Notes Preface 1. Cheung (2008), p. 2. It is now available in both Chinese and English as Cheung (2009). 2. Hayek (1967), ch. 6. 3. Cheung (1982). 4. Ibid.,p.19. 5. Cheung (1986), p. 66. 6. Ibid.,p.79. 7. Our book is so titled because it is intended as a sequel to Cheung’s (1982, 1986) pam- phlets. Terms like “capitalist” and “capitalism” are bound to invite controversy. China today remains committed to socialism, calling itself “a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.” Some readers in China may protest against our wording of the title. That China is still ruled by the Chinese Communist Party will probably lead many western readers to challenge us on our choice of title as well. Nonetheless, China has transformed over the past three decades from a broken economy where the mar- ket and entrepreneurship were banned to a vibrant one where market forces prevail and private enterprises blossom. Our book explains how this happened. 1 China at the Death of Mao 1. The Cultural Revolution was Mao’s last and most horrendous effort to mold China into socialism. Like other policy disasters, it remains a politically sensitive topic in China and the relevant government archive data are still classified and inaccessible to most scholars. For the relevant literature, see, for example, Nianyi Wang (1989); Esherick, Kickowicz, and Walder (2006); MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006); and Guo, Wang, and Han (2009), Vol. 3. A shortcoming of most historical accounts is that the voice of the victims – a conservative estimate put the human toll at 1,070,000, see Yung-fa Chen (2001), p. 846 – can hardly be heard. The courageous efforts of Dr Youqin Wang (2004), who has collected the tragic stories of 659 victims, have helped to fill the lacuna. For an early attempt along the same lines, see Jicai Feng (1990). Walder (2009) offers a fresh perspective on the most violent and cruel period (1966–1968) of the Cultural Revolution. 2. It remains an open question why Mao instigated the Cultural Revolution right after China had barely recovered from the catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward. Power struggles were clearly a factor, particularly Mao’s increasing discontent with Liu Shaoqi, who became the President of China in 1959. Nonetheless, it was the official justification to preserve socialism that gave the Cultural Revolution its distinctive ideological fever, making it an unprecedented political campaign in Chinese history. In addition, the fact that Mao at the end of his life still highly regarded the Cul- tural Revolution was a compelling reason against power struggles being his primary motivation. 3. The term “golden highway” was made popular by Ran Hao; he used it as the title for his four-volume novel that eulogized the socialist transformation in rural China. 4. For the most recent accounts of Mao’s great famine, see Jisheng Yang (2008) and Dikötter (2010). During the Cultural Revolution, the political campaign of 208 Notes 209 anti-traditionalism and anti-intellectualism reached its peak; Chinese universities were closed, most books were banned or burned. For the early origin of anti- traditionalism in modern China, see Yu-sheng Lin (1979). 5. “Mao is Dead,” The Economist (September 11th, 1976). 6. New York Times (September 10th, 1976), section 1, p. 17. 7. World News Digest (September 11th, 1976), accessed from LexisNexis. 8. Jinglian Wu (2005), pp. 46–49; Angang Hu (2008), pp. 244–253. 9. Angang Hu (2008), pp. 512–515. 10. “Reform is China’s Second Revolution,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,Vol.3.This characterization is found in a book title by Harding (1987). 11. The first section of this long poem, “Ode to Joy” (Huanle Song), was published in the People’s Daily (November 20th, 1949). 12. For the early history of the Chinese Communist Party, including the influence of the Communist International (or Comintern), see Bianco (1971); Dirlik (1989); Pantsov (2000); and Steve Smith (2000). See also the multiple volumes edited by the First Department of the Research Office of the History of the Chinese Communist Party (1997) and Chen Yung-fa (2001). For documentary accounts of the Party history, see Saich (1996) and the Research Office of the History of the Chinese Communist Party (2001). 13. The Chinese Communist Party in its early years financially depended on the Comintern; but it was uneasy with the latter’s attempt to dictate its action. Their relationship was further complicated by the presence of the Kuomintang. For the triangular relationship among Moscow, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, see Garver (1988); Heinzig (2004); Kuisong Yang (1999). 14. Chiang’s three-month visit to the Soviet Union in 1923 was a critical event in his rise to power in the Kuomintang, even though he failed to accomplish the main mission, which was to seek direct military assistance from Moscow. At the time, Chiang’s atti- tude toward Soviet practice was ambivalent. But compared with Sun, Chiang was clearly far less sanguine about the cooperation with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. For the recent literature on Chiang’s visit, see Wang and Li (2004), pp. 92–94; Tianshi Yang (2008), pp. 95–145; Pakula (2009), pp. 122–124; Taylor (2009), pp. 41–45; and Heming Xing (2009), pp. 12–25. In his own retrospective account, Chiang (1956) portrayed himself as a more adamant critic of communism than he probably was. 15. Braun (1982) provided his account of the extraordinary experience he had in China as a Comintern agent. 16. Mao Zedong, “On tactics against Japanese imperialism” (a speech delivered on December 27th 1935), in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 1, p. 179. 17. The account best known to western readers was Edgar Snow (1937), which has over the years gone through several revisions, with more chapters added. 18. The complicated relationship between Stalin and Mao, particularly Stalin’s early dis- dain toward Mao, has been well documented. See, for example, Radchenko (2009), p. 5. See also Kuisong Yang (1999). 19. For a recent account of the “Long March,” see Shuyun Sun (2006). 20. For an authoritative account of Mao’s consolidation of leadership during the Yan’an period, see Hua Gao (2000). For early treatments of the rise of the “Yan’an Way” and its transformative impact on the Chinese Communist Party, see Selden (1971, 1995) and Yung-fa Chen (1990). 21. On Mao’s first visit to Moscow and meeting with Stalin, see Radchenko (2009), pp. 3–9. For the Chinese source, see Pang and Jin (2003), pp. 28–58. 22. It is still hard to gauge why Mao, a grand strategist with a defiant mind, would bind China to a foreign policy that he called “leaning toward one side.” It was this misstep 210 Notes that gradually set Mao’s China down a disastrous path (e.g., a military conflict with the United States on the Korean peninsula, economic and political isolation from the West, and a rush to socialism). 23. The major component of China’s first Five Year Plan was the so-called “156 projects” – 156 industrial projects supported by Soviet technology and loans, which became the “cornerstone” of China’s industrial development. See, for example, Dong and Wu (2004). 24. It is not entirely clear when and how communism ceased to be a tool and became embraced as an ultimate goal. For Mao’s decision to take China to Stalinism, see Hua-yu Li (2006). 25. The literature on Mao’s China is overwhelming and grows fast, partly due to the increasing recognition that China after Mao cannot be severed from Mao’s China. A convenient starting point is the last two volumes of The Cambridge History of China edited by MacFarquhar and Fairbank (1987, 1991). Meisner (1999) and Gray (1990, 2006) provide some of the best accounts offered by historians. Bramall (2009) pro- vides an account of the Chinese political economy since 1949, with equal coverage of Mao and post-Mao eras. Naughton’s (2007) work has a fair amount of cover- age of Mao’s China, even though its focus is on the reform period. For an earlier account, see Riskin (1987). For the Chinese literature, the three-volume series on Mao’s China (1949–1976) – Lin, Fan and Zhang (1989); Jin Cong (1989); and Nianyi Wang (1989) – is a useful starting point. For a comprehensive coverage, see the ten- volume series on the history of the People’s Republic (1949–1981), published by the Chinese University of Hong Kong. In addition, the first three volumes of the five- volume series, Zhonggua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanti Shi Gao [The Thematic History of the People’s Republic of China], published by Sichuan People’s Press (2004), pro- vide a fairly balanced and focused coverage of major events during Mao’s era. For historical accounts of Mao’s economy, see Jian Sun (1992); Li Wu (1999); Shaozhi Su (2002); and Angang Hu (2008). The most comprehensive account available is the five-volume series edited by Dexin Zhao (1988–1999). See also Ning Wang (2008) for a critical assessment of Mao’s economy. 26. Hinton (1990). 27. See, for example, Meisner (1999); Angang Hu (2008); Bramall (2009). 28. Lerner (1944), p. 1. 29. For origins of the policy, see Walker (1984); Yibo Bo (1997), pp. 180–199; and Yunhui Lin (2009), pp. 90–116. 30. China’s household registration system is one of the few institutions that have so far survived the three decades of reform. See Tiejun Cheng and Selden (1994) and Fei-ling Wang (2005). 31. Even though it was and continues to be hailed as a success, land reform set a vicious example of employing brutal force and fanning hatred dressed in the rhetoric of class struggle in policy implementation.