Switzerland's Security 2016

SWITZERLAND’S SECURITY Situation Report 2016 of the Federal Intelligence Service FIS SWITZERLAND’S SECURITY Federal Intelligence Service FIS Situation Report 2016 Papiermühlestrasse 20 CH-3003 Bern of the Federal Intelligence Service FIS www.fis.admin.ch / [email protected] SWITZERLAND’S SECURITY Switzerland’s Security 2016 Table of contents Security and sovereignty in uncertain times 5 The situation report in brief 7 Strategic environment in a state of flux 13 Focus on China 24 Violent extremism and terrorism motivated by religion and ethno-nationalism 33 Right-wing and left-wing extremism 53 Proliferation 63 Illegal intelligence 71 List of abbreviations 85 SITUATION REPORT 2016 | FIS 3 Security and sovereignty in uncertain times As the previously favourable security climate becomes more volatile, security policy is required to provide guidance. Our environment is characterized by rapidly growing complexity, and even the word ‘chaos’ is creeping into the language of security policy. It is being used as a rather inadequate description of the trend toward ‘fragmentation’: the sharp rise in the number of relevant players compared with past eras. Increasingly, many non-state players are able to influence Switzerland's internal and external security, both for good and for ill. In this environment, threats and dangers can often develop rapidly and surprisingly. They are becoming more unpredictable and the response times for decision-makers are shrinking. This is generating an atmosphere of uncertainty. The probability of strategic surprises is growing. Providing security guidance under such conditions is a major challenge, and a reliable situation assessment is an indispensible requirement. It provides the basis for governing bodies to make deci- sions which will help to prevent strategic surprises and to guarantee security even in an increasingly uncertain environment. The intelligence service’s assessment of the threat situation, as presented in an unclassified version by the FIS in its annual report, using its situation radar tool, makes a substan- tial contribution to these security policy objectives. Every ship in turbulent waters relies on its own radar. This alone shows precisely those threats and dangers that are relevant to its position. However, this does not preclude the exchange of information with other ships in similar positions about risks lying in wait along the route. The situation is similar in the case of states. In a volatile security environment, it is natural to exchange information with other states about developments, risks and consequences. However, our country decides independently on our external security-policy stance and the specific design of our internal security-policy instruments. This independence requires us to be willing and able to do our own information gathering, analysis and assessment. For this reason, the intelligence service is a particularly important tool for sovereign decision-making on security policy in Switzerland. The new Intelligence Service Act will increase its importance still further. It will im- prove the intelligence service’s information gathering, primarily where there are indications of an immediate threat to our own interests. It will optimise our own radar. The new Intelligence Service Act will in this way contribute to our security and our sovereignty. Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport DDPS Guy Parmelin Federal Councillor SITUATION REPORT 2016 | FIS 5 The situation report in brief The complexity of the challenges facing the security authorities is increasing as the security environment becomes fragmented due to the growing number of relevant players. The FIS uses its 'situation radar' tool to provide a certain amount of security policy guidance. It gives an overview of the security situation, removing any unnecessary complexity, and identifies what the intelligence service sees as being the major issues facing Switzerland's inhabitants. ▪ Switzerland's strategic environment is land's strategic environment that will have marked by unusually high levels of stress lasting effects. Realistically possible secu- in Europe due to various crisis situations. rity scenarios in Europe fall into two broad These crises are long-term in nature, but they categories: in one of these, an understanding have all come to a head at around the same between East and West limits the conflicts time: the political and economic crisis over along the edges of the emerging zones of in- European integration, a new conflict situa- terest at an early stage, and in the alternative tion with Russia and the crisis situations in evolution, escalation gradually continues to the Middle East, the impacts of which have spiral upward over the next few years. been directly felt in Europe in the form of es- ▪ Syria is in many respects the epicentre of one calating migration movements and a height- of the crisis situations. The problems under- ened terror threat. lying the Arab Spring have not been brought ▪ For a number of years, Russia has opposed any closer to a solution anywhere in the re- the expanded EU and NATO in Eastern Eu- gion (with the possible exception of Tunisia), rope and has sought to consolidate its own and new crises have escalated (such as in sphere of influence on its borders. Ukraine is Yemen). The tensions between Saudi Ara- strategic territory and lies at the heart of this bia and Iran have the potential to cause par- ambition. Since the annexation of Crimea, ticularly far-reaching destabilisation of the force of arms has been used to prosecute the region. But it is in Syria that the expansion conflict; the armed conflict has left its mark of ‘Islamic State’ and signs of attrition of the on the Ukrainian economy and population. regime have internationalised the conflict to However, the country is also being weak- a whole new level. Russia took the strategi- ened by internal power struggles. Russia's cally significant decision to intervene on the influence can also be seen in Moldova, Be- side of the regime with its own armed forces. larus and Georgia. The conflict with Russia This step and the attacks by ‘Islamic State’ in will in all probability be a change in Switzer- Paris have given fresh impetus to efforts by SITUATION REPORT 2016 | FIS 7 THE SITUATION REPORT IN BRIEF the Western powers to exert influence. How- ▪ An agreement has been successfully reached ever, despite intensified military operations, with Iran in the shape of the Joint Compre- there is as yet no sign of a resolution of the hensive Plan of Action, thus overcoming one Syrian civil war, let alone a sustainable polit- of the challenges in the area of nonprolifer- ical solution. ation. This should prevent a nuclear-armed Iran for the next ten to fifteen years. Howev- ▪ The terrorist organisation ‘Islamic State’ er, the nonproliferation issue has not in any occupies the leadership role in the jihadist way diminished in importance as a result; movement. It took over this role from al-Qa- further efforts in this area are required in re- eda, but the potential threat from the latter lation to North Korea as well as Iran. has not diminished as a result. The threat posed by jihadist terrorism has increased ▪ Illegal intelligence is carried out in Swit- further in recent months, mainly due to the zerland, as elsewhere. The damage caused fact that ‘Islamic State’ is sending individu- by the theft of information is just one of the als to Europe on missions to plan or carry out resulting problems. The access which intelli- attacks. Switzerland is part of the European gence services obtain to persons, institutions threat area, and the threat level has also risen or electronic systems can potentially be ex- in this country. ploited not only in order to collect intelligence, but also for the purposes of manipula- ▪ Migration movements toward Europe have tion or even sabotage. Information obtained escalated over the course of the last year. by intelligence services can also be used for Despite rising numbers, Switzerland has un- information operations, the importance of til now been less affected by this than other which is increasing. In the area of informa- countries in Europe. Migration is not a se- tion security, the lessons that emerged from curity issue in itself, but individual aspects the Snowden affair remain as valid as ever. of migration certainly are. Notable among these are attempts by groups or individuals to reach Europe concealed within the mass flow of migrants in order to carry out terrorist attacks. The violent reactions of right-wing and left-wing extremists to developments in the area of migration and asylum also require close monitoring. The situation in Switzerland, unlike that in some countries in Europe, has been largely calm. Nonetheless, the potential for violence is present in both right-wing and left-wing extremist circles. 8 SITUATION REPORT 2016 | FIS SITUATION REPORT 2016 | FIS 9 Situation radar tool The FIS uses a situation radar tool to depict the threats affecting Switzerland. A simplified version of the situation radar, without any confidential data, has also been incorporated into this report. The public version lists the threats that fall within the FIS’s remit, togeth- er with those classified under the categories of ’migration risks’ and ’organised crime’, which are also relevant from the point of view of security policy. This report does not go into detail about these two categories, for more information on which readers are referred to the reports

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