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Stomperud I Bagdad
Fagfellevurdert artikkel A˚ rgang 74 | Nr. 3 | 2016 | ISSN 1891-5580 Stomperud i Bagdad Cecilie Hellestveit*, PhD, Seniorforsker, International Law and Policy Institute Artikkelen foretar en analyse av Norges militære bidrag i Irak fra 2015 med utgangspunkt i folkerettens regler for militære utenlandsoppdrag. Artikkelen argumenterer for at de folkerettslige rammene for det norske militære bidraget i Irak pa˚ et par vesentlige punkter skiller seg fra andre nyere norske militære utenlandsoperasjoner. Den peker pa˚ tre utfordringer som det norske militære engasjementet i Irak derfor medfører: notoriteten til det militære oppdraget innad og utad, rettssikkerheten til norske soldater, og effektiviteten til soldater i en prekær rettslig situasjon. Stikkord: folkerett × maktbruk × Irak × Syria × IS × norske militære utlandsoperasjoner The article analyses the Norwegian military contribution to Iraq initiated in 2015 from the perspective of international law regulating military operations on foreign soil. It argues that this military operation is distinguished from other Norwegian military expeditions in recent decades. The article draws attention to three challenges that consequently arise: a low level of clarity concerning the nature and scope of the assignment, lack of legal guarantees calibrated to the tasks of the soldiers and finally poor efficiency resulting from a precarious legal situation. Innledning Den norske regjeringen besluttet i oktober 2014 a˚ sende 120 norske soldater til Irak for a˚ «bidra til a˚ trene opp irakiske sikkerhetsstyrker» (Solberg 2014). Fra april 2015 er en kontingent stasjonert i den kurdiske provinshovedstaden Irbil, formelt underlagt sikkerhetsstyrkene til den autonome kurdiske regionen i Nord-Irak (KRG), mens en annen er stasjonert i hovedstaden Bagdad. Militærpersonalet skal støtte irakiske sentralmyndigheter og kurdiske regionale myndigheter i kampen for a˚ gjenerobre territorium fra organisasjonen Islamsk Stat (IS), som i 2015 kontrollerte ca. -
Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State Kathleen J. McInnis Analyst in International Security Updated August 24, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44135 Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State Contents The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State ........................................................................ 1 Counter-IS Coalition Mandate......................................................................................................... 2 Military Aspects of the Coalition .................................................................................................... 2 NATO ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Turkey ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Challenges to Coalition Coherence ........................................................................................... 6 Figures Figure 1. Operation Inherent Resolve: Average U.S. Daily Costs, by Month ................................. 3 Figure 2. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq .......................... 7 Tables Table 1. Military Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State .................................... -
Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War
Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746 Web: http://www.csis.org/burke Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: The Critical Problems The US Must Address if Iraqi Forces Are to Do the Job Anthony Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy With the Assistance of Adam Mausner Revised, May 10, 2007 Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development 5/10/07 Page ii Executive Summary Iraq has moved far beyond a Sunni Islamist or Ba’ath-driven insurgency. It is already in a state of limited civil war, and may well be escalating to the level of a major civil conflict. What began as a small resistance movement centered on loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo-Salafi Sunni terrorism, a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a series of broader sectarian and ethnic conflicts. The current combination of Sunni Neo-Salafi extremist insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, Shi’ite versus Shi’ite power struggles, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political structure. In the best case, it could lead to a Shi’ite or Shi’ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq’s Sunnis. In the worst case, it could escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. -
Unhcr Position on Returns to Iraq
14 November 2016 UNHCR POSITION ON RETURNS TO IRAQ Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 Violations and Abuses of International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law .......................... 3 Treatment of Civilians Fleeing ISIS-Held Areas to Other Areas of Iraq ............................................................ 8 Treatment of Civilians in Areas Formerly under Control of ISIS ..................................................................... 11 Treatment of Civilians from Previously or Currently ISIS-Held Areas in Areas under Control of the Central Government or the KRG.................................................................................................................................... 12 Civilian Casualties ............................................................................................................................................ 16 Internal and External Displacement ................................................................................................................. 17 IDP Returns and Returns from Abroad ............................................................................................................. 18 Humanitarian Situation ..................................................................................................................................... 20 UNHCR Position on Returns ........................................................................................................................... -
Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State Kathleen J. McInnis Analyst in International Security August 24, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44135 Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State Contents The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State ........................................................................ 1 Counter-IS Coalition Mandate ........................................................................................................ 2 Military Aspects of the Coalition .................................................................................................... 2 NATO ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Turkey ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Challenges to Coalition Coherence ........................................................................................... 6 Figures Figure 1. Operation Inherent Resolve: Average U.S. Daily Costs, by Month ................................. 3 Figure 2. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq .......................... 7 Tables Table 1. Military Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State ..................................... 8 Contacts -
Canadian Armed Force's Effectiveness in Targeting with Air Power During OP MOBILE and OP IMPACT
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES' EFFECTIVENESS IN TARGETING WITH AIR POWER DURING OP MOBILE AND OP IMPACT LCol J.O. Penney JCSP 42 PCEMI 42 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2016. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2016. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 42 – PCEMI 42 2015 – 2016 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT CANADIAN ARMED FORCES' EFFECTIVENESS IN TARGETING WITH AIR POWER DURING OP MOBILE AND OP IMPACT LCol J.O. Penney “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. -
“We Just Want Someone to Protect Us:” Civilian
“ WE JUST WANT SOMEONE TO PROTECT US” Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk 1 RECOGNIZE. PREVENT. PROTECT. AMEND. PROTECT. PREVENT. RECOGNIZE. Cover Civilians living amidst homes damaged T +1 202 558 6958 during fighting between ISIS and E [email protected] Peshmerga in a village in Kirkuk, 2016. civiliansinconflict.org Sahr Muhammedally/CIVIC December 2019 Report designed by Dena Verdesca. ABOUT CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) is an international organization dedicated to promoting the protection of civilians caught in conflict. CIVIC’s mission is to work with armed actors and civilians in conflict to develop and implement solutions to prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm. Our vision is a world where parties to armed conflict recognize the dignity and rights of civilians, prevent civilian harm, protect civilians caught in conflict, and amend harm. CIVIC was established in 2003 by Marla Ruzicka, a young humanitarian who advocated on behalf of civilian war victims and their families in Iraq and Afghanistan. Building on her extraordinary legacy, CIVIC now operates in conflict zones throughout the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and South Asia to advance a higher standard of protection for civilians. At CIVIC, we believe that parties to armed conflict have a responsibility to prevent and address civilian harm. To accomplish this, we assess the causes of civilian harm in particular conflicts, craft practical solutions to address that harm, and advocate the adoption of new policies and practices that lead to the improved wellbeing of civilians caught in conflict. Recognizing the power of collaboration, we engage with civilians, governments, militaries, and international and regional institutions to identify and institutionalize strengthened protections for civilians in conflict. -
The Rojava Revolution
The Rojava Revolution By Aram Shabanian Over five years ago an uprising in Dara’a, Southern Syria, set into motion the events that would eventually culminate in the multifront Syrian Civil War we see today. Throughout the conflict one group in particular has stuck to its principles of selfdefense, gender equality, democratic leadership and environmental protectionism. This group, the Kurds of Northern Syria (Henceforth Rojava), have taken advantage of the chaos in their country to push for more autonomy and, just perhaps, an independent state. The purpose of this paper is to convince the reader that increased support of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) would be beneficial to regional and international goals and thus should be initiated immediately. Throughout this paper there will be sources linking to YouTube videos; use this to “watch” the Rojava Revolution from beginning to end for yourself. In the midst of the horror that is the Syrian Civil War there is a single shining glimmer of hope; Rojava, currently engaged in a war for survival and independence whilst simultaneously engaging in a political experiment the likes of which has never been seen before. The Kurds are the secondlargest ethnic group in the middle east today, spanning four countries (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey) but lacking a home state of their own. Sometimes called the ultimate losers in the SykesPicot agreement, the Kurds have fought for a homeland of their own ever since said agreement was signed in 1916. The Kurds in all of the aforementioned nations are engaged in some degree of insurrection or another. -
Cause for Concern: Civilians Killed in Coalition Strikes
Cause For Concern Hundreds of civilian non-combatants credibly reported killed in first year of Coalition airstrikes against Islamic State Aftermath of a devastating Coalition airstrike at Hawijah, Iraq on June 3 2015, which reportedly killed up to 70 civilians (picture via Iraqi Spring) August 2015 Cause For Concern: Civilians Killed in Coalition Strikes Acknowledgements This Report is the result of a six-month study begun in February 2015, with the aim of building as clear a picture as possible of alleged civilian fatalities from Coalition airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria. The project has been made possible thanks to generous funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, which enabled us to employ two highly-skilled experts. Research into civilian and ‘friendly fire’ deaths in Iraq has been conducted by our Baghdad-based researcher Latif Habib, while our London-based researcher Kinda Haddad has pursued claims of civilian deaths in Syria. This Report is written by Airwars director Chris Woods with an additional feature by Kinda Haddad, and is intended to be read in conjunction with our full database of events. All data modelling and mapping is the work of Basile Simon, who also designs and maintains our ever-expanding website. We are particularly indebted to those monitoring groups, journalists and ordinary citizens in Iraq and Syria whose own courageous work informs many of the incidents we cover. In particular we would like to thank the Syrian Network for Human Rights; the Violations Documentation Center; the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; Raqaa is Being Slaughtered Silently; and Iraq Body Count, all of which have worked tirelessly to expose not just fatalities from Coalition strikes but also from the far greater carnage still unfolding in Iraq and Syria. -
Suggested Format of Humanitarian Country
Year: 2017 Ref. Ares(2017)4983615 - 12/10/2017 Last update: 01/10/17 Version 3 HUMANITARIAN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (HIP) IRAQ The activities proposed hereafter are still subject to the adoption of the financing decision ECHO/WWD/ BUD/2017/01000 AMOUNT: EUR 82.5 million The present Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) was prepared on the basis of financing decision ECHO/WWD/BUD/2017/01000 (Worldwide Decision) and the related General Guidelines for Operational Priorities on Humanitarian Aid (Operational Priorities). The purpose of the HIP and its annex is to serve as a communication tool for ECHO's partners and to assist in the preparation of their proposals. The provisions of the Worldwide Decision and the General Conditions of the Agreement with the European Commission shall take precedence over the provisions in this document. 0. MAJOR CHANGES SINCE PREVIOUS VERSION OF THE HIP Modification 2 – October 2017 Massive urgent humanitarian needs remain and need to be covered in 2017. The humanitarian consequences of the Mosul operations have surpassed the worst-case scenario estimated by the UN and humanitarian partners. Over 1 000 000 have been displaced by the conflict, out of which over 700 000 remain displaced. Military operations to retake Telafar from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) begun on 20 August; those to retake West Anbar and Hawija started on 16 and 21 September, respectively. Thousands of people have fled conflict areas in locations where current humanitarian capacities need to be urgently increased. Displacement from western Anbar increased sharply in the second half of September, rising four-fold in a week. -
Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Canadian Parliamentary Division Monthly Report April 2015 Authors: Daniel C. Park, Research Analyst Amy Barlow, Managing Director The Composition of the House of Commons this month: Minority Liberal Government Conservative (161) Prime Minister: Stephen Harper NDP (96) Leader of Opposition: Thomas Liberals (35) Mulcair Independent (7) Notable bills discussed: Bloc (2) Bill C-51 (Anti-terrorism Act, 2015), Forces et Démocratie (2) Bill C-42 (Common Sense Firearms Green Party (2) Licensing Act), Bill C-636 (Interns Vacant (3) Protection Act), Bill C-12 (Drug- Free Prisons Act), Bill S-219 (Journey to Freedom Day Act), Bill C-642 (An Act to Amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act), and Bill C-46 (Pipeline Safety Act) Canadian Parliamentary Division P a g e | 2 Monthly Report How Many Times R2P was mentioned weekly: Explicitly: N/A. Subject matters related to R2P: 14 12 10 Prevent 8 React 6 Rebuild 4 2 0 1st-2nd 20th-24th 27th-30th Explanation of Findings: R2P was not explicitly mentioned during the month of April. The Prevent category from the 20th until the 24th scored high numbers due to the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide and the introduction of Motion No. 587 (Genocide Recognition) by Mr. Brad Butt (Mississauga-Streetsville, CPC). The React category scored relatively moderate numbers from the 1st until the 2nd due to discussions on whether there has been a prima facie breach of the privileges of the House by the Minister of National Defence and other CPC ministers for providing false and misleading information about Operation Impact to the House. -
Cost Estimate of Operation IMPACT in Iraq Ottawa, Canada February 17, 2015
Cost Estimate of Operation IMPACT in Iraq Ottawa, Canada February 17, 2015 www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca Cost Estimate of Operation IMPACT in Iraq The mandate of the Parliamentary Budget Officer is to provide independent analysis to Parliament on the state of the nation’s finances, the government’s estimates and trends in the national economy; and upon request from a committee or parliamentarian, to estimate the financial cost of any proposal for matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction. This report provides an estimate of the financial cost of Operation IMPACT, as requested by two parliamentarians. Prepared by: Tolga R. Yalkin* * The author would like to thank David Perry for his assistance in the preparation of this work, Mostafa Askari, Erin Barkel, Scott Cameron, Carleigh Malanik, Ben Segel-Brown, Rod Story, and Peter Weltman for their comments, and Pat Brown and Jocelyne Scrim for their assistance in the preparation of this work. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author. Please contact Tolga R Yalkin ([email protected]) for further information. 1 Cost Estimate of Operation IMPACT in Iraq Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 5 1.1 Background........................................................................................................ 5 1.2 Information Requested ...................................................................................... 6 2 Analysis ...................................................................................................................