Resource Paper for Members of Canadian Yearly Meeting to Discuss Their Response to the Responsibility to Protect
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Resource Paper for Members of Canadian Yearly Meeting to Discuss their Response to The Responsibility to Protect Giving Perspectives and Alternatives on the Protection of Civilians: Remembering Non-violence, Just Policing, and the Transformation of Deep-rooted Identity-based Conflict By Gianne Broughton Quaker Peace and Sustainable Communities Program Co-ordinator Canadian Friends Service Committee [email protected] February 2007 Executive Summary This paper presents a selection of resources and queries to assist Quaker Meetings in Canada to discuss the international policy theme “The Responsibility to Protect”, commonly referred to as “R2P”. “United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report to the 2000 General Assembly, challenged the international community to try to forge consensus, once and for all, around the basic questions of principle and process involved: when should intervention occur, under whose authority, and how. The independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was established by the Government of Canada in September 2000 to respond to that challenge. The Commission's report, The Responsibility to Protect, is the culmination of twelve months of intensive research, worldwide consultations and deliberation.” 1 The Government of Canada supports R2P’s conclusions, making it a bedrock of Canadian foreign policy and has advocated for its support at the international level. UN members endorsed R2P as a part of the outcomes of the 2005 World Summit, held in New York.2 R2P redefines a state’s sovereignty as the responsibility to protect all of its citizens, including protection from threats that originate within the state. It insists that in cases where a state is unable or unwilling to protect, the international community, under the authority of the UN, has a responsibility to intervene and protect. Intervention is interpreted as including armed force “in the last resort”. During 2007, we will be responding to the invitation from the Canadian Council of Churches to comment on and suggest improvements to the draft statement they have prepared on which they hope member churches (including CYM) will ultimately sign off. Why should Canadian Friends give attention to “The Responsibility to Protect”? What should be the Quaker response to the dilemma posed by massive human rights violations such as genocide and crimes against humanity? Does the international community have a responsibility to protect victims? How can such a responsibility be carried out? What does our Peace Testimony call us to, “in the last resort”? This is an opportunity for us to show how nonviolent strategies can transform conflict. To do this we need to understand how nonviolent protection works, to come to terms with the dilemmas of force and coercion, and to become fluent in the description of practical nonviolent alternatives. The paper begins with a selection of experience stories of unarmed people protecting people from the violence of armed people in the midst of general armed crisis: Former Yugoslavia, D. R. Congo, Cambodia, and Uganda. Friends are invited to share their own stories, and develop their response to the larger question from their observations of these experiences. Canada-based stories are also welcome. It is a mistake to think that the dilemmas of security and intervention only apply in distant places. One of the fundamental things that I learned from reflecting on these stories is that in every violent crisis, there are people in the midst of it who are working for peace. The second section provides a selection of formal statements on this theme. Specifically, the defining paragraphs of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose report coined the R2P phrase, the relevant paragraphs of the outcome document from the UN’s World Summit in September 2005, and the Canadian Council of Churches draft statement. Further 1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty website <http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp> 2 http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/resp_protect_un_reform-en.asp 2 statements that may be of interest to Friends are provided in the Appendix. These give the framework of the international debate, and a sample of the practical and ethical responses from Quaker, Mennonite and ecumenical sources. The third section, entitled “Sovereignty and the Concept of the State”, points out that the real world is more complex than a community of more or less similarly organized states, and that intervention is more complex than sending a force somewhere to do a job and then leave. One way of interpreting R2P is to see it as an attempt to make boundaries more permeable. When understood as a way to make it easier to send in an armed force, it is quite a threatening idea. But perhaps it could be conceived as a way for states to get external counseling on the path to firmly and respectfully protecting their own people. An example from the European Community is given, showing the success of a highly skilled diplomat using good offices, and having a framework of incentives and sanctions to work within. A second example from Bosnia is given that shows the psychology of a host country that has accepted an armed intervention. It is it possible for such an intervention to be neutral? Is it possible for it to have a transformative effect rather than simply an effect of freezing relations in the condition they were when the intervening force arrived? How can intervention be done in a way that really makes it possible for the force to depart without a recurrence of the original problem? Finally, we must take into account the fact that there are a number of countries in our world where the apparatus of the state is not really like a state at all, and no wonder they are not able, or are unwilling, to protect citizens. How did this come about? Is the problem all “over there”, far away from us? Would prescriptions that might work in places where the state is more capable also work in these cases, or does our response have to be different? Paragraph 17 of the Canadian Council of Churches’ draft statement makes a distinction between “war fighting” and “just policing” in an attempt to define acceptable uses of force. The special interest group at Canadian Yearly Meeting 2006 that discussed the CCC draft statement also pointed out that Friends generally do not object to the presence of a police force in a well-ordered society. What does this distinction mean in practical terms? Earlier paragraphs of the CCC draft statement also declare that real long-term solutions cannot be military, but must be multidimensional, including economic, social, political and diplomatic activities. Friends recognize this as well, from our understanding that conflict arises from unmet human needs. How is this long-term view connected to short-term needs for protection, security, safety? A summary is given of the theory of conflict transformation as expressed by Vern Redekop in his From Violence to Blessing. Essentially, violence occurs when a person or an identity group acts to satisfy their identity needs at the expense of another person or identity group’s identity needs. Violence spreads, is learned, and becomes ingrained in structures when we imitate it. Blessing happens when people find satisfaction of their own needs in ways that also satisfy the needs of others, and acts of blessing can transform structures of violence when they are imitated. The power of imitation can be surprising, even cataclysmic. People from opposing sides can come to view their conflict differently through encounters during which they help each other understand the conflict within the more objective framework of human needs theory, and soon they can identify specific acts of blessing that they wish to undertake together in order to build peace. These kinds of encounters do not take long, and can be arranged in even the most polarized, violent circumstances. Questions are asked about the role of coercion in nonviolent protection. Baldly, coercion occurs when people are made to do something (or not to do something) against their will. Making someone stop attacking another person, when it is clearly their will to continue attacking, is coercion. It is interesting to note that the root meaning of the word “arrest” is “stop”. There are nonviolent 3 strategies for coercion. These usually involve overwhelming numbers of people refusing to co- operate. They may also take action that obstructs the perpetrator or leaves the perpetrator only one choice, a choice that is acceptable to those doing the nonviolent coercion. Police forces in relatively nonviolent social systems depend upon the legal possibility of using (usually non-lethal) physical force to coerce law-breakers. People commonly think of coercion as the use or threat of lethal force, but there are many strategies for coercion that are non-lethal. Coercion, even nonviolent coercion, is not a sustainable strategy on its own. Can it operate as a background framework for diplomatic, counselor-type strategies that gradually reconcile belligerents, making space for the construction of peaceful systems? From sharing experience through theoretical analysis we come to a moment for applying what we know to the two practical questions that we must answer in order to respond to our needs and those of our global neighbours: How can we do better prevention? How can we do better intervention? The paper offers some advice and questions from the author’s experience and reading, but, as in every section, we hope to collect more and more wisdom as Meetings and individuals respond. Why have the international preventive campaigns or mechanisms such as the United Nations Program of Action for the Limitation of Small Arms Trade and the UN Human Rights Council (formely the UN Human Rights Commission) failed? Is it because there isn’t yet an effective framework of nonviolent coercion connected with their implementation? It is important to note that “successful” states are as much at fault here as “failed” states.