Turkey and the Prospect of Energy Cooperation in the Eastern

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TURKISH STUDIES 2019, VOL. 20, NO. 3, 442–464 https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2018.1534204

Between security and prosperity: Turkey and the prospect of energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean Tolga Demiryol Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Altınbaş University, İstanbul, Turkey

ABSTRACT Can natural resources facilitate regional cooperation? Recent discoveries of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean have led many to ask whether natural resources can bring peace and prosperity to the region. This article draws upon the contrast between liberal and realist perspectives on interdependence to explicate the extent to which shared economic interests can facilitate political cooperation in a conﬂict-ridden region. The analysis of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean strategy corroborates the proposition that when states prioritize security over prosperity, they will likely continue to escalate political tensions even if this jeopardizes economic gains from cooperation.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 18 January 2018; Accepted 26 September 2018

KEYWORDS Interdependence; regionalism; Turkey; energy; Mediterranean

Introduction Recent oﬀshore gas discoveries in Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt have raised expectations of greater economic interdependence, which would not only generate welfare for regional states but also contribute to the resolution of outstanding political conﬂicts.1 Policymakers have expressed enthusiasm about the prospect of prosperity and peace in the Mediterranean. Former US Vice President Joe Biden, for instance, said that the energy potential of the Mediterranean ‘holds the promise of enhancing stability and prosperity by bringing together Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and hopefully one day Lebanon.’2 Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız echoed this sentiment when he stated, ‘While energy produced wars in other parts of the world, here it will be a force for peace.’3

CONTACT Tolga Demiryol [email protected] Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Altınbaş University, Mahmutbey Dilmenler Caddesi, No:26, Bağcılar – İstanbul 34217, Turkey © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group TURKISH STUDIES 443

The rationale behind resource-driven regionalism is straightforward: natural resources raise the opportunity costs of conflict. Former US Ambas- sador to Turkey Ross Wilson wrote that the discovery of gas in Cyprus ‘gives the decades-old stalemate between Turkey and Cyprus an opportunity cost price tag – it provides dollars-and-cents reasons for easing the estrange- ment or bringing it to an end.’4 Arguments for regionalism often invoke the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as an example of how shared economic interests can make friends out of rivals. As one observer stated, ‘With the discovery of significant gas resources off Cyprus … gas could play an important role in healing the island’s divisions as the coal and steel industry played in 1949 between France and Germany.’5 Contrary to expectations, however, Mediterranean natural gas has not only failed to facilitate regional cooperation but created new areas of inter-state tension. This article draws upon the contrast between liberal and realist perspectives on interdependence to explicate the extent to which shared economic interests can facilitate political cooperation in a conflict-ridden region.6 Lib- erals postulate that revenue-maximizing states are incentivized to peacefully resolve conflicts that would otherwise result in a loss of absolute gains.7 In addition, interdependence multiplies channels of inter-state communication, thus facilitating cooperation. Realists assert that interdependence is irrelevant for interstate cooperation or worse, that it catalyzes conflicts.8 Interdepen- dence is inconsequential according to realism since it cannot alleviate the condition of anarchy. Furthermore, realists hold that interdependence is inexorably asymmetric as gains from cooperation are never allocated equally. The uneven distribution of gains is not only a source of vulnerability for the dependent party but also leads to disparities of power, which causes further conflict. Realist and liberal perspectives on interdependence differ sharply on state preferences regarding cooperation. From the realist perspective, states prioritize security over prosperity, and thus cooperation is most likely when it allows states to maximize their security interests. Expected economic gains alone provide insufficient grounds for cooperation, particularly when vital security interests are at stake. Liberals, however, emphasize that states are likely to pursue both prosperity and security and to focus on absolute gains from cooperation. Even then, cooperation is not a foregone conclusion. Inter- mediary factors influence the possibility of cooperation, including unit-level variables such as leadership and the extent of democratic constraints as well as international/regional norms and institutions. This article seeks to contribute to the literature on regionalism by explicat- ing how states form their preferences regarding cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Two aspects of the theory and case selection require elabor- ation. First, the explanatory framework of the article is state-centric. Non- state actors – energy companies in particular – play an important role in 444 T. DEMIRYOL the Mediterranean energy game. However, given its focus on state preferences, this article deals with energy companies as part of the strategic context within which state preference formation takes place. Second, while the preferences of all relevant actors are examined, the analytical narrative focuses on Turkey’s approach to regional energy cooperation. Case selection is justifiable on several grounds. Turkey offers both a viable market and a transit route for Mediterranean gas. It is also partial to various political disputes in the region, including the conflict in Cyprus, the status of which is likely to shape the fate of natural resources. Moreover, Ankara has a wide array of instruments (including military deterrence) to pursue its strategic interests in the region, which may delay if not completely derail the monetization of natural resources. Though it is possible for other players, such as Israel and Cyprus, to implement gas development schemes independently of Turkey, Ankara’s policies shape the prospects of regionalism. Which factors shape Turkey’s preferences regarding regional cooperation? To what extent do those preferences reflect economic expectations as opposed to security interests? Turkey has much to gain from regional cooperation. First, Turkey’s energy supply security shapes its approach to Mediterranean gas development. Given Turkey’s import diversification policy, Mediterra- nean gas reserves would be a welcome addition to Turkey’s import portfolio, assuming the price is competitive. Second, Turkey is seeking to take advantage of its geography to assume the role of a regional energy hub, which requires the ability to attract gas from multiple sources. Mediterranean gas reserves can help strengthen Turkey’s position as a potential energy hub. Third, even though Turkey–European Union (EU) relations have regressed considerably over the past few years, Turkey’s bid for EU membership continues to shape its regional strategy. If Turkey manages to play a key role in the transit of Mediterranean gas to Europe, Ankara’s long-standing claim that it is a critical asset to European energy supply security9 will gain additional support. While these factors incentivize Turkey to cooperate with others in the development of the Mediterranean’s natural resources, this article under- scores the causal impact of two structural factors that directly and adversely affect Ankara’s preferences regarding regional cooperation. First, Ankara perceives natural gas development in the Mediterranean through the lens of national sovereignty and security as opposed to the more straightforward issue of allocation of resources. Turkey’s national security strategy has histori- cally displayed a concern with maritime jurisdiction zones in the Mediterra- nean as well as in the Aegean Sea. Between 2003 and 2010, a series of bilateral Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreements were signed between the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), Egypt, and Israel. These deals have elevated Ankara’s threat perception with regard to the maritime boundaries of Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In addition, TURKISH STUDIES 445 the ongoing drilling efforts by the RoC in the disputed waters of Cyprus further securitized the issue for Ankara, resulting in an assertive policy that combines diplomatic efforts with calibrated threats of force. Second, Turkey’s policy toward Mediterranean gas reserves has been influenced by recent shifts in regional alliance structures and distributions of threat. The emergence of a trilateral partnership between Israel, Greece, and the RoC (a quadrilateral partnership if one also includes Egypt) has raised Turkish security concerns. Israel, Greece, and the RoC partnership – despite not being a full-fledged military alliance – includes extensive coordination of security policies. Reacting to the shift in the regional balance of power, Ankara engaged in internal balancing by increasing its military presence in the Mediterranean at the risk of escalating conflicts and thus poten- tially foregoing economic benefits from cooperation. The case of Turkey illustrates that the state preferences regarding cooperation reflect both economic and security interests, albeit not equally. From an economic perspective, Turkey has much to gain from cooperating with regional players in the monetization of Mediterranean gas reserves. However, the development of these reserves (and exploration for new ones) also raises security concerns for Turkey, including perceived threats to sovereignty and the emergence of opposing political and security constellations in the region. Prioritizing security concerns over expected economic gains from cooperation, Turkey opts for a confrontational strategy in dealing with the existing disputes related to drilling. The article is divided into three sections followed by a conclusion. The first section discusses the literature on regionalism with an emphasis on contend- ing perspectives of interdependence. The second section reviews Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries to highlight the economic incentives they offer for regional cooperation. The third section contextualizes Turkey’s preferences and explicates Ankara’s Mediterranean strategy.

Interdependence and resource regionalism Resource regionalism is predicated upon the notion that the monetization of resources necessitates a dense web of interdependence among importers, exporters, and transit states. As states collaborate on the development and transportation of resources such as oil and gas, they share economic incentives for cooperation.10 The most popular version of resource regionalism is the peace pipelines hypothesis, which postulates that states linked via energy infrastructure are incentivized to resolve conflicts peacefully. Peace pipelines are presumed to work through several causal mechanisms. First, energy infrastructures are often complex and costly to set up, which in turn requires close policy coordination among multiple actors.11 As states seek to realize mutual gains, they have few other choices but to resolve 446 T. DEMIRYOL disputes. Second, pipelines have both high sunk costs and long operational lifespans. Once built, they continue to generate economic incentives for peace. Third, interdependence multiplies communication channels, particularly with the emergence of domestic and international business interests.12 These interest groups can help de-escalate conflicts by enabling backchannel communication between governments. Fourth, cooperation in the monetization of natural resources often spills over into other domains, such as bilateral or multilateral cooperation to develop joint defensive capacities to protect critical energy infrastructure. Natural resources have been at the core of various initiatives of regionalism, most prominently the ECSC (1951). Along with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), established in 1957, the ECSC helped build a lasting peace between Germany and France and provided the foundation for European regionalism. The natural gas trade between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the 1970s is another example of cooperation between political adversaries. In 1970, a 20-year con- tract was signed for the delivery of Soviet gas to the FRG. The initially limited exchange between the two rivals expanded throughout the 1980s, laying the foundation of a partnership that would continue after the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the USSR.13 Peace pipelines emerged as a preferred instrument of US foreign policy in the 1990s. Members of the US Congress and State Department officials often supported the idea of building an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to Armenia to resolve the conflicts between the two.14 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which crossed Georgia to bring Azeri oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, was also driven by a political rationale. The goal was to bypass Russian territory and weaken the Kremlin’s hold over transit routes into Europe. At the same time, the expectation was that the interdependence created by the energy infrastructure would help stabilize the conflict-ridden region. Energy cooperation schemes also figure prominently in the Middle East. In 2005, Egypt and Israel reached an agreement on the export of Egyptian gas via the El Arish-Ashkelon pipeline. Energy interdependence helped keep the peace between Egypt and Israel. Following the removal of Mubarak in 2011, Egypt canceled the deal to supply Israel with natural gas. However, the two states have been recently cooperating on the export of offshore reserves. Egypt and Israel have switched roles as the latter is seeking to supply gas to the former, as discussed below. Another example of conflict resolution via energy cooperation in the Middle East is the Dolphin Gas Project.15 In 1998, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman signed an agreement to cooperate on large-scale natural gas development projects, including an offshore pipeline. The signing of the Memorandum of Under- standing (MoU) was followed by concerted efforts to resolve border disputes: TURKISH STUDIES 447

‘a clear indication of the power of the pipelines to facilitate dispute resolution.’16 In South East Asia two major proposed pipeline projects, the Iran– Pakistan–India (IPI) and Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) projects, have been widely referred to as peace pipelines.17 Both projects, if completed, will transverse some of the world’s most contested territories. Not everyone is convinced that energy interdependence can bring peace. Among the chief critics of the notion of peace pipelines is Shaffer, who claims, ‘There is no evidence to date that energy supply pipelines can serve as a means for peace in conflict-ridden zones.’18 Others further claim that pipelines have a tendency to produce conflict and disagreement.19 There are at least two principal reasons to doubt that energy interdependence facilitates peace. First, peace pipeline proposition arguably suffers from inverse causality; that is, cooperative relations between partners are a prerequisite rather than a consequence of pipelines. As Shaffer puts it, ‘Energy reflects peaceful relations; it does not create them.’20 This is primarily because in the absence of political predictability, it is unlikely that expensive infrastructure would be built in the first place. As Kupchan argues, ‘interdependence plays only an ancillary role in promoting peace; it helps deepen societal linkages, but only after a political opening has first cleared the way for reconciliation.’21 Second, one can question the extent to which interdependence can be sym- metrical and mutually beneficial. Waltz argues that states are interdependent ‘if the costs of breaking their relations or of reducing their exchanges are about equal for each of them.’22 In other words, the exit costs from interdependence should be equal or at least comparable for both parties. Since this condition is difficult to satisfy in the field of energy, the less dependent state may use its superior bargaining position to gain concessions. As Hirschman argued, there is a direct connection between unbalanced trade relations and political coercion; larger states can exploit their favorable trade relations with smaller states.23 Energy exporters can wield influence in international politics by using their control over resources as a coercive instrument (threatening cutoffs) or selec- tive incentive (implementing preferential pricing). Russia is widely accused of weaponizing natural gas pipelines to influence the behavior of dependent states.24 Similarly, energy transit states can leverage their position in the supply chains to reinforce their bargaining position or obtain political concessions from suppliers and/or consumers.25 Even if long-term supply cutoffs are improbable because of the contractual requirements, shorter disruptions in gas flow due to ostensibly technical reasons would be costly for energy importers.26 Long disruptions in energy trade can also hurt states that are dependent on export revenues. 448 T. DEMIRYOL

As a result, realists dismiss the pacifying effects of interdependence and assert that economic incentives offered by the promise of realizing absolute gains are insufficient for states to overcome competitive pressures. As Mear- sheimer argues, even though states operate in an international economic environment as well as a political one, when the two come into conflict, the latter trumps the former.27

Resource regionalism in the Eastern Mediterranean The Mediterranean gas bonanza started with the discovery of natural gas in the Noa gas field off the coast of Israel and the Palestine territories in 1999, followed by the Mari-B reservoir in 2000. These early discoveries, while limited in size, led to more drilling efforts and eventually a series of larger finds in the waters of Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt. In 2009, Delek Group and Noble Energy discovered the Tamar field (280 bcm) in Israel’s waters. In 2010, gas was found in the Leviathan field, the largest (510 bcm) deep-sea discovery of the decade. In December 2011 came the discovery of the Aphrodite field (120 bcm) off the southern coast of Cyprus. The year 2015 witnessed the largest find so far: the super-giant Zohr field in Egypt, with an estimated 845 bcm of gas (Table 1). The estimated reserves of the region far exceed the volumes hitherto discovered. The Levant basin alone is appraised to contain 3.45 trillion cubic meters of gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil.28 The expectation that even greater reserves are waiting to be discovered has incentivized regional states to demarcate their maritime jurisdiction zones and expeditiously expand drilling efforts. In terms of potential markets, there are a few options. Jordan and Gaza are nearby gas markets with growing demand. A total of 93% of Jordan’s electricity is generated by gas.29 Jordan, which used to rely on Egyptian gas before 2011, now seeks to diversify its import portfolio. In 2016, Jordan and Israel signed a $10 billion deal for the supply of 45 bcm of gas over 15 years.30 However, regulatory and political obstacles remain. There is also a proposal

Table 1. Major gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1999–2015. Field Country Discovery date Estimated reserves (bcm) Status Noa Israel and Palestine 1999 1.2 Nearly depleted Mari B Israel 2000 30 Nearly depleted Tamar Israel 2009 280 In production Leviathan Israel 2010 510 Awaiting development Aphrodite Cyprus 2011 120 Awaiting development Tannin Israel 2012 34 Awaiting development Karish Israel 2013 50 Awaiting development Zohr Egypt 2015 845 In production Source: Author’s own compilation based on Karbuz and Baccarini, ‘East Mediterranean Gas’; Prontera and Ruszel, ‘Energy Security’; and Ratner, ‘Natural Gas Discoveries.’ TURKISH STUDIES 449 to build a pipeline to carry Israeli gas to Gaza’s only power plant.31 Turkey, with an average annual gas consumption of 42.7 bcm/y between 2012 and 2016,32 is the largest regional gas market. While exporting gas to Turkey will require a new underwater pipeline, the size of the Turkish market makes it an attractive option for Mediterranean developers seeking to enhance demand security. Besides Turkey, the most important market for Mediterranean gas is the EU, particularly the Southeastern European countries. The EU promotes the Mediterranean route as part of the Southern Gas Corridor strategy, which aims to achieve diversification of gas supply. There are several export options, varying widely in terms of financial costs, political preconditions, and geopolitical implications. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facilitates market access without relying on third parties. The downside of building new LNG facilities is their relatively high (compared to pipeline-only solutions) costs. Several LNG solutions have been proposed over the past few years. One idea is to place new LNG facilities in Israel, which would give the Israeli government greater operational control over critical infrastructure. Environmental concerns and public reaction in Israel, however, led to the dismissal of this proposal. The second option is Floating LNG (FLNG), which takes the entire process offshore, thus eliminating some of the issues associated with land-based LNG facilities. FLNG also allows access to isolated reserves. Short-term disadvantages of the FLNG option are high cost and regulatory barriers. The third option is to build an LNG terminal in Vasilikos in Southern Cyprus. In 2012, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the RoC and its commercial partners for the development of the Vasilikos facility. The feasibility of Vasilikos plan, however, has been questioned as the current Cypriot reserves are not large enough to cover its price tag.33 In February 2018, Italy’s ENI and France’s Total announced the discovery of a promising gas field off Cyprus. The Calypso 1, according to ENI’s statement, ‘confirms the extension of the “Zohr-like” play in the Cyprus EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone].’34 If larger reservoirs are confirmed in Cypriot waters, costly options such as Vasilikos will gain traction. The fourth option is to pipe the gas to Egypt for domestic consumption and re-export via the underutilized LNG infrastructure in Idku and Damietta. In terms of initial costs, this is the most attractive LNG solution since it utilizes existing facilities. One factor that affected the comparative advantage of the Egypt LNG option has been the discovery of the Zohr field in 2015. If gas produced at Zohr meets Egypt’s demand, the previously idle LNG facilities might be reserved for Egypt’s own exports. Nonetheless, using Egyptian LNG infrastructure remains an attractive option for Leviathan and Aphrodite partners. In early 2018, Shell was reportedly in talks to buy Leviathan and Aphrodite gas to be exported via Egypt’s Idku liquefaction plant.35 In May 2018, Egypt and the RoC signed an initial deal for a pipeline (estimated cost of 450 T. DEMIRYOL

$800 million–$1 billion) from the Aphrodite field to Egypt’s LNG facilities.36 The following month it was reported that the gas pipeline to Egypt was a ‘done deal.’37 However, the realization of the Egypt option is contingent upon the outcome of the dispute between Israel and Cyprus over the use of the Aphro- dite/Ishai gas field. The Aphrodite reservoir is located on the border of the Israeli and Cypriot economic zones, with the majority of gas lying on the Cypriot side. Since the gas in the Ishai project is technically part of the same basin, pumping gas from Aphrodite will drain gas from the Ishai project as well. The 2010 EEZ delimitation agreement between Israel and the RoC was supposed to be followed by a unitization agreement, which would stipu- late terms for the development and revenue distribution of the joint reservoirs. Without a unitization agreement, Israel is unlikely to allow Cyprus to develop Aphrodite gas.38 In terms of pipeline options, two projects have been on the table: the Israel– Turkey pipeline and the Eastern Mediterranean (EastMed) pipeline. The former is an undersea line connecting Leviathan gas to Ceyhan port in Southern Turkey, which would cost about $2.5 billion.39 This pipeline has the advantage of supplying both European and Turkish markets. The risks associated with the Turkey–Israel pipeline are mostly political. The prospects of the pipeline are directly affected by the state of affairs between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Moreover, since the shortest route from Leviathan to Ceyhan port in Turkey passes through the RoC’s EEZ, the construction of the pipeline might be derailed. The alternative to the Leviathan–Ceyhan route is the EastMed pipeline, planned to connect Mediterranean gas fields to Europe. Approximately 1900 km long (1300 offshore/600 onshore), the pipeline will have an initial capacity of 10 bcm/y and exit points in Cyprus, Crete, and mainland Greece as well as a connection point to the IGI Poseidon pipeline, the 207- km offshore interconnector between Greece and Italy.40 The EastMed pipeline project presents technical challenges due to the construction depth and length, making it the most expensive pipeline solution among the alternatives, with an estimated cost as much as $20 billion.41 Even though the economic rationale of the pipeline is disputed,42 the EU designated the EastMed pipeline as a Project of Common Interest. Israel, the RoC, and Greece continue to push for the construction of the pipeline.43 Market conditions, technical limits, legal issues, and geopolitics shape the development and export of Mediterranean gas. One thing is certain, however: virtually all export projects necessitate extensive coordination among multiple regional players. Clearly, not every actor will benefit equally from all export options. Nonetheless, the non-cooperative outcome is not preferable for anyone either. As former US Special Envoy for International Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein points out, ‘The success of all these plans hinges on cooperation. Countries will save billions if they share infrastructure and TURKISH STUDIES 451 market access. If they do not share those resources, most of the gas will have to stay in the ground.’44 Put in terms of interdependence, there is a strong economic rationale for regional cooperation. Mediterranean states have a lot to gain from cooperation, and much to lose from conflict. Why then did economic incentives fail to promote regionalism in the Eastern Mediterranean? The next section addresses these questions by focus- ing on Turkey’s Mediterranean policy.

Determinants of Turkey’s Mediterranean policy Two factors have a direct impact on Turkey’s preferences regarding regional energy cooperation. First, Ankara perceives natural gas issues in the region through the lens of sovereignty, particularly with respect to maritime borders in the region. Considering EEZ delimitation agreements signed among the RoC, Israel, and Egypt a transgression of the sovereign rights of Turkey and the TRNC, Turkey adopted an increasingly hardline stance to prevent further encroachments. Second, natural gas discoveries and contin- ued drilling efforts in the Mediterranean created an opening for new geopolitical constellations, shifting the regional balance of power. The emergence of a trilateral bloc among Israel, Greece, and the RoC became a primary security concern for Turkey. Distressed about being outflanked by regional powers, Ankara resorted to internal balancing and increased its military presence in the Mediterranean, further raising the stakes in the conflict.

EEZ disputes Throughout the 2000s, several Mediterranean states signed bilateral EEZ delimitation agreements in anticipation of hydrocarbon exploration.45 In 2003, the RoC took the first step in laying down the legal framework for development by signing an EEZ agreement with Egypt. In 2004, Nicosia passed an article of national legislation, unilaterally designating its EEZ. In 2007, the RoC signed another EEZ agreement with Lebanon. Ankara protested, claim- ing that the Israel–Lebanon agreement violates the sovereign rights of both Turkey and the TRNC. On 6 January 2007, the RoC government designated 13 drilling blocks to be licensed. Ankara claimed that Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 overlapped with the Turkish continental shelf.46 Throughout 2007, EEZ disputes with the RoC were often at the top of the agenda of Turkey’s National Security Council, which issued stern warnings that transgressions of Turkey’s maritime sovereignty would not be allowed under any circumstances.47 In 2010, the RoC and Israel signed a deal to delimit their respective EEZ, which Turkey vociferously protested. Turkey’s objections to deals by other regional states have three sources. First, instead of bilateral deals, Ankara advocates a multilateral approach to the delimitation of continental shelves 452 T. DEMIRYOL and EEZs to guarantee the sovereign rights of third parties. Second, the Turkish government is concerned that the redrawing of Mediterranean maritime borders at the expense of Turkey jeopardizes Turkey’s position in the Aegean Sea as well, where Turkey and Greece have long quarreled over the continental shelf. Third, and most importantly, the Cyprus issue directly shapes Turkey’s perception. Ankara holds that Cyprus’ natural resources belong to both communities on the island and insists that the Greek Cypriots should not unilaterally demarcate its maritime borders until the Turkish Cypriots are guaranteed to receive their share.48 The RoC does not contest the notion that Turkish Cypriots are entitled to have a share in the island’s riches. However, the Greek Cypriot administration insists that it has an ‘inalienable and non-negotiable right’49 to develop such resources and argues, ‘the management [of natural gas] will be federal competence under the settlement that will reunite Cyprus.’50 In the months prior to the discovery in the Aphrodite field in December 2011,51 tensions between Turkey and the RoC escalated. When the RoC initiated drilling in Block 12 on 19 September 2011, Ankara reacted by signing a continental shelf delimitation agreement with the TRNC the very next day. Based on this agreement, the TRNC issued drilling licenses to the state-owned energy company Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). The area licensed by the TRNC overlaps with the majority of the 13 blocks already claimed by RoC. If one includes the five blocks Turkey separately claims a partial right to, 11 out of the 13 blocs designated by RoC are disputed by Turkey and the TRNC.52 These overlapping blocks have constituted the main source of strife between Turkey and the RoC. Ankara took two further steps in late September 2011 to gain the upper hand in the escalating dispute. First, Turkey dispatched a seismic research vessel to Cyprus to reinforce its claims and test the RoC’s resolve. Since then Turkey has initiated several research expeditions in the region, often accompanied by naval detachments. Second, Turkey submitted a proposal to the UN Secretary-General, asking that parties in Cyprus either cease uni- lateral exploration or form a committee to coordinate exploration efforts. However, Turkey’s diplomatic approach failed once the RoC announced the discovery of a large reservoir in the Aphrodite field. As a countermove, in April 2012 Ankara ordered TPAO to start drilling a 3000-meter-deep well near the town of Trikomo (Iskele) in Northern Cyprus. The RoC government protested and declared, ‘Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are vio- lating the law by going ahead with drilling.’53 The EEZ disputes undermined the peace process in Cyprus. In 2014, UN- mediated unification talks were interrupted due to drilling-related tensions between Turkey and the RoC. The formal reason for the suspension of talks was a NAVTEX for a Turkish vessel to carry out a seismic survey offshore Cyprus, near the waters where Italy’s ENI and South Korea’s TURKISH STUDIES 453

KOGAS were drilling on behalf of the RoC.54 Two support vehicles and a frigate were also reportedly dispatched to the region.55 The RoC took the matter to the European Council, upon which the Council officially urged Turkey ‘to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty over its territorial sea and Cyprus’ sovereign rights in its EEZ.’56 The next round of Cyprus talks lasted from 12 May 2015 to 8 July 2017, ending without a tangible outcome. Speaking on July 10, Turkish President Erdoğan said, ‘A major opportunity was missed in the Eastern Mediterranean last week,’ adding, ‘Our expectation from all parties is that they avoid steps that would lead to new tensions.’57 The very same day, however, the RoC announced TOTAL would soon begin drilling in Block 11. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu announced that Ankara was readying ‘counter- measures’ against the Greek side, to which Nicosia replied that it was ‘ready to defend sovereign rights.’58 Turkish Armed Forces General Staff announced that the frigate TCG Gökçeada was ordered to track the West Capella drill ship. According to reports, the Turkish military deployed two ships and a sub- marine to the Eastern Mediterranean,59 indicating an escalation of conflict. Tensions between Turkey and the RoC flared in February 2018 due to drilling by the RoC in the disputed waters of the island. On February 9, Turkish naval elements intercepted the Saipem 12,000 drilling ship of Italy’s ENI. The ship was reported sailing from Block 6 southwest of the island toward Block 3. Just a day before the naval standoff, ENI had announced a residual gas discovery in Block 6, raising Cypriot hopes for much-needed new discoveries. Ankara, however, claims that Block 6 overlaps with Turkey’s continental shelf. Determined to deter any exploration efforts by the RoC, the Turkish naval detachment that blocked Saipem 12,000 remained in the region for about three months. In addition to a frigate, a corvette, a fuel tanker, and two assault boats that officially conducted surveillance missions, the detachment also reportedly included two submarines.60 ENI and the RoC insisted that they would not be deterred by Turkey’s attempts to prevent the development of the gas fields.

Reshuffling of regional alliances The second factor that shapes Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy involves the changes in geopolitical alliances, which reflect the shifts in the energy land- scape of the region. The emergence of a close cooperation between Israel, Greece, and the RoC61 and the resulting redistribution of threat adversely affected Turkey’s preference regarding regional cooperation. Mutual energy interests have been the major driver of the rapprochement among Israel, the RoC, and Greece. As reserve holders, Israel and the RoC have explored various options to develop and export the gas, including the Vasilikos LNG facility and the EastMed pipeline. Greece both as an ally of 454 T. DEMIRYOL the RoC and a gas transit country to Europe supported these projects. The col- laborative efforts were aided by the fact that the majority shareholders in both fields were the same energy companies. Egypt, while not being part of the so called ‘new energy triangle,’62 has been a partner to Israel, Greece, and the RoC in various transportation projects, which spilled over to political cooperation. The President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi; the President of the RoC, Anastasiades; and the Prime Minister of Greece, Tsipras hold regular Trilateral Summits, the fifth of which took place in Cairo in November 2017. In February 2018, a private Egyptian company (Dolphinus Holdings) signed a 10-year deal with Israel to buy $15 billion of Israeli gas. Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz called it ‘the most significant export deal with Egypt since the neighbors signed their historic peace treaty in 1979.’63 While energy interests provided a strong economic rationale for cooperation among Israel, Greece, and the RoC, the convergence of security interests also contributed to the rapprochement. Israel, Greece, and the RoC shared a mutual interest in counterbalancing the influence of Turkey, albeit for different reasons. From Israel’s perspective, the turning point was the Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010, just a few months before the discovery of the Leviathan field in December. Having severed diplomatic ties with Turkey, Israel moved on to develop closer ties with other regional powers. Tziarras calls the partnership between Israel, Greece, and the RoC a ‘comfortable quasi-alliance,’ one that allows the three states geopolitical leverage vis-à-vis Turkey in the immediate term while retaining some flexi- bility in the medium- to long-term relations with Turkey.64 While the tripartite partnership does not qualify as a formal military alliance, the relationship includes elements of security cooperation. In 2010, Turkey withdrew from the Reliant Mermaid, the naval exercises routinely held by Turkey, Israel, and the US since 1997. In Turkey’s stead, the US and Israel invited Greece to join the exercises, now renamed Noble Dina. In Sep- tember 2011, a defense agreement was signed allowing the Israeli air force and navy to be hosted at Greek bases and conduct training in the Greek airspace.65 In January 2012, RoC Minister of Defense Eliades visited Israel and signed a defense agreement with Tel Aviv.66 In February 2012, the RoC granted a permit for the Israeli air force and navy to use the Cypriot airspace and territorial waters. Joint naval and air exercises would become routine among the three powers, frequently targeting areas of gas extraction, ‘addres- sing or alleviating energy insecurities related to Turkish threats.’67 Defense cooperation among Greece, the RoC, and Israel raised Turkey’s threat perception toward the Mediterranean, causing Ankara to prioritize security over expected economic benefits. In March 2012, shortly after the defense agreement between the RoC and Israel, Admiral Murat Bilgel of the Turkish Navy said the goal of the new naval strategy was ‘to operate not only in the littoral but also on the high seas’ and to enhance ‘sea denial, TURKISH STUDIES 455 forward presence and limited power projection capacity.’68 In September 2013, the new Commander of the Turkish Navy, Admiral Bostanoğlu, under- scored that Turkey’s maritime threat perception was ‘energy-based’ and that defending Turkey’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean was the Navy’s ‘highest priority.’69 As part of the efforts to build a blue water navy, in Decem- ber 2013 the Turkish government commissioned a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), a multipurpose amphibious assault ship, which will allow Ankara to project power deeper into the Mediterranean. Furthering the security dilemma, the RoC, Israel, and Greece ramped up their military cooperation. The Noble Dina conducted in 2015 was the largest exercise to date, with a focus on the protection of offshore energy infrastructure from a hostile force. On 19 July 2015, Greek Defense Minister Kam- menos visited Israel to sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the first ever SOFA that Israel had signed to date with a state other than the US. While deepening defense ties with the RoC and Greece, Israel was also seeking to re-open channels of communication with Turkey. Following a failed attempt at reconciliation in 2014, Turkey and Israel re-initiated efforts at normalization in 2015. The mutual interest in re-establishing diplomatic ties was motivated by converging energy interests. In March 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had a private meeting with Israel’s Energy Minister, Yuval Steinitz, the first high-level contact between Turkey and Israel since 2010. It was subsequently revealed that the key item on the meeting’s agenda was bilateral energy cooperation. In an inter- view in Jerusalem, Steinitz confirmed the meeting, highlighting that he was ‘a great proponent of this effort to resume diplomatic relations with Turkey.’70 In addition to shared economic incentives toward cooperation, shifts in the regional security environment paved the way for the reconciliation of Turkey and Israel. First, the Iran nuclear deal brought Israel and Turkey closer together as both were concerned with the re-emergence of Iran as a regional power. Israel held that the P5 + 1 deal would prove insufficient in curbing Iran’s regional ambitions.71 Ankara, while publicly welcoming the deal,72 was apprehensive that the re-articulation of Iran into the international system could tip the balance of power at Turkey’s expense. Turkish President Erdoğan was stating Ankara’s unease over Iran’s resurgence when he said in March 2015, ‘Iran is trying to dominate the region. Could this be allowed? [T]his is really not tolerable, and Iran has to see this.’73 Second, the diplomatic crisis between Moscow and Ankara following the downing of a Russian jet along the Turkey–Syria border on 25 November 2015, indirectly catalyzed Turkey–Israel normalization. Following massive economic sanctions by the Kremlin on Turkey, Ankara became increasingly concerned about its dependence on Russian gas. Even though Russian sanctions did not directly involve gas exports to Turkey, both the public and policymakers were increasingly alarmed about the possibility that the Kremlin 456 T. DEMIRYOL could play the energy card. Elevated concerns about energy supply security incentivized Ankara to fast-track projects like the Israel–Turkey pipeline, which might partially substitute for Russian gas. Speaking on 13 December 2015, less than three weeks after the jet crisis with Moscow, President Erdoğan said, ‘The normalization process would be good for us, Israel, Pales- tine, and the entire region. The region definitely needs this.’74 Once conditions were suitable, reconciliation was a relatively swift process. By June 2016, diplomatic ties between Turkey and Israel were restored. Despite normalization, Turkey–Israel relations did not return to pre-2010 levels as the two governments were often caught in public spats over the Pales- tine issue. A serious diplomatic crisis erupted in July 2017, when the Israeli government instituted new security measures in Mount Temple. Turkish officials condemned Israel’s actions in the harshest of terms, to which Israel responded, ‘The days of the Ottoman Empire have passed. Jerusalem was, is, and always will be the capital of the Jewish people.’75 US President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital led to a deterio- ration of Turkish–Israeli ties. Ankara spearheaded the effort at the UN General Assembly where 128 UN member states voted in favor of a draft measure that declared President Trump’s Jerusalem decision ‘null and void.’ Even though Turkey and Israel are no longer diplomatically estranged, the bilateral relationship remains highly fragile. In addition, the partnership of Israel, the RoC, and Greece remains intact even though the initial conditions that had led to the realignment shifted. Two factors explain the resilience of the tripartite bloc. First, the security mechanisms established over the past few years continue to pay dividends. Noble Dina is routinely conducted, and the RoC Navy participated as an observer in 2017. Increasingly concerned about the security of its critical offshore energy infrastructure, Israel values defense cooperation with Greece and the RoC. Second, the RoC, Israel, Italy, and Greece continue to pursue joint export projects, including the EastMed pipeline.76 Thus even though the re- establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel relieved some of the pressure on Ankara, the geopolitical isolation of Turkey in the Mediterranean continues as Israel, Greece, the RoC, and Egypt coordinate their policies to coun- terbalance Turkey’sinfluence. As long as security stakes remain elevated, Turkey will find it difficult to prioritize potential economic gains to be obtained by cooperating with regional rivals.

Conclusion Can natural resources facilitate peace? Taking a cue from the long-standing debate between liberal and realist schools on economic interdependence, this article explored the impact of natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Med- iterranean on regional cooperation. The analytical narrative focused on TURKISH STUDIES 457

Turkey’s preferences regarding energy cooperation. The primary finding of the case study is that Turkey’s preferences reflect both security and economic interests, albeit to varying degrees. Even though Turkey has much to gain from cooperation with regional rivals, the high security stakes involved in the development and exploration of natural resources incentivize Ankara to opt for a confrontational strategy in dealing with political disputes. The politics of Mediterranean gas thus suggests that state preferences regarding cooperation are predominantly shaped by security considerations rather than economic incentives. When states prioritize security over prosperity, and the perceived stakes are high, they will likely continue to escalate tensions even if this results in the loss of expected gains from cooperation. While this finding does not necessarily indicate that the liberal creed in the pacifying effects of interdependence is entirely unsupported, it strongly corroborates the realist proposition that expected economic gains from cooperation alone are insufficient to bring about peace.

Notes 1. Grigoriadis, “Energy Discoveries”; Gürel and Le Cornu, “Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean”; Iseri and Andrikopoulos, “Energy Geopolitics”; Khad- duri, “East Mediterranean Gas”; and Pericleous, “Cyprus.” 2. The White House, “Remarks by Vice President.” 3. “Protest as Turkey Drills for Oil in Northern Cyprus.” BBC News, April 26, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17852182. 4. Wilson, “Turks, Cypriots,” 105. 5. Atlantic Council, “Prepared Remarks by Victoria Nuland.” 6. Mansfield and Pollins, “The Study of Interdependence,” 835–7. For a compre- hensive review of the literature, see Mansfield and Pollins, Economic Interde- pendence and International Conflict. 7. Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, “Investing in the Peace,” 393–6. 8. Kroll, “The Complexity of Interdependence,” 322–4, and Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War.” 9. Tekin and Williams, “Europe’s External Energy Policy,” 12–14, and Müftüler- Baç and Başkan, “The Future of Energy Security,” 375. 10. Ali, “Energizing Peace,” 7–8. 11. Omonbude, Cross-Border Oil and Gas. 12. Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence.” 13. Stern, “Gas Pipeline Co-Operation.” 14. Hill, “Pipelines in the Caspian,” 18–19. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, however, proved an insurmountable barrier to bilateral energy cooperation. 15. Dargin, “The Dolphin Project.” 16. Ali, “Energizing Peace,” 12. 17. “‘Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project Is a Lifeline for Pakistan’s Economy,’ Dr Gulfaraz Ahmed, Energy Expert.” Business Recorder, June 28, 2013. https:// fp.brecorder.com/2013/06/201306281204543/; and Kramer, “Afghanistan Breaks Ground.” 458 T. DEMIRYOL

18. Shaffer, Energy Politics, 172. 19. Stevens, Transit Troubles,14–18. 20. Shaffer, “Can New Energy Supplies,” 3. 21. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends,3. 22. Waltz, “The Myth of National,” 143. 23. Hirschman, National Power. 24. Gereben, “Russia’s Energy Weapon,” and Stegen, “Deconstructing the ‘Energy Weapon’.” 25. Stulberg, “Strategic Bargaining,” 816. 26. Shaffer, “Natural Gas Supply Stability,” 115. 27. Mearsheimer, “Disorder Restored,” 222. 28. US Geological Survey, “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil.” 29. “93 Per Cent of Jordan’s Electricity Generated by Natural Gas.” Jordan Times, May 5, 2018. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/93-cent-jordan%E2% 80%99s-electricity-generated-natural-gas. 30. “Israel Consortium Signs ‘Historic’ 15-Year, $10b Gas Deal with Jordan.” Times of Israel, September 26, 2016. http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-consortium- signs-15-year-10b-gas-deal-with-jordan/. 31. Ratcliffe, “Israel-Gaza Gas Pipeline.” 32. BP, “BP Statistical Review.” 33. The estimated cost of the Vasilikos plant is $12.6 billion. Carlson, “Pivoting Energy Relations,” 71. 34. “Eni/Total Find Natgas off Cyprus in Field Close to Zohr.” Reuters, February 8, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-natgas/cyprus-says-extensive -strain-of-natgas-found-in-formation-similar-to-zohr-idUSKBN1FS1G3. 35. “Leviathan and Aphrodite Gas to Fuel ELNG at Idku.” OGInsights, March 17, 2018. http://oginsights.blogspot.com/2018/03/leviathan-and-aphrodite-gas-to- fuel.html. 36. “Cyprus-Egypt Gas Pipeline to Cost $800 Million-$1 Billion.” Reuters, May 7, 2018. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-energy-cyprus/cyprus-egypt-gas- pipeline-to-cost-800-million-1-billion-idUKKBN1I8182. 37. “Gas Pipeline to Egypt a Done Deal but There Is a Snag.” Financial Mirror, August 7, 2018. http://www.financialmirror.com/news-details.php?nid=35714. 38. “Israel-Cyprus gas dispute goes to int’l arbitration.” Globes, May 1, 2018. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-israel-cyprus-gas-dispute-goes-to-intl- arbitration-1001233992. 39. Bryza, “Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas,” 39. 40. “Eastmed.” IGI Poseidon, February 2, 2016. http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/ eastmed. 41. Winrow, “The Anatomy,” 437. 42. Tagliapietra, “Is the EastMed Gas?” 43. “Israel, Cyprus, and Greece Push East Med Gas Pipeline to Europe.” Times of Israel, May 8, 2018. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-cyprus-and-greece- push-east-med-gas-pipeline-to-europe/. 44. “Gas Future Hinges on Regional Cooperation, and Cyprus Solution.” Cyprus Mail, September 10, 2016. http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/09/10/gas-future- hinges-regional-cooperation-cyprus-solution/. 45. Stocker, “No EEZ Solution”; and Eissler and Arasıl, “Maritime Boundary Delimitation.” 46. Başeren, “Cyprus Hydrocarbon Dispute,” 37. TURKISH STUDIES 459

47. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “30 January 2007 Press”; and MGK Basın Bildirisi, “20 Haziran 2007.” 48. Gürel and Le Cornu, “Can Gas Catalyse,” 15. 49. “Spokesman Drilling Cyprus Talks.” Cyprus News Agency, October 5, 2011. http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2011/11-10-05_1.cna.html. 50. Gürel and Le Cornu, “Can Gas Catalyse Peace?” 71. 51. As noted earlier, at 120bcm Aphrodite field is not large enough to be globally significant. However, it is important because it is a major asset for the Cypriot economy. The discovery of Aphrodite gas also reinforced hopes that larger reserves might be found in adjacent blocks. 52. Özertem, “Turkish Foreign Policy,” 366. 53. “Protest as Turkey Drills for Oil in Northern Cyprus.” BBC News, April 26, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17852182. 54. “Cyprus Slams Turkey over Second NAVTEX.” Offshore Energy Today, January 8, 2015. http://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/cyprus-slams-turkey-over-secon d-navtex/. 55. Kambas, “Cyprus Says Turkish Vessel.” 56. European Council, “European Council.” 57. “Erdoğan Dünya Petrol Kongresi’nde Konuştu.” [Erdoğan spoke at World Pet- roleum Congress.] NTV, July 10, 2017. https://www.ntv.com.tr/ekonomi/ erdogan-dunya-petrol-kongresinde-konustu,FarqY66Id0iT62RSKqtdlw. 58. Michalopoulos, “Greece-Turkey Tensions Mount.” 59. Hazou, “Turkey Ups the Ante.” 60. Gürcan, “Tempers Flare over Gas.” 61. Alterman and Malka, “Shifting Eastern Mediterranean Geometry,” For an over- view of geopolitical shifts in the Mediterranean, see; Karagiannis, “Shifting Eastern Mediterranean Alliances”; and Nopens, “Geopolitical Shifts.” 62. Stavris, “The New Energy Triangle,” 87. 63. “Egyptian Firm to Buy $15 Billion of Israeli Natural Gas.” Reuters, February 19, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-egypt-natgas/egyptian-firm-to- buy-15-billion-of-israeli-natural-gas-idUSKCN1G31BK. 64. Tziarras, “Israel-Cyprus-Greece,” 411. 65. Nastos, “Greek-Israeli-Cyprus.” 66. “Israel and Cyprus Sign Defense Agreements.” Israel Defense, January 10, 2012. http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/israel-and-cyprus-sign-defense- agreements. 67. Tziarras, “Israel-Cyprus-Greece,” 417. 68. Tanchum, “Turkey’s New Carrier,” 8. 69. Tanchum, “A New Equilibrium,” 10. 70. “How Gas Could Warm Relations between Israel and Turkey.” Reuters, June 21, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-turkey-gas-insight/how-gas- could-warm-relations-between-israel-and-turkey-idUSKCN0Z60WJ. 71. Kershner, “Iran Deal Denounced.” 72. Peker, “Turkey Hails Iran.” 73. Pamuk, “Turkey’s Erdogan Says.” 74. Karagoz, “Israeli-Turkish Rapprochement Crucial.” 75. Arbell, “Tensions over Jerusalem.” 76. Reed, “Israel Signs Pipeline Deal.” 460 T. DEMIRYOL

Disclosure statement No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding This work was supported by the Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştirma Kurumu under Grant 114K378.

Notes on contributor Tolga Demiryol is an associate professor of political science at Altınbaş University in Istanbul and a Fung Global Fellow at Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies. Demiryol received his Ph.D. in politics from the University of Vir- ginia. His areas of research include international security, geopolitics of energy and Turkish foreign policy.

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