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Unitranche Financing in US Middle-Market Leveraged Buyouts

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Unitranche Financing in US Middle-Market Leveraged Buyouts Turning the Middle Market Upside Down: Unitranche Financing in U.S. Middle-Market Leveraged Buyouts McCarthy M. Shelton Appalachian State University Under the Supervision of Dr. Ivan Roten Special Thanks to Mr. Cary Nordan, Mr. John Bitsas, and Mr. Jonathan Ward of Triangle Capital Corporation, and Mr. Robert Dodd of Raymond James Financial, Inc. UNITRANCHE FINANCING IN U.S. MIDDLE-MARKET LBOS 1 Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 4 Turning the Middle Market Upside Down: Unitranche Financing in U.S. Middle-Market Leveraged Buyouts ......................................................................................................................... 6 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 6 History of the Leveraged Buyout .................................................................................... 6 Overview of Financing Structures .................................................................................. 7 Narration ............................................................................................................................. 8 Traditional LBO Financing ............................................................................................. 8 Bank Debt ................................................................................................................... 9 Subordinated Secured Debt ....................................................................................... 11 High Yield Bonds ...................................................................................................... 12 Mezzanine Debt ........................................................................................................ 13 Middle Market LBO Structure ...................................................................................... 13 Senior-Subordinated ................................................................................................. 14 First and Second Lien ............................................................................................... 15 Division ............................................................................................................................. 17 Unitranche Financing .................................................................................................... 17 Straight Unitranche ................................................................................................... 18 Bifurcated Unitranche ............................................................................................... 18 UNITRANCHE FINANCING IN U.S. MIDDLE-MARKET LBOS 2 Unitranche Summary ................................................................................................ 20 Proof .................................................................................................................................. 20 Borrower Benefits ......................................................................................................... 21 Simplicity .................................................................................................................. 21 Speedier Closing ....................................................................................................... 22 Syndication/Execution Risk ...................................................................................... 22 Due Diligence ........................................................................................................... 23 Reporting and Compliance ....................................................................................... 23 Lender Involvement .................................................................................................. 24 Payment Structure ..................................................................................................... 24 Benefits to Lenders ....................................................................................................... 25 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 25 Refutation .......................................................................................................................... 26 Pricing ........................................................................................................................... 27 Credit Quality ................................................................................................................ 28 Bankruptcy Risks .......................................................................................................... 30 AAL Enforcement ..................................................................................................... 30 Voting Rights ............................................................................................................ 31 Post-Petition Interest ................................................................................................. 32 Inconclusive History ................................................................................................. 32 UNITRANCHE FINANCING IN U.S. MIDDLE-MARKET LBOS 3 Unproven Recovery Rates ............................................................................................ 32 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 35 Structure Comparison .................................................................................................. 36 The Future of Middle Market Leveraged Loans ........................................................... 37 References ......................................................................................................................... 37 Endnotes ............................................................................................................................ 40 Tables ................................................................................................................................ 41 Figures............................................................................................................................... 42 UNITRANCHE FINANCING IN U.S. MIDDLE-MARKET LBOS 4 Abstract Since the 1960’s, the leveraged buyout (LBO) industry has grown to represent a pillar of American finance. While Henry Ford’s management buyout in 1919 is often cited as the “first” LBO, these transactions became big business in the 1980’s. In 2015, aggregate private equity deal volume hit $634 billion, or around 3% of total U.S. market capitalization. The strategy has waxed and waned in popularity over the years, and has often earned a somewhat negative reputation with “Main Street” Americans. Hostile takeovers, “slash-and-burn” management styles, and corporate greed have cast a shadow on an industry largely portrayed to the public by books and movies like 1987’s Wall Street and tarnished by scandals such as Michael Milken’s conviction for racketeering and securities fraud in 1990. While the streamlining necessary to pay down large debt loads can lead to layoffs and liquidations, LBOs began as a means of providing viable growth and/or exit strategies for hard-working business owners. This paper analyzes the most common forms of middle-market LBO financing. Method Due to the limited history of unitranche financing, there is very limited quantitative data on unitranche deals. For this reason, I relied heavily on qualitative data, interviews with industry professionals, and numerous articles for my research. If possible, I plan to analyze further quantitative data post-graduation, potentially with the help of an academic research grant. Keywords: Leveraged Buyout (LBO): The acquisition of a target business, typically by a private equity sponsor or management team, which is financed by a relatively small amount of equity and larger portion of debt in order to leverage returns for equity stakeholders; for the sake of this paper, deals financed with more than 60% debt are considered leveraged Financial Sponsor: A buyer, typically a private equity firm or management team, that seeks financing for an LBO candidate that they plan to acquire Private Equity: Private equity firms consist of a general partner (GP) or manager which raises capital (dry powder) from limited partners (LP) and uses that capital to invest in leveraged buyouts Business Development Company (BDC): A pass-through entity created by Congress in 1980 and regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the SEC with the purpose of allowing individual investors to participate in private equity and debt investments1 EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization; often used as a cash flow and valuation metric UNITRANCHE FINANCING IN U.S. MIDDLE-MARKET LBOS 5 EBITDA turns: Leverage is often stated in terms of a multiple of EBITDA; most middle market LBOs are levered at 4x-7x, meaning that it would take 4-7 years of operating cash flows to fully repay all principal Middle-Market: Consists of businesses earning between $50 million and $1 billion in annual revenues and EBITDA of up to $100 million Lower Middle-Market: Consists of businesses earning between $10 and $50 million in annual revenues and EBITDA of up to $10 million Unitranche Financing: A form of LBO financing that
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