No. 14 6 February 2007

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NATIONALISM

■ ANALYSIS Alexander Dugin, the Issue of Post-Soviet Fascism, and Russian Political Discourse Today 2 By Andreas Umland, Kiev, Ukraine ■ ANALYSIS Imperial Nationalism in Russia 5 By Emil Pain, Moscow ■ OPINION SURVEY “Russia for the Russians?…” 8 Interethnic Hostility 11 ■ REGIONAL REPORT Russian Nationalism Expands in the Regions 14 By Yury Shabaev, Syktyvkar

Research Centre for East CSS Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen An ETH Center Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 14/07 ddigestigest

Analysis Alexander Dugin, the Issue of Post-Soviet Fascism, and Russian Political Discourse Today By Andreas Umland, Kiev, Ukraine

Summary Th e past year witnessed a welcome sensitization of the Russian public towards skinhead attacks and ultra-na- tionalist propaganda. Nevertheless, the administration of Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin-controlled mass me- dia have maintained an ambiguous stance with regard to xenophobic tendencies in politics and public discourse. While primitive hatred of foreigners and ethnic violence are offi cially stigmatized, the dissemination of national stereotypes and anti-Americanism, in particular, by Kremlin-directed mass media and political pundits contin- ues unabated. For example, the notorious publicist Alexander Dugin, who openly propagated fascist ideas in the 1990s, has become an important player in shaping the discourse of Russian political and intellectual elites today. It remains to be seen how the Russian leadership will handle the challenges resulting from such a contradictory approach to its domestic and foreign policies in the coming years.

A New Sensitization Towards Right-Wing Ambiguous Reactions Extremism? espite such encouraging signs, the Kremlin-con- n view of escalating violent attacks and other actions Dtrolled mass media have an altogether ambivalent Iagainst foreigners, the debate on Russian fascism is stance toward right-wing extremist tendencies. Al- currently experiencing a new high in the Russian me- though manifest anti-Semitism and violent racism are dia. Th ere was a similar debate in the mid-1990s, when now heavily criticized and visibly stigmatized, other xe- the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and nophobic patterns remain present, or are even increasing, the “intransigent opposition,” a state of near-civil war in reporting on foreign news and political commentaries. in Moscow, the ascent of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the In addition to the traditional anti-Western, anti-Baltic, appearance of neo-Nazi parties, and the fi rst Chechen anti-Gypsy, and anti-Polish refl exes, this is increasingly war, gave rise to the notion of a “Weimar Russia.” Even true for prejudices against Ukrainians and Caucasians, though this construct has made only rare appearances recently, especially, against Georgians. Unquestionably, in commentaries in recent months, the current media though, it is the US that holds fi rst place among the debate is also marked by alarmism. “enemies of Russia,” as projected by the Russian state It is to be welcomed that the increasing right-wing media. Th e increasingly primitive and profound anti- extremist tendencies within the party landscape and Americanism seen, for example, in prime time political youth culture, which had been largely ignored for many television shows like “Odnako” (“However”, hosted by years, are now at least partially acknowledged by the Mikhail Leontiev), “Realnaia politika” (“Real Politics”, Russian public, and countermeasures are being debated. hosted by Gleb Pavlovsky), or “Post scriptum” (hosted Even the Russian judiciary, which has been known for by Alexei Pushkov) is raised to the level of a Manichean its pro-nationalist bias is beginning to submit to the world-view, where the US is made responsible for the pressure of public opinion (or the presidential adminis- majority of mishaps and failures in recent Russian, and tration), and now applies the Russian penal code’s sec- indeed global, history, and where US society mutates tion on xenophobic crimes more frequently than was the into the negative Other of Russian civilization. It is curi- case during the 1990s. Other promising developments ous that Germany – the country that has caused Russia include the sharp reactions of state offi cials to a xeno- the most harm in recent history – is often excepted from phobic campaign advertisement aired by the “Rodina” this paranoid perception of the external world and styl- alliance ahead of elections for the Moscow municipal ized as a collective friend of Russia, probably not least parliament and the measures against the often deadly because of Putin’s personal preferences (a distorted view skinhead attacks on immigrants and visiting students. that has, however, been stoked by the unorthodox ap- Offi cial statements on such issues occasionally refer to proach to Russia of former German chancellor Gerhard the “anti-fascist” heritage of the Soviet Union and to the Schröder). Russian people’s alleged special deep-rooted aversion Finally, it is important to note that despite the in- against fascism. creasing censure of certain right-wing extremist ten- 2 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

dencies, the representatives of ultra-nationalist political as European integral Traditionalism (René Guénon, groups regarded as close to President Putin have been Julius Evola, Claudio Mutti, etc.), Western geopolitics excepted from the Kremlin’s campaigns to discredit the (Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, radically nationalist camp. Th is is true in particular for and others), the German “conservative revolution” (Carl Zhirinovsky’s so-called Liberal Democratic Party, al- Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, though many statements made by Zhirinovsky and his etc.), and the francophone New Right (Alain de Benoist, entourage equally stir xenophobic hatred among the Robert Steuckers, Jean Th iriart). population (for example, his notorious pamphlet “Th e Furthermore, during the 1990s, Dugin repeatedly Last Leap toward the South”). Last year Putin person- hinted at his sympathy for selected aspects of Italian ally awarded the “Order of Merit for the Fatherland” Fascism and National Socialism, such as the SS and its (fourth degree) to Zhirinovsky – a man who in Ahnenerbe (“Ancestral Heritage”) Institute, and has de- September 1995 had physically attacked a female MP, scribed the Th ird Reich as the most consistent incarna- Yevgenia Tishkovskaya, in the State Duma in front of tion of the “Th ird Way” that he advocates. In the chap- TV cameras. ter “Fascism – Boundless and Red” of the online version of his 1997 book Tampliery Proletariata (Th e Templar Aberrations of the Intelligentsia Knights of the Proletariat), he expressed the hope that esides such tendencies in the broader public, there the inconsistent application of originally correct ideas Bare similarly contradictory developments in the dis- by Hitler, Mussolini, etc. would, eventually, be followed course of the elites and political pundits. On the one in post-Soviet Russia by the emergence of a “fascist fas- hand, the political leadership is promoting integration cism”. In Dugin’s apocalyptic worldview, global history of Russia into Western organizations such as the G8 consists of a centuries-old confrontation between hier- and the World Trade Organization. On the other hand, archically organized “Eurasian” continental powers and the political discourse of experts, as well as intellectual liberal “Atlantic” naval powers. Today, this confronta- life in general, are characterized by the spread of an anti- tion is carried out between Russia and the US as the Western consensus often described as “Eurasian,” the main representatives of the two antagonistic types of essence of which is the assertion that Russia is “diff er- civilization, and its fi nal battle is approaching (Dugin ent” from, or indeed, by its nature, the opposite of the uses the German word Endkampf, which has fascist con- US. Th e Russian book market is experiencing a glut of notations, without a Russian translation). vituperative political lampoons whose main features in- One might expect Dugin, and other extremely right- clude pathological anti-Americanism, absurd conspiracy wing pundits off ering similar pro-fascist statements, to theories, apocalyptic visions, and bizarre fantasies of be subjected to the same public stigmatization as neo- national rebirth. Among the more or less widely read Nazi parties and skinhead groups are currently experi- authors of such concoctions are Sergei Kurginyan, Igor encing. However, this has not been the case so far. On Shafarevich, Oleg Platonov, Maxim Kalashnikov (a.k.a. the contrary, Dugin and others of his ilk, such as the Vladimir Kucherenko), and Sergei Kara-Murza. well-known editor-in-chief of Russia’s leading ultra- Probably the best-known writer and commentator nationalist weekly Zavtra (“Tomorrow”), Aleksandr of this kind is Aleksandr Dugin (b. 1962), who holds a Prochanov, are popular guests in prime-time political doctorate in political science (from an obscure Russian television shows such as Vremena (“Times”, hosted by provincial institute) and is the founder, chief ideologue, Vladimir Pozner), Tem vremenem (“In the Meantime”, and chairman of the so-called International “Eurasian hosted by Aleksandr Archangelsky), Voskresni vecher’ Movement,” whose Supreme Council boasts among (“Sunday Evening”), or K Baryeru (“To the Barricade”, its members the Russian Federation’s Culture Minister hosted by Vladimir Solovyov), and are even invited to Aleksandr Sokolov, Vice Speaker of the Federation popular talk shows like Pust govoryat (“Let Th em Speak”, Council, Aleksandr Torshin, several diplomats, and hosted by Andrei Malakhov). other similarly illustrious personages, including some marginal Western intellectuals and CIS politicians. Th e Post-Soviet Conception of Fascism Dugin’s increasing celebrity is remarkable consider- he fact that Dugin has so far been “spared” by the ing that the chief “Neo-Eurasian” is not only among TKremlin-controlled media and his political oppo- the most infl uential, but also one of the most brazen nents is not only due to his recent celebrity as a “radical of the ultra-nationalist publicists. While authors such centrist” and fanatical supporter of Putin, but also his as Kurginyan or Kara-Murza are satisfi ed to promote ability to win the sympathies of prominent members a renaissance of classical Russian anti-Western senti- of the Russian legislative and executive braches. He has ments in their pamphlets and subtly draw on Western likewise managed to avoid the charge of promoting fas- sources, Dugin admits openly that his main ideas are cism by adapting his writings and public image to the based on non-Russian anti-democratic concepts such distorted conception of fascism inherited from Soviet 3 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

propaganda. In the post-Soviet discourse, the term “fas- West that accompanies the agitational realignment of cism” is equated with German National Socialism and foreign news reporting increases the playing fi eld for the its external trappings, such as the swastika or Roman sa- propagation of anti-Western slogans which also furthers lute. Occasionally, the propagandistic usage of the term the spread of extremist ideas proposed by Dugin and “fascism” goes so far as to include all ideas regarded as theorists with similar leanings. “anti-Russian”, and, paradoxically, becomes a rhetorical instrument in xenophobic agitation campaigns of Rus- Outlook sian ultra-nationalists. ill the newfound sensitivity towards nationalist Th e example of Dugin illustrates that, as a result of Wtendencies lead to a sustained return to tolerant the idiosyncratic conception of generic fascism in post- and liberal aspects of Russia’s political tradition? Or is Soviet Russia, it is suffi cient to rhetorically dissociate this new tendency no more than the latest episode in the oneself from the worst crimes of Nazi Germany and to Putin administration’s fl uctuating media campaigns? refrain from blatant copying of Nazi symbols in order to One can identify two contrary trends – one ideolog- avoid public stigmatization as a “fascist”. Th is approach ical, the other pragmatic – whose collision has restored would, at least, explain why, on the one hand, obviously a certain measure of controversy to the generally dull neo-Nazi groups such as the “Russian National Unity” public discourse in Russia. On the one hand, the dualist of Aleksandr Barkashov or skinhead gangs are being vo- worldview introduced by the Kremlin in the past few cally suppressed by the executive and judiciary, while on years – the simple, but honest Russians struggling for in- the other hand ultra-nationalist writers who, in terms of dependence against a devious, soulless, imperialist West their rhetoric, are no less radical are not only tolerated, – fulfi ls an important role in legitimating the “tough” but have unhindered access to public platforms and course of the resurging Russia under its new president. state-controlled media, and are, sometimes, allocated However, the offi cially approved paranoia also opens the an active role in PR projects of the Kremlin’s political fl oodgates for radical conclusions. Since the US model technologists. of society is presented as the antithesis of Russian civi- lization, one should not be surprised when youth gangs 1984 – Déjà Vu of violent thugs try to prevent an “Americanization” of nother factor in favor of Dugin and similar publi- Russian society in their way. Th e damage caused by Acists is the return of the Russian leadership to quasi- such reactions to the international image of Russia is, Orwellian forms of organizing public discourse. Krem- in turn, incompatible with the equally strong tendency lin-controlled political reporting in the mass media has towards establishing the country as a respected part- become a succession of national-patriotic happenings in ner of the Western countries and as becoming a part which international developments of any kind – wheth- of the “civilized world” (the preferred Russian term for er a Russia-China summit or Russian athletes’ perfor- the economically advanced democratic states). Besides, mance at the Olympics, the “Orange Revolution” or for- the leadership of the Kremlin appears to be consider- eign success of a Russian fantasy movie – are exaggerated ing large-scale immigration as a way of replenishing the into either collective triumphs or shared humiliations of rapidly dwindling population of the Russian Federation, the Russian nation under its faithful leadership. which would create new, potentially explosive, tensions. Th e attendant superfi ciality and emotionality of Finally, the fanatical anti-Americanism and pro-Iranian public debates, which occasionally degenerate into bi- positions of Dugin and others are in contradiction to a zarre shouting matches between participants of political number of security policy preferences of the Kremlin television shows, replace serious analysis. Political com- and its eff orts to join the international coalition against mentaries are fi xated on the “here and now” which, in terrorism as a full member. Due to these and other chal- the case of Dugin, may have contributed to the fact that lenges in the coming years, the – at least partial – hando- his well-known neo-fascist stance during the 1990s has ver of power in 2008 will gain additional importance. been “forgotten”. Th e mantra-like disparagement of the Translated from the German by Christopher Findlay

About the Author: Dr. Andreas Umland is DAAD Lecturer in German Studies at the National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv, Ukraine. Further Reading: Anastasia V. Mitrofanova, Th e Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy: Actors and Ideas, Stuttgart: Ibidem Publishers, 2005 (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, vol. 13). Marlene Laruelle, “Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?” Kennan Institute Occasional Papers, no. 294 (2006), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/OP294.pdf Roger Griffi n, Werner Loh, and Andreas Umland (eds.), Fascism Past and Present, West and East: An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem Publishers, 2006 (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, vol. 35). 4 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

Analysis

Imperial Nationalism in Russia By Emil Pain, Moscow

Summary Russian nationalist ideas and organizations are rapidly spreading through Russia now. Contemporary Rus- sian nationalists stress the idea of rebuilding the Russian empire. However, their focus on the idea of “Russia for the Russians” is incompatible with eff orts to bring other ethnic groups together in one political entity. Th e authorities support Russian nationalist ideas, in the mistaken idea that they will be able to manage nationalist forces. In fact, the rise of Russian nationalism is likely to encourage separatism among other ethnic groups.

Th e Dynamics of Russian Nationalism based on the “national movements” of the various re- ociological theory usually counterposes the con- publics within the Russian Federation, including the Scepts of nationalism and imperialism. Here I will Chechens, Tatars, Lezgin, and Avars, among others. try to show that these phenomena complement each Since the end of the 1990s, most activity has focused other in the ideology and practice of contemporary on the organization of ethnic Russians groups, a sec- Russian nationalism. tor which today is the largest and fastest growing part Post-Soviet Russia is surviving a process combin- of the nationalist movement in Russia. Th e number ing the disintegration of the empire and a simultaneous of youth organizations supporting the slogan “Russia attempt to restore it. Th is process is accompanied by for the Russians” has grown by a factor of 10. (Th ese the rapid growth of ethnic self-consciousness among groups are often labeled “skinheads” but the skinheads its many peoples. In the beginning of the 1990s, the only make up a fraction of this movement.) In 1991, minority non-Russian ethnic groups began asserting only several hundred individuals were members of their rights. By the end of the 1990s, it was the major- Russian nationalist organizations; in 2001, there were ity ethnic Russians who had become vocal. Although more than 10,000. In the subsequent two years, their the ethnic Russians became ethnically conscious later numbers tripled, reaching 33,000 by 2004. While than the other groups, their feelings are quickly grow- these numbers refl ect offi cial data, experts indicate ing and now the ethnic majority considers itself to be that signifi cantly larger numbers of youth participate more threatened than the minorities. From the begin- in ultra-radical nationalist organizations. ning of 2000, the share of ethnic Russians who feel In the 1990s, the skinheads belonged to small threatened by members of other ethnic groups living groups that numbered from 3 to 10 individuals. After in Russia is almost twice the number of other groups. 2000, they began to create large organizations, bring- During the Soviet era, the ethnic Russians were the ing together up to 500 individuals. In Moscow, the most tolerant of the ethnic groups in Russia. fi rst large organizations to appear were Skinlegion and Th e Russian’s fear of other ethnic groups was par- the National Socialist Group 88. In Moscow, there are ticularly noteworthy after the series of terrorist acts more than 6,000 young Nazis. In St. Petersburg, there in the summer of 1999 and beginning of the “second are more than 3,000, including at least 500 in Russian Chechen war” that fall. Initially, the feelings were Fist and no less than 100 in the Kolovrat organiza- directed against the Chechens, but after 2000, they tion. In Nizhny Novgorod, there are more than 2,500 spread to a variety of other ethnic groups. Since that skinheads and 300 of them are in North, the largest time, approximately two-thirds of respondents feel group. some form of antipathy toward other nationalities. If the growth of the youth national-fascist groups Anti-Semitism grew particularly quickly and now continues at this rate, and they continue to focus their the level of anti-Semitism among Russian nationalist attention on Russia’s large cities, their numbers could leaders has even outstripped their anti-Chechen and quickly become comparable to the numbers of law en- anti-Muslim feelings. forcement offi cers. Th e members of these groups are Th e number of nationalist organizations is growing well coordinated across cities and can quickly move as quickly as nationalist consciousness. In the begin- from place to place. In fact, their level of organiza- ning of the 1990s, most nationalist organizations were tion is much higher than the police forces who must 5 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

deal with them. Deputy Interior Minister S. Shadrin dropped below 53 percent and in some years reaches recently admitted this fact, pointing out that his col- as high as 60 percent. Today, supporters of this idea leagues had little information about the nationalist include Communists, Soviet conservatives, and tradi- groups. tionalists seeking to restore the empire and monarchy, Th e youth Russian nationalist organizations are but also Russian (rossiiskii) pragmatists and support- quickly becoming politicized under the infl uence of ers of radical market reform. Among the latter group, radical political parties, such as the National Great 30 percent support the slogan. Such nationalist ideas Power Party of Russia (NDPR), the Party of Freedom are equally wide-spread among members of parties on (PS), Russian National Unity (RNE), and the Russian the right and the left. About half of the people who All-National Union (ROS). All of these parties exist today support “a special Russian national path” 15 illegally, but act openly. For example, two NDPR years ago backed such democratic leaders as Andrei leaders presented their books in the Union of Writers Sakharov, Galina Starovoitova, and Yegor Gaidar. of Russia hall in the center of Moscow. Aleksandr Th e most prominent member of this group is Mikhail Sevostyanov presented “Time to be Russian” and Boris Yur’ev, once a State Duma member from the Yabloko Mironov, who is formally wanted by the authorities, party, who has recently penned a best-selling book presented “Th e Jewish Yoke.” At the latter presenta- which is the most consistent and eff ective expression tion, organizers announced that they were collecting of imperial nationalism currently available. signatures for the notorious Appeal of the 500, which demanded the closing of the all Jewish organizations. On the Phenomenon of Imperial Various pickets, demonstrations, rallies, and other Nationalism acts of mass protest conducted by nationalist activists n my view, the classic contradiction between empire are becoming regular occurrences in Russian cities. Iand nation needs to be redefi ned, at least in Russian Force is used with increasingly frequency. In 2004, conditions. Th anks to the lack of development of all skinheads committed 12 murders and 40 beatings peoples in Russia, few adopt a civic form of nationality, in Moscow, and 7 murders and 24 beatings in St. in which the state is built on the basis of popular sover- Petersburg. In 2006, the number of violent incidents eignty. Ethnic nationalism, however, proclaiming the based on nationalism increased. During the fi rst six dominant position of one ethnic, racial, or religious months of the year, 137 fell victim to such attacks, group in the state, is growing. Th is ethnonationalism with 18 dying from their wounds. is not the same among diff erent ethnic groups. Th e Th e police have noted the upsurge in violence. national movements of the ethnic minorities set the In 2003, they fi led 20 cases of murder on national- goal of creating their own states and succeeding from ist grounds and 44 in 2004. Th ese cases represent the the Russian empire, Soviet Union, and now Russian most clear cut examples of murder for nationalist or Federation, using the rhetoric of “the nation against racist reasons. Most of the time, the authorities are the empire.” Th e leaders of Russian nationalism are reluctant to qualify the murders as being connected to fi lling out their ranks with an alternative idea: the res- nationalist causes. Usually they list the cause as hooli- urrection of the empire as the geographic expression of ganism or domestic quarrels. the Russian nation. Th e Russian authorities try to ignore the growth What is the relationship between the growth of and activities of Russian nationalism in order not to Russian nationalism and the conduct of the imperial cloud the picture of political stability in the country. project? Th ese phenomena would seem to be mutually Nevertheless, the nationalist groups became so active exclusive: the growth of ethnic suspicion is incompat- that Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev described ible with the desire to preserve peoples in a unifi ed them as fascist. Putin indirectly admitted the same government. Th e slogan “Russia for the Russians!” thing during a 2005 speech in Poland. contradicts the traditional imperial slogan of “All peo- Unfortunately, there are enormous reserves for ples are subjects of one state and sovereign.” However, the growth of national-fascist organizations. Levada the supporters of the new imperial project have not Center senior researcher Leonid Sedov claims that the set themselves the goal of establishing a stable, func- latent support for the “Russia for the Russians” slogan tioning empire, making their project entirely utopian. is 17 million. However, the overall number of people Th eir goal is to mobilize the ethnic majority to take sympathetic to this idea is much larger. According to power and ultimately establish an entity in which the the polls of numerous sociological organizations, the Russian people can dominate. When a people does share of the population supporting the slogan “Russia not feel like the owner of its country, it begins to as- for the Russians” in one form or another has not sert itself, at least in respect to the ethnic minorities. 6 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

All contemporary national-imperial projects in Russia nationalists and the Islamic fundamentalists in the re- play on these feelings. publics of the North Caucasus. But the authorities do not want this force used against the Russian people Th e Russian Authorities and Russian and, as a result, are being dragged along behind a grow- Nationalism ing xenophobic outburst. After the ethnic pogrom in he federal authorities use standard nationalist Kondopoga from August 30 to September 3, 2006, Tideologies to consolidate society. Th us they rely the authorities talked about the need to “guarantee on the military heroic past, emphasizing the glorious the priority of the indigenous population,” signaling victories of the empire; fear, focusing on the image of support for the idea of Russian dominance. After the an enemy; and strength, pressuring the national move- excesses with Georgia in the fall of 2006, in which ments of the ethnic minorities. hundreds of illegal Georgian migrants were deported, Th is policy is suicidal for the authorities. Th ey are the authorities announced the introduction of quotas victim to the illness typical of personalistic regimes: for foreigners living in Russia. Th e Russian authorities conceit. Many regime ideologists claim that if is pos- undoubtedly are drifting toward a policy of imperial sible to create “managed democracy,” then it is also nationalism. However, a new generation is rising and possible to manage nationalism. Th ey are deeply mis- they are hungry wolf cubs, who have studied Dugin’s taken since nationalism has a completely diff erent textbooks, becoming brainwashed xenophobes. For a nature than democracy. It is based on the weakly- start, why shouldn’t they try to take the place of those controlled mythological consciousness and demands with non-Russian last names in the government? constant emotional support. It is easily awakened, but diffi cult to direct toward the goal of preserving power. Th e Future of Imperial Nationalism in Today we see that the main thing is that nationalism Russia has escaped state control and is developing beyond the hanks to contemporary Russia’s democratic pro- desire or goals of the current Russian establishment. Tcedures, these forces cannot win political offi ce. All types of nationalists do not consider the current Naturally, they have no interest in democracy. Th eir regime their ally. Th us, Yur’ev notes that “no one likes ability to take power through a coup is also unlikely, the current pseudo-model [Putin’s regime], some less although they discuss the possibility among them- than others, but nevertheless no one.” Th is mood selves. More probable is a “quiet” and gradual replace- among the imperial nationalists dooms all attempts ment of the authorities and the growth within the bu- by the authorities to work with them. reaucracy of the national-imperial forces. Th us I am in In order to consolidate the people who revere the agreement with Yur’ev, who writes that “the strategic past, the Russian authorities created a new holiday, appearance in the depths of the Russian power struc- “the Day of National Unity,” marking the events of tures of an orientation favoring the second model (a 1612. However, the holiday was quickly monopolized full-blooded empire - E.P.) is completely logical and by the Russian nationalist organizations united in facilitated by the pressure of conditions.” the Russian March movement. Now the authorities In its drift toward imperial nationalism, Russia is fear this holiday, placing Russian police on guard in similar to Germany at the end of the 1920s. However, Russian cities. Th e authorities tried to scare the people I remind you, that the Nazi’s premier idea, in the fi nal with an enemy image, but instead became the en- analysis, did not bring them to power in Germany. In emy themselves. In numerous fl yers, the nationalists Russia, the likelihood of the success of the national- explain to their readers that all of their problems are imperial model is even smaller, taking into account the result of the so-called “antinational government,” the complicated territorial structure of our country, where people with non-Russian last names dominate, with large sections populated by non-Russian peoples particularly ministers Zurabov, Levitin, Nurgaliev, and with their growing share of the Russian popula- and even Prime Minister Fradkov. tion. In these conditions, the divide between imperial In the throes of “managed nationalism,” the au- policy and the real demands of the country would ap- thorities created the nationalist party Rodina, but pear very quickly and, as a consequence, the nation- soon it almost slipped out of control. Th e authori- al-imperial regime would not have any chance for a ties managed to reorganize the party’s leadership, but stable existence. seem incapable of dealing with its electorate, which Empires can long fi ght the nationalism of the mi- could turn into a crowd of people willing to conduct norities living on the periphery or in the colonies, but a pogrom. Th e authorities are extremely afraid of this against the nationalism of the majority, they are de- crowd. It is capable of using force against the Chechen fenseless and will be quickly destroyed. Russian his- 7 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

tory testifi es to this fact. Provoked by the defenders of ty. Russian nationalism will stimulate quick growth the empire and supported by the authorities, the rise among the nationalist and religious-fundamentalist of Russian nationalism in 1905-1906 was the begin- movements of the ethnic minorities in the Russian ning of the end of the Russian empire. Th e paradox of republics. Th is situation confi rms the indeterminate imperial nationalism is that it is made for saving the fragility of the national-imperial system. Th e threat of empire, but in reality is the base for its destruction. a fascist Russia is real, unfortunately, but this outcome If the current rise of Russian nationalism brings it to is not foreordained. Th e country has a choice. power, it will not be possible to preserve Russia’s uni-

About the Author: Emil Pain is a sociologist and political analyst, professor of the Higher School of Economics and General Director of the Center for Ethno-Political and Regional Studies.

Opinion Survey

“Russia for the Russians?…” Source: http://www.levada.ru./press/2006082500.html, 27 August 2006 Do Russians in Russia Live far Better than Other Ethnicities?

2006 7% 46% 6% 41%

2005 9% 41% 4% 46%

2004 9% 41% 5% 45%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Far better/somewhat better Neither better nor worse Difficult to answer Somewhat worse/far worse

What is Your Attitude Towards the Concept „Russia for the Russians“?

Aug 20066 17% 37% 11% 7% 28% Jun 20055 19% 39% 9% 7% 3% 23% Dec 20044 16% 37% 12% 5% 4% 25% Jul 20033 21% 32% 7% 14% 8% 18% Nov 20012 16% 42% 11% 6% 5% 20% Aug 19981 15% 31% 10% 5% 7% 32%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

I support this concept, it should have been implemented long ago It would not be a bad idea to implement this concept, but within reasonable limits It does not interest me I haven't thought about this concept (answer not off ered in the 2006 survey) Difficult to answer I have a negative attitude towards this concept, it is fascism pure and simple

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To What Extent Do You Agree with the Following Statement: “People of ‘Non-Russian’ Ethnicity are to be Blamed for a Lot of Russia‘s Problems”?

2006 34% 8% 58%

2005 37% 6% 57%

2004 42% 6% 52%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Definitely yes/probably yes Difficult to answer Probably not/definitely not

To What Extent Do You Agree with the Following Statement: “Ethnic Minorities Have Too Much Power in Our Country”?

2006 38% 11% 51%

2005 45% 9% 46%

2004 47% 8% 45%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Definitely yes/probably yes Difficult to answer Probably not/definitely not

To What Extent Do You Agree With the Following Statement: “It is Necessary to Limit the Infl uence of Jews in Government, Politics, Business, Law, Education and Show Business”?

2006 41% 16% 43%

2005 44% 12% 44%

2004 48% 11% 41%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Definitely yes/probably yes Difficult to answer Probably not/definitely not

9 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

In Your Opinion, What Policy Should the Government Pursue in Regard to Immigrants?

Attempt to limit the inflow of immigrants 2006 52% 9% 39%

Difficult to answer 2005 59% 5% 36%

It should not erect any administrative barriers to limit the inflow of immigrants, 2004 54% 8% 38% and attempt to use it for the benefit of Russia

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Do You Feel/Experience Hostility…?

2006 3% 8% 3% 27% 59%

2005 4% 9% 2% 25% 60%

ethnicities 2004 4% 13% 2% 29% 53%

Towards people of other 2002 3% 9% 1% 29% 59%

2006 2% 8% 3% 27% 60%

2005 3% 9% 2% 26% 61%

ethnicities 2004 4% 10% 1% 29% 56%

From people of other 2002 2% 8% 2% 29% 60%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Very often Rather often Difficult to answer Rarely Never/practically never

Is It Necessary to Limit the Residence of the Following Ethnicities on Russian Territory? 2004 2005 2006 1. Emigrants from the Caucasus 46% 50% 42% 2. Chinese 39% 46% 41% 3. Vietnamese 39% 42% 35% 4. Gypsies 32% 30% 29% 5. Emigrants from the former Central Asian republics of the USSR 31% 31% 23% 6. Jews 15% 18% 13% 7. Ukrainians 8% 8% 7% All ethnicities apart from Russians 14% 11% 11% It is not necessary to impose any limitations on the residence of any ethnicity 21% 20% 25% Diffi cult to answer 5% 5% 7%

10 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

Are Th ere Fascists in Russia? If Yes, Has Th eir Number Increased in the Last Years?

There are no fascists in Russia 12%

Difficult to answer 23% Yes, there are, their number has increased 53%

Yes, there are, their number has decreased 12%

Interethnic Hostility

Source: Survey conducted by FOM Institute, 11-12 November 2006 http://bd.fom.ru/zip/tb0645.zip, 20.11.2006 In Your Opinion, is it Necessary to Limit the Entry of Certain Ethnicities into Your Oblast, Rayon or Town?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

All respondentsAll respondents

Men

Women

Age 18 to 35

Age 36 to 55

Age 55 and above

No secondary school

Secondary school

Vocational school

University

Income up to 2,000 rubles

Income 2,001-3,999 rubles

Income above 4,000 rubles

Moscow

Megapolis

Large town

Small town

Village

It is necessary Difficult to answer It is not necessary

11 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

If, in Your Region, the Decision Would be Taken to Expel Certain Ethnic Groups, Would You Approve or Disapprove of Such a Decision?

Village

Small town

Large town

Megapolis

Moscow

Income above 4,000 rubles

Income 2,001-3,999 rubles

Income up to 2,000 rubles

University

Vocational school

Secondary school

No secondary school

Age 55 and above

Age 36 to 55

Age 18 to 35

Women

Men

AllAll respondents respondents

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

I would approve Difficult to answer I would disapprove

On November 4, in a Number of Russian Cities Th ere Occurred Demonstrations Under the Overall Des- ignation “Russian March”. Do You Know, Have You Heard, or Do You Hear For the First Time Th at a “Russian March” Has Taken Place in a Number of Russian Towns?

Village

Small town

Large town

Megapolis

Moscow

Income above 4,000 rubles

Income 2,001-3,999 rubles

Income up to 2,000 rubles

University

Vocational school

Secondary school

No secondary school

Age 55 and above

Age 36 to 55

Age 18 to 35

Women

Men AllAll respondents respondents

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

I know of this I have heard of this Difficult to answer I am hearing of this for the first time

12 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

Did a “Russian March” Take Place in Your Region? (Answers By Th ose Who Knew of the “Russian March”)

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

l l l ts n o o ty s s w is n n n ve o e es e o l w w ge Me o 35 o 55 hoo h bl to la de omen t t c c versi rubl rubl sc to il n abo scho s l s i ru gapo V W 18 36 d ry y a n Mo rge all n U Me a respo ge ge an da dar o ,999 L Sm ll A A n ati -3 A 55 o on c ec o to 2,000 ve 4,000 ge s Sec V p A ,001 bo o e u 2 a All respondents N m e e o m m nc o o I Inc Inc

It took place Difficult to answer It did not take place

Do You Know the Main Idea Behind the „Russian March“? (Answers By Th ose Who Knew of the „Russian March“)

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

n l l l y s s s n n nts ve o o t e es e w li ge o bl o w w a de Me omen to 35 to 55 choo ch ubl ubl sc to to ill n abo scho s iversi r ru r V W y l s n gapo all 18 36 d ry a U Mo rge an n Me La Sm respo ge ge da dar o ,999 ll A A n ati -3 A 55 o on c ec o to 2,000 ve 4,000 ge s Sec V p A ,001 bo All respondents o e u 2 a N m e e o m m nc o o I Inc Inc

I know the idea Difficult to answer I don't know the idea

13 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

Regional Report Russian Nationalism Expands in the Regions By Yury Shabaev, Syktyvkar

he fall of 2006 marked an increase in the activ- reach eff orts. During October and the beginning of Tity of Russian nationalist groups in Russia at the November, I received requests to prepare seven reports national and regional levels. Th e most visible manifes- on agitation material, determining whether the con- tation of this phenomenon was the “Russian March” tent of the fl yers directed against migrants and specifi c held on the November 4 Day of National Unity in ethnic groups violated laws designed to prevent the Moscow and many regional capitals like Komi’s Syk- sowing of ethnic discord. Th is is the fi rst time that I tyvkar. have seen so much activity among radical movements In Komi, on that day Union for National Revival in Komi. (SNV) leader Yury Yekishev sought permission to hold a demonstration, but never received an offi cial Offi cial Policy Fails to Address Problems response from the authorities, even though the law re- omi’s offi cial policies to deal with ethnic confl ict quires that a response be provided within three days. Kare characterized by their declaratory and formal However, when approximately 60 of his supporters be- nature. Th e authorities have no desire to form their gan to gather, they were met by police who informed ethnic policies based on the interests of the ethnic them that the authorities had forbidden the demon- groups living in the republic. Moreover, the authori- stration. Th ose who had intended to march were then ties are displaying clear ethnic favoritism for well-con- taken by bus to the police station. nected individuals and groups. By working with the Th e SNV was not alone in organizing the demonstra- formal leaders of the various ethnic organizations in tion. Among the groups that joined in the march were the republic, the authorities cannot hope to infl uence Dor’yam As’nymos, an association of Komi intellectuals the mood of the population or change social attitudes that represents the radical fringe of the Komi nationalist because these leaders have little or no infl uence within movement. Such coordination among radical groups is the larger ethnic communities. growing at both the national and regional levels. Th e recently formed new commission on inter-eth- nic relations, initiated by veterans’ groups (primarily Radicals Benefi t From Kondopoga Events Afghan), and headed by the governor, is not capable of vents at the end of the summer of 2006 in the transforming the character of ethnic relations in the Ecity of Kondopoga in the republic of Karelia gave republic. For a start, it has no plans to create even the the nationalists a powerful new rallying cry in the fall most simple system of monitoring ethnic relations in of 2006. After men from Azerbaijan and Chechnya the republic’s large cities. Th e people who set up this killed two ethnic Russians in a bar fi ght in Kondo- committee have no idea what they should be doing. poga, young ethnic Russian men in the city burned Currently, their main plan is to “visit the markets” the bar and attacked homes and businesses owned by where many non-ethnic Russians engage in retail migrants from the Caucasus on the night of Septem- trade activities. ber 2. Many ethnic minorities fl ed that night and the In fact, it seems as if the entire bureaucratic ma- events received extensive national media attention. chine has decided to pay much more attention to the After Kondopoga, Russian nationalists began to markets and now the situation at these sites has be- actively distribute information about the events there. come the focus of considerable attention. Th e repub- Radicals in Komi handed out leafl ets with such titles lic’s migration service has also begun to participate in as “Th e Truth about Kondopoga” and “A Letter from inspections of the city markets, but these measures are the Women of Kondopoga” calling on Komi residents hardly likely to produce the results that the bureau- to follow the Karelian example and drive “guests from cracy is hoping for. the south” out of their territory. Th ese fl yers were dis- tributed not only in the usual places where similar Sources of Ethnic Tension in Kondopoga leafl ets have appeared in the past, but also in a host espite the authorities’ focus on the markets and of new cities and villages where such publications had Dthe non-Russians who work there, it is neces- not been seen before. In essence, the geography of na- sary to understand that the events in Kondopoga did tional-radical activity is spreading. not start in these places and did not become possible Like the SNV, the Movement Against Illegal because the ethnic minorities who worked there were Immigration (DPNI) has also intensifi ed its out- unpopular with the larger population. Th e violence 14 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

occurred because the authorities preferred to adopt ethnic segments. formalistic nationalities policies rather than truly ef- Today in Russia there is an enormous defi cit of fective ones, thereby severely undermining the rule of civic solidarity, which naturally creates grounds for an law. Additionally, the social mood was such that, ideo- unprecedented growth of xenophobia. In these con- logically, the Kondopoga population was prepared for ditions, the further continuation of the authorities’ pogroms against the Caucasus migrants living there ethnic policies could threaten the internal stability of (see Izvestia, November 28 and 29, 2006). Accord- Komi and Russia as a whole. ing to a recent survey conducted among the youth of Karelia, more than 40 percent of college and high Clear Signs of Danger in Komi school students in this republic have negative feelings he question remains of whether the authorities toward Caucasus migrants. Twill pay attention to these warnings. Unfortu- It is important to note, however, that the at- nately, in Komi the authorities have declared that a mosphere of confl ict in Karelia, in general, and in repeat of the Kondopoga violence is impossible. But Kondopoga, in particular, was not off the chart. In this is not correct! Th e situation in the republic dif- the opinion of confl ict specialists, in this situation fers little from the situation in Karelia. Moreover, a the danger of prolonged, open confl ict does not exist. public opinion survey of the Komi population that we Nevertheless, the confl ict potential was signifi cant. conducted in 2004 showed that 40 percent of the re- Additionally, the sharp growth of confl ictual feelings spondents (the same number as in Karelia!) support sparks incidents, which eff ectively violate the rights the idea of removing all the Caucasus migrants from of entire ethnic communities. Such an incident took the republic. Fear of the Caucasus people is growing, place in Kondopoga. Of course, it is impossible to as we discovered when we compared the results of the predict the occurrence of such an incident. It is only 2004 survey with one we conducted in 1996. possible to warn about the presence of confl ict feelings In this situation, it is necessary to pursue a consis- within the mass consciousness of the population. tent policy of civic consolidation and a state program of integration, which makes it possible to strengthen Growing Racism and Xenophobia regional identity and civic solidarity. Additionally, it ussian specialists have noted with increasing is necessary to pay attention to the needs of the indig- Ralarm that there is a strong growth of racist and enous Finno-Urgric people. xenophobic feelings in Russian society. Th is situation Th e Komi authorities do not take into account is a logical result of the removal of the idea of an ex- the warnings that the situation in the sphere of inter- pansive civic solidarity from the mass consciousness. ethnic relations is extremely complex in the republic. Having fi rst rejected the idea of the “Soviet people,” Th e main ethnic advisors who infl uence ethnic policy and then having failed to build a general civic identity, are themselves ethnic entrepreneurs. As a result, like the regional political elites (together with politicians at the governor of Karelia, the Komi authorities place a the federal level) and ethnic entrepreneurs created the lot of hope in the actions of local ethnic group lead- ideological basis for the expanding xenophobia. ers, claiming that they are responsible for the actions Th is growth might not have occurred, but during of the members of their ethnic communities. Th ese the last 15 years in the country there was a consistent hopes proved unfounded in Karelia. imposition of ethnicity while simultaneously rejecting In our view, while the politicians at the federal and the idea of an authentic civil society. Th ere was no ef- regional levels do not make the formation of a over- fort to pursue a policy of consolidating society or form reaching Russian identity the core of their inter-eth- practical mechanisms to form a Russian (rossiisky) civil nic policy by building a non-ethnic Russian (rossiisky) society in the civic rather than ethnic (russky) sense. As people through a program of integration, the ethnic a result, Russian society, which experienced an inten- Russian marches will systematically destroy the unity sive process of social stratifi cation and is suff ering a of the people living in Russia. crisis of identity, has become increasingly divided into

About the Author: Yury Shabaev is a researcher based in Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.

Suggested Reading: Aleksei Ukkone, “Proshchanie s ‘kulinarnym internatsionalizmom’”, www.kominarod.ru.

15 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 14/07 ddigestigest

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