of 2014 has been facilitated by the military success of the government forces and – at the same time – by the growing infra-conflictuality between anti-Assad militias and especially between the Western sponsored militias part of the Free Syrian Army network and ISIS, the group that hosts the highest number of foreign fighters. The reduction in the strategic ambitions of the FSA and of its possibility for success in the medium-term has also reduced the inflow of fighters from Western countries to Syria, especially the part of it that has happened under the scrutiny and facilitation of the Turkish and other Western security agencies. A great number of Euro-Mediterranean countries is considering the return of Syrian jihadist fighters as one of the most dangerous emerging threats to national security. This is confirmed by the fact that a growing number of countries are intro- ducing new laws, or other administrative measures, to discourage or impede their nationals to re- turn home after having spent a fighting period in Syria. Turkey, for the strategic role of hub and entry point for the war in Syria played in the last years, is probably the country that could be mostly concerned with the attempts of other States to regulate and redirect the incoming flux of Syrian fighters veterans. A widespread policy of non-acceptance of jihadist returnees in Europe and in the Middle-East will de facto result in their permanence in Syria/Iraq, or in a concentration of hun- dreds or thousand of former fighters in neighbouring Turkey. The security authorities of Morocco, for example, started some months ago to practice a policy of arrest of the jihadists returning from Syria, with the not so hidden intent to discourage and obstruct the home return of Morocco national jihadist. In February 2014, Saudi Arabia has included ISIS and al-Nusra in the list of terrorist or- ganisations. The King’s decree granted a minimal “amnesty” period of 15 days to all its citizens to return to Saudi Arabia. Since March 2014, any Saudi Arabian citizen who joins abroad a listed terrorist organisation to fight in its rank in a foreign conflict commits a crime punishable with up to 20 years of jail. Similar steps have been undertaken by Kuwait and by the United Arab Emirates. Naturally, the fact that a significant number of countries adopted (or are going to adopt) such leg- islations, it doesn’t imply that an efficient counter-jihadist architecture has been put in place at in-
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ternational judicial level. In fact, the crucial aspect remains the different naming of the groups that each country decides to enlist, according to its political preferences and national security necessi- ties. Saudi Arabia – for example – named ISIS, al-Nusra and the same Muslim Brotherhood among the terrorist organisation. The recent measures introduced by some Muslim and European States have de facto activated a complex and ambiguous strategic “game” aimed at reducing, controlling or diverting the flux of jihadist returnees. Handling this phenomenon in a global-jihad context is one of the most complex issue for the homeland security management. Usually there are different counter-terrorist approaches to curb international jihadism and its return-flows: fighting prose- lytism and recruiting networks at home, facilitating its delocalisation abroad, preventing its repa- triation from jihad areas. These approaches are usually blended together in very specific strategies, which may differ according to nature, size and origin of the jihadist phenomenon, interchanging the prevention tools with the de-radicalisation ones. In this context, South Eastern Europe assumes a very peculiar role, not only for the bonding function performed by Turkey between the Balkans and the Middle East, but also for a growing direct involvement of Balkan Islam into Syrian conflict. In recent months, a number of Western Balkans countries have been adopting or discussing counter-jihadist measures, specifically tailored to prevent the return of foreign fighters from Syria.
The role of the Balkan countries in Syrian Jihad. Since 2014, the necessity of criminalising jihadist proselytism has emerged also in the Balkans, where a prevalent political trend seems to encourage the introduction of the “crime of recruitment of foreign fighters”. In April 2014, Bosnia Herzegovina, the country of the region where most of jihadists are coming from, has approved a so called “anti jihad” law, forbidding to every citizen of the country to fight abroad, sanctioning it with 10 years of jail. Kosovo has also approved an anti jihad law, while Serbia is working on a draft law that will criminalise the participation of their citizens to paramilitary activities abroad. Other countries of the region are working on similar ini- tiatives.
In order to better focus the phenomenon, it is important to start from the quantitative data, even if estimates differs significantly and are all based on sources that can not be verified. There is a gen- eral consensus on the fact that there are several thousands of foreign fighters in Syria. One of the most authoritative source is the English institute ICSR, that put up to a maximum of 11.000 the number of foreign jihadists having fought in Syria, while minimum estimates start from no less than 4.000. Even considering the lowest estimate the number is impressing, compared for example with the estimated 10.000 foreign fighters that are believed having fought in Afghanistan during 10 years of conflict. ICSR considers the Balkans to be the third region of recruitment after Middle East and Western Europe, with as much as 500 jihadists. Considering that it is a relatively low population area, the number of jihadists is a significant one if counted per capita. If these figures will be confirmed, it shouldn’t be inappropriate to talk of a new unprecedented explosion of ji- hadism in the Balkans. Different security agencies of the region have confirmed the magnitude of the phenomenon in Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro. A more accurate indicator is given by the number of identified jihadists from the Western Balkans fallen in Syria. This figure is no smaller than 18, almost equally divided between the Slavic speak-
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ing and the Albanian speaking population. Bosnia Herzegovina is the country with the highest number of death fighters, followed by Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro. The last jihadist fallen in Syria coming from the former Jugoslav area has been Midhat Đono, Bosnian citizen, who died on 2 June 2014, in Northern Syria. He was born in Hadžići, a village close to Sarajevo. He is the 7th Bosnian citizen died while fighting in Syria. In march 2014 Ferid Tatarević, from Zenica, who had a past fighting history with the El Mudhaeidin brigade during the Bosnian war was killed. Previously other BiH citizens were reported death in Syria: Derviš Halilović from Nemila, Senad Kobaš from Travnik, Emedin Velić from Sarajevo and Muaz Šabić, Mirza Ganić from Zenica. Another area of former Yugoslavia that revealed to be a breeding ground for jihadism is the Muslim inhabited parts of Serbia, Sandjack and Presevo. Eldar Kundaković from Novi Pazar, Rasim Zeqiri and Muaz Ahmeti from Presevo and the Montenegrin Adis Salihović from Rožaja were also reported having found death while fighting in Syria. Two dead were Kosovo citizens, Naman Damolli from Priština and Muhamet Koprova from Mitrovica. At least two are the Albanian citizens died in Syria, Halit Maliqaj from Tirana and Ermal Xhelo from Valona. Small Macedonia accounts for three dead: two from the capital Skopje, Nimetullah Imeri and Sami Abdullahu and one from Gostivar, Rasim Zeqiri. These figures should be increased if we consider the Balkan sec- ond generation diaspora naturalised in Europe and that left for Syria from their new countries. Like Egzon Avdyli, Norwegian citizen of Albanian origin who died in Syria while fighting with ISIS or Blerim Heta, a German born kosovo Albanian who returned to Urosevac before becaming the first Balkan suicide bomber, blowing himself up in Baghdad on 25th March 2014.
Why Balkan Islam is radicalising now? Potential catalysts factors The first question is why Balkan Islam is entering only now the 30 years long history of global ji- hadism? Why citizens from the region started participating in conflicts abroad in a relevant number only from the year 2012/2013? Why the Syrian conflict has represented an attracting factor stronger than any other conflict occurred in the last two decades? Answers to these important questions could be attempted only after extensive in depth research, but some considerations and analytical thoughts can be tried also in this context. First of all, it is clear that the Syrian conflict has activated the Islamic community in the Balkan region as never happened before. The Syrian conflict, ex- ported and internationalised to South Eastern Europe by the Turkish and western proximity to the anti-Assad faction, has further transformed the political Islam of the Balkans advancing the global jihad narrative versus the nationalist and self-determination one. Balkan Islam has always been considered sheltered from fundamentalism due to its mostly secular identity, even during the nineties when it was exposed to the influx of foreign jihadists and al-Qaeda affiliates. The political and military success of Bosnian and Kosovo Muslims in achieving their secular goals and creating a national statehood, appeared to many to be a sufficient antidote against pan-Islamic extremism and jihadist radicalisation. In the nineties, during the war in Yugoslavia, the religious dimension of the conflict remained mostly subjected to the etno-nationalist and territorial nature of the war, frustrating the external attempts to transform it in a stage of a greater internationalised global war. In a different international and political context, the Syrian conflict appears to have succeeded in making its way into a changed and internally instable society, more open to the transformative ef- fects of the external interferences.
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One of the factors that has played a role in this transformation may have been the growing disap- pointment with many state-building projects supposed to be a geopolitical alternative to former Yugoslavia. Almost all of these state-building efforts have faced severe difficulties and are met with growing disappointment and frustration by its citizens. The low governance capacity that af- flicts the region is evident in the negative standards for corruption, organised crime, poverty, un- employment and emigration. The saturation of the main European emigration routes, especially visible after 2008, and a growing tendency towards expelling immigrants with criminal records, has contributed to worsen the situation of great economic depression that has struck the region since 2008. Kosovo is a case in point. Independence, if it brought sovereignty and statehood, it did not bring prosperity and very little development, even with massive help and support from the international community. It remains the country with the lowest European living standards, with half of the population living in poverty and at least 10 % in extreme poverty, and youth unem- ployment of more than 50%. A similar worrying situation, although slightly better, can be found in Albania and Macedonia. It is not surprisingly that the Albanian speaking area of Western Balkans represents, probably, the part of the region most receptive to the Islamist radicalisation processes. It should not be forgotten that the new generations of those born in the nineties are mostly interested by radicalisation and exposed to its ideological proselytism, even though they didn’t have a direct role in the conflict of dissolution of Jugoslavia nor they have been fighting for it. These are the disillusioned generations of the Balkans, those who should have benefit from the new geopolitical context their fathers have been fighting for. Blerim Heta, for example, the mentioned first Kosovar suicide bomber, celebrated its 18th birthday in 2008, the same year when Kosovo was, finally, granted its independence. As it may be Heta’s case, it appears that a significant part of the jihadist radicalisation of the Balkan Muslim involved in the Syrian conflict, it is hardly connected with the Yugoslavian conflict, and more with those post war generations, grown up in between Europe’s diaspora and their Balkan homeland. The European diaspora represents a very specific environ- ment, a bridge between the old nationalistic radicalisation of the war time in the Balkans and the new second generation global-jihad as it developed and evolved after 9/11. No explanation could otherwise be possible to explain mysterious cases like the one of Samra Kesinovic and Sabina Se- limovic, the two Bosnian teenagers who abandoned their families in Wien and disappeared, pre- tending in their social network web pages, to have joined the Syrian jihadists.
A confirmation of this growing trend of islamisation in the Balkans, may be found in other emerg- ing signs of recent radicalisation. In Kosovo, it could be the case of the appearance of a new Is- lamist protest movement called Bashkohu (Levizja Islame “Bashkohu” – LISBA), that claims a stronger role for Islam in the public life. The only existence of an active islamist political movement in Kosovo is already a sign of the transformation of its society. This group, in the coming years, it may follow a developmental process similar to that of the nationalist protest movement Veteven- dosje!, but operating from an Islamist and not an ethnic platform.
Syria Balkan foreign fighters are the first sign of the fact that a new transformation of the Balkan Islam is underway, apparently as consequence of an incomplete and problematic transition from
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communism. Today, Balkan Islam appears to be exposed to a new phase of political and religious activism, challenging the nationalist narratives that have prevailed in the nineties. Of course, it is too early to say that we are witnessing the feared global radicalisation dimension of Balkan Islam, but the unexpected flow of jihadist fighters to Syria from Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedo- nia, Albania shouldn’t be underestimated.
Conclusions Several have been the vectors that have increased the exposure of the Balkans to the Syrian conflict and that have contributed to produce the “entry” of the Balkan political Islam into the global processes of radicalisation and jihadism, outside South Eastern Europe and far behind the “tradi- tional” territorial and nationalist agenda we were used to. Among them we believe that should be mentioned:
a. The impact and interactions of the Balkan diaspora with other Muslim communities living in Western Europe, that brought also to a direct discovery of the phenomenon of radicalisation in Europe and its narratives in time of peace and inside pluralist and dem- ocratic societies;
b. The outbreak of the Arab spring and its digitally internationalised dimension, based especially on the diffusion of radicalisation narratives “user to user”, without or with min- imal intermediation;
c. The weak statehood and economic depression of the Balkan States, further aggravated by the effects of 2008 economic crises, that has interrupted most of the financial and in- vestment connections with Europe;
d. The long term effect of the orthodox and ultra conservative forms of Islam that sneaked into the Balkans during and after the Yugoslav war and that have poured im- portant resources into proselytism and social welfare for many years.
e. The growing geopolitical role played by Turkey as a cultural and physical bridge be- tween the Balkans and the Middle East, its crescent de-secularisation and pan-islamism, its increasing regional soft power and its decision to reset the region geo-political balance, especially by supporting regime change in Syria, also with the use of hard power instru- ments;
f. The specific character of the Syrian civil war, the extremely high number of foreign fighters and its geographic proximity to the Balkan region.
The maturation and interconnection of these different elements in the last decade it may partially explain why and how the Syrian conflict has entered into the radar of Balkan political Islam, while other conflict did not produce similar outcomes. The legitimacy of the Syrian jihad for a part of
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the Western Balkans Islamic communities remains an issue that should be carefully studied in order to better understand the evolutionary process of the region. What must be considered a po- litical phenomenon worth of international attention is that even for a peripheral and apparently marginal region like the Balkans, isolation from the global world is something difficult or impos- sible to achieve. The concept of a secular Balkan Islam impervious to radicalisation may not be any more adapt to outline the growing complexity of the religious identity of the region and the tendencies toward a further segmentation of the Muslim communities, crossing-over the territorial and ethnical borders of its identity toward a more pan-islamic vision. This process is mostly hap- pening inside post-war generations of Western Balkans Muslim, especially among the European diaspora’s second generations.
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Latin America
Latin America: a deadly pandemic
Alessandro Politi
The Americas, especially the Caribbean and Latin America, are affected by what we can call a murder pandemic. The overall murder rate is 16,3 per 100.000 inhabitants, compared to 12,5 in Africa, 3,0 in Europe and Oceania and 2,9 in Asia. The global average is of 6,2, while Italy for instance has a murder rate of 0,85. In this region also the mortality rates for men and women are high; particularly vulnerable are the ages between zero and 30 years. In 66% of cases, the victims die after attacks with firearms, an abnormal average compared to the rest of the world (41%). In order to reduce the rates and to achieve a comprehensive solution for this problem there are three synergetic policies: strengthening the state structures, rebuilding the social fabric and a strong control on the ownership, trade and smuggling of arms. A serious initiative regarding light arms control in the United States would have tangible effects in many countries of Central America, al- though probably not decisive ones. The political cost of introducing such measures could be less challenging than commonly thought because the US light arms lobby is slowly losing its advantage in opinion polls, allowing congressmen to choose principled positions.
Dangerous towns and UN resolutions The UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution presented by Ecuador and Peru in favour of universal standards regarding controls on the purchase, possession and use of weapons by civilians. The resolution was approved by 44 yes in the 47 member-states body. The United Arab Emirates, the Republic of Macedonia and the United States abstained, and raised objections on the council’s jurisdiction on the issue. The US case is characterised by a second amendment to the Constitution that guarantees citizens the freedom to arm themselves; a freedom that is construed as an individual right, according to debatable legal interpretations. Nevertheless, the resolution calls upon the fundamental right to security regarding hundreds of thousands of people (almost 180.00 according to UN estimates) that are threatened worldwide by the misuse of firearms, including a considerable number of women. The purpose of the resolution is to prevent firearms from falling into the wrong hands. The reason why precisely two Latin American states have raised the topic is related to their direct experience in terms of social violence and to the harrowing UN statistics vis-à-vis the subcontinent. In a ranking of the 10 most violent capitals in the world, eight belong to the region of Latin America and the Caribbean. The ranking is presented as follows (UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2014
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Latin America on 2012 data, when available):
1. Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis (homicide rate: 131,6 in 2011, resulting from the figure of 17 deaths); 2. Caracas, Venezuela (homicide rate: 122 per 100.000 inhabitants in 2009); 3. Guatemala City, Guatemala (homicide rate: 116,6 in 2010); 4. Belize City, Belize (homicide rate: 105,1 in 2011); 5. Tegucigalpa, Honduras (homicide rate: 102,2 in 2011).
With double-digit rates follow: Maseru, Cape Town, Panama City (53,1 in 2012), San Salvador (52,5 in 2012) and Kingston (50,3 in 2011). 1 The capitals’ picture is, however, rather misleading, primarily because it does not show the country as a whole and then because capitals are typically much more controlled than other cities. One should also keep in mind data discrepancies as shown by the following table, published by Mexican sources. Figures of the top ten cities are in bold. Table 1. Ranking of Latin American cities by homicide rate in 2012
source: Seguridad Justicia y Paz, Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Publica y Justicia Penal A.C. (CCSPJ), San Pedro Sula otra vez primer lugar mundial; Acapulco, el segundo, 07/02/2013; http://www.se- guridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/biblioteca/view.download/5/163 (1/7/2014). 2
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One can see that there are some more or less important discrepancies with regards to Caracas, Guatemala City (116,6 UNODC versus 67,36 CCSPJ), Belize City (which is just not included in the Mexican ranking), Tegucigalpa (a minor mismatch, but including the whole capital district), El Salvador (present in the CCPJ data only at the 44th place with a 32,48 murder rate against the 52,5 of UNODC data), Kingston (ditto at the 25th place with 48,48 against 50,3 UNODC ). Similar deviations are unfortunately difficult to eliminate on the one hand because errors can happen in counting the events, in organizing national data and in the frequency of surveys; on the other hand the authors of these reports recognise and correct them each year. But, despite small deviations, both UN and Mexican NGO data converge on the dominance of Latin America in murder statistics, both regarding the most dangerous cities in the world (Mexican and UN data) and at worldwide level (UN). In fact, the global homicide rate is 6,2, but Central America has an average rate of 24 and South America is in the 16,00-23,00 range. In addition to this, if one considers the global male population in the 15-39 years age range, 42% of the deaths is concentrated in the Americas (i.e. 15% of the 35% of global casualties of this category). In other words, these casualties in South and Central America are four times more numerous compared to the rest of the world. The countries that have the unenviable distinction of having double-digit murder rates are: Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Jamaica, Colombia and Venezuela at the high end; Mexico, Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, Brazil in the middle range; Nicaragua, Panama, Guyana, French Guiana, Ecuador and Bolivia in the low end. The following map shows clearly the problem in global terms.
Map 1. Homicide rates by country (2012 data or latest year available)
Source: UNODC, op. cit..
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Latin America
If one focusses on the subnational level (shown in the following map), the distribution of homicides in the most problematic and important states follows a rather precise geography and causality. In Guatemala, Belize, Honduras and El Salvador the deadliest zones match those of the Pan-American the drug transportation conduits and the areas where there is a strong infiltration of quasi-mafia gangs (maras), structured organized criminal groups or paramilitary groups that switched to com- mon crime after the long civil wars in Central America. A typical case of the region is Guatemala where the main actors of organized crime are the local offshoots of the Salvadoran maras Barrio 18 (M-18) and Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13), the Guatemalan branches of the Mexican Zetas and Sinaloa cartels, the traditional smuggling families of the Lorenzanas, Mendozas and Leon, a good number of so-called private security companies and the remnants of the CIACS (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad, Illegal Security Forces and Clandestine Security Organizations).3 Much less known, despite tragic statistics, is Honduras, a country that has been historically a drug transporting bridge between Colombia and Mexico since the ’70s of the past century. Main criminal actors are on the one hand the maras MS-13 and B-18, responsible for most of the violence affect- ing the country and on the other the transportistas (drug transporting smugglers) los Cachiros, los Valles, Chepe Handal connected with local agents of the Mexican drug cartels Sinaloa and Zetas. Just six out of 17 regions in the country do not show significant signs of violence (75% of homi- cides is concentrated in 30 municipalities). The departments with the highest murder rate are: Chiquimula, Esquintla, Zacapa, Santa Rosa, Itzabal, Jalapa, Guatemala and Petén, most of them bordering Salvador and/or Honduras or Belize and/or Mexico (Itzabal and Petén). Interestingly enough, these are also the areas where the density of indigenous population is lowest, suggesting that a Latino gun-and-honour culture contributes to more homicides in conjunction with a weak and corrupted state apparatus. Also regarding Jamaica, deaths are concentrated in few places (including Kingston, Montego Bay, Spanish Town), precisely where mafia gangs (posse), controlling territories and political votes, are strongest. After the arrest of a powerful “don”, mafia murders had fallen by 31%, but the trend is on the rise with a 61% attributable to organized crime. In Colombia the homicide picture shows that the states most affected are those where old mafia cartels (and their successor networks) or the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionary de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Army) narcoguerrillas are traditionally more rooted. Since year 2002 the municipalities with significant coca cultivations display higher murder rates compared to municipalities without these crops with difference of almost 40% , strongly emerging by year 2008. The hope of reducing murder rates lies with the ongoing two-speed peace negotiations with FARC first and ELN later. Lastly, concerning the high-end countries, the areas of Venezuela that are most affected by the scourge of intentional homicides are on the one hand near the border with Colombia (affected by cocaine trafficking, often protected by the very military units that should suppress it), on the other where there is infiltration by BACRIM (Bandas Criminales, criminal gangs) on the run from Colombia or astride the border and finally where economic and social conditions are particularly bad.4
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Mentioning Brazil, the areas with the highest murder rates correspond to:5 • New internal development centres, founded in the 90s of the last century (attraction of in- vestments, labour and migration, compounded by the shortcomings of state and public security); • Border areas, crossed by smuggling, drugs and weapons flows; • Amazonian deforestation areas (characterised by contemporary slavery, illegal timber felling, extermination of indigenous communities, land grabbing); • Territories of predatory tourism, i.e. those bordering the sea that attract a violent seasonal tourism during weekends; • Zones of traditional violence like in the Pernambuco state of where there are pockets of political patronage.
Map 2. Murder rates at sub-national level in Latin America
Source: UNODC, op. cit..
There are two other important aspects of this sub-continental murder pandemic: the killing methods and the violence against women. The Americas as whole, North and South, have a world record regarding the criminal use of firearms: USA and Canada have only slightly lower percentages
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Latin America compared to their southern partners.
Homicide mechanisms
Source: UNODC, op. cit., Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, Washington DC, 2012 data.
In no other area in the world exists such a large predominance of firearms and one should keep in mind that the global average is 41%. This fact raises an issue about two aspects of crime control: the proliferation of small arms and presence and effectiveness of state control. It is absolutely clear that there are smuggling chains of light weapons, including military-type ones (called in the crim- inal slang “matapolicias”, cop-killers), which run from the United States not only to neighbouring Mexico, but also to almost all countries of Latin America, with the exception of Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina. Other countries involved in arms trafficking belong often to the post-Soviet area, a legacy of the massive supplies to the left-wing guerrillas during the Cold War directly or via Cuba. In the last decades the usual Russian or Ukrainian illegal channels have been replaced by a variety of dealers belonging to NATO countries, that were able to exploit massive assistance shipments to new Balkan states or to Iraqi and Afghan forces. That said in Mexico prevail illegal weapons of US and European design, while widely known Soviet/Russian/license produced AK-47 represent just the 14,6% of all confiscated weapons (Small Arms Survey 2013). Finally one has to consider the homicide rate in relation to the so-called femicides. Considering 2012 data, the homicide rate in the Americas featured a 29,3 for males against 3,7 regarding fe- males, compared to global averages of 9,7 and 2,7 respectively. The American continent is unfor-
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Latin America tunately in first position in the count of murders involving males and females between zero and 14 years. Africa, which ranks second in men’s killings, is world’s first in the rate of female homi- cide with a rate of 6 per 100.000 inhabitants.
The entire American continent and especially Latin America have suffered from much higher homi- cide rates than any other continent, also compared to the world average. It is an essential issue for the human, political and economic growth of the Latin American sub-continent because the high levels of violence tend to hit the youth with a double loss: first human resources are reduced in the short term and then in the medium term the degradation of the development potential and of the total workforce will emerge. The explanation of this state of affairs lies with the insufficient capacities of state organizations and with the social and cultural disintegration caused by ongoing conflicts or by the consequences of protracted civil wars, along with the general negative effects of globalization.
1 The homicide rate in Italy in 2013 was, for instance, 0,85 per 100.000 inhabitants. 2 The source lists the 50 most dangerous cities in the world, but for brevity’s sake, we stopped at the first 20 cities. 3 The CIACS are a sinister legacy of the 36-year long bloody civil war (1960-1996). Since the demobili- sation was carried out with a blanket amnesty, reinforcing a long standing impunity perception, disbanded special units (Kaibiles) and intelligence bodies started setting private criminal enterprises quickly in- volved in political crime and narco-trafficking. Until 2010 they represented a parallel or deep state in the country, today they appear in decline together with most smuggling local groups. PSCs are largely illegal (99%, July 2014 data) and are often linked to CIACS or serve as front companies for TOC. 4 In detail we are talking about the states of: Zulia, Trujillo, Lara, Yaracui, Carabobo, Aragua, Miranda, Sucre, Azoategui, Bolivar, Apuro, Barinas, Tachira. The military conniving with narco-trafficking are known under the denomination “Cartel de los Soles”, derived from the rank symbol (suns instead of the usual stars). 5 States of: Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Paranà, Cearà, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia, Espirito Santo.
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Middle East - Persian Gulf
The Sunni front and the Iraqi crisis
Nicola Pedde
Who’s sharing Sunni’ territory The Iraqi Sunni community is quite heterogeneous – as well as the Shiite – and since the fall of Saddam Hussein there has been a progressive localization of the various groups in the geographical areas where their leaderships are traditionally rooted. This is the result of the stifling role of the Shia’s political administration, but it also reflects the traditional territorial roots of most of the political and confessional groups in the region. The June 2014 crisis highlighted the role of ISIS and its ability to penetrate into the western and central regions of Iraq, although this is actually just one of the many political and social realities of the Sunni’s fabric in the region and in Iraq. The majority of the Sunni forces has found a formula for political and ideological cohesion in the waves of anti-government protests occurred from 2011, sharing the common feeling of hostility toward the central institutions in Baghdad, and in particular towards the oppressive and stifling anti-Sunni politics of Prime Minister al-Maliki. The Army of the Men of the Naghsbandi Order (Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa an-Naqshbandiya - JRTN) is probably today the most important element of organized opposition within the Sunni community. It is decidedly modest the confessional profile of the group, whereas its cohesive element lies in- stead in the doctrine of the Baath Party and the Pan-Arab nationalism. Former general Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri – once one of the leading exponents of the armed forces of the regime of Saddam Hussein – is believed to be the commander of the organization, which is mostly located in the provinces of Nineveh, Salahaddin and Divala, where tribalism can assure further rooting. The JRTN and ISIS have often clashed on Iraqi territory, especially with regard to the administra- tion of justice and the application of the Sharia law, which the group under al-Douri strongly op- pose. The General Military Council of the Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR) has been recently established, and it collects an heterogeneous group of individual activists and organizations. The Council's am- bition is to become the armed wing of the Iraqi Sunni opposition, regrouping the entire ideological spectrum of the protest. Among them, the majority is composed by non-Islamist activists, with a strong tribal identity and only minimally willing to compromise with the sectarian forces, also present in the group, although less relevant. The Council is dominated by a small group of former soldiers of Saddam Hussein’s army, who in- sists on being recognized as an element of an armed non-sectarian and confessional faction, in
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contrast with the excesses of ISIS and in no way subordinates to them. The Council declared to control with its forces the city of Mosul, Fallujah, Salahaddin, Biji and Ramadi, although the effective control of these centres is difficult to assess, being more complex and articulated. The Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), operating since 2003 and led by former members of the armed forces of Saddam Hussein, was characterized since the beginning by a clearly distinct position with respect to the groups of the Baathist and those of confessional inspiration. The IAI’s coagulant force was primarily nationalism, characterized by a strong pragmatism and by an ability to reshape its objectives in accordance to the reality on the ground. No wonder that many of its members, having previously fought tenaciously against the American forces, have then joined organizations funded by the United States (such as the Awakening Councils) used as anti- jihadist. The Awakening Councils have been set up and funded with the direct support of the United States, and composed of representatives of the Sunni tribes. The element of cohesion of the Councils – structured on a plurality of distinct fighters groups, autonomous among them, but connected by a common command line – was the fight against the spread of proselytizing jihadism and Al Qaeda in northern Iraq. The initial project concerned the gradual integration of the forces of the Councils (approximately 100,000 men) within the reconstituted Iraqi national armed forces, with equal dignity in roles, and full integration of the commanding line with that expressed by the Shia majority government. The project of integration, however, has been disrupted by the political inability of al-Maliki and the departure from the country of the U.S. military forces, while further fuelling a growing resent- ment toward the central institutions. Which had been transformed into an open opposition since 2012. The commander of the Councils’ military forces, Ahmed Abu Richa – who has being accused of being a terrorist by the government of al-Maliki in 2014 – opted to side with the government’s forces after the arrival of the ISIS on the Iraqi territory. None of these organizations it actually has a real and predominant Islamic connotation, and for that reason does not agree with the ISIS neither the goals nor the political and religious aims. Nev- ertheless, some of these organizations have seen the impact force of ISIS as a valuable tool for achieving objectives otherwise difficult to reach, accepting its entrance on Iraqi territory. This unlikely marriage of interests then arises from the common need to free the territory from the presence of Baghdad’s government forces, resulting in a political and military project of du- bious resistance and characterized by an highly explosive potential. While Sunni combatant or- ganizations aim at territorial consolidation and the establishment of political and administrative autonomy, ISIS forces are characterized by regional ambitions greatly fuelled by violent sectari- anism. ISIS has arisen from the evolution of some Iraqi jihadist organizations linked to Al Qaeda, and it has always characterized by an high degree of autonomy and independence. Thus, its operational and political programs has been consequently quite distinct from these of the other al-Qaeda in- spired forces, provoking contrasts and direct conflicts within the context of the conflict in Syria. ISIS’s Islamist and jihadist connotation is coupled with deep organizational skills and strong eco-
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nomic capacities, which had transformed in a few years the organization in one of the most ambi- tious and financially solid. With strong regional ties within the Salafi context, but also with a very well defined individual agenda, poorly pluralistic in terms of operational synergies. For these reasons, the divergences among ISIS and the other regional Sunni organizations already emerged during the first phases of the operations on the central-western Iraq, showing the nature and the size of the future problems that will characterize the difficult coexistence of these hetero- geneous armed organizations. With whom ISIS shares almost nothing, if not the immediate ob- jective of defeating the forces under the command of al-Maliki's Shiite government.
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri and the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order The Naqshbandi’s is one of the oldest and most famous Sufi brotherhoods, and intentionally Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri recalled its name to create what today is, without any doubt, one of the most ef- ficient and capable political and military organizations of the Sunni Iraqi context. With a bounty of 10 million dollars pending on his head, and an almost certain death sentence in case of capture, al-Douri had to move with caution in these last eleven years. And if he is still alive today – an issue on which many show scepticism – this is because he can count on the ca- pacity and efficiency of the organization known as the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, or Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa an-Naqshbandiya - JRTN . Born in 1942 in Dawr from a poor family, al-Douri has joined the Ba'ath party when he was very young, rapidly becoming a leading member of the organization a serving for a long time as prin- cipal assistant of Saddam Hussein. Trusted by the Rais – al-Douri never betrayed him – he was compensated with growing positions within the administration of the State, up to the rank of Vice President and Deputy Secretary of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq. Grown intellectually and professionally within the system of the Baath Party, al-Douri has never shown any particular interest or attention or religion, or mysticism, until the fall of the regime. Once entered into hiding, on the contrary, and after taking full control of the JRTN, he changed its attitude giving the organization an aura of mysticism and assuming the role of Sheik himself, in a mixture of religious spirituality, Sufi mysticism and tribal tradition. Although officially active only since 2007, the JRTN has a longer and articulate history. Its exact origin is unknown, but most of the sources collected in Iraq seem to agree that the organization is active since the late Eighties. Originally formed as an organization similar to a modern Masonic fraternity, in its first ten years of life represented the instrument of political and economic power of al-Douri, without having any ideological connotations and by drawing its adherents mainly within the ranks of the officers of the Republican Guard. Membership in the JRTN, at the time of the regime, allowed its members to gain professional and economic benefits, thanks to the large flow of public money used by al-Douri for the consolidation of the organization. Which remained, however, numerically small until the early years of the fol- lowing decade. With the worsening of the international crisis that affected Iraq in 2003, and understanding al- Douri the imminent escalation, the ranks of the JRTN were increased with the arrival of younger elements from the Republican Guard, which soon after had been able to provide the organization
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with an efficient and well-trained fighter component. The JRTN remained virtually inactive until the death of Saddam Hussein in December 2006, when it took action in an attempt to counter the growing role of the political and military Shiite groups, in order to regain part of the territory and reaffirm the role of the Baath Party. With a localisation in the provinces of Nineveh, Salahaddin and Divala, the JRTN has shown an high pragmatism in the past few years of operation, engaging in order to be consistently recognized as an indigenous and non-jihadist force, but at the same time entering into agreements and coop- erating with some of the most infamous Islamist organizations. Which has been delegated in order to carry out the most controversial and less popular actions. But eventually condemned by JRTN itself, and militarily crushed in order to gain population support. And it is with a similar strategy that JRTN has matured the particular - and brief - relationship with ISIS in early 2014. The circumstance that favoured the conditions for a synergy of such a nature was the revolt of the population after the massacres of the Sunni city of Anbar, in the first months of the year, and the following arrival of ISIS’ militants in northern Iraq. Al-Douri, pragmatic and cynical at the same time, had been supportive for the the mass impact of ISIS in the conquest of Mosul, promoting the role of jihadist forces and taking advantage of their military capability also during the occupation of many towns and villages in the central and western regions of the country. Soon after, however, both the JRTN forces and those of the other major jihadi organizations have clearly stated their positions, provoking an atomization process in the capacity of exercising ter- ritorial control. In some cases entering in direct contrast with the jihadist groups, in other operating under a sort of forced coexistence, characterized by a dubious capacity of survival. The goal of the Sunni non-Islamist forces today is to exercise control over its territory, aiming at an autonomist or federalist agreement with the next central government in Baghdad. The objective of the forces of ISIS and other jihadist groups is on the contrary that of consolidating control of the territory, in order to increase the capacity to expand sectarian strife on the regional dimension. Targeting without any doubt in the direction of Jordan and Lebanon. Objectives and political goals in stark contrast to those of Baathists groups, and then doomed to collide in a short period of time in a purely national Sunni perspective. According to the recent history of the JRTN and many other Iraqi fighters organizations, it is then not unlikely that these may define direct agreements with central authorities in Baghdad, provoking an anti-jihadist reversal of the front. But this could happen only if a broader political agreement is made with a wiser government, different from the disastrous one headed by al-Maliki. The strength and the political significance of the Sunni fighters organizations is today greatly in- creased by the presence and the role of the Kurds, whose contribution is at this point impossible to be ignored in an overall political and institutional redefinition of Iraq.
Marching toward Baghdad? Without any doubt, one of the objectives of ISIS is the collapse of the central government in Iraq, and the possibly the conquest of the capital by their own militias. It is however unlikely that this goal could be shared and supported by most of the non-jihadist militias.
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The relationship among ISIS and some of the Sunni fighters’ groups in Iraq is nothing more than a temporary partnership, justified by the short-term objectives of each of the actors involved. Even within the local components historically closer to jihadism – as for example the seven tribes of Anbar – it is not hard to find positions and objectives largely different from those of ISIS. Making the medium and long term framework stability unlikely. At least three different strategic conceptions coexists at the moment within the Sunni groups. The first, on a regional scale, is supported by ISIS, which considers Iraq as part of a much larger system, and where the real goal is the capacity to control a wide strip of land that includes Syria, Iraq, Jor- dan and Lebanon. The second is that of the Iraqi jihadists, who sees in the fight against Shiites throughout the country the only solution to end the abuses suffered since 2003, and that therefore considered necessary to re-impose a Sunni domination over the country. The third, and to date probably the wider, it that of those who believes that a negotiating capacity with the Shiites must be won on the field, in order to impose an autonomist or federalist solution to balance the power of the Shia majority. This third component, therefore, sees in Baghdad the territorial limit of military operations, and the political target to develop a negotiation phase which could favour for the first time the Sunni community to operate from a point of strength in the achievement of its priorities. And, ideally, to allow a restoration - even if partial - of the role of the Baath Party. The higher risk of clash, therefore, will be determined by these so heterogeneous goals of the var- ious Sunni groups. Jihadists consider the territorial element as a mere operating environment, aim- ing at the wider political and religious project of the caliphate. And this concept, at least to date, should be achieved with a complete victory on the “Shiite heresy”. On the other side, Baathist ideology – which Westerners have largely undervalued – is still highly rooted among the Sunnis of Iraq, being systematically inculcated in the years of the regime, and still represent the bastion of independence and the safeguarding of the interests of the Sunni com- munity. The Iraqi territorial element is dominant for this group, which certainly sees its counterpart in the Shiite community as hostile, however considering this hostility not as sectarian, but essen- tially political. The objective of the Baath is therefore to dominate the Shia, not to eradicate them in religious terms.
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The fourth EU-Africa Summit
Marco Massoni
April the 2nd and the 3rd, the Fourth EU–Africa Summit – titled People, Prosperity and Peace – was celebrated in Brussels; by the way, the V Summit will be held in an African country in 2017. It clearly emerged that Africa is now to be ultimately considered as the place par excellence of global investment (Business-First Strategy) and not only the Continent of final destination of aid and international solidarity. It is therefore the transition from development to economic growth – from aid to trade. Nick Westcott, Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service (EEAS), well explained that some European countries today enjoy a lower GDP than some African countries! Among the outcomes of the Brussels Summit, one can count the agreement on the adoption of the Euro-African positions in regards of the UN Conference on Climate Change to be held in Paris next year (EU-Africa agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Cli- mate Change). In addition, the African Peace Facility (APF), or the European fund at the base of the Peace & Security pillar, has been increased to 750 million Euros over the next three years. It was decided that three billion Euros will be allocated to the agricultural sector in Africa over the next six years; a billion will be donated to the integration of African institutions and African stu- dents and researchers will benefit some three hundred and fifty million of Euros through dedicated scholarships. In reality, the institutionalization of the EU–Africa Dialogue began with the First EU–Africa Summit in Cairo (3-4 April 2000), in order to give an innovative and strategic dimension to the relationship between Europe and Africa. The relations between these two continents are strategic, but unfortunately so few European decision makers do understand that in depth. Demo- graphic projections estimate that by 2050 Africa will have two billion people, while Europe only half a billion. Compared to the Chinese whole strategic vision over Africa, the worst European mistake would be to persist in believing to the complementarity of roles to play and perform in Africa; actually, Brussels seems to be unable to realize that the Chinese model for the ultimate control of Africa precisely envisage to persuade its major competitors of its own good faith through the simulation of multilateralism© or simulated multilateralism©, a system according to which China would not give the impression to hold any competitive relationship with Europe. The Second EU–Africa Summit (Lisbon, 7-9 December 2007) had the aim of launching a renewed policy that would have put an end to those obstacles and those asymmetries between the European and the African blocs in the light of the new international scenario. At least, the intentions were to try to create the conditions for a qualitative leap in relations between the parties, giving greater political importance to African partners, eager to be treated in conditions of equality and not of subjection.
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The summit in the Portuguese capital ended with the adoption of two documents: the Joint Africa- EU Strategy (JAES) and its Action Plan, establishing a new strategic partnership between equals. It is worth noting that between the First and the Second Summit the EU Member States have in- creased from 15 to 28. The Third Summit took place in Tripoli in 2010 without major conse- quences. Today, there is an ongoing diversification of strategic partnerships between Africa and the rest of the world, increasing the bilateral meetings between Africa and other country, groups of countries or individual states. Along the lines of the Sino-African Summits (Forum on China- Africa Cooperation - FOCAC)1 in force since 2000, next August the very first US-Africa Meeting shall occur, and in June it will be the turn of the Japan-Africa Summit, while the Italia-Africa Ini- tiative has been postponed from September this year the autumn of 2015 in connection with the EXPO in Milan. Around the Brussels summit some multilateral events took place: the 5th EU- Africa Business Forum, with special attention paid to the areas of Information Technology (IT), transfer of knowledge and agriculture; the 3rd Pan-African-European Parliamentary Summit; the 3rd Africa-Europe Youth Summit; the EU-Africa Economic and Social Stakeholders Networking Meeting. Among the topics addressed some issues are still open and unanswered, because of the delicate European institutional phase, also including that of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and migration. The former concerns the attempt to liberalize, in other words to let enter into the world market without safeguards and not gradually, the yet still fragile African economies, with the goal to create free intra-African trade areas by 2017. Upon this question, the President of the African Union Commission (AUC) herself, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, has called the need for Europe to understand that, if there were a single African market rather than regional ones, it would be of mutual benefit instead. Under the Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement, the EU guaranteed a duty-free access to products from the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) countries, but the World Trade Organization (WTO) has stated it is improper. Therefore, the EU should rethink these agreements, and Africa disregards them and at the same time negotiates the topic in an en- tirely new way. In reality, the issue is crucial and needs to be resolved quickly, because there is a lot at stake, because the EPA not fully satisfying the needs of African industrialization, tend to be perceived as tools curbing economic growth, therefore any African political freedom, favouring the European geo-economic supremacy. As for the latter, related to migration policies, at the end of the summit a principle agreement was set down as follows: joint fight against trafficking in human beings; to be against illegal migration and better management of the regular one; strength- ening of the plexus between migration and development; increasing international protection for asylum seekers. The philosophy that inspired the EU-Africa Partnership is in fact synthesized in the idea of No Development Without Security. The individual national interests within the European Union help to undermine the unity of the pan-European purpose, making intermittent effectiveness of European foreign policy in Africa. Therefore, the EU-Africa Dialogue should really become more political and less technical-bureaucratic to do so.
Northern Africa: Mauritania and Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) Among the candidates vying for the presidential elections in Mauritania, scheduled June 21, but from the favourite, (i.e. the incumbent President Ould Abdelaziz) at the same time also President of the African Union (AU) for the current year, there are Boidiel Ould El Houmeid of the El Wiam
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party, Ibrahim Moctar Sarr of the Alliance for Democracy and Justice, Birame Ould Dah Ould Abeid of the Initiative for the Rebirth of the Abolitionist Movement of Slavery in Mauritania, Alioune Ould Bouamatou, Ahmed Salem Ould Bouhoubeini and Lalla Mariem Mint Moulaye Idriss. With reference to the Sahrawi Arab Demcoratic Republic (SADR), the United Nations Mis- sion for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been extended for another year, with- out however including the monitoring of human rights in both the Tindouf refugee camps and in the territories occupied by Morocco, as being increasingly required by many international stake- holders. Besides, the former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, is the new African Union Special Envoy for Western Sahara, whose appointment was formalized during the AU 23rd Summit of Heads of States and Governments held in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea).
Western Africa: Cabo Verde, Chad, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger and Nigeria As per Cabo Verde, in order to combat the economic crisis, Praia endorsed, thanks to an agreement with Luanda, a vast privatization programme, which provides for the strengthening of internal and external links in the areas of airport, port and massive investments in the telecommunications sec- tor. Cabo Verde and Angola share a common colonial heritage and the membership to the Luso- phone bloc of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), and to the African Countries of Portuguese Official Language (PALOP). In Chad, the President of the Republic, Déby Itno, gave rise to the fourth cabinet reshuffle since the beginning of the year; the new Gov- ernment is mainly of technical nature. On April 3, 850 Chadian soldiers of the Armed Forces serv- ing in the MISCA, the African Union (AU) mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), had to leave the CAR, because inefficient and biased as to their ethical conduct as peacekeepers, having been guilty of summary executions evidently not in line with the mandate given by the AU. By 2015, Ghanaian foreign trade with Turkey will reach one billion dollars, according to what has been learned from official sources in Accra. Ghana is the fourth largest trade partner for Turkey in Africa, a continent with which it has an interchange of almost $ 25 billion. Regarding Guinea- Bissau, on May 18, José Mário Vaz – also known as Jomav – candidate of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), won the presidential election. Actually, in the runoff Vaz scored over sixty percent of preferences against his challenger, Nabiam Nuno Gomes, who has shown little less than forty percent. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) has confirmed the regularity of the electoral process, which took place in a peaceful, free, transparent and orderly. As per Mali, with a budget of 5.5 million euros, Brussels has launched a new civilian mission under the CSDP – the EUCAP Sahel Mali – aiming at assisting the Malian security forces to better combat terrorism and cross-border trade in the region. The Forum for Peace and National Reconciliation meetings have begun, in order to promote national dialogue especially with that part of the country, the North, that has always been sidelined. The former Prime Minister Modibo Keita was appointed High Representative of the Head of State for Inclusive Inter-Malian Dialogue. Meanwhile, a new PM was appointed, Mr. Moussa Mara, re- placing Tatam Oumar Ly, who was on a collision course with the President of the Republic, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. On June 10, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and the Azawad Arab Movement (MAA) signed the Declaration of Algiers; the aim is to pick up the thread of dialogue with the central government
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of Mali in the light of the political and cultural diversity of the inhabitants of the northern regions compared with southern populations of the huge Sahel-Saharan state. Among the mediators of such prolonged crisis Algeria, Burkina Faso, Morocco and the United Nations are to be mentioned. As far as Niger is concerned, on May 6, the Belgian police commissioner Filip de Ceuninck has been appointed new head of mission of the EUCAP Sahel Niger, replacing thus General Francisco Espinosa Navas, in office since the start of the mission established in 2012. Within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) the EUCAP Sahel Niger, which is framed in the European Union Strategy for the Sahel, provides support and training as to the capacity of the police, the national police and national guard of Niger, in order contrast both terrorism and or- ganized crime. The same type of CSDP mission was recently established in Mali too, while that for Mauritania is experiencing serious delays. Regarding Nigeria, Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC-CBLT) member states – Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Libya and RCA – have an- nounced their intention to form a multinational force in Africa, to combat Boko Haram and ANSARU. In the meantime, a growing commitment of international intelligence (China, France, Israel, UK and USA), in anticipation of the possible deployment of an international force or oth- erwise of new measures to root out those Islamist sects is being reported. As a matter of fact, the EU has made available 10 million euros, to support Abuja in counter-terrorism, also following the Boko Haram’s abduction of hundreds of students in the state of Borno, now seized against their will in the Sambisa forest at the border with Cameroon.
Eastern Africa: Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Tanzania The Somali Shebaab has claimed the suicide bombing of May 24 in Djibouti in a well-known restaurant of the capital. The attackers accused France to massacre Muslims in operations currently led by Paris in the Central African Republic; besides, they require that Djibouti withdraw its troops from Somalia, and that Christians be expelled from the country. Meanwhile, France will open by next autumn right in Djibouti her third African Special Operations Command (COS) – the other two are in Burkina Faso and in Mauritania – in order to widen French projection capability in the several continental operation theatres. The choice has fallen on Djibouti, after the rejection of Mali. In addition to France, Djibouti hosts many foreign military bases: Italy, USA, Russia, Japan, China and the European Union. Moreover, the President, Ismail Omar Guelleh, in power since 1999, has announced he will not run again in the election of 2016. In June, the Eritrean President, Isaias Afeworki, said that the former Italian colony must set soon for a new Constitution. In truth, since independence from Ethiopia, gained in 1993, the Constitution of Eritrea has never been ap- plied, although ratified in 1997. Since the very beginning of May in Kenya, many Western tourists, especially British, have been leaving the beach resorts along the coast for fear of terrorist assaults. Indeed, the Somali Shebaab claimed the 15 June attacks on the coastal town of Mpeketoni, which provoked more than sixty victims. Yet, according to the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, the responsibility should fall on local political networks, related to the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a local separatist movement, which calls for the independence of the areas. There is, how- ever, still uncertainty about the real causes of the massacre. As per Somalia, in a period of tense relationship between Mogadishu and Nairobi, Kenya is about to open its own diplomatic repre- sentation to Hargheisa, the capital of Somaliland, notoriously self-proclaimed independent in 1991.
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Sheikh Mohamed Said, also known as Atam, surrendered to Somali institutions. He is considered a prominent figure in the chain of command of the Shebaab in Puntland. In regards of South Sudan, the cease-fire agreement, signed on 9 May in Addis Ababa between President Salva Kiir and the former Vice-President Riek Machar, is not in fact respected by the warring parties on the ground. Actually, the country is on the brink of the abyss, because of the crimes against humanity constantly committed by all sides. Likely, only a wide range regional force, such as of IGAD, or even of greater magnitude, such as of the Au or the UN, can stop the ethnic violence going on for more than six months in the country. Moreover, Norway has convened a donors conference, so that they are allocated approximately five hundred million euro in humanitarian aid, while the United Na- tions, which have placed the South Sudanese emergence at the highest level of urgency and com- plexity (L3), quantifying in at least two billion dollars the minimum requirements for the overall responsiveness required. In particular, figures are terrific: one million of displaced persons, three hundred thousand refugees in the neighbouring countries and five million people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. In Tanzania, there is a growing concern about the potential osmosis of the international jihadism with the UAMSHO (‘awakening’ in Swahili language), an autonomist movement of the island of Zanzibar.
Central Africa: Central African Republic (CAR) and Gabon. In regards of the Central African Republic (CAR), even Italy will participate with fifty people to the EU military mission ‘CSDP-EUFOR RCA’. In addition, the UN Security Council has approved the establishment of an ad hoc mission – the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabi- lization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) – made of twelve thousand blue helmets, which will be deployed on 15 September. It shall take over the African Union’s MISCA, now composed of forces originated from Burundi, Cameroon, DRC, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Rwanda. Despite the high volatility in terms of security in the CAR’s capital, Bangui, however an agreement seemed to have been reached between the two local belligerent factions, namely the so-called local self-defence groups based in the south – the Anti- Balaka or Christian supporters of former President Bozizé – on the one side and on the other, the former pro-Islamic rebels Séléka, whose headquarters are in the north-central region of the country (Bambari). In April, President of Gabon, Ali Bongo, has made an official visit to Paris, where he discussed with his French counterpart, Hollande, the plan to make within the next decade Gabon transformation economy and not just a mere export of local raw materials any longer. To Paris, Libreville remains a cornerstone in the troubled region of Central Africa.
Southern Africa: Angola, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço is the new Minister of Defense of Angola, replacing Candido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dunem. Luanda, after Pretoria, is the second African country in terms of military spending. Since April 10, Christophe Laurent Kolo Roger is the new Prime Minister of Madagascar as a result of compromise after three months of negotiations. The Premier has started consultations to give life to his Government. Béni Xavier Rasolofonirina, as the new Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, takes the place of André Ndriarijaona, while General François Rodin Rakoto
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is the new commander of the Gendarmerie in place of his counterpart Richard Ravalomanana. After four years of suspension, the European Union has resumed development cooperation pro- grammes with Antananarivo. Former Foreign Minister, Peter Mutharika, was elected new Presi- dent of the Republic of Malawi, bringing 36 per cent of preferences. Awkwardly, the outgoing President, Joyce Banda, was not re-elected, having reported only 20 percent of the vote, coming in third after the second candidate, Chakwera Lazarus, who got 28 percent of the consensus. Ev- idently, several months of scandals under Banda’s leadership must have moved the electorate else- where. The new President, Mutharika, has announced plans to move away from dependence on the United Kingdom, through strategic alliances with the BRICS, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Together with the Seychelles, Mauritius has joined the IO-5, a naval agreement for maritime security within the Indian Ocean in co-operation with India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. As per Mozambique, the historic leader of the largest opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), Afonso Dhlakama has been nominated candidate in the elections of October. He also announced the ceasefire of the Sofala Province, where over the past few months there had been several attacks by his militia, which is expected soon to be fully integrated in the national Armed Forces, thanks to recent agreements signed with the Gov- ernment. The political landscape for the general elections scheduled next fall in Namibia is going to be outlined. The incumbent Prime Minister, Hage Geingob, in office since 2012, will be the candidate of the ruling party, the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), since the current President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, will not be allowed to stand for a third term according the Namibian Constitution. In South Africa, President Jacob Zuma is going to take office for his second term, following the election victory of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). In point of fact, military cooperation of Zimbabwe with Beijing is strengthening. In fact, some Chinese financing for several million dollars has been granted to the Armed Forces.
Conclusions Among the points of friction still unresolved at the base of the relationship between Brussels and Addis Ababa one sees the difficulty of implementation of the JAES, as it is perceived differently by the parties: usually, the Europeans complain about the slow pace of regional and continental integration as well as the limited human resources made available by the African to carry out the projects, whereas the Africans accuse the Europeans to make their support and funds - a few in their opinion - contingent upon the actual available African capacities. Objectively mutual frus- trations are more than legitimate, since it is tangible to both the parties, the absence of a profound political vision of a continental partnership, Europe-Africa. Power politics realism of some indi- vidual EU Member States reveal a sickening paternalism, a shaky ambiguity, in terms of double standards and the inconsistency as well as the schizophrenia with which Europe is so determined to keep looking at Africa, matching with the subsequently justified prejudices through which the European external Action is being perceived in Africa. A striking example is given by the absence of any cultural cooperation partnership, most likely the only area that should be promoted as such, unless one gets stacked in the realm of bureaucracy, where the relationship between the two con- tinents is stagnating nowadays, not to mention the establishment of the so-called Pan-African Pro- gramme (PANAF), as it seems to be falling along the same lines.
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1 During the World Economic Forum on Africa (Abuja, 7-9 May), the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, announced tens of billions of new investments in Africa. China in 2013 was the first African trading partner for a total of over twenty billion dollars, and approximately across the next decade of five hundred billion dollars!
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The end of the Third Plenum's reformist wave?
Nunziante Mastrolia
The reforms proposed by the Third Plenum, at least theoretically, could represent a turning point in the history of contemporary China. However, in order to implement these reforms a number of conditions are necessary: that is to say a solid leadership of the reformers in the party and in the country and a stable political climate both internationally and inter- nally. Consequently, the “party of reformers” has all the interest in creating a stable climate at regional level, avoiding frictions, particularly on those disputed areas in the South China Sea and East China Sea, that could cause waves of tension in the area. Therefore, the greater the strength of the “party of reformers” is, the lower should be the friction among the countries in the region. At the same time, the stronger the reformers are, minors should be internal tensions. Yet, a few days after the end of the Third Plenum, a series of events aroused that gradually polluted the political climate both internally and internationally: the impressive increasing of terrorist attacks (starting by last November attack in Beijing), and the growing tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea and with Japan the East China Sea (since ADIZ institution occurred last November). What happened in May is, till today, the highest point of this process of involution. On the first of May the CNOOC, one of the three Chinese oil giants, installed under the protection of eighty naval units an oil rig at 70 nautical miles from the Triton island coast in the Paracelsus archipelago, controlled from Beijing, and at 170 miles from the coast of Vietnam1. An overpowering action (condemned by the United States2 and by ASEAN members) that produced an massive uprising in Vietnam. Meanwhile, Beijing started a campaign against the Vietnamese authorities – accused to have ignited the riot by spreading false information and failing to prevent the lynching of Chinese citizens that happened in Vietnam – and accused the United States to be - accord- ing to the words of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson - the primary source of tensions in the South China Sea: “It is true that provocative actions have been seen in the South China Sea recently. But they are not taken by China. It is nothing but the wrong words and actions made by the U.S. side on maritime issues that have emboldened some
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countries to take provocative actions”3. A position then repeated with increasingly harsh tone by the party press (the Global Times, in particular). At the same time, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, General Fang Fenghui, during an official visit in Washington, that was supposed to represent a major step forward in military relations between the two countries,4 stated: “Beijing will not allow that even an inch of its territory would get lost and warned We do not make trouble. We do not create trouble. But we are not afraid of trouble”. It is still unclear the reason why Beijing took this action in the South China Sea and why against Vietnam, with which in recent months there had been a substantial improvement in bilateral relations. Some experts believe that the Chinese move is a way to test the U.S. commitment in the region in order to highlight the weakness of the Obama administration. However, this hypothesis does not hold water. First of all, because such a test would have made sense if conducted with those countries (for example Japan and the Philippines5), with which in recent months occurred closer relationships with the United States. Secondly, Washington is actually enforcing its strategic rebalance in the region (“Pivot to Asia”). With regards to the most recent events, in April Obama declared that the US is duty-bound to come to Japan’s aid in the event of a conflict with China over disputed islands in the East China Sea. In April, Washington and Manila signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, under the which the U.S. military will enjoy greater access to military bases across the Philippines archipelago for a 10-year term. In May, the US Justice Department indicted five Chinese military officers with stealing data from six US companies, “the US for the first time would seek to bring officials of a foreign government to the US to face charges of infiltrating American computer networks to steal data beneficial to US trade competi- tors”6. Therefore, it can be argued that the Chinese authorities have chosen Vietnam be- cause it is perceived as the weakest or most isolated country within the new alliance system that the US are enforcing in the region. Hence, it is necessary to understand the strategic ends that Chinese decision makers are trying to reach. To this end, it is useful to take a step back. One of the key strategic imperatives of imperial China was to prevent the formation of hostile alliances pressing at its borders. This imperative persisted in communist China. Kissinger wrote: "Mao was resolute to prevent encirclement by any power or coalition of powers, regardless of their ideology, as he saw them concentrated in accumulating too many 'stones' (weiqi) to encircle China; he intended to succeed by messing up all their calculations”. How? Settling “a sudden hit”, aiming not to obtain a prior and decisive mil- itary victory, but to change the psychological balance: not defeat the enemy, but forcing it to change its assessment of risk”. At this point it is possible to argue that the first “sudden hit” stroke by Beijing was the es- tablishment of the Air Defensive Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, which
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was followed by a second hit, namely the installation under armed protection of the oil rig in the disputed waters with Vietnam in South China Sea. The effectiveness of these actions may raise some doubts, even regarding the past. Kissinger argues that Beijing has applied this “sudden hit” strategy to disrupt opponents during the Taiwan Strait crisis (1954-58), throughout the war against India in 1962, against the Soviets on the Ussuri River in 1969-1971 and during the Vietnam war in 1979. With these interventions, especially in the first phase when Mao believed that the United States had plans to intervene again in China, the survival of the communist regime was ensured, but paying on the other side a growing international isolation and a severe economic stag- nation. This situation changed only when, during the Eighties, China put aside its regional strategic ambitions and started to focus on the economic boom. The most recent events (the ADIZ and the facts of May in the South China Sea) give rise to similar doubts. In November 2013 American B-52 bombers flew over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands without informing Beijing ahead of time. According to Zachary Keck, “the flight represented a clear challenge to China”7. Meanwhile, Japan intensified the efforts to overcome the constitutional restrictions, imposed by the United States fol- lowing the World War II defeat and, at the same time, it has set up a series of countermoves: the first was the installation of a radar base on the Yonaguni island, close to the disputed islands and, secondly, in May Tokyo announced the decision to allocate troops in the is- lands of Amamioshima, Miyako and Ishigaki, a few hundred miles from the Senkaku/Diaoyu8. Is it possible that the action in the South China Sea will give better results? It is unlikely. With this strategy Beijing is facing the risk of a closer integration between Washington and Hanoi. Moreover, there is the possibility that the Chinese behavior might undermine the efforts made in recent years towards an improvement of the relations between ASEAN countries and China9, as for the first time ASEAN countries have taken a common position (expressing their deep concern) unlike what happened in the past10. Furthermore, it is pos- sible that Narendra Modi, the new Indian Prime Minister, might show a greater anti-Chi- nese attitude in comparison to previous years. If this is true, it is then the case to start wondering why Beijing continues in pursuing such a policy that appears to be so harmful? A miscalculation? Francesco Sisci on Asia Times wrote that “China seems not understand the grammar of political relations”. It may be possible that Beijing in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea has tried to put the other regional players and the United States in front of a fait accompli (that is placing new stones in order to occupy new spaces), underestimating their reactions. An error of perception? Edward Luttwak argues that China is suffering from a kind of “great state autism”, which consist in ignoring what “is happening in the surrounding world”. In other words, Beijing may not be fully aware of the concerns and apprehensions
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spreading among other countries caused by its growing economic, political and military strength. In both hypotheses, therefore, Beijing is making a mistake, even quite rough. In other words, China has two irrational approaches from a strategic point of view: also States, just like humans, make mistakes. However, it is necessary to make two additional assump- tions, in which it is excluded that Beijing makes such errors of perception or miscalcula- tions and is actually enforcing a rational strategy. The first hypothesis: Beijing has finally “removed its mask”, that is to say that Beijing has put aside Deng’s advice (“Hide your strength, bide your time”), abandoning the peace- ful rise rhetoric and openly revealing its ambitions to build a new Asian order, unchained from U.S. influence and ruled by China: nothing new from the old imperial Sino-centric order, with a system of tributary states that orbit around Beijing. In this sense, it is inter- esting to highlight the emphasis that the party press has given to the - so far unknown - Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), that Beijing - according to what the South China Morning Post argues - aims to turn into its institutional tool to build this new order11. According to the China Daily this would be a new mean through which China can forge its “Asian century”12. Moreover, China is trying to counterbalance the intensified relations between Japan, Viet- nam, Philippines and the United States by strengthening its alliance with Russia. That is the case of the 30-year deal between the two countries on the Russian gas: Moscow will supply China 38 billion cubic meters of gas per year via the eastern ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline, which crosses Siberia and reaches China’s populous northeast regions.13 The agreement could be the first step of a new Moscow-Beijing axis with an anti-Western func- tion: the agreement with Beijing, indeed, undermines Europeans and Americans attempts to weaken Putin regime, not surprisingly, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Jacob Lew, had asked the Chinese authorities not to take any steps that might fade the sanctions imposed on Russia14. Last hypothesis, not in contrast with the previous one, concerns the presence of groups or factions inside the Chinese political elites interested in derailing the reform process launched by the Third Plenum. As already written in previous issues of the CeMiSS Quar- terly, the heart of the reform process (at least on paper) is the progressive reduction of the party powers, horizontally, in favor of the constitutional bodies, and vertically, in favor of the market and the civil society. Currently, the tensions at regional level revitalize Chinese nationalism and strengthen the rhetoric that describes China as a victim of the European power politics in the XIX century, now envied and attacked by foreign nations, whose purpose is to prevent the eventual re- turn of the country among the world great powers. Meanwhile, the internal tensions caused by the terrorist attacks lead to invoke a strong and united party, able to use its iron fist in order to stop the wave of violence.
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In this regard, it is important to report the publication of the China’s first national security blue book issued by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and titled “Annual Report on China's National Security Studies”. Presented by the media as the most influ- ential semi-official publication on this issue, it is actually a mix of ideological preconcep- tions, that identifies, among others, Western cultural hegemony and the “export” of Western democracy as serious threats to China's internal security. Lanxin Xiang on the South China Morning Post calls the book “a foolish document”15. It is hard to predict which of these hypotheses will be the correct one, but it is necessary to emphasize that internal tensions and external frictions are creating in China all those conditions able to block the reform process.
1 See Ernest Z. Bower, Gregory B. Poling, "Vietnam-China Tensions High over Drilling Rig in Disputed Waters," CSIS, May 7th, 2014. 2 See "Kerry: China's Oil Rig in the South China Sea 'Provocative'," Voice of America, May 13th, 2014. 3 "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on May 13th, 2014" at the fol- lowing link http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1155614.shtml 4 See "Improve Sino-US military ties step by step", China Daily, May 20th, 2014. 5The already tense relations between Beijing and Manila have suffered a further deterioration following the arrest by the authorities of 11 Philippine fishermen for illegal fishing (500 sea turtles). 6 For an example of Chinese reactions in this regard, see "U.S. cyber thief thief cries," China Daily, May 20th, 2014 and "China Publishes latest date of U.S. cyber attacks," Xinhua, May 20th, 2014. 7 “US Bombers Challenge China’s Air Defense Identification Zone”, The Diplomat, November 27th, 2013. 8“Japan to establish military outposts on remote islands”, Japan Today, May 19th, 2014.
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9 See "ASEAN leaders 'sends wrong signals on conflict'," China Daily, May 20th, 2014 and "China de- mands neutrality ASEAN over the South China Sea," Xinhua, May 19th, 2014. ASEAN Foreign Ministers have, in fact, expressed in a statement joint serious concern over what happened in the South China Sea. Contrary to what happened in 2012 when, on the occasion of another peak of tension between Hanoi and Beijing, the ASEAN countries were not able to sign a joint statement. See "ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea", May 10th,2014. 10 “South China Sea: ASEAN Summit falls short again”, The Interpreter, may 10th, 2014. 11 “Beijing moves to boost forum's role to counter US influence”, South China Morning Post, may 22nd, 2014. 12 "China's platform for 'Asian century'," China Daily, May 21st, 2014. See also "China's Xi Proposes secu- rity concept for Asia," China Daily, May 21st, 2014. 13 Sarah Lain, The Significance of the China-Russia Gas Deal, The Diplomat, May 24th, 2014. 14 See "U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew urges China to ease controls on renminbi", The Economic Times, May 14th, 2014. 15 “China's national security blue paper a worrying throwback to the cold war”, South China Morning Post, may 20th, 2014.
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India
Introducing Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the new India he wants to shape
Claudia Astarita
In late May, the charismatic leader of the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was swept to power by the most resounding Indian election result in three decades. It has been calculated that nearly 551 million people out of 815 million adult citizens took part in the national ballot to decide who was going to govern India next. They were actually more people than the population of the US, UK, Germany and Canada combined. Although, as usual, at the centre of the election there was the contest between the ruling Congress Party-led United Progressive alliance and the National Democratic Alliance led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, as emphasized in more than one occasion by Professor Amitabh Mattoo, the Director of the Australia-India Institute at the University of Melbourne (Australia), these elections were particularly important as they were no more concentrated on leadership, governance and policies, only. On the contrary, the contest was about “the idea of modern India itself and its abiding faith in the ability of its citizens to make the right choice”. During the whole electoral campaign, “the feisty oratory of the BJP’s thrice-elected Gujarat chief minister, Narendra Modi who invites extreme passions; contrasted with the mild almost reclusive style of the Congress’s Rahul Gandhi, who even his admirers admit has not lived up to his potential; and the steely determination of the man against all odds: AAP’s Arvind Kejiriwal”. However, it was Mr Modi’s pledge to take India forward after ousting the ruling Congress party from power to emerge after the ballot. The country rewarded Mr Modi’s passion, commitment, and successful and sound political and economic background in Gujarat with what should be defined an historic mandate. The Bjp party emerged with an extraordinary and unforeseeable result of 282 out of 543 parliamentary seats, more than enough to form a government without having to broker a post- election coalition. Mr Modi is aware that this unprecedented victory gives him a much freer hand than the one the typical leader of such a large democracy may have. He is actually about to lead the first majority government India has elected in 30 years. 63 years old, son of a provincial tea-seller, Mr Modi de- fines himself an outsider amid New Delhi’s elite, as well as the man who will eventually break the current status quo. The first words he shouted after his appointment was officially confirmed were “India has won. Good days are coming.” He continued stressing his intention to nominate an “inclusive government for a ‘Shining India’ that will make the 21st century ‘India’s Century’.” The new Indian Prime Minister also added that, thanks to him, “India’s social differences will come together and make a flag, just like different threads come together to weave a cloth,” and that “people rose above caste rhetoric, a new foundation has been laid and will build a new shining
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India in the coming days.” In order to understand what the new “Modi wave” is going to change in India, it is necessary to focus on what these elections meant for the country; the real reasons behind Narendra Modi’s vic- tory , and the challenges (ranging from social internal problems, economic growth and foreign policy) the newly appointed administration has to face. The Indian journalist Swapan Dasgupta has been probably one of the first analysts arguing that huge expectations have always been associated to Modi’s campaign and victory, and that 2014 elections have in many occasions been defined as a “landmark election”, that is to say an election where existing rules of the game were broken and new alignments forged. It is argued that India’s last elections were unique as they ended up being centred on one person, and in many ways they represented something similar to a presidential election, except for the fact that there were only one candidate, with people voting either for or against him. 2014 elections in India can be considered unique also from another perspective. Very rarely a Prime Minister candidate has travelled so much. From the 15th of September until the 10th of May, Narendra Modi has addressed 450 unbelievably crowded public rallies in India, not to mention the consequences of the smart massive use he made of other innovative techniques. Mr Modi suc- cessfully re-launched the “Tea party” idea, which in the Indian context means pushing people to gather to enjoy a cup of tea while discussing political issues. It is particularly interesting to notice that these congregations went far beyond original expectations, as rather than rounding up an av- erage of 20/30 people per tea session, they succeeded to involve up to 250/300 people. For those thinking that public speeches and gathering had become old-fashioned, uninteresting and useless in India, Mr Modi proved that this evolution was only the consequence of the lack of good candi- dates and smart ideas at both local and national political levels. Further, Mr Modi shocked voters in remote villages allowing them to join his public rallies with his brand new 3D program, based on simultaneous live broadcasting of Prime Minister Candidate speeches exploiting satellites and the use of hologram images. In every election there is usually one slogan that catches voters’ imagination. For India this year this motto was “the good days are beginning”, referring to the rise of a new India led by Narendra Modi. A series of pre-election polls coordinated by some of the most prestigious research centres in New Delhi identified inflation, corruption and leadership as the main issues at stake during 2013/2014 electoral campaign. Behind Mr Modi’s victory there is also his capacity to tackle all these topics in a more effective way compared to what Sonia and Rahul Gandhi did for the Con- gress Party. In terms of inflation and costs of living, Mr Modi could count on the legacy of the ex- traordinary economic performance Gujarat recorded during his “realm”. In terms of corruption, it has been argued that although it always existed in some form, since India has become more prosperous, the level corruption within the country dramatically raised. In this context, it was not Mr Modi’s promise to fight this bad habit that counted, although his cleaner image and background certainly helped, rather the worsening perception of the Congress Party performance in terms of corruption that proved self-defeating. According to the latest surveys, in July 2013, 66 per cent of Indian thought that the Congress Party was either very corrupt or somehow corrupt. By March 2014 this figure raised to 73 per cent. In terms of leadership, it has been argued that during the last ten years India has been ruled by a
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strange system of diarchy, where the political and the executive authorities have been separated, with the main political figure in the country, Sonia Gandhi, keeping her position as Congress Party President, and a Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, lacking a significant political influence. This arrangement has been working for a while, with its weaknesses hiding behind India economic suc- cess. However, when the national market started its massive slowdown from a record 9 per cent growth rate to one remaining slightly below 5 per cent, the question of leadership became para- mount. In particular, the diarchy endorsed by the Congress party started being interpreted as a symbol of incoherence within the party and the government, with political representatives and ex- ecutives within the same cabinet accused of going into very different directions, making the Prime Minister completely ineffective. This experience made it clear for many Indian voters that the country urgently needed a new kind of leader to be successful again, a person able to take firm decisions, mature, and decisive. This belief further contributed to build a context in which Mr Modi suddenly appeared as the way out to this general impasse. Trying to summarize the reasons behind Mr Modi’s success, many analysts have stressed that Modi’s victory “resounds to a transformation in how Indian politics is being made”. Some of them have mentioned that “Modi's victory is a revolt against India's democratic capitalism, which failed to create sustainable growth beyond 5 per cent. India, however, needs at least 10 per cent growth per year for its growing working population, which only Modi’s authoritarian capitalism can offer.” Other scholars believe that “the electorate was somehow misled into voting Narendra Modi to power. In fact, many voters had felt betrayed by the ruling Congress party. The real surprise of the election was not Modi, who won, but his rival, Rahul Gandhi, who lost”, as for many his leadership symbolised the feudal and undemocratic way state affairs have always been run by the Gandhi family. Finally, as Professor Mattoo brilliantly summarize, “The BJP fought the election on the basis of just one issue: the personality and track record of Modi. Modi spoke at nearly 400 public rallies during the campaign, and at each rally he was treated like a rock star. A decisive, clear-thinking leader, Modi had a simple message: the magic of the Gujarat model of development (a state he has ruled for more than a decade) and how it can be replicated in the rest of India.” Mr Modi bravely communicated this forcefully to “an impatient young India (600 million people under the age of 25) angry with the establishment and the ruling Congress Party for letting them down, and looking for hope”. Love him or loathe him, there is no denying that only Narendra Modi can claim credit for the landslide victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party in India’s just-concluded 16th General Election. Moreover, no matter how critical his detractors can be, he definitely has the chance to fulfil his promise. In case he succeeds, he will certainly ensure that his party will stay in power even beyond this election. Facing such a challenging background, it becomes urgent to understand if Mr Modi will be able to turn around India’s faltering democracy, delivering on his twin promises of development and good governance. With an “outgoing government presided over a continuous slowdown in the economy and who failed to check high inflation”, his main priority needs to be the one of delivering reforms that can address the current dangerous combination of slow economic growth, soaring in- flation and high unemployment. According to Eswar Prasad, economics professor at US-based
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Cornell University and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “the key challenge for the government is to revive growth by restoring momentum to the process of economic reforms and creating a sense of policy certainty,” adding that in order to boost growth, Mr Modi also has to “tackle the country’s vast infrastructure needs, reform the labor market and streamline land ac- quisition policies,” and find a way to bring down Indian public debt. India’s fiscal deficit currently amounts to around 4.1 percent of the GDP on the back of subsidies and pay-outs, particularly on items such as fertilizers, gold and oil. What Indian people expect Modi to do is unleashing the growth potential and creating jobs without blowing the budget. To do that, he will inevitably have to scrap populist programmes like the rural job guarantee scheme and the right to food, as these schemes have provided jobs and food to millions, but have proven to be too expensive. While doing so, Mr Modi will also have to be very careful while interacting with minorities, reassuring them that they can be safe, secure and successful in Modi’s India. To succeed in this bristly contest, Mr Modi needs to focus on the agenda for economic growth and good governance. In particular, he needs to create new hopes for young people, broaden access to the financial inclusion and revive manufacturing growth to boost employment generation and help to spread the benefits more evenly among the population and reduce poverty. Many economists believe that “India should emulate the successes of China and other East Asian states and focus more on its industry and manufacturing, in order to create jobs for the country's young people and to attain high and sustainable growth rates.” Furthermore, it is argued that “this could accelerate the South Asian nation’s transformation from a predominantly rural, agricultural society into a more urban, industrial one”. However, it is also broadly recognized that this won’t be an easy task and that no major accomplishments can be achieved in the short term. On the con- trary, economists such as Arvind Subramanian and Amrit Amirapu argue that “boosting the man- ufacturing sector will require a lot of hard work, particularly to create an environment that attracts domestic and foreign investments.” This implies that although the promise to replicate the “Gujarat model” should remain Mr Modi’s ultimate goal, reminding that this has been the only region where manufacturing as a share of economic output exceeded 20 percent and came close to the levels seen in major manufacturing hubs in East Asia, such a drastic change cannot happen in a few nights. However, many analysts have also stressed that if the newly elected Bjp government does not want to lose its momentum, it needs to enact reforms decisively and rapidly. Luckily, the fact that Mr Modi received such a strong mandate from the Indian electorate and does not need to be- stow political favours on any coalition partners or be constrained by them offer him a chance to be successful. Finally, to draw a better nuanced picture of Mr Modi’s India, it is necessary to conclude this overview with a few remarks on his foreign policies ideas. Although they have often described as too vague and incomprehensible, Professor Amitabh Mattoo recently argued that “the incipient Modi doctrine has five key elements. First, and most important, is the idea that a strong, self- reliant and self-confident India will pursue a foreign policy of “enlightened national interest” (in international diplomacy, enlightened national interest is defined as the recognition that the narrow pursuit of self-interest in an interdependent world can lead to sub-optimal policy outcomes). “Sec- ond, is the idea that India will help to build and strengthen a democratic, peaceful, stable and eco- nomically inter-linked neighbourhood.” From this perspective, the presence of heads of
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government or senior representatives from all the South Asian countries at the swearing in of Prime Minister Modi and his Cabinet was particularly encouraging. “Third is Modi’s emphasis on soft- power”, in a country were soft-power is based on tradition, talent, tourism, trade and technology. “Fourth, the incipient Modi doctrine moves beyond the former delineation between “non-align- ment”, “non-alignment 2.0”, and “alignment” to suggest that India could follow a policy of “multi- track alignment” with all the great powers.” Finally, “the willingness to raise issues of concern at a bilateral level (read Pakistan) and the uncontroversial claim that stability can only be built in the region if there is an end of the export of terrorism”. It is undeniable that in case Narendra Modi government will be able to deliver on all its promises, it will make history. However, it would be fair to add that even if he will be able to cope with just some of his priorities, he will do very well as well.
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European Defence Initiatives
A new deal for European Defence Industry
Claudio Catalano
The European Commission has released on 24 June 2014 a report entitled “A New Deal for Euro- pean Defence” COM (2014) 387. As a matter of fact, it is the “implementation roadmap” follow- ing-up to the Commission's Communication on Defence “towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector” COM (2013) 542 published in July 2013, that was welcomed by Eu- ropean Council of December 2013, which will further review its progress in June 2015. The “implementation roadmap” will provide the basis for the Commission's work programme, subject to the priorities established by the new Commission. By means of this roadmap, the Com- mission proposes an industrial action plan, including details and timelines for the actions, which will contribute to making the European defence and security sector more efficient Common Se- curity and Defence Policy (CSDP). The roadmap, was the last action taken by European Commission Vice President and Commis- sioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship, Antonio Tajani. He was also the leading force behind the two Commission’s Communications on European Manufacturing industry COM (2012) 572 of October 2012, and the above said Communication COM (2013) 542. Having been elected to the European Parliament, he resigned from his position, being replaced by Amb. Ferdinando Nelli Feroci. Nelli Feroci a career diplomat, formerly Italian representative to the EU and then president of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome, will take this position for about four months, until the new Commission 2014-2019 will be officially appointed. So far, only the new president of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, formerly prime minister of Luxemburg and Chairman of the Eurogroup, has been officially nominated in the European Council on 26 June 2014, while all the Commissioner still have to be appointed by Member States. Moreover, on 25 June 2014, the High level expert group on the future of the European steel industry presented the annual report on progress in the implementation of the Steel Action Plan. Thus com- pleting the Commission’s industrial plan with a specific raw materials report.
The 2014 “New deal” implementation roadmap The Commission reports that cuts in Defence budgets and the persistent fragmentation of internal market, including the Defence markets in Europe are threats to the industry and the EU's capacity to sustain effective Defence capabilities and a competitive Defence industry. Therefore, the Commission’s initiatives in this sector are particularly important as anti-cyclical measures to sustain an industry which is of strategic importance to Europe.
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European Defence Initiatives
The Aerospace and Defence industry is a major industrial sector, which according to ASD in 2012 employed about 400,000 people and generated up to another 960,000 indirect jobs, with a turnover of €96 billion. Its cutting-edge research has created important indirect effects in other sectors, such as electronics, space and civil aviation and provides growth and thousands of highly skilled jobs. Mr Tajani described the roadmap in terms of helping the EU pull itself out of the economic crisis. He stated: “The European Council recognised that defence collaboration between Member States needed to be deeper and more sustained if the EU was to adequately face its security challenges. Therefore, it is vital that, the European defence industry remains a world-leading centre for man- ufacturing and innovation, creating highly qualified jobs and growth.” To foster cooperation and enhance the efficiency of the defence sector, the Commission has decided to take the following actions: 1) Complete the Single Market for Defence and Security, thus making it more profitable; 2) prepare a roadmap for a comprehensive EU-wide security of supply regime; 3) Strengthen the competitiveness of European Defence industry; 4) support Defence-related re- search by fostering synergies between civil and military research and drafting a ‘Preparatory Ac- tion’ on CSDP-related research. The report also explores other initiatives for sectors closely connected to Defence industry, such as Space, Energy Efficiency and Raw Materials.
1) The legal base for the completion of the Single Market for Defence and Security are the Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC and the Directive 2009/43/EC on intra EU Defence transfers. The Commission is monitoring the correct application by the Member States of the Directive 2009/81/EC, and it is also tasked to write a report on the effects on the market of its implemen- tation, to assess whether the scope of the directive has been achieved. The implementation report is to be sent by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament by August 2016. In particular, clarifications to the extent of the exclusions to the scope of the directive, such as gov- ernment-to-government sales, purchases under international agreements and via international or- ganisations shall be addressed by the Commission by 2015. On the other hand, offset policies have been banned in the EU, while the Commission is finding alternatives to protect the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the supply chain to facilitate cross-border market access of SME, while removing any offset practice.
2) Security of supply is essential to assure that the Armed Forces of Member States are suf- ficiently supplied in all circumstances no matter in which Member State their suppliers are situ- ated. Security of supply is also key to the functioning of the Defence single market. For these reasons, a roadmap for a comprehensive EU-wide Security of Supply regime shall be drafted by the Commission in cooperation with the High Representative and European Defence Agency (EDA) to be presented to the European Council in June 2015. Moreover, the Commission will present further measures to strengthen the implementation of the Directive 2009/43/EC by taking into account a study on Defence internal market which is expected by July 2014. Later on, the Commission will better assess the impact of this directive
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so as to draft the report on its implementation to be released by June 2016, together with the report on Directive 2009/81/EC. The Commission is also considering to publish by the end of 2014 a Green Paper on possible shortfalls of Member States’ systems for the control of industrial and technological assets to shift it away from national governments to a new system at the EU-wide system. Details have yet to be formulated, and the Green Paper is intended for the consultation of various stakeholders on this matter.
3) The Commission is working on an industrial policy based on two strands: to strengthen European Defence industry’s competitiveness through standardization and certification; to sup- port SMEs by establishing clusters and regional networks. The Commission is supporting the EDA to identify a new mechanism for developing a common approach to defence standardisation and certification, in particular military airworthiness. For this reason, they are coneiving a new process for developing defence and hybrid standards, linking in a coordinated way the existing national, European and international standardisation mechanisms. This must be done in agreement with Member States taking full account of national sovereignty and ensuring no duplication with NATO. Common standards that can support European projects in specific areas, such as the Common Information Sharing Environment for the EU maritime surveillance, will be addressed by the Commission. The Commission together with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and EDA will help in the convergence of military airworthiness with the applicable civil requirements. Among the ideas is to create drones capable of carrying out both civil and military operations, this will in- clude to explore the feasibility of the insertion of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) in non-segregated airspace. Commission’s support for SMEs include development of networks between Defence-related re- gions within the EU, support Defence-related SMEs in global competition and provide practical guidance for regional authorities and SMEs, thus clarifying the possibility of using European funds for supporting dual-use projects.
4) The Commission will address Defence-related research to seek the maximum synergies possible between civil and military research, also intensifying and merging military research with the civil sector. The roadmap endorses the development a ‘Preparatory Action’ on CSDP-related research to ex- plore the potential of a European research programme, to test the added value of an EU contri- bution to Defence-related research for the CSDP. Unfortunately this is supposed to be a lengthy process and no “Preparatory Action” is expected before 2020. The roadmap also wants to expand on 'dual-use technology', in which equipment can be used for both civilian and military objectives. This is because, the gap between military and civil R&D is increasing, as Defence R&D investments are continuing to fall dramatically. In 2012 alone, EU- wide Defence R&D expenditure decreased by 38% compared to 2011. The EU's €80 billion Horizon 2020 research programme would be used to help fund dual-use
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projects. It also wants to develop a new programme to explore the potential benefits of EU-funded research projects. A joint-assessment of dual-use capability needs for CSDP will have the objective to highlight common military and non-military areas and identify the potential for synergies which will also take into account capability areas, including RPAS, SatCom and Cyber-security. The Commission also started to identify a number of innovation fields and applications to which cross-cutting Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) contribute, including a range of civil sectors that are of high interest to the defence and security industries to consult High Level Group on KETs to draft a report by the end of 2014.
Moreover, access to space is increasingly an area of interest for Member States with increased synergies between national and European space assets. Space includes dual-use capabilities, and assets under military control. Commission initiatives include Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) Support Framework to protect space infrastructure, which was adopted on 2 April 2014; and the help in support of Member States in the preparation of the next generation of Governmental Satellite Communication (SATCOM), with a study to map SATCOM demand both from the civil security users and for the big EU infrastructures to be resealed in 2015. Furthermore, Energy policy is aimed at the application of EU Energy Policies to the Defence domain to improve energy efficiency, the use of renewable energy sources and the protection of critical energy infrastructure. Other initiatives are aimed at helping national armed forces in re- ducing their energy consumption. The Commission initiatives on Raw Materials will be analysed in the following chapter.
The Raw Materials initiatives Raw materials, together with energy, are fundamental to Europe’s industrial sectors, including ad- vanced manufacturing, such as Aerospace and Defence industry. Raw Materials also regards the availability of alloys, and intermediate castings or semi-finished casting products for manufacturing sectors. Securing reliable and undistorted access of certain Raw Materials is of growing concern within the EU and across the globe. As a consequence of these circumstances, the Raw Materials Initiative was instigated to manage responses to Raw Materials issues at an EU level. Critical Raw Materials have a high economic importance to the EU combined with a high risk associated with their sup- ply. The first EU study on Raw Materials was published in 2010 by the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials, a subgroup to the Raw Materials Supply Group, which is an ex- pert group of the European Commission. 14 critical Raw Materials were identified from a candidate list of 41 non-energy, non-food materials. In the 2011 Communication on Raw Materials COM (2011)25 of February 2011, the Commission formally adopted this list and stated that it would continue to monitor the issue of critical Raw Materials in order to identify priority actions. It also committed to undertake a regular review and update of this list at least every 3 years. The December 2013 review has used the same methodology, indicators and thresholds as the original 2010 study, but with updated data and a wider list of 54 candidate materials of which 20
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were identified as critical Raw Materials: 13 out of 14 were already in the 2010 list, while 6 new materials enter the list.1 None of the biotic materials were classified as critical. Raw materials are also a strategic matter of security of supply: about 90% of global supply of all Raw Materials, also including base, speciality and precious metals, and rubber, are originated from extra-EU sources. China is the major supplier for most of these Raw Materials, however many other countries are important suppliers of specific materials. EU primary supply across all candi- date materials is estimated at around 9%. In the case of the 20 critical Raw Materials, supply from the EU sources is even more limited. These lists, however, highlight the criticality for the EU Member States of certain materials from the EU perspective, but the lists may include limitations and uncertainties with data, and the scope of the assessment. It is worth recalling that all Raw Materials, even when not critical, are important for the European economy and therefore not being critical does not imply that a given Raw Material and its availability to the European economy should be neglected. The new list was published in Commission’s Communication “On the review of the list of critical raw materials for the EU and the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative” COM(2014) 297 of May 2014. The Commission’s Communication also regards the Horizon 2020 initiatives that concerns Raw Materials. Additionally, the Steel Action Plan was devised in June 2013 to help the industrial sector confront challenges and lay the foundations for future competitiveness by fostering innovation, creating growth and jobs. The report reveals that a number of measures have been proposed or put in place by EU countries to support the implementation of the EU's Steel Action Plan. For example, Italy and Spain have revived at national level a High Level Group similar to the EU High Level Group, by incorporating companies, trade unions and the government. Slovakia adopted a national Steel Action Plan based on the EU plan. Poland and other countries have intro- duced a scheme regarding the earmarking of the Emission Trading Scheme revenues. The UK has provided support to retain strong research and development facilities. Specific transition metals such as Titanium are vital for Aerospace and Defence industry, in par- ticular in Europe, which is traditionally poor in Raw Materials as compared to Asia, Africa or the Americas. Demand for Titanium will be boosted by European Aerospace or Chemical Industries, up until 2015. Titanium has properties that make it particularly useful in bridging composite and aluminum structures. European commercial aircraft manufacturer, Airbus and its competitor Boeing with a order back- log of about 10.000 aircraft worldwide in the next few years will need about hundred tones of Ti- tanium for each aircraft. For instance, the structure of Airbus A350, now in flight testing, has 14% titanium content. The problem is that actually the world largest Titanium producer is Russian company VSMPO- Avisma owned by Russian state defence conglomerate Rostec. In 2013, VSMPO, which exports 70 % of its output, raised production to 28,855 tonnes from 26,242 tonnes in 2012. VSMPO meets 60 % of Titanium products demand at Airbus and 40 % of demand at Boeing The Ukrainian crisis will not help Boeing and Airbus in getting all the supply they need. Airbus has
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threatened to terminate the $4 billion contract signed in 2010 with its Russian supplier, running until 2020. VSMPO has stated that Airbus would face penalties for terminating the contracts. Airbus officials stated that there were no short-term impacts from the crisis in Ukraine but that the firm was looking to safeguard supplies of titanium. Furthermore, Airbus has a more diversified sources of supply and gets most of its Titanium from Kazakhstan. Besides VSMPO, America's Timet, Alleghany Technologies , Japan's Toho Titanium, and China's Zunyi Titanium and Pangang and Jinchuan groups are large titanium suppliers. Conversely Chinese demand for Titanium has dropped from 60% of the world total demand, to 10% in 2013, thus leaving room for Western aircraft manufacturers.
Commission’s implementation roadmap is an initiative which has been long expected by European Defence industry. However, since expectations were high, they may not be enough for an industrial sector, which needs more than words. A few initiatives, such as the “Preparatory Action” may take too long to be implemented, and it may be too late for European companies. On the other hand, the initiatives for critical Raw Materials, including the Steel plan have been released in a timely way. It is never too late for these innovative plans, though the effects of the Ukrainian crisis on Titanium availability for Western Aircraft manufacturer have boosted the need for more of these strategic initiatives
1 Materials confirmed in the new list include: Antimony, Beryllium, Cobalt, Fluor spar, Gallium, Germa- nium, Indium, Magnesium, natural Graphite, Niobium, PGMs, REEs (heavy), REEs (light), Tungsten. Newly added materials include Borates, Chromium, Coking Coal, Magnesite, Phosphate Rock and Sili- con Metal. Tantalum, originally in the 2010 list, was removed from the new list.
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Pacific (Japan-Korea-ASEAN Countries-Australia)
The new “drone war” in the Korean skies
Stefano Felician Beccari
During the last months the North-South confrontation over the Korean peninsula has shown a new face: a series of drone incursions over the skies of South Korea (formally Republic of Korea or ROK) has been discovered and some of these airplanes have been publicly shown by the ROK Ministry of Defence (MOD). These units, allegedly sent from North Korea, have collected valuable imagery intelligence (IMINT), mainly gathered by aerial photography. Beside the pictures, many of whom collected over classified areas, two main questions have arisen: is the South Korean de- fence ready to face this threat? Are these incursions the best approach to pursue a détente between Pyongyang and Seoul? The new “drone war” over the skies of South Korea is a clear message that North Korean (formally Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) pressure is not over, but has just changed its shape. In the meanwhile the last visit to Seoul of the People's Republic of China (PRC) President has futher underlined the political isolation of Pyongyang. It is likely than instead of pursuing a strategy of decreasing the tensions in the penisula, DPRK will use (also?) the new piloteless technologies to put pressure on South Korea.
It is no secret that relations in the Korean peninsula are still tense, despite a major change in the leadership of the two sides (DPRK, 2012, ROK, 2013). Even if the first half of 2014 has passed without any major military event between the counterparts, Pyongyang is still continuing its “pres- sure policy” using a blend of rethorical attacks, launch of rockets and, maybe, looking for a fourth nuclear test. The Chinese behaviour is also influencing Pyongyang's approach. The increasing gap and lack of confidence between the PRC and DPRK is palpable. During his last visit to the Korean Peninsula, PRC's president Xi Jiping has deliberately skipped a stop in Pyongyang preferring in- stead to proceed straight for Seul. The political distrust between the two countries is blatant, even if formally DPRK and China are still allied. Therefore, the last actions of DPRK should be exam- ined considering this shaking context.
The last incursions and the drones' data During the spring of 2014 there have been at least three confirmed drone incursions over the skies of South Korea, even if there is the concrete possibility that these kind of activities have been car- ried out more than three times. The South Korean MOD has officially confirmed only three incur- sions and, understandably, has not confirmed nor denied other activities over the ROK's airspace. According to the available information it should be noticed that the drones crashed or landed within
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the South Korean territory for a mistake or due to technical failures; they were not supposed to end their journey in such way. On the other side, the three aircrafts were not targeted or hit by ROK's anti aircraft defence. The drones have been found in three different locations; the first, on March 24, in the city of Paju, one of the last South Korean settlement nearby the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the heavily-guarded land border with DPRK. The second has been discovered on March 31 in the tiny island of Baengnyeong. This island is one of the last strips of South Korean land nearby the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a contested line that separates the territorial waters of ROK and DPRK. Morevover, in the waters nearby Baengnyeong, in 2010, the ROK's Navy corvette Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo. The third drone was found on April 6 deep in South Korean territory, near the city of Samcheok, on the eastern part of the country. De- spite the differences, the three aircrafts are all Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), even if quite dif- ferent from the “traditional” ones. The Western public opinion generally identifies UAVs as medium-sized pilotless aircraft able to conduct both “kinetic” and “non kinetic” operations, even if recently the UAVs are quite popular due to some of their attack capabilities. These operations (the so-called “targeted killings”) are regularly debated on Western magazines and newspapers as well as in courts and governments. Some of these UAVs are quite famous among the public opin- ions, like the notorious US aircraft “Predator” (formally General Atomics MQ-1 Predator) or the “Global Hawk” (or Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk). Many of these systems usually are a concentrate of high technologies, with advanced attack capacities as well as sensors (i.e. cameras, infra-red or radars) capable of acquiring a vast array of information; therefore the cost of these aircrafts is very high, and only a few states can produce such units. But the reality of the recent silent confrontation over the skies of South Korea is less fascinating and especially not so packed of high-tech gadgets. On the contrary, the allegedly DPRK UAVs landed or crashed on the South Korean soil are characterized by a rudimentary chassis, small dimensions, weight and wingspan, a very limited payload, and eventually by an extremely limited (“low-tech”) control system. Ac- cording to the images released and to the information of the ROK MOD, the three drones are slightly bigger than some toys or some aircrafts used for leisure purposes: therefore some important broadcast corporations, like CNN, have immediately dubbed these UAVs as <
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sified, and it is absolutely forbidden to fly over it: but as far as we know, at least one of the drones, completely unnoticed, has been able to collect many pictures. Despite their primitive technologies and commercial cameras, the DPRK drones were able to collect a vast amount of sensitive IMINT regarding many different (possible?) targets. The second element concerns the new methodology used by the North Koreans. Despite the lack of a full evidence, it is quite likely that only the DPRK could have sent the drones over the skies of South Korea. Beside the information and the pictures gathered, to identify the possible source of these drones it is important to reflect on their physical elements. The three units are not remoted controlled aircrafts, but they were tasked to travel over a precise itinerary, and to end their journey back in DPRK, even if in an unidentified location. Moreover, according to other sources, many of the codes present in the cameras or in the drones are using Korean words and expressions which belong to the North Korean jargon. Therefore, as the ROK MOD has declared, these elements are like a <
A new asymmetric way of confrontation? From the security challenge to the political level As widely known, North and South Korea do not have any kind of political bilateral relations; it should be also considered that the two countries are technically at war, because since the end of the Korean War (1950-1953) a formal treaty of peace has never been signed. But beneath the “po- litical” surface, there have been many occasions for informal talks or just communications between the two capitals. More than sixty years of “forced cohabitation” have created a very complicated “bilateral dialectics” between the two countries. This “bilateral dialectics” includes also some limited violent acts (usually firing artillery shells or missiles) and a substantial amount of rethoric (mainly used by the North against the South) that sometimes can reach peaks of high (verbal) vi- olence. In other words, some acts that in other areas of the world would be considered hostile, in the Korean peninsula are accepted or, at least, tolerated. The recent drones flights over the skies
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of South Korea, which have sparked the rage in the Southern political and military élites, are just one of these elements of the “bilateral dialectics”, even if with some new characteristics. Due to the very poor conditions of the bilateral relations and the notorious acrimony of the DPRK against the South, regularly expressed in the North official press releases, the ways of exerting pressure on the other partner are very limited. But while South Korea keeps a more moderate approach, DPRK uses a wider array of provocations even to “communicate” with the neighbour. For instance during one of the last ROK-US joint military exercises, a DPRK military ship has trespassed the ROK maritime border for a couple of hours: it was a way to show Pyongyang's disagreement with the joint drill. The latter “drone war” is just a confirmation of this approach. But this new silent “offensive” of DPRK has found the South Korean authorities completely off-guard. How many drone operations have been conducted before the discovery of the UAVs? How many parts of the country and how many strategic installations have been photographed, even deep behind ROK borders? How can the ROK air force guarantee the security of the national air space? Now these questions are a serious concern for the ROK government: the South Korean defence is looking to quickly acquire new radars (probably from the UK and Israel) able to detect even smaller aircrafts, while there are some plans to intensify the surveillance of ROK's air space. From its side, DPRK is observing the evolution of the situation in the South. Maybe the new con- termeasures of the ROK will limit or stop any further incursion with the current drones; but using these technologies the North has shown its ability to exert political pressure on its neighbour, as well as creating many internal troubles in the ROK cabinet and in the public opinion. Therefore the latter DPRK provocation should not be considered only as a standard intelligence-gathering operation, but instead as an action able to affect also the political level.
The recent developments and the growing isolation of DPRK A few months after the emergence of the “drone war” Seul has hosted a visit of the Chinese Pres- ident. In Seoul, at the beginning of July, the South Korean President, Park Geun Hye and her Chi- nese counterpart, Xi Jinping, have met to discuss some economic and trade issues, but also the fragile security context of the Korean peninsula. RPC-ROK relations are strong, in particular re- ferring to the bilateral trade: today China is the most important partner for ROK both for imports and exports, while for China ROK is the first partner for imports. But during the recent talks be- tween Xi and Park, the topic of DPRK was also discussed. Just ahead of the bilateral meeting, DPRK's forces fired some missiles into the nearby sea, a clear sign of disappointment for the RPC- ROK visit. The reasons of this behaviour are simple. For the first time a Chinese president has snubbed Pyongyang to visit directly the North's first rival: this behaviour has been considered un- acceptable in DPRK. Despite the formal friendship between Pyongyang and Beijing, there is a growing gap in the political bilateral relations. China strongly disagrees with the “maverick” provo- cations of the North, such as the last nuclear experiment and the sporadic test of new missiles; on the other side, Seoul understands that only China could be a mediator to exert pressure over Py- ongyang. The last visit of president Xi to Seoul is a clear message to Pyongyang. China, already actively involved in many other fronts (mainly Japan and the South China Sea) has focused its at- tention on the stabilization of the peninsula. The languid Six Party Talks should restart, provoca- tions should be limited or cancelled and a possible fourth nuclear test must be avoided at all costs:
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these, in brief, seem to be the PRC's key words for the Korean peninsula. All these possibilities seems to limit Pyongyang's room for manoeuvre; therefore the North has expressed its (limited) disagreement also firing the missiles. DPRK's regime seems to be more isolated now. While the relations with Seoul remain tense (drone incursions and missile tests cannot be considered as a “confidence-building” measure) China has clearly underlined its disapproval for Pyongyang in favour of Seoul. The North now has few options to follow. Without considering on the short term a detente approach, DPRK should find other ways to put pressure, avoiding missile launches and nuclear tests. The drones seem to be a perfect solution to this plan, and, right now, can be consid- ered as a new military asset that DPRK has shown to master efficiently. Until the air space of South Korea will be monitored by a new series of radars, the ghost of a silent and bloodless “drone war” will continue to hover in the South Korean skies.
The last “drone incursions” have shown a new capability of the DPRK industrial complex. Even if these drones lack a real offensive capability, South Korea cannot ignore such an open viola- tion of its air space. A new array of radars should be installed soon, therefore in a few months Seoul should be ready to face also this threat. In the meanwhile a possible détente between the Koreas still remains a not-possible situation.
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International Organizations and Central Asia Cooperation
The crisis in Ukraine: crystallization and possible new scenarios
Lorena Di Placido
May was a month of voting for Ukraine, with referendums for the separatist groups and presidential elections for the whole country (or almost all of it). The issue of Crimea seems out of the picture and only occasionally returns to the attention of the media due to the claims of the Kiev leadership, sporadic protests by the Tatars or the growing number of displaced people that are leaving the peninsula to take refuge in west-central regions of Ukraine or abroad. Following the outcome of the 25th May elections, won by Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine has to face a new phase of its long crisis. The election of a new president to manage the political, ethno-lin- guistic and socio-economic crisis has led to high expectations that have clashed with an increas- ingly complex scenario, with growing violence still affecting the east of the country. The sanctions, which according to the EU and the United States, should have diverted Moscow from supporting the pro-Russian eastern separatists, have proved inconsistent and merely symbolic, while renewed east-west tensions are taking shape. Though hard to place within the traditional Cold War frame- work, these new tensions are clearly leading to a new balance with interesting implications even outside of Europe.
Chronology of events Pro-Russian groups scheduled a referendum for 11th May in the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk to decide on the status of the two oblast', and announced new voting on annexation to Russia. The organizers said that about 90% of voters were in favor of independence, out of a turnout of about 75% of those eligible. However, according to figures released by the Interior Ministry in Kiev, turnout was 32% in the Donetsk Oblast’ and 24% in the Lugansk Oblast'. Many foreign observers exposed confusion and irregularities in the voting process, with consequent difficulties in estimat- ing the number of voters. This uncertainty took away credibility from the referendum, which was called illegal by the government in Kiev and the Western countries. Referendums were held only in the separatist regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, while Kharkiv (where occupations and clashes between government forces and pro-Russians took place) accepted Moscow’s call to postpone the vote until after the presidential election. Although the referendums were not legally binding, they confirmed the existence of a strong sen- timent of opposition to Kiev in the eastern regions, made even more dangerous by the dramatically growing tension in that area. Government forces are engaged in operations aimed at regaining control of infrastructure and institutional offices under the control of pro-Russian groups, while
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separatists continue to stand strong against Kiev. The situation was particularly serious in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, while growing tension was reported in the south of the country. More than 40 people were killed in a fire at the House of Unions in Odessa, during clashes between protesters and pro-government separatists on 2nd May. At least 20 pro-Russian activists and a member of the security forces died in the port city of Mariupol on 9th May. Still in Mariupol, on May 14th, organized groups of workers in the local steel mills were able to regain control of the city and drive out the pro-Russian militias. Attacks on checkpoints under Kiev’s control increased on the eve of the presidential elections, and the Ukrainian authorities claimed dozens of victims in sep- arate attacks, the most serious of which took place near Blahodatne (22nd May) and Volnovakha (23rd May), both in the Donetsk region. Tension remained high in June in the areas occupied by the separatists, with the most critical sit- uations again in Lugansk, Donetsk, Mariupol and Sloviansk (the latter city was re-conquered by the Kiev forces on 13th June). The Kiev government closed some border crossings between the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk and Russia, to protect that area from the infiltration of men and military means, sparking strong protests from Moscow, which continues to reject the accusation of moral and material support to eastern secessionists. Several sources reported sightings of men and equipment from the Russian border, while some weapons used by separatists against govern- ment forces seem to have confirmed the flow of military equipment from Moscow. This was also shown by the sighting of three Russian tanks entering the eastern regions from a checkpoint guarded by the separatists in Lugansk, between 12th and 13th June, and the shooting down of a military transport aircraft in Lugansk by the separatists in the night between 13th and 14th June, which caused the death of 49 military crew members. Further tension resulted from the bombing occurred in the Poltava Region on 17th June (Poltavskaya Oblatst') on a pipeline that transports Russian gas to Western Europe, which the Kiev authorities considered a terrorist attack.
The situation also deteriorated in Kiev, due to protests set by civil society organizations (partly linked to the movements that led November-February occupations), which are strongly critical of the political management of the new Ukrainian leadership. In particular, a protest was held on 15th June to call for early parliamentary elections and the resignation of politicians deemed re- sponsible for the ineffective operations in the east (commander of the border guards, Defense and Interior ministers, the director of the intelligence services and the Attorney General). New protests followed President Poroshenko’s conciliatory steps towards the separatist regions: on June 16th, he announced the imminent presentation of a 15-point peace plan – after giving early notice of that at the 7th June inauguration ceremony – with a ceasefire as a precondition for the implemen- tation of constitutional reforms and decentralization of powers to the regions.
In June, further developments were also reported with regard to the thorny issue of the debts in- curred by Ukraine with Russia on gas supplies, for which Moscow had claimed $485.5 per 1,000 cubic meters since 1st April 2014, compared to $268.5 per 1,000 cubic meters in the previous quarter (after freezing the promised aid to Ukraine in December 2013). In addition, the Russian government asked for advance payment of gas starting from 1st June, due to the debts that Kiev
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had not yet honored, estimated by Moscow at $4.455 billion. On 2nd June, after the payment of the fee due for the first quarter of 2014 ($786 million), Kiev obtained an extension until 10th June (later postponed to 16th) for the payment of all previous debts. Negotiations for an energy agree- ment between the two countries did not produce effective results and, on 16th June, Moscow cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, continuing to ask for advance payments, but maintained the gas vol- umes for the European countries unchanged. Russia said that new negotiations would be subject to Ukraine paying all debts, while Gazprom appealed to the Stockholm Arbitration Court to defend its own rights in the ongoing dispute.
Russia’s position The EU and U.S. adopted sanctions against Russian companies and managers, accused of directly or indirectly supporting the secessionist forces in the east of Ukraine and urged Moscow to a more cooperative attitude to reach a reconciliation between the parties. NATO strengthened its presence in the Baltics and Poland, while the Russian government denied its involvement in the violence and called for the withdrawal of the army from the Ukrainian eastern regions. Following a meeting between Putin and the OSCE Presidency (held in Moscow on 7th May), Rus- sia agreed to a road map, which provided for the start (14th May, Kiev) of negotiations with rep- resentatives of the interim government of Ukraine and local leaders. The roadmap also included a ceasefire and an amnesty. The pro-Russian separatists refused to join the initiative: besides their difficulty considering Kiev as a legitimate interlocutor, the separatist groups never managed to show a common leadership being truly representative of shared goals. The whole scenario was, however, complicated by Kiev’s being available to start talks as long as the separatists laid down their arms. President Putin gradually changed his attitude with respect to the presidential vote, moving from a clear refusal to recognize the Kiev leadership – emerged as a result of the institu- tional upheaval that followed the 21st February events – to calling the presidential election a "first step" and then declaring himself ready to recognize any election result.
Despite some sporadic glimmers emerging from the long-distance dialogue between Moscow and Kiev, the difficult negotiations got even more complicated following the failure of the ceasefire in late June. After a telephone conversation with Putin in the night of 17th June, the Ukrainian pres- ident said he was ready for a unilateral ceasefire, so as to give those called "Russian mercenaries" by Kiev the time to leave Ukraine (intensifying, at the same time, the operations of the regular forces against separatists). On 20th June, Poroshenko declared a one-week ceasefire (later extended to 30th June) and unveiled a 15-point peace plan (including the decentralization of power to the regions, new parliamentary elections and the creation of a 10-km buffer zone on the border with Russia). After initially refusing the truce (with attacks on the government forces on 21st and 22nd June), on 23rd June, the Donetsk rebels said they were ready to observe the ceasefire. In contrast, Lugansk’s position on the temporary truce remained rather ambiguous. The suspension of hostil- ities was, however, quite ineffective: both sides accused each other of ceasefire violations and, after the deadline, Kiev resumed counter-terrorism operations with even greater intensity. The escalation of violence caused a growing number of people to flee from fighting areas, both internally displaced people (about 54,000) and refugees who sought shelter in Russia (110,000).
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Russia's interests Despite the sensitivity of the ongoing crisis, Russia's interests do not only involve Eastern Europe, but are again focused on the main threads of Putin’s latest foreign policies, marking future devel- opments: a harder position on the Eurasian Space (of which the Russian influence on Ukraine is a key point) and the development of the Siberian Far East. This framework includes the thirty- year contract for gas distribution of that the Russian and Chinese presidents signed in Shanghai on 21st May. The agreement provides for a very huge investment project: $55 billion will be in- vested in the construction of infrastructure for the production and transportation of gas; an exten- sive connection infrastructure will be built in eastern Russia, within the regional overall development project called Razvitie (which means Development, launched in February 2013), while the metallurgical, engineering and pipe industries will in turn benefit from the implementa- tion of every part of the agreement. As for the gas, the agreement includes the supply of 38 billion cubic meters of gas in 30 years, with the first portion to be sold in 2018. The contract value for Gazprom is $400 billion. The cost of gas per cubic meter for China will be similar to that for Eu- ropean buyers, i.e. around $350-380. A new pipeline will be built to provide Siberian gas to China from fields other than those that supply Europe: the Russian side will invest €55 billion in the de- posits of Kovytka and Chayandin, while China will grant a minimum of $20 billion for various investments. So, while the Ukrainian crisis is leading to a new balance in Eastern Europe, Russia does not lose sight of the consolidation of the development project in its Far Eastern regions, considered as a priority and necessarily intended to tie the fate of Moscow with Beijing’s.
Final remarks A new international framework is emerging, but it is not comparable to the Cold War scenario, which was marked by two opposing sides with a clear leadership, recognizing each other as equal opponents with global aspirations. Today, the United States (lonely unipolar power) and its allies are opposed to a Russia, which is focused on itself and the maintenance of traditional spheres of influence within the former Soviet Union, with the Eurasian Union project as a necessary means to benefit from traditional cooperation. Moreover, the economy, which is stagnant and too depend- ent on the energy sector, urgently needs to be revitalized. This goal can be reached through the implementation of a comprehensive infrastructural and industrial restructuring, starting from the Far Eastern Siberian regions, to be turned into a driving force for the overall development of the country. This project can be successful only if based on a preferential relationship with China. This approach, though aimed at increasing Russia’s overall weight, does not grant Moscow the status of a global and equal rival to the United States, but identifies it as a regional power with limited and targeted aspirations. So the rules of the current bilateral relationship are different: while during the Cold War confrontation was hard and tough sanctions were imposed to repress mutual violations, the conflict is now essentially bland and sanctions are little more than symbolic. Only tones are typical of a bipolar confrontation, at the expense of the eastern European stability, and in favor of an imbalance of Moscow's interests towards Asia. This situation does not serve ei- ther Russia or Europe, which – though hard to admit – still need each other to grow, whereas the geo-strategic and geo-economic strengthening of China – also favored by the alliance with Moscow
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– is likely to cause medium-to-long-term damage to Russia itself. To avoid a progressive isolation of Russia and an imbalance of Moscow's interests towards the Siberian Far East, it would be necessary to break the deadlock of negotiations, considering some basic needs of the protagonists of the Ukraine crisis:
• Ukraine: it needs to cope with its “border-land” status, trying to take advantage of it to become a bridge between east and west, rather than give in to the clashing interests of Moscow, Brussels and Washington. Although it is not that easy under the present conditions, Kiev should not ruin relations with its largest trading partner, Russia, in favor of a pro-European choice, which is a good opportunity for growth, but not enough to fill the void caused by a potential break of the historical relations with Moscow. • Separatist regions: free from any biased manipulation, what happened from April 2014 onwards proves the extreme vulnerability of the eastern regions of Ukraine with respect to the perception of a deep gap between them and Kiev. • Russia: Kiev’s decision to cooperate with the Brussels structures rather than with the Eurasian Economic Union, has increased Russia’s belief (which Moscow has had since the end of the Cold War) that the Western countries are constantly trying to isolate Moscow. To overcome the existing differences, it is necessary to look beyond the current situation and start thinking about shared interests (cross-border relations, energy transit, international trade). By fo- cusing on common benefits (instead of biased interests), it might be easier to flip the role of Kiev (bridge rather than border land), enhance the specific features of the eastern regions (economic engine and mining hub as well as a connection to a fundamental economic partner for the country) and make Russia feel as part of Europe and a real Eurasian power, keeping it away from the trap of an ever more exclusive cooperation with China. With a clear benefit for all interested parties, including Europe.
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China’s Nuclear Weapons: The American view lucio Martino
The Pentagon's annual report to Congress on military and security developments in the People's Republic of China analyses the Chinese strategic vision and describes the processes of development and modernization. The report issued early June 2014 described the People's Republic of China's apparent intention to follow a complex long-term modernization program, primarily by improving the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short high intensity regional conflicts. Preparing for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, especially in order to deter or defeat the intervention of third countries, remains the primary objective of Chinese military investment. However, with the growing international interest and importance of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese military machine appears to be slowly evolving towards effectively addressing very different con- tingencies, including those distant from their own shores. Although there has been progress and improvement in the dialogue between the United States and the People’s Republic of China for some years now, issues of strategic significance between the two countries remain unresolved, above all those relating to the growth of Chinese military ex- penditures. In 2013, the Beijing authorities announced an increase of almost six percent in military spending, now estimated to be about one hundred and twenty billion dollars a year, thus confirming a two-decade trend of steady increases. Of great concern, at least in the United States, is the in- vestment of a significant amount of resources in the modernization of short-, medium- and long- range nuclear forces to be based on land and at sea. The United States estimates that the nuclear arsenal of the People's Republic of China is slowly increasing both qualitatively and quantitatively. Sources independent of the U.S. government es- timate that the People’s Republic of China has approximately two hundred and fifty nuclear war- heads, with delivery entrusted to approximately one hundred and fifty ballistic carriers, mostly ground-based short- and medium-range missiles, and to a continually increasing number of aircraft carriers and submarines. Currently, about sixty intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are ca- pable of reaching the United States. The U.S. Intelligence Community expects that by the middle of the next decade Beijing could double the number of ICBMs capable of directly threatening North America. In terms of nuclear weapons, there is little or nothing new in the Military and Security Develop- ments Involving the People's Republic of China 2014 (MSDIPRC 2014). This edition confirms the previously reported steady progress of all nuclear weapons programs. Three important points have been verified. The first is the construction of new nuclear submarines equipped with a larger
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number of ballistic missile launch tubes than on preceding versions. The second is the gradual elimination of old DF-3A intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBM). The third is the unex- pected stall in the development of a new ICBM, the DF-31. Although a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the People’s Republic of China is currently expanding its nuclear capacities, as are other countries with analogue weapons. From information contained in the MSDIPRC 2014, given the numerically small size of the Chi- nese nuclear arsenal compared to that of other nuclear powers, the U.S. Department of Defense appears to attribute this process of expansion of nuclear forces to China's objective of ensuring the maintenance of their capacity to reply effectively to a surprise attack. In any case, this year's report continues the policy adopted by the Obama administration of not providing numerical data relating to the volume of Beijing's missile arsenal. Until 2010, the annual reports of the Department of Defense on the Chinese military system included a table illustrating an overview of the composition of the missile force. In more recent years, this overview has grad- ually become less detailed, disappearing completely in the 2013 edition. Regardless of the quan- titative aspect of China's strategic nuclear arsenal, it is indisputable that the missile capabilities of the People’s Republic of China are undergoing a major modernization process, with the older liq- uid-fuelled mobile missiles gradually being replaced with new long-range missiles fired by solid propellants. These efforts mean that in the near future a large part of the Chinese missile compo- nents will be characterized by a greater range and still greater survivability. This year's report, for the first time, formally identifies the new mobile ICBM, discussed since at least 1997 as the DF-41. The new missile is expected to be capable of carrying multiple re-entry vehicles. It is therefore interesting to note that the U.S. Intelligence Community has always con- sidered this kind of ballistic missile as loaded with a single warhead, while for more than a decade the Department of Defense has maintained that the People’s Republic of China has developed the capacities necessary to equip missiles such as the DF-5A with multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRV). It would seem that the Chinese MIRV capability could not fail to affect the development of U.S. strategic defensive systems, because the Chinese authority's development of the necessary capa- bilities to equip its new ICBMs with multiple warheads, even at the cost of significantly reducing the range, reveals their intentions to be able to respond quickly to any strong future improvement of the U.S. anti-missile defense systems. The stance taken by the Obama administration concerning anti-missile defense is characterized by a co-existence of a strong continuity and remarkable changes from the path followed by the previous administration. The changes are in part explained by the progress reached by other coun- tries in the development of short- and mid-range ballistic missiles, but not in developing of ana- logue intercontinental capacities, so far generally hampered by delays. The deployment of a missile defense system strictly based in Europe was therefore abandoned, and in its place a multi-phase project took form, with the aim of assuring an immediate protection against short- and mid-range ballistic missiles. On the other hand, again, President Obama has not hindered with the realization of anti-missile defense systems initiated by his predecessor with the purpose of protecting the United States from a small long range ballistic threat. The MSDIPRC 2014 also implies the truth of the rumors that the distribution of the DF-31 to the military came to a halt after the deployment of a dozen items within a single brigade. Intended to
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replace the DF-4 and be deployed alongside the out-dated liquid-fuel DF-5A ICBMs, which thanks to its range of approximately thirteen thousand kilometers have threatened the American and Russ- ian land masses since the early Eighties, the DF- 31 is the terrestrial version of the JL-2, with which it shares a slow and arduous development history. The Chinese ICBM fleet modernization process indicates a commissioning of the DF-31A, and the U.S. Department of Defense report as- sumes its deployment by the end of next year. Given that in the entire document there is no mention of the liquid fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) known as DF-3A, we may infer that Beijing has finally decided to cancel a weapon system which is now over forty years old. Another Chinese mobile ballistic missile using com- bustible fuels may soon share this fate, the DF-4, only a dozen of which are still in operation. The entire Chinese ballistic liquid fuel arsenal would then amount in only twenty DF-5AS, and for now at least, no modernization program seems in place. On the other hand, the Chinese military system is actively engaged in the development of new medium- and long-range solid-fuel ballistic carriers. Among these is the anti-ship version of the DF-21, the DF-21D. The U.S. Department of Defense report confirms that the Chinese navy has taken delivery of three Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and the advanced stage of the construction of two additional units of the same class. The next decade should then witness the creation of a class of third-generation SSBN, currently referred to as Type 096. Unless it is planned to put them to sea without an armed payload, the imminent deployment of the first Jin class units should also involve the operation, at the end of a long gestation, of maritime ballistic missile (SLBM) JL-2. Equipped with a single warhead, and perhaps penetration aids as well, the JL-2 is estimated to be able to cover distances of seven thousand miles, not enough to threaten the U.S. national territory, unless the loaded submarine is stationed in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. The confirmation of the forthcoming entry into service of the new generation of Jin-class SSBN is one of the most interesting and controversial items in the MSDIPRC 2014, because the People's Re- public of China has so far not claimed strategic capabilities such as those guaranteed by the SSBN operational cruises, and because it implies China's acquisition of the sophisticated command, con- trol, communications and computerization capabilities. In addition, the deployment by Beijing of the Jin class of submarines armed with nuclear-tipped SLBMs represents a major change in their complete deterrent-use philosophy. It represents the first deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territory. In any case, the number of doctrinal, operational and technical limitations that the Chinese SSBN fleet is destined to face raises eyebrows among observers of the Chinese sub- marine strategy. Chinese nuclear weapons aboard SSBN vessels in the Pacific Ocean are vulnerable to attack by hostile forces and, in fact, appear to expose Beijing to risks far greater than those re- sulting from a dispersion of its nuclear weapons within its enormous mainland territories. Another important aspect to consider in this year's report signed by the Department of Defense is seen in the lack of an explicit attribution of nuclear capacity to the growing inventory of Chinese cruise missiles. Yet, for some time, the DH-10 has generally been considered capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. In addition, the DH-10 was recently modified for the transport aboard H-6K long-range bombers, difficult to explain in the absence of an effective nu- clear capability. During a visit to California in summer 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Obama
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stated that the People’s Republic of China and the United States must continue to work together to build a "new model" of relationships, in order to expand areas of practical cooperation and con- structively manage the differences that still characterize their bilateral relations. During 2013, as part of a short series of high-level bilateral meetings, the leadership of the two countries repeatedly agreed that a new "potential and substantial" dialogue between the respective military systems would favor greater understanding and expanded mutual trust. In this context, the U.S. Department of Defense has sought to build a military relationship with the People’s Republic of China to en- courage a constructive contribution by the Chinese to the efforts made by the United States, the Allies and partners to ensure peace and international stability. In its entirety, the MSDIPRC 2014 reflects this state of affairs, while not failing to indicate how much more work is still needed in this direction, especially in light of the swinging pendulum between rhetoric statements and inter- national activities recently undertaken by the People's Republic of China. Over the past decade, Chinese political leaders have taken to describing the first two decades of the twenty-first century as a "period of strategic opportunity." In their assessment, during this pe- riod, the international conditions continue to favor the national development and international ex- pansion of the "comprehensive national power", which includes all the elements of state power, among them economic and military strength and diplomatic powers. In line with this interpretation, Chinese leaders predict that an expansion of the global success of national power could not help but be to the advantage of their leading national strategic objectives, which include the preservation of the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the maintenance internal political stability and the defense of national unity. The debate in the U.S. regarding the real possibility of China exploiting this period of strategic opportunity is far from exhausted. However, at least for the mo- ment, the most widely shared thesis describes a People’s Republic of China intent on achieving and consolidating great power status through the creation and supply of the capabilities required for the protection of maritime communication channels, to defend its territorial claims, and fight and overcome potential conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. From the moment when, thirty-five years ago, the People's Republic of China embarked on their unequalled path of reform and openness, the essential elements of the strategy chosen to achieve these goals have re- mained relatively unchanged. The Chinese leaders have adopted a pragmatic approach to interna- tional relations and economic development that aims to strengthen the economy, modernize the armed forces and solidify the power of the CCP. Within this context, even the U.S. Defense Department seems to believe that the People’s Republic of China cannot avoid acknowledging that stable relations with its neighbors and with the United States are essential for their own national stability and development. On the other hand, the People's Republic of China continues to identify the United States as the principal regional and global actor and, therefore, the only power which is consistently capable of supporting as well as obstructing Chinese ascendency. Nevertheless, recent obvious efforts by the Beijing authorities to defend "na- tional sovereignty and territorial integrity" have often resulted in much more decisive and con- frontational behaviors than those which would be congruous with their rhetorical choices. There have been no end of examples, ranging from the recent maritime disputes with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines in the South and Western China Sea to the punitive use of trade policy as an instrument of international coercion, all measures justified as responses to un-instigated threats or
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provocations by external actors. For the U.S. Department of Defense, the lack of transparency sur- rounding the growing Chinese military capabilities and their decision-making processes cannot but lead to that increasing mistrust of Chinese intentions which has always characterized the other countries in the region, a diffidence which has encouraged these powers in their strategic ap- proaches to the United States and, therefore, the success of that reorientation towards Asia-Pacific region that seems increasingly destined to characterize the future heritage of the Obama adminis- tration.
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Lebanon and Afghanistan: strategic operational theatres
Claudio Bertolotti
Lebanon: analysis on consequences of the Syrian crisis From the Lebanese “cedars revolution” in 2005, and the ensuing withdrawal of Syrian forces, to the current conflict in Syria, the United Nations Mission named “Unifil” and the international community have supported the conditions for a general stability in the country. The aforementioned Lebanese uprising (or “Lebanese spring”), anticipated the more recent so- called Arab spring. At that time, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese people protested in the street in the aftermath of the assassination of prime minister Rafiq Hariri. That partly spontaneous and partly organized protest led to the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon after almost 30 years. In brief, since 2001 Lebanon managed to stay out of the conflict in Syria, despite the support Salafi elements have provided to the opposition to Bashar al-Assad. It is clear that the Sunni anti-Syrian attitude and the will to prevail over the Shias and Hezbollah loom as shadows over some of these groups. On the other hand, the part of Hezbollah having links with Iran and Syria and committed to support the Syrian regime is aware of the delicate internal situation. Consequently, it opted for a lower profile, almost supporting the institutions in Lebanon. Last, but not least, we should also consider the moderating role played by the Christians within the institutions. Coupled to social, cultural, and confessional reasons are geopolitical factors and mechanisms that set the pace of a composite and instable conflict. Therefore, it is necessary analyze the direct and indirect effects of the Syrian crisis over the subjects involved.
Lebanon: domestic political situation It is, in brief, a delicate internal situation. Given the strong uncertainty generated by the conflict in Syria, the Lebanese community logic allowed the political forces to extend the mandate of the parliament by 17 months until 20 November 2014. Implementing such a formally unconstitutional provision was possible thanks to the informal agree- ment among the major political and confessional groups. Whatever the solution will be, it has to rest on consensus to last. Consequently, we may have a long crisis. The Christian-Maronites and the Druzes formations still seem to enjoy the genuine support by the respective electorate. Shias and Sunnis – on the contrary – are revolving around complex regional
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clusters. However, although there is an active participation on the Syrian front, Hezbollah has adopted a more accommodating attitude towards the possible rivals and has shown no interest in forceful actions aimed at standing out nationally.
Hezbollah On a different note, flanking Assad’s government in a resistance war is a must for Hezbollah. As far as the role of the latter is concerned and apart from any consideration, it is assessed a military disengagement of Hezbollah from Syria is anything but likely for the engagement is strategically required in both the political and military domains. Despite that, Hezbollah is interested in keeping the profile as low as possible in order to supporting the regime and protecting its survival. Such an unbalanced mix of pros and cons that may lead, in turn, to a satisfactory scenario. Hezbol- lah has accepted the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces in Dahie and in the Bekaa valley. Although many analysts have underestimated the event, it could be the first step towards the in- stitutionalization of the monopoly of force, and therefore as the beginning of the process towards the realization of the Lebanese state. Beyond the mere propaganda spread by the media, realpolitik pushed Hezbollah to assume an ac- tive role in the Syrian war in order to have free access to the lines of communications to Iran. Moreover, should the regime of al-Assad fall, Hezbollah would suffer a deathlike isolation. Last, but not least, sound political pragmatism comes into play as Hezbollah shares with the Syrian government not the will to fight the Sunnis in Syria, but rather the will to oppose the spreading of radicalism of Salafi fundamentalists. The latter may pose a threat to Hezbollah in Lebanon directly from Syria, a threat that is even greater given the possible fall of the regime in Damascus, as some recent and violent events confirm. In addition, Hezbollah currently needs to regain the domestic consensus partially lost due to the many casualties the fallen in the battle in Syria. Therefore, there are many reasons for being in Syria, and very few for leaving. Lebanese sunnis
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the victories obtained by the Syrian armed opposition groups have inspired many Lebanese Sunnis coreligionists in their effort to ideally oppose Hezbol- lah, which is militarily engaged in Syria along with Assad’s forces. In short, Lebanese sunnis are increasingly divided between hawks and doves.
The role of the refugees Since much hosting space is required, thousands of Sunni Syrians from the Idlib and Hims regions are currently hosted in the Gabal Amil region dominated by Hezbollah and occupied by a Shia majority. Any support from the international community – and from Europe in the first place – can indeed make a difference with respect to refugees, and alleviate the recent tensions the crisis tends to ag- gravate. The history of Lebanon shows how refugees can become a source of instability. There is more to say, however, about the Palestinian refugees, who have always been at the core of regional insta-
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bility. While no one can exclude propaganda in and recruitment from within the camps, the direct involvement of Palestinians in the current conflict is unlikely, also for the (justified) fear of be- coming once again the victims of violence.
Jihadist groups The increasing role played by jihad-inspired armed groups in Syria raises increasing concerns, also for the repercussions on Lebanon. The Syrian conflict has attracted thousands of jihadist fighters from the Middle East and North Africa and Europe (many from Bosnia, but also from European nations such as Germany, France, etc. A case in point is the death in combat of Giuliano “Ibrahim” Delnevo among the supposed 40-50 Italian jihadists). They have responded to the call of jihad in surprisingly huge numbers to the point that one can refer to a ‘complex militant Sunni galaxy of non-state actors’. Among these hundreds groups is Jabhat al-Nusra (included by the US in the list of the most dan- gerous terrorist organizations), composed of dozens of armed groups, but also the ISIS and al- Qa’ida Iraq, which has sent a large group of fighters to join their Syrian counterpart (including the “Abdullah Azzam Brigades”, “Fatah al-Islam” and the “Jordan Salafi” jihadists). The effort – which includes ‘moderate Islamic groups’ and true ‘jihadist ones’ – has caused the direct inter- vention of Shia Hezbollah, as recalled. Such a presence raises more than simple concerns about the security of Lebanon, as the tension and the violent episodes occurred between those who support and those who oppose the regime in Damascus have shown. Violence occurred in Tripoli and Sidon, where Syrian antagonist groups are supposedly hosted, and in Beirut, were some suicide attacks and bomb attacks occurred since October 2013 (some attacks have been claimed by the “Abdullah Azzam Brigades” jihadist group).
Unifil The matter concerns a theatre of operations where Italy has deployed 2,700 personnel immediately after the un security council approved resolution 1701, and where 1,100 soldiers are still engaged. Italy has played a leading role from the political and military point of view. Theoretically speaking, the area would have to include all the possible entry points, which, in turn, could have bothered the political and religious sensitivity in Lebanon heavily. Concerning the generally critical situation, among the available options are: - a humanitarian safe area at the border between Syria and Lebanon to support the refugees and, indirectly, the Lebanese authorities. Such a solution is very difficult to implement, as it may be entrenched in trans-boundary Salafi or Hezbollah flows, depending on the area. - Another option considers providing strong political-military and technical-military support to the sovereignty of Lebanese authorities. In the technical-military domain, this translates into support to the Lebanese armed forces for them to express better operational capabilities.
Brief analysis The situation in Syria is cause and consequence of a greater regional crisis. Solving it would require a prior agreement among the major international stakeholders.
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The presence of the International community is essential to implement a solution to the Syrian crisis and provide Lebanon with special support. In short, sectarian violence, separations and contrasts among the different Muslim factions from abroad, may well lead violence to escalate beyond control. Lebanon is looking for support: Europe should respond to this direct request, notwithstanding the current economic crisis.
The future of the Nato presence in Afghanistan: Mission 2.0 In line with the official NATO’s strategic road map, formal disengagement from the Afghan war is underway. The US-led “International Security Assistance Force” mission will conclude formally the 31st of December 2014 and a new NATO mission will start on January 1st, 2015 with the name of “Resolute Support Mission” (RSM): in total, not less than 8,000 troops and not more than 12,000; advisors, trainers and special operation forces but not conventional combat troops (offi- cially a formal Security Agreement between the Afghan government, the United States and Nato is required). This step represents the symbolic watershed for international commitment in South Asia: a com- mitment based on a four years economical support to the Afghan government and on a security support to the Afghan National Security Forces which is aimed to the implementation of cooper- ation and development projects as well as for the protection of the national interests of the donors engaged in the country. In brief, - talks and negotiations are involving the US, the Taliban and the Afghan government; - the US placed Afghanistan in a peripheral position: an interest limited to maintaining the ability to be ready to operate – eventually with drone and air forces – on the regional level; - the Nato mission in Afghanistan is changing its name, size and mandate and will no longer be able to ensure widespread operational support to complex operations; - the US, and consequentially Nato, are going to create the chance to maintain a long-term presence and the management of important strategic military bases in the country; - the ANSF are afflicted by structural and operational limitations; it is assessed that, in the medium-term, are unable to guarantee security and control autonomously, in particular in the rural areas and in the southern and eastern parts of the country; - the Armed Opposition Groups (Taliban firstly) will keep on expanding their operational and political capabilities through the negotiation process and opposition activities. The time line: - 2014 is the year of the substantial breakdown of the “military's approach”; - 2015 Us is going to maintain presence in Afghanistan and support to Afghan government; - 2016 main US and Nato forces could leave Afghanistan (leaving a residual force for coun- terterrorism operations and advisory activities).
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