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China-Qatar Relations in Perspective

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China-Qatar Relations in Perspective Volume 17, Issue 9 July 7, 2017 In a Fortnight: China-Qatar Relations in Perspective China, Russia Commit to “Dual Track” Approach Toward Korean Peninsula Issues Nuclear Bomber Could Boost PLAAF Strategic Role, Create Credible Triad By Michael Chase Xi Jinping and China’s Traditionalist Restoration By Zi Yang Swarms at War: Chinese Advances in Swarm Intelligence By Elsa Kania The United Front Work Department: “Magic Weapon” at Home and Abroad By Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle ChinaThe United-Qatar Front RelationsWork Department: in “Magic Weapon”China maintainsat Home andclose Abroad relationships with states By Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle on both sides of the Gulf. Its foreign policy state- Perspective ments describe both Saudi Arabia and Iran as “Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships” (全面战 O n June 5, Saudi Arabia announced it was cut- 略伙伴关系) in the dense bureaucratese of the ting diplomatic ties with Qatar and closing its Ministry of Foreign Relations. This level of part- land border in response to Qatar “supporting nership means that China has built a deep rela- terrorism.” Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab tionship with both countries and maintains sig- Emirates quickly joined, and all denied airspace nificant cooperation on security issues. By con- overflight rights to Qatari airlines. Saudi Arabia trast, its relationships with Kuwait, Oman, and and its allies gave Qatar until July 4 to accede to Bahrain are primarily economic and defined as a list of demands. For China, the spat between “Friendly Cooperative Relations” (友好合作关系). Saudi Arabia and its allies and Qatar is an un- Examining China’s response to the Saudi em- wanted complication between important eco- bargo of Qatar as well as China’s broader rela- nomic partners. ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 tionship with the small but strategically im- (BRI) and the China-led Asia Development Bank portant state provides insight into Beijing’s were clearly highlighted in the agreement then, broader Middle East strategy. and repeatedly emphasized since by members of the foreign ministry (MFA, May 18). In 2014, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s The improvement in relations and expansion to visit to Qatar, the two countries upgraded their security and political cooperation was built on a relationship to Strategic Partner (战略伙伴关系), solid economic relationship. Since 2013, China a status that recognized Qatar’s role not only as has been the world’s largest consumer of oil an economic partner but also as a security part- from the Middle East. Qatar is the world’s lead- ner. In his speech at the signing of the joint ing exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and statement on establishment of the relationship, in 2014 was China’s largest supplier of LNG, Xi Jinping stressed the opportunities to improve though imports appear to have moderated military exchanges and work together to combat somewhat since then (EIA, April 30, 2016). terrorism (Xinhua, November 3, 2014). The text of the agreement laid out an expansive set of While the rate of increase in China’s demand for goals from increased security cooperation to se- energy will likely decrease, the proportion of curity exchanges (Xinhua, November 3, 2014). natural gas as a percent of total consumption is Qatari support for the Belt and Road Initiative projected to double to 11 percent through 2035. 2 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 [1] This demand is likely to increase the im- solve their differences through negotiation, re- portance of the largest LNG exporting nations— main united and together promote stability in particularly Qatar, Oman and Iran—to Chinese the region” (FMPRC, June 5). energy markets. The shift in Chinese imports could have consequences for its relations with In addition to maintaining economic relations the Gulf states. throughout the Middle East, China is committed to expanding its ability to project military power China has largely managed to successfully navi- across the region. This includes the aforemen- gate the animosity between Iran and Saudi Ara- tioned military exchanges, port visits and exer- bia, maintaining good relations with both coun- cises with Oman, its naval base in Djibouti and tries. Chinese demand for oil has benefited all additional bases in, according to a recent U.S. the states in the region, and Chinese weapons department of defense report, “countries with are increasingly sought out by both states. China which it has long-standing, friendly relationships and Saudi Arabia have recently made moves to (DOD, June 6). This is understood to include Pa- deepen their security cooperation and have a kistan, with whom China has its closest diplo- weapons export relationship that stretches dates matic relationship—an “all-weather strategic co- back to the 1980s (China Brief, March 2). operative partnership” (NBC, June 19; see map). However, this delicate balance may be reaching While the embargo against Qatar has not been a tipping point, as China continues to improve extended to include petroleum, Qatar has yet to military relations with Iran and increase its sup- respond to Saudi Arabia’s’ demands to its satis- port for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria faction, setting the stage for further escalation. (China Brief, August 22, 2016). Particularly since Historically, China’s non-interventionist foreign 2014, China’s military exchanges and exercises policy has allowed it to remain neutral in most with Iran have become more regular and more inter-regional disputes. But as Iranian and Qatari prominent, including a joint exercise held in LNG begin to make up a larger proportion of mid-June of this year (China Brief, February 4, Chinese petroleum imports, and Chinese mili- 2015; China Brief, March 7, 2016; MOD, June 16). tary involvement in the region becomes more pronounced, balancing between Iran and Saudi A core part of Saudi Arabia’s demands is that Arabia may no longer be possible. Qatar cut all ties with Iran (People’s Daily, June 24). These relationships make the recent flare- Notes up between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and its allies 1. BP, World Energy Outlook, 2017 all the more awkward for Beijing. http://www.bp.com/con- tent/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/en- Responding to a question about China’s stance ergy-outlook-2017/bp-energy-outlook- on the crisis, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017.pdf Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s response was typically subdued: “We are aware of the reports. *** China hopes that the countries involved can re- 3 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 China, Russia Commit to approach of denuclearizing the peninsula on the one hand and establishing a peace mechanism “Dual Track” Approach on the other" (Xinhua, March 8). Wang also ar- Toward Korean Peninsula gued that China had “done its best” to bring the relevant parties to the negotiation table. Issues This new policy did little to mollify U.S. policy- On July 4, North Korea launched a multi-stage makers, who see China as having control over Hwasong-14 ballistic missile. During the flight North Korea via its trade relationship. U.S. am- test, the missile reached an altitude of 2,300 km bassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, for example, and a lateral distance of 900 km (People’s Daily, immediately responded to Wang’s remarks by July 4). Though the test followed a “lobbed” tra- saying that “positive action” was needed from jectory (higher altitude over a shorter distance North Korea before negotiations were possible than in a true combat scenario), the altitude and (Reuters, March 8). In June, the 8th Strategic and other measures place the Hwasong-14 in the Economic Dialogue between China and the class of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). United States yielded mostly platitudes (People’s Daily, June 8). A further meeting between U.S. The ICBM test is merely the latest in a growing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Chinese 杨洁篪 list of actions by North Korea to put itself at State Councilor Yang Jiechi ( ) during the odds with its northern neighbor. A nuclear test U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue on and satellite launch (widely viewed as a missile June 21 ended with promises by both sides to test) in early 2016 put stress on China-North Ko- continue the “strict implementation” of UN Se- rea relations (China Brief, February 8). This year curity Council Resolutions (People’s Daily, June has seen no improvement, as North Korea used 21). its annual military parade in April to showcase However, just over a week later, furious with ap- several new missile types, and there has been a parent Chinese inaction on trade with North Ko- steady drumbeat of additional missile tests rea, the U.S. Treasury Department enacted sanc- (Xinhua, April 15; Xinhua, March 7). North Ko- tions against the Bank of Dandong for “continu- rea’s actions have steadily increased calls for ing to serve as a gateway for North Korea to ac- China to exercise its economic influence over its cess the U.S. and international financial systems neighbor and “curb” its nuclear weapons and despite U.S. and UN sanctions” (Treasury, June missile programs. 29). Also included in the sanctions were Dalian Global Unity Shipping Co., Ltd., for transporting In March, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs “700,000 tons of freight annually, including coal Wang Yi (王毅) attempted to reframe Chinese and steel products”. [1] In response, Chinese policy toward North Korea, recommending a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lu “dual-track approach” (双轨并进) and “double Kang stated that “China has always opposed unilateral sanctions outside the framework of suspension” (双暂停) (MFA, March 8). As Wang the Security Council” (MFA, June 30). explained, ”[North Korea] may suspend its nu- clear and missile activities in exchange for the suspension of large-scale U.S.-[South Korea] military exercises…We may follow the dual-track 4 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 This is not the first time that Chinese banks have been implicated in helping violate UN resolu- Like China, while a more stable situation on the tions.
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