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Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society Editorial Board Elisabeth Leinfellner Rudolf Haller of Philosophy and the Future Wittgenstein A Reassessment afterYears 50 Werner Leinfellner Klaus Puhl Paul Weingartner der Philosophie und die Zukunft Wittgenstein Eine Neubewertung nach 50 Jahren 2 Volume IX (2) Band IX (2) 1 Wittgenstein und die Zukunft der Philosophie Eine Neubewertung nach 50 Jahren Beiträge des 24. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums 12. - 18. August 2001 Kirchberg am Wechsel Band IX (2) Herausgeber Rudolf Haller Klaus Puhl Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Abteilung Kultur und Wissenschaft des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2001 Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 2 Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy A Reassessment after 50 Years Papers of the 24th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 12 - 18, 2001 Kirchberg am Wechsel Volume IX (2) Editors Rudolf Haller Klaus Puhl Printed in cooperation with the Department for Culture and Science of the County of Lower Austria Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2001 Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 3 Distributors Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel Österreich/Austria ISSN 1022-3398 All Rights Reserved Copyright © 2001 by the authors No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, and informational storage and retrieval systems without written permission from the copyright owner. Visuelle Gestaltung: Georg Lohmer (Entwurf des Grundlayout), Katja Hartmann (Layout Assistent), Sascha Windholz (Gesamtleitung Grafik), Oliver Zoihsl (Generallayout) Der Band ist gesetzt in den Schriften Arial und Times New Roman Druck: Copy 11, 1110 Wien 4 Inhalt / Contents Finitism and Symmetry 13 Jonas Larsson Wittgenstein and Other Minds 20 Yakir Levin Functions and Operations in the Tractatus 26 Eric Loomis The Silence After Kant 33 Charles W. Lowney Wittgenstein on Dissimulation and the Constitution of the Inner 39 Antonio Marques Wittgenstein, Metaphors, and Mental Concepts 45 Ken Maruta Wittgenstein and Teaching 51 Yasushi Maruyama Diamond's Wittgenstein and the Mute Philosopher 57 Anat Matar Setzungen: Wittgensteins Stil im Tractatus 64 Dieter Mersch The Aesthetic Turn: Wittgenstein, Cavell and 'Therapy 72 Thomas Meyer War Wittgenstein Hitlers "Jude aus Linz",wie Kimberley Cornish aus antipodischer Sicht meint? Kritische Gedanken zu einem krausen Buch 78 Hermann Möcker 5 Is Logic Syntax of Language? Carnap's Programme, Gödel's Critique, and Wittgenstein's Evasion 86 Brian David Mogck Ludwig Wittgenstein and Yorick Smythies. A hithero Unknown Relationship 92 Volker A. Munz Pragmatische und/oder dekonstruktive Wittgensteinlektüren? 98 Ludwig Nagl Gewißheit und befriedigendes Verstehen 104 Karl Nähr Language, Action, and Mind: Language-game and Attitude Ascription 111 Yasuo Nakayama Wittgenstein, the Ordinary and Certainty 117 Matteo Negro Autonome Grammatik - Linguistischer Idealismus ? Ein Versuch mit Wittgenstein und Peirce 122 Mariele Nientied The Color-Exclusion Problem Revisited 130 Yasushi Nomura Wittgenstein And Computationalism 136 S. Jack Odell Rule-Following and Explanation Transcendence 142 Cyrus Panjvani Truth and Taste 149 Fabrice Pataut Private Language: A Voiced Secret 155 David Pérez Chico & Moisés Barroso Ramos 6 Wittgenstein on Logical Necessity: Two Interpretations 161 Patrice Philie 5 Thesen zu der Entstehung und Eigenart der Philosophischen Untersuchungen 167 Alois Pichler Logic vs. Information - Two Approaches To Language 175 Jan Werszowiec Plazowski, Marek Suwara From Truth To Certainty 182 Albinas Plešnys Is Wittgenstein a Possibilist? 186 Jimmy Plourde Aggregatzustände des Wissens. Die Grundlagen der Wissenschaft im Lichte Wittgensteins Bemerkungen Über Gewißheit 193 Konstantin Pollok Environmental Holistic Ethics: Leopold and Callicot 202 Leszek Pyra Wittgenstein und die Cambridge-Theorie der Repräsentation 208 Josef Quitterer Wahrheit, Negation und Falschheit im Tractatus - Stenius' Erklärung des falschen Satzes 215 Ana María Rabe Logik, Datenbanken und Tractatus-Welt 223 Michael Rahnfeld Wittgensteins sogenannte Privatsprachenargumentation - Eine übersichtliche Darstellung 234 Adolf Rami 7 Wittgenstein and Freud 243 Roberto Rojo Was Mary nicht konnte... und was sie nicht wusste - Wittgensteins Beitrag zur Qualia-Dabatte 249 Tobias Rosefeldt Religious Truth and Realism in Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinians 256 Jacob Joshua Ross Art, Opinions, and Attitudes 260 Simo Säätelä Philosophy As A Guide To Life? 266 Saurabh Sanatani Wittgenstein on Thoughts and Representations. 273 Priyambada Sarkar Through the Looking-Glass: The Problem of Wittgenstein's Point of View 278 Genia Schönbaumsfeld Wittgensteins Beichte 283 Monika Seekircher Wittgenstein's Legacy for the Self 290 Paul Smeyers Wittgensteins religiöser Determinismus 295 Ilse Somavilla Blinded By Words: Philosophy As The Mirror Of Confusion 304 Richard Sørli Wittgensteins Beitrag zur modernen Konzeption der narrativen Identität - Sein Einfluß auf die Philosophie Paul Ricœurs 310 Ruth Spiertz 8 The Incoherence of Wittgenstein's (Weak) Idealism 318 Lambert Vincent Stepanich Was sind Propositionen der Form "A glaubt (daß) p": Russell und Wittgensteins Kritik 324 Elena Tatievskaia Wittgenstein On Myth, Ritual And Science 329 Aydan Turanli Form(s) Of Life 336 Jaap van Brakel The Net Metaphor Reconsidered: Wittgenstein's Conception of Science in the Tractatus 342 Remko van der Geest How Dissolving The Rule-Following Paradox Can Give Philosophy A Future 347 Claudine Verheggen Remarks on Bernays vs. Wittgenstein 353 Risto Vilkko Der Philosoph als Fremdenführer - Anmerkungen zur Selbstbezüglichkeit von Wittgensteins Philosophieren 359 Klaus von Stosch Lofty Ladders, Rough Ground - Learning from Hacker vs. Diamond 366 Thomas Wallgren Wittgenstein und Kant zur Metaphysik 372 Heinrich Watzka 9 Is Wittgenstein a Foundationalist? 380 Michael Williams The importance of nonsense - Some Remarks on the Notion of Secondary Use of Words 386 Cato Wittusen Bioethik und das Problem absoluter Werte 393 Monika Wogrolly-Maani Wittgenstein und die indirekte Mitteilung 401 Jacek Ziobrowski 10 Beiträge / Papers 11 12 Finitism and Symmetry Jonas Larsson The Strong Programme of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge is more often than not discussed on the basis of its four methodological theses: causality, impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity. However, a closer reading of the works of David Bloor and Barry Barnes displays the significance of the hitherto much neglected thesis of finitism. These advocates of the Strong Programme are interested in finitism, which primarily is a thesis in the philosophy of language, because of its significance for the sociology of knowledge. The present paper investigates the significance of finitism with respect to concept application. It is fruitful to begin by examining Bloor's critique of rationalism. Bloor on Rationalism According to Bloor's paper Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the Sociology of Knowledge, the main problem with rationalism is its false belief that rules or concepts can be assigned explanatory status: Rationalism seems plausible because we think that rules and meanings furnish us with invisible rails which reach ahead of behaviour, giving guidance to those rational enough to intuit their presence. But we cannot make concepts or rules explain the activity of concept or rule users. It is the activity of the users, their habits and goals, which explain why a concept or rule is applied in the way it is. (1988: 69) In order to understand why the explanatory status of rules and concepts are of importance to the Strong Programme, the asymmetry of rationalism must be taken into account. Think for example about rational explanations of theory choice. Rationalists commonly assume that a scientist, in so far as s/he intends to choose the epistemologically superior theory, acts in accordance with the acknowledged principles of comparison and the available data and thereby makes correct judgements (with respect to the epistemic merits of the competing theories). One the other hand, if the scientist does intend to choose the superior theory but acts contrary to the principles of 13 Jonas Larsson comparison, then some non-rational factors, such as psycho-sociological factors, are assumed to override her/his predisposition to judge correctly, i.e. in compliance with the rule. Hence, given the pursuit of the epistemologically superior theory, rationalists conclude that psychological and sociological explanations are appropriate only when the relevant principles of comparison are applied wrongly (Newton-Smith 1981). At stake in Bloor's critique of rationalism is whether the rationalists can uphold their asymmetrical styles of explanation. The symmetry requirement, proposed by the Strong Programme, states that the sociologists should provide social explanations of actions, judgements, beliefs and inferences independently of whether the actions are rational or irrational, of whether the judgements and beliefs are true or false, or of whether the inferences are valid or invalid (Bloor 1991). I shall begin my investigation of finitism and its significance for a sociological understanding of concept application by explaining why Bloor rejects explanations based on rules
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