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ISSUE 2 - 2014 Q UARTERLY YEAR XII ISSUE 1I 2014 CeMiSS Quarterly is a review supervised by CeMiSS director, Major General Nicola Gelao. It provides a forum to promote the knowledge and understanding of international security affairs, military strategy and other topics of significant interest. The opinions and conclusions expressed in the articles are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Italian Ministry of Defence. SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE Syrian foreign fighters and the Balkans A new challenge for political Islamism in South Eastern Europe Paolo Quercia 5 LATIN AMERICA Latin America: a deadly pandemic Alessandro Politi 11 MIDDLE EAST - PERSIAN GULF The Sunni front and the Iraqi crisis Nicola Pedde 19 AFRICA The fourth EU-Africa Summit Marco Massoni 25 CHINA The end of the Third Plenum's reformist wave? Nunziante Mastrolia 33 INDIA Introducing Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the new India he wants to shape Claudia Astarita 39 EUROPEAN DEFENCE INITIATIVES A new deal for European Defence Industry Claudio Catalano 45 PACIFIC (JAPAN-KOREA - ASEAN COUNTRIES - AUSTRALIA The new “drone war” in the Korean skies Stefano Felician Beccari 51 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CENTRAL ASIA COOPERATION The crisis in Ukraine: crystallization and possible new scenarios Lorena Di Placido 57 NATO -TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS China’s Nuclear Weapons: The American view Lucio Martino 63 FOCUS Lebanon and Afghanistan: strategic operational theatres Claudio Bertolotti 69 QUARTERLY Military Center for Strategic Studies Department of International Relations Palazzo Salviati Piazza della Rovere, 83 00165 – ROME - ITALY tel. 00 39 06 4691 3204 fax 00 39 06 6879779 e-mail [email protected] Year XII N° II - 2014 South Eastern Europe Syrian foreign fighters and the Balkans A new challenge for political Islamism in South Eastern Europe Paolo Quercia Several countries in the Western Balkans have recently increased their measures to prevent the return home of jihadist fighters from Syria. Starting from the summer 2013, numerous European governments and security agencies have increased the level of attention to this phenomenon, after the number of returnees from the Syrian conflict started picking up. The alarm demonstrated its deadly relevance when, on May 24th, a French citizen, who was a former Syrian jihadist, assaulted a Jewish museum in Bruxelles. The return of jihadists from the Syrian battlefield in the first se- mester of 2014 has been facilitated by the military success of the government forces and – at the same time – by the growing infra-conflictuality between anti-Assad militias and especially between the Western sponsored militias part of the Free Syrian Army network and ISIS, the group that hosts the highest number of foreign fighters. The reduction in the strategic ambitions of the FSA and of its possibility for success in the medium-term has also reduced the inflow of fighters from Western countries to Syria, especially the part of it that has happened under the scrutiny and facilitation of the Turkish and other Western security agencies. A great number of Euro-Mediterranean countries is considering the return of Syrian jihadist fighters as one of the most dangerous emerging threats to national security. This is confirmed by the fact that a growing number of countries are introducing new laws, or other administrative measures, to discourage or impede their nationals to return home after having spent a fighting period in Syria. Turkey, for the strategic role of hub and entry point for the war in Syria played in the last years, is probably the country that could be mostly concerned with the attempts of other States to regulate and redirect the incoming flux of Syrian fighters veterans. A widespread policy of non-acceptance of jihadist returnees in Europe and in the Middle-East will de facto result in their permanence in Syria/Iraq, or in a concentration of hun- dreds or thousand of former fighters in neighbouring Turkey. The security authorities of Morocco, for example, started some months ago to practice a policy of arrest of the jihadists returning from Syria, with the not so hidden intent to discourage and obstruct the home return of Morocco national jihadist. In February 2014, Saudi Arabia has included ISIS and al-Nusra in the list of terrorist or- ganisations. The King’s decree granted a minimal “amnesty” period of 15 days to all its citizens to return to Saudi Arabia. Since March 2014, any Saudi Arabian citizen who joins abroad a listed terrorist organisation to fight in its rank in a foreign conflict commits a crime punishable with up to 20 years of jail. Similar steps have been undertaken by Kuwait and by the United Arab Emirates. Naturally, the fact that a significant number of countries adopted (or are going to adopt) such leg- islations, it doesn’t imply that an efficient counter-jihadist architecture has been put in place at in- 5 Year XII N° II - 2014 South Eastern Europe ternational judicial level. In fact, the crucial aspect remains the different naming of the groups that each country decides to enlist, according to its political preferences and national security necessi- ties. Saudi Arabia – for example – named ISIS, al-Nusra and the same Muslim Brotherhood among the terrorist organisation. The recent measures introduced by some Muslim and European States have de facto activated a complex and ambiguous strategic “game” aimed at reducing, controlling or diverting the flux of jihadist returnees. Handling this phenomenon in a global-jihad context is one of the most complex issue for the homeland security management. Usually there are different counter-terrorist approaches to curb international jihadism and its return-flows: fighting proselytism and recruiting networks at home, facilitating its delocalisation abroad, preventing its repa- triation from jihad areas. These approaches are usually blended together in very specific strategies, which may differ according to nature, size and origin of the jihadist phenomenon, interchanging the prevention tools with the de-radicalisation ones. In this context, South Eastern Europe assumes a very peculiar role, not only for the bonding function performed by Turkey between the Balkans and the Middle East, but also for a growing direct involvement of Balkan Islam into Syrian conflict. In recent months, a number of Western Balkans countries have been adopting or discussing counter-jihadist measures, specifically tailored to prevent the return of foreign fighters from Syria. The role of the Balkan countries in Syrian Jihad. Since 2014, the necessity of criminalising jihadist proselytism has emerged also in the Balkans, where a prevalent political trend seems to encourage the introduction of the “crime of recruitment of foreign fighters”. In April 2014, Bosnia Herzegovina, the country of the region where most of jihadists are coming from, has approved a so called “anti jihad” law, forbidding to every citizen of the country to fight abroad, sanctioning it with 10 years of jail. Kosovo has also approved an anti jihad law, while Serbia is working on a draft law that will criminalise the participation of their citizens to paramilitary activities abroad. Other countries of the region are working on similar initiatives. In order to better focus the phenomenon, it is important to start from the quantitative data, even if estimates differs significantly and are all based on sources that can not be verified. There is a general consensus on the fact that there are several thousands of foreign fighters in Syria. One of the most authoritative source is the English institute ICSR, that put up to a maximum of 11.000 the number of foreign jihadists having fought in Syria, while minimum estimates start from no less than 4.000. Even considering the lowest estimate the number is impressing, compared for example with the estimated 10.000 foreign fighters that are believed having fought in Afghanistan during 10 years of conflict. ICSR considers the Balkans to be the third region of recruitment after Middle East and Western Europe, with as much as 500 jihadists. Considering that it is a relatively low population area, the number of jihadists is a significant one if counted per capita. If these figures will be confirmed, it shouldn’t be inappropriate to talk of a new unprecedented explosion of jihadism in the Balkans. Different security agencies of the region have confirmed the magnitude of the phenomenon in Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro. A more accurate indicator is given by the number of identified jihadists from the Western Balkans fallen in Syria. This figure is no smaller than 18, almost equally divided between the Slavic speak- 6 Year XII N° II - 2014 South Eastern Europe ing and the Albanian speaking population. Bosnia Herzegovina is the country with the highest number of death fighters, followed by Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro. The last jihadist fallen in Syria coming from the former Jugoslav area has been Midhat Đono, Bosnian citizen, who died on 2 June 2014, in Northern Syria. He was born in Hadžići, a village close to Sarajevo. He is the 7th Bosnian citizen died while fighting in Syria. In march 2014 Ferid Tatarević, from Zenica, who had a past fighting history with the El Mudhaeidin brigade during the Bosnian war was killed. Previously other BiH citizens were reported death in Syria: Derviš Halilović from Nemila, Senad Kobaš from Travnik, Emedin Velić from Sarajevo and Muaz Šabić, Mirza Ganić from Zenica. Another area of former Yugoslavia that revealed to be a breeding ground for jihadism is the Muslim inhabited parts of Serbia, Sandjack and Presevo. Eldar Kundaković from Novi Pazar, Rasim Zeqiri and Muaz Ahmeti from Presevo and the Montenegrin Adis Salihović from Rožaja were also reported having found death while fighting in Syria. Two dead were Kosovo citizens, Naman Damolli from Priština and Muhamet Koprova from Mitrovica.

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