Issue 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Joint Force Quarterly
JPME Today Godzilla Methodology China’s Role in
I ssue S eventy-two, 1 Afghanistan st Quarter 2014 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 72, 1st Quarter 2014 www.ndu.edu/press/index.html
GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Publisher MG Gregg F. Martin, USA, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Photography Editor Martin J. Peters, Jr.
Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley
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Advisory Committee BG Guy T. Cosentino, USA/National War College; MG Anthony A. Cucolo III, USA/U.S. Army War College; Brig Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col Mark J. Desens, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Lt Gen David L. Goldfein, USAF/The Joint Staff; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/ Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Maj Gen Scott M. Hanson, USAF/ Air War College; Col Jay L. Hatton, USMC/ Marine Corps War College; LTG David G. Perkins, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; RDML John W. Smith, Jr., USN/Joint Forces Staff College; LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
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Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Soldier fires tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile at heavy weapons range on Forward Operating Base Salerno, Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Todd A. Christopherson); crew chief dedicated for RQ-4 Global Hawk attaches Dash-95 air cart, which provides air to starter for launch of unmanned aircraft system (U.S. Air Force/Bennie J. Davis III); and Sailors prepare F/A-18E Super Hornet to launch from USS George Washington, providing combat-ready force that protects and defends collective maritime interest of United States and its allies and partners in Indo-Asia-Pacific region (U.S. Navy/Ricardo R. Guzman). About the Cover In this Issue Marines with Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion, 8th Dialogue Marine Regiment prepare to board MV-22 Osprey during 2 Letter Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and 3 In Memoriam Personnel mission at Marine Corps Base Camp Upshur, 4 From the Chairman VA, November 26, 2013, in 6 Backbone of the Armed Forces preparation for deployment (USMC/Ed Galo). Forum 8 Executive Summary 10 The Role of Professional Military Education in Mission Command Joint Doctrine By Nicholas Murray 65 Cut Defense Pork, Revive Presidential Impoundment 106 Security Cooperation: 14 The Pen and the Sword: Faculty By Lawrence Spinetta How It All Fits Management Challenges By Taylor P. White in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College Features By George E. Reed 69 Biometric-enabled Intelligence in Regional Command–East Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National 21 Putting “A Cooperative Strategy By David Pendall and Cal Sieg st Defense University Press for the Chairman of the for 21 Century Seapower” to Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship Work: A Wargaming Perspective 75 Strategic Implications of the joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, By Jeffrey M. Shaw Afghan Mother Lode and allies, and other partners on joint and integrated China’s Emerging Role operations; national security policy and strategy; 26 Godzilla Methodology: Means for efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; By Cindy A. Hurst and Robert Mathers and developments in training and joint professional Determining Center of Gravity military education to transform America’s military and By James P. Butler 82 Improving Safety in security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges the U.S. Arctic better while protecting freedom today. 31 Improving DOD Adaptability By Heath C. Roscoe, Paul F. NDU Press is the National Defense University’s and Capability to Survive Campagna, and Dave McNulty cross-component, professional military and academic Black Swan Events publishing house. By William R. Burns and Drew Miller 88 Forging a 21st-century Military The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the Strategy: Leveraging Challenges contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views By Robbin F. Laird, Edward T. of the Department of Defense or any other agency of Special Feature Timperlake, and Murielle Delaporte the Federal Government. 39 Strategy for Intelligence, Submissions and Communications Surveillance, and JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Recall research from members of the Armed Forces, security Reconnaissance policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic By Jason M. Brown 96 Learning and Adapting: Billy specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration by email to Mitchell in World War I [email protected], with “Attention A&R Editor” in the 47 The Joint Stealth Task By Bert Frandsen subject line. Or write to: Force: An Operational Concept for Air-Sea Battle Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Book Reviews NDU Press By Harry Foster 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) 102 Foreign Powers and Intervention Fort Lesley J. McNair 54 Unifying Our Vision: Joint in Armed Conflicts Washington, DC 20319 ISR Coordination and the Reviewed by David A. Anderson Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 NATO Joint ISR Initiative Email: [email protected] JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm By Matthew J. Martin 103 The Tender Soldier Reviewed by Michael C. Davies 1st Quarter, January 2014 ISSN 1070-0692 Commentary 104 Useful Enemies 61 “Gallantry and Intrepidity”: Reviewed by William A. Taylor Valor Decorations in Current and Past Conflicts By Eileen Chollet Letter
n Joint Force Quarterly 71 (4th have not changed, much less been trans- against potential regional intercontinental Quarter 2013), Karen Kaya offers formed; NATO remains a nuclear alliance ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The admin- I a number of perspectives on the and indeed has chosen in recent years istration of George W. Bush accelerated North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s not to make fundamental changes to its and expanded this effort, though to infer (NATO’s) evolving missile defense nuclear deterrence mission. Thus, missile that this was a resurrection of the SDI project, in particular those shaping Tur- defense is best viewed as complementing program is mistaken. Kaya is correct that key’s calculations as it works to define the nuclear deterrence mission, hopefully the missile capabilities of North Korea its role. Ms. Kaya makes a numbers of providing new opportunities for burden- and Iran were the principal concerns, but observations that merit comment. sharing and enhanced decisionmaking she does not make clear that it was those Irrational Actors and Extended flexibility in a crisis. If the Alliance deter- nations’ potential development of ICBMs Deterrence. Kaya is right to suggest that mines one day that missile defense and that drove the program—and less so some new actors who may present strate- other nonnuclear strategic capabilities their continued investment in short-, me- gic threats to NATO may prove difficult can replace nuclear-sharing arrangements dium-, and intermediate-range missiles. to deter, and while one cannot rule out as the core of extended deterrence, that To fully address the potential ICBM the possibility of an adversary that truly truly would be transformational. But that threat from Iran, the second Bush admin- acts without regard to costs, risks, and seems a distant prospect. istration promoted a so-called Third Site benefits, the main challenge to deterrence History. Kaya’s brief historical refer- in Eastern Europe (to complement two is not the irrationality of adversaries but ences are not fully accurate and less than U.S.-based sites). The agreement reached rather, properly understanding their complete. It is true that the Reagan-era with Poland and the Czech Republic was strategic intentions, capabilities, deci- Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was for the deployment, respectively, of 10 sionmaking, and degree of commitment. a source of friction between the United two-stage ground-based interceptors and Certainly, an adversary’s development of States and Soviet Union, though whether a sophisticated X-Band radar. The Patriot asymmetric strategies and its preparedness it ever precipitated a crisis in relations is missiles Ms. Kaya refers to were not part to pay a high price in pursuit of advantage debatable. SDI certainly was controversial, of the Third Site. They were essentially or victory can hardly be considered hall- in part because of its cost, but the reori- a sweetener for Warsaw under which the marks of irrationality. Kaya is closer to the entation of the U.S. approach to missile United States agreed to deploy Patriots to mark when she later states that missile de- defense was driven principally by the end Poland and train Polish units in their oper- fense provides the means to add a denial of the Cold War and the emergence of ation. These missiles, of course, provided component to traditional deterrent strat- regional missile threats, exemplified at the no protection against Iranian ICBMs. egies based on the threat of unacceptable time by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Thus, Kaya is correct that the Third Site initiative retaliation, implicitly acknowledging the on the eve of the first Gulf War, President was strongly opposed by Moscow, but the premise that adversaries armed with bal- George H.W. Bush announced a major termination of these arrangements was listic missiles may think twice about using reconfiguration of SDI to focus on limited not undertaken principally to ease political such weapons if they stand a good chance missile threats from any source, to include tensions; rather, it reflected the Obama of being intercepted. protection of the United States, forward administration’s new approach to missile Adversaries making such an assess- deployed forces, power projection capabil- defense based on an updated assessment ment are by definition rational—even ities, and the territory of allies and friends. of the threat (which Kaya does not men- if they weigh costs, risks, and benefits After the Gulf War, the Clinton adminis- tion) and concerns about reliability and differently than we do. But Kaya’s asser- tration emphasized the development of affordability. Indeed, as Kaya herself notes, tion that the advent of missile defense theater missile defenses to protect against the European Phased Adaptive Approach represents a transformational shift away regional threats; capabilities to protect the (EPAA) has done little to ease tensions from extended deterrence is mistaken. homeland were given lesser priority but with Moscow over missile defense. Extended deterrence as a concept and a not abandoned. Russia’s Position. The roots of policy does not include or exclude any When the intelligence basis for pri- Moscow’s opposition to NATO missile particular set of military capabilities or oritizing short-range over long-range defense run deep and reflect a range of strategies. Both “deterrence by punish- missile threats was challenged by the grievances and anxieties that goes beyond ment” and “deterrence by denial” are Rumsfeld Commission in the late 1980s, the relatively narrow question of whether perfectly compatible with the theory and the Clinton administration reconfigured projected Alliance capabilities pose a practice of extended deterrence. U.S. ex- its missile defense program to give greater meaningful threat to Russia’s nuclear tended deterrence assurances to its Allies weight to protecting the homeland deterrent. Unfortunately, this broader
2 Dialogue / Letter JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 context is missing from Kaya’s article. On the question of capability, she states that the now-canceled Phase Four of the IN MEMORIAM EPAA “would have capability against some of Russia’s strategic forces.” She David C. Jones does not explain what she means by General, U.S. Air Force that. By the citation, her statement ap- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pears to be based on the findings of the June 21, 1978 to June 18, 1982 September 2011 report by Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol published by the Volunteering for the Army Federation of American Scientists. I am Air Corps shortly after Pearl not a physicist, so I will not engage on Harbor, General Jones received technical issues. But Kaya should not have his commission and pilot wings in asserted this conclusion as ground truth; early 1943. During the Korean War, she should have offered a more balanced General Jones flew more than 300 and nuanced discussion of this question, hours on combat missions against which is a critically important aspect of the North Korea. In 1969, he served in ongoing U.S.-NATO-Russian dispute on the Republic of Vietnam as Deputy Commander for Operations and then missile defense. At a minimum she should as Vice Commander of the Seventh Air Force. have noted that this issue is contentious, In August 1971, General Jones assumed command of U.S. Air Forces that Butt and Postol themselves place in Europe and the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, was promoted to important caveats around their analysis, general in September, and led the way toward establishing the integrated and that other respected experts have air headquarters in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Central come to different conclusions (notably, Region, Allied Air Forces Central Europe. Dean Wilkening’s “Does Missile Defence General Jones became Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force in July in Europe Threaten Russia?” Survival, 1974 and was responsible for administering, training, and equipping a February–March 2012). worldwide organization of men and women employing the world’s most Turkey. I defer to Kaya on matters advanced defense systems. Turkish where her expertise far exceeds On June 21, 1978, General Jones was appointed Chairman of the mine. This part of the article conveys a Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Chairman during the turbulent post-Vietnam strong understanding of Ankara’s think- years, he was a spokesman for increased defense effort—placing major ing and there are many useful insights. emphasis on enhancing the combined capabilities of U.S. combat But I was surprised not to see mention forces. In his last year in office, General Jones conducted an extensive of the government’s anticipated—now examination of the systemic problems within the joint system, resulting announced—decision to purchases a in a proposal to make legislative changes to the National Security Act to missile defense system from a Chinese strengthen the quality and timeliness of military advice and to improve the company that has been sanctioned by combined readiness and effectiveness of combat forces. This prompted the United States. Even taking account the most active debate on organizational issues in defense since the 1950s of cost and coproduction considerations, when President Eisenhower proposed to strengthen the joint system. this decision certainly had to be under- At the time of his retirement, General Jones’s 8 years as a member of stood as one that would invite conflict the Joint Chiefs of Staff—4 as Air Force Chief and 4 as Chairman—were with Turkey’s NATO allies. It is entirely the longest in history, and uniquely he served four different Presidents possible, of course, that Ankara will and four different Secretaries of Defense during that time. change course. But how should we try A graduate of the National War College in 1960, General Jones to reconcile this development with the was awarded an honorary doctorate of humane letters degree from the other decisions that Kaya documents University of Nebraska at Omaha in 1974, an honorary doctorate of demonstrating Turkey’s commitment to laws degree from Louisiana Tech University in 1975, and an honorary NATO’s missile defense project? doctorate of humane letters degree from Minot State College in 1979.
—Paul Bernstein Senior Research Fellow Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Dialogue 3 Chairman addresses U.S. Servicemembers during town hall event at Yokota Air Base, Japan, regarding importance of maintaining strong bilateral ties to ensure security throughout Asia-Pacific region (U.S. Air Force/Yasuo Osakabe)
From the Chairman Mount Up and Move Out
he Joint Force remains unrivaled. our activities for the next 2 years. It builds Achieving our national military We deter threats, assure partners, on what you have already accomplished. I objectives also requires that we develop T and defeat adversaries. We are am confident that, together, we can fortify and evolve our relationships with our strong—and our nation is secure— the foundation for the future force. interagency and international partners. because we commit to being the best The cooperative practices we establish will led, best trained, and best equipped Achieve Our National play a large part in our success. The les- force as our non-negotiable imperative. Military Objectives sons we learned during the past 12 years You, the men and women of the Joint At its core, our military keeps the are being applied today and will help us Force—all volunteers—are the Nation’s Nation free from coercion. Whether adapt to the challenging days ahead. The qualitative military edge. We are who at home or deployed, the Joint Force combat-tested quality of the force—from we are because of your commitment deters adversaries, protects our critical battlefield leaders to combatant com- and determination. The world is not infrastructure, preserves the free flow manders—will continue to guarantee U.S. getting any safer, but we are becoming of commerce, responds to crisis, and security over the next 2 years. more adaptable. builds partner capabilities. The Joint We are facing three transitions—to Force’s enduring power comes from our Develop Joint Force 2020 a different force posture, to a smaller ability to balance our response, rotation, The Joint Force of tomorrow must defense budget, and for some, to civilian and reset activities. Despite the current be able to achieve our national secu- life. We can only lead through these budget uncertainty, we must prioritize rity objectives against a threat that is transitions with the trust of the force, threats, articulate risk, and allocate increasingly difficult to define, even our families, and the American people. resources in support of a systematic and as we reduce budgets. We must use This midpoint of my term as the 18th sustainable strategy. We have to provide this period of transition to renew our Chairman prompts an assessment of our the Nation options. These options commitment to the cornerstone of our work so far and informs the work we still depend on the creativity of our people, military advantage—innovation and have to do. I would like to update you on the readiness of our forces, and the risk leader development. We need to reassess my focus areas and how I intend to guide we are willing to underwrite. what capabilities we need most, rethink
4 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 how we develop and aggregate the Joint Force, and reconsider how we fight together. We must develop a research and development strategy that maxi- mizes our ability to nurture promising technologies and to rapidly and effi- ciently build them out into the force. Fundamental to Joint Force 2020 is interoperability. Our capabilities, tactics, techniques, procedures, and terminology must translate across the Services, the interagency, and with our partner nations. Becoming the force of the future demands that we develop, test, and refine concepts for the future fight. We must mobilize the entire Joint Force Development enterprise to forecast those capabilities. We know that we will be a General Dempsey talks with U.S. Marine Corps drill instructors at 4th Recruit Training Battalion, Parris smaller force and that we must adapt to Island (DOD/Charles Marsh) be increasingly agile. Our task is to carry forward those lessons learned from yes- These reviews serve as overt reminders have had an impact on the way we relate terday into the context of today. of the uncompromising standards of our to them. On our part, we must actively conduct and the enduring tenets of our dispute labels often applied too generally Renew Our Commitment to oath. We contribute to our profession by across the force and inform a richer con- the Profession of Arms reinforcing these principles every day. versation about the character of those who Our profession is grounded in our The ethical decisions and proper volunteer to serve. We also have a duty to sacred oath to defend the Constitution. behavior of each member of the Joint the Nation to listen. Our fellow citizens We remain committed to defending the Force mold our professional reputation. have different perspectives that we need Nation and the values it has pursued Each one of us—from the private to the to hear and understand. Military service is for more than 200 years. We must hold general—represents the whole of our about stability, meaning, and variety, and true to these enduring values of service profession. Our actions speak louder and we must continue to inspire those who even as we remake our force and its echo longer than our words. will volunteer to serve in the future. capabilities. Our force is as diverse and rich in experience as it has ever been. Keep Faith with Our I have been impressed with what the Twelve years of war have created a Military Family Joint Force has accomplished in my 2 generation of leaders experienced in We keep faith with the Nation by years as Chairman, over 12 years of war, joint and interagency operations. The making sure the Joint Force is the best and throughout my 39 years of military future force will require the skills and led, best trained, and best equipped in service. But there is more work to be knowledge of both our battle-tested the world, ready to meet any mission. done, and I need your help to do it. veterans and the contributions of new The health and well-being of our people Together, we can ensure we remain the Servicemembers who bring fresh skills is critical to our national security and most respected profession, the global and perspectives to new ways of warfare. the future of the force. leader, and the Nation’s strength. The cornerstone of service must We must prioritize and synchronize I’m proud to serve with you. JFQ remain dignity and respect among all our support to reflect the needs of today’s members of the force. The mortar is military family, which is as diverse as the Martin E. Dempsey leadership. We must set the example of Nation it serves. We must ensure we are General, U.S. Army extraordinary character and exceptional investing in the right services at the right Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff competence at every echelon. We must time while adapting for the future needs seek and share best practices to combat of the force. We are committed to being sexual assault, suicide, and high-risk be- upfront and honest about the tough haviors. We will implement 360-degree choices we face and the changes that will reviews for all general and flag officers occur, as they affect our people personally. on the Joint Staff to make us aware of We must also consider what our mili- our strengths and weaknesses and enable tary means to the people it protects—our us to grow as leaders of the Joint Force. fellow citizens—and how the last 12 years
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Dempsey 5 Washington and Lafayette at Valley Forge (John Ward Dunsmore/Library of Congress)
Backbone of the Armed Forces
t was December 17, 1777, and General. His mission: strengthen the Across the years, from its birth to the General George Washington’s Con- professionalism of the Continental present, the NCO corps (and the petty I tinental Army had just returned Army. Von Steuben’s training objec- officer corps of our sea-going Services) to winter quarters in Valley Forge, tives constituted the first written plan experienced an enormous profession- Pennsylvania. They were exhausted and for standards, discipline, and duty for alization, diversity, growth, skill, and had gained minimal success in their Washington’s army, and he created the empowerment. For nearly two and a fight against the British army. But this first manual that outlined the duties half centuries they have proudly carried period in Valley Forge proved critical and responsibilities of the noncommis- the battle colors; stood tall in rank and for the fledgling army and led General sioned officer (NCO). So in an import- file; maintained ships, planes, and tanks; Washington to recruit former Prus- ant way, December 17 is considered led the patrols; inspected the lines; and sian officer Baron Friedrich Wilhelm the birthdate of the U.S. Armed Forces manned the rails. von Steuben. His new title: Inspector NCO corps.
6 Dialogue / Backbone of the Armed Forces JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 noncommissioned officer and petty offi- cer attributes and competencies without New from diluting Service branch expectations or standards. The book defines why our NDU Press NCO corps is historically and tradition- for the Center for Strategic Research ally branded as the “Backbone” of the Strategic Forum 284 U.S. Armed Forces. Next Steps in Syria It is a privilege to serve as a non- by Judith S. Yaphe commissioned officer or petty officer in America’s all-volunteer force. We repre- Syria has sent a professional and empowered cadre been in of enlisted leaders that society respects a state of and admires and a community of leaders sectarian civil that many nations envy. Each of us carries war since an obligation, a responsibility, and a pro- early 2011. fessional, moral, and ethical bond toward The conflict every American we have sworn to protect. has spread to The book is available through the its neighbors U.S. Government Printing Office. It is in Iraq and Lebanon and, if left un- I was fortunate to lead an effort in also available online at these sites: checked, could destabilize Turkey, developing a book that captures the Jordan, and a much wider swath of NDU Press: www.ndu.edu/press/ significance of these military leaders •• the Middle East region. Regardless nco.html throughout the history of America’s of whether President Bashar al-Asad Joint Electronic Library: www.dtic. Armed Forces. Why so fortunate? Because •• survives or fails, resolution of the mil/doctrine/nco.htm I had a team of intellectually savvy and civil war poses especially difficult JDEIS: http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/ extremely talented leaders who served as •• problems for U.S. strategic planning jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=97 the A-team of chapter writers. I would at a time when the Obama admin- like to introduce the Joint Force Quarterly You can also download the book onto istration is trying to focus on the readership to the Defense Department’s your device by scanning this code: pivot to Asia rather than the con- newest book, The Noncommissioned stant crises in the Middle East. Officer and Petty Officer: Backbone of the The Syrian crisis risks redefining Armed Forces (NDU Press, 2013). the traditional balance of power As a symbolic testament to our obli- in the region as well as relations gation and affirmation to our calling as between the United States, re- noncommissioned officers, December gional friends, and Russia. Russia’s 17 was chosen specifically as the official proposal that Syria cooperate with release date of the book. A ceremony United Nations restrictions on its took place in the Pentagon, officiated by chemical weapons and the unease the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of expressed by Iran’s new president We hope you will acquire a personal Staff. I truly find this book to be a “best over Syria’s possible use of chemical copy and enjoy its contents. JFQ seller” not only because of the knowledge weapons have raised speculation that of the folks who wrote it and the role the Syrian crisis could be resolved Bryan B. Battaglia, USMC of the people who will read it, but also without U.S. military intervention. Senior Enlisted Advisor to the because of the story it tells. It is written Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by, for, and with noncommissioned offi- and the Senior Noncommissioned Officer cers and petty officers. It is an inspiring, in the U.S. Armed Forces thought-provoking, leadership-enhancing book that captures the character of the noncommissioned officer and petty officer. It is grounded in the Profession of Arms, complementary to the Armed Forces Officer book and our enlisted Service manuals, yet written to be dis- Visit the NDU Press Web site tinctive in its own right. You will enjoy for more information on publications at www.ndu.edu/press/index.html its contents as it exposes and captures
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Battaglia 7 Executive Summary
here was a time when “jointness” enough to negate the need for legisla- retirement in 1982, directly influencing had no champions. There was a tion later on to bring the Services closer the legislators who would write and even- T time when professional military together. Legislation mandating jointness tually pass Goldwater-Nichols, including education at the Service colleges offered arrived in the form of Public Law 99-433 Congressman Skelton. little in the way of joint content. Joint (Goldwater-Nichols), widely recognized If one has doubts concerning the military operations often revealed a lack as the most sweeping change to be or- power of education, particularly JPME, of basic coordination, much less coop- dered for the Defense Department since look to General Jones. Imagine if you eration or cohesion. Despite examples its formation in 1947. were one of his NWC instructors and in World War II of joint coordination Recently we lost two of the strongest later on witnessed his substantial efforts in various operations, after the war, supporters of jointness: General David C. to forge jointness into law: his advocacy Army Chief of Staff General Dwight Jones, USAF, the ninth Chairman of the for jointness may have been based on an D. Eisenhower and Chief of Naval Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Representative idea he was assigned to study in one of Operations Admiral Chester Nimitz Isaac “Ike” Newton Skelton IV of your classes, or a conversation he had with committed their respective Services to Missouri. The deaths of General Jones a classmate from another Service or part work together to establish a joint mili- and Congressman Skelton require, I of the government, or from collaborating tary education effort 40 years before believe, that we pause to reflect on their with a student from a partner nation. the Goldwater-Nichols Department of individual and combined legacies, espe- Would he have achieved as much as Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 cially on the effect each man had on joint he did had he not attended the NWC? It required it. professional military education (JPME). is possible. He had been General Curtis Those who have spent time at the While many can rightfully claim to LeMay’s aide, had served in three wars, Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) might have been a part of the push for joint- worked on future weapon systems devel- be aware of the April 1946 memo from ness, few joint advocates at the level of opment, and more. But would he have Eisenhower to Nimitz recommending General Jones and Congressman Skelton been such a forceful advocate for joint- the establishment of the Armed Forces were as consistently in the vanguard of ness without what we now call “JPME Staff College. Eisenhower saw a “distinct support both to achieve and to keep experience”? Maybe. Who would fault joint necessity” for a school focused jointness successfully and permanently him for retaining his Service loyalties? on courses that teach officers from all in place. Interestingly, neither man had One might also conclude that he must Services and branches “joint staff tech- obvious reasons to do so based on their have given significant weight to some of nique and procedures in theatres and origins. General Jones volunteered for the ideas he encountered at NWC, and joint overseas operations.” He believed the Army Air Corps shortly after Pearl the JPME he received at NWC had a pos- that there was a need “for a school of this Harbor and became a pilot in 1943 itive influence on General Jones during type for officers of our services prior to before finishing college, and while his the rest of his military career. Moreover, attendance at the National War College.” résumé shows no undergraduate degree, even after he retired from service, he was Since the National War College (NWC) he would later graduate from the NWC motivated to seek the advancement of was located in Washington, DC, at Fort in 1960. Based on how his story unfolds the power of the Chairman in addition to Lesley J. McNair, the Nation’s third- after his NWC education, we can assume many other changes that would undoubt- oldest Army base, it seemed appropriate that joint education had a positive effect edly make the joint force a reality. for the Staff College to be located on a and served him well for the next 22 years At the same time, a man from naval base. The rest, as they say, is his- of his career, culminating in sequential Missouri who had seen no military ser- tory with today’s JFSC—the successor terms as Chief of Staff of the Air Force vice to speak of would take the lead in to the Armed Forces Staff College—still from 1974 to 1978 and Chairman of the solidifying joint education as a part of educating officers about joint opera- Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1978 to 1982. the military experience. Representative tions and planning at National Defense As Chairman, General Jones worked Skelton served for more than 30 years University’s (NDU’s) southern campus hard to push for reforms, including those in the House of Representatives and he in Norfolk, Virginia. of the role of Chairman that exist today chose to make it his personal responsibil- But where did the continuing sup- because of Goldwater-Nichols. So com- ity that the United States had the best port for this idea of jointness come from mitted was General Jones in the reform military in the world. His many contribu- after Congress created NDU in 1976? to support jointness that he continued tions to the military were the result of his For 40 years after the Ike memo, these work to change the Services’ relationship personal efforts as a steadfast advocate schools and their graduates were not and the Chairman’s role even after his for JPME. Joint Force Quarterly will
8 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 have an article on Ike Skelton’s life and the tradition of wargaming born in the Timperlake, and Murielle Delaporte out- legacy in the next issue. I am certain all 1920s while testing naval employment line a new approach for military strategy who have been a part of JPME over the strategies. James Butler has found the in the 21st century. years know Congressman Skelton’s work Japanese science fiction movie character In our Recall section we continue well and look for another member of the Godzilla as a useful means to student en- our look back at World War I and leader- U.S. Congress to step forward as a similar lightenment on center of gravity theories. ship lessons as Bert Frandsen discusses champion for an educated joint force. From one of the leading research centers the combat record of Brigadier General This edition of JFQ has a number of here inside the Beltway, William Burns William “Billy” Mitchell. There are also significant updates in both style and con- and Drew Miller offer a great article that three book reviews that should help you tent. First, the journal has a subtle but discusses how the Defense Department expand your views on a range of subjects. different look in design. We have always can adapt and survive black swan events. In the Joint Doctrine section, Taylor P. worked hard to be economically efficient In our Special Feature section, Jason White provides an excellent discussion yet maintain a high quality of editorial Brown argues that it is time to aban- on where security cooperation fits in content to our audience each quarter. don our Cold War–era ISR collection doctrine and how it executes in terms The changes in style address two trends management methods and replace them of programs and activities, including in the publishing industry. First, our new, with a strategy-oriented approach. Harry the regular J7 joint doctrine publication streamlined presentation of compelling Foster operationalizes Air-Sea Battle update. ideas in this issue helps us to develop an through the formation of a joint stealth Our JFQ team continues to find and online presence for the journal with a task force. Providing valuable coalition bring you new ideas that support better more Internet-friendly process. Second, insights, Matthew Martin describes ef- awareness and understanding of jointness. the new design is easier to read, has forts under way to improve joint ISR We all stand on the shoulders of giants, fewer distracting page elements, and coordination and the North Atlantic in particular General David C. Jones and costs the taxpayer less money to produce. Treaty Organization ISR Initiative. Congressman Ike Skelton IV, who knew We hope you will enjoy JFQ even more This issue’s Commentary presents the great value of joint education and of as we go forward. two important discussions. Eileen jointness itself. JFQ On the content front, with the Chollet’s research results compare how Chairman’s emphasis on joint education the highest of combat awards—valor Dr. William T. Eliason as a key ingredient to the future joint decorations—have been granted over Editor force, we are positioning JFQ to sup- time. Looking at the fiscal environment port authors and ideas from the JPME our nation finds itself confronting, community more directly in order to Presidential impoundment, a somewhat get the best ideas into and out of those obscure power of the executive branch, is education environments. Our Forum sec- a better way to reduce spending accord- tion features articles from JPME faculty, ing to Lawrence Spinetta. researchers, and students on a range of In Features, we present a wide issues including JPME itself, useful issues range of ideas from around the globe. to explore in the classroom, and online Technology has been brought to bear distance learning—anywhere JFQ is read. to identify friendly civilians, as David In the next issue, our Special Feature Pendall and Cal Sieg provide an in-depth section will be retitled “JPME Today” look at the employment of biometrics in and dedicated to articles that explore the Regional Command–East. Cindy Hurst world of JPME. and Robert Mathers shed light on one As mentioned, this issue’s Forum important aspect of Afghanistan’s eco- presents insights from and for the JPME nomic and geopolitical future: China’s community and begins with Professor efforts at mining the country’s rich Nicholas Murray’s views on how PME mineral deposits. As the Arctic region supports the development of Mission becomes more accessible to ship traffic, Command. Bringing the voice of an Heath Roscoe, Paul Campagna, and administrator to the discussion of the Dave McNulty assess the requirements quality of faculty at the war colleges, for search and rescue in the Arctic region George Reed describes ongoing issues as activity continues to increase there involved in the selection, development, for longer periods each year. Looking and retention of this critical element of to leverage significant new capabilities the JPME equation. Jeffrey Shaw shows available both to the joint force and us how the Naval War College continues to our allies, Robbin Laird, Edward
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Eliason 9 Army Staff Sergeant briefs Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, Jr., about new technologies used in war against terrorism (U.S. Army/D. Myles Cullen)
The Role of Professional Military Education in Mission Command
By Nicholas Murray
he debate about the quality and military’s new system of command— ized execution based upon mission type role of professional military that is, mission command. This is the orders. Successful mission command T education (PME) has been much case despite its proclaimed importance demands that subordinate leaders at all written about across the Armed Forces to the future vision of the Service echelons exercise disciplined initiative and the blogosphere. However, one area environment. In his Mission Command and act aggressively and independently that has received scant attention in the white paper, General Martin Dempsey to accomplish the mission.”2 debate is the role of education in the outlined mission command’s criticality To prepare the forces for that to the concept of Joint Force 2020.1 concept, General Dempsey states that To better understand the context of mission command “must be institution- this article, it is helpful to provide the alized” throughout the military, with Dr. Nicholas Murray is an Associate Professor in definition of mission command used explicit reference to the education system; the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort by the Armed Forces: “the conduct of that is, “[joint and service doctrine, edu- Leavenworth, Kansas. military operations through decentral- cation and training are keys to achieving
10 Forum / The Role of PME in Mission Command JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 the habit of mission command . . . our James Breckenridge, commander of the sent to the PME community and to the schools must teach it, and we must train Marine schools at Quantico, wrote, “It is Armed Forces writ large? individually and collectively to it.” He my constant ambition to see the Marine If the military is to integrate mission goes on, “the education of our officer officers filled with ambition, initiative, command into its way of doing things, corps—joint and service—must begin at and originality; and they can get these it must create a culture within PME that the start of service to instill the cognitive attributes only by liberality of thought,— facilitates it. The emphasis should be capability to understand, to receive and broad thought,—thought that differs placed on education rather than training. express intent, to take decisive initiative from precedent and the compulsory The tension between these two ideas within intent, and to trust.”3 imprint of others. I want them to origi- has provided much fuel to the fire of the For mission command to work, nate,—not to copy.”7 regular bashing of PME. The routine understanding and clarity of purpose Similar calls have been made by senior lack of understanding of the difference are the two key components. Without leaders for years. Why then has it proved between the two was also unfortunately an understanding of what is required so difficult to achieve? This is where emphasized in the CAC brief. To get the to meet the endstate of a mission, it is military culture comes in. There is a fear best out of the personnel passing through unlikely that a commander can create an of white space on the calendar. It suggests PME, both the students and staff must order (intent) that gets to the problem “idleness on the part of soldiers,” as my value attendance. In addition, PME cul- at hand. Likewise, without clarity, it is former regimental sergeant major might ture should promote critical thinking so unlikely anyone will understand the com- have put it, idle being the insult of choice, this is not only an add-on to other parts mander’s intent. So how do we provide aimed at anyone who did not look physi- of the curriculum. How should PME go understanding and clarity of purpose to cally busy. Now, that might well relate to about achieving this? our officers? We do it through better my experience as a recruit in the British The Armed Forces must first ensure education. army, but it is equally applicable in the that the best officers attend PME institu- In his white paper on Joint U.S. military. In addition, effective train- tions. Continuing with CGSOC as our Education, General Dempsey requires ing can more easily be judged. To that example, the move toward merit-based joint PME to develop the “habits of mind end, the amount of time devoted to a selection is already on the way, and there essential to our profession”—that is, particular subject often seems to be the have been encouraging signals that this critical thinking.4 A recent brief relating main metric of measurement. will continue. However, details are scarce, to leader development and education, For example, the Command and and it is essential that PME institutions however, states that the first core com- General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) do more than shave off the bottom few petency of the Combined Arms Center currently devotes roughly 250 school students. PME needs something more (CAC), which is the overseer and guide hours of study to mission command, radical. Close to universal attendance has to joint PME, is “inculcating leaders with directly or indirectly. This number comes meant there are some students who are a mastery in the art and science of war.”5 from a total of about 700 hours of core not ready for, or capable of, high-level The problem with this competency is that and advanced instruction, going by the critical thinking. This is not to say there inculcation is simply rote learning under 2013–2014 academic year. That looks are no bright “go get ’em” types. There the guise of a fancy name. Rote learning impressive on paper. However, only certainly are. But there is a larger issue at is sometimes a valuable tool for training, around 100 of the teaching hours truly hand, one that is frustrating both to those but it does not clearly fit the command- involve critical thinking as it would be un- officers who really do want to challenge er’s intent relating to critical thinking. derstood outside of PME. Additionally, themselves and to their instructors. With General Dempsey identifies the the amount of time devoted to critical universal, or near universal attendance, development of critical thinking as the thinking has hardly changed despite the we really cannot expect much in the way key ingredient to the future of PME: “to emphasis on a command system that is of challenging critical thinking skills from fully realize the potential of mission com- absolutely dependent upon it. This is all PME students, and this has a direct mand, our joint education efforts must despite the addition of more hours of effect on the ability of the Armed Forces effectively instill the cognitive capability instruction into the curriculum at the to implement mission command because to understand, receive, and clearly express staff school. This has meant that students, effective critical thinking is one of the key intent, to take decisive initiative within whose critical thinking skills we need to components. intent, accept prudent risk, and build develop, have even less time to think and Compounding this situation is the trust within the force.”6 Thus, we have a study than before. fear that officers’ attendance in a PME conundrum. While General Dempsey is For mission command to work ef- school harms their chances of promo- calling for critical thinking, CAC is call- fectively, this cannot be the case. When tion. Indeed, some officers choose not ing for inculcation. How do we get to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to attend resident PME. Moreover, if effective mission command from there? provides guidance through his white they do choose to attend CGSOC, they Moreover, General Dempsey’s call is papers, and a key PME institution appears sometimes do not choose to go to the not new. In 1934, Lieutenant General to do the exact opposite, what message is follow-on year at the School of Advanced
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Murray 11 Military Studies because of the risks to their careers from an extra year in PME. This fear is not confined to students. The difficulty of getting the best and brightest officers to instruct PME is often criticized for much the same reason. Largely, this is the case because officers need Key Development (KD) jobs as well as time in operations and in command to progress in their careers. Currently, rightly or wrongly neither attendance nor instruc- tion in a PME school is classed a KD assignment. Thus, in many ways, the per- ception that involvement in PME might be a real hindrance to career progress is all too real. Again, the effect on mission command is a reduction in the level of critical thinking, which can go on in an environment lacking some of the best and brightest instructors and students. To encourage the best serving of- ficers, the Services should make teaching in a PME institution a KD job, which would be a quantum shift in military culture. By doing so, the Services could avoid the current scramble for KD post- ings, which often comes at the expense of its personnel attending or teaching at PME institutions. It would also provide a strong incentive for the best and bright- est to teach in the PME system, which does not always happen (despite many excellent serving instructors). This would also have the benefit of helping improve critical thinking in the classroom, thus facilitating the use of mission command. For officers to teach PME (if it be- comes a KD position), they should have attended the relevant course and perhaps completed a Master’s degree there in a topic relevant to the area in which they wish to teach (in the case of CGSOC, this would be the Master of Military Art and Science). It might also be sensible to require that PME instructors possess a relevant skill identifier in addition to their degrees. This is already the case for his- tory, and there is no reason why it should not also be the case for leadership, tactics, jointness, and logistics. More officers completing degrees would increase the breadth and depth of the faculty’s knowledge as well as Afghan air force officer Niloofar Rhmani, accompanied by USAF 438th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group executive officer and AAF pilot advisor, deplanes Cessna 208 becoming first Afghan woman to provide the results of such research to fly fixed-wing combat mission (U.S. Air Force/Ben Bloker) the wider military community. It would
12 Forum / The Role of PME in Mission Command JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 both improve and expand the intellectual senior fellow in the Hoover Institution at are likely to be doing when they leave. core of the Army (in this case). It would Stanford University, has shown the strong This is where civilians come in. They also encourage students, many of whom link between teacher effectiveness and should have the experience of a civilian currently go to online degree Web sites student learning. Much of his research graduate program, and they will be more to prepare (while they are attending PME focuses on the K-12 school system and accepting of this scenario. Furthermore, and with an often deleterious effect on the huge gap in learning outcomes for PME must make sure it employs the best their military studies) for their post-Army students, depending on whether they serving officers and civilians—not only careers, to focus on more directly relevant are taught by excellent or poor teachers: in terms of qualifications, but also in topics. Providing a link between PME “The difference in student performance terms of their teaching skills. Therefore, and military career growth would have in a single academic year from having a we must provide instructors with the the added benefit of more clearly meet- good as opposed to a bad teacher can be incentives to make teaching in PME ing General Dempsey’s intent as well as more than one full year of standardized institutions a key part of their careers. General Breckenridge’s ideal from 80 achievement.”8 Although the focus of his Although training remains an essential years ago. The infrastructure for much of article is on K-12, there is no reason to part of PME, it should not dominate this is already in place. suppose that the educational outcomes the schedule. There has to be time for Of course, high-quality candidates for students in PME are fundamentally officers to think about what they have with at least a Master’s degree (related different. If that is correct, and this au- learned. Only that will allow us to excel to the subject area in which they are to thor sees no legitimate reason to doubt at the critical thinking required by the teach) from other institutions should it, getting the best people to teach, both Armed Forces of the future. not be barred from teaching in PME military and civilian, is of paramount To end, I can do no better than institutions if they are excellent teachers. importance to the mission. This is partic- use the words of Lieutenant General It should not be enough for someone ularly so if we are to achieve what General Breckenridge: “If we can stimulate our to check the box of PME attendance to Dempsey outlined in his white papers. officers to work as hard and intelligently gain a teaching job. Teaching is the main To that end, credentialing is impor- in an academic sense as they always do in focus of the institutions, and that should tant, and it is one method for identifying a physical and mental sense when con- remain the case. But too often the criti- people with the requisite level of knowl- fronted by things ‘that can’t be done,’ then cism has been leveled that many of the edge. However, it does not identify an we will open the door for the great man teaching staff use PME institutions as a excellent instructor, who, with a relevant (or men) I hope to see produced.”9 JFQ pre-retirement step, and they are accepted Master’s degree, is worth far more to the as instructors because of the lack of viable institution of PME than a bunch of bad alternatives. Whether this is true across instructors who have doctorates. This Notes PME institutions is subject to debate and is not to say that PME does not need 1 beyond the scope of this article. However, instructors with doctorates—quite the Martin E. Dempsey, Mission Com- mand White Paper, April 3, 2012, encouraging the best to teach through opposite. Proper credentialing is vital available at
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Murray 13 General Dempsey visits U.S. Naval War College to speak to students and faculty about state of U.S. military (U.S. Navy/Eric Dietrich)
The Pen and the Sword Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College
By George E. Reed
he war colleges recently became ant colonels and colonels for the next the focus of both internal and level of responsibility, and there are T external criticism.1 Continuing two “joint” colleges: the National War scrutiny is appropriate in light of their College and the Dwight D. Eisenhower expense and importance as the pin- School for National Security and nacle of professional military education Resource Strategy (formerly known as Colonel George E. Reed, Ph.D., USA (Ret.), is the (PME). Each Service maintains a war the Industrial College of the Armed Associate Dean of the School of Leadership and college designed to prepare lieuten- Forces). While they have different Education Sciences at the University of San Diego.
14 Forum / Faculty Management Challenges in a War College JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 cultures at the institutional level, they some might reject the observations of an the war colleges excel, and because of the share some common challenges and outsider such as Ricks, Hughes served level tone of her work, she is much harder opportunities. This article examines for 18 years at the Air War College, thus to dismiss than some others who have some of those challenges from the providing an insider view. Some might be contributed to the topic. perspective of an administrator, a voice inclined to dismiss him as a disgruntled that is often missing from the current former employee, but regardless of his Comparing PME to Civilian dialogue, which seems to be dominated motivation, there is cause for concern if Higher Education by journalists, bloggers, and civilian his observations have any merit. It is important to note that comparing professors who do their work at the Robert Scales, a retired two-star gen- the war colleges to traditional civil- uncomfortable intersection of academic eral and former commandant of the Army ian graduate institutions is a bit of an and military cultures.2 War College, raised an alarm by observ- “apples to oranges” exercise. The best This submission represents a friendly ing that the military could become “too graduate program at a top-tier univer- critique submitted by one who benefited busy to learn.”6 His essay did not address sity would, in many respects, be a poor greatly as a student and then, after com- the war colleges specifically except for substitute for what should happen at pleting a fully funded doctoral program, noting that the average age of attendees the war colleges. The model for the as a faculty member. This perspective is has increased from 41 to 45, making an war colleges is much more akin to that informed by 6 years as a faculty member expensive educational experience more of a professional school (for example, and a course director for two segments of a preparation for retirement than a law or medicine) where sophisticated of the core curriculum at the U.S. Army platform for leadership at higher levels. craft knowledge is blended to a lesser War College, followed by an equal time He decried the wane of experienced of- degree with disciplinary forays more as a civilian faculty member at a doctoral- ficers as instructors in the system of PME. common to colleges and universities. degree conferring university and now as His critique echoed some of the concerns The war colleges are not designed to an administrator. Even with an admittedly voiced by Ricks when he suggested that produce scholars and researchers; they favorable viewpoint, it is not hard to see a bias for action over learning and an develop operators and leaders, albeit that there is room for systemic improve- organizational malaise in the schools have with knowledge and skills that are ment. After a brief review of contemporary made them an “intellectual backwater.” sometimes derived from graduate-level critiques focused on the war colleges, the His solution is to change the military’s education. The adult learning model, article turns to some observations from an reward system to elevate soldier-scholars seminar method, use of case studies administrator’s perspective. rather than denigrate them. He advo- contextually appropriate to a unique cated a return to the day when uniformed group of experienced practitioners, and War Colleges under Fire officers rather than civilian instructors the many opportunities to engage in Former Washington Post journalist and and contractors are assigned to the no-holds-barred professional discus- author Thomas Ricks launched a public schoolhouse, not because their careers are sions with a parade of flag officers and salvo against the war colleges in a series at a dead end, but as career-enhancing civilian officials are bright spots that of ForeignPolicy.com blogs where he assignments on the way to even higher should not be underestimated for their actually called for their closure, describ- levels of responsibility. positive impact on future senior military ing them as both expensive and second- In an especially helpful and recent leaders. It is vital to have a place where rate. While his criticism is sometimes book, Joan Johnson-Freese examines military officers can delve deeply into hyperbolic and tends to be disregarded the war colleges and succinctly captured the nuances of their profession and by those within the system, he raises what she terms “overriding institutional most importantly plumb the tensions, some good points and serves as a and cultural issues” that hinder the ac- intricacies, and limitations of operating watchdog of sorts as evidenced by his complishment of their educational goals.7 a large standing military in a democracy. recent accounting of personnel changes A military penchant for training over If done properly, that very process that resulted in the reduction of civilian education, counterproductive clashes be- can serve as a crucial protection of the professor positions at the Army War tween military and civilian culture, student Republic. Uninformed and underedu- College.3 attitudes, administrators who lack experi- cated officers who control vast amounts Douglas Higbee provided a useful ence in running educational institutions, of military power can fall, or be led, into critical anthology from authors ranging short-term contracts for civilian faculty, serious mischief. across the system of professional military administrative bloat, and lack of faculty Here is a dirty little secret we should education.4 Daniel Hughes’s depiction control of the curriculum all make her list consider as we seek the goodness that re- of the Air War College in that edited vol- of detractions. She is an insider who served sides in our comparison group of top-tier ume was strident in highlighting a nasty on the faculty of the Air War College and civilian universities. Great and sometimes strain of anti-intellectualism, ultracon- Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies inordinate emphasis is placed on research servatism, Christian nationalism, and a and is currently serving at the Naval War and publication, which can detract from largely disinterested student body.5 While College. She rightly points to areas where effective teaching. The ability to conduct
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Reed 15 research is a strong motivator for first-rate protection can have a chilling effect on ways the PME system is disadvantaged faculty members who wish to be tenured. speaking truth to power,8 a role the war in the marketplace for academic talent Good teaching, however, is not usually colleges might well serve. in addition to the issue of tenure: access that high a priority, especially at research- Having noted the necessity of tenure to outside employment, compensation, focused universities. Faculty members or a tenure-like system for both academic copyright restrictions, quality of infra- savor the discretionary time to pursue freedom and talent management, we structure, ability to teach in an area of their own interests and require even more ought to also take notice of the other expertise, faculty governance and cur- time to locate and complete extensive edge of the sword. The accounts of riculum oversight, and hiring practices. and complicated applications for grants to abuses by senior faculty members who are Access to Outside Employment. In the fund that research. There is often a much protected by tenure but are unproduc- Federal system, outside employment is lower emphasis on high-quality teaching. tive or simply uncivil in their practices either prohibited outright or significantly The drive for tenure and how to achieve are legion in higher education.9 Indeed, constrained by 5 C.F.R., Part 2635, it consumes the attention and energy of there are opportunities for post-tenure Subpart F.11 At the very least, permis- junior faculty members, generating great review at some institutions or triggered sion must be obtained ahead of time stress. While most tenure evaluation reviews prompted by serious misconduct, and in some cases an ethics finding from schemes include teaching, scholarship, but they are rare and a great deal of poor an attorney is advisable. University and and service as elements of review, few are practice is tolerated before consideration departmental policies on outside employ- denied tenure due to mediocre teaching is given to initiating them. Behavior is ment vary as do practices by discipline, evaluations or lack of service on university routinely tolerated in the system of civil- but many professors significantly aug- committees. Research and publication ian education that would invariably and ment their salaries through consulting are the long poles in the tent. Having justifiably involve contract termination or or additional teaching. In many civilian firmly established the primacy of research nonrenewal in the PME system. schools, outside employment is not only through the socialization process, the permitted but also encouraged as a means more successful faculty members are, Faculty Talent Management of expanding the reputation and reach the less they will be seen in a classroom. It is appropriate to focus on the concept of the institution. Faculty members are Teaching assistants take up the slack. of academic talent management because permitted to engage in outside employ- Despite the prestige of some civilian of the centrality of the quality of the ment without restriction provided they colleges and universities, many teach- faculty to the effectiveness of any edu- give first priority to their university du- ing practices there are not particularly cational institution including the PME ties. Since professors are not expected to effective. system.10 This concept seems to be be in their offices on a daily basis, faculty Tenure is a double-edged sword. The lost on some administrators in military members who strategically construct their PME system does not seem to recognize organizations. That is understandable teaching schedules can build a lucrative its importance in recruiting and retaining in a system where Servicemembers are consulting practice. Because they are high-quality faculty members. Tenure easily exchanged or replaced and the serving 9-month contracts, faculty mem- is the brass ring of a budding academic personnel system routinely generates bers have time in the summer to pursue career—a designation that delineates the replacements for vacancies on demand. outside work or consulting. Faculty serious academic from the part-timer— Servicemembers engage in permanent members who choose to teach courses the professional from the amateur. A change of station moves regularly, and during summer months or teach more colleague recently suggested that no self- the kind of personnel churn that would than their assigned faculty load are paid respecting competitive academic would debilitate most educational institutions a healthy stipend. Moreover, at civilian be willing to join the faculty of an institu- is accepted as routine. No one person institutions, if faculty members are asked tion that did not offer tenure unless the is irreplaceable in a military forma- to perform additional work beyond their rate of compensation and likelihood of tion, and it is unknown when another contractual teaching load, such as provid- contract renewal were so high as to offset might become a casualty. Attracting and ing presentations or workshops, they the attendant loss of security. Short-term retaining academic talent, however, is a are paid extra, usually in the form of a contracts subject to renewal at the whims competitive sport that the PME system stipend or honorarium. Howard Wiarda of nonacademics and the vagaries of a plays at significant disadvantage. Hiring reports being frequently “tasked” to give vacillating defense budget are no way and retention are also some of the most lectures beyond the terms of his contract to hire the best and brightest. There is important activities an administra- at the National War College.12 It would also a relationship between tenure and tor engages in. Recent experience as not occur to most administrators of academic freedom. Those who cannot be the chair or member of several search military educational facilities to provide fired for their opinions as long as they are committees for both junior and senior additional stipends on top of salary for expressed within the norms of responsible faculty positions provokes reflection on such activities. academic practice can become effective the differences when one is recruiting Compensation. The war colleges and useful gadflies. The lack of such academics. Let us briefly examine seven place emphasis on pay equity across
16 Forum / Faculty Management Challenges in a War College JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 departments with allowance for senior- classroom or scholarly effort, is fully sub- example might illustrate the point. I ity. In one sense that is appropriate since ject to copyright by the civilian professor. graduated with a Ph.D. in public policy instructors are doing the same kinds of Academic publishing is not particularly analysis and administration, a subject I daily work. While Federal pay scales look lucrative, but royalties from published came to appreciate and enjoy. My teach- generous in some fields (for example, works can augment salaries. ing duties largely centered on three history and the humanities), in other Quality of Infrastructure. A good elements of the core curriculum: the first fields they are not nearly as attractive. At number of the facilities in the PME block addressed cognitive skills associ- civilian universities it is accepted without system, at least as far as the war colleges ated with strategic thinking, the second question that management professors are concerned, are aging, retrofitted, and was oriented to strategic leadership, and in the school of business will receive in some cases overstuffed. Many of the the third focused on defense systems and much higher salaries than history profes- faculty members share offices or cubicles. processes such as Department of Defense sors in the college of arts and sciences. For military personnel who have spent budgeting, force management, and That holds true within interdisciplinary significant time deployed or in the field, acquisition. While I came to thoroughly departments as well. A professor who such accommodations are nothing to enjoy the first two blocks and loved comes from the field of public policy complain about, but the quality of facili- teaching in general, I detested the block will be paid more than one who comes ties is an element of the larger issue of of instruction on defense processes. While from education even though they are work environment and quality of life. such processes are arguably important working in the same department. Civilian College campuses vary along a spectrum and something that senior military lead- institutions sometimes find creative ways from functional to beautiful, but it would ers should understand (points that are to compensate faculty members beyond not be hard to assert that civilian colleges continuously drummed into the heads of salary. Home-buying assistance, noncon- and universities have an edge in this cat- the students who were not particularly tributory retirement plans, mass transit egory. Faculty members at the Army War enthusiastic about the subjects either), assistance, reduced teaching load, and College shared small offices with other they were outside my range of expertise tuition remission for family members are faculty members. Consultations with stu- and my boundaries of interest. but a few examples. dents involved whispered conversations Faculty Governance and Copyright Restrictions. The applica- or gracious exits by office mates. Curriculum Oversight. The war colleges tion of copyright rules varies by Service Ability to Teach in an Area of place inordinate emphasis on the curricu- and interpretations vary by legal advisor, Expertise. Many academics are special- lum that is derived largely from the top but the general rule is that materials pro- ists. They strive to become experts and down. At most civilian universities, the duced by employees of Federal agencies develop a deep level of knowledge about curriculum belongs to the faculty. There are considered to be in the public domain something. That something might are processes for faculty voice and indeed and are not subject to copyright protec- change over time, and their breadth of veto when it comes to new programs and tion. Work that is prepared by an officer knowledge might expand, but good courses, course modifications, and cancel- or employee of the U.S. Government academics work hard to establish and lations. Faculty control of the curriculum cannot by copyrighted in accordance maintain a strong foundation in disciplin- is a jealously guarded prerogative that can with Chapter 17 U.S. Code § 105.13 A ary knowledge. Entire academic careers frustrate administrators. Administrators conservative interpretation of this statute are made on niche knowledge that can have an important role, especially re- can have a retarding effect on scholarly be arcane in some cases but valuable for garding resource considerations and publication. Most scholarly journals will its depth in others. Former dean of the limitations, but getting heavy handed only publish on the basis of copyright Army War College Jeffrey McCausland with curricular issues is a pathway to a ownership that is conferred by the author. once sagely suggested that the first loy- vote of no-confidence from the faculty, Faculty members in the PME system alty of academics is to their disciplines. a concept that is foreign in PME. There have in some cases gone to great lengths My economist colleague can always be are advantages to this kind of bottom-up to establish that their published works counted on to advocate for what that dis- system. It is easy to argue that those who are not works of the government. They cipline brings to the scholastic table, and are experts in their fields ought to control will work at home on personal comput- another colleague who has built a career the content of their courses. It can admit- ers and assiduously avoid materials or in K-12 education speaks forcefully for tedly also be a recipe for stagnation and resources that could be construed to be that program. immunity to necessary change. While part of their government work. In some Now imagine a new teacher arriving there is a variable amount of faculty voice cases, there is institutional winking going at a war college to find out he is to teach in the curriculum at the war colleges, it on around this subject since publishing subjects far outside the boundaries of his is remarkably diminished in comparison enhances the prestige of the institution. discipline and, in fact, the only time he to many civilian institutions of higher None of this is an issue in civilian aca- would have the opportunity to teach in education. The war colleges serve one demic institutions. Research funded by his beloved area of expertise is during an customer, the Department of Defense, university grants, or inherently part of abbreviated elective period. A personal and responsiveness to the needs of that
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Reed 17 customer drives top-down processes such If going head to head with a war col- in national security and especially the as joint PME accreditation standards and lege in a competition for an accomplished military, the war colleges provide privi- demands from the joint and Service staffs civilian faculty member, the contest would leged inside access that is unequaled in that compete with what the faculty might likely be decided after a discussion about most colleges and universities. Some will see as good educational practice. Faculty tenure alone, but if the potential faculty be attracted by the opportunity to work voice is muted in the PME system as evi- member were not convinced, the discus- with military officers and their Federal denced by an absence of the organs that sion could turn to these seven points. The workforce counterparts. Working with provide the means for involvement, such war colleges can attract a form of second- such dedicated professionals can be re- as faculty senates or assemblies. tier academic, the kind who teaches well warding, especially for those who enjoy Hiring Practices. Quite frankly, the but fails the tenure review because he working with adults. While academic hiring practices of most civilian person- lacks a record of meaningful scholarship. life in colleges and universities can be nel offices are slow, bureaucratic, and After all, the war colleges are not much removed from practice, the connection sometimes unfriendly. When preparing to interested in research or scholarship. to real-world problems and the obvious retire in 2007, I sent an application for an Wiarda states it succinctly: “The National relevance of a war college classroom open faculty position to a PME institu- War College places almost no emphasis can be quite motivating. We should not tion. My first contact from it was over 90 on research. It honors research and publi- underestimate the social wage that comes days later when I received an email telling cation in the breach, in theory, but it sees from making a contribution to national me that a relocation allowance would no relevance for the research that the fac- defense. It can be gratifying to have a role not be provided. By the time I received ulty does to its primary mission, which is in shaping and developing the next gen- that notice, I had interviewed at several teaching.”14 War colleges sometimes have eration of national security leaders. civilian academic institutions and already a department that focuses on publica- accepted an offer of employment. In con- tion, such as the Army’s Strategic Studies Academic Leadership trast, when my institution opens a faculty Institute, which is staffed with talented Those who focus on leadership in their search, it becomes a personal matter. We authors who produce insightful opinion teaching and scholarship are likely to send letters and notices to individuals we pieces and geopolitical essays, but few agree that leadership is an important think would be a good fit and court them. teaching faculty members are supported, variable in the quality of PME. The When they visit our campus, we wine and encouraged, or rewarded for engaging in Services have made both inspired and dine them and reimburse their expenses, the kind of scholarly work that would be poor choices in selecting those who if they have any that we have not already expected as terms of employment at most serve as executives of their war col- covered, without requiring forms and colleges and universities. leges. Context matters, and leadership signatures from the candidate. Yet the war colleges do manage to success in one type of organization does Hiring decisions involve a great deal attract some outstanding civilian fac- not necessarily translate to success in of faculty voice in civilian institutions. ulty members including those who are another.15 This suggestion runs con- The search committee, composed of fac- research and publication oriented. The trary to the military personnel system, ulty members from across the school and frustrations experienced by these academ- which tends to regard senior officers a student representative, screens applica- ics have been well explored in the works as interchangeable. Selection for flag tions, manages campus visits, and makes a of Johnson-Freese, Wiarda, and Higbee. rank is not sufficient qualification on recommendation for hire only after every To give some balance to the other side of its own to serve as a college president, faculty member who chooses to com- the coin, let us consider some of the rea- even a war college. Neither should it be ment has that opportunity. Students give sons why a civilian faculty member might a consolation prize for those who are input on the quality of the candidate’s gravitate to the PME system. Some are not selected for combat command. The teaching presentation and staff members attracted by the location, perhaps because same goes for other lesser administrative are queried as to their experience with they have family in the area, a consider- roles as well. Successful completion of the candidate. If the position involves ation that becomes more important with brigade, ship, or squadron command a senior faculty candidate who already senior faculty members who have paid does not inherently qualify a person has tenure at another institution, the their academic dues and are in a position to be a vice president, chief of staff, Appointment, Reappointment, Rank, to relocate. Faculty members in the PME provost, dean, or department chair. and Tenure Committee reviews candidate system are spared the pernicious nature of Such key positions of influence would qualifications and makes a recommenda- the grant economy that drives the pursuit benefit greatly from an understanding of tion for or against the award of tenure of funding, which is highly sought after the kinds of tensions that Hughes and before the dean, in consultation with the by universities but is also a distraction to Johnson-Freese identify. Demonstrated provost, makes an offer of employment. those more oriented to providing a qual- ability in academic settings should be a The dean of the school conducts the final ity classroom experience than to funding prerequisite for service in executive roles negotiations and extends the official offer research projects. Others might be drawn at the war colleges. Selectees should be in consultation with the provost. to the subject matter. For those interested deeply attuned and dedicated to the
18 Forum / Faculty Management Challenges in a War College JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 primary purposes of the institutions they lead. They should also be incentivized to speak and act fearlessly by making it understood that they are in their termi- nal assignment for an Active-duty officer or on a specified term for a civilian. In that way, they would have no favor to curry with others, including superiors, as they would not be eligible for promo- tion to higher grades. Most war college executives come to their positions with a successful military career behind them and little to no expe- rience in operating academic institutions. Wiarda suggests that they have a deep fear of losing control to the faculty and a military inferiority complex that spawns controlling behavior. He further asserts that such behavior serves to disguise an inability of most military officers to succeed in a nonmilitary environment. That is a harsh indictment that belies the experience of a number of former military officers who are now successfully leading academic institutions, but his hypothesis on the fear of loss of control has some merit. Most Active-duty officers assigned to the war colleges are there for a short time compared to the civilian faculty. They can kick up a great deal of institutional dust that is unproductive in the short term and exhausting in the long run. Both civilian faculty and staff who are in it for the long haul can become adept at appearing to comply while en- gaging in subtle resistance that waits out the “temporary help” at the top. The recent firing of the president and provost at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is worthy of examination.16 NPS is not a war college. It is designed to pro- vide advanced degree opportunities for National Defense University President MG Gregg F. Martin addresses NDU Class of 2013 during more junior officers than those who at- convocation ceremony on front steps of National War College (NDU/Katie Lewis) tend the war colleges, but this case raises some issues that apply to other PME in- The report assumes that academic doing so would be in direct conflict with stitutions. The first sentence of the third philosophies and ideals can be made to the business practices that are necessary paragraph of the cover letter to the Navy reconcile with Department of the Navy for operating a university.”18 Inspector General Command Inspection (DON) standards, and that is an assump- It would be a reasonable interpreta- report speaks volumes: “The overarching tion that can be questioned. Later in the tion of the report to suggest that the problem . . . is that NPS chooses not to same report, the Inspector General notes, Inspector General saw an institution follow governing Navy rules, regulations “A consistent theme from the highest that had become too civilianized, aca- and laws in the conduct of the majority of level of NPS leadership to the lower ranks demic, far out of compliance with Navy its programs, because it will not reconcile of the faculty was that NPS cannot oper- regulations, research oriented, and its academic philosophies and ideals with ate as a Navy command (and adhere to insufficiently focused on the training of the governing standards.”17 DON programs and procedures) because naval officers. The report attributed the
JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Reed 19 autonomy given to the institution and a such neglect too far even if the intent is wrong-and-right-with-the-war-colleges>; and Thomas Ricks, “Army War College Axes 10 lack of Service oversight as a causal fac- to achieve academic excellence. Civilian Profs,” ForeignPolicy.com, October 25, tor. If seeking evidence of the “military Johnson-Freese notes that it is not 2012, available at 20 Forum / Faculty Management Challenges in a War College JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 DOD’s first production F-35B Lightning II joint strike fighter flies toward its new home at Eglin Air Force Base, escorted by Marine Corps F-18 Hornets (U.S. Air Force/Joely Santiago) Putting “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” to Work A Wargaming Perspective By Jeffrey M. Shaw Cooperative Strategy for 21st Navy has declared that international Century Seapower proposes engagement is “a powerful tool in that the maritime forces of the delivering longer term conflict preven- A 2 United States will “join with other tion” and is one of its three key roles. like-minded nations to protect and There is little doubt that the United sustain the global, inter-connected States and the United Kingdom (UK) Jeffrey M. Shaw is an Associate Professor of 1 Strategy and Policy in the College of Distance system through which we prosper.” In will operate side by side in future con- Education at the U.S. Naval War College. addition, the United Kingdom’s Royal tingency operations. The War Gaming JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Shaw 21 measures (MCM), and the employment of special operations forces (SOF). The F-35 and the Royal Navy CV to be launched in 2016 present an op- portunity for interoperability with U.S. forces. For the first time, the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, along with the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, will employ the same airframe. The F-35 is arguably the last manned aircraft, and as such it would be worth pursuing as much commonality as possible in train- ing and employment. Liaison officers are the most effective option for ensuring standardization in training, tactics, and procedures. From a training perspective, flight simulator interconnectivity could promote standardized flight procedures and tactics. Players from the UK indicated that it may be too late to garner the advan- tages of true interoperability between U.S. and UK F-35 pilots because many U.S. and Brazilian naval officers provide inputs to multitouch, multiuser interface during 2013 Inter- procurement decisions for items such American War Game (U.S. Navy/James E. Foehl) as communications hardware and tran- sponders have been made without regard Department at the U.S. Naval War areas that warrant further investigation to for commonality with U.S. platforms. College sought to improve mutual facilitate operating as a combined force, However, with some effort in the short understanding between U.S. and UK which in the context of this game is re- term, to include renewed emphasis on operators and planners in conducting ferred to as “a military force composed of ensuring the placement of liaison officers combined operations in a future mari- elements of two or more allied nations.”4 and identifying areas for standardized time environment. From January 14 to These areas are doctrine, communica- training, it might still be possible to reap 18, 2013, participants from the U.S. tion and information systems (CIS), and at least some interoperability advantages Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force cultural constructs to include rules of from one of the most expensive weapons met with officers from the Royal Navy, engagement (ROE) and political will and procurement programs in history. Royal Marines, and Royal Air Force in authority. In addition to these three areas, There are significant challenges ahead Newport, Rhode Island, to examine players demonstrated an overall lack of as the Ministry of Defence integrates ways to operate effectively together familiarity with the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen in the future. It is imperative that concept, which while not the focus of the Elizabeth, into its national security strat- ideas that emerged from the exercise game deserves to be addressed. egy. The UK strategic defense review in are shared with senior officers from 2015 will help clarify this issue; however, both the United States and the United Doctrine it is not too early to begin considering Kingdom so steps can be taken to Doctrine is defined as the “fundamental ways to maximize interoperability be- ensure that their fleets can act jointly principles by which the military forces tween Royal Navy and U.S. Navy pilots. toward a common objective. or elements thereof guide their actions Having HMS Queen Elizabeth available The purpose of any wargame is to in support of national objectives.”5 Mul- in a future contingency environment “provide military commanders with both tinational doctrine is further defined is itself a tremendous advantage, but decision-making experience and decision- as principles applicable to guiding pursuing ways to allow the ship to be making information that will be useful the forces of “two or more nations in used by both UK and U.S. assets will in real-world situations.”3 The weeklong coordinated action toward a common only increase its usefulness. It is also not event in Newport provided plenty of objective,” which is then “ratified by too early for Royal Navy operators to information for participants to consider participating nations.”6 The wargame consider ways to more effectively operate regarding the combined employment identified three specific areas that with the Royal Air Force. According to of U.S. and UK maritime and air forces. deserve attention: F-35 and aircraft UK players, there is plenty of work to do Participants identified three overarching carrier (CV) operations, mine counter- in this arena. 22 Forum / Putting Seapower Strategy to Work JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Mine countermeasures “reduce the enhanced through the establishment of together international, interagency, pri- threat and effects of enemy-laid sea shared doctrine. This is an area for future vate and public [groups] to address very mines.”7 This is an area in which the study and experimentation, not only complex problems, and I will put cyber Royal Navy could provide valuable as- regarding combined operations involv- at the top.”11 sistance to U.S. forces. The Japanese ing the forces of two nations. Identifying A final CIS point to consider is that Maritime Self Defense Force supported appropriate training, equipment, and both U.S. and UK players indicated that the U.S. Navy during Operation doctrine to ensure proper CID within too often information is classified at a Enduring Freedom by providing oil tank- the branches of the U.S. Armed Forces higher level than necessary. To ensure the ers to refuel U.S. ships. Identifying this must also continuously be pursued, as too free flow of important information to the type of niche capability, whether refueling many “blue-on-blue” events over the last commander, as well as between forces or mine-clearing, could be the most ef- few decades have shown. and from those forces back up the chain fective way for forces from two nations to BMD interoperability is another im- of command, perhaps “unclassified” operate together toward a common ob- portant area of concern, especially with should be the default; otherwise, we help jective. To standardize MCM operations, the emergence of the ASB concept. As the enemy keep information out of the assigning liaison officers between the U.S. and allied forces operate within the proper hands, making his job easier. Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy is a good threat envelopes of advanced missiles, it is first step. The identification of common imperative that our forces have the capa- Cultural Considerations training practices is also important. bility to share information that enhances Players noted that ROE and political Players indicated that U.S. and UK survivability. In light of recent events in will and authorities were two key cul- tier 1 SOF already have the ability to North Korea, BMD is important across tural considerations that can affect com- operate closely together at the tactical the board, whether dealing with allies and bined operations. Differences in culture level. It would be worth examining their partners or from the joint operations per- cannot be “fixed,” so the challenge is procedures to determine the optimum spective within the U.S. Armed Forces. It to identify what they are and then find way ahead for enhancing interoperability is also within our interest to ensure that ways to work within and around the between other forces and capabilities, our allies can conduct successful BMD differences. Perhaps this issue affects such as the F-35 and MCM assets. operations on their own. U.S. military personnel more than our Cyber and space operations will affect allies and partners. Addressing this Communication and everything from the ability to com- issue, Admiral Stavridis indicated, “As Information Systems mand forces at the tactical level to the opposed to many of our European part- The term communication and informa- ability to formulate and communicate ners, who effortlessly speak four or five tion systems is used by the UK armed political resolve at the highest levels of languages and have a deep knowledge forces and was adopted by game government. The full implications of of each other’s background and culture, participants to encompass elements cyber and space have yet to be realized. we in the U.S. are failing to fully train relating to the ability to communicate The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of and prepare for this kind of interna- and share information between U.S. Staff has indicated, “The relevance of tional work. . . . This is an area in which and UK forces acting together. Players space and cyberspace to national security we have much work to do.”12 This issue noted that one of the most pressing will grow exponentially in magnitude has been recognized and addressed communication issues facing combat of importance.”9 One way for the U.S. throughout the Department of Defense forces is combat identification (CID), Navy to address this looming issue is to (DOD), and individual Services have “the process of attaining an accurate continue to “educate the next genera- sought various ways to remedy this characterization of detected objects in tion of cyber officers at the U.S. Naval deficiency. the operational environment sufficient Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, Many players believed the United to support an engagement decision.”8 and Naval War College.”10 Other States and the United Kingdom are not In addition to CID, the ability to share Services will also want to examine ways far apart on political issues, and recent ballistic missile defense (BMD) informa- they can train and deploy cyber officers. events seem to indicate that at the higher tion and operating effectively together It is hoped this cadre of highly educated levels of government, this is probably the in the cyber and space domains were officers will include not only members of case. For example, an examination of cur- noted as areas needing attention. the U.S. Armed Forces, but also officers rent events demonstrates that the United The ability to accurately distinguish from the armed forces of our allied and States maintains the ability to work whether a detected object is friendly is partner nations. The importance of cyber closely with partner nations at short no- complicated when operating with forces was summed up succinctly by former tice. Steven Erlanger’s article in the New from a partner nation. It is imperative U.S. European Command Commander York Times on January 20, 2013, noted that common architecture be identified, Admiral James Stavridis in 2012: “We that the United States and France are procured, and employed to prevent frat- hear a lot about strategic communica- collaborating in Mali, sharing intelligence ricide. Combat identification can also be tion. Strategic connection is bringing that was garnered from drones and other JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Shaw 23 means. Problems associated with interop- the tactical level. Second, the bottom According to the Dean of the Center erability seemed to be less evident at the line regarding political legitimacy is that for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval strategic level and more pronounced at the objective, not the number of nations War College, “It is all too easy either to the operational—and especially at the aligned together attempting to achieve ignore or put a favorable spin on game tactical level, according to both U.S. the objective, will determine the degree events or results that do not fit comfort- and UK players. Similar consistency at of legitimacy seen on the world stage. ably into existing doctrines or accepted the highest policy levels will be required It is unlikely that anyone other than al theories,” especially when games “gener- for the United States and UK to achieve Qaeda will condemn France for interven- ate information that is bureaucratically mutual objectives. To ensure that both ing unilaterally in Mali. Likewise, Egypt’s or politically threatening to players or nations are able to operate with similar 1973 surprise attack against Israel did not sponsors.”14 Many players and sponsors ROE, the International Law Department achieve greater legitimacy simply because associated with this particular gaming at the Naval War College would be the Syria chose to join them. Hence, the “we exercise may have had a vested interest perfect forum within which to begin ex- have a partner, therefore our objective in the ASB success. Rather than continu- amining this important topic. is legitimate” mentality should be taken ing to evaluate ASB at the tactical and The majority of players indicated that with a grain of salt. operational level, it is incumbent on the by operating together, the United States Naval War College and the professional and the UK would be more likely to gain Air-Sea Battle military education institutions through- international legitimacy. While players Although this particular game was out DOD to examine whether ASB is correctly noted that identifying areas in not designed to examine ASB, players actually an intellectual construct worth which political objectives will need to be were questioned about their familiar- pursuing. Examining the concept was aligned, the game focused more at the ity with this emerging concept. By a not the object of this game, but “the operational level of war. It is at that level wide margin, both U.S. and UK players gaining of knowledge is inherent and that commanders will need authority to noted a general lack of familiarity with unavoidable, whatever a game’s object,”15 act. Therefore, if the United States and ASB. This is problematic, especially if and the knowledge gained in this game UK hope to work side by side, or as an this concept continues to drive U.S. Air about the participant’s general lack of integrated force, the authority to act as Force and Navy funding and acquisition familiarity with ASB should be acted on. necessary to accomplish the mission will priorities. Perhaps it is time to consider While doing so, it might be worth asking need to be clearly articulated from the the statement made by Representative whether the antiaccess/area-denial con- civilian leadership down through the Randy Forbes (R-VA), the Chairman of cept that drives ASB will encourage our chain of command. These authorities the House Armed Services Readiness fighting admirals and generals to adopt must be coordinated between govern- Subcommittee: a “George B. McClellan” mindset rather ments so combined forces have the ability than a “George S. Patton” mindset. That to pursue the same objective in the same There is still a broader misunderstand- would be problematic to say the least. manner if the operational commander is ing amongst the press, think tanks, and to accomplish the mission. international observers of what Air Sea Recommendations While operating together toward Battle actually is and is not. This stems Continued study of the issues that a common objective has the potential from a struggle by the Navy and Air Force emerged from this game is important. to provide greater political legitimacy, to explain the concept, its purpose, or the Players suggested a number of ideas caution is warranted for two reasons. role of the Air Sea Battle Office. The clas- for how this should be done, with a First, it may be enough simply to have sified status and diplomatic sensitivities tactical-level game being the most forces in the same theater of operations, surrounding Air Sea Battle are partially widely suggested option. The Naval demonstrating resolve through pres- to blame.13 War College’s 2012 Arctic game exam- ence. Having Royal Navy and U.S. Navy ined a number of set-piece scenarios, aircraft sharing a carrier flight deck or This comment demonstrates that the the goal of which was to determine engaging in MCM operations side by U.S. military needs to not only try harder whether the United States is properly side may not be required to demonstrate to communicate in the unclassified poised to operate in the Arctic. The both nations’ resolve. It is incumbent on domain, but also to present a strategic advantages of this approach would be the combatant commander to determine communication message geared toward to narrow in on specific doctrinal issues, the optimum level of interoperability its own people and government in ex- and “as is the case with the global/ that will provide the greatest leverage in plaining what ASB is and why the Nation strategic games, the principal purpose any given contingency, and the partici- needs it. Until the military can clear this of the tactical games is to give their pants in the wargame provided plenty relatively low hurdle, it is unlikely that participants an improved perspective,”16 of examples as to when the commander the U.S. Armed Forces can operate effec- which is exactly what many players hope should, and equally important, should tively either as a joint force or with allies to obtain in the next iteration of this not seek to operate forces together at and partners. important dialogue. 24 Forum / Putting Seapower Strategy to Work JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Another suggested option is to have important topic. Examining effective Notes both U.S. and UK judge advocates ways to operate with our allies and part- general (JAGs) examine the specific ners should be a priority for the Services 1 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century ROE that might be employed in future and the Joint Staff. How to do this Seapower (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, U.S. contingencies. Whether through round- properly is an avenue for further inquiry. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, October table discussions or including JAGs in What is the role of the individual Service 2007), available at JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Shaw 25 Marine amphibious assault vehicles maneuver back to USS Tortuga at Hat Yao Beach, Krabi Province, Thailand, as part of joint/combined exercise Cobra Gold 2012 (U.S. Marine Corps/Courtney White) Godzilla Methodology Means for Determining Center of Gravity By James P. Butler hat are enemy force capabili- staffs need to address in planning mili- how to determine the center of gravity. ties? Where does the enemy tary operations. How does a military planner or analyst W derive its strength? What are One of the terms commonly used determine the “it”? How does a military the enemy’s objectives? Combatant while conducting an analysis of enemy commander determine his own center of commanders are often tasked with iden- force capabilities is center of gravity. gravity so he can protect it? This article tifying which enemy forces will need to Military analysts and historians com- attempts to identify a methodology for be attacked, destroyed, or neutralized monly refer to a force or capability as determining centers of gravity. in order to achieve established military the “enemy center of gravity,” meaning The term center of gravity first objectives. These are some of the ques- that this force is of such strength that appeared in Michael Howard and tions combatant commanders and their it will need to be addressed (attacked, Peter Paret’s translation of Carl von destroyed, or neutralized) to achieve the Clausewitz’s immortal discussion of objective of the operation. Although warfare On War.1 Clausewitz actually Dr. James P. Butler is a Professor of Joint Military use of this term is common, seldom used the German term Schwerpunkt to Operations at the Naval War College. does anyone offer an explanation for describe “that area where the greatest 26 Forum / Means for Determining Center of Gravity JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 concentration of enemy troops can be destroyed; and finally he indicates that the commanders need to know what to at- found.”2 In the English translation of the purpose of this destruction is to achieve tack (the enemy center of gravity) and book, center of gravity is defined as “the a political or military objective. If one what to defend (the friendly center of hub of all power and movement, on which were to look at Operation Desert Storm in gravity). Rapidly attacking the enemy everything depends. That is the point August of 1990 for an example of center center of gravity may be a determining against which all our energies should be of gravity, analysis would identify Saddam factor in the outcome of war. directed.”3 This definition indicates that a Hussein and his inner circle security ap- For years, commanders and their staffs center of gravity is not just any concentra- paratus as the enemy strategic center of have struggled to correctly identify centers tion of military strength, but the source of gravity and the Republican Guard as the of gravity. If an enemy has multiple forces strength that must be attacked. operational center of gravity.7 Although that are strong and formidable, how does Planners and analysts of modern Saddam had multiple critical strengths a planner determine which one is the cen- warfare expend great time and energy (for example, an integrated air defense ter of gravity? For example, enemy sources analyzing enemy force capabilities to pre- system, land-based ballistic missiles, of strength may include a strong army, pare for military operations. Where does missile-armed surface combatant ships, superior navy, and formidable air force. the enemy derive its strength? What is the and sea mine inventories and delivery Which force should commanders devote enemy’s source of power? Analysis may platforms) available during this operation, their maximum effort toward attacking, reveal that a particular leader is the source the Republican Guard was the source of neutralizing, or destroying? of power at the strategic level of war or power used to achieve his objective of that an elite division or army component occupying and holding Kuwait. That was Center of Gravity Analysis is the source of power at the operational the force the allies needed to degrade, In answering these questions, Vego pro- level.4 These sources of power where the neutralize, or destroy to prevent Saddam poses that commanders and their staffs enemy derives its strength are commonly from achieving his operational objective conduct an analysis of objectives and the referred to as centers of gravity. of defeating or neutralizing the coali- military situation to determine centers Joint doctrine defines center of gravity tion force attempting to liberate Kuwait, of gravity. The purpose of analyzing the as “a source of power that provides moral which was linked to his strategic objective military situation is to determine critical or physical strength, freedom of action, of retaining Kuwait as a 19th province.8 factors, which are things “considered or will to act.”5 Joint doctrine also speci- essential for the accomplishment of the fies that centers of gravity may be found Why Is This Important? specific military objective.”11 Critical at all three levels of war (strategic, opera- Commanders need to effectively factors can be tangible (physical things tional, and tactical) and that they should employ their forces in order to enhance that can be measured or touched) or be nested, meaning the destruction of an their ability to achieve objectives. The intangible (abstract things that are dif- operational-level center of gravity should strength of forces needs to be applied ficult to measure). For example, in mea- have a major impact on the strategic cen- toward achieving objectives, not wasted suring the tangible aspects of an army ter of gravity. For example, destruction on secondary, insignificant actions. division, one could count the number of an operational-level center of gravity Many of the principles of war directly of troops or tanks or artillery pieces (for example, an elite army division) will apply in determining the importance assigned to the unit. Intangible factors impact the strategic center of gravity (the of centers of gravity.9 For example, the of the army division might include a nation’s will to fight). commander should direct the operation discussion of unit morale, training, or Milan Vego, one of the foremost the- toward a clearly defined goal (which warfighting ability. orists on operational warfare, emphasizes emphasizes the principle of objective). In addition to identifying tangible the importance of identifying the center The commander should also concen- and intangible factors, Vego proposes di- of gravity and defines it as “a source of trate the effects of combat power at viding critical factors into two categories: massed strength—physical or moral—or the most advantageous place and time critical strengths and critical weaknesses. a source of leverage whose serious deg- (emphasizes the principle of mass) and Critical strengths are “primary sources of radation, dislocation, neutralization, or minimize the expending of combat physical or moral potential/power or ele- destruction would have the most decisive power on secondary efforts (emphasiz- ments that integrate, protect, and sustain impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ing economy of force).10 Although all the specific sources of combat potential/ ability to accomplish a given political/ principles of war can be addressed to power.”12 Determination of what forces military objective.”6 The value of Vego’s varying degrees in this way, their rel- are critical is based on the good judg- definition is that he addresses three key evance is not as direct. ment and experience of commanders and aspects of a center of gravity. First, he Time is also a critical element their staffs. Elements are deemed critical identifies the center of gravity as a source in warfare. The efforts of the com- strengths if they affect or potentially af- of physical or moral strength; he then in- mander should be synchronized toward fect accomplishment of the objective. dicates that this source of strength should achieving the objective in the shortest Critical weaknesses are sources of power, be degraded, dislocated, neutralized, or possible time. To be successful in warfare, essential for accomplishing the objective, JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Butler 27 USS John C. Stennis and USS George Washington in Andaman Sea with their carrier strike groups (U.S. Navy/Kenneth Abbate) that are grossly inadequate to accomplish if the attacking force had the ability to How does one know if he has selected the mission.13 At the operational level exploit this vulnerability. On the other the correct center of gravity? Even if one of war, a force might be considered as hand, identification of critical strengths explicitly followed Vego’s recommenda- a critical weakness if it were necessary as critical vulnerabilities is often more tion for conducting an analysis of force to accomplish the objective and it was difficult. Determination of vulnerabilities capabilities, one could still select the considered to be deficient in some aspect in elements considered critical strengths wrong element on the critical strength such as mobility, firepower, doctrine, mo- is possible, especially if one considers at- list. This could be a costly error if forces rale, or training. In determining critical tacking logistic support or sustainment were wasted attacking the wrong center strengths and weaknesses, it is essential requirements. For example, if a carrier of gravity. The Godzilla Methodology to keep military objectives in mind. strike group (a naval force composed of a was developed to resolve this problem Consideration should be given only to carrier and multiple cruisers, destroyers, and assist military planners in determin- those elements (critical strengths or criti- frigates, and submarines) is identified as a ing which element on a list of critical cal weaknesses) that have some effect on critical strength, its vulnerability may be strengths is the correct center of gravity. accomplishing the objective. its logistic support. Rather than attacking Continuing to follow Vego’s analytical the carrier strike group directly, an enemy The Godzilla Methodology construct, other factors to be considered might attack this force indirectly by tar- Since Godzilla first terrorized Japan in are those that are vulnerable to attack. geting its supply ships. Ishiro Honda’s 1954 film (appropri- Those elements (critical strengths or Having identified critical strengths, ately titled Godzilla), this monster has critical weaknesses) open to attack or ex- critical weaknesses, and critical vulnerabil- wreaked havoc on civilizations through- ploitation because of some deficiency are ities, the next step in determining center out the world.16 As a fictional creature identified by Vego as critical vulnerabili- of gravity is to look at the list of elements born from the fallout of atomic bomb ties.14 It is often easier to identify elements considered critical strengths. One of the testing in the Pacific, this giant quasi- considered critical weaknesses as critical elements on that list is the center of grav- dinosaur has gained popularity as both vulnerabilities because their deficiency ity, a critical strength that is essential for a destructive monster and as a hero, a may lend itself to the reason the force achieving the objective. This is where the defender of friends. is vulnerable to attack. For example, an analysis could lead to problems and er- Godzilla had the power to reach out infantry battalion (composed of approxi- rors—the misidentification of the center and destroy antagonist forces and protect mately 850 men) might be considered a of gravity is a common mistake. The cen- friendly forces from harm. For example, critical weakness because it does not pos- ter of gravity may not be the strongest or as an antagonist, he was depicted sinking sess the ability to defend itself from attack largest force on the critical strength list. ships, downing aircraft, and even destroy- from the air.15 This same deficiency might Reasoning must be employed to deter- ing cities; as a hero, he was depicted as lead those conducting the analysis to mine which critical strength is necessary defending friends from imminent de- consider this force a critical vulnerability to achieve the objective. struction by other mythical monsters. 28 Forum / Means for Determining Center of Gravity JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 The basic premise of the Godzilla in order to establish an airfield, which their objective? Surprisingly, the answer Methodology is to use this mythical would be used to facilitate follow-on op- is still no. In fact, it is not until Godzilla monster to determine which force on the erations for the island-hopping concept destroys the amphibious attack force that critical strengths list is required to achieve developed during World War II. the Allied operational objective is pre- the objective. Godzilla destroys (re- Godzilla will defend the Japanese- vented. Thus, the amphibious attack force moves) one force at a time from the list held island from attack by Allied forces. is the enemy operational center of gravity. of critical strengths until removal of a par- If the Japanese had conducted an analysis It is the only force capable of establishing ticular force prevents the objective from of force capabilities to determine the lodgment ashore. being achieved. When that happens and Allied operational- level critical strengths, Determining the center of gravity is the objective can no longer be achieved they may have identified the following only one step in identifying how to attack because of the removal (neutralization elements: the submarines assigned to the enemy. After determining the enemy or destruction) of a particular force, then commander, Submarine Forces Pacific; center of gravity, the Japanese staff of- that force is the center of gravity. The the land-based air in the region; a fast car- ficers would still have to continue their Godzilla Methodology allows planners rier force (consisting of aircraft carriers, analysis to determine how to attack it and to identify which force is the center of fast battleships, cruisers, and destroy- the other enemy forces identified in the gravity by comparing forces identified as ers); a fire support group (consisting of analysis of critical strength forces. For critical strengths to the objective. battleships, cruisers, and destroyers) used example, the Japanese staff officers would By definition, the center of gravity is primarily for force protection and gunfire also need to address how to defeat or a source of strength whose destruction or support; and an amphibious attack force neutralize the Allied fast carrier force and neutralization would have a decisive im- (composed of cruisers, destroyers, de- fire support group. These forces would pact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability stroyer escorts, escort carriers, transports, have been assigned to support and pro- to accomplish a given political/military cargo ships, landing craft, mine craft, and tect the amphibious attack force so the objective.17 Having determined which supply vessels carrying one or more Army Japanese would have to deal with each force is the center of gravity, planners can or Marine divisions). of these forces in some way (deception continue their analysis to determine how Using Godzilla as a destructive may be used in addition to annihilation) to attack (enemy) or defend (friendly) force, the Japanese staff officers could before commencing an attack on the am- sources of power. have examined this list of Allied critical phibious attack force. strengths by destroying one force at a In this example, the amphibious at- An Example time, and then analyzing the impact the tack force possesses minimal strength To illustrate this methodology, Godzilla removal of each force would have had on during its transition to the amphibious will be used to determine centers of achieving the objective. For example, if operating area. It has significant potential gravity for a notional Allied amphibious the Japanese used Godzilla to destroy all strength because of the infantry division operation in the Pacific during World the Allied submarines operating in the onboard, but only minimal offensive War II. Looking first at the enemy region, would that prevent the Allies from strength while in transit. This is the fact objectives, Godzilla will support Japa- achieving their operational objective of that causes staff officers the greatest prob- nese forces by destroying Allied critical establishing lodgment ashore? The answer lem when trying to determine centers strengths until one is identified whose is no. Considering all the forces that re- of gravity. The fast carrier force and fire removal would prevent the Allies from main on the critical strength list, the Allies support groups obviously possess greater achieving their operational objective. could still conduct an amphibious landing dynamic strength, so why are they not Having determined the enemy (Allied) and achieve their objective (seizing the the center of gravity? The answer lies with center of gravity, the Godzilla Method- island). Thus, the Allied submarines are the objective. If the objective is to seize ology will then be used to determine not the center of gravity. Continuing and occupy an island, then the amphibi- the friendly (Japanese) center of gravity. with this methodology, if Godzilla de- ous attack force is the only force that can The ultimate strategic objective of stroyed all the land-based aircraft in the achieve that objective. This is the only the Allied forces in the Pacific during operational region, would this prevent force listed as a critical strength that has World War II was “the unconditional sur- the Allies from achieving their operational the ability to seize and hold territory. render of Japan.”18 The immediate Allied objective? Once again, the answer is no. Aircraft, ships, and submarines cannot strategic objective was “to obtain posi- The Allies could still use their remaining seize and hold territory; only the am- tions from which the ultimate surrender forces to assault and occupy the island. phibious forces of the amphibious attack of Japan can be forced by intensive air Thus, land-based aircraft should not be force can do that. bombardment, by sea and air blockade, considered the center of gravity. Godzilla This methodology can also be used and by invasion if necessary.”19 An Allied could then destroy another force, such as to determine the friendly (Japanese) generic operational-level objective, nested the fast carrier force or the fire support center of gravity. The Japanese strategic under these strategic objectives, might group. Would removal of either of these objective in the Pacific during World have been to seize an island in the Pacific forces prevent the Allies from achieving War II was to win a great engagement JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Butler 29 center of gravity, the Godzilla methodol- ogy may provide an answer. Without application of this imaginative methodol- ogy, planners may make costly mistakes by focusing their attack on the wrong force. Mistakes of this type can lead to catastrophic consequences. JFQ Notes 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ- eton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 2 Ibid., 485. 3 Ibid., 595. 4 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Opera- tions (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), identifies three levels of war to Members of 82nd Airborne board C-17 Globemaster III to conduct static line jump during mobility air distinguish between national objectives and tac- forces exercise (U.S. Air Force/Jason Robertson) tical actions. The strategic level is the highest, referring to the employment of the instruments at sea (decisive battle) with the Allies to attack the Allied forces en route to the is- of national power to achieve theater, national, negotiate a settlement.20 An example of land to prevent the landing. The Japanese or multinational objectives. The operational level links the tactical to the strategic, and the a theater-strategic objective may have naval fire support group is the friendly tactical is characterized as the employment of been to maintain control over a particular operational-level center of gravity that forces in relation to each other. geographic region to keep the Japanese should be protected. Protection in this 5 JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning (Wash- sea lines of communication open, their example does not mean this force should ington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), resources flowing, and their territorial ex- be held back and hidden from harm, but III-22. 6 Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: pansion boundaries intact. An operational rather that it should be used in the attack Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval objective may have been to prevent the with the support of other forces on the War College, 2009), VII-13. Allies from attacking this notional island list of critical strengths. For example, the 7 U.S. Naval War College, Joint Operation in the Pacific. If Japanese planners were to land-based air could be used to provide Planning Process (JOPP) Workbook (Newport, compile a list of friendly critical strengths protection from aircraft attack and the RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2012), C-7–C-9. 8 Ibid., C-7. (Japanese forces), it would be similar to submarines could be used to provide 9 Nine principles of war are recognized in the Allies, and might include a naval fire defense in depth for the Japanese naval joint doctrine: objective, offensive, mass, ma- support group (multiple types of war- fire support group as it attacks the Allied neuver, economy of force, unity of command, ships such as aircraft carriers, battleships, center of gravity. security, surprise, and simplicity. See JP 3-0. 10 cruisers, and destroyers), submarines, The Godzilla Methodology provides JP 3-0, A-1–A-5. 11 Vego, VII-14. land-based air, and an infantry battalion. a simple but effective means of identify- 12 Ibid. In using the Godzilla Methodology to ing centers of gravity. This mythical film 13 Ibid., VII-16. determine the friendly center of gravity, figure can be used by commanders and 14 Ibid. each element on the critical strength list their staffs during the planning process to 15 Yves J. Bellanger, U.S. Army Infantry would be analyzed and removed one item determine which forces are necessary to Divisions 1943–45: Volume 1—Organization, Doctrine and Equipment (Solihull, England: at a time until the objective cannot be achieve military objectives. Identification Helion and Company Limited, 2002), 53. achieved. For example, if all the subma- of enemy centers of gravity allows com- 16 David Kalat, A Critical History and rines in the area were removed, could the manders to focus their efforts on the Filmography of Toho’s Godzilla Series, 2nd ed. Japanese still prevent the Allies from at- neutralization or destruction of those (Jefferson, NC: McFarland Company, 2010), 2. 17 tacking this notional island? Yes, they have forces that have a decisive impact on ac- Vego, VII-13. 18 Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean other forces that would allow the Japanese complishing a given political/military Areas, Campaign Plan Granite (College Park, to achieve their objective. It is easy to objective. The identification of friendly MD: Department of the Navy, 1944), 1. ascertain that the naval fire support group centers of gravity allows commanders to 19 Ibid. would be the critical strength necessary focus their efforts to protect and possibly 20 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, for achieving the objective of preventing enhance the capability of those forces Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941 (Annapolis, the Allies from seizing this notional island necessary for achieving objectives. MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 515. in the Pacific. This is the only force with If commanders are having difficulty enough mobility and strength available to determining which force is the enemy 30 Forum / Means for Determining Center of Gravity JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 U.S. Marines and Georgian soldiers exit USMC MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft during operation in Helmand Province (DOD/Ashley E. Santy) Improving DOD Adaptability and Capability to Survive Black Swan Events By William R. Burns and Drew Miller rofessor of risk engineering at of the Highly Improbable.1 A black swan prepare for its potentially dire conse- New York Polytechnic University event is an outlier, something outside quences. But it is not an unpredictable P Nassim Taleb wrote persuasively the realm of regular expectations, event. Most major black swan events about the need to prepare for catastro- where nothing in the past can convinc- (the 9/11 attacks, for example) are phes in his seminal work on risk man- ingly point to the real possibility that foreseen and warned about, but the agement, The Black Swan: The Impact it will occur or persuade us we need to warnings tend to be ignored because of strong personal and organizational resistance to changing opinions and Captain William R. Burns, Jr., USN (Ret.), and Colonel Drew Miller, Ph.D., USAFR (Ret.), are Senior outlook. Many experts describe future Research Staff Members at the Institute for Defense Analyses. threats such as bioengineered viral JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Burns and Miller 31 pandemics as “inevitable,” yet they that “the U.S. is not very good at pre- this probability lower than 25% would be cannot predict their likelihood, and dicting threats of any kind.”4 Former misguided, and the best estimate may be gaining attention (let alone mitigation) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates considerably higher. . . . The reactive ap- for these coming disasters is therefore noted, “Our record of predicting where proach—see what happens, limit damages, extremely difficult. we will use military force since Vietnam and learn from experience—is unworkable. The black swan provides insights into is perfect—we have never once gotten it Rather, we must take a proactive approach. our tendency to avoid thinking about right. . . . We need to have in mind the This requires foresight to anticipate new and preparing for rare but potentially greatest possible flexibility and versatil- types of threats and a willingness to take de- catastrophic events. Taleb makes the case ity for the broadest range of conflict.”5 cisive preventive action and to bear the costs that we are physically and psychologically Since black swans are “unpredict- (moral and economic) of such actions.8 programmed to make common misjudg- able,” Taleb states, “we need to adjust to ments. His key point is critical for the their existence (rather than naively try to U.S. conventional force technological Department of Defense (DOD): Do not predict them).”6 We should operate on superiority almost demands that a de- try to predict the likelihood of a disaster, the assumption that they will eventually termined opponent use an asymmetric but prepare for the impact. The most im- occur and position ourselves to survive attack such as weapons of mass destruc- portant thing DOD can do to prepare for them. This view calls for rejecting the tion (WMD) or terrorism either to defeat inherent unknowns and new technologies traditional two-axes risk matrix with our forces or to inflict losses that lead to capable of producing catastrophic effects consequence of event on one axis and loss of popular support for the campaign. is to enhance individual and organiza- probability of occurrence on the other. Intelligent, determined adversaries will tional adaptability and procure more Defining critical risks the organization make their decision based on their calcu- flexible, diverse weapons systems oper- should deal with as those with high lation of costs and benefits influenced by ated by more adaptable personnel. consequences and high likelihood of our relative vulnerability.9 Tasked by DOD to identify changes occurrence means ignoring black swans We maintain robust nuclear forces not to training that would produce a military and remaining unprepared to survive the because we estimate enemy use of nuclear better prepared to respond to asymmetric consequences when they occur. weapons is likely, but because the conse- threats, Institute for Defense Analyses Nick Bostrom, director of the quences of not being well prepared could (IDA) researchers postulated that given Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford be disastrous. We cannot predict the the uncertainty of future threats, the key University, also argues against the likelihood of WMD attacks and should skill or attribute that individuals, units, common practice of assigning low prob- not try. It would be wiser to assume that and teams of commanders and leaders abilities to or ignoring unpredictable, an intelligent and determined adversary, need to improve on is adaptability.2 IDA has-never-happened-before threats: aware of our vulnerabilities, would act to defines adaptability as the capacity to exploit them. We need the capability to bring about an effective response to an Although more rigorous methods are to be deter, defeat, and recover from the worst altered situation, a metaskill that requires preferred whenever they are available and threats. the integration of both cognitive and applicable, it would be misplaced scientism Given unpredictable aspects of WMD relational skills. To be adaptive, leaders to confine attention to those risks that and new technology risks, DOD would at all levels, and particularly senior lead- are amenable to hard approaches. Such a be better off focusing on consequences ers, need to apply well-developed skills strategy would lead to many risks being rather than deluding itself into thinking of critical and creative thinking, intuition ignored, including many of the largest risks it could reasonably estimate likelihood of (pattern recognition), self-awareness and confronting humanity. It would also cre- occurrence. If an organization refuses to self-regulation, and a variety of social ate a false dichotomy between two types of abandon the standard risk matrix, then skills in varying combinations and across risks—the “scientific” ones and the “specu- change the definition of critical risk so a wide range of situations.3 lative” ones—where, in reality, there is a low-probability threats qualify as critical This article offers eight recommen- continuum of analytic tractability.7 risk. Taleb points out that, “There are dations on how to make DOD more so many things we can do if we focus adaptable and capable of deterring, coun- Dr. Bostrom argues that when we on anti-knowledge, or what we do not tering, or recovering from black swan consider the many potential sources of know.”10 While generally contrary to events. existential, black swan risks, there is sub- DOD culture of preventing attack, for stantial likelihood of some great disaster: many threats we need to prepare for Stop Using the Traditional disaster recovery: “It is much easier to Risk Matrix The balance of evidence is such that it deal with the Black Swan problem if we The idea that we cannot predict when would appear unreasonable not to assign focus on robustness to errors rather than and where the military will have to a substantial probability to the hypothesis improving predictions.”11 respond has broad acceptance. A 2012 that an existential disaster will do us National Research Council report stated in. My subjective opinion is that setting 32 Forum / Adaptability and Capability in Black Swan Events JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Encourage Critical Thinking in Time that teach critical thinking nearly 250 former junior officers who While IDA was tasked to develop and challenging assumptions and false left the military between 2001 and 2010, an adaptability training strategy, its analogies, brainstorming, and adaptive revealed that the second most frequently researchers found that adaptability was planning techniques should be a key part reported reason was frustration with mili- a function of not only training, but also of officer education.14 Nuclear strate- tary bureaucracy.18 education and experience. Education gist Victor Utgoff suggests that DOD In 2004, Leonard Wong of the and training are part of a continuous should brainstorm black swan threats and U.S. Army War College warned that process of learning, the robustness then assign them as critical and creative the “Army must now acknowledge and of which is dependent on real-world thinking exercises to National Defense encourage this newly developed adapt- experience. In the classroom, regard- University classes, charging students and ability in our junior officers or risk stifling less of the subject, the most important faculty to figure out how we could deal the innovation critically needed in the thing the student learns is to think with them.15 Army’s future leaders.”19 Six years later, critically—an essential skill for adaptive William Deresiewicz, a Yale professor performance. Critical thinking takes Encourage and Promote in a widely publicized lecture at West hard work to develop and constant Innovation and Adaptation Point, urged cadets to fight bureaucratic practice to maintain. Derek Bok, Probably the best adaptive capability we conformity by thinking both critically former president of Harvard University, have in the U.S. military is the ability and independently, challenging routines, observed, “Many [graduates] cannot of Soldiers and young officers to adapt and taking risks.20 David Chu, former reason clearly or perform competently in battle. Special Forces on horseback head of the top DOD personnel manage- in analyzing complex, non-technical in Afghanistan and Servicemembers in ment office, suggested that talented and problems, even though faculties rank Iraq performing duties they had never adaptive young officers could be retained critical thinking as the primary goal of been trained for—improvising to deal and groomed for more senior leadership an education.”12 Lieutenant General with bad situations—are case studies positions by not tying them to routine Sir John Kiszely, former director of in bold, successful adaptation. As a staff jobs that are a complete letdown the Defence Academy of the United particularly decisive example, when from their combat tours. He pointed out Kingdom, recognizes the long-term al Qaeda in Iraq took actions that led that with the drawdown in Afghanistan, value of education in developing adap- many Sunni insurgent allies to break more officers would become available for tive leaders: with them, Army and Marine officers nontraditional assignments that will allow quickly adapted, moving to assist and them to advance their educations and It is important to recognize the purpose of work with insurgents they had just been expand their perspectives. He contends this education. Its purpose is not the purist fighting. Cooperatively, they promoted that those officers are much more apt to one of the pursuit of knowledge for its own the Anbar Awakening and its expan- grow as leaders and be retained by the sake, but of developing capacity for good sion across Iraq. It is likely that future military if they are given the opportunity judgment. Such education, therefore, has a studies of the Iraq campaign will con- to influence their career paths and are not training dimension in that it is preparing clude that this movement was at least as penalized for time away from traditional practitioners to exercise good judgment in important as the surge in U.S. forces.16 jobs.21 their profession, but not just in their next Many have suggested that adaptability In 2007 the Army moved in a unique job or deployment, but over the duration of in the lower ranks was not matched by way to overcome its inability to promote their career.13 similar adaptability in the strategic think- talented but unconventional thinkers. ing and campaign planning of senior Secretary Gates had directly challenged A superficial understanding of the leaders.17 The challenge, therefore, is to Army promotion practices when he security environment and a simplistic continue promoting adaptability on the called for “reexamining assignments and view of history and culture are an invita- battlefield while moving both the more promotion policies that in many cases tion to bad judgments. The alternative is adaptable individuals and the more adap- are unchanged since the Cold War.”22 continuous learning, an ever-broadening tive thinking from the tactical level into Secretary of the Army Pete Geren called perspective, and the practice of criti- the realm of operational and strategic General David Petraeus, recognized as cal thinking, which allows students to planning, including efforts to deal with an unconventional thinker, “back from question their own thinking and that of black swan events. Iraq to Washington to lead a promotion others. U.S. troops in the field are so good board [fiscal year 2008 board] to pick DOD leadership should ensure that at adaptation because they are freed from the Army’s new class of brigadier gener- the development and practice of criti- many of the bureaucratic constraints als—an unprecedented assignment for cal thinking is a priority of the military that are constant in a headquarters. That a theater commander in the midst of a academies, the Naval Postgraduate bureaucracy is also what drives many war.”23 Ultimately, the board selected School, command and staff schools, and bright young officers from the military. several unconventional thinking colonels, war colleges. Books such as Thinking A 2011 Harvard study, which surveyed officers who had previously been passed JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Burns and Miller 33 USS New Jersey fires salvo from 16-inch guns during early 1984 deployment off coast of Lebanon (U.S. Navy/Ron Garrison) over, for brigadier general. Many were thing.”24 When black swan disasters Europe) has improved readiness to watching for Colonel H.R. McMaster, hit, if we have anticipated them and adapt. The Defense Department does USA, whose book Dereliction of Duty conducted diverse “what if?” plan- consider some low probability events, was an indictment of military leadership ning, we will be better prepared to act. but the scenario set should continue to during the Vietnam War. McMaster was DOD switched to adaptive planning in broaden to include more black swan a brilliant officer who did not follow the the 1990s. Paul Davis, an architect of disasters such as electromagnetic pulse “normal” career path to general, and he those changes, judges that the shift has (EMP) attacks, bioengineered viral pan- had been passed over before. McMaster been largely successful.25 By looking demics, and overwhelming homeland was promoted and now serves as com- at a wide range of scenarios and a defense and recovery scenarios. OSD manding general of the U.S. Army lot of “what if?” analyses of different scenarios are limited by not only what Maneuver Center of Excellence. enemy actions and capability options is considered plausible, but also what Civilian leaders need to ensure that the United States could deploy, ana- can be funded. A larger and more chal- those chosen to sit on selection boards lysts, operators, and decisionmakers lenging set of OSD scenarios is needed and the precepts given to these boards can devise a more flexible and capable in a process that promotes adaptability contribute to promoting military lead- force. Davis believes that most black despite budget constraints. IDA devel- ers who are most capable of adapting swan events can be anticipated “but not oped the Integrated Risk Assessment and to a rapidly changing environment and which ones will actually occur.”26 Management Methodology to encour- dealing with low probability but highly The Office of the Secretary of age evaluators to bring up all kinds of consequential events. Defense (OSD) planning scenario scenarios.27 This structured approach to process and shift to improving broad interviewing, discussing, and evaluating Continue to Improve Planning capabilities versus a force structure senior subject matter expert assessments General Dwight Eisenhower wrote, focused on one specific threat scenario permits the experts to assess risks as “Plans are worthless; planning is every- (such as the Soviet invasion of Western high as they want, unbounded by the 34 Forum / Adaptability and Capability in Black Swan Events JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 simple multiplication of probability and consequences. Army Colonels Kevin Benson and Steven Rotkoff call for more red teaming to improve planning: “the Red Team envi- sions the worst-case future. They describe the nightmare scenario in detail . . . then examine the plan to see how well it heads off the events that would lead to failure. Invariably, this leads the staff to see things it otherwise would not.”28 Davis cautions that while the adap- tive planning process has improved and young military officers are good at it, “they can get those traits beaten out of them by working in a bureaucratic head- quarters.”29 This is another reason for the recommendation offered later to adapt DOD culture to promote questioning and challenging. Promote “FARness” Davis’s key recommendation for improving DOD resource management is to emphasize “FARness”—that is, flexibility, adaptiveness, and robust- ness.30 This is not the norm for acquisi- tion programs. We have historically focused on specific threats or capability needs and chosen the single most capable (and usually most expensive) system to address the threat. Taleb’s recommendations for improving adapt- ability and the capability to recover from black swan disasters are applicable: “Avoid optimization; learn to love redundancy. . . . Overspecialization also is not a great idea. . . . Above all, learn to avoid ‘tunneling’—the last thing you Hurricane Katrina at peak strength on August 28, 2005 (NASA/Jeff Schmaltz) need to do when you deal with uncer- tainty is to ‘focus,’ this focus makes you too, that “known requirements” often deliveries, or staff who refuse to come to a sucker. . . . Compensate complexity assume the ability to predict the future ac- work to avoid a virus. with simplicity.”31 curately, a skill rarely demonstrated. Perhaps DOD should not pick the one Many have warned that a high-alti- Demand Accountability item that appears the most capable but tude EMP attack could severely damage Adaptability requires responding to instead pick the top three or a combina- our high-tech conventional military change, but in an effective manner. tion with a broader range of capabilities, capability. Cyber attacks, viral pandem- Leaders should be rewarded for adap- yielding a more flexible, robust force. A ics, and other disasters that shut down tive performance and held accountable balanced, resilient force needs large num- our just-in-time delivery-dependent when they prove unable to adapt.32 In bers of simple, diverse systems to handle all economy might cause cascading effects The Generals, Thomas Ricks argued contingencies. Low-cost systems procured that dwarf initial damage and casual- that “accountability is the engine that in large numbers may not be optimal for ties. Black swan risks and adaptability drives adaptability”33 and took the meeting specific known requirements, argue for having some basic systems in Army to task for failing to hold its but they may be lifesaving to preempt or the inventory that would enable us to leaders accountable since World War recover from black swan disasters. Recall, operate without the Internet, overnight II. He demonstrated how a system that JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Burns and Miller 35 has not held leaders accountable has “faced with the choice between chang- same commitment in the Intelligence produced leaders who in many cases ing one’s mind and proving that there Community and DOD? failed to adapt to the changing environ- is no need to do so, almost everyone The same ruthlessness at getting to ment in which they operated, resulting gets busy on the proof.” Chu reported the truth and “speaking truth to power” in costly failures. Not holding leaders that even when he asked people for regardless of hurt feelings or positional accountable has removed a major their opinions, he often had to “pull” authority was a feature of General Electric incentive for leaders to adapt. Promo- their thoughts out.37 With the risks of (GE) under Jack Welch. Of 30 companies tions keep on coming even as a lack of disagreeing with bosses, few are likely to originally in the Dow Jones industrial av- understanding of the operational envi- challenge them or to question accepted erage, only GE has survived—a testimony ronment and adherence to outdated conventional wisdom. Yingling sub- to adaptability and evidence of the conse- strategies lead to unnecessary expendi- sequently received a mediocre perfor- quences of failing to adapt. An infamous tures and tragic loss of lives. mance evaluation from his commanding management rule of Welch was to fire the The military can improve its adap- general, who publically took exception lowest performing 10 percent of manag- tive performance and better prepare for to what the lieutenant colonel wrote.38 ers annually. He argued that firing the a black swan event if it takes the idea of We examined how successful and low performers was not only good for the accountability seriously. Senior leaders adaptable businesses encourage people company (and 90+ percent of the com- should be evaluated on their success or to speak out. Hedge funds stand out as pany personnel remaining) but also, in failure at meeting the goals and mile- businesses that must be especially adapt- the long run, the individuals fired.41 They stones they have established.34 Their able to survive. Bridgewater is the largest were not in the right position and could retention or relief should be dependent and arguably most successful hedge move on to find a better fit. Bridgewater’s on hard-nosed evaluations. Holding fund. Founder and chief executive of- Dalio makes the same argument: people senior leaders accountable in this manner ficer Ray Dalio has an aggressive culture often struggle with personal problems would also influence talented younger of- he promotes called “radical openness,” because they are not honest with them- ficers to continue their service. Aggressive which basically means that one is not only selves in focusing on harsh realities. Being and forward-thinking young officers want allowed but also required to question told and having to accept that one really to be part of an effective organization. anything and anyone, with total disre- did make mistakes, or that one has poorly The frustration of working under ineffec- gard to personal feelings or hierarchy, to thought-through ideas or annoying per- tive leaders who are unable to adapt was probe for weaknesses and get at the truth. sonal habits that make them less effective, borne out in Paul Yingling’s widely read According to the Bridgewater Web site: will never be enjoyable. But finding out article from 2007: “America’s generals about issues so one can change is better have failed to prepare our armed forces Above all else, we want to find out what is than remaining in ignorance. for war and advise civilian authorities on true and figure out how best to deal with DOD may not want to use the term the application of force to achieve the it. We value independent thinking and “radical openness” and might prefer aims of policy. . . . America’s generals innovation, recognizing that independent instead to call it “moral or intellectual failed to adapt to the demands of coun- thinking generates disagreement and courage,” but it must seek a way to terinsurgency.”35 The symbiotic effect innovation requires making mistakes. describe the duty to speak out strongly between seniors held accountable and To foster this thinking and innovation, and honestly about improving everything imaginative junior leaders would, over we maintain an environment of radical from combat and major acquisition plans time, produce a more adaptable military openness, even though that honesty can be to office operations. Forcefully disagree- that is better prepared to deal with the difficult and uncomfortable. . . . Everyone ing does not require one to be rude or constant challenge of a changing security is encouraged to be both assertive and disrespectful. Honesty and moral courage environment and black swan threats. open-minded in order to build their un- should hardly be perceived as a threat to derstanding and discover their best path. teamwork, camaraderie, or good order Adopt a Policy of “Radical The types of disagreements and mistakes and discipline. Particularly for officers and Openness” that are typically discouraged elsewhere are personnel in decisionmaking positions, Army colonels Benson and Rotkoff expected at Bridgewater because they are consistent with other principles of effective note that “Commanders require critical the fuel for the learning that helps us maxi- leadership, DOD should create a culture thinkers who can challenge assumptions mize the utilization of our potential.39 of radical openness that invites critical and and offer alternative perspectives,”36 creative thinking and demands speaking but if traditional reluctance to ques- This policy is aggressively imple- truth to power. Such openness would have tion commanders leads to self- or staff mented at Bridgewater.40 There is no particular relevance in thinking about po- censorship, this vital critical thinking worse offense than failing to speak out tential black swan events where traditional challenge and debate will not occur. or analyze. One must be “hyper realistic standard operating procedures may be less Outworn ideas will persist. Nobel econ- and hyper truthful” with cold, hard- likely to work and truly adaptive, perhaps omist Kenneth Galbraith observed that, hitting analysis. Would we not want this radical, change may be needed. 36 Forum / Adaptability and Capability in Black Swan Events JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 USS Cole (DDG-67) conducts berth shift during port visit to Crete (U.S. Navy/Paul Farley) Accept Disasters and enhancing the capacity to cope with and itself on being a “can do” organization Improve Capabilities adapt to surprises rather than trying to where “failure is not an option.” Yet even Taleb believes the effects of black swan prevent all catastrophes in advance was within the department, there are proph- events have been growing and accelerat- the best course of action.43 Moreover, ets accepting the inevitability of black ing as the world gets more complicated: Warren Buffet insists that “the CEO swan events. In their 2012 strategic vision “The future will be increasingly less pre- should regard his position #1 as the report, the Defense Threat Reduction dictable, while both human nature and Chief Risk Officer. Now you have a lot Agency’s Joint Science and Technology social ‘science’ seem to conspire to hide of other functions too, but you should Office for Chemical and Biological the idea from us.”42 Many other policy wake up every morning and think about Defense wrote, “Surprise from biologi- analysts and business leaders have a ‘is this place built to take everything’?”44 cal and chemical threats is inevitable.”45 similar view. The late Aaron Wildavsky, Military culture understandably does As former Defense Secretary Donald a president of the American Political not fit with the idea of admitting that we Rumsfeld put it, “The only thing that Science Association and author of many cannot know, cannot be prepared, and should be surprising is that we continue books on public policy analysis, argued must accept a campaign phase of recov- to be surprised.”46 While we must do for adaptiveness and resilience over ery from setbacks and defeats. Indeed, what we can to forestall or preempt an at- excessive regulations and restrictions there is no such phase in formal DOD tack, we must also prepare to be surprised on new technologies. He believed that campaign planning. The military prides by ramping up both our ability to adapt JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Burns and Miller 37 as the attack is happening and our capac- 38 Forum / Adaptability and Capability in Black Swan Events JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 U-2 Dragon Lady taxis for takeoff in Southwest Asia (U.S. Air Force/Eric Harris) Strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance By Jason M. Brown n the last 10 years, numerous reports means will more effectively meet com- Intelligence collection managers at have highlighted obstacles to the manders’ needs and expectations in the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) I integration of intelligence, surveil- today’s increasingly complex operating headquarters routinely tasked the U-2 to lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) into environments. conduct change detection, a technique of military campaigns and major opera- using two images taken at different times tions.1 The root cause of many of these The Problem to determine changes on the ground. In difficulties is adherence to a central- The history of the U-2 aircraft in theory, if an insurgent planted an IED ized Cold War collection management Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates the in the time between the two images, doctrine focused on production rather challenges related to ISR integration. an analyst could detect a change on the than goals and objectives.2 This Indus- Shortly after the start of the Iraq War, second image and report the possibility of trial Age concept is not agile enough insurgent use of improvised explosive an IED.4 Because the collection manag- to meet the challenges of military devices (IEDs) caused the United States ers treated all counter-IED requirements operations in the information age, to spend billions of dollars and dedicate equally, MNC-I “peanut-butter spread” which include compressed decision substantial resources toward defeating U-2 coverage throughout Iraq.5 As a re- cycles and demands for operational these threats. This included tasking sult, the U-2 could not capture the second precision. A strategy-oriented approach reconnaissance aircraft to find IEDs image required for change detection until that balances ISR ends, ways, and prior to detonation.3 4 to 5 days after the first, while insurgents often detonated IEDs within hours of planting them. Moreover, analysts within tactical units had to submit most collec- Colonel Jason M. Brown, USAF, is Commander of 693rd ISR Group at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. He tion requests no later than 72 hours in was previously Military Assistant to Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Joint and Coalition Warfighter Support, and Commander of 13th Intelligence Squadron “Dark Knights” at Beale Air advance of a U-2 mission, long before Force Base, California. units planned and executed missions JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Brown 39 involving ground movement. Finally, based on the priority ranking and the when they thought through objectives collection managers at MNC-I discour- frequency with which analysts need infor- and concepts to allow commanders to aged U-2 operators and analysts from mation about the collection target. arrange ISR resources in time, space, and interacting directly with ground units for The ISR TF discovered many draw- purpose. fear the units would circumvent their rigid backs to this process. First, analysts and Units found some success in counter- collection request process. Consequently, collection managers rarely had the appro- ing IEDs, for example, by refocusing ISR U-2 operations did not integrate with priate understanding of ISR capabilities from locating the devices to understand- the tactical operations they were meant to determine the feasibility of require- ing the insurgent network behind them. to support.6 The result was little to no ments. Analysts submitted requirements To meet the ends of protecting troops evidence that change detection found any based on limited ISR training prior from IED attack, ISR planners adjusted IEDs. Despite this lack of evidence, collec- to deploying, and collection manag- the ways from threat warning to target- tion managers, concerned more about the ers throughout the validation process ing, and the means from route scans to percentage of satisfied requirements than often rubber-stamped requirements. manhunting. This new approach required flaws in ISR strategy, continued to task the For example, analysts would submit phasing and layering ISR resources against U-2 to hunt for IEDs via change detec- GMTI requirements over cities failing to the right targets at the right time. One tion for nearly 5 years.7 recognize GMTI platforms’ inability to Marine unit in early 2012, for instance, This U-2 example illustrates a distinguish moving targets in the clutter dedicated 80 percent of its ISR resources decades-old systemic problem with ISR. of an urban environment. Second, there to studying insurgent network patterns During the Cold War, limited availability was little incentive for time-constrained and linkages. This shift against routine of collection assets and an Industrial analysts to remove older requirements procedures of route scans and patrol over- Age approach to intelligence production from the collection management system. watch required a great deal of restraint by favored long-term indications and warn- Collection managers provided little the unit commander to allow time for ISR ing problems focused on large-signature oversight on purging the system of stale efforts to generate targeting intelligence. collection targets such as Soviet tank divi- requirements, yet they would grow In this case the Marine unit learned the sions. As a result, a system of managing frustrated, for example, if their change path to force protection was indirect and competing requirements emerged that detection requirements had a 35 percent was only obtainable by carefully think- worked well for static environments but satisfaction rate.10 The third problem was ing through the ISR strategy that would failed to adequately integrate ISR opera- that requirements were rarely prioritized achieve the commander’s goals.13 tions into dynamic military operations. to focus ISR on the most important task The Marines’ success juxtaposed with While a lack of analytic and col- at any given time. For example, if five the ineffective Industrial Age require- lection resources contributed to ISR different units had counter-IED require- ments-based processes illustrates the need problems, it did not explain why the ments in the system, each likely had the for new thinking about ISR strategy. The same issues persisted despite a massive same priority, even though four out of Marines succeeded because they adjusted infusion of ISR resources into Iraq and five may not have planned any ground ISR ends, ways, and means to achieve their Afghanistan.8 In 2010 the Department movement during the collection cycle. commander’s intent. Rather than impose of Defense (DOD) ISR Task Force (ISR Lastly, there was little to no feedback to an ISR construct meant for static warning TF) conducted a study on the utility of determine if intelligence collection was scenarios, commanders must emulate the ground moving target indicator (GMTI) meeting commanders’ expectations. The Marine example and create processes that platforms, such as the E-8C Joint STARS, system focused on whether ISR resources generate similar effects throughout a joint in Afghanistan. The study found the util- “satisfied” the requirement, which meant force engaged in a campaign. Other warf- ity was “moderate to low” not because collection occurred, not that collection ighting functions such as joint fire support GMTI was inappropriate for the operat- actually met commander’s intent. In have a solid foundation and track record ing environment, but because there was short, analysts, collectors, and consum- for achieving that purpose—that is, inte- not an effective organizational framework ers rarely interacted directly, and ISR grating the ends, ways, and means related to integrate ISR operations to optimize planners expended more energy on ad- to that function with the overall campaign intelligence and tactical effects.9 ministering requirements than planning strategy.14 Joint forces can achieve the The following describes how the to meet commanders’ objectives.11 same result by developing a process to de- doctrinal collection management process Many leaders and analysts eventually velop and articulate a commander’s intent essentially works. An analyst believes that realized that it was not viable to submit for ISR. a specific intelligence discipline, such as formal intelligence requirements and then GMTI, can identify a signature related hope all the pieces would arrive at the Developing the to a collection target, which is validated, right time.12 Military units achieved ISR Commander’s Intent deconflicted, and prioritized by collection success by focusing less on managing re- The goal of an ISR strategy should be managers. A collection manager then quirements and more on ends, ways, and to create a problem-centric and not a tasks an asset to collect the requirement means. In other words, they succeeded requirements-centric approach to opera- 40 Special Feature / Strategy for ISR JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 AH-64 Apache attack helicopter at Bagram Airfield after conducting armed reconnaissance operations and precision air strikes (U.S. Air Force/Matt Hecht) tions. In other words, analysts, platform direction to subordinates. Commanders shared context among higher headquar- operators, and consumers should state will be required to clearly translate their ters collection managers and supporting the problems they must solve, not intent (and that of higher commanders) ISR organizations: simply what requirements they must to their subordinates and trust them to satisfy. Success in military operations perform with responsible initiative in Fearing our phased non-kinetic collection increasingly depends on a commander’s complex, fast-changing, chaotic circum- requirements, taken individually, would ability to unify the ISR enterprise in stances.”16 The key to intent, therefore, go uncollected, the J2 ISR team briefed support of campaign goals. Articulat- is to establish shared context. Lawrence the plan in its entirety to the [higher ing intent—the traditional method Shattuck states, “It is not enough to tell headquarters] collection managers (CM). that commanders use to establish unity subordinates what to do and why. When The briefing flowed from the operational of effort for organizationally complex situations permit, commanders should macro view of CJSOTF-A’s mission to the operations—is the necessary but often explain how they arrived at the decision. tactical micro view of a village stability overlooked step to focus ISR strategy. Explaining the rationale helps subordi- platform, followed by the comprehensive According to the Chairman of the nates understand and develop similar collection plan as it related to the phases of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), intent patterns of thought.”17 VSO expansion. . . . Linking the purpose is one of the basic principles of mis- ISR operations over the last decade of the collection plan to the individual sion command, which is the operating have demonstrated the importance of requirements proved highly productive and construct “critical to our future success explaining intent to higher headquar- informative. The CMs recognized the over- in defending the nation in an increas- ters and outside organizations as well. all long term phased collection plan as both ingly complex and uncertain operation Major John Ives, the J2 for Combined sustainable and feasible.18 environment.”15 He continues, “Shared Joint Special Operations Task Force– context is a critical enabler of . . . in- Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), explained how All of this suggests that ISR strategy tent. In mission command, intent fuses his team sold the ISR strategy for Village must start by framing the problem, understanding, assigned mission, and Stability Operations (VSO) to establish setting mission expectations, and JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Brown 41 IPS? What IPS are most relevant in the pursuit of campaign goals? How thin can planners spread resources among IPS while still effectively supporting the campaign? In answering these questions, planners should consider five roles and missions for ISR that emerged in the last decade: understanding the environment, targeting, operational assessment, threat warning, and operations overwatch.21 The commander must effectively balance these roles and missions by identifying priority, weight of effort, and phasing within the campaign. Ranking Roles and Missions Historically, ISR has been decisive when focused on the right roles and missions at the right time. The U.S. Navy was Marines load RQ-7B Shadow UAV onto launching ramp, Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province (U.S. victorious during the Battle of Midway Marine Corps/Robert R. Carrasco) primarily because signals intelligence outlining objectives in a way that will the various players who influence the and aerial reconnaissance provided guide the activities of disparate groups operating environment. That effort can awareness of Japanese operations (threat and organizations at all levels toward a provide planners manageable categories warning) and reaction to Navy decep- common purpose. of intelligence problem sets (IPS) to tion efforts (operational assessment). focus ISR planning.20 Planners must During the Korean War, the effort of Framing Intelligence Problems avoid making IPS an order of battle by U.S. intelligence to analyze the site of Commanders and their ISR staffs another name. Categorizing with proper the Inchon Landing (understand the must understand what they are trying nouns (people, places, and things) can environment) enabled the strategic to accomplish before they determine result in analytic gaps; therefore, analysts surprise of the amphibious operation. how to accomplish it. This starts by and planners should focus on behavior Efforts to understand and destroy key examining the campaign goals in order and intent as the criteria to define IPS. components of air and air defense capa- to determine the problems ISR opera- For example, in assessing threats to air bilities were the decisive factors in both tions must solve. The challenge for operations, an intelligence organization the Six Days’ War and Operation Desert ISR in recent campaigns is the lack of may spend a great deal of time studying Storm (targeting).22 a common framework for approaching an integrated air defense system (IADS). Inherent tension between ISR roles problems to consistently drive collection What an organization may overlook is and missions, particularly those that and analysis. From the 1970s through that the adversary’s primary objective, or require operational and tactical patience the 1990s, the DOD Intelligence Com- end, is not to shoot down aircraft; it is to (understanding the environment, munity had a clear system for profiling prevent getting bombed. While the or- operational assessment, and targeting potential adversaries in the form of ganization may pursue this goal by using networks) and those requiring short-term orders of battle overlaid with capability its IADS, it will likely use other ways and support (threat warning, operations assessments. While this machine was means to achieve the goal—cyber attack overwatch, and targeting specific threats) adequate for conventional scenarios, or poisoning the airbase water supply, for can result in an ineffective application of it was virtually meaningless to the example. The most appropriate IPS in resources. The counter-IED examples operations over the past decade, and no this scenario would be adversary attack show how competition for assets between framework has clearly arisen to replace of our airpower. This ends-ways-means roles and missions requires commanders it.19 Intelligence problems have become problem framing drill can provide the to make clear choices. If commanders campaign specific; therefore, planners analytic framework for a campaign and do not articulate priorities between roles must make the effort to frame unique the starting point for focusing ISR. and missions, planners inevitably revert problems and not rely on peacetime Once planners identify IPS, they to spreading resources thinly, primarily organizational inertia to define the cat- can then determine where and how to to support short-term operational needs, egories for analysis and collection. leverage the ISR enterprise by asking a while potentially making ISR ineffective Framing those problems begins with series of questions. What are the capabili- for all missions. As Devaunt LeClaire exploring the ends, ways, and means of ties and limitations for ISR against each states, “Using an ISR asset exclusively 42 Special Feature / Strategy for ISR JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 to support operations is ‘robbing Peter goal toward which every operation is consumers, platform operators, and ana- to pay Paul’ in that planning based on directed.”25 Using campaign goals, IPS, lysts.27 This is the surest way to establish sound information and intelligence is not roles and missions, and the 4Cs as a shared context within the organization- possible without robust collections.”23 foundation, commanders can develop ally complex ISR enterprise. Choosing to focus ISR on a single ISR objectives that provide focus and The four components of a com- problem set does not guarantee success, direction to operational and intel- mander’s intent for ISR—campaign and however. When commanders focus on ligence efforts. ISR objectives can also operational goals, intelligence problem roles and missions where ISR is inef- provide a basis for resource develop- sets, roles and missions, and objec- fective (threat warning for IEDs), they ment, deployment, apportionment, and tives—are the foundation of a strategy. siphon resources away from roles and allocation. Staffs struggle with these Intent is more than a way to establish missions where ISR succeeds (targeting activities because collection require- shared context and unity of effort; it is an the network). ments provide the foundation for ISR investment in ISR strategy that eventually Another dilemma commanders face resourcing decisions. Requirements are pays substantial dividends.28 The largest when developing an ISR strategy is difficult to regulate, which inevitably dividend of intent is the foundation it whether to strengthen ineffective ISR leads to an ever-increasing demand for establishes for leading the ISR enterprise. roles and missions. While attempts to resources and a misrepresentation of As organizations become more connected strengthen ISR capabilities for threat needs and risk. The U-2 was continually and operations become more complex, warning against IEDs were mostly inef- tasked to conduct change detection, leadership in implementing intent matters fective, efforts to reorient ISR toward for example, because the requirement infinitely more than management. understanding the environment and pop- satisfaction rate was always low and col- ulation in Iraq and Afghanistan were vital lection managers believed they needed Implementing the Strategy in pursuit of counterinsurgency objec- to fix that shortfall. If, instead, the ISR In addition to a conceptual framework, tives. Adding additional remotely piloted staff used an objective such as “Provide commanders and their staffs require a aircraft to the Libya operation improved threat warning for convoys by delivering practical method to develop and carry North Atlantic Treaty Organization intelligence to ground units of probable out ISR strategy given information targeting capabilities, helping lead to IED locations,” U-2 change detection age capabilities and challenges. Iraq Muammar Qadhafi’s demise.24 missions would have received appropri- provided an example of a higher staff Determining which roles and missions ate scrutiny when they did not produce exercising tighter controls to regulate to emphasize or strengthen requires a results or, put another way, when the and synchronize ISR in an attempt to constant evaluation of the enterprise’s ways and means did not achieve the deal with emerging organizational and capabilities, coverage, capacity, and con- ends. ISR objectives that flow from operational complexities.29 Centralized straints. ISR planners can use these “4Cs” commander’s intent and appropriately ISR planning as part of a joint opera- throughout the development of ISR defined IPS provide a better foundation tional planning process may work well strategy by asking the following questions for ISR assessment. in the early phases of a campaign and in about specific resources and the enter- Objectives provide a common high-risk scenarios; however, as opera- prise as a whole: terminology to prioritize the things a tions progress, headquarters attempting commander must know alongside what to control diversified and distributed Are the available resources capable in •• he must do. This is important for working processes and organizations can stifle dealing with the problem sets? through the competition between roles the ISR enterprise’s ability to adapt to Is the capacity sufficient to cover the •• and missions (that is, should planners changing conditions in a campaign. timelines related to the IPS operating pull resources off targeting missions to Despite lessons from Iraq and Afghani- scheme? conduct operations overwatch?). As the stan, joint doctrine still emphasizes Does the enterprise have adequate •• roles for all types of resources continue to a centralized method for developing coverage both geographically and blur—traditional fire and maneuver assets ISR strategy, failing to account for the within the networks analysts are gathering intelligence, for instance—ob- complex command relationships or the trying to understand? jectives offer a clear process to prioritize increasingly collaborative nature of ISR What constraints prevent the ideal •• both operational actions and intelligence planning that affects the full spectrum employment of resources? collection for infantry squads, fighter of operations.30 Rather than focus on The answers to these questions can help pilots, remotely piloted aircraft crews, and centralized planning, commanders commanders develop obtainable and cyber operators alike. Finally, objectives should concentrate on synchronizing relevant objectives for ISR. provide a foundation for implementing ISR strategy teams at multiple echelons mission command through mission type and components through appropriate Stating Objectives orders (MTOs) within an ISR enter- resourcing, relationships, and processes. Joint doctrine defines an objective as “a prise.26 MTOs convey purpose and intent While not using the term ISR strategy clearly defined, decisive, and attainable and facilitate the interaction among ISR teams, in recent campaigns formal or JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Brown 43 working groups emerged within organi- cal units greater flexibility in execut- focus the enterprise to solve a unit’s intel- zations to flatten hierarchical structures ing operations and an organizational ligence problems. ISR strategy teams and integrate expertise to improve ISR construct to share operational context, must address challenges through leader- operations. Commanders and their staffs offered another incentive to integrate ship, tradecraft, policy, and technology, in can discern practical methods to integrate strategies. IJC required detailed coordi- that order. Too often, commanders and these teams by specifically examining nation and planning before approving staffs approach problems in the reverse. strategy improvements between the ISR MTOs. In short, higher head- As Timothy Oliver, who served five tours height of operations in Iraq (2006–2008) quarters in Afghanistan focused more in Iraq and as an intelligence battalion and Afghanistan (2010–2012). There on prioritization, and units were more commander in Afghanistan, asserts, “Any were significant differences between the likely to receive resources and/or more success or failure of intelligence stems campaigns that partially account for these flexibility when they invested intel- from the same source as other types of improvements including wider dispersal lectual capital in ISR strategy instead military failures, from the leadership. of units, a greater coalition presence, of simply submitting requirements. Intelligence must be an ‘all hands’ ef- and a much larger armada of ISR as- This second structural improvement— fort, and commanders, consumers, and sets in Afghanistan. However, the most designing a system that encouraged producers all must drive this process and important lessons on ISR strategy from better planning—could not have hap- insist on its success.”34 Afghanistan are not related to ostensible pened without the first improvement— situational advantages, but rather come resourcing units with the right people Fostering Relationships from structural and procedural improve- to carry out that planning.31 ISR strategy consistently succeeds when ments that reduced friction, promoted team leaders overcome the challenges planning integration, and encouraged Building the Team of multiorganizational complexity and operational creativity. Given those lessons, how should ISR lack of unity of command by building strategy teams organize and operate? solid personal relationships. Alterna- Identifying the Lessons Describing how special operations tively, poor relationships often directly At the height of operations in Afghani- forces designed their ISR teams in Iraq contribute to ineffective ISR strategy. stan, commanders made two key and Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Because every commander’s level of structural improvements to ISR strategy Michael Flynn, USA, wrote in 2008, confidence and perception of risk are as compared to Iraq. First, the United the “organizational imperative was linked to ISR, competition for resources States dedicated more manpower to simple: get the best people and bring between organizations can quickly ISR planning at multiple echelons. them together face to face in a single become personal. Trust can easily break This included deploying Air Force ISR location collaborating on a target set down when teams begin to stereotype liaison officers (ISRLOs) to brigade- while orchestrating reachback support along organizational lines and argue and battalion-level units. Embedding to their national offices.”32 But what if over command relationships. Trust ISRLOs created de facto ISR strategy face-to-face interaction is not feasible? depends on selecting knowledgeable teams that effectively worked through Organizational and logistical constraints team members who can break down the 4Cs of ISR strategy and flattened may lead to a distributed ISR strategy cultural and organizational barriers in hierarchal planning processes. Second, team connected by modern technol- pursuit of mission accomplishment and the International Security Assistance ogy. While not always ideal, there were installing the right leaders to direct their Force Joint Command (IJC) offered numerous examples in Afghanistan efforts. greater incentives for planners to think where a distributed construct worked Leaders overcome barriers and cre- through ends, ways, and means rather when members were focused on launch- ate trust by demonstrating transparency, than flooding the system with require- ing planning efforts, building relation- empathy, and competence. Major Ives ments. While headquarters in both Iraq ships, and remaining relevant. Whether provides an example: “Our ISR team’s and Afghanistan conducted Joint Col- formal, ad hoc, face to face, or distrib- proficient grasp of collection manage- lection Management Boards to allocate uted, ISR strategy teams succeeded ment created a mutual trust with the IJC resources, the former focused on the with the right mix of analysts, capability ISR planners. Over the next few days, our number of operations and require- experts, and consumers with the right two teams worked hand-in-hand towards ments as a means to justify allocation, planning, critical thinking, and leader- a theater-wide effort supporting the while the latter encouraged analytic ship abilities.33 original purpose of the focus area collec- rigor in its allocation process. Subor- Effective teams must include ac- tion without disrupting the IJC priority dinate units in Afghanistan more often tive leadership and expertise to break collection plan for ongoing named opera- had to explain not simply what they through the inherent imperfection of tions.”35 Ives illustrates the success that needed but how they would employ ISR processes, technology, and organizational well-resourced teams had when operating resources. The introduction of the ISR structures. Simply relying on formal, within a system that incentivized both MTO concept, which provided tacti- impersonal processes will not sufficiently competence and interaction. Valuing 44 Special Feature / Strategy for ISR JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 competence and creating trust resulted in on organizational knife fights instead of on the capabilities, coverage, capacity, a virtuous circle that reinforced itself over future planning. Organizations can over- and constraints of available resources. time, leading to a willingness to accept come this friction when commander’s Intent must guide the enterprise and greater risk to obtain greater payoff in intent is adequately developed, updated, joint force toward achieving specific ISR future ISR operations. and communicated in a way that sub- objectives that support campaign goals. ordinate commanders perceive that the In short, intent balances the ends, ways, Testing the Process allocation decisions are consistent and in and means of ISR operations and facili- Trust alone, however, will not deliver line with campaign goals. IJC’s priori- tates leader efforts to integrate intel- success. ISR strategy teams must also tization and weighting scheme enabled ligence and operations in ways modern build an effective structure and process massing and dispersal while limiting fric- military campaigning demands. to meet mission requirements. Other tion because ISR stakeholders at all levels The key to developing and imple- than identifying the need to integrate understood that IJC made its allocation menting ISR strategy is finding ways to effectively within operational plan- decisions in line with the commander’s move organizations, relationships, and ning processes, any other prescriptive priorities. processes toward collaboration, trust, guidance on developing ISR strategy When designing processes to develop and incentives. During recent operations, would not likely apply across a broad ISR strategy, commanders and staffs leaders created ISR strategy successes spectrum. Leaders must avoid making should consider important lessons from when they overcame organizational the campaign fit a doctrinal process, and Iraq and Afghanistan that demonstrate inertia and doctrinal restrictions that must instead design a process to fit the the need for dedicated teams at multiple impeded integration. This happened campaign. That said, planners should levels to continually refine ISR strategy. when leaders focused teams of experts at apply several tests to any ISR strategy Investment in leadership, manpower, multiple echelons on ISR strategy. These development process. relationships, and balanced processes are teams balanced the needs of lower level First, does the process minimize and critical to making these teams effective. commanders with campaign goals and re- scrutinize assumptions? Unlike fire and This focus provides the best method duced friction between organizations that maneuver capabilities, ISR does not have to ensure shared context and expertise inevitably occurs in operations involving an adequate test and evaluation process. throughout the enterprise. It also over- life and death. As a result, ISR planners often rely on comes the disaggregation inherent in the The role of ISR in building confi- assumptions about capabilities versus requirements-based collection manage- dence and reducing risk naturally leads collection targets, and consequently they ment process. As Lieutenant General to competition over resources. Less suc- should conduct thorough operational Flynn concludes: cessful attempts to reduce pressure and assessments to continuously evaluate friction in recent campaigns included those assumptions. Planners may assume If we do more synchronized planning with throwing resources at problems or a sensor is adequate for finding IEDs greater rigor right from the start, using spreading them evenly among organiza- but must develop a feedback loop that our operations planning process, we can tions without adequately balancing ISR focuses on the interplay of enemy and provide our subordinate units greater flex- ends, ways, and means. The struggle to friendly activities to determine the as- ibility and less uncertainty. At the end of counter IEDs offers an example of how sumption’s validity. the day, we achieve success in combat when organizations can obsess over numbers Second, does the process minimize subordinate units collectively understand while losing sight of operational realities. gaps and seams in a way that creates a the mission and higher commands have The last decade drove significant learning problem-centric ISR enterprise? ISR properly resourced them for success. Then on ways to make ISR relevant in high- teams must work through organizational and only then can they accomplish a well- tempo operations. The joint force must complexity by refining the process to synchronized campaign plan.37 codify the hard lessons learned on evolv- make the enterprise act as a whole. ing ISR processes that reduce friction and Organizing constructs including ISR increase timeliness while retaining a focus objectives, MTOs, or a find-fix-finish- Conclusion on priorities and effectiveness. Failure to exploit-analyze targeting model can ISR strategy should provide focused do so will mean future commanders and provide the synchronization needed for a direction and create a shared context staffs will once again spend energy and problem-centric approach.36 that orients the ISR enterprise toward resources chasing white whales instead of Third, does the process allow for problem-solving over production. developing winning ISR strategies. resources to quickly mass and disperse Articulating intent, as the CJCS asserts, When faced with information age with minimal friction? Losing ISR re- is the best method to achieve these challenges and their impact on ISR op- sources to another unit or mission often aims. The commander’s intent for ISR erations, many still insist better adherence creates a significant emotional event for should define intelligence problems and to collection management doctrine is the commanders and staffs. This can cause identify the critical ISR roles and mis- answer. Departure from proven doctrine staffs at multiple levels to expend energy sions to address those problems based has certainly led to disaster for military JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Brown 45 forces in the past. However, joint ISR nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses /2009/ Las Vegas,” The Telegraph (London), October Dec/09Dec_Price.pdf>. 20, 2011, available at 46 Special Feature / Strategy for ISR JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle at postflight inspection (U.S. Air Force/Stanley Thompson) The Joint Stealth Task Force An Operational Concept for Air-Sea Battle By Harry Foster t is time to come back to basics on Air-Sea Battle has been envisioned last word on Air-Sea Battle.2 While this Air-Sea Battle. Since the United from its inception as a set of operational concept updates the American way of I States announced a pivot to the concepts to preserve combat effective- high-end warfare, it does not fully ad- Asia-Pacific region, Air-Sea Battle has ness in areas where technology-based dress the true A2/AD challenge: how been derided as a strategy of tactics too antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) to maintain sensor and weapons density focused on China, disparaged by the strategies, coupled with disadvanta- at distance, over time, without forward Army and Marines Corps as a budget geous geographic or diplomatic access, bases or aircraft carriers. Overcoming this ploy aimed at cutting ground forces, challenge U.S. ability to project power challenge requires more than achieving and even skewed as a diplomatic initia- rapidly and persist with high opera- cross-domain synergy, a term describ- tive.1 Whether the scenario is in Asia, tional tempo. ing better joint force integration and the Middle East, or even the Levant, Many have construed the Department incorporation of emerging capabilities of Defense Joint Operational Access such as cyber warfare.3 It also requires Concept—which emphasizes attacks- unconventional thinking about how the in-depth across broad areas, indirect U.S. military Services combine sensors, Harry Foster is Deputy Director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Strategy and Technology at Air approaches, and deception to reduce weapons, and platforms to create new University. the pressure on forward basing—as the disruptive capabilities. JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Foster 47 In the spirit of bringing the Air-Sea Antiaccess/Area-denial Lines of Operations Battle debate back to center, this article Line of Operation Objective Capability proposes the creation of a joint stealth Slow force closure, deny air Air, guided rocket, artillery, task force initiative as part of the Air- Disrupt blue airbases refueling, deny sensor and mortars, missiles, submarine, Sea Battle concept set. Its purpose is to weapons density special operations leverage the asymmetric advantages the Deny carrier approach, deny Missile, submarine, small boat Deny sea approaches United States enjoys in sensor technol- sensor and weapons density swarm ogy, networking, long-range stealth, Special operations, air, missile, Deny/disrupt sea logistics Deny operations undersea warfare, and special operations submarine to solve the density-at-distance, over- Disrupt space surveillance Reduce sensor density Ground- or space-based time problem. To understand why the Deny persistent intelligence, Integrated air defenses, fighter Reduce/deny sensor and surveillance, and forces, electronic warfare, cyber, Nation needs such an initiative, some weapons density background on the nature of A2/AD reconnaissance, and strike counterspace Reduce sensor and weapons strategies is helpful. Decoy, deceive Physical and cyber means density Simply put, antiaccess/area denial is a set of overlapping military capabilities and Immunize against attack Deny U.S. military objectives Bury, harden, disperse Deny command and control/ operations designed to slow the deploy- Deny or confuse operations Cyber/electronic warfare ment of U.S. forces to a region, reduce networked communications the tempo of those forces once there, and deny the freedom of action neces- air and missile defense units, driving a Key U.S. Gaps sary to achieve military objectives. A2/ logistics-intensive dispersal of the force, Achieving joint operational access AD capabilities are created by applying and tying down naval forces to defend without forward land or sea bases is several affordable and readily available logistics convoys or provide air and mis- daunting. Five key capability gaps illus- technologies to everything from missiles sile defense. All these efforts sap already trate this difficulty. to mortars and from air defenses to con- limited offensive power. Keeping Offensive Momentum ventional submarines. These capabilities, Second, a nation does not need to Going. The first gap is how to keep enabled largely by the proliferation of conduct operations across all of the lines meaningful offensive momentum if for- precision, make many U.S. fixed facilities to conduct A2/AD successfully. Merely ward airfields are denied, aircraft carrier vulnerable to attack in ways hard to imag- disrupting U.S. operations enough to strike groups are pushed back, and space ine a decade ago. Similar capabilities also affect the availability of low-density/ surveillance capabilities are degraded. make surface naval forces such as aircraft high-demand capabilities, such as air re- While the United States still has freedom carrier strike groups more susceptible to fueling, airborne surveillance, or airborne of action to strike fixed targets with attack from significant distances.4 antisubmarine warfare capabilities, can be standoff weapons, many of the key facili- adequate to undercut U.S. operations. ties posing a threat to joint operational Lines of Operation access are mobile or hard and deeply As illustrated in the table, at least eight Defeating A2/AD Strategies buried, requiring either overflight or near overlapping lines of operations com- The rationale for developing a joint flight of a sensor or strike platform. prise an A2/AD strategy. While each is stealth task force is grounded in a Gaining Local Air Superiority for intended to achieve a specific objective, denial strategy. If the United States can Operations. This near-flight requirement the overall effect of these operations is maintain sensor and weapons mass at gives rise to the second gap: how to gain to reduce the density of U.S. sensors distance over time in the opening days access for airborne sensors and weapons and weapons at range. If A2/AD can of conflict, regardless of the status of despite future integrated air defense disrupt either the “find” or “strike” its forward bases or aircraft carriers, systems that include advanced fighters, component of the kill chain, then the then it can achieve its objectives while advanced surface-to-air missiles, active and strategy is effective. denying an adversary the benefit of its passive cuing systems, and directed energy Two factors make A2/AD a novel A2/AD investment. This approach is weapons. Most, if not all, of the concepts military strategy. First, these lines of op- completely consistent with the goals of to achieve this objective require combina- erations strike directly at vulnerabilities in the Joint Operational Access Concept. tions of long-range stealthy bombers, the U.S. concept of employment, which The difference is that in addition to short-range stealthy fighters, and standoff is highly dependent on forward bases, seeking cross-domain synergy, a joint missiles. Conventional wisdom suggests unimpeded seaborne logistics, and the stealth task force requires the Services that without escort fighters, it is not pos- time required to build forces. Efforts to to recognize the technological shifts sible for larger reconnaissance or strike defend forward bases and sea logistics taking place that enable new, collab- platforms to “get through.” But the prob- impose heavy costs on the United States, orative uses of sensors, weapons, and lem of gaining air control without forward forcing the deployment of lift-intensive platforms. basing does not end here. 48 Special Feature / The Joint Stealth Task Force JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Littoral combat ship USS Freedom conducts counter illicit trafficking operations in Pacific (U.S. Navy/Michael C. Barton) Maintaining an In-depth Defense to air refueling and Airborne Warning have significant limitations attacking against Cruise Missile Attacks. The third and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, hardened or mobile targets in an A2/ gap deals with how to deny airborne whose forward presence is essential for AD environment. The U.S. stealthy launch of cruise missiles (both land-attack maintaining persistence at range. bomber inventory is small and must and antiship) from airborne platforms. Countering Surface Action Groups operate from range, which greatly Concepts to accomplish this task nor- Inside the A2/AD Ring. The final gap reduces sortie rate. Submarines, on the mally consist of layered approaches that deals with a shortfall in the U.S. ability other hand, offer persistence, but have include attacking the host airfields, deny- to locate and destroy naval surface ac- limited payload capacity and require ing targeting data, attacking the launch tion groups operating inside the A2/ significant time to reload. While special platform, and attacking the missile itself AD ring. Modern Chinese surface action operations forces offer a covert means either in midcourse flight or at end- groups can extend the A2/AD ring by of surveillance, they have limited mobil- game. With degraded forward airfields, providing long-range air defense using ity and attack capability. Finally, none however, U.S. action may be limited to active electronically scanned array radars of these forces possess the counterair conducting standoff strikes against fixed and sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. capability needed to establish local air bases, disrupting command and control Defeating these surface action groups re- superiority, attack key enemy airborne of forces, or conducting terminal defense. quires a joint U.S. Navy–Air Force effort. nodes such as airborne early warning, or Without a substitute capability to con- To overcome these gaps, the United defend U.S. forces from enemy fight- duct air control in the absence of forward States must explore new ways to develop ers. Technology now offers the ability bases, the U.S. air defense concept loses capabilities that can provide density and to reduce these limitations but only if its depth, requiring commanders to persistence at range, reducing the effects Sailors, Airmen, and special operators double down on endgame defense. of degraded forward-basing. Achieving look beyond platform capabilities and Defending Forward Airborne this goal requires not only linking long- toward concepts of operations that Enablers. The fourth gap addresses range air capabilities, undersea stealth, connect sensors and weapons in new, defense of nonstealth airborne enablers and special operations forces operating disruptive ways. operating inside of the A2/AD ring. ashore, but also leveraging advances in These include antisubmarine warfare technology. Five Enabling Technologies (ASW) capability such as maritime patrol Technologies are emerging that could aircraft and helicopters, air refueling A Viable Concept? prove revolutionary if integrated with aircraft, and airborne sensor aircraft. ASW As bomber, submarine, and special a vision toward maintaining sensor platforms are an essential component operations capabilities stand today, and weapons mass at distance over of the outer defenses of a carrier strike the rationale for a joint stealth task time without forward bases. These group. Without the ability to project force may seem less than compelling. include technologies to find, fix, and credible air defense for these platforms, a While bombers and submarines can communicate precise target location higher risk of submarine attack may limit keep offensive momentum going when as well as technologies that serve to the U.S. ability to bring aircraft carriers forward bases are denied by attacking gain access. Undergirding several of closer to the fight. Similar concerns apply fixed targets using standoff missiles, all these technologies is the availability of JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Foster 49 F-22 Raptor over Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, participates in 3-month theater security package (U.S. Air Force/Kevin J. Gruenwald) increasingly sophisticated unmanned demands, allowing their deployment on adversary air defense targeting. Swarm vehicles capable of carrying sensors and smaller vehicles for the first time. logic has typically been associated weapons that perform a host of func- Networking gateway technology, like with micro–unmanned aerial vehicles. tions including acting as decoys, finding follow-ons to today’s Battlefield Airborne However, the same approach could and striking targets, and degrading Communications Node, can merge this be used to organize flights of larger adversary situational awareness elec- multispectral sensor data from multiple unmanned aerial vehicles, which could tronically. To understand how these platforms and share it beyond line of be used for a number of purposes simul- technologies enable a joint stealth task sight and regardless of the data link taneously.7 When connected to a find, force, we must first gain better insight protocol.6 Taken together, these develop- fix, communicate network, these swarms into what these technologies are and ments represent a tactical breakthrough can continuously report on ground, how they relate to one another. that is not yet fully appreciated. For the sea, and air targets; they can serve as Find, Fix, Communicate. These first time, any sensor can be connected to weapons platforms to attack air defense technologies include the combination of any weapon to provide target-quality data systems from multiple axes; or they can advances in find-and-fix sensors and net- regardless of the platform. This means serve as a “counterair picket” to pass working gateway technologies that allow any weapon that is in range and has ca- missile targeting data to any platform distributed sensor data to be federated pability against a target can be brought carrying a counterair missile. Although and shared with anyone connected to a to bear with any platform provided the these swarms will inevitably take losses, network. The capability to sense the tar- required connectivity is established. their distributed nature makes it difficult get environment with high fidelity across Swarm and Hypersonics. While the to destroy every member of the group, the electromagnetic spectrum from radio United States has enjoyed an airborne allowing for graceful degradation of the frequency to infrared (especially low- to stealth advantage against integrated air swarm’s overall capability. mid-band) to the visible spectrum has defenses for more than two decades, Whereas the objective of swarm- exploded in recent years.5 These sensors swarm and hypersonic speed are two ing vehicles is to overwhelm enemy are becoming smaller with reduced power other approaches that can complicate air defenses, the high-speed regime of 50 Special Feature / The Joint Stealth Task Force JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 hypersonic missiles offers survivability 12 to 40 missiles. More importantly, These five areas provide the means on par with stealth.8 In addition to being Virginia payload module tubes could to close the capability gaps that cur- highly survivable, hypersonic speed launch a variety of missile form factors rently hinder full execution of the Joint provides for timely attacks against mo- such as miniature air-launched decoys, Operational Access Concept. The next bile targets. For example, while a cruise cruise missiles to carry intelligence, sur- sections explain how these technologies missile flying at 0.7 Mach requires 28 veillance, and reconnaissance sensors or could come together to enable an ef- minutes to reach a target 200 nautical weapons, or future attack payloads such fective concept of operations for a joint miles away, a hypersonic missile travel- as hypersonic-glide vehicles. All these stealth task force. ing at 7.0 Mach requires only about 3 systems could contribute to locating, at- minutes. Taken together, swarm and tacking, and degrading A2/AD systems. Architecture hypersonic missiles provide a distributed The incoming U.S. submarine force com- The joint stealth task force is not plat- means to conduct surveillance and recon- mander indicated that he plans to pursue form-centric. Instead, it is a construct of naissance against mobile targets deep into the Virginia payload module option.12 six major capability groups. enemy territory and a timely and surviv- A third, longer-term option the First, a connected find-and-fix able way to strike once a target is located. United States should explore is leveraging network may be distributed among Counterair. Since the advent of the advances in unmanned undersea vehicles platforms deployed on land, at sea, in airplane, military planners have pushed (UUVs) to augment manned submarine the air, in space, or in the cyber domain. for faster, more maneuverable fighter payload capacity. While these vehicles The data produced may connect directly aircraft in order to maneuver the aircraft possess limited capability compared to the weapons network or be further into a limited weapons employment to manned submarines, hybrid UUVs processed and fused with other sensor zone for both gun and missile attacks (HUUVs) could be designed to work in data depending on the type of data and against an opponent. Beginning with the concert with manned submarines. For its end use. advent of all-aspect missile seekers in the example, a large HUUV with vertical- Second, a connected weapons net- 1990s, however, the need for platform launch missile tubes could be towed work consists of land-attack, countersea, speed and maneuverability became less by submarines submerged. They could and counterair capabilities. These weap- relevant as beyond-visual-range missile remain tethered to the host submarine, ons may be standoff or stand-in and attacks became the norm.9 By combining or they could be moored to the seabed actively or passively guided depending on developments in find, fix, communicate, near the submarine’s operating area. the target type and geospatial orientation swarm, and counterair technologies— During heightened tensions, submarines of the weapons network. The network and by using larger missiles such as the could tow the HUUVs while on patrol also includes speed-of-light capabilities to Patriot PAC-2 or PAC-3 to offset the to augment their internal payload capaci- attack cyber target sets using a variety of speed advantage of enemy fighters—an ties. During conflict, after the submarine electronic and photonic means. opportunity exists to expand counterair expends its internal and towed payload, Third, a gateway communications capabilities to nontraditional platforms it could drop off the empty HUUV, pick construct connecting finders to shooters such as existing transport aircraft, bomb- up a new one from an undersea stor- integrates sensor and weapons networks. ers, or future long-range strike vehicles.10 age site, and return quickly to the fight. This backbone is not a centralized en- Undersea. As the Navy retires its Without such a concept, the submarine terprise communication architecture. Ohio-class SSGNs (nuclear-powered would have to traverse thousands of miles Instead, it relies on redundant, overlap- guided-missile submarines) and Los to a distant reload port, taking it out of ping communications pathways that Angeles–class nuclear-powered attack the fight for many weeks.13 employ decentralized communications submarines, it will sustain a 66 percent Speed of Light. The final technology gateways to translate and facilitate data reduction in undersea payload capacity area is sensitive and deals with advance- exchange across a variety of networks. between 2024 and 2030 unless program- ments in cyber capabilities, electronic This approach provides for a data matic changes are made.11 warfare, and directed energy. The capa- network tailored to operational require- The Navy has several options. First, bilities in this area are changing rapidly, ments while enabling the plug-and-play it could design and build a new class of are disruptive, and will likely prompt exchange of sensor, finished intelligence, SSGN, possibly based on the Ohio-class a move-countermove competition be- command, and targeting data that is replacement ballistic-missile submarine tween nations over time. This makes it resilient in dense electronic warfare or design. However, most defense analysts difficult to predict what opportunities space-denied communications environ- consider that option unaffordable. The and challenges lie ahead in this area. ments. Its distributed, ad hoc, constantly second option would insert payload What is clear, however, is that these ca- changing composition also makes it more modules in the last 20 Virginia-class pabilities will play an essential role in the resilient to cyber attack. attack submarines. This option would ex- joint stealth task force’s ability to main- Fourth, special operations forces may pand a single Virginia-class submarine’s tain sensor and weapon density at range prove useful in an A2/AD environment Tomahawk cruise missile capacity from without forward bases. by placing sensors, creating access points JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Foster 51 into closed networks, and performing follow-on operations. Once a strike is di- AD environment, swarms of UAVs use other functions to disrupt enemy opera- rected, submarines assume a high data rate cooperative search strategies to locate and tions. By integrating into the joint stealth communications posture and long-range find these mobile targets, while another task force’s sensor and weapons networks, unmanned aerial vehicles deploy to estab- swarm maintains links to the weapons special operations forces can call for sup- lish the basic communications backbone. and command and control networks. porting fires and other support. Gaining access begins by locating spe- Attrition by enemy air defenses is inevita- Fifth, a fleet of undersea or airborne cific elements of the integrated air defense ble in these swarms, but their distributed trucks may carry communications nodes, system. To detect mobile threats, a non- nature allows the mission to continue. sensors, munitions, or other unmanned stealth air truck such as a C-17 deploys a When a target does appear, it must be vehicles. These trucks are distinguished swarm of unmanned aerial vehicles over struck quickly. Accordingly, airborne and from today’s platforms in that they may the horizon that fly in at various altitudes undersea trucks must be positioned as perform a number of ancillary tasks not to stimulate and detect threat emitters. close to the coast as possible, well inside directly related to their primary mission. As key threat emitters along the ingress the range of enemy fighters. Submarines For example, an air refueling tanker route for the penetrating platform ap- routinely operate close-in and can at- could serve as a communications node pear, the command and control node tack these targets with cruise missiles. for a submarine, sensor platform for early selects the best available weapon from the However, as discussed earlier, magazine warning, or even launch platform for network (consisting mainly of submarines size can quickly become an issue unless small unmanned vehicles that will form a at this point) and directs the attack. To submarines are augmented by HUUVs. counterair picket. provide additional weapons and to attack Stealth air trucks carrying PAC-2 and Sixth, a command and control func- fixed elements of the integrated air de- associated swarms of counterair pickets tion plans and synchronizes the task fenses system, nonstealth air trucks such could also support this mission. By oper- force’s activities. This activity may be as B-1s or B-52s move closer to enemy ating in an integrated way, this undersea hosted on a truck platform or reside on air defenses. Synchronized with these and airborne stealth team can provide a land if communication with the task force actions, speed-of-light weapons degrade bubble of air superiority to allow persis- is assured. Employment at the tactical enemy command and control systems. tent airborne weapons presence close to level is led by tactical commanders who With the A2/AD network stimu- the coast. This reduces missile time of operate independently based on under- lated, submarines launch miniature air flight and denies adversaries the benefit of standing the commander’s intent. decoys to confuse the air picture further. their A2/AD strategy. Simultaneously, an air truck delivers Concept Three: Defeat Cruise Missiles Concept of Operations a second swarm of counterair pickets and Protect U.S. Forward Aircraft. The joint stealth task force aims to equipped with passive and active seekers. The joint stealth task force can also be achieve three essential concepts: This swarm deploys ahead of two B-2 incorporated into a layered defense to holding deeply buried targets at risk, bombers loaded with 32 Patriot PAC-2 defeat enemy cruise missiles and protect holding mobile targets at risk, and missiles each. These aircraft and their as- U.S. antisubmarine warfare, air refueling, conducting counterair tasks to protect sociated swarm conduct counterair sweep and AWACS aircraft. Building on ideas friendly forces and gain access into the for a stealth air truck attacking hard and presented in the first two concepts, the A2/AD ring. deeply buried targets far in the adver- following explains how these counterair Concept One: Gain Access to Hold sary interior. As the counterair pickets capabilities can be brought to bear. Hard and Deeply Buried Targets at encounter enemy fighters, the B-2s, 80 Defeating a cruise missile threat Risk. As discussed earlier, holding hard miles behind, fire their PAC-2s. begins by attacking the enemy aircraft and deeply buried targets at risk requires After the strike, while U.S. aircraft or submarine prior to launch. Just as the a penetrating aircraft capable of delivering egress, submarines continue their air de- joint stealth task force created an air supe- heavy munitions specifically designed for fense role as air trucks deploy a third set riority bubble for air trucks to loiter close these targets. To gain access, these aircraft of counterair pickets. As the strike force to the coast in concept two, the same may be forced to overcome the chal- exits, counterair pickets create a defensive approach could be used to attack aircraft lenges of defeating naval surface action line to protect departing aircraft and ap- carrying cruise missiles. Should a cruise groups, land-based fighter aircraft, and proaching tankers. missile be launched, however, another a modern integrated air defense system Concept Two: Hold Mobile Targets line of counterair pickets could detect with active and passive detection ability. at Risk. Mobile targets present a dif- and cue the weapons network to attack Accomplishing this objective begins ficult problem given the breadth and it. As the defense moves further away by preparing the battlespace. Submarines, depth of some nations’ developing A2/ from enemy A2/AD systems, nonstealth possibly with HUUVs, deploy to their AD systems. Detecting these targets air trucks could launch weapons and be operating areas. Special operations forces requires widespread surveillance and integrated with Aegis and Patriot systems may also be positioned during this phase reconnaissance and using space-, air-, to provide rear-area defense. to accomplish specific tasks to prepare for and ground-based sensors. In the A2/ 52 Special Feature / The Joint Stealth Task Force JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 B-2 Spirit over Andersen Air Force Base in Guam as part of continuing operations to maintain bomber presence in region (U.S. Air Force/Kevin J. Gruenwald) Finally, protecting U.S. aircraft operat- and development is needed, the technol- Bringing-Home-the-BACN-to-Front-Line- ing forward requires a layered defense as ogies required to support this concept Forces-05618/>. 7 “Boeing Shows UAS Swarm Technol- well. The same linear defense used to stop are real. It is time for warfighters to ogy,” United Press International, August cruise missile attacks might also serve as a take notice, start debating alternative 22, 2011, available at JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Foster 53 Airman fastens GPS mechanism inside RQ-11B Raven B hand-launched remote-controlled unmanned aerial vehicle (U.S. Air Force/Gustavo Castillo) magine an aging but still lethal SA-6 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sitting Unifying Our Vision I a few miles from an international border in a suburb of a city in a conflict Joint ISR Coordination and zone. The SA-6 is active and protects the illegal and belligerent activities of its master. Across the border and 60 the NATO Joint ISR Initiative miles up-range, a Norwegian DA-20 on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization By Matthew J. Martin (NATO) mission detects and geolocates the SAM. Due to the location and concern for potential collateral damage, the NATO joint task force (JTF) com- Every night and day that you flew into Kosovo or into Serbia, mander directs that a positive identi- you had to accept that you were in the lethal range of a surface-to-air missile, fication (PID) and collateral damage estimate (CDE) be conducted before because they were moving all the time. We could not identify he is willing to authorize an airstrike. their locations all the time, so the kids just accepted that. But there is poor weather in the area. The NATO fighters on station with —Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF their targeting pods are unable to peer Joint Force Air Component Commander, Operation Allied Force through the clouds and visually identify the SAM. What to do? Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Martin, USAF, is Chief of Allied Airborne Reconnaissance and Electronic What if there was an allied special op- Warfare, NATO Air Command, Izmir, Turkey. erations force on the border? And what if 54 Special Feature / Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Initiative JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 it could launch a small Raven unmanned The Initiative Joint Force Air Component Commander aircraft to fly to the SAM site below the Recent operations have highlighted for Operation Unified Protector: clouds and provide the PID and CDE? NATO’s limitations when it comes If the aircraft could transmit images back to conducting well-integrated JISR We were able to do things like cross-cuing, to a NATO intelligence exploitation cen- operations. In an April 2012 letter to but it took us a few months to get that ter, imagery analysts could accomplish the NATO Secretary General, the per- going and get it right. And I think the the task. Moreover, if they had access manent representatives of the so-called point that you’ve been working on with to the data from the Raven, they might Multi-intelligence All-source Joint ISR Unified Vision is that we need to have those even be able to convert that data into Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) things in place right now so that when the a set of high-fidelity coordinates. This nations stated: next operation comes about—humanitar- would enable the employment of GPS- ian assistance, disaster relief, or a kinetic guided weapons to destroy the SAM. Operations in Afghanistan, and more operation in support of whatever it might It would only be a matter of transmit- recently in Libya, underlined several be up through Article 5—that we have all ting those coordinates (somehow) to a shortfalls in Alliance JISR processes, those things in place so that you don’t have NATO fighter and directing that fighter which have also been identified as BI-SC to develop these TTPs as you’re conducting to engage the target. Priority Shortfall Areas: among oth- the operation.3 This scenario and others like it were ers, scarce JISR assets, lack of efficient demonstrated June 18–29, 2012, at the intelligence sharing for dynamic target- Even before Unified Protector, the NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, ing, insufficient JISR dedicated staff trend was clear: ISR standardization, and Reconnaissance (JISR) trials held preparedness, and over-dependence on a connectivity, and integration were areas in Ørland, Norway. The training and few nations for skilled officers trained in in need of laser-like focus for the Allies. live trials involved land, maritime, and dynamic targeting operations.1 Informally at first, then codified at the air forces and were conducted not only 2012 Chicago Summit,4 the NATO JISR to demonstrate improved NATO JISR The letter goes on to propose a “Smart initiative was born. integration but also to build and refine Defense Initiative” to “put a concrete At first the work of the NATO tactics, techniques, and procedures JISR capability in place for use by all Joint Capability Group for ISR (JCG- (TTPs). Alliance nations.” ISR—reporting indirectly to the North NATO is already deep into planning Of course, the NATO ISR gap Atlantic Council and made up of national Unified Vision 2014 (UV14) with the is nothing new and was made obvi- delegations and a few representatives hope of refining TTPs and the technical ous as early as Operation Allied Force, from NATO organizations) was technical aspects of JISR integration to the point where the United States contributed in nature. A few small working groups where they can then be incorporated into approximately 95 percent of the ISR under the JCG-ISR put forward a great NATO doctrine and tactics manuals and capability as measured in hours flown.2 deal of effort to improve NATO’s ISR be available to NATO commanders for While NATO has made great strides in interoperability. The result was the future conflicts. But it has been a long equalizing the pro-rata contributions NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture, road to get to this point, and the work of of Allies to operations in other mission a series of standardization agreements allied JISR integration is far from over. areas (particularly in precision-strike (STANAGs) governing everything from This article provides an overview of and electronic warfare), the enabling data link format to database configura- the aims and results of Unified Vision capabilities such as air mobility, com- tion to the kinds of film still used in some 2012 (UV12), identifies the key require- mand and control, and ISR in particular imagery sensors. ments of operationally relevant JISR remain stubborn areas of overreliance But there is more to ISR integra- integration, and makes a few modest on the United States. This is evidenced tion than data formats. Likewise NATO proposals for a way forward. As this by the comparison of sorties flown in depends on allied nations who have article makes clear, the key to JISR Allied Force to those flown in Operation ratified and declared compliance with integration is not only the technical con- Unified Protector in 2011. the various STANAGs to self-certify nection of various ISR data sources (as The bulk of mobility, C2, and ISR their forces when contributing them to important as that is), but also the opera- capacity came from the United States, Alliance operations. NATO requires a tional integration, command and control but an even more important point is that forum—beyond regular exercises where (C2), and tactical employment of ISR the Alliance relied on America to provide the focus is on evaluating the ability of capabilities. That simply is not possible the communications networks, trained specific combat units to perform NATO without a sound and mature body of personnel, and the body of tactical exper- missions—where nations and NATO doctrine, TTPs, and training for those tise needed to integrate those capabilities organizations can connect and test out who will operate, employ, integrate, and into a coherent operation. According to forces in an operational environment with control JISR. Lieutenant General Ralph Jodice, the an aim of practicing ISR integration and JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Martin 55 confirming STANAG-based interoper- This resulted in an overall 61 percent cell, this mini-JOC arrangement had the ability.5 At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the success rate. Of course, the results were ability to provide guidance to the compo- JCG-ISR was given the task of providing due in part to normal growing pains— nents. All that was needed after that was just such a forum—which brings us back becoming familiar with the geography, a connection between the components to Unified Vision 2012.6 mission tools, and relationship-building. and their assets. This was done through But much of it resulted from the fact that Norwegian air traffic control for air play- Unified Vision Series of Trials the trial did not have an operational or ers, “JChat” to the Norwegian maritime Unprecedented in size and scope, UV12 tactical ISR C2 construct in place at the operations center for maritime forces, and brought together the capabilities of 14 beginning. In fact, the C2 arrangement personal cell phones for ground players. NATO nations and approximately 1,250 ultimately used was built on the first day This was far from ideal, but it got the personnel to Main Base Ørland, Norway, of the trial and refined over the first week job done. For UV14, however, things for 9 days of live-trail execution. The to become effective. will need to be different. In the subse- trials were conducted in accordance While it is easy to point fingers for quent working group meetings to capture with a plan that called for a realistic this seemingly obvious oversight, the trial lessons from UV12, a consensus was built operational environment to test technical planners are not to blame. The combined that UV14 should have an operational objectives. The bulk of the effort was facts of a compressed planning schedule focus. In fact, ISR C2 will be foremost on invested in network design, data flow, (all of the most significant planning the list of objectives. and connectivity.7 Since the JCG-ISR is activities took place in the 3 to 4 months made up of national delegations versus prior to execution) and the dearth of Operationalizing JISR NATO operational commands, the plan- operational experience among those who UV12 did a great job of bringing ning of UV12 was heavy in technical volunteered to conduct the planning together the latest in NATO ISR expertise but light in operational experi- explain the shortfall. This article does not information technology and connect- ence. While the networks assembled for delve into the specifics of NATO devel- ing it, per the NATO STANAGs, in an UV12 enabled some of the best ISR opmental planning. Suffice it to say that operationally relevant and useful way. connectivity ever seen in a NATO event, conducting a full planning cycle along Data from any JISR sensor, so long as the operational and tactical C2 structures with ensuring a high level of operator it is compliant with the STANAGs and needed to coordinate joint sensors real- participation from the beginning were connected to the network, can now get time per command priorities were absent significant lessons learned from UV12. to any NATO joint agency or player. at the start of the trial. While this ad hoc structure got the But to whom should that data be sent? The trial was organized around mis- job done, it bears little resemblance to And what should it be used for? More sion threads—one for every area of JISR the NATO Response Force joint com- important, how can we translate that to be tested per the objectives. The vi- mand structure that will be used in future data into desired effects to achieve the gnettes were standalone events, with four allied operations. The trial plan did not commander’s intent? UV14 needs to or five conducted each day of the trial. As call for the C2 elements at the joint answer these questions, and the JISR the focus was on the technical aspects of level—mainly a joint operations center construct that follows can help. It all connectivity and data flow, the trial plan (JOC) and component headquarters with begins with the commander’s intent. did not call for a continuous scenario. links to their tactical C2 elements such as Before any operation can begin, Each day was a fresh start, with no sce- a combined air and space operations cen- NATO will need to know how to de- nario elements carrying over from one ter for air players or a maritime operations termine commander’s intent based on day to the next. Likewise, because the center. Likewise the trial plan did not a desired strategic outcome. But the vignettes were not part of an overall sce- have any provisions for tactical real-time Alliance is a defensive organization. It is nario, ISR data collected in one vignette coordination. While the ISR data flowing unlikely that ISR professionals charged was not transferable to any other. to the all-source fusion cell (ASFC) could with carrying out the commander’s intent The trial plan specified 159 technical result in a decision to shift assets, there will know what that intent is until opera- objectives covering areas such as multi-in- was no initial way to communicate any tions begin. So what is to be done? Be telligence connectivity, delivery of data in such change to the assets themselves. flexible. The best way to achieve flexibility STANAG-compliant formats, and latency The C2 structure was developed is through complete operational as well as and accuracy of data delivery. There were to provide an operational link between technical joint integration. Now that we even operational objectives concerning the ASFC and tactical players. A J2/J3 have the ability to send any piece of ISR speed of the kill chain and the distribution role player was put in place to express data wherever it needs to go, we must of a common operating picture. Of these a changing commander’s intent and to also build the ability to use that data to objectives, 97 were passed with 14 others determine the priority of asset allocation support any joint player. To do that, every blocked due to circumstances beyond the among the various vignettes. When inte- JISR sensor will need to have the ability control of the trial team, such as weather. grated with the collection management to be responsive to every joint C2 entity 56 Special Feature / Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Initiative JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 NATO E-3A Sentry AWACS patrols over Germany (U.S. Marine Corps/Colby Brown) that may be participating in a NATO op- operational level—such as the RC-135 This will allow them to make the best eration. We need an operational view. or the NATO RQ-4 Alliance Ground possible real-time decisions on how to First, the sensor needs the ability to Surveillance aircraft—must be able to employ their sensors in a collaborative push ISR data to tactical players such integrate at the tactical level and provide way to achieve the commander’s intent. as special operations or general purpose direct support to tactical units. Likewise, To do this, each JISR player must be ground units, to tactical aviation, to a traditionally tactical ISR sensor such as fully integrated into the Joint Common maritime forces, or to operational air the hand-launched Raven unmanned air- Operational Picture (JCOP)—more on units be they fixed-wing strike or other craft must be able to support operational that in a bit. ISR platforms. The JISR sensor will also objectives and be tasked by the air com- need to be able to push its tactical ISR ponent commander when needed. The NATO Joint Task data to tactical (such as a battalion tacti- Exploitation elements such as the Force and C2 of ISR cal operations center), operational (such U.S. Air Force Distributed Common As every good operator knows, achiev- as a component headquarters), or even Ground Station (DCGS) must be ing tactical success calls for starting at strategic (the JTF HQ or NATO HQ) operationally integrated as well. In a the target and working backward. But echelons of C2. But just as important, the STANAG-compliant ISR data environ- operational effects flow from the com- JISR sensor must have the ability to be ment, this will allow a U.S. exploitation mander’s intent. Therefore, to achieve responsive to every level of joint C2. At team to receive and process ISR data operational success, the C2 structure every phase of the campaign, when the from allied sensors so they can produce must be built from the top down. JTF commander determines where the joint, allied ISR products and push them This brings us to NATO doctrine. weight of effort will be and which com- to the joint-level fusion cell to feed the While still not fully developed regard- ponent commander will be the supported decisionmaking process. ing operational integration of JISR, it commander, the JISR sensor must be As all this happens, all JISR players does provide with a few key concepts able to flex to the appropriate level of C2. must possess a high level of situational to build on. For example, Allied Joint ISR assets that are typically tasked at the awareness regarding the tactical scenario. Publication–3 (B), Allied Joint Doctrine for JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Martin 57 the Conduct of Operations, identifies the key and the JOC. It also will need the ability joint-level ISR coordination. Specially, it C2 elements required at the joint level.8 to pull situational-awareness data from should do the following: Of course the JTF commander is at the JCOP as well as manually push new own and maintain the ground, mari- the center. Moreover, while there are data into it. Much of this will be ac- •• time, air, space, and cyber operations many joint-level players and organizations complished via a STANAG-compliant orders of battle important to a campaign, there are only a Cooperative Electronic Signals Measures act as the ultimate PID authority for few that bear directly on the operational Operations network whereby EW data •• opposing force targets C2 of ISR. For instance the JOC serves will be filtered, fused, and routed to the facilitate joint ISR cross-cueing as the primary C2 instrument to transmit SEWOC for processing.10 •• conduct real-time coordination of the commander’s intent to all tactical The SEWOC could be configured •• the component ISR divisions as well elements in real time. Likewise, there any number of ways, but it must have as the ISR-tasked assets themselves must be joint-level coordination cells for the core functions of information ensure a high level of situational ISR and Signals Intelligence/Electronic management; liaising with EWCCs; •• awareness among all ISR-tasked Warfare (SIGINT/EW), as well as other expertise on component capabilities and players specialized operations such as personnel operations to facilitate joint cross-cue, provide processed and fused ISR recovery or civil-military relations. SIGINT, and SIGINT-fused analysis •• products to the J2 and J3 for plan- But for our purposes, the joint-level to both positively identify signals and ning purposes ISR and SIGINT/EW cells are the most build the EOB; and the ability to nomi- coordinate with the joint collection important, as they will conduct real-time nate EW targets for insertion into the •• management to shift the ISR weight joint coordination with ISR- and EW- collection management and targeting of effort as needed to carry out the tasked assets. Of these two, the SIGINT/ processes. During joint operations, it commander’s intent. EW Operations Center (SEWOC) is the should therefore be composed of experi- more mature concept.9 enced EW and SIGINT operators as well Like the SEWOC, the JASIC will as SIGINT analysts who not only under- interact with both the planning (J2/3/5 The Role of the SEWOC stand the role of SIGINT and EW but collection management, targeting, and While the specific guidance on the role also are empowered to make decisions operational planning staff elements) of the SEWOC is not publicly available, and direct actions for EW-tasked assets and real-time coordination (JOC and we can deduce a number of things it While the doctrine regarding the SEWOC) at the joint level. It will also would need to do to achieve JISR and SEWOC function and set-up in NATO is coordinate with the ISR planning and EW integration: fairly mature, there is little guidance avail- coordination elements at other echelons able on the TTPs of SEWOC interaction such as the A2, G2, and M2 staff func- own and maintain the Electronic •• at the joint level. A key objective for tions within the component commands, Order of Battle (EOB) UV14 should therefore be to refine and the ISR Division within the air compo- act as the Signals Identification •• practice the TTPs needed to integrate the nent, the NATO Intelligence Fusion Authority (SIA) SEWOC and its subordinate EW forces Center, and national exploitation cells manage the electromagnetic spec- •• into NATO operations at the joint level. provided by NATO nations. trum for joint players It should be stressed that the SEWOC facilitate joint SIGINT and EW •• The Role of the Joint All- and JASIC are not tactical C2 agencies, cross-cueing source Information Center but rather they provide operational-level conduct real-time coordination of •• We will need a comparable entity at the direction. They will conduct neither air the component EW Coordination joint level to coordinate ISR. There traffic control nor terminal guidance. Centers (EWCCs) as well as the EW- have been many concepts used in What they will do is provide coordina- tasked assets themselves previous operations with names such tion and guidance to and between the coordinate GPS-denial and other •• as the Joint Intelligence Center, the component functional entities to enable navigation warfare responses Joint Fusion Center, and the ASFC, rapid cross-cue and retasking as needed ensure a high level of situational •• which was used in UV12. However, to respond to dynamic targets. awareness among all EW-tasked since NATO AJP-3(B) specifically talks In this scheme, the JASIC must have players about a Joint All-Source Information connectivity and the ability to coordi- provide advice and recommendations •• Center (JASIC) organized under the J2 nate not just with the component ISR on all matters relating to SIGINT and responsible to the Joint Collection cells, but also with NATO and national and EW. Manager, we will stick with JASIC. exploitation cells. While most exploita- To accomplish these functions, the Just as the SEWOC would act as tion elements provided for NATO SEWOC will need access to the same the joint-level coordination cell for the operations will be under the operational real-time data as the joint-level ISR cell EW effort, the JASIC will conduct all control of the NATO commander, some 58 Special Feature / Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Initiative JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 MQ-1 Predator prepares to land (U.S. Army/Thomas Duval) nations may be reluctant to share their and regarding JISR and EW, we can Team usually composed of J2/3/5, high-fidelity intelligence exploitation identify the following: legal advisor, political advisor, and capabilities or data feeds with other na- public affairs representatives, with maintain a high level of situational tions. But in the end the commander •• others as needed awareness (SA) on the execution will care about conclusions drawn from maintain the JCOP and act as the of joint operations including the •• the data rather than the data itself. final authority on all elements con- location and intent on all blue, red, Therefore, the JASIC must have the tained in it. green, and white players ability to receive finished intelligence ensure a high level of SA for all To do this, the JOC will need to products from national exploitation ele- •• players executing joint tasks (vs. coordinate with the ISR elements of ments and fuse the products with other players executing component-specific all component headquarters and feed/ ISR data. tasks) interact with JCOP during execution. It The Role of the JOC •• ensure smooth transition of tactical will also need to work continuously with C2 responsibilities between joint all the planning elements of the JTF HQ The JOC will be the equivalent orga- players either as part of planned including the component liaisons. nization to the SEWOC and JASIC execution or when needed as a result for all operational assets not tasked to of unforeseen events Collection Management ISR, EW, or some other special func- oversee the identification and sat- vs. Execution tion. Again, NATO doctrine does not •• isfaction of Commander’s Critical While it is not the aim of this article provide much in the way of specific Information Requirements to go into detail on the formulation guidance as to the roles and functions provide a means to respond to of collected ISR data into actionable of the JOC. But based on the roles of •• incidents by hosting a Crises Action intelligence, it must be remembered functions of the JASIC and SEWOC, JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Martin 59 that any collection plan is a means to cycle, the JTF must also be set up for, to field this capability in spite of what an end—satisfying the commander’s connected to, and well-versed in the pro- may be a reduced U.S. contribution to information requirements to enable cess of real-time coordination inside the NATO operations in the future. JISR actions and achieve the desired effects. execution phase. The JISR process should will give us this capability, but it must The real-time identification of targets allow the commander to take rapid action be built on a foundation of interoper- and subsequent action against those against targets that may already be on an ability, technical interconnectedness, the targets as part of a planned campaign order of battle but whose location may ability to exercise joint C2 of allied ISR must therefore not be confused with only be known for a very brief time. assets, and—most important—ISR op- the process of producing a collection erators who are organized, trained, and plan to gather that data. In fact, the Real-time JISR—Putting equipped with the right TTPs to get the collection phase is but one of the four It All Together job done. Here’s hoping the UV14 does basic pillars of the production of mili- To place all this into a practical context, just that. JFQ tary intelligence. Together, these pillars reconsider the opening vignette. Using form a continuous process to provide a traditional SIGINT/EW asset like the the commander with the information to Norwegian DA-20 is a longstanding Notes wage an effective campaign. capability. But with JISR, we can send 1 The above process is as old as ISR that data immediately to the JASIC and Letter from the Multi-sensor Aerospace- ground Joint ISR Integration Interoperability itself, and the NATO process of airborne SEWOC, where they can collaborate Coalition to NATO Secretary General Anders ISR collection, for example, is mature to make an assessment. In this case, Fogh Rasmussen, April 16, 2012. and refined. But as we have learned in they identify the SA-6 but immedi- 2 James P. Thomas, The Military Challenges Afghanistan and Operation Unified ately realize that additional ISR data is of Transatlantic Coalitions, Adelphi Paper 333 Protector, a process that depends on a needed for PID and CDE. (London: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, processing phase that sometimes lasts With their connectivity to the Land 2000), 52. several days does not give the Alliance the Component HQ ISR cell, they are able 3 Lieutenant General Ralph J. Jodice II, flexibility to prosecute dynamic targets or to redirect the Raven that has already USAF, interview by author, May 29, 2013. to even identify targets and make deci- been tasked for that day’s ISR collec- 4 NATO Media Backgrounder on Multina- sions in what may only be a few minutes tion plan. Since the Raven in this case tional Projects, available at 60 Special Feature / Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Initiative JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Staff Sergeant Salvatore Giunta, USA, first living recipient of Congressional Medal of Honor since Vietnam War, rescued two members of his squad during insurgent ambush in Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley, October 2007 (U.S. Army/Leroy Council) “Gallantry and Intrepidity” Valor Decorations in Current and Past Conflicts By Eileen Chollet he Battle of Chosin Reservoir lowing the end of World War II, and The scorching deserts of Iraq and lasted 17 bitterly cold days in late Soldiers and Marines were sent to Afghanistan are a long way from fro- T November and early December Korea with equipment that was not zen Chosin, and 60 years have elapsed 1950. Thirty thousand United Nations designed for the environment. By the since the Korean War. The nature of (UN) troops were surrounded by time the UN forces broke the encircle- warfare has changed, from a brutal 120,000 Chinese troops, and they ment and fought their way to evacu- force-on-force engagement to a high- fought as a Siberian cold front brought ation at Hungnam, 3,000 U.S. Ser- tech counterinsurgency operation. the temperature down to −30oF. Back vicemembers had been killed, another During 11 years of war, nearly 2.5 in the United States, the country had 6,000 had been wounded, and 12,000 million U.S. troops have served in Iraq been enjoying the peace dividend fol- had suffered frostbite injuries. Fourteen and Afghanistan, more than 5,000 have Marines, two Soldiers, and a Navy pilot been killed, and nearly 50,000 have were awarded the Medal of Honor been wounded due to hostile action. Dr. Eileen Chollet is an Operations Analyst at the for heroic actions during the Battle of However, only 13 Medals of Honor Center for Naval Analyses. Chosin Reservoir. have been awarded for actions in those JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Chollet 61 no complete database exists, with the Pentagon citing privacy concerns and incompleteness of records following a 1973 fire in an Army records build- ing in St. Louis.1 Following the recent Supreme Court overturning of the Stolen Valor Act, which upholds the right to lie about receiving a valor decoration, the Department of Defense (DOD) has begun to compile a data- base, initially intended to include only Medal of Honor winners going back to September 11, 2001, and recently expanded to include Service crosses and Silver Star. A complete database of Medal of Honor winners is maintained by the Congressional Medal of Honor Society, but the only mostly complete database of Service crosses and Silver Star awards is the Military Times Hall of Valor, which is maintained by military historian Doug Sterner. Although the incompleteness of the data complicates the analysis, a compari- son of award rates for current and past conflicts shows that 20 times fewer valor decorations have been awarded during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars than dur- ing Vietnam and Korea (see table 1). The Medal of Honor is the most talked about example. Explaining the Decrease Lawmakers, journalists, and military historians have speculated on what might be causing the 20-fold decrease in award rates. In a 2009 Army Times article, former Marine Joseph Kinney argued that being killed in combat U.S. Marines patrol during cordon and search mission in Habib Abad, Helmand Province had become a de facto criterion for (DOD/Anthony L. Ortiz) winning a valor decoration, charging that DOD has an “inordinate fear that 11 years, compared with 17 awarded for Honor is presented to Servicemembers somebody is going to get the Medal of those 17 days in Korea. Servicemembers for gallantry and intrepidity in risking Honor [and] be an embarrassment.”2 and civilians alike wonder why. their lives above and beyond the call of Of the 11 medals awarded for the duty. A Service cross (the Navy Cross, current conflicts, only 4 went to living Valor Decorations Then and Now Distinguished Service Cross, or Air recipients, and the first was not pre- Official criteria for the three highest Force Cross) is presented for heroism sented until 2010. The cases of Captain U.S. decorations for valor—the Medal not rising to the level of the Medal of Charles Liteky, USA (a Vietnam-era of Honor, Service crosses, and Silver Honor. The Silver Star is presented chaplain who later renounced his medal Star—were established shortly after for heroism not rising to the level of a in protest of U.S. policies in Central World War II, so reliable comparisons Service cross. America), and Major General Smedley can be made for these awards through Although records on military decora- Butler, USMC (who later wrote a the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and tions are public information (subject book denouncing war as a government in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Medal of to the Freedom of Information Act), “racket” to protect the interests of cor- 62 Commentary / Valor Decorations in Conflicts JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 porations), argue for caution in present- Table 1. U.S. Valor Decorations Awarded by War(s) ing the high-profile Medal of Honor to Korea Vietnam Iraq and Afghanistan living recipients. However, the award Medal of Honor 135 awarded 248 awarded 13 awarded rates for the Service crosses and Silver Star have dropped by the same factor of 1 per 13,000 1 per 14,000 1 per 200,000 Servicemembers in Servicemembers in Servicemembers in 20, suggesting that something common theater theater theater to all three decorations—that is, some- Service Crosses 1,100 awarded 1,700 awarded 70 awarded thing beyond the widespread publicity 1 per 2,000 1 per 2,000 1 per 37,000 unique to the Medal of Honor—is Servicemembers in Servicemembers in Servicemembers in causing the decrease. theater theater theater In a report accompanying the Silver Star 88,000 awarded 35,000 awarded 1,000 awarded National Defense Authorization Act for 1 per 20 1 per 100 1 per 2,600 fiscal year 2010, the House Committee Servicemembers in Servicemembers in Servicemembers in on Armed Services requested that DOD theater theater theater study the Medal of Honor award process Note: The award rate in Iraq and Afghanistan has a 20-fold decrease from Korea and Vietnam for all to determine whether commanders in valor decorations. the field had inadvertently raised the criteria for valor, leading to the low Table 2. U.S. Valor Decorations Awarded per Casualties by War(s) numbers of awards. DOD reported that it was confident that the process had not Korea Vietnam Iraq and Afghanistan changed and cited two reasons for the Medal of Honor 113 awarded 159 awarded 10 awarded decrease in award rates: the current use of 1 per 1,200 casualties 1 per 1,300 casualties 1 per 5,000 casualties “stand-off” technology (unmanned aerial Service Crosses 480 awarded 650 awarded 30 awarded vehicles, or “drones”) by U.S. forces, and 1 per 300 casualties 1 per 300 casualties 1 per 2,000 casualties the use of improvised explosive devices Silver Star 7,000 awarded 5,700 awarded 300 awarded (IEDs) by the enemy.3 However, a closer look at the data shows that these changes 1 per 20 casualties 1 per 30 casualties 1 per 200 casualties in the nature of warfare are only part of Note: The award rate in Iraq and Afghanistan for Servicemembers killed or wounded has a five-fold the answer, accounting only for a factor decrease from Korea and Vietnam for all valor decorations. of about 6 from the factor of 20. valor due to remote warfare probably historically account for more casualties The DOD Answer: accounts for a factor of 3 out of the than small-arms fire. Even the Vietnam Drones and IEDs factor-of-20 decrease in awards. War, known for its close fighting in the In current conflicts, drones have played Among those who do experience jungle rather than distant shelling, had a prominent role in surveillance and combat and are wounded or killed as a more casualties due to explosives such as targeted killing, replacing some Service- result, the number of valor decorations artillery, land mines, and grenades than to members who would otherwise be put is still lower than it was in the past (see small-arms fire according to the Office of in harm’s way. Since risk of one’s life is table 2). Since personnel who do experi- the Secretary of Defense, Southeast Asia required for valor decorations, the use ence combat are receiving 5 times fewer Combat Casualties Current File.7 While of drones does indeed partially explain decorations, the lack of personal combat it might be “hard to be a hero against an fewer valor decorations, but not the actions cannot entirely explain the miss- IED,”8 as one military historian put it, it entire factor of 20. Though the exact ing factor of 20.4 is just as hard to be a hero against artillery number of missed combat actions is IEDs have been called the “signature fire, which can have an effective range of difficult to estimate, casualties can be weapon of the 9/11 era,” account- more than 10 miles. used as a proxy for combat actions since ing for two out of three casualties Second, all the Medals of Honor each casualty due to hostile action prob- in Iraq and Afghanistan.5 Given the awarded for combat in Afghanistan were ably represents a chance for valorous unpredictable nature of these weapons, for incidents that occurred in 2005 or action. Only 1 in 50 Servicemembers Servicemembers probably have fewer later, when IEDs were most heavily used. in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters opportunities to demonstrate “gallantry If IEDs were causing the drop in award have been killed or wounded due to and intrepidity . . . above and beyond rates, we would expect the awards to be hostile action, compared with about 1 the call of duty.”6 However, three factors clustered at the beginning of the war in 15 in the Korean and Vietnam wars. argue against IEDs playing a large role in when IED use was minimal. Since the casualty rate between the past the drop of award rates. Finally, reading through citations and current conflicts has dropped by a First, explosives were extensively makes it clear that involvement in a close factor of three, lack of opportunities for used in Korea and Vietnam, and they combat firefight is not the only (or even JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Chollet 63 the most common) way to be decorated include the Valor Devices for combat needs to be expanded to include all valor for valor. Numerous awards have been service, and commanders may now decorations and conflicts. The natures presented to Servicemembers who jump nominate Servicemembers for these of combat and military culture have on grenades or other explosives to shield awards instead of decorations specifi- changed since the 1970s, and the ef- their comrades. Rescue of one’s comrades cally for valor. During the 1990s, mili- fects on the award process deserve more from danger—even while not under tary officials debated internally whether careful study to ensure that our Soldiers, direct hostile fire—fits the criteria for a medals were being awarded haphazardly Sailors, Marines, and Airmen are awarded valor decoration. For example, Sergeant and too freely, ultimately resulting the decorations they earn. JFQ First Class Rodney Yano, USA, was a in a Pentagon review of Bronze Star helicopter crew chief during the Vietnam awards presented for the intervention War, and he was marking enemy posi- in Kosovo. Delegations of approval Notes tions with white phosphorous grenades. authority for the Iraq and Afghanistan 1 One exploded prematurely, partially operations admonish commanders to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Report to the Sen- blinding him and covering his body with reserve awards for those “who truly dis- ate and House Armed Services Committees on a severe burns while igniting other am- tinguish themselves from among their Searchable Military Valor Decorations Database, munition in the helicopter. He began comrades by exceptional performance in March 2009, available at 64 Commentary / Valor Decorations in Conflicts JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Army Secretary John McHugh (speaking) and Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno testify before House Armed Services Committee (U.S. Army/Teddy Wade) Cut Defense Pork, Revive Presidential Impoundment By Lawrence Spinetta We have gone from a sense of urgency to restrict an imperial President to a sense that the President needs to restrict, if not an imperial Congress, at least a spendthrift one. —Senator William Cohen Line Item Veto Debate, 1995 very year, Congress packs the diverts $74 billion in proposed savings Raymond Odierno repeatedly telling the defense budget with expensive, to, in the words of former Secretary House Appropriations Subcommittee unnecessary, and unwanted of Defense Leon Panetta, “other areas on Defense: “these are additional tanks E 1 2 weapons. This year’s National Defense that, frankly, we don’t need.” that we don’t need.” The Army wants Authorization Act is no exception. As a case in point, Congress man- to continue shedding its Cold War–era Not only does it spend $2 billion more dated the purchase of 280 M1A2 Abrams heavy armor and will likely send the 280 than the military requested, but it also tanks despite Army Chief of Staff General additional tanks to join 2,000 others sitting idle at depots in the California des- ert.3 The Army made the same argument Colonel Lawrence Spinetta, USAF, serves on the Joint Staff J7 in Force Development. He has been to Congress last year but was similarly selected to command 69th Reconnaissance Group at Grand Forks, ND. rebuffed. JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Spinetta 65 Defense as a Jobs Program tanks, bases, even those that have outlived various times and for various reasons ex- Lawmakers habitually spend more on their usefulness have a natural political ercised that authority. They mostly used defense than the Pentagon requests constituency. Readiness does not.”5 it for narrow defense-related purposes, because they treat the defense budget as Past statements by then-Senator trimming expenditures for weapons they a jobs program. In the case of the M1 Chuck Hagel suggest the new Secretary deemed unnecessary.10 For example, tank, Congress was unwilling to close will be keen to prevent Congress from Harry Truman refused to spend $735 the production line because it provides throwing money at wasteful defense million to increase the Air Force from 16,000 jobs at 882 suppliers spread projects. In June 2011, he lectured fel- 48 to 58 groups. Dwight Eisenhower widely among congressional districts. low lawmakers: “You guys have it upside set aside $137 million for the Nike-Zeus In short, parochial interests triumphed down. Our Defense Department budget missile system. And John Kennedy, over national security requirements. . . . is not a jobs program. It’s not an on the advice of Secretary of Defense The Services share some of the blame. economic development program for my Robert McNamara, withheld $180 mil- They recognize that many in Congress state or any district.”6 One way Secretary lion to end the XB-70 Valkyrie bomber prioritize jobs within their districts, which Hagel can counter Congress’s penchant program.11 is why most major weapons systems for pork is to advocate for the revival of have parts built in nearly every state. For Presidential impoundment, an execu- Congress Fights Back example, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a tive branch tool used to enforce fiscal Congress sometimes acquiesced to Pres- new fighter jet designed for the Air Force prudence. Impoundment occurs when idents’ actions while at other times the and Navy, has 1,300 suppliers in 47 states the President delays or refuses to spend parties negotiated a political settlement. and Puerto Rico. While this legislative money appropriated by Congress. However, the balance of power changed strategy helps gain approval for new Thomas Jefferson set precedent for as a result of President Richard Nixon, weapon systems, it is a Faustian bargain impoundment in 1803 when he sus- who expanded the scope and magnitude because it entrenches the political power pended the purchase of 15 gunboats.7 In of Presidential impoundments, holding of the defense industry and saddles the his Third Annual Message to Congress, back between 17 and 20 percent of Services with inventories of strategically President Jefferson stated, “The favor- controllable expenditures between obsolete weapons that Congress loathes able and peaceable turn of affairs on 1969 and 1972. In 1973, under the to cut. the Mississippi rendered an immediate guise of controlling inflation caused by Money used to maintain these execution of that law unnecessary.” high levels of government spending to expensive, unnecessary, and unwanted Furthermore, he explained, “Time was support the Vietnam War, he suspended weapons could be better spent elsewhere. desirable in order that the institution of nearly $15 billion, almost 20 percent of In March 2012, Lieutenant General that branch of our force might begin on controllable spending, which affected Robert Lennox, the deputy chief of staff models the most approved by experi- over a hundred Federal programs.12 for Army programs (G8), emphasized ence.”8 In short, Jefferson exercised his Congress fought back and passed the that the Army does not have the budget discretion as Commander in Chief and Congressional Budget and Impound- to support legacy systems to prop up the chief executive. He impounded congres- ment Control Act (CBICA) of 1974, defense industry. He used a historical sionally appropriated funds based on his which had the objective of curtailing analogy to deride Congress’s decision to assessment of the strategic situation and the President’s budgetary powers. The buy more M1 tanks notwithstanding a his desire to purchase new and better act outlawed impoundment, requiring lack of need: “We don’t want to be in the models at a later date. the executive branch to spend every last position of 1939 when we say we have to The U.S. Constitution established penny of congressional appropriations. go out and protect the saber and saddle a system of checks and balances that Nixon denied that Congress had the industry because our cavalry is going to entrusts the “power of the purse” to constitutional authority to impose such need it for the future. We have to make Congress under Article I. However, a restriction. However, weakened by sure we got the right industrial challenges Article II assigns the executive branch the the Watergate scandal, he elected not to for the future and those are the ones we authority to expend appropriated funds. fight it. Nixon resigned a month after have to focus on.”4 A 1995 Senate budget committee report the CBICA became law. The new Ford Not only does innovation suffer, noted, “This tug-of-war goes to the most administration, not wanting to further but readiness suffers as well. “There is basic tenet of the American democratic antagonize a hostile Congress, chose to pressure on the department to retain system of government—the balance of comply with the law rather than appeal excess force structure and infrastructure powers between the executive and the to the Supreme Court.13 That decision, instead of investing in the training and legislative branches of government—the according to Senator John McCain, con- equipment that makes our force agile and power of the purse versus the impound- tributed to “exploding” deficits. “It is not flexible and ready,” observed Secretary ment power.”9 coincidence that up until 1974 revenues Panetta in December 2012 remarks at For 170 years after Jefferson claimed and expenditures . . . were in sync,” the National Press Club. “Aircraft, ships, the power of impoundment, Presidents at opined McCain during a 1995 Senate 66 Commentary / Cut Pork, Revive Impoundment JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 M1 Abrams battle tanks (DAC/Don Teft) debate. “There are times . . . in war when vetoes of Presidential actions uncon- 1996. The move coincided with a shift in we ran up huge deficits. But after those stitutional.15 Acting quickly to regain the tug-of-war between Congress and the emergencies subsided, we again brought the upper hand, Congress enacted the President back in favor of the executive. the budget into balance. It was in 1974 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Congress enacted the Line Item Veto when the two began to diverge to an Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 Act of 1996, which gave the President incredible degree.”14 (otherwise known as Gramm-Rudman- sweeping powers to veto individual items The CBICA fundamentally shifted Hollings II). The bill took away most of in appropriations bills unless Congress the budgetary balance of power between the President’s deferral power, although overrode the veto with a two-thirds vote Congress and the President. The law it did provide for limited exceptions. in both houses. allowed the President to request rescis- In 1988 the Air Force probed The legislation was immediately chal- sions, but that was only permitted if congressional appetite for enforcement lenged by multiple lawsuits. One appeal both houses of Congress consented. Not of the law when it refused to spend reached the Supreme Court in 1997, surprisingly, subsequent to the enactment $160,000 authorized by Congress to but justices withheld ruling on the con- of CBICA, Congress has simply ignored keep seven SR-71 Blackbird spy planes stitutionality of the act, choosing instead Presidential rescission requests, killing in flyable storage. The Service insisted to dismiss the challenge on technical them through inaction. the aging Cold War aircraft were too grounds.16 During the legal wrangling, The CBICA granted more leeway expensive to operate and were no longer President Bill Clinton used his new power with deferrals. The President was au- needed because of the capabilities of spy 82 times, including taking action to thorized to defer spending unless either satellites. The move went unchallenged, rescind $39 million allocated for the SR- the House or Senate passed legislation perhaps because the sum at stake was 71.17 Finally in June 1998, the Supreme disapproving the request. (Note that relatively inconsequential. Five years later, Court took up a second appeal (Clinton appropriated funds still had to be spent Congress ordered the Blackbird out of v. City of New York) and struck down before the end of the fiscal year.) In 1986 retirement. The Air Force, which had the law in a 6 to 3 decision.18 In dissent, the Supreme Court reviewed the CBICA not budgeted for the aircraft, moved to Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, “There is deferral provision and ruled one-house ground the plane for a second time in not a dime’s worth of difference between JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Spinetta 67 Congress authorizing the president to tion over appropriated funds. Indeed, from Spain and closed the port of New Orleans to American commerce. Two months later, cancel a spending item, and Congress’ the Supreme Court in its Clinton v. City France agreed to sell the Louisiana Territory authorizing money to be spent on a par- of New York decision suggested that to the United States, thereby negating the im- ticular item at the president’s discretion. practice was within the bounds of the mediate need to acquire the gunboats, at least And the latter has been done since the U.S. Constitution. in Jefferson’s opinion. founding of the nation.”19 Absent a legislative compromise, 8 Thomas Jefferson, Third Annual Message to the Senate and House of Representatives of The Supreme Court decision shifted the President should pick an egregious the United States, Washington, DC, October the balance of power back in Congress’s example of defense pork, perhaps the 280 17, 1803. favor, something that is not conducive to M1 tanks slated for storage, and reassert 9 U.S. Senate, Legislative Line Item Veto of curing, to quote then-Senator and later his historic right. While the Supreme 1995: Report of the Committee on the Budget, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Court was not amenable to allowing Report 104-9, 104th Cong., 1st sess., February 27, 1995, 1. “the presence and prevalence of trichino- Congress to vote to give the President 10 Notable exceptions of Presidents who 20 sis in the halls of Congress.” Congress’s broad line-item veto power, it may be less impounded funds for other than defense- refusal to cut public spending has led to willing to infringe upon the President’s related purchases include Ulysses S. Grant and sequestration, which mandates across- independent constitutional authorities as Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1876 Grant declined the-board defense spending cuts that no Commander in Chief and chief executive to spend money appropriated for harbor and river improvement projects. Similarly, relying one believes make strategic sense. to block defense spending that is wasteful on emergency authorities during World War II, While dysfunction and a failure of or strategically unsound. Roosevelt laid aside funds appropriated for pub- political will to cut spending do not Even if a limited Presidential authority lic works not directly related to war efforts. See justify unconstitutional remedies such emerges from this next round of tug-of- Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency as the Line Item Veto Act, returning war, it would serve to lower the defense (New York: Mariner Books, 2004), 236. 11 Ibid. to a pre-1974 equilibrium where the baseline every year. And as every saver 12 Ibid., 238. President routinely exercises his judg- knows, even small cuts over a long period 13 See Paul M. Johnson, A Glossary of Politi- ment to trim defense pork would be can add up to considerable savings. More cal Economy Terms, available at 68 Commentary / Cut Pork, Revive Impoundment JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Biometric eye scanner identifies patients arriving at hospital at Bagram Airfield (U.S. Army/Chris Hargreaves) Biometric-enabled Intelligence in Regional Command–East By David Pendall and Cal Sieg n Afghanistan, coalition and Afghan A majority of our operations produce achieved major impacts on the insur- National Security Forces (ANSF) biometric information that leads to gent ability to maintain leadership I continue to leverage an important arrests, warrants, and the removal of and lower-level cell structures as both component of the counterinsurgency insurgent anonymity. Furthermore, coalition and Afghan forces regu- and counterterrorism fight: biometrics. increasing components of our success- larly employ biometrically developed Simply put, biometric-enabled intel- ful insurgent-targeted operations are a insurgent watch lists and “be on the ligence (BEI) efforts are producing a result of our biometric collection and lookout” (BOLO) messages and as they high return on operations designed to enrollment processes. Across Regional execute deliberate detention operations. collect and exploit information about Command–East (RC-E), biometric The biometric enrollment program insurgents. Consider a few key metrics. intelligence-driven operations have in Afghanistan began in earnest in 2006. Since then, hundreds of thousands of bio- metric records have been ingested in both coalition and Afghan databases. In total, Colonel David Pendall, USA, was the CJ2 for Regional Command–East/Combined Joint Task Force–1 in Afghanistan and concurrently G2 of First Cavalry Division. Cal Sieg was a Law Enforcement Professional we have developed an extensive reposi- with First Cavalry Division in Afghanistan. tory of biometric data across Afghanistan. JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Pendall and Sieg 69 Additionally, these same modes of biomet- For those elements that are identi- We regularly read about “cold cases” ric data allow both coalition and Afghan fied and are transient, BEI offers even being solved, death row inmates being forces to protect themselves by ensuring greater advantages. The combined team cleared or convicted based on new DNA that the ANSF, local national workforce, regularly uses checkpoints and other ran- evidentiary technologies, and new bio- Afghan Local Police, and reintegrating dom screenings along traffic routes, fixed metric forensic extraction techniques that insurgents (and criminals) are who they facilities, and areas where locals regularly tie violent acts to previously unknown say they are and can be screened against concentrate such as bazaars and markets. terrorists. Having consistent biometric derogatory information (matches for Coupled with an active BOLO program ingestions and data compilation from previous incidents such as improvised and electronic checks against watch lists, individual enrollments and from attack or explosive device [IED] attacks and other the “out of towners” are either identi- crime scenes will set conditions to better events that leave biometric information fied, enrolled and matched, or correlated enable security and law enforcement ele- behind). The biometrics program is an with previous enrollments in other areas, ments in the future both in Afghanistan invaluable part of the campaign that has which highlights them as mobile actors. and as part of our own homeland security even greater potential in the future. Each of these actions flags the individuals initiatives. Since the world is increasingly and allows security forces to know more linked, and a day’s travel can move both Applying BEI about them and to take appropriate steps individuals and material to nearly any spot Enrollment is merely the first step in the such as questioning, enhanced search, or on the surface of the Earth, it is an invest- application of this tool for counterin- detention. ment in security we should not allow to surgency and counterterrorism. Enroll- For specific, deliberate actions such as go unresourced. ment comes from volunteerism in local directed detention operations, the execu- In terms of Afghan sustainability, villages, often supported by the village tion of police force high-risk warrants, both the government and security forces elders and leaders, as well as involun- and targeted raids against identified insur- are demonstrating signs of readiness to tary enrollment of detained individuals gents, the combined team has leveraged pursue biometrics in their own rights. We believed to be witnesses or having direct biometrics to confirm identities on the do not delve into the question of fund- involvement with security incidents. objective, confirm linkage of the detained ing here, but we do highlight the fact Both coalition and Afghan forces are individuals to previously committed that the rule of law sector acknowledges involved in the enrollment phase since insurgent or terrorist acts, and collect ad- biometrics as a legal tool and accepts operations in Afghanistan are inherently ditional biometric evidence. biometric forensic data in national courts. partnered—that is, combined opera- Afghan security forces are increasingly tions are the standard. Why We Do It: The Payoff trained in evidence collection, handling, Following enrollment and upload of The overarching purpose of using BEI- and retrieval. The government maintains the biometric data to the data reposito- and biometrics-based toolsets is to deny its own biometric database, its own ac- ries, the anonymity previously counted anonymity and increase the effectiveness cess to enrollment technology, and a on by the insurgent is removed. This of security and police operations. This growing forensically trained workforce. step is crucial as it leads to the ability to premise also begs additional questions: Additionally, the government is expand- identify individuals with previous events Is it sustainable for future Afghan secu- ing a warrant-based targeting program, that have associated biometric-based rity forces? Does the Afghan rule of law issues warrants based on biometrically facts. The extraction of the biometric process fully condone and embrace the derived evidence, and has a growing data begins with an event, and addi- use of biometrics? Are the biometrics information technology infrastructure tional biometric information is gained processes subject to countermeasures by to allow better access to biometric and through forensic means to recover trace insurgents? Are insurgents dissuaded by other identity-based information for elements and fully admissible biometric biometrics capabilities? As we address select fielded forces and operating units. information for both prosecution and these valid questions, keep in mind the Coalition and other international efforts intelligence exploitation. The Afghan broader element in play: we are likely continue to enable the ANSF and the rule of law sector—the Ministry of only in the early stages of biometrics as security- and justice-related ministries Justice, courts, judges, and prosecutors a 21st-century capability for nation-state to pursue these capabilities. The issue at the national level—understands the security. ultimately is one of confidence and estab- significance of biometric evidence and Just as U.S. security and justice lished practice with sustainable processes, supports its use for making the case systems in the 20th century benefited not lack of interest or basic capability. against insurgents. The intelligence and from the use of fingerprint enrollments, The Afghan rule of law sector has sup- operations communities—Afghan and “mug shots,” and DNA, scientific and ported biometrics as addressed above, and coalition—use the exploitation to trace technological breakthroughs coupled increasingly the courts look for biometrics individuals back to events. This gives the with readily accessible national data bases as a component of the prosecution’s case. combined team a great advantage over are likely to benefit us in the 21st century. Whether it is fingerprints, DNA, or pho- the enemy that it must use. The full potential remains unknown. tos of insurgents at the crime scene with 70 Features / Biometric-enabled Intelligence JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 seized illegal material, we can confidently Table 1. BOLO/Warrants for Regional Command–East, as of January 29, 2012 state that biometrics are fully embraced Task Force BOLOs Issued Warrants Requested Warrants Issued Detentions by the Afghan legal system at the national Blackhawk 21 7 8 6 level, as evidenced by the actions of the National Security Court at the Justice Bronco 28 12 14 4 Center in Parwan (JCIP). The regularly Bulldog 16 9 7 1 issued criminal warrants from the Ministry Lafayette 2 0 2 0 of Justice further empower the combined Maverick 3 0 3 0 team and ANSF to conduct direct actions Spartan 70 39 20 20 and detentions of individuals wanted Thunderbird 6 3 2 1 by the courts. As an enabler to this, the RC-E team provides a mechanism for White Eagle 4 3 1 0 distribution of warrants and BOLOs in English, Dari, and Pashtu, with the Table 2. BOLO/Warrants in Afghanistan, as of January 29, 2012 individual’s photo and explanation of the Task Force BOLOs Issued Warrants Requested Warrants Issued Detentions offense. Even matched identities without RC-E 150 73 84 32 warrant can be distributed as BOLO in- RC-N 18 13 3 2 formation to security forces and placed on RC-C 1 0 1 0 leaflets and other media. RC-S 112 80 23 10 BOLO/Warrants (Rule of Law) RC-SW 175 139 19 8 In RC-E, the BOLO produced by RC-W 3 0 2 1 Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Paladin is the foundation upon which conducted by the various explosive responsibility of the Afghan law enforce- the rule of law apprehension program ordinance detachments supporting the ment community to aggressively pursue is being developed. These IED-related overall mission. This PBA yields items the subject of the warrant. BOLOs are simply a storyboard detail- of evidentiary value in varying forms. Currently, there are roughly 150 CJTF ing an IED event (whether detonation The Afghanistan Captured Material Paladin IED BOLOs issued in RC-E (see occurred or not) with the results of the Exploitation Laboratory (formerly the tables 1 and 2) with 459 throughout exploitation of the site or device and the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell Afghanistan, and 73 CJTF Paladin IED subsequent identification made by bio- and Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facility NSWs issued in RC-E with 305 through- metric means. This connection between labs) receives the items and conducts out the country. While the majority of the identified person and the device is extensive scientific analysis and testing, apprehensions based on these BOLOs and sufficiently documented (to include a often producing biometrically identifi- NSWs are essentially the result of “mili- photo of the subject) and causes issu- able samples that will support positive tary” (either coalition forces or ANSF) ance of the BOLO. This same informa- matches for identification purposes. These missions, there have been apprehensions tion is also submitted to the Anti-Terror matches can be used to initiate a warrant based purely on Afghan law enforcement Prosecution Directorate (ATPD), for identified individuals involved with the actions. As rule of law becomes more which utilizes the information to issue a security incident. Often, these warrants widespread, law enforcement will become National Security Warrant (NSW). are also used to create the Afghan BOLO more involved in the apprehensions of To achieve more acceptance of report that is disseminated to the ANSF. these BOLO and NSW subjects. BOLOs by Afghans, the format was While the BOLO is not an official To assist the ANSF, the RC-E has in- changed from a rather bland appear- Afghan document, it does contain what stituted a program to make these BOLOs ance to a more colorful look. These some would term “sufficient cause” and warrants available to the ANSF new BOLOs were issued in 2011. Their (“probable cause” in our system) for a electronically by uploading them to a nickname of “Jingle BOLO” comes judicial order. In this case, the ATPD re- public Web site that has been established from the colorful trucks seen through- views the “evidence” relating to the IED as a leave behind system for use by the out Afghanistan (called “jingle trucks”). event (with subsequent positive identi- Afghan government and people. This The Jingle BOLOs were designed to be fication), and, once satisfied, the ATPD site, called Ronna (Pashto for “guiding more culturally appealing. We observed issues an NSW. This warrant is significant light”), is a relatively new concept, and its a noticeable increase in Afghan accep- in that as an official Afghan government use can be termed “in its infancy” at best. tance and use of these BOLOs over the “order,” it should be followed and its ex- Properly utilized, Ronna can provide a following year. ecution should not only be expected but simple tool for Afghan law enforcement The CJTF Paladin BOLOs occur as compelled. Unlike the BOLO, the NSW to utilize in managing a basic wanted the result of post-blast analysis (PBA) must be given due deference, and it is the persons program. JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Pendall and Sieg 71 Ronna in Support of the existing in almost all provinces through- Center in Parwan. The trials conducted BOLO/Warrant Program out the country, will be the springboard at the JCIP are entirely Afghan adminis- In July 2011, Ronna was targeted as for implementing electronic searches for tered and controlled, using Afghan laws, a potential repository for the CJTF BOLOs and warrants by ANSF. judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and Paladin BOLOs and resulting warrants To be sure, success is not guaranteed. investigators. Justice advisors from the issued by the ATPD. In a sense, the There are yet issues to overcome such as U.S. Defense and State Departments American National Crime Information high illiteracy rates among ANSF, lack of mentor, train, and advise these prosecu- Center system would be replicated in computers and connectivity, infiltration tors, defense counselors, and judges at that these BOLOs and warrants would of ANSF by insurgents, and government both the primary court and appellate be available electronically and would interference from either outright corrup- court levels. cover all of Afghanistan. tion or simple bureaucratic meddling/ The use of biometrics in prosecu- The first phase of the process was to control. If, however, even marginal suc- tions at JCIP now plays a prominent role upload all CJTF Paladin BOLOs and cess is achieved, the message to Afghan in the convictions of those individuals IED-based NSWs. This project began law enforcement would be that this who have been so matched to criminal in September 2011, and, as mentioned, electronic medium could provide great offenses. The majority of these crimi- over 450 BOLOs and 305 warrants have assistance and support in the mission of nal cases involve biometric matches to been uploaded. The second phase of the service to the people. instrumentalities of criminal acts. This process (currently under way) is to ensure use of modern science by the Afghan the widest possible dissemination of the Biometrics and the Afghan National Security Court has resulted in capabilities of Ronna as it relates to sup- Judicial System convictions in almost every case where port of the law enforcement mission. To Experience and lessons learned from a biometric match has been made be- achieve this end, law enforcement profes- Iraq have shown that the judiciary will tween the defendant and the criminal sionals have been informing their contacts accept biometric evidence if it has been instrument (compared to a roughly 80 during key leader engagements of the educated in the process of biometrics percent conviction rate in all prosecu- existence of Ronna, that it can be viewed including not only the scientific basis tions). The success story does not end in either Pashtu or Dari, and that wanted for reliability but also the actual collec- with convictions alone. In cases involving person information is contained therein tion, preservation, and security (chain of DNA evidence, sentencing is consistently regarding those individuals linked to IED custody) of such evidence. longer than those without DNA use (see events by biometric evidence. It is envi- In Afghanistan, the model for success- figure). sioned that the Operations Coordinating ful use of biometric evidence in criminal While the success of biometric evi- Centers Regional and Provincial, a com- prosecutions is the Afghan National dence use in court has become the norm bined coalition force–Afghan force site Security Court located at the Justice at the JCIP, this is not the case in the primary courts at the provincial level. Average Length of Confinement Per Month Although the government has established its own forensics laboratories, there has DNA v. Fingerprints v. No Biometrics yet to be infusion of lab results into the mainstream judicial system. Afghans still 140 require a concerted training and indoc- Sentence Length: Fingerprints Non-Biometric Evidence trination program for those judges below 120 Sentence Length: DNA 120 the national level in the acceptance and 108 107 use of biometric-based evidence. Work 100 96 continues to develop the evolution of fo- 87 rensics use and availability for the primary 80 courts (judges, investigators, prosecutors, 68 66 and defense attorneys) at the provincial 68 64 62 60 60 level and below and in the use and accep- 60 54 49 tance of biometrics as credible evidence. 48 48 42 So does widespread biometric use 40 36 38 29 Months of Confinement dissuade the insurgent from participating 36 37 28 32 33 31 24 in crimes or terrorist events? We believe 20 21 18 so. This is not true for every insurgent, 2 and we are not painting this capability as 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a panacea for counterinsurgent strategy. The facts are that insurgents understand Jun-10 Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 that the ANSF and coalition can remove 72 Features / Biometric-enabled Intelligence JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 their anonymity permanently. They know that when they are enrolled they are no longer unknown. Those reintegrated know they are forever registered, and a return to the insurgency will not be with- out great risk for recapture or increased sentence when they are prosecuted. The resultant pressure from knowing these facts does change behavior, which could and should be exploited. In a growing number of operating areas, the use of billboards, leaflets, and television and radio broadcasts routinely make “most wanted” lists of insurgents public, with tip line and contact information for citizens to provide information. Village elders and community leaders are aware of the programs and understand the prac- tical use of biometrics against insurgents. Marine gathers identification information from Afghan during census patrol in Helmand Province Three Success Stories (U.S. Marine Corps/Dexter S. Saulisbury) “Hey, I’ve Seen You Before!” As Gul and Mohammad, members of an also innocent Afghan citizens who have contributed to the identification matches Afghan local police force, sat at their been victimized by war for decades. and subsequent apprehensions. In some checkpoint surveying the countryside, The Lone Bomber. Two police of- instances, the IED events from which the they noticed people walking slowly ficers watching from their vehicle saw an evidence derived occurred years before. down the road toward them. As the approaching motorcycle and knew imme- In early August 2011, the gang ap- small group reached the checkpoint, diately that something was wrong. The peared before the JCIP. It was the first Gul and Mohammad, who like many motorcycle’s speed and erratic movement IED network case to appear before this of their comrades were unable to read, dictated a stop and inquiry. The police court. Of the 11 suspects from the Mota matched the faces before them with the asked for proof of identity but none was Khan District of Paktika Province, all but BOLO photos hanging on the wall. produced. After incomplete or evasive one had been biometrically matched to Gul, closely examining the five faces, answers to routine questions, the police the 39 separate events. The 10 biometri- asked a male in his late 20s to step transported the motorcyclist to a nearby cally matched suspects were convicted forward. As he did, Gul pulled down a police station for further investigation. of violations of Articles 19 and 14 of the BOLO from the wanted board behind He had no identification documents Afghan Penal Code with sentences of 14 him and studied both the face in the and continued to be evasive regarding years for four of the defendants, 9 years poster and face in front of him. With a his identity, so he was subjected to an for another four, and 2 years for two. broad smile, Gul told the man “You are iris scan that identified and connected The Combined Explosives Exploitation mine” and took him into custody. The him to over a dozen bombing events. Cell Lab (now the Afghanistan Captured face on the BOLO was an individual He was placed under arrest and a further Materials Exploitation Lab) provided 13 identified as being involved in multiple check via computer under his true name latent to known matches. DNA labs pro- IED events. He had years earlier been revealed not only a BOLO, but a national vided 29 DNA to known matches. CJTF biometrically enrolled by a U.S. Army security warrant on him as well. Paladin’s Theater Explosives Exploitation patrol that encountered him during an The Bomber Gang. A group of Cell provided six replicas of the primary enrollment mission. insurgents had been operating in a devices that were recovered as evidence. It did not matter that the Afghan rural agricultural province in eastern While these events might seem to be police officers who identified and ap- Afghanistan for some time, plying their routine examples of good police work prehended him could not read or write. deadly trade as bomb makers and emplac- in the United States, Europe, or other What did matter was that by using the ers. Their activity resulted in the killing developed nations, there was nothing earliest form of biometric identification, and wounding of International Security routine about them occurring in remote facial recognition, the officers removed a Assistance Forces as well as ANSF. It parts of Afghanistan. The use of biomet- dangerous bomb maker from the battle- was just a matter of time until they were rics and supporting Internet connectivity field, making the area safer for not only identified with a particular IED and ap- is a major success story in the continuing coalition and Afghan security forces, but prehended. All told, 39 separate attacks transition to rule of law in the country. JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Pendall and Sieg 73 on the operations graphic as an overlay. Units can review the density of previously enrolled individuals, review in aggregate or by individual, assess threats based on matches to security incidents, and better predict where these individuals are likely to be ahead of the operation, especially when they integrate the biometrics with other all-source intelligence as part of the intelligence preparation. Treat every event as a means to col- lect additional biometrics. The planning phase of every operation should include the biometric enrollment and battle drill for the collection and preservation of evidence for further forensic biometric exploitation. Treating every site or event as a crime scene and an intelligence op- Border police at Wesh review information flier about Afghan 1000 Biometrics Facility (U.S. Army/ eration will produce positive effects. The Joseph Johnson) use of properly collected materials and the thorough processing of detainees will The use of biometrics in identifying IED Back-end database management, pay off in terms of prosecution and lead makers and emplacers has been an ongo- rapid dissemination, and data ingest from to additional actionable intelligence. ing achievement, first in Iraq and now in collections and enrollments are critical in Continue to migrate biometrics to the Afghanistan. maintaining speed and actionability for application and support of rule of law. As in all biometric matching operating forces. The need for regular As the obvious endstate of a successful programs, first and foremost, a well- updates and watch list refresh directly counterinsurgency campaign, rule of populated reference (or comparison) enables BEI and follow-on successes. law in the 21st century must include the database must be established. Obviously, Information technology must continue latest scientific advances in the field of the more references available (identified to support the data transfer and dissemi- criminal justice. Although biometrics persons via biometric identifiers such as nation processes via coalition and Afghan has been introduced successfully to the DNA sample, fingerprint sample, and/or infrastructures. Afghan courts, its use must become more iris scan), the greater the probability that The enrollment of biometric data, widespread as not only an investigative there will be a match from biometric evi- whether individuals are enrolled directly tool, but also as credible evidence with an dence taken from an IED or other event or through forensic extraction, is espe- understanding of its value in ascertaining of a criminal nature. cially important for foreign fighters and truth. transient populations. As stated earlier, The full appreciation of the biomet- Insights from Afghanistan these individuals are part of a population rics program and BEI is a key enabling Collections and enrollments matter and base demographic that could impact the factor in the continued progress of increase the effectiveness of all other oper- security of multiple nations, demonstrat- the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. ations. As more elements of a selected ing the global nature of the 21st-century Moreover, the implications of future bio- population are enrolled and more security environment. metrics-related collections, exploitations, forensic evidence is collected, there is Incident tracking and analysis will and applications are promising if not yet a substantial increase in ratio of opera- discern patterns and enable better plan- fully known. As we continue to see great tions to matches. Considering the close- ning for security operations. Units should gains and daily successes in Afghanistan knit nature of a community and the never enter an area for targeting raids, by our ANSF partners, as well as direct consistent patterns of the insurgency— deliberate detentions, or clearance opera- payoffs for units that fully leverage cur- inherently a localized minority group tions without knowing who they will likely rent best practices, we can confidently of insurgents (and criminal elements) encounter. “Never going anywhere for state that the biometric component of conducting the majority of attacks—the the first time” is a great proposition. The the fight in Afghanistan is an investment biometric program advantages to the BEI-based process of developing biomet- in our future. Our national security combined team multiply with every ric named areas of interest allows units at forces have an ever-advancing capability ingest of biometric data. Even the out- all levels to pull the known entities from in biometrics and BEI to reduce our col- of-towner or foreign fighter transient is the database and plot them (by site of en- lective risks, aid our allies, and defeat our placed at greater disadvantage. rollment or by associated event location) adversaries. JFQ 74 Features / Biometric-enabled Intelligence JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Member of U.S. Geological Survey conducts site survey outside Sukalog, Afghanistan, with Marine escorts (U.S. Marine Corps/Sarah Furrer) Strategic Implications of the Afghan Mother Lode and China’s Emerging Role By Cindy A. Hurst and Robert Mathers s the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. pattern of power struggles, be taken Afghanistan. While this may seem prom- and North Atlantic Treaty Orga- over by the Taliban, or continue to ising, there are many economic, logistical, A nization (NATO) troops draws develop into a global economic player? cultural, military, and geopolitical issues closer, the question on many minds In June 2010, reports estimated to resolve before beginning the exploita- is what will become of Afghanistan. that there are more than $1 trillion in tion of those natural resources to help Will the country slip back into its usual mineral deposits within the borders of lift the country out of its current state. Export of strategic minerals could offer Afghanistan an opportunity to become a Lieutenant Commander Cindy A. Hurst, USNR, is a Research Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies successful player in the global economy, Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Colonel Robert Mathers, USA, is the former Chief of the International but success is contingent on the creation Engagement Cell, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, and is now the Director of the Eurasian Security Studies Program at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch- and maintenance of a viable, centrally Partenkirchen, Germany. controlled police and military force, and JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Hurst and Mathers 75 For any major investment and development projects to succeed, the NATO-led mission must attain its goals in concord with the central government in Kabul. Despite continuous criti- cism, it could be reasonably argued that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been achieving those goals thus far. The al Qaeda network within Afghanistan has been effectively eliminated (although a Pakistani-based insurgency remains a menace), ANSF is nowadays a well-trained and well- equipped force that has reached its intended strength levels, and the organs of effective management of governmental programs are in place, albeit in some places still weak and/or embryonic. ANSF with its bureaucratic pitfalls and Archeologists discovered ancient Buddhist settlement at Mes Aynak in Logar Province, which sits potential for corruption will be the most above enormous copper deposit (Jerome Starkey) important organization to rehabilitate and therefore sustain and will be crucial on the central government’s ability to geologic strata in great detail. However, to natural resource exploitation. hold sway over its interaction with bilat- their work was disrupted by the 1979 eral partners, as well as domestic tribes, Soviet invasion, the occupation that Out of the Ashes through the years to come. A number followed, and the civil war. During Afghans have been mining gemstones of possible outcomes could occur based the post-1996 chaos, a small group of such as lapis lazuli and emeralds for cen- on the dynamics of the internal makeup, Afghan geologists hid the geological turies. These small operations are archaic tribes and their influence within the reports produced during the 1960s in at best. Gemstones are mined the old country, and ties outside the country. their homes in an effort to protect them way with pick, shovel, and dynamite. As foreign troops, equipment, and from being destroyed by the Taliban. The miners are Afghan migrants who donation amounts dwindle over the The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in leave their families for half of the year to coming years, Afghanistan will be drawn late 2001 ousted the Taliban, and the live in windowless huts in a place called into the orbit of its immediate neighbors long process of rebuilding began. Today, Mine Town and earn up to $10 per day.2 regarding influence and future direction. as U.S. and NATO forces strive to im- In the snowcapped Panjsher mountains, In both regional and global competition, prove the security situation, the Ministry almost 10,000 feet above sea level, the Chinese are ahead in the areas of of Mines (MOM) is trying to kick-start hundreds of untrained miners search direct investment and long-term outlook the mining industry by opening up min- for some of the highest quality emeralds in the Afghan natural resources sector. ing opportunities to foreign companies. in the world.3 These operations have Although this prospect may initially be The goals of the NATO coalition over the continued uninterrupted even during distasteful to those who have shed blood period 2001–2012 have generally been: the fight against the Soviet Union in the and treasure over the past decade to cre- destroy al Qaeda and its affiliates 1980s and their profits helped to fund ate a viable state within Afghanistan, it •• residing in Afghanistan and defeat the mujahideen.4 Meanwhile, larger may be the best way to achieve the end- or neutralize those elements posing extraction operations arose in coopera- state those nations strived to establish. a threat to the country and its tion with Moscow. In 1959 the Soviet Amid the Chaos Hides a Pearl neighbors Union developed a number of oil and train, equip, and enable a self- natural gas fields and later three uranium Afghanistan, a country rich in culture •• sustaining Afghan National Security mines and some copper mines, but and history, lags far behind much of the Force (ANSF) that can protect the large-scale mineral extraction remained rest of the world economically, in infra- country from external and home- underdeveloped. Afghanistan’s mining structure development, and as a socially grown threats industry began its renewal during the integrated society. In the 1960s and help create the conditions for eco- new millennium at about the time the early 1970s, the Soviets, along with the •• nomic recovery and development by AGS began undergoing its post-Taliban Afghanistan Geological Survey (AGS), supporting those Afghan institutions renovation. It was then that the hidden were the first to map the country’s that lend assistance to this effort.1 geological reports began to reemerge, 76 Features / The Afghan Mother Lode and China’s Role JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 some even punctured with bullet holes Afghanistan: Major Mineral Occurences from past battles. Between 2004 and 2007, scien- tists from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) joined forces with the AGS to track down existing information about mineral deposits within the country. They gathered information from Afghan, German, Soviet, Polish, Czech, and other sources and combined it to create the Preliminary Assessment of Non- Fuel Mineral Resources of Afghanistan. According to the assessment, the country has an abundance of non-fuel mineral resources such as copper, iron, sulfur, bauxite, lithium, and rare earth elements. The USGS determined that 24 high-priority areas required further analysis, believing that within these areas are world-class deposits of strategic min- erals. In June 2006 the revitalized AGS reoccupied the newly renovated AGS building, equipped to access and study old and new data.5 In 2009 the USGS began work- ing with the Department of Defense Task Force for Business and Stability To date, offering huge incentives, Despite the dilapidated state of the Operations (TFBSO) using both airborne Chinese companies have been the top infrastructure and a relatively minuscule and satellite geophysics and remote sens- natural resource investors in Afghanistan. industrial base, Afghanistan’s domestic ing to gather new information to validate Beijing has bought the rights to two requirement for petroleum—for trans- older information. The data gathered major projects: the oil and natural gas portation, housing needs, and electric during phase one and subsequent work blocks in Amu Darya and the Aynak power generation—is estimated at with TFBSO were used to create high- copper deposit. In 2011 the state-owned 20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day. Due quality thematic maps and images that China National Petroleum Corporation to the absence of domestic production, were put into a Geographic Information (CNPC) reached an agreement with the country must import all of its petro- System framework. Kabul on the final terms of a deal to leum products. Projects such as the Amu develop the Kashari, Bazarkhami, and Darya oil field and CNPC refinery will The Race for Strategic Minerals Zamarudsay oil fields in the Amu Darya alleviate domestic demand and consump- In early December 2011, Afghanistan basin. According to Jalil Jumriany, an tion needs. began a licensing program to allow Afghan MOM official, for the first 2 years In 2007 Afghanistan and the foreign companies to bid on various CNPC investment will be $200–300 mil- Metallurgical Corporation of China exploration and development programs lion. As part of the deal, CNPC agreed (MCC) signed the largest extraction throughout the country.6 According to pay a 15 percent royalty on oil and a contract between the host country and to Jack Medlin, a geologist with USGS corporate tax rate of 30 percent to work a foreign competitor. The $3.5 billion international programs, “If someone in the country.8 In addition, CNPC will project is a 30-year lease to develop the would go in and rehabilitate and restart give up to 70 percent of its profit to the Aynak copper mine, located 15 miles the existing oil and gas fields, and if government with the project expected south of Kabul in Logar Province.9 The someone would go in and do explor- to bring almost $5 billion to Afghanistan mine has an estimated 11 million tons atory drilling, in five to seven years within 10 years. Jumriany added that the of copper, according to surveys in the there would likely be enough energy in oil field development project will be run 1960s.10 Minister of Mines Mohammad Afghanistan, especially if you add in the by a 75/25 joint venture between CNPC Ibrahim Adel expects the mine to bring coal, to meet the energy needs of the and local investors and could create up to the government $400 million annually in country. However, it simply has been 7,000 jobs for locals. CNPC also plans to fees and taxes in addition to an $800 mil- slow to develop (the extractive industry) build an oil refinery within 3 years, which lion down payment from the developer. or restart.”7 would be the country’s first. Moreover, China committed to build a JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Hurst and Mathers 77 railway line, one or two power plants that is notorious for growing poppy and is a years to put in place all the infrastructure will drive the mining equipment and sup- hotbed of Taliban activity.16 According and logistics necessary to make such an plement the regional power grid, and a to Mulla Muhammad Daoud Muzzamel, extraction venture work. Even then, local village for workers complete with schools, deputy governor of Helmand Province, expertise is virtually nonexistent and clinics, and roads. The project is expected while “foreign occupiers” have estab- Afghanistan would still have to rely on to create some 5,000 jobs.11 lished bases in the province, “an absolute foreign expertise and backing. There are numerous other resources majority of these bases have been under While mining rare earth elements as well. Eighty miles west of Kabul in complete sieges for the past few years.”17 might be simple enough, processing remote mountainous terrain lies the mas- Helmand Governor Golab Mangal, them is another story. They cannot be sive Hajigak iron ore deposit, and three however, and other sources are touting treated like emeralds or lapis lazuli; they mines have already been awarded to the an overall improvement in the prov- must be separated through complex, Steel Authority of India, Ltd., a consor- ince. For example, according to Andre multistep processes involving a variety tium of Indian companies. According Hollis, a former senior advisor to the of often-hazardous chemicals and acids. to the Afghan MOM, the deposit is counternarcotics minister in Afghanistan, Then the ore has to be transported to worth an estimated $420 billion and the tide is turning in the cultivation of another country that is willing to pay could bring in $400 million in govern- opium poppy. Between 2007 and 2011, the high cost of shipping and process- ment revenue each year while employing production decreased 38 percent. Hollis ing. China’s proximity and ties to the 30,000.12 In addition, it is located close attributes the drop to a British-run country and its expertise would make it to the proposed MCC railroad north of program called the Food Zone. In this an ideal candidate to direct the develop- Aynak. To be financially feasible, the de- program, Afghan farmers are provided ment of Afghanistan’s rare earth elements posit will need access to a rail system due fertilizer, seeds, and a scheme to store industry. to the weight of iron ore and the cost-to- various crops and transport them to benefit ratio comparison between using markets outside of Helmand. According China: Influence, Soft Power, trucks versus rail cars. Afghanistan is also to Hollis, Mangal has been a driving and the Competitive Edge home to a massive world-class rare earth force in reducing the opium poppy trade Afghanistan has signed various long- deposit. Rare earth elements are critical in Helmand. He is credited with taking term strategic/cooperation agreements to hundreds of high-tech applications steps to eradicate the crop, such as order- with at least seven countries besides including key military technologies such ing the arrests of some family heads of China: Australia, France, Germany, as precision-guided weapons and night households involved in the trade. The India, Italy, the United Kingdom, vision goggles. They are used in lasers, opium trade is a major source of fund- and the United States. However, the fluorescents, magnets, fiber optic com- ing for the Taliban; therefore, as Senator most effective strategic partnership munications, hydrogen energy storage, Dianne Feinstein pointed out, replanting in the long term would likely be with and superconducting materials.13 China opium fields with legitimate crops “can China.19 Beijing seeks both mid- and currently produces over 95 percent of the ultimately help to cut off financing to the long-term economic benefits from its world’s rare earth elements, and some Taliban . . . [and] will help to achieve the growing investment in Afghanistan experts believe the country will soon be- dual goal of strengthening Afghanistan’s and hopes to decrease the potential for come a net importer of rare earths.14 economy while weakening the Taliban.”18 Islamic extremism born out of Afghan There are an estimated 1 million In addition to programs such as the poverty. Since September 2001, China metric tons of rare earth elements Food Zone, it is conceivable that the has taken various steps to strengthen its within the Khanneshin carbonatite in successful mining of the Khanneshin car- relationship with Afghanistan. In 2004 Helmand Province and an estimated 1.5 bonatite rare earths could also contribute it relieved the Afghan government of million metric tons in all of southern to improving Afghanistan’s economy, all matured debts, and in 2006, during Afghanistan. The deposits are said to cutting off financing to the Taliban a visit by the president of Afghanistan, be of similar grade to those found in through job creation and the building both countries signed the Treaty of Mountain Pass, California, and Bayan of local infrastructure. Of course, the China-Afghanistan Friendship, Coop- Obo in China’s Inner Mongolia, two of security environment has to improve eration, and Good Neighborly Rela- the world’s top light rare earth deposits.15 dramatically first. While Afghan security tions. In March 2010 the president of The main rare earth deposit in Helmand forces are taking a more active role in Afghanistan paid another visit during is located atop rocky volcanic terrain, leading stability operations in Helmand, which both parties signed a number which currently can only be safely ac- their performance is inconsistent, being of agreements on trade and economic cessed by helicopter. While the lack of mainly determined by the caliber of development. China also applied a zero- infrastructure and difficult terrain pose a individual leaders. The attainment of a tariff status to some products originat- huge challenge to mining and processing stable environment in the province is still ing from Afghanistan.20 these rare earth deposits, a bigger issue tenuous at best. Once the security situa- China’s approach is different from is the ongoing security threat. Helmand tion does improve, it could take over 10 that of the United States. According to 78 Features / The Afghan Mother Lode and China’s Role JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Chinese author Wang Jian, Washington normally, transparent and trustworthy and billions in U.S. aid funds, which have attempts to defeat the Taliban through institutions must be in place. As the been misappropriated, worsening cor- large-scale attacks. As the fighting withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops ruption despite belated attempts by U.S. spreads, “Taliban counterattacks are draws nearer, corruption is becoming officials to track expenditures more care- bound to intensify,” and “it will be im- a major issue in Afghanistan. Accord- fully.”27 The spread of corruption can be possible for Afghanistan’s future security ing to social activist Shafiq Hamdam, problematic in that it weakens the rule of situation to break free from arduous corruption “feeds the unrest” and law, debilitates the judicial and political difficulties. The present situation has ex- “feeds the insurgency.”24 Transparency systems, and causes citizens to lose faith acerbated the investment environment in International’s “Corruption Percep- in their government officials. Afghanistan, lowered the investment rate, tions Index 2011” ranks Afghanistan In October 2010, in an effort to fight and increased operational risks; security as the fourth most corrupt country in corruption, the Afghan government problems are becoming the biggest risk the world after Somalia, North Korea, passed a law that would allow the estab- in mining investment.”21 Clearly, Wang’s and Myanmar.25 According to the lishment of special tribunals to investigate opinion ignores the billions spent by the United Nations Office on Drugs and suspected senior officials.28 While mea- United States on investments to alleviate Crime, Afghan citizens now pay twice sures are being taken to fix the problem, poverty and rebuild infrastructure, not the amount for bribes they paid 2 years the troop withdrawal is quickly ap- to mention its efforts against Taliban ago. Transparency International esti- proaching and only time will tell whether extremism, one of the pillars of China’s mates that the current level of $158 per corruption will be more contained after professed fight against the “three-isms”— bribe is equivalent to 37 percent of the U.S. and NATO forces leave. Thus the terrorism, extremism, and separatism. average Afghan’s annual income. Polls question may not be whether corruption The most marked ideological differ- show that Afghans rank corruption as will remain prevalent in Afghanistan, ence between Chinese and U.S. relations their top concern, over the Taliban, but rather who is best apt to handle the with other nations is best outlined in terrorism, or the economy.26 ubiquitous corruption when the finger- a 2008 report by the Congressional Some claim that this corruption prob- waggers and nay-sayers are gone. Research Service, which states that China ably has already filtered down into the is known to offer other nations oppor- minerals industry. For example, MCC Other Hurdles to Overcome tunities in foreign investment and aid was accused of winning its contract While Afghanistan is plagued with projects in a “win-win” situation. While for the Aynak copper mine through a security and moral issues that could these countries provide China with natu- $30 million bribe paid to Mohammad delay or obstruct its success in the ral resources or a trade market in which Ibrahim Adel. Without “reliable minerals industry, there are a host of to operate, China provides its aid under evidence” and documents, however, other hurdles. Because Afghanistan is a policy of “noninterference” in other Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight landlocked, it depends on neighboring nations’ political and economic realms and Anti-Corruption refuses to investi- countries to export its mineral goods without concern for corruption or any gate the allegations. Some observers have to world markets. Therefore, it is criti- such unethical business practices as might dubbed the mineral wealth in the country cal to the mining industry to maintain exist.22 That is, China turns its head the “blood diamond of Afghanistan.” good relations with its neighbors to away from ethics and directs its attention Without adequate transparency and with diversify its outlets and remain flex- toward self-gain. On the other hand, the the government’s rampant corruption, ible to market requirements. In that “the U.S. emphasis on shared demo- Afghanistan’s natural resources could regard, roads and railway networks are cratic values, considered to be a pillar of easily be used to fuel further insurgencies crucial to any future export-based eco- American soft power, can be perceived in or their revenues could end up in illegal nomic growth. Afghanistan’s rugged other countries as an obstacle to arriving coffers. Indeed, whoever controls the terrain, remote locations, and extreme at solutions to international problems.”23 minerals has the opportunity to control weather conditions make building any Ethics and political correctness matter in the war. kind of transportation infrastructure the United States whether it is a realistic One article described corruption in more costly and challenging. Security line of attack or not and whether the host Afghanistan as daunting with 30 to 50 concerns such as ongoing insurgency country accepts the principle or not. The percent of the economy consisting of the activity, which is more prevalent in the bottom line is that China and the United illicit opium trade, which in turn fuels south, can also increase costs for ship- States do not adhere to the same moral criminal and insurgent elements. The pers with added security and insurance and legal practices. report further stated that “recent presi- premiums. Afghanistan runs the risk of dential and parliamentary elections were having its infrastructure destroyed by The Spread of Corruption characterized by a high incidence of elec- insurgent groups. For any legitimate enterprise to flour- toral pay-offs and fraud. There was also Building a railway system is the ish and for the creation of a civic the scandal at the Bank of Kabul, replete simplest and most economical option and commercial system to operate with phony loans to the Afghan elite . . . for shipping minerals, but there is the JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Hurst and Mathers 79 developing of its own resources makes the country heavily dependent on foreign assistance. Technical expertise is needed to achieve each step, from building up infrastructure, to mining and processing minerals, to distributing them. China, through its vast resources, is ideally suited to provide the technical expertise needed for success and has much to offer through its ever-growing global experi- ence in the mining industry. Conclusions Afghanistan’s economic issue is complex. While its vast mineral wealth would seem to offer an ideal solution to its hardships by creating jobs and trade, its infrastructure, regional vulnerability to neighbors and outside actors, educa- tion and expertise levels, environmental fears, rugged terrain, and lack of water are formidable barriers. Even smaller issues, such as differences in track Excavated Buddhist shrine at Mes Aynak (Jerome Starkey) gauges, can throw a monkey wrench into the equation. Yet these obstacles problem of choosing a track gauge (dis- Access to water is another hurdle. may not be impossible to overcome. tance between the inside edges of the Water is used throughout the mining The consensus among Afghanistan’s rails that make up the track). According process, from extracting the mineral to own analysts is that, more important than to Piers Connor, an independent con- milling, washing, and flotation (bring- focusing on security and building up the sultant on global railway operations, the ing the target minerals to the surface country’s military forces, Kabul needs to countries surrounding Afghanistan all after crushing and milling them). Huge implement steps to build stability in the have different gauges—a legacy from the amounts of water are also used for sec- economic and social structures. Rohullah days of colonial expansion.29 Before any ondary oil recovery (water is injected Ahmadzai, head of the media section of track is laid, Afghanistan has to decide into an existing oil reservoir to build up the Investment Support Administration which gauges to use, or backers must be pressure, which allows more oil to be re- in Afghanistan, stated that security can prepared to take costly steps to overcome covered). With water in short supply and now be more effectively strengthened the differences. the population depending on agriculture, if more efforts go toward social and In June 2012 engineers from the farmers have been digging deeper wells, economic investment.32 He pointed out China Railway Company began research- using pumps to reach scarce water to irri- that since mid-2011, when discussions ing the technical aspects of building the gate their lands. The search for obtainable about the possible departure of the railway that would connect the Aynak water could create competition between International Security Assistance Force copper mine to Uzbekistan as part of the mining industry and other industries began to surface, there have been in- China’s deal to extract copper. The cost for supplies. Added to that, some observ- creased anxieties regarding the economy, is estimated at $4 billion.30 The MOM in ers fear the mining process could damage especially in the private sector. Not only mid-2011 publicly proposed a viable al- the environment. Afghanistan has little are Afghan investors wondering whether ternative rail route running west to Iran, history of environmental protection, private investment opportunities will then along the Zaranj-Delaram Highway which has some observers wondering continue to exist; foreign investors are to the Iranian port of Chabahar. In late if the country is capable of engaging in too.33 It is a vicious cycle. Political and 2011, India appeared to be planning to mining and development activities respon- security stability is essential to investment construct this railway, allowing for ad- sibly.31 Projects that prove damaging to in the mining industry. Equally, however, ditional export routes rather than relying the environment could easily prompt citi- social and infrastructure investment must on MCC’s eastern rail route to Torkham. zen protests and unrest, which would be promote stability in the region. Without This is, above all, an effort by India to detrimental to the country’s leadership. one the other cannot exist. develop further alternative routes out of Finally, lack of technical expertise The Sino-Afghan relationship seems Afghanistan that do not cross Pakistan. in all areas related to the mining and to be a win-win situation. China has the 80 Features / The Afghan Mother Lode and China’s Role JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 16 technology, expertise, money, and politi- “Security to Remain Daunting Challenge Notes for Afghan Government in 2012,” Xinhua cal will to make a difference. The Chinese News Agency, January 2, 2012. are taking a major risk putting so much 1 Gleaned from official North Atlantic 17 “Interview with Deputy Governor Mulla into a country that ranks so poorly in Treaty Organization and ISAF documents. Muhammad Daoud Muzzamel,” Taliban Voice the corruption index. However, while Each year, commander and election cycles of Jihad Online (Pashtu), March 22, 2012, the risks are high in Afghanistan, there seem to bring incremental changes to the of- available at JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Hurst and Mathers 81 U.S. Coast Guard rescue swimmer deploys from MH-65C Dolphin during mass rescue exercise Icy Resolve 2013 (U.S. Coast Guard) n Friday, August 27, 2010, the MV Clipper Adventurer, a cruise O ship carrying 128 passengers, ran aground on an uncharted rock off the Nunavut Coast while making its way from Port Epworth to Kugluktuk in the Northwest Passage. None of the passengers were injured, but they were forced to stay on the ship until Sunday, when a Canadian coast guard icebreaker arrived to ferry them to Kugluktuk.1 It took 3 days for the icebreaker to arrive. If the Adventurer began to sink in frigid waters, could the Canadian government have responded in time? If the same event occurred off the coast of Alaska, could the United States respond in time? Currently, the United States is not postured to handle the increase in human activity that is occurring in the Arctic. The Arctic capabilities of the United States are inadequate and action is re- quired in the near term—the next 5 to 7 years—to operate in this more accessible yet still challenging region. In the imme- diate future, the area of gravest concern is safety. In coming years, Arctic sovereignty claims, commercial shipping, resource ex- ploration, tourism, and increased military operations could drive multiple scenarios causing the region to become an arena of international cooperation, competi- tion, or conflict.2 As greater accessibility and commercial development expand, national interest and an urgency to ensure that the United States possesses the ca- pacity to preserve freedom of navigation, provide safety of life at sea, protect its natural resources, and preserve the natu- ral environment will increase as well.3 For these reasons, the United States should immediately invest in search and rescue Improving Safety (SAR) infrastructure and icebreakers to support future regional safety needs. Arctic sea ice melted to its lowest in the U.S. Arctic recorded level in 2012 and resulted in the opening both of previously inacces- By Heath C. Roscoe, Paul F. Campagna, and David McNulty sible parts of the Arctic Ocean and of economic exclusion zones (EEZs). The biggest driver for opening the Arctic is simple economics: trillions of dollars worth of resources could lie below newly Colonel Heath C. Roscoe, USA, Commander Paul F. Campagna, USN, and Lieutenant Colonel David McNulty, Massachusetts Air National Guard, are National Security Fellows at the Harvard accessible areas. According to the U.S. Kennedy School. Geological Survey, nearly 13 percent of 82 Features / Improving Safety in the U.S. Arctic JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 the world’s undiscovered oil reserves are likely to increase proportionally. Even fully known, each of the Arctic nations and 30 percent of its undiscovered gas today’s relatively meager number of is expending great effort to assess, reserves are north of the Arctic Circle, summer tourists cruising Arctic waters access, and extract these resources.10 a staggering 90 billion barrels of oil and exceeds the limited emergency response For example Alaska, by way of the Red 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.4 capabilities of the local communities. Of Dog mine, produces 10 percent of the Countries and corporations are postur- most concern is the spatial compression world’s zinc output. This accounted ing themselves to tap into this enormous of opportunity to successfully respond for 55 percent of the mineral value pro- potential wealth of oil, gas, and minerals. and conduct lifesaving operations. The duced in Alaska in 2008.11 In addition, Melting Arctic ice during the summer Arctic’s cold air and water temperatures, the Alaskan mining industry produces months and shoulder seasons will increase shifting pack ice, and unpredictable zinc, lead, gold, silver, and coal as well human activity because of: weather require the quick and efficient as construction minerals such as sand, rescue of tourists aboard lifeboats or dis- gravel, and rock. Alaska’s five opera- increased tourism—primarily cruise •• tressed vessels. Even limited exposure to tional mines (Fort Knox, Greens Creek, ship traffic cold weather and Arctic seawater reduce Red Dog, Usibelli, and Pogo) provided increased oil/gas/mineral/fish •• human endurance to minutes and the more than 1,500 full-time jobs of the exploration and exploitation—eco- likelihood of long-term survival to nearly nearly 3,500 mineral industry jobs in nomic drivers zero. These hazardous environmental Alaska last year.12 increased shipping—an increase in •• conditions prevail in a region with scarce The Bering Sea is world renowned traffic to and from resource extrac- emergency resources and vast distances for its enormously productive, profitable, tion sites and potentially cheaper that result in lengthy response times.7 and sustainable fisheries. The Alaska trans-Arctic shipping routes. To address these stressors, the Arctic Marine Conservation Council estimates Council, an international body of Arctic the net worth of these fisheries to be Cruise Ships and Tourism nations, penned an Arctic SAR agreement $2.5 billion annually.13 Seven of the top Maritime traffic in the Arctic is increas- that was signed by the U.S. Secretary of 30 ports for fishery landings, by both ing. From 2008 to 2012, U.S. Coast State in May 2011. The agreement is the weight and value, are located in Alaska. Guard Arctic Maritime Activity data first legally binding instrument negoti- Dutch Harbor-Unalaska is the busiest show a 100 percent increase of traffic ated under the auspices of the Arctic fishing port in the country, harvesting in the region from 123 vessels to 247.5 Council and the first legal accord on any 612.7 million pounds of fish in 2008 Though not a large numerical increase, topic among all eight Arctic states. The (the last year for which statistics are it does demonstrate an upward trend. signing of the Nuuk Declaration demon- available). Furthermore, Naknek-King The increase in vessel traffic has height- strates the commitment and cooperation Salmon, another major Arctic fishing ened the probability of incidents and to address emerging safety issues in the port, processed 105.2 million pounds potential casualties that would require Arctic region. The agreement commits of fish in 2008. The combined catch ex- Coast Guard medical response/evacu- parties to provide appropriate assistance ported through both harbors was valued ation or SAR support. Of significant when incidents arise and to take other at over $260 million.14 concern, cruise ship traffic in the Arctic steps to address growing SAR require- exponentially increases the aspect of ments in the Arctic region.8 Shorter Shipping Routes safety and potential undesired conse- Many journalists, economists, and quences. In 2007 more than half of Economic Drivers academics have been looking at the Alaska’s 1.7 million visitors were cruise The Shell Oil Company has already utility of Arctic Sea routes (Northern ship passengers, and the economic invested 6 years and $4.5 billion in Sea Route along Russia’s coast and impact of the tourist industry cannot an effort to tap into the oil reserves the North West Passage along the be overstated. It provides a $1.07 off the North Slope of Alaska.9 The Canadian and U.S. coastlines) as a cost billion economic benefit annually for U.S. Geological Survey projects that a saving measure for transshipments. The the state and $767 million in direct good portion of this undiscovered oil Northern Sea Route along the Russian industry spending. Despite the total lies off the coast of Alaska, within the northern coast could reduce a maritime cruise capacity in Alaska declining by 10 U.S. EEZ. Heather Conley, a senior journey between East Asia and Western percent from 2009 to 2010, the indus- fellow for the Center for Strategic and Europe from 21,000 kilometers (km) try experienced overall growth over the International Studies, believes signifi- utilizing the Suez Canal to 12,800 km, last 10 years. This trend is expected to cant mineral deposits such as nickel, cutting transit time by 10 to 15 days.15 continue.6 iron ore, tin, uranium, copper, and rare The summer of 2011 saw a record 33 As passenger and cruise vessels earth minerals are already mapped or ships carrying 850,000 tons of cargo increase in number and routes stretch postulated to be located throughout navigating the Northern Sea Route off further into the Arctic, SAR infrastruc- the Arctic. She argues that even though Russia’s northern coast. This year’s ship- ture and passenger safety requirements the full extent of these resources is not ping season may see up to 1.5 million JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Roscoe, Campagna, and McNulty 83 tons of cargo. The development of •• SAR operation small maritime vessel responsibilities in the maritime region Arctic offshore hydrocarbon resources (fishing/recreational) of Alaska, including the North Pacific and related economic activities will also •• small oil spill/discharge in the Ocean and the U.S. slice of the Arctic. improve the integration of the Arctic Chukchi or Beaufort seas Because Alaska is vast and remote, D17 economy into global trade patterns.16 •• downed aircraft (small passenger) relies on other government and civilian However, Stephen M. Carmel, senior SAR mission agencies for SAR missions. For example, vice president of Maersk Line, Limited, •• vessel runs aground, caught in ice, the National Guard, U.S. Air Force, has questioned the viability of global or sinks Alaska State Troopers, dozens of small Arctic transshipping. Carmel argues that •• emergency barge resupply for North fire departments and volunteer rescue Arctic shipping routes do not offer an Slope community organizations such as SAR Dogs, Civil attractive alternative to the more tradi- •• large oil spill from drilling operation Air Patrol, and Sitka Search and Rescue tional routes and are highly unlikely to be •• large oil spill from tanker operating are important augmentation resources advantageous in the future. He believes in Arctic that ensure timely SAR coverage. Fur- the variability in transit time due to •• mass rescue operation (MRO) thermore, in the far north, D17 relies shifting ice and unpredictable weather is downed jetliner on local North Slope Borough Bell unacceptable in a world of “just in time” •• MRO cruise ships/ferries. 412SP helicopters and fixed-wing air- supply. He further notes that variability craft for SAR requirements.21 Despite assuming a lower position eliminates network efficiencies. Arctic The nearest Coast Guard air station on the list due to probability of occur- routes are useful for only a small part of to the Arctic is in Kodiak and requires rence, MROs would be nearly impossible the year and are more expensive due to a 4-hour fixed-wing or 10-hour rotary- to carry out given currently assessed poor economies of scale.17 Therefore, wing flight to support the most northern response shortfalls. For example, if an Carmel would not expect to see a large Alaskan population of Barrow, a distance MRO or large oil spill incident occurred increase in commercial transit shipping. of 820 miles. By sea, Coast Guard cut- on the North Slope of Alaska, the closest Regardless of whether trans-Arctic ters routinely patrol the Bering Sea, but Federal SAR and oil spill response is 820 shipment is slow to develop for reasons it requires at least 3 days once embarked miles away in Kodiak. Current oil spill outlined by Carmel, the traffic support- to reach the Arctic Ocean.22 In 2012, response capabilities include four Spilled ing the worldwide delivery of extracted the Coast Guard in its Seventeenth Coast Oil Recover Systems equipped on 225- resources from the Arctic is increasing Guard District Area of Responsibility foot buoy tenders home ported in Alaska dramatically.18 Oil and gas developments Analysis Fiscal Year 2012 identified the at Kodiak, Sitka, Cordova, and Homer; in northern Russia have resulted in a two primary challenges to successful Arctic an aerial dispersant delivery system staged higher demand for shipping to and from SAR operations as distance (the time it in Anchorage as a backup to commercial that area. A similar trend was seen in 2012 takes to arrive on the scene to effectively venders; and Federal on-scene coordi- off the coast of Alaska as Shell had a small respond to distress) and infrastructure (the nators located in Juneau, Anchorage, armada supporting its oil-drilling mis- lack of equipment, personnel, and loca- and Valdez with incident management sion. The Coast Guard reported a steady tions to effectively respond to distress).23 expertise and limited prepositioned oil increase in Bering Strait transit from 247 response equipment.20 Given these sparse vessels in 2008 to 484 in 2012.19 Requirement for the and widely dispersed assets, the long-term North Slope environmental impacts of a spill in the Risk Strategically positioning SAR infra- Arctic Ocean could prove cataclysmic. Given the safety concerns cited, the structure in key locations in the U.S. authors developed a list of probable U.S. Safety Response Arctic would decrease response times by incidents/events from Coast Guard significantly reducing transit distances. The primary Federal agency responsible SAR historical documents the may There is an urgent need to respond for operational safety in the Arctic is require a U.S. safety response in the quickly in the Arctic, as the prevention the Department of Homeland Security future. Although not all-encompassing, of injury and loss of life depends on (DHS) with the Coast Guard as its the 10 potential scenarios are listed timely SAR response, prompt evacu- operational arm. When directed, U.S. most to least likely. The wide array ation, and the application of medical Northern Command provides defense demonstrates the fragility of the Arctic and other emergency services. Effective support to DHS in order to support the and the scenarios serve as driving factors responses can only be accomplished safeguarding of human life, the environ- as the United States considers future by the design and implementation of ment, critical infrastructure, and prop- capacities and capabilities: appropriate SAR management policies erty. The District 17 (D17) commander, and programs, supported by appropriate Medical Evacuation/nonmaritime headquartered in Juneau, is the North •• physical infrastructure and well-trained medical transports (currently 3 Pacific SAR coordinator and has the personnel.24 The Coast Guard is pos- percent of all SAR cases) task for maritime and aeronautical SAR tured for effective response with the 84 Features / Improving Safety in the U.S. Arctic JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 exception of not having an Arctic SAR challenges with even this small footprint. and supply is limited. If it is not possible stepoff location to launch SAR missions. For example, fuel for the HH60s had to to lease facilities because of the strain it During an interview in December 2012, be flown in using C-130s, but hanger places on the community, the United Rear Admiral Thomas Ostebo com- and berthing facilities, while manageable, States should invest in commercial off- mented that Barrow would be the ideal were subpar for the requirements.27 the-shelf expeditionary-type structures/ location for SAR: “Barrow is Alaska’s Another SAR location to consider facilities similar to what the Department most northern and largest town [on the is Prudhoe Bay. While half the size of of Defense (DOD) used during North Slope] and is centrally located Barrow with approximately 2,000 people, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi in the U.S. Arctic. It is also the center many of whom are transient workers Freedom. Washington is not in a position of power for corporate, tribal, and eco- supporting oil facilities, Prudhoe Bay to invest in major construction without nomics of the North Shore Borough has an interconnected road network and further study, so temporary facilities make making it the best location for invest- limited port infrastructure. However, sense as a stopgap measure. ment of SAR infrastructure.”25 it is disadvantaged by being 200 miles Another import consideration is refu- Despite its advantages as a key location east of Barrow, closer to the Canadian eling operations. Once on scene, maritime for SAR support assets, Barrow’s central border, and farther from potential SAR assets are limited both by fuel capacity and North Slope position creates significant events along the western Alaskan Arctic. the distance to a refueling station. With logistical challenges due to a limited Prudhoe Bay is the unofficial northern the closest fueling point to Barrow nearly road network and port access. No roads terminus of the Pan-American Highway, 1,000 nm away in Dutch Harbor in the link Barrow to the rest of Alaska, which which was used during Arctic Shield Aleutian Chain, on-station times are prevents ground shipment of supplies, 2012 to transport the Navy Supervisor dramatically reduced. Even under ideal and the lack of a deep-water port requires of Salvage (SUPSALV) tactical oil spill water conditions, the Coast Guard does extensive use of small landing craft and response equipment. Its limited port fa- not have the surface capacity to support fuel barges to deliver supplies to the main- cilities allowed the SUPSALV equipment sustained presence in the Arctic.28 Ostebo land. Given weather impacts, Barrow’s to be loaded onto a commercial barge identified one possible solution. Shell primary line of communication is by avia- and shipped to the exercise training site obtained a refueling barge that supported tion from either Anchorage or Fairbanks. near Barrow. The limited port infrastruc- 22 maritime vessels during its oil explora- Today, supplies and equipment required ture can only support small ships and tion in the Chukchi Sea, and he believes to execute SAR missions are flown into barges with 6 to 8 feet of draft. Resupply a similar contract to support cutters and Wiley Post–Will Rogers Airport, the new- of a Coast Guard cutter would require other ships is possible for future missions. est airport on the North Slope, serviced a helicopter from the public Deadhorse On-station refueling would allow for by Alaska Airlines. Lack of port facilities Airport or barge out to approximately sustained maritime presence in the Arctic means that marine cargo bound for 12 nautical miles (nm) where the vessels Sea before returning to Dutch Harbor Barrow is transferred from barges offshore could safely anchor, much further than for resupply is required. Regarding air to landing craft. U.S. cutters can anchor the 1,200 yards at Barrow. platforms, once an adequate supply of avi- 1,200 yards off Barrow in 30 feet of water Neither location is ideal to satisfy ation fuel is housed at Barrow, the Coast to receive supplies and transfer person- requirements without major investment, Guard can use the location to sustain air nel by small boat, but the anchorage is but the United States must be able to presence in the region. exposed to weather from all directions. operate in this area to support tourism, Barrow is also a destination for small cruise shipping, and oil exploration and drill- Emerging Need for ships carrying as many as 400 passengers, ing. Barrow offers a central location that Additional Icebreakers who must also be ferried on small boats.26 is critical to reducing the time-distance When issues begin to arise in the Arctic, D17’s 2012 Arctic Shield exercise factor. Any enhancement of Barrow’s the United States will need a maritime demonstrated Coast Guard ability to infrastructure will require coordina- surface presence sufficient to support execute a seasonal SAR capability from tion with the North Slope Borough. safety and response. Presence enables the airport in Barrow. D17 staged two A seasonal SAR capability could be the Coast Guard to respond to vessels HH60 helicopters along with aviation established—when the ice retreats in in distress, thus saving lives and protect- and communication detachments from the summer—to cover oil exploration ing against potential pollution. Presence June through September during Shell’s and drilling along with recreational and also ensures adequate enforcement of drilling season. The operation was cruise vessels. It is possible the Coast vessel routing regimes and compliance deemed a success because of the SAR Guard could lease facilities in Barrow to with safety, environmental laws, and proof of concept but also due to the support aircraft maintenance, fuel stor- treaties.29 To maintain a presence in robust and positive engagement plan age, lodging, and command and control. the Arctic, the United States needs an and the partnership D17 fostered with However, even a small footprint places adequate number of icebreakers or ice- the North Slope Borough communi- a significant burden on the local com- capable ships. Presently, there is only ties. Nevertheless, there were logistical munity, where resources are expensive one operational surface ship capable of JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Roscoe, Campagna, and McNulty 85 operating in ice. That ship, the USCGC would be to build two heavy icebreakers acquisition funding to initiate survey Healy, is considered a medium ice- while performing minimal maintenance and design activities for a new polar breaker capable of cutting through 4.5 to keep the existing icebreakers opera- icebreaker. The Coast Guard’s Five Year feet of ice at 3 knots, and it has less than tional. Given the timeframe associated Capital Investment Plan includes an 20 years of service life remaining. The with building new ships, the report con- additional $852 million in fiscal years Polar Star, a heavy icebreaker commis- cluded that the Coast Guard must begin (FY) 2014–2017 for acquiring the ship. sioned in the 1970s, is capable of break- planning and budgeting immediately.35 The Coast Guard anticipates awarding a ing through 6 feet of ice. It recently A third report, The High Latitude construction contract within the next 5 finished a major refit and is undergoing Study, included a broader analysis of years and taking delivery within a decade, sea trials. The Polar Star was expected the Coast Guard’s icebreaker needs. just as Polar Sea retires. The project to to return to service in early 2013 with Presented to Congress in July 2011, design and build a polar icebreaker is 6 to 7 years of remaining service life.30 the report found that the common, a new acquisition project initiated in The Coast Guard placed the Polar dominant contributor to the significant the FY13 budget.39 The next step is for Sea, the sister ship of the Polar Star, mission effects in the Arctic is a gap in Congress to act on the Coast Guard’s in “commissioned but inactive” status polar icebreaking capability, and that the budget to modernize its icebreaker fleet October 14, 2011, because of a blown existing icebreaker fleet is insufficient to so it has the capability to perform its engine.31 For comparison, Russia has up meet the Coast Guard’s statutory mission polar missions. Construction of this new to 25 icebreakers, and several nuclear- requirements in both the Arctic and the icebreaker will still only give the Coast powered icebreakers can cut through ice Antarctic. To fulfill these mission require- Guard two operational icebreakers after 6 to 9 feet thick. China is building an ments, the study found that the Service 2020, when the Polar Star meets the end icebreaker for launch in 2014. This will needs a minimum of six icebreakers of its service-life extension. be China’s second—it purchased its first (three heavy and three medium). If the The High Latitude Report listed a re- from Ukraine in 1993.32 requirements for a U.S. Navy presence quirement of up to six icebreakers to meet Since September 2010, at least three are taken into account, the Coast Guard statutory requirements into the future. reports have identified the Coast Guard’s would require three additional heavy That number may be what is required in challenges in meeting its current and icebreakers and one additional medium the far term, but near-term requirements future icebreaking mission requirements icebreaker, for a total of 10 icebreakers.36 suggest that the United States needs a in the Arctic, as well as the hurdles it faces The Coast Guard estimates it will take minimum of three icebreakers to support in acquiring new icebreakers.33 A January 8 to 10 years to design and build a new the following missions: 2011 report from the DHS Office of the icebreaker. It is projected that it will cost Antarctica Presence—scientific Inspector General noted that the Coast $859 million to construct a new Polar- •• research and McMurdo resupply Guard and other U.S. agencies are un- class heavy icebreaker and $1.2 billion to Arctic Presence—enforcement of able to meet their current Arctic mission reconstruct the Polar Sea or Polar Star •• vessel routing regimes, compliance requirements with existing icebreaking from scratch to the current standard for with safety, security, and environ- resources. The report highlighted that heavy icebreakers.37 Other options include mental laws/treaties, freedom of Coast Guard resources are unlikely to leasing icebreakers or jointly funding navigation, response to vessels in meet future demands as well, in part icebreakers through the National Science distress, SAR, protecting against because the agency has not followed its Foundation (NSF) or DOD. Currently, potential pollution life-cycle replacement plan, which requires these options do not appear viable. DOD Arctic Research/Thule Air Force replacement of icebreaking ships after 30 is working through its own budget con- •• Base resupply/Flex—support to years of service. The report concluded straints. Using the NSF is possible, but the NSF, resupply of Thule, and an that without funding for new icebreakers it might pull the icebreaker away from option to flex to any location in case or major service-life extensions of existing its primary missions to support scientific a crisis or emergency arises. vessels, the United States would lose all of research. Lastly, there have been bad expe- its polar icebreaking capabilities by 2029.34 riences with leased icebreakers that could Deciding to keep the U.S. icebreaker Sent to Congress in October 2011, not fulfill their mission requirements. fleet “status quo” in the near term would the U.S. Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Sweden called the Oden home, breaking risk response capability for incidents in Report addressed recapitalization of U.S. its commitment by ending its resupply the Arctic and place the United States at polar icebreakers. The report addressed and science mission support of the U.S. a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis other ways to meet mission requirements by Antarctic McMurdo Research Station and countries that are committed to increas- assessing options for rehabilitating the putting the entire 2011–2012 research ing their role in the Arctic. Washington icebreaker fleet including new icebreaker season in jeopardy. The NSF was eventu- needs to start building two icebreakers construction, refurbishment of Polar Sea ally able to commission a Russian vessel.38 to fill this need immediately because the or Polar Star, and leasing. The report The good news is that the Coast Polar Star service life is extended to 2020 found that the most cost-effective option Guard budget includes $8 million in and the Healy to 2030. 86 Features / Improving Safety in the U.S. Arctic JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 The United States needs to take steps tion on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Coast Guard Operational and Support Units Rescue in the Arctic (Nuuk, Greenland: Arctic Collaborated to Support the Forward Operat- now to invest in Arctic safety capabilities Council 7th Ministerial Meeting, May 12, 2011), ing Location in Barrow,” unpublished report, to operate in a more accessible region as available at JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Roscoe, Campagna, and McNulty 87 Mountain near Kabul, Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force/Michael O’Connor) s the United States comes to st terms with the past decade and Forging a 21 -century A faces the future, what will its military strategy be? The answer is not likely to come in briefing slides Military Strategy but rather in shaping both concrete steps forward and responses to new and ongoing crises. Although it will Leveraging Challenges be nationally based, any U.S. military strategy will be dependent on what By Robbin F. Laird, Edward T. Timperlake, and Murielle Delaporte allies and adversaries do. It will not be forged in a vacuum; instead, it will be highly interactive with the shaping of new operational concepts and approaches. When the United States deals with a Dr. Robbin F. Laird is a Military and Security Analyst, cofounder of Second Line of Defense, and member of the Editorial Board of Contributors for AOL Defense. The Honorable Edward T. Timperlake is editor massive challenge such as shaping a strat- of Second Line of Defense Forum and former Director of Technology Assessment, International egy for the vast Pacific, and at the same Technology Security, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Murielle Delaporte has been working in the time has limited assets, it is impossible French government, various French and American think tanks, and as a journalist for French, British, and American defense publications for 30 years. She is the founder and editor of the only French magazine to imagine a strategy that does not build that specializes in logistics, Soutien Logistique Défense. from allies back to the United States and 88 Features / Forging a 21st-century Military Strategy JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 from the United States back to allies. ahead for the joint and coalition force. the air and who, if things got ugly, could Critics who point out the shortfalls of The fourth case examines the challenge then marshal in other aircraft. The guys U.S. forces often forget that platforms do of deterring North Korea in the second sitting at Creech [Air Force Base, Nevada] not fight alone and that the United States nuclear age. At the heart of this challenge can’t do that. . . . The individual in the will not fight alone in the Pacific. There is is enhancing the credibility of American backseat of the aircraft is the one that’s always the reactive enemy. The term often and allied forces facing North Korea. going to be communicating to these jets who refers to an asymmetric enemy or strat- How might reform of the U.S. presence are still 30 minutes away—15 minutes egy. But strategy is usually asymmetric as in South Korea be part of a broader rede- away, an hour away—and giving them one seeks to enhance one’s advantage to sign of deterrent strategy? Here, the Air the target brief and the whole situational the disadvantage of the other. This occurs Force drives the kind of innovation neces- awareness piece of what’s going on while the other way as well. America and its sary and leads the way in reshaping the they ingress, which is something that your allies can shape capabilities that severely force structure to deal with the threats of guy at Creech is not going to be able to disadvantage adversaries. the second nuclear age. do. . . . But now that’s the tactical piece. With financial pressures has come a The operational piece is back to the whole new pessimism that seeks to confront Case 1: Counterinsurgency COIN environment. Again, [perhaps mainly problems that can be solved using Air Forces in Shaping what] you’re trying to do in a COIN envi- yesterday’s force structure. But with the Partnership Possibilities ronment is drive your cost of doing business force being remade by technologies that In the debate over the acquisition of the down as close as you can to the level of the will ripen in the next decade, there are light-attack aircraft for Afghan forces, a other guy; right now, UAVs [unmanned significant possibilities for innovation and key opportunity to shape a 21st-century aerial vehicles] ain’t cheap. . . . You’ve reshaping the force. The decade ahead is option may be missed. A light-attack got a tremendous logistics piece; you’ve got assuredly not the decade behind. Most aircraft such as the Embraer Air Super the sophisticated communications infra- notably, it will not be a decade of the type Tucano, when combined with several structure required to fly them. You’ve got of land wars we have just seen, which are other rugged air assets capable of being the whole piece back in [the continental ending without enthusiastic chants of maintained in a variety of partner United States] in order to operate them. victory. To provide a sense of how U.S. nations, could not only form a core Your cost of doing business is huge and you strategy might be shaped, we address four capability crucial to the defense of the also have reliability issues. The accident current operational dynamics that could partnership nation, but also provide a rates are not great with UAVs right now. be leveraged to shape the future. These solid baseline capability for a long-term . . . And in terms of that ability to act as dynamics cross the spectrum of conflict. working relationship with the United FAC-A [forward air controller–airborne], The first case is the Afghan transition. States or its allies. that’s something that you just can’t get We examine an aspect of the transi- The value of a counterinsurgency with a UAV.1 tion—the airpower transition—to see (COIN) aircraft versus a more advanced how it might be exploited to shape a fighter can be lost when the issue is 21st- Even though the acquisition of such residual leave-behind capability that will century higher end warfare. A rugged aircraft for U.S. forces is not on the table, be important to the United States and aircraft such as the Super Tucano can their use by partners is already prevalent that could shape a global model for other operate for longer periods at considerably in many parts of the world. Partnerships situations. The second case expands the less cost than advanced fighters. It can be with allies flying such aircraft provide understanding of the key role of expedi- configured with command and control interesting possibilities. This is not just an tionary logistics in shaping an insertion (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and abstraction but has been demonstrated force that could operate rapidly but also reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and by 12th U.S. Air Force working with the transition effectively. The French opera- links and can dialogue with forces on the Dominican Republic air force. The 12th tion in Mali is a key expression of this ground. provides ISR support to other nations’ new approach—how landpower could Colonel Bill Buckey, USMC (Ret.), combat air capabilities. U.S. Southern operate in the context of a joint and the deputy commander of the North Command (USSOUTHCOM) and coalition force structure. The third case Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the Dominican Republic air force have examines the emergence of distributed Airbase at Kandahar in 2009, explains: combined—with USSOUTHCOM pro- military operations in the Pacific led by viding an ISR input and the Dominican the U.S. Marine Corps–U.S. Navy team. One of the things that the special opera- Republic flying the Super Tucano—the Here the maritime force is driving an tions forces, who started the idea of the same planes that will be used by the innovation approach to the challenges. whole Imminent Fury piece, wanted was Afghans. This remarkable and replicable “Jointness” is a quality of 21st-century the ability to have a partner in that light success is made possible by U.S. “hi” operations, but for innovation to occur attack platform; a TAC-A [tactical air ISR technology in partnership with the there needs to be a lead force whose commander–airborne] or supporting arms Dominican Republic “lo” technology, the core competencies can shape the way coordinator that would be above them in Super Tucano. JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Laird, Timperlake, and Delaporte 89 Global Hawk UAV returns after supporting War on Terror (U.S. Air Force/Chad Bellay) The opportunity to further evolve core fleet of aging Mi-35s and AN-32s support those guys, and they’re going to such a model of cooperation is being will be replaced by a mixed fleet, along be much more distributed. You’re not forged in the period of transition in with capabilities to replace the battlefield going to have the battalions out there that Afghanistan. The Air Force, NATO, and lift provided by the Chinook heavy-lift you support people on the FABs [forward other allies have been working for many helicopter. air bases] have. It’s going to have to be years to shape an unheralded airpower Shaping the right fleet is crucial to from a central location. And the QRF transition. The core idea has been to shaping an effective training mission. [quick reaction force] is going to have to provide the Afghans with an integrated Putting a reliable and rugged and eas- be good, and it’s going to have to be there air force that can provide for their needs ily maintainable lift aircraft with the quickly. In the end, we have to be able to and be robust and easy to maintain, and Super Tucano and the Mi-17 fleet along prove to the Afghan security forces that then partner with this air force. That with Cessna trainers is the core force if something happens, this platoon is would allow the United States and its for the Afghan air force going forward. good enough until we get someone in allies to leave a force behind that could Interviews with American and French there. . . . If you ever need more than a provide mobile ground forces supported military operators in Afghanistan have hit platoon’s worth of trigger pullers in a by correlated ground assets. This sound hard on a key theme: airpower is central district center, the V-22s [Osprey tilt-rotor Western force package would then be to today’s operations, and there is a aircraft] is how you’re going to get there able to work effectively with the core clear need to arm the Afghan allies with quickly and decisively enough to matter. . . Afghan air force as well. A real transition a functional capability along the same . The Afghan National Army and Afghan could be forged, one still able to engage lines. The Afghan military population has Security Forces understand, from their in effective combat against the Taliban. come to appreciate air support as a key perspective, how important air is. We have The broad trajectory of change for element of future success and security (in made them big consumers. They know that the Afghan air force has been to move particular, a Medevac ability being part of the air is there for them; they’ll go out and from a Russian-equipped force in disre- any operation). As Major General Glenn operate. I’ve had more than one brigade pair to shaping a mixed fleet of aircraft Walters, USMC, commented when he commander tell me that if it wasn’t for able to support the various missions that returned from Afghanistan: the medevac, [if] it wasn’t for the resupply, the Afghans need: transport, ground sup- and if it wasn’t for the aviation fires, he port, counterinsurgency, inverse synthetic Our role will be to support the Afghan didn’t think he could get the battalions aperture radar (ISAR), and strike. The security forces. You’re going to have to out operating like they do. Because they’ve 90 Features / Forging a 21st-century Military Strategy JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 learned that if they get hurt, we’ll fix must aggregate and seize territory. One to be operational after a strategic airlift them. They know if they run out of bul- only has to remember the teachings from the South of France to the capital lets, we’ll get them bullets. And if they’re of Mao Zedong. What this means as of Mali and in autonomous operation hungry or thirsty, we’ll get them food and well is that an outside force configured with the help of the logistic battalion water. . . . As the U.S. looks forward to and poised to attack aggregated enemy simultaneously deployed with the strike work with allies worldwide in the years to forces moving against definable territo- force. As a French officer involved in the come on COIN and related operations, the rial “prizes” can be attacked as such. operation noted: U.S. will not be bringing the entire gamut The French entered at the beginning of capability to the party. Working with of the operation, first with airpower After leaving Bamako for Sévaré five hun- allies in current and projected financial directly initiated from French air force dred kilometers further on January 26th, conditions requires a new formula: the bases and then more rapidly with massive then leaving again for Gao on February U.S. supports allies who can fend for them- air-ground forces. As a result, they have 6th five hundred kilometers further, I have selves, up to a point.2 been forming a 21st-century caravan ap- available the support tools of nearly a full proach where logistics and operational regiment ranging from my air control Western powers are facing the end- elements are combined simultaneously tower . . . to spares allowing me to last for game in Afghanistan. If the Afghans into a single force. There is no classic ap- months. as a nation are going to work together proach to the rear and front. The forces to shape a COIN and defense strategy, are expeditionary and carry their capa- The rapid surge of the Serval force, airpower is a crucial lynchpin. Working bilities with them, adjusting those as they which eventually grew to three battalion- together with an air-enabled Afghan transition to new phases. size task forces (GTIA for Groupement force, Washington could continue to in- In what could be called phase one, tactique interarmes), has also been facili- fluence the necessary outcomes in the war France conducted its own version of tated by France’s historic presence and against terror and at the same time pull “shock and awe.” A rapid and massive defense commitments in this part of the out most of its troops. That would be a offensive was generated to block the world. France was able to leverage various war-winning formula the Army might insurgents from reaching Bamako, and national assets currently based in other want to consider for its global future. the troops were within reach of the capi- African countries as well as full support tal within a matter of days. The French from those governments. Case 2: Expeditionary government mobilized an insertion force Mobility and concentration of Logistics in Shaping New on January 11, 2013, after a request for forces have also been rendered pos- Combat Capabilities help came from the president of Mali. A sible by good C2 and joint training and The revolution in logistics seen in month later the commander of French experience between the French air force air and maritime support for ground army aviation in Mali explained: (Rafale and Mirage 2000D fighters and forces can reshape how these forces N’Djamena-based joint force air com- operate. The French experience in Mali The enemy has been taken by surprise and is ponent commander), the navy (with the provides a case in point.3 French forces now destabilized. Because of the lightning amphibious assault ship BPC Dixmude were requested by the Mali govern- speed of the maneuver by the Serval [the bringing ground elements ashore and ment to intervene to defend the capital French name for the operation] force, the with the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol and the southern part of the country insurgents are now fleeing and not willing aircraft crucial to coordinate close air sup- almost at the last moment. Because to fight as they did not expect such concen- port operations between army aviation of a rapid political decisionmaking tration and mobility heading their way. and ground troops), and the army. This process, because of French presence in is also true at the joint level, since good the regional theater linked to ongoing This effort has been possible due to C2 and joint training have been key to military missions (for example, the several factors. The first is the speed of operating the international transport and Épervier operation in Chad since 1986 the French forces and their ability to act refueling fleet which joined in Serval. and the United Nations Unicorn opera- from the outset in a matter of hours as While executing phase one, the tion in Côte d’Ivoire since 2002), and far as air operations were concerned. For French were preparing their transition because the French have been building example, on the air force side, the first to the next phase, in which regional an integrated rapid deployment force strikes made by the Rafale fighters taking peacekeepers and the Mali army would forged around expeditionary logistics, off from FAB Saint Dizier were done become the key force to provide stability. the French were able to intervene and thanks to a 9-hour, 35-minute flight in- Moreover, France is keeping a modest move rapidly. This allowed French forces volving five air-to-air refuelings. force in place that can aid in the process to attack the aggregated enemy forces. On the army side, it took only 2 days and also move rapidly within the country What is often forgotten is that extremist for the French army air mobility group to defend itself and its allies. forces may disperse to avoid destruction, (GAM for Groupe aéromobile), involving From the beginning, the French but to have a real political effect they some 300 personnel and 20 helicopters, intervention was not seen as an isolated JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Laird, Timperlake, and Delaporte 91 event, but rather one designed to clear In other words, the French experience Marine Air Ground Task Force Laydown the path for coalition forces to take over in Mali is about building a first entry in- and made it clear that he and Congress the mission. For France, the North Africa sertion force with expeditionary logistics and the American people are not inter- region is as significant as Mexico is for the fully integrated with the maneuver forces. ested in a nonfunctional concept for a United States. Ongoing engagement is a This force is then able to work within Marine force. Beyond what is directed, reality in a region of close proximity with the region and become a lead element in the Marines need to maintain a ready high strategic consequences and many its own transition and withdrawal. The force in the face of existing training area foreign nationals in residence. French approach is very much about encroachments. They also have that re- Regional support is absolutely key how to intervene and trigger coalition quirement for training areas near the new to prolonging the deterrent effect of the operations to stabilize the situation with force laydown locations. initial French military action and has been regional partners rather than simply stay- Within the distributed laydown, the made possible by the months of prepara- ing in place a long time. It is shock and Marines must retain the ability to respond tion before it occurred ahead of schedule, awe as a counteroffensive and deterrent rapidly to crises across the range of de- as is the effort of the international com- to the enemy, as well as a trigger space for mands, from major combat operations in munity via the United Nations and/or coalition success, and not shock and awe Northeast Asia to low-end humanitarian other organizations. The latter is slowly for the sake of staying. assistance and disaster relief wherever the but surely picking up with a growing need arises. number of allied logistic and support Case 3: Shaping a Distributed Each location for the Marines is in assets being gathered to help sustain Operations Force for the Pacific transition as well. From Okinawa and French and African armed forces in a The United States is in the midst of Iwakuni, the Marines can train locally theater where vast elongations and the its pivot to the Pacific and the Marine in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines as ability to hold difficult territory are the Corps is in many ways the pivoting well as respond with “fight tonight” key challenges. force for this action. The Service is capabilities. From Guam, the Marines Transport aircraft and tank- not only redeploying in the region but can train locally in the Commonwealth of ers were sent early on by the United enhancing its role as a rotational force the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) States and European countries, while as well. As Colonel John Merna, com- to the north, the Federated States of the Eindhoven-based European Air mander of 31st Marine Expeditionary Micronesia to the south, and Palau and Transport Command played its role in Unit (MEU), put it: the Philippines to the west. Guam and providing assets. From a French perspec- CNMI provide the Marines something tive, the goal has been to start reversing In one sense, the Marines are going back to they do not have elsewhere in the Pacific: the balance between supported and the force levels we had in the region prior a location on U.S. soil where they can supporting forces as early as April 2014 to 9/11. So it is simply a restoration rather train unilaterally or with partners. in order to prevent the “Afghanization” than a build up or build out. But the way The Marine Corps is focused on of the conflict feared by many, but in the force is being configured is very differ- shaping a distributed operations force to a secure, responsible, and coordinated ent. We are emphasizing building out a meet these evolving engagement chal- manner. Indeed, as the commander, rotational force, notably in Australia, but lenges. For such a force, strike is built in General Grégoire de Saint Quentin, has elsewhere as well.4 but is not the defining quality. For many, been stressing, Serval not only boosted augmenting the precision strike force is the Malian armed forces’ confidence to The Corps is itself “pivoting” in this Washington’s key area for investment keep on fighting, but also served as a pivot to the Pacific. Marine forces in in the Pacific. But the priority ought to catalyst for the African forces to mobilize Okinawa are moving partly to Guam and be on building up the capabilities for themselves and play the regional role to shaping a new working relationship with distributed operations within which pre- which they have been aspiring. the Australians in Western Australia. In cision strike is embedded.5 As Lieutenant Phase three could thus be character- fact, they will be the lead force in reshap- General Terry Robling, commander of ized as shaping the postinsurgent Mali, ing the U.S. presence in the Pacific over Marine Forces Pacific, emphasized: and here, working with the Mali govern- the next few years. The Marines face ment and African forces is central. In this myriad challenges in the Pacific. They The key is persistent presence and scalable phase, European support and trainers have been directed through international force. We need to be engaged in the process will be a key part of shaping whatever is agreements spanning two administrations of reform of the various allied forces as well possible regarding stability in the country. to execute force-positioning moves. This in the Pacific. We cannot nor should not do European military training, which is also is political, but it is not partisan. it all on our own. And distributed force al- kicking in, will be another major factor The Secretary of Defense has man- lows for the kind of security engagement we in ensuring that African ground troops dated that at least 22,000 Marines in U.S. need to do so, and to be well positioned for have the best chances to secure the whole Pacific Command remain west of the escalation if that comes. . . . Distributed op- country. International Date Line in the distributed erations and disaggregation is a fact of life 92 Features / Forging a 21st-century Military Strategy JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 in the Pacific. Rarely do we send an ARG [Amphibious Ready Group]/MEU out now, especially the 31st MEU, into the AOR [area of responsibility], where we don’t disaggregate. . . . Until we distribute them to different missions and then re-aggregate to come back to a large exercise or mission, they spread and can cover several missions by distributed operations. . . . And then, with the types of equipment we’re buying and we’ve shown this as well in exercises like Bold Alligator, you can stick a MV-22 on any one of those amphibious ships or any one of those ships, like an MLP [mobile landing platform] . . . and you have just extended your shoreline north and south 300 miles each direction.6 Joint terminal air controller communicates with F/A-18 Super Hornet supporting Operation Spartan The Marines are at the forefront of Shield in training to provide U.S. and coalition close air support (U.S. Air Force/Jonathan Snyder) operation innovation and have led with the Osprey, creating new opportunities man-portable air-defense system in 2007. formation. The Ospreys could fly with the Bs and potentially new strategies. The com- They do not wish to see a similar problem to provide fuel and munitions for rearm- manding general of 1st Marine Air Wing with their legacy aircraft and will seek to ing wherever the F-35Bs can land. As you in Okinawa characterized the leveraging bring their F-35Bs, currently training at know, the F-35B can land in a wide variety of the Osprey to shape possibilities of a Yuma Air Station, into the Pacific as early of areas and as a result this gives us a very new and more effective distributed or as 2015. With the Marines, evolving the mobile strike force to operate throughout the island operational strategy: strategy of getting the new equipment to battlespace. This kind of flexibility will be warfighters is crucial to shape that strat- crucial in the years ahead.9 When you add to that the Osprey and its egy. It is not about testing in the abstract; range and speed, you now have a wider it is about prevailing in combat, and they An additional advantage to working selection of landing spots if we needed an believe that getting new equipment into out a new strategic approach in response intermediate support base. . . . A good the hands of the warfighter—in this case to new weapons—in this case the MV-22 case in point would be [that] when we the F-35B to the Pacific—is a crucial and the anticipated arrival of the F-35B— wish to deploy helicopters from Futenma part of the “testing” reality. Former is that the Marines are working with allies [the Marine Air Base on Okinawa] to the Secretary of the Air Force Michael to reshape their forces and approaches. Philippines, there are a couple of places that Wynne underscored the approach: “The Shaping convergent capabilities for future we must land for fuel. For one leg, there is current wisdom . . . that testing must operations is central to a Pacific strategy only one site, which allows us to do this. But conclude before operations can be fully and will only happen by working the when you have an aircraft with greater implemented has been turned on its problem at the real-world level. There range, it opens up more possibilities. . . . If, head during the past two decades. But is no point in playing with yesterday’s in a time of conflict, we were going some- the reality is the opposite. Operational equipment to reinforce 20th-century con- place and an adversary wanted to deny us use at crucial points is the real testing of cepts of operations; we must leverage the the ability to put in a refueling point or systems.”8 new to shape 21st-century approaches. intermediate support base, they would have The Marines are already experi- As Lieutenant General Robling stated to now take into account a much greater menting with Harriers and Ospreys to regarding the Australians partnering with number of islands. With only helicopters, anticipate a new potent flexible combi- the Marines, notably in the new working an adversary could draw a 100-mile ring nation. Osprey refuelers and weapons relationship based in Darwin: around a base and know where we could resupply reloaders with the Harriers operate. . . . Ospreys, particularly when sup- as surrogates for the F-35Bs. Deputy They want to have a bigger part in the ported by KC-130Js, would significantly Commandant of Aviation, Lieutenant security of the Pacific because they see complicate an adversary’s attempts to pre- General Robert Schmidle, USMC, has themselves as major players here. And the dict our movements and operations.7 underscored: only way that they can be major players with an Army that’s only 30,000 strong The Marines brought the Osprey into We are looking at a sixteen-ship F-35B is to give them the capability to have am- operation after a CH-46 was struck by a formation flying with a four-ship Osprey phibious forces that can project away from JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Laird, Timperlake, and Delaporte 93 Australia and make a difference. And the postwar period. We need the same atten- capability. Investments clearly need to be only way they’re going to be able to do that tion once again, and this must include made in this area, or, more to the point, is for us to train them up in amphibious serious debate; it must also focus both they should be pooled to shape an effec- operations, buy the equipment they need on shaping new conventional options tive outcome. to load up those amphibious ships that they and on introducing nuclear warfighting But this is not only about technology. bought, and then go out and exercise it. considerations other than countervalue It is about adapting defense strategies deterrence. and concepts of operations to provide the For a thuggish regime such as the space for innovation to occur. Recrafting Case 4: Deterring North Korea one in North Korea, credible leadership the U.S. posture in the defense of South For the United States, the deterrence decapitation is the only threat, which is as Korea would provide a great place to of North Korea is no longer reduced real as a deterrent. This could come via a start in shaping Pacific perceptions of the to the defense of South Korea. It is reshaped conventional capability, a com- impact of fifth-generation aircraft not only about deterrence of states emerging bined conventional and nuclear capability, on the air element, but also on the joint in the second nuclear age. There is or a low-yield and precise nuclear capac- force and the coming of distributed opera- significant global cross-fertilization ity. No option should be off the table tions to the deterrence of North Korea. from the lessons being learned about when debating options and developing Secretary Wynne recently suggested North Korean behavior and the pres- capabilities. The Air Force has a unique that as the Air Force brings its first squad- sures associated with the possession of position in the American forces and can rons of F-35s into being, it should deploy a small nuclear force and the ability to provide solid leadership for this effort. those aircraft along with F-22s into the gain effects far beyond the position of In part this could be about shap- defense of South Korea. Then, over a rela- this force. ing new options such as deployment of tively short period, all fourth-generation The core question is rather simple: hypersonic cruise missiles with various aircraft would be brought back to the how do you deter a nuclear power such warheads including electronic warfare United States. This would focus maximum as North Korea when it simply will not warheads. Mark Lewis, the former chief attention on shaping a different concept play by the rules of conventional deter- scientist of the Air Force and now head of operations for the defense of South rence? What is the U.S. and allied nuclear of the Science and Technology Policy Korea. Not only would the area covered and conventional response to the threat Institute at the Institute for Defense by the aircraft become radically different of war on the Korean peninsula? Paul Analyses, is one of the leading hypersonic with a variety of vectors whereby the at- Bracken has called this scenario the com- experts in the world. He has underscored tack and defense enterprise could operate, ing of the second nuclear age. Although that a hypersonic cruise missile is the but reshaping the ground element could his book, The Second Nuclear Age, is low-hanging fruit of the hypersonics be facilitated as well. Secretary Wynne has really about strategy in a world of nuclear revolution.11 In considering the impact articulated this strategic opportunity: proliferation, it is about deterrence in of a high-speed missile with evolutions in a very different nuclear world than the warheads carried by such missiles, one can This is clearly the theater of highest utility one shaped by the competition and the see the breakthrough possibilities. The for the emerging F-35 . . . with the F-22 to rules of the two nuclear superpowers. goal would be to marry the missile with be the guardian of the Pacific Expanse, and Bracken has focused on the need to warheads that have the ability to get in- perhaps even used in a partnership with the understand escalation and de-escalation side the electronics, fire controls, signals, F-35, and the ROKAF [Republic of Korea in this new nuclear age where the rules and sensors of opponents flying at hyper- Air Force] forces. . . . This would have the have not been established and crises sonic speeds. With a forward-deployed highest probability of training as a “1000 will shape the nature of the rules, not stealth fleet doing target identification Unit Air Fleet” and the ROKAF, equipped the other way around. As Bracken puts as well as being available to rapidly pros- as they are with terrific fourth generation it, “Communication and bargaining, ecute combat advantage from the results fighters, would yearn to be protected and and escalation and de-escalation are at of the strike, U.S. and allied forces would supportive of this Air Battle Management the heart of the use of military force, not only be more lethal but would be a System proposed and promoted for the including nuclear weapons. They are not far more effective deterrent force. F-35. . . . One can as well see in the Korean so unique as to preclude such normal Hypersonic cruise missiles are part of Theater where in lieu of Aegis, Army systems behavior.”10 the competitive landscape, with China, connected via a C2 system as well can be the The Air Force has struggled to dis- India, and Russia all investing in these wingman for the F-35As/Bs or CV Versions. cover its post-Afghan role. Clearly, it can capabilities. U.S. allies such as Australia Service identified targets [will] be well find it by leading the effort to shape a and France are core players and partners within the range of tactical missiles cur- deterrent strategy in the second nuclear in shaping future capabilities. This is not rently fielded and/or well into their design age. The prominent thinkers of the a race one wants to lose to the Chinese, cycle. . . . With the width of the Peninsula first were closely tied to the Air Force notably because the rollout of the stealth inside the range of Naval Missiles, one can and its long period of innovation in the fleet could make good use of such a see the real need is off-boarding targets and 94 Features / Forging a 21st-century Military Strategy JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 8 serving them appropriately. Real Time to determine the kind of command and Michael W. Wynne, “The Role of the U.S. Air Force in the Future Fight,” Second Line of Bomb Damage Assessment and even real control and intelligence, surveillance, Defense, February 8, 2013, available at JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Laird, Timperlake, and Delaporte 95 he 2012 Joint Staff Decade of War study concluded that U.S. T military operations in the first half of the decade were “often marked by numerous missteps and challenges.” The second half, however, “featured successful adaptations to overcome these challenges.”1 Reflecting on these conclusions, General Martin Dempsey has emphasized, “We need to put a premium on those who seek and embrace adaptability as an imperative.”2 The Chairman’s emphasis on adaptabil- ity echoes similar comments made by the well-regarded British military his- torian Sir Michael Howard, who wrote that the capacity to adapt oneself to the “utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown” is “an aspect of military science which needs to be studied above all others in the Armed Forces.”3 In this regard, William “Billy” Mitchell’s experience in World War I provides an excellent case study in adapting to the unknown. Mitchell played a leading role in helping the American military adapt to an entirely new domain of war—the air. Sometimes referred to as the father of the U.S. Air Force, Mitchell is one of the most famous and controversial characters in American airpower history. He is the subject of at least six published biog- raphies and numerous articles. He was Brigadier General Billy Mitchell even the topic of a full-length Hollywood (U.S. Army Air Service) movie titled The Court-Martial of Billy Mitchell, starring another iconic American, Gary Cooper.4 Unfortunately, most of the attention about Mitchell goes to his court-martial and his stormy rela- tionship with the Army and Navy brass. Learning and Yet one of the most fascinating aspects of his career was that he was a newcomer to aviation at the outset of World War Adapting I. Despite that, he rapidly surpassed more experienced officers and became the Army’s senior operational air com- Billy Mitchell in World War I mander. More than any other American of the time, he mastered the operational By Bert Frandsen art from the airman’s perspective, which he exemplified in his leadership during the Saint-Mihiel campaign. How did Mitchell do this? He was a well-educated Dr. Bert Frandsen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Leadership and Warfighting at the Air and gifted officer, but at least as impor- War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. tant and often overlooked was his ability 96 Recall / Billy Mitchell in World War I JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 to learn after personal setbacks that ironi- Aero Squadron during General John J. hear my typewriter clicking as I wrote up cally worked to his advantage. Pershing’s Punitive Expedition against my notes.”15 Pancho Villa. Foulois’s command rep- Mitchell kept up this habit of writing A Bitter Rivalry resented America’s first employment of about daily experiences in his journal In 1913, America’s future airpower airpower on a major expedition. Although throughout the war as he moved from prophet and martyr for an independent the squadron was incapable of adequately one position to another.16 The modern air force testified in congressional hear- accomplishing its reconnaissance mis- reader cannot help but be impressed ings against aviation’s independence sion due to the inferiority of its airplanes, with his observations and analysis. Thus, from the Signal Corps. At this point in valuable lessons were learned that would it was not only being one of the first his career, Captain Mitchell was one of be useful when Foulois helped build an American aviation officers on the scene, the rising stars of the Signal Corps, and American air force for World War I.10 but also his systematic and disciplined ap- at age 32 the youngest officer on the Mitchell, from his comfortable perch proach to learning that helped Mitchell Army’s new General Staff.5 Instead of at aviation headquarters in Washington, develop a superior understanding of creating aviation as a separate branch DC, harassed Foulois in the Mexican des- air warfare. By reviewing, writing, and of the Army, as proponents of indepen- ert during the Punitive Expedition about processing his daily observations, he dence hoped, Congress established the such details as unauthorized purchases developed the insights that would help Aviation Section of the Signal Corps in of gasoline. Later, as the United States him learn the operational art from the 1914.6 Accordingly, airpower advocates mobilized for war in Europe, Mitchell’s airman’s perspective. Keeping a journal viewed Mitchell as antagonistic to their plans for the expansion of the Air Service helped him learn. goals.7 overlooked establishing bases in the U.S. Interestingly, a scandal at the Army’s South and Southwest with their superior The Air Service Expands flying school in San Diego resulted in weather. Instead he focused on basing As the American Expeditionary Force Mitchell’s transfer from the General in the North and East, which was politi- (AEF) and its Air Service expanded in Staff in 1916 to the Aviation Section. cally astute but revealed his ignorance France during 1917, officers moved As historian Juliette A. Hennessy noted, on such practical matters as good flying from position to position, as did Mitch- “A basic cause of the trouble was . . . conditions.11 ell. He quickly advanced to colonel, that young flying officers wanted an air Foulois referred to Mitchell’s tour becoming the air commander of the organization separate from the Signal of duty in the Aviation Section as “a Zone of Advance. During this period, Corps.”8 Because of his stellar reputation, supreme irony which almost wrecked mil- however, Mitchell commanded no avia- Mitchell was selected to temporarily head itary aviation in this country.”12 Foulois tion units because none had yet arrived the Aviation Section after its chief was continued, “Billy must have known that in the Zone of Advance. He functioned relieved. Mitchell’s job was to restore his days were numbered insofar as his mainly as a planner, all the while “old-fashioned military discipline among usefulness as Squier’s deputy was con- anticipating, studying, and laying the the so-called prima-donna pilots,” opined cerned. In March [1917] Mitchell asked groundwork for the future employment Benjamin Foulois, one of the leaders for orders detailing him for duty as an of American airpower.17 of those prima donnas.9 Later, Mitchell observer of military aviation in Europe. The main effort for the Air Service at stayed on to become the deputy to the As soon as Mitchell left, I was ordered to this time was not Mitchell’s responsibil- new aviation chief, Lieutenant Colonel Washington to take his place.”13 ity but rather that of his counterpart, George Squier, who returned from Mitchell was actually well suited for Colonel Raynal Bolling, who com- Europe where he had been observing the job as an official observer because manded the Zone of the Interior and aviation developments in the war. he spoke French, and the assignment focused on the larger job of aircraft It was during this period that a bitter provided an ideal stepping-stone to procurement, training, and reception of rivalry developed between Mitchell and combat command. He toured the front, deploying units that were beginning to the pioneer Army aviator (and prima took detailed notes, and learned about arrive in France. Pershing had decided donna) Benjamin Foulois. Although air strategy, tactics, and organization to conduct the final organization, train- Mitchell may be America’s premier through repetitive visits with the French ing, and equipping of the Air Service airpower prophet and martyr, Foulois and British air commanders and their in France because the Americans were rightly deserves to be called the father of units.14 Most important, Mitchell’s job so far behind the Europeans in military American airpower. He flew with Orville required him to systematically record, aviation. It was a key strategic decision Wright in 1909 on the Army’s accep- reflect on, and analyze what he saw. “I perfectly suited to the strategy of the tance tests for its first airplane. He took was a different breed of cat from any French and British, who needed to build Army No. 1 to Fort Sam Houston and, of the others they had seen,” he wrote American partnership capacity to help as ordered, taught himself to fly it. He in his hotel room at Chalons after visit- them win the war. helped form the Army’s first Provisional ing French pursuit commander Victor This so-called Dual Monarchy of Aero Company and commanded 1st Menard. “Deep into the night they could Bolling and Mitchell ended with the JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Frandsen 97 air forces. He knew more about these subjects than any other senior American officer. Subsequently, the first observation and pursuit squadrons arrived in the I Corps area, known as the Toul sector. This was a quiet part of the front where American units gained initial combat ex- perience under the control of the French Eighth Army. It was a peculiar command arrangement that provided Mitchell with maximum flexibility. He was not responsible for the orchestration of flying operations, nor did he issue daily opera- tions orders because the French army performed this function, but he did have administrative jurisdiction. Captain Philip Roosevelt, the operations officer of 1st Pursuit Group, wrote, “God knows what his authority was, but as usual we decided General Mitchell standing by Vought VE-7 Bluebird (U.S. Air Force) that if it came to a question of getting arrival of Benjamin Foulois in November Service was just then rapidly accelerating along . . . we would do all the getting 1917.18 Foulois was the obvious choice as the effect of American mobilization along.”23 These early operations provided to lead the Air Service because of his began to make itself felt. Mitchell the opportunity to begin taking command of 1st Aero Squadron on Foulois assigned Mitchell to be the the measure of his men and machines in Pershing’s Punitive Expedition. He had chief of Air Service, I Corps.20 Though their first combats. quickly advanced from major to brigadier a personal setback, this “demotion” Mitchell also polished his flying skills. general back in Washington where he had removed Mitchell just as a tsunami of He arrived in France without the wings finished laying the groundwork for the administrative and logistical issues arrived of an aviator, but the limited responsi- mobilization of American airpower. at the doorstep of his successor. American bilities of successive jobs enabled him to Foulois brought his own staff and aero squadrons were beginning to reach build on the flying lessons he began in reassigned both Bolling and Mitchell to the Zone of Advance at various orga- the States. By then he had become an new jobs, removing them from key posi- nization and training centers (pursuit, accomplished pilot, even learning to fly tions in the headquarters and replacing bombardment, observation), where they America’s first fighter, the French-made them with officers who had accompanied received their aircraft and equipment and Nieuport 28, which was a difficult plane him across the Atlantic. Mitchell was were made combat ready before being to handle because of the gyroscopic effect greatly embittered with this treatment: “A assigned to the front.21 In contrast, when created by its rotary engine. In May 1918 more incompetent lot of air warriors had Mitchell arrived at the recently organized he led a six-plane exhibition flight of 94th never arrived in the zone of active military I Corps headquarters, it did not yet have Aero Squadron’s Nieuport 28s during an operations since the war began. . . . The operational control of any American awards ceremony in which the command- competent men, who had learned their combat units. As before, he did not com- ing general of the French Eighth Army duties in the face of the enemy, were dis- mand much of anything. He joined a presented the Croix de guerre to several placed and their positions taken by these headquarters whose staff was itself under- officers of the 94th, including Eddie carpetbaggers.”19 going organization and training. Rickenbacker, in recognition of their first Foulois’s dismissal of Bolling and Like the other members of the staff, victories against the Germans.24 Mitchell was a colossal error. The veteran Mitchell conducted a study of his area of In contrast, many of the experienced from the Punitive Expedition failed to responsibility undistracted by the daily prewar Army aviators, such as Foulois transition from tactical to senior leader- grind of command. This time he focused and Colonel Robert Van Horn, who had ship, where building consensus with on the enemy: the organization, aircraft, replaced Mitchell as commander of the other senior leaders and peers is so and operations of the German air force.22 Zone of Advance, were so overwhelmed important. In effect, his reassignment of Thus, by the spring of 1918, Mitchell with the workload of building the Air Mitchell and Bolling decapitated the Air had spent a year in France, developed Service that they simply could not devote Service at a time when recently acquired plans for the tactical organization of the time to learning to fly the latest combat institutional knowledge was more impor- Air Service, and conducted in-depth aircraft. They could never lead by ex- tant than ever. The growth rate of the Air studies of both the friendly and opposing ample as Mitchell did. 98 Recall / Billy Mitchell in World War I JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 While at Toul, Mitchell anticipated Sixth French Army, which was reeling and observation groups and the armies the establishment of an Army headquar- back from the German onslaught. The and corps they supported. This was made ters that would be needed to control Marines fought one of their most famous all the more difficult while fighting under multiple corps as American doughboys battles at Belleau Wood, and the Army’s French command. Today, we would call poured into France. He established a 3rd Infantry Division won the moniker Mitchell a COMAFFOR (commander of provisional air headquarters for First “Rock of the Marne” for its stalwart de- Air Force forces) who had OPCON (op- Army. As happened before to Mitchell in fense along that river. erational control) of U.S. 1st Pursuit and the Zone of Advance, however, he was After observing these initial battles, 1st Observation groups. He was support- removed from this position just as First one of Pershing’s scouts sent a strongly ing a French CFACC (combined force Army was nearing activation. worded report back to AEF headquar- air component commander) who had The deteriorating state of affairs in ters: “I recommend that an observation TACON (tactical control) of the U.S. air the Air Service, exacerbated by the earlier and a pursuit squadron of aero planes forces of 1st Air Brigade. But these sorts decapitation of its senior leadership, be sent here to work with this division of command relationships had not yet resulted in Pershing dismissing Foulois. at [the] first opportunity. The Germans been created.31 His replacement, engineer officer Major have control of the air and embarrass Nevertheless, Mitchell’s presence General Mason Patrick, remembered our movements and dispositions.”28 enabled him to organize a tactical head- Pershing describing the Foulois regime as Consequently, Pershing ordered quarters, which he located adjacent to the “good men running around in circles.”25 American aviation to the Marne sector air headquarters of Sixth French Army As the dominoes fell, Foulois arrived at along with the 1st Corps headquarters, just as it was preparing to conduct the the provisional air headquarters for First which provided overall command for ad- largest combined air operation of the war Army and told Mitchell, “There’s no ditional American units reinforcing the up to that time. The Marne campaign use beating around the bush, Billy, I’m French. served as his postgraduate education in here to take over your office, your files, Despite their previous falling out aerial warfare. and your job. You are relieved as of this (but also getting Mitchell away from the moment.”26 First Army sector), Foulois put Mitchell The Initiative Shifts More than mortified, this time in command of 1st Air Brigade, a new Anticipating a renewal of the German Mitchell was insubordinate. In response organization created to accompany offensive, Allied Commander in Chief to Foulois’s request to stay on a few U.S. reinforcements to the beleaguered General Ferdinand Foch assembled a days to help with transition, Mitchell Sixth French Army. Mitchell’s command large air force as a strategic reserve. It responded, “Not on your life, General. consisted of 1st Pursuit Group and 1st consisted of the French Air Division, . . . [Y]ou couldn’t possibly acquire the Observation Group. Again, the lines the Royal Air Force 9th Brigade, and knowledge to run this office in a few of authority were unclear. First Pursuit U.S. 1st Pursuit Group. The French days and I’ll be damned if I’m going to Group received its operations orders Air Division was the largest single avia- make it easy for you.”27 He refused to from the chief of the Air Service of Sixth tion unit of the war. Its two brigades hand over officer furniture, maps, and Army, which was in overall command of represented some 370 fighters and 230 even the telephone. It was a low point for the sector. That was logical because the bombers. Ninth Brigade provided an Mitchell. Word spread throughout the American Pursuit Group replaced Sixth additional nine squadrons of offensive upper echelons of the AEF that he was Army’s former Pursuit Group, which had airpower. Added to that were the four not a team player. Foulois asked Pershing been practically shot out of the sky. First squadrons of 1st Pursuit Group. to send Mitchell back to the United Observation Group, which directly sup- With his brigade headquarters col- States, but Pershing instead counseled ported 1st Corps with reconnaissance and located with the French Sixth Army air Mitchell and required Foulois to make artillery adjustment, took its orders from headquarters, Mitchell learned how to the best of it. the corps.29 integrate multinational airpower in a Yet again this setback would ironi- These unclear command relation- large operation. Once the battle began cally provide Mitchell the opportunity ships created a difficult conundrum for on July 15, 1918, the combined forces to further his study of air warfare, gain Mitchell’s subordinates, who sometimes established air superiority and attacked experience in a major coalition air op- received orders from multiple head- German crossing sites along the Marne. eration, and surpass Foulois as the most quarters. Roosevelt explained, “I had This operation helped defeat the German important American air leader to emerge to spend a lot of time seeming to obey army in the most decisive battle of the from World War I. By the end of May, their orders while really making my own war, known as the Second Battle of the Germany’s last great offensive, launched dispositions. . . . All our orders really Marne. After that, the Allies seized the in March, had reached Château-Thierry came from the French—which [Mitchell] initiative and never lost it. Germany only 40 miles from Paris. The resulting approved.”30 To be sure, the Army was would be defeated a few months later. panic led to the piecemeal commitment still working out the nuances of com- Meanwhile, Pershing finally activated of Soldiers and Marines to reinforce mand relationships between the pursuit First Army and was preparing for the JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Frandsen 99 German Hannover CL IIIa brought down in Argonne by American machinegunners on October 4, 1918 (U.S. Army/NARA/J.E. Gibbon) Saint-Mihiel offensive. The stakes were Accordingly, he reinforced Pershing with unable to interfere with the First Army high because the United States had yet to troops and enablers, especially artillery offensive.33 demonstrate the ability to campaign on and aviation. Saint-Mihiel occupies a special place the European battlefield. Realizing that The French, British, and even Italians in airpower history not only because it Mitchell was his best and most experi- provided air units to reinforce the was the largest single air operation of the enced air commander, Pershing returned American Air Service’s 28 squadrons. The war. The concentration of coalition air him to the position of chief of Air Service total force numbered 701 pursuit planes, forces did its part in helping Pershing of First Army, replacing Foulois who, to 366 observation planes, 323 day bomb- to wipe out the salient and achieve a his credit, supported the decision and ers, and 91 night bombers adding up to successful inauguration of American took a new job that focused on training 1,481 aircraft for the largest air operation arms in continental warfare. Mitchell’s and logistics. of the war.32 In contrast to the Allied example provided a vision for unity of First Army’s mission was to reduce defensive battle on the Marne, Mitchell’s command that would inspire airmen the Saint-Mihiel salient, a large bulge plan supported an offensive operation long after he passed from the scene. His in Allied lines that had existed since the and therefore took an entirely different continued command for the upcoming early days of the war. Foch was eager approach. While American combat avia- Meuse-Argonne offensive was a foregone for Pershing to finish this attack quickly tion operated within 3 miles of the front, conclusion. Just prior to the end of the because he wanted the Americans to Mitchell ordered the French Air Division war, Pershing made Mitchell chief of concentrate their main effort in the to attack 12 to 20 miles behind enemy the Air Service for an Army group that Meuse-Argonne sector, joining the lines. By pressing the attack, he kept his would command First and Second U.S. French and British for the final offensives. enemy off balance and on the defensive, Armies.34 100 Recall / Billy Mitchell in World War I JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 12 Conclusion environment for Mitchell’s creative and Ibid., 125. 13 Ibid., 141. Billy Mitchell’s experience in World adaptive spirit to soar. Through a com- 14 Cooke, 51. War I is an ironic story of learning and bination of persistence and a systematic 15 William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War adapting. Each setback he experienced approach to learning, Billy Mitchell I: From Start to Finish of Our Greatest War could have been, and probably was, adapted and learned the operational art (New York: Random House, 1928), 26. 16 perceived as a failure. He commanded from the airman’s perspective. JFQ Mitchell’s published memoir “probably represents the diary to a remarkable degree.” the Zone of Advance but was removed Ibid., vi. from that prestigious position just as it 17 Bert Frandsen, Hat in the Ring: The Birth was becoming active. Although bitter Notes of American Air Power in the Great War (Wash- about his relief, he showed initiative in ington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003), 86. 1 establishing the office of the provisional Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis 18 Bolling and Mitchell were loosely super- Division, Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring vised for a few months by non-flyer Brigadier air chief of First Army. Removed yet Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations (Suf- General William Kenley. again, one sees this tendency for him folk, VA: The Joint Staff, June 15, 2012), 1. 19 Mitchell, 165–166. to be “demoted” to positions where 2 Martin E. Dempsey, “Building Tomor- 20 Ibid., 178. his authority and responsibility were row’s Leaders,” Joint Force Quarterly 67 (4th 21 The Air Expeditionary Force Air Service reduced. The irony is that without these Quarter 2012), 2. established organization and training centers 3 Michael Howard, “Military Science in where pursuit, observation, bombardment, and setbacks, he would not have had such the Age of Peace,” RUSI Journal 119 (March, balloon squadrons and groups were formed and ideal opportunities to learn. By the time 1974), 7. made combat ready before being assigned to the AEF was ready to conduct its first 4 Phillip S. Meilinger, American Air Power the Front. See Frandsen, 8. major offensive, even Foulois, who had Biography: A Survey of the Field (Maxwell Air 22 Mitchell, 179. asked Pershing to send Mitchell back to Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1995). Bi- 23 Philip Roosevelt was a favorite cousin of ographies include Paul H. Jeffers, Billy Mitchell: President Theodore Roosevelt and an ardent the States, admitted that Mitchell was The Life, Times, and Battles of America’s Prophet supporter of the President’s “Preparedness the best man to command air opera- of Air Power (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, Movement” for the war in Europe. See Philip tions in the AEF’s final offensives. 2005); Roger G. Miller, Billy Mitchell: Stormy J. Roosevelt to Captain [Arthur R.] Brooks, Did Mitchell see it so optimisti- Petrel of the Air (Washington, DC: Office of February 14, 1921, U.S. Air Force Historical cally at the time? His memoir suggests Air Force History, 2004); James J. Cooke, Billy Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, Mitchell (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publish- file GP-HI (FTR), 5–6. he was filled with resentment in each ers, 2002); Roger Burlingame, General Billy 24 Ninety-fourth Aero Squadron Alert Log, instance. He may have even feared he Mitchell: Champion of Air Defense (Westport, National Air and Space Museum Archives, file had been sidelined permanently. But as CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); Alfred F. Hurley, 1247, 216. we have seen, setbacks can be learning Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power (Bloom- 25 Mason Patrick, The United States in the opportunities. Indeed, it is the point of ington: Indiana University Press, 1975); Emile Air (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., H. Gauvreau and Lester Cohen, Billy Mitch- 1928), 16. Tim Hartford’s recent book Adapt: Why ell: Founder of Air Force and Prophet without 26 Foulois, 172. 35 Success Always Starts with Failure. In Honor (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1942). Otto 27 Ibid. spite of setbacks, Mitchell persisted with Preminger directed the filmThe Court-Martial 28 Col. Walter S. Grant to [Col. Fox] Con- an intensity that was undergirded by the of Billy Mitchell, released in 1955. nor, June 15, 1918, in United States Army in 5 self-confidence born of an inner light. Mark A. Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower the World War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Convictions: Development and Legacy of Center of Military History, 1988), IV-490. He derived this coup d’oeil by developing William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” in The 29 Frandsen, 150. a degree of competence in aerial warfare Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower The- 30 Roosevelt to Father, July 8, 1918, Philip that far exceeded his American peers. ory,” ed. Phillip S. Meilinger, 82 (Maxwell Air J. Roosevelt papers, family collection of Philip His study of this new type of warfare was Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997). J. Roosevelt II, Chappaqua, New York. 6 supercharged by the fact that throughout Alfred F. Hurley and William C. Heim- 31 Thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Jim Bur- dahl, “The Roots of U.S. Military Aviation,” in lingame, USAF (Ret.), for clarification on this the war, whatever his position, he regu- Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the point; Joint Publication 3-30, Command and larly made time to systematically process United States Air Force, ed. Bernard C. Nalty, Control for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: his experience by writing down his daily I-28 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and The Joint Staff, January 12, 2010), chapter observations and analyzing what they Museums Program, 1997). 3; Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force 7 meant. This practice helped him gain Cooke, 50. Basic Doctrine (Washington, DC: Headquar- 8 Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States ters Department of the Air Force, October 14, understanding. Army Air Arm: April 1861 to April 1917 2011), 105. One of the ironies of life is that (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 32 Patrick, 27. setbacks can have silver linings, but to 1985), 145. 33 First Army Air Service, Operations Order exploit this irony, we must learn, adapt, 9 Benjamin Foulois with Colonel C.V. 1, September 11, 1918, in United States Army and more often than not persist in the Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astro- in the World War, VIII-216. nauts: The Memoirs of Major General Benjamin 34 Cooke, 100. face of adversity. Not everyone succeeds. D. Foulois (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 35 Tim Hartford, Adapt: Why Success Always To borrow from Carl von Clausewitz, 125. Starts with Failure (New York: Farrar, Straus the chaos and uncertainty that character- 10 Ibid., 60–65, 70, 87; Hennessy, 175. and Giroux, 2011). ized the AEF’s Air Service provided the 11 Foulois, 139, 141. JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Frandsen 101 tical analysis is complemented by quali- tied to the belligerents can be readily tative analysis of numerous country counterbalanced by a powerful opponent case studies providing a uniquely in the conflict, thus diminishing the comprehensive historical perspective value of the use of force as an option. on international intervention through Democratic states support democratic various political and international states even when a democratic state is the institutional means (for example, diplo- first to employ its military in a conflict. matic, military, and economic). Finally, external state actors do not get The author’s research shows com- involved in conflicts to necessarily “save pelling proof that America and other weak states” or “oppose those who seek states primarily intervene in conflicts to alter the world order.” Again, this and civil wars based on economic and suggests that states intervene in armed national security interests. For example, conflicts primarily out of their own na- his statistical analysis strongly points to tional security interests, increasingly tied intervention as a way to protect foreign to the growth of economic liberalism and direct investment and trade. Keeping the economic interdependence it creates land and sea lines open for trade was among states. also identified as an imperative, one Although the scholarly rigor of that allows other states to residually Aydin’s research is laudable, there are benefit. His examination also demon- shortcomings. The book reads too much strates that intervention is undertaken like a doctoral dissertation, making it sty- Foreign Powers and to circumvent potential adversaries listically difficult to digest. He did not tie Intervention in Armed Conflicts from posing security concerns in given some of the literature cited to the main regions. Particularly noteworthy is that thesis. Furthermore, the book is short By Aysegul Aydin Washington has generally aligned with relative to the complex and volumeous Stanford University Press, 2012 those states presenting the least threat to nature of the subject matter. Finally, the 202 pp. $45 the Nation and its regional allies. excellent choice of country cases was un- ISBN: 978-0-8047-8281-4 Frankly, none of the results of Aydin’s dermined (including the chapter focused Reviewed by analysis are necessarily profound or on contemporary U.S. interventions) by David A. Anderson surprising. What they do provide, how- somewhat hollow/shallow qualitative ever, within a uniquely comprehensive analysis. framework, is empirical evidence linking The book is best read by political sci- ysegul Aydin, an academic anecdotal, independent, and often dis- ence, international relations, international scholar, sets out to determine connected historical accounts of conflicts political economic, and security studies A why and through what means over the past 70 years. This empirical scholars. It may also be of interest to external states choose to get involved analysis allows collective patterns of exter- military historians, foreign policy design- in interstate conflicts and civil wars. nal states’ and institutional actors’ actions ers, and those generally interested in why He asserts that intervening states make and behaviors to emerge that otherwise and how states get involved in the armed their choices based on a combination would have gone statistically unproven conflicts of others. JFQ of security and economic interests. His or undiscovered. This alone makes a challenge is significant since the related significant contribution to this body of literature (that is, international rela- scholarly literature. Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anderson, USMC (Ret.), DBA, is a Professor of Strategic Studies tions, international political econom- More specific outcomes of this and the Odom Chair of Joint, Interagency, and ics, and security studies) has evolved author’s work include reinforcing the Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army somewhat independently. Aydin’s notion that neither liberalist nor realist Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. investigation is rooted in realist and theory alone can account for why nations liberalist international relations theory. get involved in international conflicts. He uses empirical data from hundreds Diplomacy was identified as the preferred of external conflicts and 153 civil wars form of statecraft used by external state from 1944 to 2001. For contextual actors for intervening in civil wars. The purposes, he also brings both pre- military instrument of national power conflict and postconflict intervention was shown to be the favored option of measures to bear, coupled with litera- external intervening states for interna- ture addressing conflict prevention and tional conflicts normally small in scale postconflict reconstruction. His statis- and short in duration. States strongly 102 Book Reviews JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 into Iraq and Afghanistan to engage in interviewing family members and local combat ethnography in direct support of villagers about the incident, and the U.S. military units was anathema to many possible reasons for the attack—which in academia, the military, and the media. ranged from Taliban bribery, Taliban ex- These are the topics, controversies, and tortion, mental instability, and extremist debates that Gezari traces as the story of sympathies—the reader is offered a full Loyd develops. panoply of issues to consider. Sadly, with Gezari describes in great and often Salam long dead, the truth will never be uncomfortable detail that fateful known or understood. November day. Loyd was interviewing an What certainly makes the book valu- Afghan man, Abdul Salam. After many able is the nearly 100 pages of discursive minutes of questions, Salam poured a notes. For a program that has been can of cooking oil on Loyd and set her treated to uncritical promotion and on fire. Salam was quickly executed by overly negative condemnation, these one of Loyd’s teammates, Don Ayala. notes add authentic evidence to the de- Loyd would die from complications in bate. This is a particular problem for the a hospital 2 months later. Even though critics of HTS within the anthropology the program had lost two other mem- discipline who have (without irony) of- bers that same year, Michael Bhatia and fered ferocious and vitriolic commentary Nicole Suveges, this would be its darkest devoid of genuine research and primary day. For the reader, it can be a genuine sources while simultaneously declaring The Tender Soldier: A True struggle to read Gezari’s account as the program guilty of unethical behavior. Story of War and Sacrifice she intimately describes what happened The comprehensiveness of Gezari’s through the eyes of Loyd’s teammate, account can have some odd side effects, By Vanessa M. Gezari Clint Cooper, who held Loyd’s hand in however. She engages with a number Simon & Schuster, 2013 the aftermath, and many others present at of detailed issues about the program, 347 pp. $25 the time. The horrifying sights, sounds, such the contested genesis story of HTS, ISBN: 978-1-4391-7739-6 and smells are imbued on the page. It is which has been “embellished by ambi- Reviewed by a testament to Gezari’s writing to be able tious and therefore potentially unreliable Michael C. Davies to achieve such realism. narrators who nevertheless, each holds The narrative style of The Tender a piece of the story” (pp. 23–24). She Soldier weaves through the past and then- also discusses the atypical biography n November 4, 2008, Paula present by combining an individual’s of McFate and accusations relating to Loyd, a social scientist with biography with the larger issue of the corporate espionage (p. 118). Yet a final O a relatively new U.S. Army program. The story of HTS’s iconoclastic answer on these issues is not stated. The program, the Human Terrain System managers, Colonel Steve Fondacaro and reader is left to ponder which declaration (HTS) and its deployed Human Dr. Montgomery McFate, interlock with is correct. This may have been intentional Terrain Teams, was on task in the history of deinstitutionalization and in noting the relative claims of competing Maiwand, Afghanistan. Deployed to reengagement with sociocultural knowl- individuals, but it can be disconcerting in study the sociocultural nuances of the edge within the U.S. military, and the one’s search for the final answer. Afghan people and help commanders response of the American Anthropology Additionally, because of the highly better understand the host population, Association to the program (chapter 2 focused and personal narrative style, this day would lead to Loyd’s death. and 5, respectively). The biography of the reader is left with the impres- The Tender Soldier: A True Story of Ayala and Cooper is explained alongside sion that every team beyond Loyd’s War and Sacrifice, by journalist and the history of Maiwand (chapter 4). This was incompetent. The other teams in Columbia University Graduate School effective device helps ensure the personal Afghanistan mentioned are primarily of Journalism Professor Vanessa M. content is understood in relation to the negative examples. Gezari’s story, and Gezari, is a well-researched and deeply issues inherent to the war and HTS as therefore the reader, is blind to the ac- personal narrative of the events of that topics and time both shift. tions of others deployed. This is not to day and the controversies surrounding Perhaps one of the most surpris- deny that the actions described (pp. 162, the program that deployed Loyd into ing aspects of Gezari’s book is her 182–185) are proof of incompetence, the field. biography of Salam himself. In travel- merely that they are the actions of a HTS has been a controversial topic ing to Afghanistan, Gezari has added few people among many hundreds who from its earliest days. The notion of an additional layer of description and have gone into two theaters, operated deploying civilian Ph.D.s and M.A.s explanation others would negate. In with a range of units, and even operated JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Book Reviews 103 independently with special operations n Useful Enemies, David Keen existence of “ghost soldiers” (p. 28) in forces, all in a variety of circumstances. (professor of conflict studies at Uganda whose pay was syphoned off by But these are minor quibbles. The I the London School of Economics) profiteering officers. Economically, he story of November 4, 2008, is a terrible explores both the causes of conflict also examines the impact of international one, but it has been told masterfully. As and the varied factors that perpetuate aid on conflict. Keen argues that in former HTS Program Manager Colonel war. Military leaders, policymakers, Afghanistan “it is very hard to channel Sharon Hamilton previously stated, analysts, scholars, and general readers large amounts of aid through corrupt “The HTS story is one of challenges, interested in the complex dynamics of and abusive regimes without reinforc- rewards, stumbles, and successes.” In a warfare should find the work engaging. ing corruption and abuse” (p. 69) and program often overwhelmed with po- Keen’s thesis is controversial: “This thus prolonging war. Keen develops lemical accusations, Gezari’s work stands book suggests that a great many wars the intriguing concept of “international out as sober, rigorous, and appreciated. are resistant to ending for the simple blind spots,” maintaining that “This The Tender Soldier is therefore a wel- (but hidden) reason that powerful ‘statist’ bias has been reflected in a much come addition to the literature on the actors (both local and international) do greater willingness, generally, to sanction Decade of War. JFQ not want them to end. . . . Very often, abusive rebel movements than abusive powerful actors may simply pursue governments” (p. 44). other priorities that conflict with the Second (chapters 5–7), Keen ex- Michael C. Davies is one of the coauthors expressed goal of winning (actions amines politics as a cause of conflict. of Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular that may have the effect of reproduc- Countering common depictions of Warfare (Institute of World Politics, 2013). ing the enemy, or that may simply take contemporary hostilities that focus solely time, energy and resources away from on “ethnic hatreds,” he develops the ‘winning’)” (pp. 8–9). useful concept of “political adaptation” Keen implores readers to consider that occurred in the former Yugoslavia why many contemporary conflicts last so when communism gave way to national- long, especially given that often one side ism based on ethnicity as the currency holds a significant military advantage. of local politics (p. 103). He provides His answer is that winning wars in the similar insights into the political (as op- military sense frequently takes a second- posed to solely ethnic) dimensions of ary priority to simply waging them for the complexities of genocide in both economic, political, or even psychologi- Darfur and Rwanda. Keen perceptively cal reasons. As Keen argues, “I want to reminds readers that policymakers often stress that winning is only one part of manipulate conflict for political purposes. war (and sometimes a surprisingly small As he contends, “Discovering the most part)” (p. 10). To make his case, Keen important fault-lines in any particular explores the underlying causes of conflict conflict is made more difficult by the in such diverse places as Sierra Leone, fact that a misreading is often intended. the Democratic Republic of the Congo, For example, the manipulation of ethnic Sudan, Uganda, Angola, Sri Lanka, divisions by elite groups will ‘work’ better Guatemala, and Colombia. He utilizes when people see—and are encouraged evidence from his own wide-ranging to see—ethnic fault-lines as natural and travels including personal interviews with inevitable” (p. 115). participants, journalists, aid workers, and Third (chapter 9), Keen explores human rights advocates. He also delves psychological motivations for starting and Useful Enemies: When Waging deeply into nongovernmental organiza- perpetuating conflict, especially the role Wars Is More Important tion reports and scholarly works. of shame. As Keen explains, “Crucially, Than Winning Them Keen organizes his book into nine the avoidance of shame—and conversely chapters that collectively explore three the pursuit of respect—represents By David Keen alternative motivations for conflict other another important goal that departs Yale University Press, 2012 than the conventional explanation of from the commonly assumed aim of 311 pp. $38 winning wars militarily. First (chapters ‘winning’” (p. 195). Keen connects this ISBN 978-0-300-16274-5 1–4 and 8), he focuses on economics important factor to relative deprivation: Reviewed by by exploring the role of diamonds in “Significantly, it is not necessarily poverty William A. Taylor Sierra Leone, oil in Sudan, gold and that causes shame, but the interaction of coltan in the Democratic Republic of the poverty and wealth, the juxtaposition of Congo, cocaine in Colombia, and the ‘underdevelopment’ and a development 104 Book Reviews JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 effort that somehow manages to exclude huge sections of society” (p. 201). Shame then contributes to a cycle of violence Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision where depredations to one side often de- (to be signed within 6 months) mand retribution against the other side. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of Useful Enemies is an enjoyable read the Operational Environment that is global in scope. Keen contributes JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations useful concepts, such as the role of “wars within wars” (p. 117) and “war sys- JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation tems” (p. 236). The first concept places JP 3-05, Special Operations local conflicts within broader wars and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism explains how this dynamic further fuels hostilities. Examples include combatants JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support waging local conflict within broader civil JP 3-26, Counterterrorism wars and adversaries fighting national JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance battles under the mantle of global wars such as the Cold War or the war on JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations terror. The second concept illuminates JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations the multifaceted nature of violence JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control and therefore warfare. Conflict is not solely defined by its military dimension, JP 3-63, Detainee Operations but also by its economic, political, and JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning psychological aspects. When analyzed JP 4-09, Distribution Operations in combination, conquering the enemy becomes a less exclusive explanation JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support for the existence and duration of many contemporary conflicts. In the end, JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) Keen asks a fundamental and sometimes JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations (20 Nov 13) uncomfortable question: “What ends are served by endless war?” (p. 175). In JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence (22 Oct 13) Useful Enemies, he provides many of the JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations (20 Nov 13) most compelling answers. JFQ JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations (14 Aug 13) JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, William A. Taylor is Assistant Professor of Security and Nuclear Environments (4 Oct 13) Studies at Angelo State University in San Angelo, Texas. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (16 Jul 13) JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations (30 Sep 13) JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency (22 Oct 13) JP 3-27, Homeland Defense (29 Jul 13) JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (31 Jul 13) JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (7 Aug 13) JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (11 Sep 13) JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (16 Oct 13) JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Book Reviews 105 The term nation assistance is not often used in policy or strategy. For example, Security Cooperation the current National Security Strategy mentions foreign assistance three times How It All Fits but does not use the term nation assis- tance. The first opportunity to create some clarity is to replace the term By Taylor P. White nation assistance with foreign assistance in the upcoming revisions of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign epartment of Defense (DOD) conducted, yet some of these actions Internal Defense. security cooperation activities fall outside security cooperation. Even If foreign assistance were to replace D support or are combined with though security cooperation spans the nation assistance in joint doctrine, the other assistance programs and often are range of military operations and is inclu- definition would include that portion a part of nation assistance. This often sive of large-scale operations conducted of security cooperation that falls outside occurs in a manner that may appear in support of foreign nations, it is not all- the realm of nation assistance in figure 1. confusing or convoluted to the joint encompassing of security related support Foreign assistance then encompasses all of warfighter. This article portrays how from U.S. agencies other than DOD. security cooperation and reduces some of the programs and activities converge. Nation assistance is support rendered the ambiguity. Security cooperation then Although the various terms and activi- by foreign forces within another nation’s focuses strictly on the DOD contribution ties in show in the accompanying figure territory based on mutual agreements.1 to foreign assistance and encompasses all appear to have simple names and mean- While this term is used to describe the DOD interactions with foreign defense ings, they in fact have strict definitions comprehensive approach to assisting establishments to build both national based on funding and authorities. While other nations, the definition associated and regional defense relationships that some of the activities directly support with nation assistance has two limita- promote specific U.S. security interests, one another, others have distinct tions: it does not encompass support to develop allied and friendly military capa- boundaries between their definitions regional organizations, and it is only assis- bilities for self-defense and multinational and functions. The joint community tance by foreign forces. A better, broader operations, and provide U.S. forces with is beginning to address the framework term is foreign assistance, which is assis- peacetime and contingency access to host of security cooperation in a new joint tance to foreign nations ranging from the nations.5 doctrine publication, Joint Publication sale of military equipment to donations of Having addressed the larger con- (JP) 3-XX, Security Cooperation. It is food and medical supplies to aid survivors structs, it is possible to review and clarify important to embark with clear defini- of natural and manmade disasters.2 When the relationships between other programs tions and understanding of the complex examining the current definitions for for- and activities that occur within them. relationship among these terms to facili- eign assistance and nation assistance, we First is security assistance with a specific tate understanding by the joint force. find significant overlap: definition in relation to both DOD and Security cooperation is referred to in State. It refers to a group of programs au- both joint professional military educa- Foreign assistance to foreign nations thorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of tion programs and joint staffs as a tool to [ranges] from the sale of military equip- 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export be employed by combatant commands. ment to donations of food and medical Control Act of 1976, as amended. However, in other settings, it is a set supplies to aid survivors of natural and These programs are funded and autho- of programs managed by the Defense man-made disasters. U.S. foreign as- rized by State to be administered by Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive sistance takes three forms: development DOD through the Defense Security review of joint doctrine and policy reveals assistance, humanitarian assistance, and Cooperation Agency.6 This is the process that the definition of security cooperation security assistance.3 by which the United States provides de- appears to encompass these areas and fense articles, military training, and other more. After expanding our understanding This term is likely to resonate with the defense-related services. That portion of security cooperation, other terms such State Department, which has an Office of of security assistance outside of security as security force assistance, foreign internal U.S. Foreign Assistance and a designated cooperation in figure 1 reflects State and defense, and security assistance provide foreign assistance budget. other civilian agency involvement. additional specificity for the tasks being Foreign internal defense, one of the Nation assistance—assistance rendered 11 core activities of special operations, is to a nation by foreign forces within that frequently thought of as only small en- Major Taylor P. White, USMC, is a Joint Doctrine nation’s territory based on agreements mu- gagement teams training foreign forces. Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7. tually concluded between nations.4 Actually, it represents more to include 106 Joint Doctrine / Security Cooperation: How It All Fits JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 Security Cooperation Framework the nature of the threat, but all efforts must be in support of the host nation’s programs for internal defense and devel- opment. The United States can assist in the development and assessment of these programs, but they must be administered Security Cooperation by the host nation with all activities across Foreign Internal Defense all categories of foreign internal defense working toward a common objective. Security Assistance Indirect Support Based on the intensity and scope of the threat (for example, terrorists, violent criminal enterprises, or an insurgency), the United States could support some of FID Direct U.S.US Combat Combat Support Operations the defense and development programs Security Force though routine security cooperation Assistance activities. To promote U.S. interests and support allies and partners around the Foreign Assistance globe, the United States often provides security force assistance to train host na- tion forces. Security force assistance is the “participation by a foreign govern- populace or military when it is faced with DOD’s contribution to a unified action ment in any of the programs taken by a a threat beyond its capabilities. This sup- effort to support and augment the de- host nation to free and protect its society port does not overlap security assistance velopment of the capacity and capability from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, in figure 1 because these activities involve of foreign security forces and their sup- terrorism, and other threats to its secu- the employment of the joint force in porting institutions toward achievement rity.”7 It encompasses involvement in a supporting role, are joint or Service of specific objectives shared by the U.S. the internal defense of a host nation by funded, and do not involve the transfer Government.8 The approaches used both civilian and military agencies. As of arms or equipment. This support is by the joint force to build relationships long as there is an internal threat to the typically in the form of logistics and intel- and promote U.S. security interests vary host nation, any support provided by the ligence support to the host nation. The widely from country to country. United States to that nation falls under final category of foreign internal defense Some U.S. partners already possess the definition of foreign internal defense. is U.S. combat operations and is meant to extensive security capability (qualitative) Large-scale U.S. counterinsurgency, serve only as a stopgap measure until host and capacity (quantitative), and it is im- counterterrorism, and counterdrug op- nation security forces are able to provide portant to develop interoperability with erations conducted in support of a host security for the population. This includes these partners through bilateral exercises nation are just as much foreign internal major operations against internal threats and military-to-military exchange and defense as using special operations forces but remains strategically defensive in education. Other partners’ security forces to train and advise foreign security forces. nature. Although not widely recognized benefit from security force assistance that This range of support to a host nation as such, the United States conducted for- focuses on the sustainable development is captured in the three categories of for- eign internal defense campaigns in Iraq of the foreign security forces’ capabilities eign internal defense. The first is indirect and Afghanistan after the establishment and capacities. These efforts represent support, with emphasis on strengthening of the host nation governments. only DOD activities, but they can be national institutions through economic All three categories of foreign internal applied to all types of security forces and and military capabilities that contribute defense can take place simultaneously, supporting institutions. Defense minis- to self-sufficiency. The overlap of security with security assistance programs provid- tries and training institutions can be the assistance and indirect support in figure ing funding and equipment to the host target of security force assistance as well 1 reflects State Department–funded nation (indirect support), intelligence- as local police and border patrol forces. programs administered by DOD, which sharing with the ministry of defense These activities include organizing, train- provides training and/or equipment to (direct support), and American forces ing, equipping, rebuilding and building, a foreign nation facing an internal threat conducting large-scale counterinsurgency and advising and assisting, but they must to its security. Second is direct support, operations (combat operations). The level be conducted with, through, and by the involving everything short of combat of U.S. involvement is driven by the po- foreign security forces. operations that provides direct military litical decisions of its elected leaders, the As security force assistance is only a assistance to the host nation civilian host nation’s capability and capacity, and DOD activity, it remains fully inside the JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 White 107 realm of security cooperation in figure 1. A ways as they guide the employment of principles that guide the employment of portion of security force assistance falls out- the joint force toward a common objec- U.S. forces in coordinated action toward side of the definition of nation assistance tive and the desired endstate. Security a common objective. It is important for in the figure because the United States assistance programs and security force as- future joint doctrine to define and explain can provide security force assistance to sistance activities are part of the means in the relationship of security cooperation regional organizations such as the African an ends-ways-means methodology. terms to facilitate understanding by the Union (another instance where foreign Successful National Security Strategy, joint force. assistance should replace nation assistance). supported by foreign assistance and se- JP 3-XX, Security Cooperation, is ex- As shown in figure 1, some security force curity cooperation, typically encourages a pected to address the many related terms assistance activities are funded by security whole-of-government approach using all and programs that support our nation’s assistance programs, but only those that U.S. Government instruments of national foreign policy. This emerging doctrine contribute to the sustainable capacity power. This approach is supported by the must refrain from forcing the security and capability of the host nation security joint force through interagency coordina- related topics into a hierarchal relation- forces. Some international military sales tion. A more comprehensive approach ship. It must explain the supporting involve subsequent military training on the designated as unified action integrates relationships while properly defining the operation and maintenance of the equip- activities of the military, other interagency ends, ways, and means of employing the ment. While selling equipment does not partners, multinational partners, and joint force in support of security coopera- constitute security force assistance, some intergovernmental and nongovernmental tion activities and related joint operations subsequent military training on the equip- organizations for unity of effort by all (for example, foreign internal defense). ment would fit into its definition. participants in a given activity, opera- The future revision of JP 3-22, Foreign Security force assistance is a primary tion, or campaign. Much thought must Internal Defense, should be synchronized tool to support partner nations when be put into what type of foreign forces with the development of JP 3-XX, while an internal threat is present. When the we are supporting or enabling. Equal also expanding the discussion of the third United States conducts indirect and thought must be placed on the strategic category of foreign internal defense, U.S. direct support foreign internal defense, endstate for the security cooperation and combat operations, to consider large-scale security force assistance is the means to foreign assistance efforts supported by counterinsurgency and counterterrorism bolster the host nation’s efforts to coun- the United States and the future use for operations conducted in support of a ter internal threats. These security force the foreign security forces the Nation is host nation. Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, assistance activities must be conducted supporting. Washington cannot expect Security Force Assistance, will also assist the with, through, and then ultimately by to create foreign forces in its own image; joint force commander in identifying tools the host nation’s forces, never as a substi- the history and culture of the host nation and resources for assisting foreign forces. tute. The employment of U.S. forces in must define the organization and ethos of However, none of these documents combat operations is a separate category its security forces. We must also take the should be viewed as the synchronizer of all of foreign internal defense and does not nature of the threat and the operational DOD activities; rather, each should high- directly improve the capability or capacity environment into account when training light its unique planning considerations of the host nation’s forces. U.S. combat and equipping foreign forces. Not all and use of existing programs to support operations establish the time and space partners will fight wars of proxy for the strategic objectives. JFQ necessary to develop a host nation’s United States. Instead they will use their forces until security can be provided with, forces as they deem appropriate, so se- through, and ultimately by them. curity force assistance could dramatically Notes As previously discussed, security shift the balance of power in underdevel- 1 cooperation is a broad term encompass- oped regions or create other undesired or Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Opera- tions (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August ing many related but nonhierarchal unanticipated consequences. 11, 2011, revised). programs, operations, and activities Grouping together the various se- 2 JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance encompassing ends, ways, and means. curity cooperation–related topics aids in (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 17, Ends are the desired objectives or end- budgeting and appropriating resources 2009). 3 state. Ways are the sequence of actions, to accomplish strategic objectives. The JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, methods, tactics, and procedures most employment of military forces, however, DC: The Joint Staff, November 8, 2010, as likely to achieve the ends. Means are the should never be obfuscated by unnec- amended through January 31, 2011). resources required to achieve the ends, essary redundancies in language and 4 Ibid. such as forces, weapons systems, funds, definitions. It is important for the joint 5 JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Wash- will, and time to accomplish the sequence force commander and a joint staff to ington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 12, 2010). 6 Ibid. of actions. For the DOD contribution understand both the means available and 7 Ibid. to foreign assistance, joint and Service the ways to sequence operations. Joint 8 Ibid. operations and campaigns represent the doctrine consists of the fundamental 108 Joint Doctrine / Security Cooperation: How It All Fits JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014 call for entries for the 2014 Secretary of Defense and 2014 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners. Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows. What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college. When? Anytime during the 2013–2014 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Colleges set their own internal deadlines, but must submit their official entries to NDU Press by April 23, 2014, for the first round of judging. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 15–16, 2014, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC. National Defense University Press conducts the competition with the generous support of the NDU Foundation. For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: www.ndu.edu/press/SECDEF-essay-competition.html www.ndu.edu/press/CJCS-essay-competition.html Joint Force Quarterly Issue Seventy-two, 1st Quarter 2014 Flickr Pinterest witter Facebook T ou can also find us on: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm Y Visit us online at: www.ndu.edu/press/index.html Visit JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique vistors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique vistors each month, 176 pp. JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY • National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, Aspirational and fulfilling, this book helps prepareAspirational and fulfilling, this book helps young men and women who strive to become NCOs/POs, re-inspires serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates reflection by those who have retired from or left active service. 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