DOCSLIB.ORG

Deterring Corruption and Improving Governance in the Electricity Sector

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Deterring Corruption and Improving Governance in the Electricity Sector THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433 DETERRING CORRUPTION AND IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR Energy, Transport & Water Department Finance, Economics & Urban Department April 2009 DETERRING CORRUPTION AND IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR Energy, Transport & Water Department Finance, Economics & Urban Department Acknowledgements This Sourcebook was prepared as part of a broader program of work addressing governance and corruption in infrastructure of the Energy, Transport, and Water Department and Finance, Econom- ics and Urban Department of the World Bank. The sourcebook and a companion dissemination note were prepared by a Bank team comprised of Jonathan Halpern, Charles Kenny and Eric Dickson, sup- ported by Castalia (David Ehrhardt, Alex Sundakov, Seini O’Connor, and Chloë Oliver) with guidance provided by an advisory group comprised of sector and governance specialists across the regional and central units of the World Bank. A number of Bank staff provided valuable contributions at vari- ous stages including Anders Hjorth Agerskov, Alexander Bakalian, Ivor Beazley, Philippe Benoit, Steven Charles Burgess, Ed Campos, Robert Chase, Fook Chuan Eng, Marianne Fay, Meike van Ginneken, Mohinder Gulati, Erica Jorgensen, Brian Levy, Alain Locussol, Alan Townsend, Maria Vagliasindi, and Jon Walters. Any errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the authors. Special thanks are due to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) which provided generous fi- nancial support for this undertaking. ii Preface In 1996, then World Bank President James Wolfensohn appealed to the international development community to fight the “cancer of corruption”, bringing corruption to the fore of the World Bank’s agenda. A year later, in 1997, the Executive Board endorsed the paper Helping Countries Combat Corruption: the Role of the World Bank, which “fundamentally reformed the way the World Bank thinks about and acts against corruption”, and set policies for how the World Bank would tackle corruption. In March 2007, the Executive Board unanimously endorsed a new strategy and set of policies to im- prove governance and fight corruption:Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Gover- nance and Corruption. The strategy essentially confirmed the 1997 commitment to fight corruption, but with an important difference in emphasis: “reducing corruption by strengthening governance” rather than simply “stopping corruption”. Six months later, in September 2007, the World Bank finalized theImplementation Plan for the strategy. A key element of the Implementation Plan is to develop sector-level diagnostics and interventions, specifically signaling the need to “mainstream governance and anticorruption [activities] in sectors … where opportunities for interventions are often more immediate”. This Sourcebook is part of a broader program on governance and corruption in the electricity sector. The Sourcebook is meant as a resource to sector practitioners to assess the extent and risks of corrup- tion in the sector and to improve governance in ways that reduce corruption. As this is an emerging field, the sourcebook is not intended to be a manual, nor a set of directives but rather to organize and illustrate approaches and tools which sector practitioners may find useful. The program of work on governance and corruption of which these sourcebooks are a part includes an extensive database of academic and operational literature on governance and anti-corruption, a review of global knowledge and of World Bank practice that was presented and reviewed by sector and governance specialists. iii ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADB Asian Development Bank BEEPS Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey CAS Country Assistance Strategy CoST Construction Sector Transparency Initiative CPI Corruption Perception Index CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CRC Citizen Report Card DFID Department for International Development DIR Detailed Implementation Review Electricity sector Electricity generation, transmission, and distribution in grid-based power systems EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association IDB Inter-American Development Bank INT Department of Institutional Integrity IPP Independent power producer IT Information Technology KDP Kecamatan Development Project MDB Multilateral Development Bank MIS Management information system(s) NGO Non-governmental organization PACS Project Anti-Corruption System PIP Performance Improvement Plan PMU Project Management Unit PSP Private sector participation QSDS Quantitative Service Delivery Survey iv TaBLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 What’s in the Sourcebook .......................................................................................... 1 1.2 How to Use the Sourcebook ...................................................................................... 2 1.3 A Sourcebook, not a Toolkit ....................................................................................... 2 2 Understanding Corruption and Governance .................................................................... 4 2.1 Definition of Corruption .............................................................................................. 4 2.2 Dynamics of Corruption ............................................................................................. 6 2.3 Persistence of Corruption ........................................................................................... 8 2.4 To Reduce Corruption, Improve Governance ........................................................ 9 2.5 Four Levels of Governance Analysis ....................................................................... 10 2.6 Dealing with Second (and Third) Best Solutions .................................................... 12 PART I ASSESSING CORRUPTION RISKS ....................................................................................... 17 3 Country Level Scan for Corruption Risk ............................................................................ 19 4 Sector Assessment.............................................................................................................. 24 4.1 Sector Performance and Efficiency Indicators ..................................................... 24 4.2 Stakeholder Complaints, Dialogue, and Media Reports ..................................... 24 4.3 Surveys of Corruption in Infrastructure Sectors ...................................................... 27 4.4 Asset Observation ..................................................................................................... 29 4.5 Mapping Corruption Risk across the Electricity Sector ......................................... 29 5 Detecting Corruption at the Provider Level ..................................................................... 42 5.1 Fuel Procurement ...................................................................................................... 42 5.2 Suppliers and Contractors ....................................................................................... 44 5.3 Commercial Operations .......................................................................................... 46 5.4 Human Resources ..................................................................................................... 49 5.5 Company Property and Money .............................................................................. 53 6 Planning and Implementing Capital Projects ................................................................. 56 6.1 Corruption Risk in Planning ....................................................................................... 58 6.2 Corruption Risk in Implementing Capital Projects ................................................. 62 7 Detecting Corruption Risk with Independent Power Producers .................................... 69 7.1 Corruption Risks in Independent Power Producer Awards .................................. 69 7.2 Detecting Corruption in Independent Power Producer Awards ........................ 70 8 Detecting Corruption Risk in Wholesale Market Operations ......................................... 74 8.1 Single Buyers .............................................................................................................. 74 8.2 Competitive Wholesale Markets ............................................................................. 75 v 9 Corruption and Private Participation ................................................................................ 81 9.1 Privatization Transactions ......................................................................................... 82 9.2 Corruption Risk with Management Contracts ....................................................... 82 9.3 Regulation and Supervision of Private Participation Arrangements ................... 84 9.4 Contract Renegotiation and Extension.................................................................. 85 PART II INCREASING PROBITY AND IMPROVING GOVERNANCE............................................. 91 10 Increasing Probity in Capital Projects .............................................................................. 92 10.1 Sound Planning and Evaluation .............................................................................. 92 10.2 Procurement Procedures
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Cover 1 the Enron Story
    Cover 1 The Enron Story: Controversial Issues and People s Struggle Contents Preface I. The Project and the First Power Purchase Agreement II. Techno-economic and Environmental Objections III. Local People“s Concerns and Objections IV. Grassroots Resistance, Cancellation of the Project and It“s Revival V. The Renegotiated Enron Deal and Resurgence of Grassroots Resistance VI. Battle in the Court VII. Alternatives to Enron Project Conclusions Appendices I Debate on Techno-economic objections II The Merits of the Renegotiated Project III Excerpts from the Reports of Amnesty International IV Chronology of Events Glossary The Enron Story, Prayas, Sept. 1997 Cover 3 Cover 4 The Enron Story, Prayas, Sept. 1997 (PRAYAS Monograph Series) The Enron Story: Controversial Issues and People s Struggle Dr. Subodh Wagle PRAYAS Amrita Clinic, Athavale Corner Karve Road Corner, Deccan Gymkhana Pune, 411-004, India. Phone: (91) (212) 341230 Fax: (91) (212) 331250 (Attn: # 341230) PRAYAS Printed At: The Enron Story, Prayas, Sept. 1997 For Private Circulation Only Requested Contribution: Rs. 15/- The Enron Story, Prayas, Sept. 1997 Preface cite every source on every occasion in such a brief monograph. But I am indebted for the direct and indirect help from many The Enron controversy has at least four major categories individuals (and their works) including, Sulbha Brahme, Winin of issues: techno-economic, environmental, social, and legal or Pereira and his INDRANET group, Samaj Vidnyan Academy, procedural. In the past, the Prayas Energy Group has concentrated Abhay Mehta, and many activists especially, Yeshwant Bait, its efforts mainly on the techno-economic issues. Many Ashok Kadam, and Arun and Vijay Joglekar.
    [Show full text]
  • Request for Arbitration
    REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION UNDER THE INVESTMENT INCENTIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 19 NOVEMBER 1997 - BETWEEN - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Claimant) THE GOVER1NMENT OF INDIA 0~espondent) November 4, 2004 UNDER THE INVESTMENT INCENTIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TIRE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ) Govermnent of tile ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) c/o Office of the Legal Adviser ) U.S. Department of State ) Washington, D.C. 20520 ) United States of America ) ) Claimant, ) ) and ) ) GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ) Honorable Mamnohan Singh ) Prime Minister ) c/o Ministry of External Affairs ) South Block ) New Delhi 110001 ) Republic of India ) ) Respondent. ) ) REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION 1. Pursuant to Article 6 of the Investment Incentive Agreement ("Bilateral Agreement" or "Agreement")t between the Govenwaent of tbe United States of America and the Government ~ Signed on November 19, 1997 and entered into force on April 16, 1998. A copy of the Bilateral Agreement is atlached hereto as Exhibit 1. Article 7(a) of the Bilateral Agreement provides that the Bilateral Agreement shall "replace and supersede the agreement between the United States of America and India on the Guaranty of Private Investments effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington on September 19, 1957 as supplemented by exchanges of notes signed at Washington on December 7, 1959 and at New Delhi on February 2, 1966 (the ’Prior Agreement’)." Article 7(a) further provides that any matter related to Investment Support provided under the Prior Agreement shall be resolved under the Bilateral Agreement, unless raised prior to entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement.
    [Show full text]
  • Exploring Corruption in Public Financial Management 267 William Dorotinsky and Shilpa Pradhan
    Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized 39985 The Many Faces of Corruption The Many Faces of Corruption Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level EDITED BY J. Edgardo Campos Sanjay Pradhan Washington, D.C. © 2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org E-mail: [email protected] All rights reserved 2 3 4 5 10 09 08 07 This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgement on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; telephone: 978-750-8400; fax: 978-750-4470; Internet: www.copyright.com.
    [Show full text]
  • Deterring Corruption and Improving Governance in the URBAN Water Supply & Sanitation Sector
    46829 WaterWater Working WorkingNotes Notes Public Disclosure Authorized Note No. 18, December 2008 Public Disclosure Authorized DETERRING CORRUPTION AND IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN THE URBAN WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION SECTOR A SOURCEBOOK Jonathan Halpern, Charles Kenny, Eric Dickson, David Ehrhardt, and Chloe Oliver Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Water Working Notes are published by the Water Sector Board of the Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank Group. Working Notes are available on-line: www.worldbank.org/ water. Working Notes are lightly edited documents intended to elicit discussion on topical issues in the water sector. They disseminate results of conceptual work by World Bank staff to peer professionals in the sector at an early stage, i.e. “works in progress”. Comments should be emailed to the authors. Acknowledgements This Sourcebook was prepared as part of a broader program of work addressing governance and corruption in infrastructure of the Energy, Transport, and Water Department and Finance, Econom- ics and Urban Department of the World Bank. The sourcebook and a companion dissemination note were prepared by a Bank team comprised of Jonathan Halpern, Charles Kenny and Eric Dickson, sup- ported by Castalia (David Ehrhardt, Alex Sundakov, Seini O’Connor, and Chloë Oliver) with guidance provided by an advisory group comprised of sector and governance specialists across the regional and central units of the World Bank. A number of Bank staff provided valuable contributions at vari- ous stages including Anders Hjorth Agerskov, Alexander Bakalian, Ivor Beazley, Philippe Benoit, Steven Charles Burgess, Ed Campos, Robert Chase, Fook Chuan Eng, Marianne Fay, Meike van Ginneken, Mohinder Gulati, Erica Jorgensen, Brian Levy, Alain Locussol, and Jon Walters.
    [Show full text]
  • Mainstreaming Collective Action Establishing a Baseline
    Mainstreaming Collective Action Establishing a baseline Gemma Aiolfi, Kyle Forness, Monica Guy March 2020 Basel Institute on Governance Associated Institute of Steinenring 60 | 4051 Basel, Switzerland | +41 61 205 55 11 the University of Basel [email protected] | www.baselgovernance.org BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE Table of contents 1 Executive summary 2 2 Introduction 4 3 What is anti-corruption Collective Action? 5 4 From mainstreaming to private sector implementation of Collective Action 6 4.1 Shifting the needle 7 4.2 The view from business 7 4.3 What is a “norm”? 8 5 Establishing the baseline 9 5.1 International endorsements 10 5.2 National endorsements 15 5.3 Other endorsements 20 5.4 What impact have endorsements of Collective Action had so far? 22 6 A strategy to mainstream Collective Action 23 7 Appendix I: Endorsements in NACS 24 7.1 Introduction 24 7.2 Country summaries 25 8 Appendix II: NACS country list 36 9 Appendix III: Submission to review of 2009 Recommendations by the OECD Working Group on Bribery 42 BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE Acronyms and abbreviations EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EU European Union HLRM High Level Reporting Mechanisms IFBEC International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct IRM Implementation Review Mechanism (UNCAC) MACN Maritime Anti-Corruption Network NACS National Anti-Corruption Strategy NCPA Network of Corruption Prevention Agencies OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development SADC Southern African Development Community SDG Sustainable Development Goal SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprise SOE State-Owned Enterprise UN United Nations UNCAC UN Convention Against Corruption UNGC United Nations Global Compact UNIC Ukrainian Network of Integrity and Compliance UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime WCO World Customs Organization WEF World Economic Forum Acknowledgements and disclaimer This baseline report has been produced as part of a project funded by the Siemens Integrity Initiative Third Funding Round, for which the Basel Institute on Governance expresses its thanks.
    [Show full text]
  • Electricity in India
    prepa india 21/02/02 12:14 Page 1 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY ELECTRICITY IN INDIA Providing Power for the Millions INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY ELECTRICITY IN INDIA Providing Power for the Millions INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION FOR ENERGY AGENCY ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 9, rue de la Fédération, AND DEVELOPMENT 75739 Paris, cedex 15, France The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in autonomous body which was established in Paris on 14th December 1960, and which came November 1974 within the framework of the into force on 30th September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to implement an Development (OECD) shall promote policies international energy programme. designed: It carries out a comprehensive programme of • To achieve the highest sustainable economic energy co-operation among twenty-six* of the growth and employment and a rising standard OECD’s thirty Member countries. The of living in Member countries, while maintaining basic aims of the IEA are: financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy; • To maintain and improve systems for coping • To contribute to sound economic expansion in with oil supply disruptions; Member as well as non-member countries in • To promote rational energy policies in a global the process of economic development; and context through co-operative relations with • To contribute to the expansion of world trade non-member countries, industry and on
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C. Stephenson Harvard Law School August 2021
    Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C. Stephenson Harvard Law School http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/ August 2021 Aaken, A., & Voigt, S. (2011). Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? Economics of Governance, 12(4), 301–324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0100-8 Aalberts, R. J., & Jennings, M. M. (1999). The Ethics of Slotting: Is this Bribery, Facilitation Marketing or Just Plain Competition? Journal of Business Ethics, 20(3), 207–215. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006081311334 Aaronson, S. A. (2011a). Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? Available at SSRN 1922190. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922190 Aaronson, S. A. (2011b). Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Public Administration and Development, 31(1), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.588 Aaronson, S. A., & Abouharb, M. R. (2014). Corruption, Conflicts of Interest and the WTO. In J.-B. Auby, E. Breen, & T. Perroud (Eds.), Corruption and conflicts of interest: A comparative law approach (pp. 183–197). Edward Elgar PubLtd. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN_batch:ELGAR01620140507 Ab Lo, A. (2019). Actors, networks and assemblages: Local content, corruption and the politics of SME’s participation in Ghana’s oil and gas industry. International Development Planning Review, 41(2), 193–214. https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2018.33 Abada, I., & Ngwu, E. (2019). Corruption, governance, and Nigeria’s uncivil society, 1999-2016. Análise Social, 54(231), 386–408. https://doi.org/10.31447/AS00032573.2019231.07 Abadi, A.
    [Show full text]
  • Dabhol Power Company
    DABHOL POWER COMPANY The Challenges of Developing and Financing An LNG-Fired Power Project in India William D. Gathmann Executive Vice President Enron India GASTECH 2000 Conference Houston, Texas November 2000 PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS —Largest project in India —Largest foreign investment in India —Largest non-recourse project financing in India —Largest LNG-fired power plant in the world —First LNG regassification facility in India —First long term sale of LNG to non-investment grade, emerging market country —First project financing of an LNG ship 2 DABHOL TIMELINE May 1992 Enron invited to India December 1993 Dabhol PPA signed March 1995 Financial closure of Dabhol Phase I Construction starts August 1995 Project cancelled Construction stopped Arbitration in London starts September 1995 Re-negotiations commence November 1995 Re-negotiations complete Nov-Aug 1995 New approvals obtained December 1996 Phase I financial closure (again) Construction restarts Arbitration dropped 3 DABHOL TIMELINE January 1997 Phase II Development commences December 1998 Start construction of regas terminal May 1999 Financial close of Phase II Construction begins on all Phase II Commercial operation of Phase Third Quarter 2001 Power Block B on line Fourth Quarter 2001 Power Block C on line Phase II operational on liquid fuels First Quarter 2002 LNG vessel arrives Regas facility and tanks complete Entire project switches to natural gas 4 PROJECT OVERVIEW G Project Owner Dabhol Power Company G Project Location Dabhol, Maharashtra, India G Project Sponsors Enron, Bechtel
    [Show full text]
  • Answered On:31.07.2003 Dabhol Power Project Bhawana Gawali (Patil);Prakash V
    GOVERNMENT OF INDIA POWER LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO:1629 ANSWERED ON:31.07.2003 DABHOL POWER PROJECT BHAWANA GAWALI (PATIL);PRAKASH V. PATIL Will the Minister of POWER be pleased to state: (a) whether the Government have allowed NTPC to operate controversial Dabhol Power Plant; (b) whether dispute of tariff structure between Maharashtra State Electricity Board and State Government has been finalized; (c) whether all the legal complications with Enron of USA have been taken care before starting the Dabhol Phase-I; and (d) if so, the details thereof? Answer THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF POWER ( SHRIMATI JAYAWANTI MEHTA ) (a) : The Dabhol Power Plant (Ph.I) has been shut down since 29.05.2001 aftert he Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) stopped taking power following contractual disputes with M/s. Dabhol Power Company (DPC) and subsequentr escissions of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) by MSEB.T he PPA was entered into between MSEB and DPC.T hus, the responsibility to restart Phase-I and complete Phase-II of the Dabhol project lies with the main stakeholders viz. MSEB and DPC asw ell as the Government of Maharashtra (GOM), who had guaranteed the obligations of MSEB under the PPA.T he Indian Financial Institutions (IFIs) led by the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI), having substantial stakes in the Dabhol Power Project, have been trying to restructure and revive the Dabhol Plant. Government of India has agreed to facilitate any amicable solution to the various issues in order to revive/restructure the project. Any scheme finalized for revival of the Dabhol Project would come as a comprehensive package and would have to resolve complex, legal, financial and technical issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Contested Meanings of Corruption: International and Local Narratives in the Case of Paraguay
    Inclusion of a paper in the Working Papers series does not constitute publication and should limit in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Papers serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior publicaton encourage exchange ideas and academic debate. Working GIGA GIGA Research Programme: Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations ___________________________ Contested Meanings of Corruption: International and Local Narratives in the Case of Paraguay Malte Gephart No 191 April 2012 www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers GIGA WP 191/2012 GIGA Working Papers Edited by the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Leibniz‐Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien The GIGA Working Papers series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presenta‐ tions are less than fully polished. Inclusion of a paper in the GIGA Working Papers series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. Copy‐ right remains with the authors. When working papers are eventually accepted by or pub‐ lished in a journal or book, the correct citation reference and, if possible, the corresponding link will then be included on the GIGA Working Papers website at <www.giga‐hamburg.de/workingpapers>. GIGA Research Programme “Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations” Copyright for this issue: © Malte Gephart WP Coordination and English‐language Copy Editing: Melissa Nelson Editorial Assistance and Production: Silvia Bücke All GIGA Working Papers are available online and free of charge on the website <www.giga‐hamburg.de/workingpapers>.
    [Show full text]
  • Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption?
    Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption? Calla Hummel*1 John Gerring** Thomas Burt** *Department of Political Science, University of Miami **Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin Abstract Reformers claim that public subsidies and regulations of political finance reduce corruption in politics, while observers worry that they have no impact on corruption or increase it. Despite national-level debates and billions of dollars spent, few studies test this relationship. We argue that political finance reform mitigates corruption by reducing private money’s importance in politics and increasing sanctions for corrupt behavior. Elite interviews from Paraguay’s political finance reform illustrate the argument and elaborate the theoretical mechanisms. We evaluate the argument with an original dataset measuring political subsidies from 175 countries from 1900-2015, as well as disaggregated corruption measures from the Varieties of Democracy project. Findings support the thesis that political finance reform reduces corruption, even in countries where reforms are unevenly implemented. 1 We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Hind Arroub, Alejandro Avenburg, Merike Blofield, Ashley Brooks, Kevin Casas-Zamora, Lee Cojocaru, Louise Davidson-Schmich, Peter Esaiasson, Jessica Gottlieb, Adam Harris, Allen Hicken, Jay Kao, Sokol Lleschi, Lindsay Mayka, Daniel Ogbaharya, Susan Scarrow, Iryna Solonenko, Mike Touchton, Agustín Vallejo, Jack Vowles, and the Political Science faculty workshop at the University of Miami. This project was previously presented at the Red de Economía Política de América Latina 2019 meeting at Tulane University and the Southern Political Science Association 2019 meeting in Austin. This research project was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden as well as by co-funding from the Vice-Chancellor's office, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg.
    [Show full text]
  • Enron Annual Report, 1999
    ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 1999 ENRON ANNUAL REPORT ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 1999 ® 1400 Smith Street Houston, Texas 77002-7361 www.enron.com ©2000 Enron Corp. Enron and the Enron logo are registered trademarks and Endless possibilities, ePowered, ePowered Media Cast, ePowered Media Transport and EnronOnline are trademarks of Enron Corp. or one of its subsidiaries. Other company, product and service names may be trademarks of others. ENRON operates networks throughout the world to develop and enhance energy and broadband communication services. Networks, unlike vertically integrated business structures, facilitate the flow of information and expertise. We can spot market signals faster and respond more quickly. Networks empower individuals, freeing them to craft innovative and substantive solutions to customer problems. Networks are the foundation of our knowledge-based businesses, OUR VALUES and they provide exceptional COMMUNICATION INTEGRITY returns and value for our We have an obligation to communicate. Here, we We work with customers and prospects openly, shareholders. take the time to talk with one another… and to honestly and sincerely. When we say we will do listen. We believe that information is meant to something, we will do it; when we say we cannot CONTENTS move and that information moves people. or will not do something, then we won’t do it. 1 FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS 2 LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS 6 WHOLESALE ENERGY BUSINESS RESPECT EXCELLENCE 14 ENRON BROADBAND SERVICES We treat others as we would like to be treated We are satisfied with nothing less than the very best 18 RETAIL ENERGY SERVICES ourselves. We do not tolerate abusive or disrespectful in everything we do.
    [Show full text]