Ruining the King’s Cause in America: The Defeat of the Loyalists in the Revolutionary South,1774-1781 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Daniel Conor Troy, M.A. Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2015 Dissertation Committee: Peter R. Mansoor, Advisor John L. Brooke Mark Grimsley AndreW J. O’Shaughnessy, University of Virginia Copyright by Daniel Conor Troy 2015 Abstract This dissertation examines the dynamics of political violence in the Revolutionary South from 1774 to 1776 as manifested in the rebels’ strategy to overthrow the royal provincial governments in that region. It connects the failure of the British to recapture the southern provinces beginning in 1779 to this strategy implemented early in the War. It also offers a logic to the violence of the war in the South, Which is often depicted as random and lacking any broader purpose but annihilation of the American Loyalists. British strategy for the southern colonies throughout the war was heavily reliant on the support of Loyalists, a reality that the rebels understood even before the war began. Most historians who have written on the British southern strategy have argued that the British failure was due to exaggerated reports of Loyalist strength in the South, usually the result of misleading reports from self-interested Loyalist officials or officials in London Who had no better solution and grasped desperately for any proposal that looked promising. These historians have often draWn their evidence from the letters of General Charles, Lord CornWallis, Who had similar complaints about the Loyalists, Who he believed Were to blame for his lack of success. ii Recently historians have started to question this historiographical argument, suggesting that those of Loyalist sentiment Were more numerous and willing to act than previously assumed. As With their earlier counterparts, however, these historians suggest the rebels undertook an indiscriminate and brutal campaign of violence aimed at simply eradicating Loyalists in a process reminiscent of The Terror to come in the French Revolution. The rebels’ strategy instead emphasized control more than indiscriminate destruction. They Were not attempting to eradicate an irreconcilable population or “purify” their society, the actions typically associated with revolutionary violence. The real threat for the rebels Was the British rather than the Loyalists. As a result they used violent as well as non-violent measures to control the Loyalists and prevent them from supporting the British. So long as they could maintain that control, they often avoided expending the resources that Would have been required to capture, imprison, and even execute large numbers of Loyalists. The rebels maintained this strategy of control throughout the War, even through conventional military defeats. Though the British had a number of battlefield victories beginning in 1779, they did not understand how to leverage Loyalist support. They instead expected Loyalists to find their own Way to British lines, over miles of territory controlled by the rebels. When this did not yield the expected support, the British blamed the Loyalists, calling them Weak, lazy, and indifferent. The British debated whether they should organize support through conciliatory measures, including offering political incentives, or through punitive measures to punish those Who did not actively support the British. The iii historiography mirrors this debate, but neither measure Would have brought the British success. They did not understand hoW the rebels maintained their control over the population, did not prioritize intelligence or other measures that Would allow them to tell friend from foe and isolate rebels from the population, and failed to temper expectations for the long-term process of organizing and training Loyalist militia. The British southern strategy Was not a hopeless cause, even as late in the war as 1779. The fundamental mistake the British made Was instead in failing to first understand their opponent’s strategy. iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank the many people Who made this dissertation possible. My advisor, Peter Mansoor, saW this project through from start to finish, providing feedback, advice and encouragement along the Way. John Brooke has been involved about as long, since this dissertation first took shape as more than an idea in his seminar, and he always encouraged me to look at the material from neW perspectives. Mark Grimsley took on this project on very short notice, for which I am grateful, and provided similarly helpful advice and encouragement. Finally, I am grateful to AndreW Jackson O’Shaughnessy of the University of Virginia for taking time out of his very busy schedule to act as an outside reader on my committee. I would also like to thank the staff in the Ohio State History Department, and particularly Jim Bach who patiently answered countless questions about navigating the process of graduate studies. Thank you as well to my felloW graduate students in the History Department at The Ohio State University, particularly the Military History Reading Group, for their advice, support, brilliance, and company. I am indebted to various organizations that provided me With financial assistance that made researching and Writing this dissertation possible. These include the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, the Lynde and Harry v Bradley Foundation, the North Caroliniana Society and the History Department at The Ohio State University. I Would also like to thank the friendly and extremely helpful staffs at the Georgia Historical Society, the Hargrett Library at the University of Georgia, the South Carolina Historical Society, the South Caroliniana Library at the University of South Carolina, the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, the Duke University Rubenstein Library, the University of North Carolina Wilson Library (including the Southern Historical Collection and the North Carolina Collection), Davidson College, and the National Archives in KeW, London. Though they can’t read and I suspect Would be much more interested in a dog treat than being mentioned here, I am grateful for the company of the dogs who kept me company during the long Writing process. Pogo Was present from start to finish, and Peppe, Seamus, and Abby, all slept at my side for major portions of the writing process. They were alWays Willing to provide me With a much-needed distraction, Whether it Was tug-of-war with a rope bone or going for a long walk. Most importantly, thank you to my parents, Daniel and Kathleen, and my sister and brother-in-law, Meghan and Kevin for their support and encouragement. When my sister and I Were kids, my parents, both former history teachers, took the family to countless battlefields, national parks and other historic sites, and developed a life-long love of history. My dad read and provided feedback on the first draft of every chapter of this dissertation, for Which I am very grateful. My mom, sister and brother-in-law also provided invaluable “research” and a sense of himor by sending me pictures of historic markers they saW while on vacation in Charleston, Beaufort, and elsewhere in South Carolina. vi Vita 2000……………………….………………………….....Notre Dame High School, LaWrenceville, NJ 2004……………………….……………………………………………….B.A., History, Davidson College 2006……………………..............................M.A., International Relations, University of Chicago 2006-2009…………………………………………………….Policy Analyst, SAIC, Washington, D.C. 2009-2011………………………………Senior Consultant, Booz Allen Hamilton, McLean, VA 2011-Present………………………….Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University Fields of Study Major Field: History Primary Field: Military History Secondary Fields: Early American History, Diplomatic History vii Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... ii AcknoWledgements ................................................................................................................................... v Vita ................................................................................................................................................................. vii Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................... viii Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 2 PART ONE: 1774-1776 ......................................................................................................................... 29 Chapter 1: A NeW Government is in Effect Erected ................................................................. 30 Chapter 2: All PoWers of Government Being Obstructed ..................................................... 86 Chapter 3: Wrest the PoWer and Command of the Militia From the CroWn ............. 137 Chapter 4: That No Improper Correspondence Be Carried On ....................................... 179 Chapter 5: Liberate the Slaves and Encourage Them to Attack Their Masters ........ 228 Chapter 6: So Wicked as to Instigate the Savages to War Against Us ........................... 275 Chapter 7: Confusion in