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Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition

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Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition Adam B. Lowther Editor Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition Contributing Authors Jason Armagost Matthew Kroenig Stephen Blank Adam Lowther Stephen J. Cimbala Curtis McGiffin Michaela Dodge Richard W. Mies Richard D. Fisher, Jr. Franklin C. Miller Shane Grosso Brooke Mitchell Mark Gunzinger William Murphy Lee Hobbs Keith B. Payne Peter Huessy James Ragland Bruce Klinger Mark B. Schneider Frank G. Klotz Ian Williams Louisiana Tech Research Institute Bossier City, Louisiana Guide to nuclear deterrence in the age of great-power Senior Advisor competition / edited by Adam Lowther Peter Huessy Includes index. 1. Deterrence (Strategy) 2. United States—Military policy Project Manager measures. I. Lowther, Adam, editor of compilation. Brooke Mitchell Illustrator Rachel Garcia Print Specialist Ann Bailey Editor Adam Lowther The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Air Force or the U.S. Government. Louisiana Tech Research Institute 6300 E. Texas Street Bossier City, LA 71111 Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. In cooperation with the Cyber Innovation Center 6300 E. Texas Street Bossier City, LA 71111 This book is dedicated to the airmen of Air Force Global Strike Command. Your service provides peace to a grateful nation and to the many allied nations who depend upon the United States to provide a credible deterrent for their own security. Contents Illustrations ix Foreword xi About the Authors xv Acknowledgements xxv PART 1 DETERRENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 1 Artisans and Advocates: The Importance of Strategic Deterrence Education 3 Curtis McGiffin 2 American Nuclear Deterrence Policy: What Is It and How Is It Implemented? 23 Franklin C. Miller 3 Nuclear Superiority Matters 37 Matthew Kroenig 4 The Cost fo Nuclear Deterrence 51 Michaela Dodge 5 The Legislative Process: How Congress Funds Deterrence 65 Brooke Mitchell 6 Nuclear Crisis Stability: Cold War Legacies and New Era Challenges 81 Peter Huessy 7 Deterrence and Disarmament: Pulling Back the Curtain 99 Keith B. Payne v CONTENTS 8 The NNSA Contribution to the Nuclear Mission 117 Frank G. Klotz 9 Nuclear Weapons Physics 139 Lee Hobbs PART 2 AMERICA’S ADVERSARIES 10 Russian Nuclear Strategy and Forces 155 Mark B. Schneider 11 China’s Nuclear Challenge 181 Richard D. Fisher, Jr. 12 The Challenge from the Islamic Republic of Iran 197 Matthew Kroenig 13 North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and Forces: Trusted Shield and Treasured Sword 213 Bruce Klingner 14 Reflections on Russian Nuclear Strategy 229 Stephen Blank 15 Russo-Chinese Military Cooperation: The Nuclear Agenda 245 Stephen Blank PART 3 THE SERVICE CONTRIBUTION TO DETERRENCE 16 US Air Force Bombers: The Most Versatile Leg of America’s Nuclear Triad 283 Mark Gunzinger vi CONTENTS 17 The Role of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles in National Security 299 Peter Huessy 18 Understanding Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications 315 Adam Lowther and Shane Grosso 19 The Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine in National Security 331 Richard W. Mies 20 Missile Defense in US Deterrence Strategy 349 Ian Williams 21 Fight Through: Command and Control…Nuclear and Joint All Domain 365 Jason Armagost and William Murphy 22 Why Minimum Deterrence Is Doubtful 381 Stephen J. Cimbala 23 The Role of Conventional Nuclear Integration 395 James Ragland Abbreviations 407 Index 411 vii Illustrations Figure 8.1 NNSA Laboratories, Production Facilities, and Sites 120 8.2 Size and Age of the US Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945–2017 122 8.3 Current US Nuclear Weapons and Associated Delivery Systems 123 9.1 Conceptual Atomic Structure 140 9.2 Timeline of Early Nuclear Weapon Development 142 9.3 Neutron-Induced Fission 143 9.4 Nuclear Fusion 144 9.5 Gun-Type Nuclear Weapon 145 9.6 Implosion-Type Nuclear Weapon 146 16.1 Projection of the USAF’S Bomber Inventory 288 21.1 The OV-1 provides a high-level graphical/textual description of the operational concept 372 Table 8.1 NNSA Warhead Activities 128 21.1 JADC2 Capabilities versus NC2 MEFs 372 ix Foreword There is no more important time to understand nu- clear deterrence operations than now. Global geopolitics and strategic threats continue to evolve, and we need to adjust our thinking about our deterrence responsibili- ties. Great-power competition with Russia and China, and the risks and uncertainties that come with it, will in- creasingly define the character of the Joint Force for years to come. This book breaks down the complicated strate- gic environment into easily digestible chapters to explain the critical roles strategic and nuclear deterrence play in defending our nation. Air Force Global Strike Command forces will remain an essential component to our nation’s ability to deter a range of adversaries and threats in great-power competition, even as Russia and China modernize and attempt to chal- lenge international norms. This provides the opportunity to revisit deterrence and Global Strike forces. To do that, we answer the simple question: why does deterrence mat- ter to each Global Strike airman? First, functional deterrence is having the means to im- pose costs on an adversary to shape its calculus away from egregious behavior. Global Strike forces are an essential element of the Joint Force that can do that quickly and on a global scale. Second, deterrence has to be credible—that is, believ- able—to be effective. If Global Strike airmen do not do their jobs in an exceptional manner, and do not have weapon systems that perform as advertised, this could lead xi FOREWORD adversaries to perceive the US as weak and miscalculate the cost of their aggressive actions. Adversaries need to know, and the US needs to be prepared to deliver a deci- sive response—anytime, anywhere. Third, we need a variety of methods to communicate our intentions and our resolve. Global Strike forces pro- vide excellent signaling options for leadership. Bomb- ers, for example, provide a visible form of such signal- ing by changing their location to forward-operating areas and changing the numbers that are deployed. Ad- ditionally, missile-strike forces are always on alert and provide the bedrock to our strategic posture. Signaling is essential, not only when tensions are increasing, but also when we need to signal our intention to deescalate in a crisis. Fourth, US Joint Forces also need the ability to man- age escalation below the threshold of armed conflict, in crisis and during war. There are times, despite our best efforts, that deterrence can fail. In those times, we need to restore deterrence by punishing adversary ac- tions in such a way that they restrain from further at- tacks. Our conventional Global Strike forces can be utilized to conduct such punishment below the nuclear threshold. This serves two purposes: first, it punishes the adversary for past actions, and, second, it demon- strates to other adversaries our capabilities and will- ingness to strike, thus deterring future potential ag- gressive actions. Each Global Strike airman is a critical component to deterrence now and well into the future—to impose costs; xii FOREWORD maintain deterrence credibility; signal; and restore deter- rence. So, why does deterrence matter to each Global Strike airman? Because each Global Strike airman matters to deterrence! THOMAS BUSSIERE Lieutenant General, USAF Deputy Commander United States Strategic Command xiii About the Authors Brigadier General Jason Armagost is director of oper- ations and communications at Air Force Global Strike Command. He was commissioned in 1992 from the United States Air Force Academy. In the progress of a 28-year ca- reer, he has flown in combat in the F-16, B-2A, B-52, and B-1 in eight named coalition operations. His operational nuclear experience is rooted in the B-2 and B-52 during assignments culminating in wing command. Stephen Blank is an internationally recognized expert on Russian foreign and defense policies and international relations across the former Soviet Union, and he is a lead- ing expert on European and Asian security, including en- ergy issues. Since 2020, he has been a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. From 2013–2020, he was a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, and from 1989–2013, he was a professor of Russian national security studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Pennsylvania. Dr. Blank has been professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Stud- ies Institute since 1989, and in 1998–2001, he was Douglas MacArthur professor of research at the War College. Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala is distinguished professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine. The author of numerous works in national security policy and defense studies, Dr. Cimbala is an award-winning Penn State teacher and has served as a consultant to various government agencies. He most recently authored The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, xv ABOUT THE AUTHORS 2020). He lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife Betsy, sons Chris and David, and daughter-in-law Kelly. Dr. Michaela Dodge is a research scholar at the Na- tional Institute for Public Policy. Prior to joining the Na- tional Institute, Dr. Dodge worked at The Heritage Foun- dation from 2010–2019. She left Heritage to serve as Senator Jon Kyl’s senior defense policy advisor from Octo- ber to December 2018. She received a PhD from George Mason University in 2019 and earned her Master of Sci- ence in defense and strategic studies degree from Missouri State University in 2011. Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the Inter- national Assessment and Strategy Center, having previ- ously held positions with the House Republican Policy Committee, the Jamestown Foundation, and The Heritage Foundation.
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