DOCSLIB.ORG

The Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Timor-Leste

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Timor-Leste CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CIR Working Paper No. 48 March 2009 UN Photo by Marco Dormino The Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Timor-Leste Daisaku Higashi CIR Working Paper No. 48 i Abstract It appears to be a widely shared understanding that it is imperative for peacebuilders to construct legitimacy in the eyes of local people and leaders. Surprisingly, however, the concrete methods or policies to obtain this “local legitimacy” have not been fully examined. The objective of this report is to address this critical question by examining key policies regarding legitimacy construction in Timor-Leste peacebuilding. The report is based on more than 45 individual interviews with key political leaders as well as a total of 319 opinion surveys in three districts. ii Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Timor-Leste The Author Daisaku Higashi is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Obtaining a research grant awarded by the Toyota Foundation, Higashi is currently conducting field research in both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. Higashi’s another report “Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebulding: Case of Afghanistan” was published from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Headquarters. CIR Working Paper No. 48 iii Preface and Acknowledgements Legitimacy in world politics has been the focus of both global attention and scholarly study in recent years, yet its role in peacebuilding has not been well studied. It is often remarked in both public and scholarly discourse that legitimacy is critical for success in creating sustainable peace in war-torn states; Larry Diamond, a political scientist who worked as a political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, asserts, “the first lesson of America’s experience in Iraq is that… any effort at administration and reconstruction of the post-conflict state must mobilize legitimacy, both internally in the post-conflict country as well as internationally.”1 It appears to be a widely shared understanding that it is imperative for peacebuilders to obtain or construct legitimacy in the eyes of local people and leaders. Surprisingly, however, the concrete methods or policies to obtain this “local legitimacy” in the host states have not been fully examined. The objective of this report is to address this critical question by examining key policies regarding legitimacy construction in the specific context of Timor-Leste peacebuilding. I have already conducted research with the same question in Afghanistan and completed my report titled, “Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Afghanistan”, which has been posted on the website of the Best Practices Section in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Headquarters, and was widely shared by UN officials, government officials (in both the Afghan government and donor states), and academic scholars. I believe that accumulated case studies will demonstrate policy implications for both ongoing and future peacebuilding efforts. I wish to thank Carolyn McAskie, former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, who introduced me and my research proposal to numerous UN peacebuilders and key officials in UN missions. In her letter, she endorsed my project as research “which will shed much-needed light on an issue which perhaps more than any other affects the success or failure of international peacebuilding efforts.” Yukio Takasu, the Permanent Representative of the Japanese Mission at the UN, and Kenzou Oshima, the former Permanent Representative of the Japanese Mission at the UN, also supported my research with written endorsements. Nelson Santos, Timor-Leste Ambassador to the United Nations also gave me great cooperation to realize my field research. The United Nations Integration Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) gave me special cooperation to accomplish this research. I also appreciate the cooperation of the Japan embassy in Timor-Leste, including Iwao Kitahara, the Japanese ambassador in Timor-Leste. I am sincerely thankful for the precious advice I received from Fatemeh Ziai, the former acting director of the best practices unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and current director of the integrated training section at DPKO. I am also extremely grateful to Dr. Richard Price, Dr. Katharina Coleman, and Dr. Brian Job for their academic support and advice at UBC. 1 Diamond 2006, 34. Emphasis added. iv Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Timor-Leste Financially, I deeply appreciate the Toyota Foundation, which funded my field research in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. I also would like to send my many thanks to all UN officials, officials in ISF (International Stabilization Forces), and all Timorese who cooperated with my interviews. Thanks to their cooperation, I conducted individual interviews with over 20 international officials, several cabinet members of the Timor-Leste government, more than 10 central government officials, several top leaders from FRETILIN, currently the largest opposition party, leaders in F-FDTL (Timor-Leste National Army), and leaders in PNTL (Timor-Leste National Police), as well as 319 ordinary Timorese citizens who responded to my opinion survey. This paper reflects the views of the author and does not represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or of the United Nations or the Government of Japan. I hope that my research and report can make a contribution to ongoing efforts for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste as well as future peacebuilding efforts in the world. CIR Working Paper No. 48 v Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. i Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1 • Hypothesis and Methods • Key Recommendations I. Enhancing the Dialogue in Local Areas to Address Gap among People with Regard to the Legitimacy of the Government and Elections..................................................................................... 3 • Background • Embedded Divide in Legitimacy of the Government and Elections • Policy Recommendations II. Setting up a Joint Field Monitoring Committee that Will Monitor the “Security Sector Reform” to assess the Timing of UN Police Withdrawal ...................................................................................... 6 • Background • Security Situation, Expectation, and Reality • Challenge of Reforming PNTL (1) Capacity Building • Challenge of Reforming PNTL (2) Avoid Politicization • Policy Recommendations III. Initiating Community-Based Development Projects to Create Job Opportunities for Timorese People across the Country by Using the Sustainable Petroleum Fund ........................................... 10 • Background • Challenge: How to Satisfy the Young Labors in Timor-Leste • Policy Recommendations IV. Lesson from the Past on Timor-Leste Peacebuilding ................................................................. 13 • Substantial Support for “Timorization efforts” by UNTAET and Sergio de Mello • Outcomes of Cheap Exits: Automatic Transfer from Constitutional Assembly to Parliament • Role of the UN: Comparative Advantage of UN Peacekeepers and Multinational Forces V. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 17 Appendix 1: Results of Opinion Survey in Timor-Leste in November 2008 ..................................... 19 Appendix 2: Graphs: Hypothesis on Constructing Domestic Legitimacy in Peacebuilding.............. 31 Appendix 3: Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... 32 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 33 vi Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Timor-Leste CIR Working Paper No. 48 1 Introduction peacebuilding process. And repeated compliance with these political developments will enhance the creation of legitimate Hypothesis and Methods governments; on the other hand, repeated noncompliance will erode the legitimacy of governments. The purpose of this research is to address the question, “What are effective policies for In my hypothesis, there is one intermediate international and domestic peacebuilders to factor between these five factors and construct domestic legitimacy in the process compliance behaviors: the “credibility as of peacebuilding?” In other words, the impartial,” which peacebuilders should research seeks effective policies for create and enhance. For example, when peacebuilders to create “legitimate domestic factions perceive that governments,” under which a majority of peacebuilders are credible, fair, and people comply with the rules of government impartial, it is more likely that domestic in voluntary mode. As for the definition of factions will participate in elections and legitimacy, Thomas Frank argues “legitimacy accept their results, as they can perceive that exerts a pull to compliance which is powered their political rights will be protected even by the quality of the rule or of the rule-making after they lose elections, and their institution and not by coercive authority. It
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency
    Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°87 Dili/Brussels, 9 February 2009 Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency I. OVERVIEW saw a stream of human rights abuses, stemming from ill-discipline and a sense of being above the law. There are tensions between the Timorese and the international A year after the near-fatal shooting of President José security forces, with the Timorese police increasingly Ramos-Horta, security in Timor-Leste is strikingly resisting UN supervision. There are also signs of wor- improved. Armed rebels are no longer at large. The rying disdain for the justice system and civilian con- atmosphere on the streets of Dili is far less tense. The trol over the army. The police and army depend too government does not seem to be facing any serious heavily on a few individuals and on personal relation- political threat to its survival. It has, at least temporar- ships that have been able to hold the security forces ily, been able to address several of the most pressing together. security threats, in large part by buying off those it sees as potential troublemakers. Nevertheless, the cur- Presidential interventions in cases involving political rent period of calm is not cause for complacency. Secu- violence have undermined an already weak justice sys- rity sector reform is lagging, the justice system is weak, tem. They send a signal that those involved, especially the government shows signs of intolerance towards the elite, will not be held to account, creating resent- dissenting voices, and it has not got a grip on corrup- ment among the victims and failing to create a deter- tion.
    [Show full text]
  • In Bissilau^Ajleu (Area) on 16Th This Month Falantil Ambushed the Enemy and Killed Ko Indonesian Soldiers
    - -'..-. •.-'• -•• -••. :.••'/; \s< ..:'-:: u. z^ T" .o::--. first floor, 232 Casilereagh St..Sydney NSW aoOO^ phoner-2b'l?0't Pecerabex * PRESS RELEASE " 1^,000 INDONESIANS KILLED SINCE DECEMBER 7 1975" Radio Maubere on November . 19 claimed in a broadcast that Falantil (National Liberation Forces of East Timor) "has killed over 1*f,000 Indonesian troops since December 7, 1975." This news was contained in a communique from the Ministry of Information and National Security , read in English in the form in which messages' were, previously sent to Telecom Darwin, Prime Minister Eraser ordered Telecom to no longer pass on messages received from Fretilin inside East - Timor on Outpost Radio Darwin. The last message sent on- by Telecom was on November 14. The text of the message read on Radio Maubere on November 19 is as follows ( due to poor reception, some parts were indecipherable and are marked by dots) Democratic Republic of East Timor Ministry of Information and National Security Indonesia is increasing strongly its aggression in East Timor. Through the territory ,fierce fighting is still going on. Falantil has killed over 14,000 Indonesian troops since December 7 1975. In Bissilau^Ajleu (area) on 16th this month Falantil ambushed the enemy and killed kO Indonesian soldiers. Indonesian warplanes,ships and heavy artillery are still bombarding the territory.... The peace can be restored by the withdrawal of all Indonesian soldiers. The The world should not remain indifferent to the human suffering of the people of ^ast Timor Indonesian authorities .... heroic people of East Timor under the leadership of Fretilin .... €* Fernandes, Minister of Information and National Security.
    [Show full text]
  • Timor-Leste’S Security Sector Collapsed and the Fledgling the Security Sector Nation Lurched Toward Civil War
    AddressingSECURITY International Governance Challenges SECURITYSECTOR SECTORREFORM RMEFORMONITOR MONITOR TIMOR-LEEAST TIMORSTE Decemberoctober 20092009 •• No.1No.1 INSIDE INTRODUCTION Introduction 1 Historical Background of 2 In mid-2006, large parts of Timor-Leste’s security sector collapsed and the fledgling the Security Sector nation lurched toward civil war. The country’s police (Polícia Nacional de Timor Leste - Security Environment 4 PNTL) and military (Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste - F-FDTL) were at best incapable The United Nations and 6 of controlling, and at worst complicit in fomenting crime and lawlessness, requiring SSR the government to request an Australian-led peacekeeping force and international Policing 6 policing presence to restore public order. Justice Sector 10 Armed Forces 10 The tragic events of April–June 2006—in which 37 died in the violence and over Conclusion 11 150,000 were driven from their homes—laid bare the dysfunctions of the security Works Cited 12 sector. “The Crisis,” as the events of 2006 are now known, revealed that there was ISSN 1920-1087. little substance to many parts of the security sector beyond uniforms and weapons. The opinions expressed in this It became clear that Timor-Leste required a comprehensive and far-reaching security paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance sector reform (SSR) process. Innovation or its Board of Directors and/or Board of Governors. Copyright © 2009, The Centre for International Governance Innovation. This work was carried out There have been significant changes in the Timorese security sector since 2006, with the support of The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (www.cigionline.org).
    [Show full text]
  • Timor-Leste's Displacement Crisis
    TIMOR-LESTE’S DISPLACEMENT CRISIS Asia Report N°148 – 31 March 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE ORIGINS OF THE IDP CRISIS ......................................................................... 2 III. WHO ARE THE IDPS? ................................................................................................. 3 IV. CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS .................................................................................. 4 V. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS’ EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CRISIS.............. 6 VI. OBSTACLES TO RETURN.......................................................................................... 7 A. FEAR/SECURITY....................................................................................................................7 B. PULL FACTORS......................................................................................................................8 C. POLITICISATION AND CRIMINALISATION OF THE CAMPS........................................................9 D. LACK OF HOUSING ALTERNATIVES .......................................................................................9 1. Failure to rebuild houses..........................................................................................10 2. Land issues...............................................................................................................10
    [Show full text]
  • Cable Viewer
    Cable Viewer http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07DILI101.html Viewing cable 07DILI101, AUSSIES BRIEF ON REINADO OPERATION If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 07DILI101 2007-03-12 08:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dili VZCZCXRO2275 PP RUEHPB DE RUEHDT #0101/01 0710857 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P R 120857Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY DILI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3350 INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0851 RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0810 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0919 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0745 RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0055 RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2702 Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000101 Articles SIPDIS Brazil DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,IO Sri Lanka PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD SIPDIS United Kingdom Sweden E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/12/2017 Global TAGS: KPKO MOPS PGOV PREL TT AU NZ United States SUBJECT: AUSSIES BRIEF ON REINADO OPERATION Latin America REF: A) DILI 94, B) DILI 96, C) DILI 95 Egypt Jordan DILI 00000101 001.2 OF 003 Yemen Thailand CLASSIFIED BY: Seiji T. Shiratori, DCM, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) Browse latest releases 2011/08 Browse by creation date ¶1. (C) Summary: International Stabilization Forces (ISF) commander Brigadier Malcolm Rerden and Australian Ambassador to 66 72 73 75 78 79 85 86 East Timor Margaret Twomey briefed Emboffs March 9, reviewing 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 the current status of ISF operations to apprehend Major Alfredo 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Reinado and summarizing a meeting Rerden has just attended with top GOET and UN officials to discuss strategy to resolve the 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • Land and Life in Timor-Leste Ethnographic Essays
    Land and Life in Timor-Leste Ethnographic Essays Land and Life in Timor-Leste Ethnographic Essays Edited by Andrew McWilliam and Elizabeth G. Traube THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY E PRESS E PRESS Published by ANU E Press The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at http://epress.anu.edu.au/ National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Title: Land and life in Timor-Leste : ethnographic essays / Andrew McWilliam and Elizabeth G. Traube, editors. ISBN: 9781921862595 (pbk.) 9781921862601 (ebook) Notes: Includes bibliographical references. Subjects: Ethnology--Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste--Social life and customs--21st century. Timor-Leste--Social conditions--21st century. Timor-Leste--Rural conditions--21st century. Other Authors/Contributors: McWilliam, Andrew. Traube, Elizabeth G. Dewey Number: 301.295986 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU E Press Cover image: ‘Uma Lulik Borolaisoba, Watulari, Viqueque’ by Josh Trindade. Printed by Griffin Press This edition © 2011 ANU E Press Contents Contributors . .vii Map . x 1 . Land and Life in Timor-Leste: Introduction . 1 Andrew McWilliam and Elizabeth G. Traube 2 . Origins, Precedence and Social Order in the Domain of Ina Ama Beli Darlari . 23 Susana Barnes 3 . Opening and Closing the Land: Land and power in the Idaté highlands . 47 Judith Bovensiepen 4 . Fataluku Living Landscapes . 61 Andrew McWilliam 5. Darlau: Origins and their significance for Atsabe Kemak identity .
    [Show full text]
  • Resistance: Structure and Strategy
    Part 5: Resistance: Structure and Strategy Part 5: Resistance: Structure and Strategy...........................................................................................1 Part 5: Resistance: Structure and Strategy...........................................................................................2 5.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................2 5.2 Fretilin and the Base de Apoio....................................................................................................4 Organisation of civilians ................................................................................................................4 Military organisation.......................................................................................................................6 Fretilin’s socio-political programme ..............................................................................................9 Strategy........................................................................................................................................14 Protracted people’s war...............................................................................................................16 Internal conflict.............................................................................................................................17 5.3 The End of Bases de Apoio.......................................................................................................23
    [Show full text]
  • Timor-Leste Strategic Review: Progress and Success in Achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 2
    TIMOR-LESTE STRATEGIC REVIEW: PROGRESS AND SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 2 “Tau matan ba ita-nia futuru” Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD) Timor-Leste and Johns Hopkins University. Jessica Fanzo, João Boavida, Gianna Bonis-Profumo, Rebecca McLaren, and Claire Davis May 2017 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CEPAD and Johns Hopkins University would like to thank the Timorese citizens who shared their ideas, opinions, and knowledge in a spirit of open dialogue and gave their time to participate in focus group discussions and interviews at the municipality level, and in consultations, interviews and the validation workshop at the national level. Community engagement activities would not have been possible without the assistance of five of CEPAD’s District Liaison Officers located across Timor-Leste. The research was led by Johns Hopkins University and the report was written by Jessica Fanzo, João Boavida, Gianna Bonis-Profumo, Rebecca McLaren, and Claire Davis with the invaluable assistance of Jose Henriques, Florenciana de Jesus Rego, and Lamberto Quintas. The community consultations, national interviews and report writing were led by CEPAD’s Strategic Review Team with the support of CEPAD’s Programme Unit and the Department of Administration and Finance. The Research Team would like to thank the Advisory Group under the Prime Minister’s Office which was convened by H.E. Dr José Ramos-Horta, and H.E. Bishop Dom Virgílio do Carmo da Silva, SDB, providing expert guidance to the research team. The Advisory Group also
    [Show full text]
  • East Timor Inquiry: Canberra, 11 November 1999
    The Timor Gap, 1972-2017 Robert J. King 2 March 2017 The Timor Gap, 1972-2017 Robert J. King Contents Introduction page 4 The creation of the Timor Gap 5 Why Indonesia agreed to a compromise line in 1972 9 Negotiations with Portugal to close the Timor Gap, 1970-1974 12 Australian petroleum exploration in and off Timor 18 Negotiations with Indonesia on the Timor Gap 20 The Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty 28 Decision of the International Court of Justice 32 1997 Delimitation Treaty 32 East Timor during the period of UNTAET 33 Bayu-Undan Liquids Recovery and Gas Recycle Project 34 Indonesia's interest subsequent to its renunciation of sovereignty 37 Position of the East Timorese leading up to independence 39 Negotiations with UNTAET/ETTA 42 International Law on the resolution of maritime boundary disputes 43 Petrotimor 45 The July 2001 Interim Agreement 46 Australia’s rejection of international arbitration 47 The 2002 Timor Sea Treaty 48 Negotiations on a unitisation agreement for Greater Sunrise 50 The International Unitisation Agreement (IUA) 54 Negotiations on maritime boundaries, 2003-2006 55 Towards a ‘Creative Solution’ 58 The Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea 64 Non-implementation of the CMATS Treaty, 2007-2013 68 Arbitration on CMATS 73 Recommencement of negotiations on the maritime boundary 76 Toward a final settlement of Australia’s maritime borders 88 3 Introduction The 23 February 2013 was a significant date for Australia's relationship with 1 Timor-Leste. A condition of the Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) Treaty was that either country could terminate it if by then there was still no jointly approved development plan for the Greater Sunrise gas project.
    [Show full text]
  • Re-Enter the United Nations
    Lusotopie Recherches politiques internationales sur les espaces issus de l’histoire et de la colonisation portugaises XV(2) | 2008 Histoires d’Asie Re-enter the United Nations A Role for The Peacebuilding Commission in East Timor?* Le retour des Nations unies : un rôle pour la Commission de consolidation de la paix au Timor oriental ? O regresso das Nações Unidas : Um Papel para a Comissão de Manutenção da Paz em Timor-Leste ? Geoffrey C. Gunn Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/648 ISSN: 1768-3084 Publisher: Association des rechercheurs de la revue Lusotopie, Brill, Karthala Printed version Date of publication: 20 November 2008 Number of pages: 197-219 ISSN: 1257-0273 Electronic reference Geoffrey C. Gunn, « Re-enter the United Nations », Lusotopie [Online], XV(2) | 2008, Online since 01 February 2016, connection on 21 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/648 Tous droits réservés RE-ENTER THE UNITED NATIONS A role for the Peacebuilding Commission in East Timor?* On 23 June 2006 the UN proudly launched its Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) seeking to reverse a situation where international efforts to rebuild war-torn societies had, more often than not, failed. Mindful of such cases as Haiti, Cambodia, Somalia, and Liberia, where security deteriorated once international support was withdrawn, obviously the drafters of the PBC had much to learn from the East Timor (Timor-Leste) example. This was highlighted by the massive civil unrest sparked off in East Timor in early 2006, returning to world attention in February 2008 with the near assassination of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) president and the continuing humanitarian crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • What Makes a Leader?
    O c t o b e r 2 0 1 0 A N A L Y S I S FERGUS HANSON What Makes a Leader? Research Fellow Tel: +61 2 8238 9120 Mapping Leadership in [email protected] our Region ALEX OLIVER Research Fellow Tel: +61 2 8238 9117 [email protected] E x e c u t i v e s u m m a r y There is good reason to believe that leaders matter, and may be particularly important in developing countries. Yet there has been almost no systematic effort to try to understand the pathways to leadership in the Pacific, where Australia spends over $1 billion annually on aid. This empirical study draws on nearly 100 interviews with senior leaders in Samoa and Timor-Leste. It attempts to map the pathways leaders have taken and the role played by family, schooling, scholarships, custom and donors. It finds elites in both countries are overwhelmingly tertiary-educated, generally overseas and often through scholarships. However, most went to local primary and high schools, suggesting the important need for quality local schooling. Having a leadership whose parents are well educated may be a factor influencing a country’s political stability and development trajectory. It suggests customary obligations and large numbers of dependents do not necessarily translate into high levels of corruption. The findings LOWY INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY offer insights into how future leaders could be more easily identified at 31 Bligh Street an early stage. Sydney NSW 2000 Tel: +61 2 8238 9000 Fax: +61 2 8238 9005 www.lowyinstitute.org The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent international policy think tank.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 1 Aims, Structure and Methods
    CHAPTER 1 AIMS, STRUCTURE AND METHODS INTRODUCTION This thesis is a study of FRETILIN, the political party which led the independence struggle in Timor-Leste. The primary aim of my research has been to discover how FRETILIN’s theory and practice of ‘popular education’ in the period from 1973 until 1978, and, in particular, in the Resistance Bases known as the Bases de Apoio, contributed to the capacity of FRETILIN and its supporters to sustain that struggle over two and a half decades of brutal military invasion and occupation by the Indonesian Military. My secondary aim has been, through undertaking this research, to contribute to a process of ‘re-conscientisation’, by helping the participants in my research to rediscover the relevance of popular education now in independent Timor-Leste. While Portuguese colonialism had come in different social and political forms and with different ideologies (Gunn 1999), it had completely negated the education of the people or mass education, keeping the majority of the indigenous Timorese illiterate and excluded from politics until early 1974. When the April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal overthrew the fascist regime which had ruled there since 1926, and political parties became legal in Timor, FRETILIN was the only political party able to read this persistent social dimension of colonialism, and initiate change. Two leaders, António Carvarinho ‘Mau Lear1’ and Roque Rodrigues2 were central figures in the first FRETILIN Education Committee. In early 1975, Roque Rodrigues explained FRETILIN’s education policy to an Australian journalist, Bill Nicol, saying that “colonialism used many guns, one of which was illiteracy.” Nicol quoted Rodrigues directly: A struggle against illiteracy means also a struggle against mindlessness.3 The colonial state used the education system to polarize the people’s creativity and suffocate the Timorese culture.
    [Show full text]