Nature Conservation and the Military in Central and South- Eastern Europe – an Overview –

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Nature Conservation and the Military in Central and South- Eastern Europe – an Overview – Nature conservation and the military in Central and South- Eastern Europe – An overview – Fig. 1: Dr. Eike Biedermann. April 2010 Table of Contents Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................. 3 1 Summary of overview survey of CEE and SEE countries .................................................................................. 4 2 Baltic States 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 2.2 Latvia .................................................................................................................................................................... 7 2.3 Lithuania .............................................................................................................................................................. 9 2.4 Estonia ............................................................................................................................................................... 12 3 Visegrád countries 3.1 Czech Republic ................................................................................................................................................. 15 3.2 Hungary .............................................................................................................................................................. 17 3.3 Poland................................................................................................................................................................. 22 3.4 Slovakia .............................................................................................................................................................. 25 4 SEE countries 4.1 Albania ............................................................................................................................................................... 29 4.2 Belarus ................................................................................................................................................................ 30 4.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina .................................................................................................................................. 32 4.4 Bulgaria............................................................................................................................................................... 33 4.5 Croatia ................................................................................................................................................................ 34 4.6 Kosovo ............................................................................................................................................................... 37 4.7 Macedonia .......................................................................................................................................................... 38 4.8 Moldova ............................................................................................................................................................. 39 4.9 Montenegro ....................................................................................................................................................... 40 4.10 Romania ........................................................................................................................................................... 41 4.11 Serbia ................................................................................................................................................................ 42 4.12 Slovenia ............................................................................................................................................................ 44 4.13 Transnistria ...................................................................................................................................................... 45 4.14 Ukraine ............................................................................................................................................................. 46 2 Abbreviations ARM Army of the Republic of Macedonia BALTNET Baltic Air Surveillance Network CAF Croatian Armed Forces CBD Convention on Biological Diversity CEE Central and Eastern Europe DBU Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EU European Union EUFOR EU-led force GDP Gross Domestic Product IFOR NATO-led International Peacekeeping Force ISAF International Security Assistance Force JFTC NATO Joint Force Training Centre KFOR NATO-led Kosovo Force KLA Kosovo Liberation Army KPC Kosovo Protection Corps KSF Kosovo Security Force MKSF Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force MODBF Ministry of Defence Budapest Forestry Stock Company MoD Ministry of Defence MoE Ministry of Environment MOND Ministry of National Defence MORM Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia MTA Military Training Area NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NFR NATO Response Forces PEBLDS Pan-European Biological and Landscape Diversity Strategy PfP Partnership for Peace RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe RASCC Regional Airspace Surveillance Coordination Centre SCI Site of Community Importance (Natura 2000) SEDM South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial SEE South-Eastern Europe SEESIM South-Eastern Europe Simulation Military Network SFOR NATO-led Stabilisation Force SPA Special Protected Area (Natura 2000) TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo USSR Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 3 1 Summary of overview survey of CEE and SEE countries There are some deep differences between the countries covered by this survey, as well as some remarkable parallelisms. There are two major dividing lines: 1) Between those countries (10 of the countries surveyed, Fig. 2) which are now members of the EU and those which are not. In the former, there is an obligation to designate Natura 2000 sites, which can include military areas, and to ensure that species and habitats from the Habitats and Birds Directives are kept in a ‘favourable state of conservation’. In the other countries, there is no such legal and enforceable (European Court of Justice!) obligation to designate ecologically valuable military lands as conservation areas. Only the more or less voluntary international conventions such as Bern, Bonn, PEBLDS, Ramsar or CBD are applying here. Countries like Croatia which are candidates for EU accession are however already aligning their environmental and nature policies to the EU models, and the Council of Europe-sponsored Emerald network is in many ways parallel to Natura 2000 in its scientific concept and strategy. Fig. 2: Map of the EU member states. Country codes indicate those countries, which have been investigated in the survey. 2) Between those countries which have existed as independent states, with Armed Forces and all the accompanying military infrastructure, from long before 1990 (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania) and those countries which came into being after 1990 and have had to build up their armed forces from zero or from remnants inherited from predecessor states (e.g. the Baltic states, the former Yugoslav Republics, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Moldova). In those countries which existed before 1990, we see that the changes in political and strategic contexts since then (the shift from large conventional forces for Cold War land battles with massive armour deployment, to light mobile forces for rapid deployment to theatres far removed from Europe, to the increasing significance of counter-terrorism and urban warfare) have had a strong impact. The end of national military service (conscription) and the shift to professional forces, which has been taking place in all these countries, means that a significant number of barracks and training areas are redundant. The downsizing of the formerly large Armed Forces equipped with impressive arrays of vehicles, aircraft and armour, to smaller forces equipped with less (but more sophisticated) material, has also meant a major reduction in needs for training and exercise areas. Finally, in some countries (e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, 4 Latvia, Lithuania) the Soviet Armed Forces had garrisons and training areas and these were of course abandoned after 1990. Consequently, since 1990 there has been a steady decommissioning of surplus military estates, which includes training and exercise areas of great size and natural value. The process is not ended yet – it is still slowly proceeding in the new EU member States and is now getting under way for instance in Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Likewise, Ukraine has a long list of areas to be decommissioned. Paradoxically, new training and exercise areas have also been opened, or are planned, since 1990, in new countries which have been building up their Armed Forces and which did not always inherit the right infrastructure from their predecessor state, for example Estonia and Slovenia. Others are investing in their training areas to upgrade them and make them suitable to the new requirements of their military: Croatia, Lithuania and Macedonia. What are the trends in the training and exercise areas which remain
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