China-Qatar Relations in Perspective

Volume 17, Issue 9 July 7, 2017

In a Fortnight:  China-Qatar Relations in Perspective

 China, Russia Commit to “Dual Track” Approach Toward Korean Peninsula Issues

Nuclear Bomber Could Boost PLAAF Strategic Role, Create Credible Triad By Michael Chase

Xi Jinping and China’s Traditionalist Restoration By Zi Yang

Swarms at War: Chinese Advances in Swarm Intelligence By Elsa Kania

The United Front Work Department: “Magic Weapon” at Home and Abroad By Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle

ChinaThe United-Qatar Front RelationsWork Department: in “Magic Weapon”China maintainsat Home andclose Abroad relationships with states By Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle on both sides of the Gulf. Its foreign policy state- Perspective ments describe both Saudi Arabia and Iran as “Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships” (全面战 O n June 5, Saudi Arabia announced it was cut- 略伙伴关系) in the dense bureaucratese of the ting diplomatic ties with Qatar and closing its Ministry of Foreign Relations. This level of part- land border in response to Qatar “supporting nership means that China has built a deep rela- terrorism.” Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab tionship with both countries and maintains sig- Emirates quickly joined, and all denied airspace nificant cooperation on security issues. By con- overflight rights to Qatari airlines. Saudi Arabia trast, its relationships with Kuwait, Oman, and and its allies gave Qatar until July 4 to accede to Bahrain are primarily economic and defined as a list of demands. For China, the spat between “Friendly Cooperative Relations” (友好合作关系). Saudi Arabia and its allies and Qatar is an un- Examining China’s response to the Saudi em- wanted complication between important eco- bargo of Qatar as well as China’s broader rela- nomic partners.

ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 tionship with the small but strategically im- (BRI) and the China-led Asia Development Bank portant state provides insight into Beijing’s were clearly highlighted in the agreement then, broader Middle East strategy. and repeatedly emphasized since by members of the foreign ministry (MFA, May 18).

In 2014, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s The improvement in relations and expansion to visit to Qatar, the two countries upgraded their security and political cooperation was built on a relationship to Strategic Partner (战略伙伴关系), solid economic relationship. Since 2013, China a status that recognized Qatar’s role not only as has been the world’s largest consumer of oil an economic partner but also as a security part- from the Middle East. Qatar is the world’s lead- ner. In his speech at the signing of the joint ing exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and statement on establishment of the relationship, in 2014 was China’s largest supplier of LNG, Xi Jinping stressed the opportunities to improve though imports appear to have moderated military exchanges and work together to combat somewhat since then (EIA, April 30, 2016). terrorism (Xinhua, November 3, 2014). The text of the agreement laid out an expansive set of While the rate of increase in China’s demand for goals from increased security cooperation to se- energy will likely decrease, the proportion of curity exchanges (Xinhua, November 3, 2014). natural gas as a percent of total consumption is Qatari support for the Belt and Road Initiative projected to double to 11 percent through 2035.

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[1] This demand is likely to increase the im- solve their differences through negotiation, re- portance of the largest LNG exporting nations— main united and together promote stability in particularly Qatar, Oman and Iran—to Chinese the region” (FMPRC, June 5). energy markets. The shift in Chinese imports could have consequences for its relations with In addition to maintaining economic relations the Gulf states. throughout the Middle East, China is committed to expanding its ability to project military power China has largely managed to successfully navi- across the region. This includes the aforemen- gate the animosity between Iran and Saudi Ara- tioned military exchanges, port visits and exer- bia, maintaining good relations with both coun- cises with Oman, its naval base in Djibouti and tries. Chinese demand for oil has benefited all additional bases in, according to a recent U.S. the states in the region, and Chinese weapons department of defense report, “countries with are increasingly sought out by both states. China which it has long-standing, friendly relationships and Saudi Arabia have recently made moves to (DOD, June 6). This is understood to include Pa- deepen their security cooperation and have a kistan, with whom China has its closest diplo- weapons export relationship that stretches dates matic relationship—an “all-weather strategic co- back to the 1980s (China Brief, March 2). operative partnership” (NBC, June 19; see map).

However, this delicate balance may be reaching While the embargo against Qatar has not been a tipping point, as China continues to improve extended to include petroleum, Qatar has yet to military relations with Iran and increase its sup- respond to Saudi Arabia’s’ demands to its satis- port for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria faction, setting the stage for further escalation. (China Brief, August 22, 2016). Particularly since Historically, China’s non-interventionist foreign 2014, China’s military exchanges and exercises policy has allowed it to remain neutral in most with Iran have become more regular and more inter-regional disputes. But as Iranian and Qatari prominent, including a joint exercise held in LNG begin to make up a larger proportion of mid-June of this year (China Brief, February 4, Chinese petroleum imports, and Chinese mili- 2015; China Brief, March 7, 2016; MOD, June 16). tary involvement in the region becomes more pronounced, balancing between Iran and Saudi A core part of Saudi Arabia’s demands is that Arabia may no longer be possible. Qatar cut all ties with Iran (People’s Daily, June 24). These relationships make the recent flare- Notes up between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and its allies 1. BP, World Energy Outlook, 2017 all the more awkward for Beijing. http://www.bp.com/con- tent/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/en- Responding to a question about China’s stance ergy-outlook-2017/bp-energy-outlook- on the crisis, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017.pdf Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s response was typically subdued: “We are aware of the reports. *** China hopes that the countries involved can re-

3 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 China, Russia Commit to approach of denuclearizing the peninsula on the one hand and establishing a peace mechanism “Dual Track” Approach on the other" (Xinhua, March 8). Wang also ar- Toward Korean Peninsula gued that China had “done its best” to bring the relevant parties to the negotiation table. Issues This new policy did little to mollify U.S. policy- On July 4, North Korea launched a multi-stage makers, who see China as having control over Hwasong-14 ballistic missile. During the flight North Korea via its trade relationship. U.S. am- test, the missile reached an altitude of 2,300 km bassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, for example, and a lateral distance of 900 km (People’s Daily, immediately responded to Wang’s remarks by July 4). Though the test followed a “lobbed” tra- saying that “positive action” was needed from jectory (higher altitude over a shorter distance North Korea before negotiations were possible than in a true combat scenario), the altitude and (Reuters, March 8). In June, the 8th Strategic and other measures place the Hwasong-14 in the Economic Dialogue between China and the class of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). United States yielded mostly platitudes (People’s Daily, June 8). A further meeting between U.S. The ICBM test is merely the latest in a growing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Chinese 杨洁篪 list of actions by North Korea to put itself at State Councilor Yang Jiechi ( ) during the odds with its northern neighbor. A nuclear test U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue on and satellite launch (widely viewed as a missile June 21 ended with promises by both sides to test) in early 2016 put stress on China-North Ko- continue the “strict implementation” of UN Se- rea relations (China Brief, February 8). This year curity Council Resolutions (People’s Daily, June has seen no improvement, as North Korea used 21). its annual military parade in April to showcase However, just over a week later, furious with ap- several new missile types, and there has been a parent Chinese inaction on trade with North Ko- steady drumbeat of additional missile tests rea, the U.S. Treasury Department enacted sanc- (Xinhua, April 15; Xinhua, March 7). North Ko- tions against the Bank of Dandong for “continu- rea’s actions have steadily increased calls for ing to serve as a gateway for North Korea to ac- China to exercise its economic influence over its cess the U.S. and international financial systems neighbor and “curb” its nuclear weapons and despite U.S. and UN sanctions” (Treasury, June missile programs. 29). Also included in the sanctions were Dalian Global Unity Shipping Co., Ltd., for transporting In March, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs “700,000 tons of freight annually, including coal Wang Yi (王毅) attempted to reframe Chinese and steel products”. [1] In response, Chinese policy toward North Korea, recommending a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lu “dual-track approach” (双轨并进) and “double Kang stated that “China has always opposed unilateral sanctions outside the framework of suspension” (双暂停) (MFA, March 8). As Wang the Security Council” (MFA, June 30). explained, ”[North Korea] may suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for the suspension of large-scale U.S.-[South Korea] military exercises…We may follow the dual-track

4 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017

This is not the first time that Chinese banks have been implicated in helping violate UN resolu- Like China, while a more stable situation on the tions. In 2005, the U.S. Treasury named Banco Korean Peninsula would be welcomed, it is not, Delta Asia (汇业银行) in Macau a “primary laun- in fact Russia’s greatest security priority. For dering concern” for North Korea that among China, Russian endorsement of its dual other things “handles the bulk of the DPRK's track/double suspension approach makes it precious metal sales, and helps North Korean even more unlikely that China will adopt a more agents conduct surreptitious, multi-million dol- strict approach to North Korea. lar cash deposits and withdrawals” (Treasury, September 15, 2005). Further measures in 2007 Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can spooked the Bank of China into ceasing all trans- follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW actions through Banco Delta Asia, which signifi- cantly hurt North Koreas’ money laundering op- Notes: erations (Treasury, March 14, 2007; Armscon- 1. Both Dalian and Dandong are im- trolwonk, June 4, 2007). portant commercial hubs, Dalian on Bo- hai Gulf, and Dandong at the mouth of China’s consistent inability to cut off trade with the Yalu River and astride the primary North Korea points to a broader unwillingness rail link between China and North Korea. to step up sanctions. For Chinese leaders, the basic calculus remains the same: stepping up pressure on North Korea’s economy means at a *** minimum loss of valuable trade and at worst the risk of a collapse of the North Korean regime. Nuclear Bomber Could Boost China’s current “dual track approach” and “dou- PLAAF Strategic Role, Create ble suspension” policies therefore represent its best outcome and would result in a de-fanged Credible Triad North Korea and reduced U.S.-South Korean Michael S. Chase military capability. Chinese policies gained additional support when, on July 5, Russia and China Chinese President Xi Jinping has charged the issued a joint statement on the Korean Peninsula PLA Air Force (PLAAF) with transforming itself committing the two parties to the policy while into a “powerful people’s air force with inte- additionally condemning the deployment of the grated air and space and offensive and defen- THAAD anti-missile system (MFA, July 5). sive capabilities” (iFeng, September 1, 2016).

This undertaking aligns with the capabilities pri- Russia’s participation in the joint statement oritized in China’s 2015 defense white paper, marks an end to its conspicuous absence from China’s Military Strategy, and one that PLAAF involvement in the North Korean issue. Moscow Commander Ma Xiaotian has suggested his ser- continues to view U.S. presence in the region vice must approach with a sense of urgency (De- with greater trepidation than it does a fully ca- fense White Paper, May 29, 2015; iFeng, Sep- pable North Korean nuclear program (Eurasia tember 1, 2016). One important part of this Daily Monitor, March 28). transformation is strengthening the PLAAF’s

5 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 strategic deterrence and long-range strike capa- likely to feature “good stealth performance,” bilities. Xi has expressed personal interest in very long range, a larger bomb load than China’s China’s bombers. In February 2015 Xi and other current bomber, the H-6K, nuclear and conven- members of the Central Military Commission tional strike capabilities, and “strong electronic visited a PLAAF bomber base near Xi’an to in- combat capability” (China Military Online, Feb- spect China’s newest bomber variant, the H-6K ruary 17). Additionally, the H-20 should be “ca- (Xinwen Lianbao, February 17, 2015). China ap- pable of large-capacity data fusion and trans- pears to have even more ambitious plans for its mission,” so that it will be able to “serve as a future strategic bomber force. C4ISR node and interact with large sensor platforms like UAV, early warning aircraft and stra- According to the Department of Defense’s latest tegic reconnaissance aircraft to share infor- annual report to Congress on Chinese military mation and target data.” Although the authors power, Military and Security Developments In- are unclear about many of the details, including volving the People’s Republic of China 2017, the the potential targets the new bomber might PLAAF “is developing a strategic bomber that of- hold at risk, its range, and other requirements, ficials expect to have a nuclear mission.” [1] In- they underscore the importance of it having nu- deed, the PLAAF, which has long seen its contri- clear and conventional strike capability. With re- bution to China’s strategic deterrence posture spect to “nuclear-conventional integration,” the overshadowed by the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) authors write, “The new-generation long-range and more recently by the PLA Navy (PLAN), ap- bomber will have both nuclear and regular strike pears to be moving in the direction of develop- capability to hit the enemy's key links and sys- ing a modern nuclear deterrence and strike ca- temic weaknesses” (China Military Online, Feb- pability of its own. A PLAAF nuclear bomber ca- ruary 17). The authors of the China Youth Daily pability “would provide China with its first cred- article do not specify what type or types of mu- ible nuclear ‘triad’ of delivery systems dispersed nitions the new bomber will carry. Nor do they across land, sea, and air.” [2] say anything about the possibility of adding nuclear strike capabilities for the PLAAF’s H-6K China’s New Strategic Bomber bombers, which China used to conduct long range patrols around Taiwan and in the South PLAAF Commander Ma Xiaotian foreshadowed China Sea last year and are currently the PLAAF’s this development in fall 2016 when he publicly most advanced bombers. Of note, however, ac- confirmed China’s development of a “next-gen- cording to the May 2017 worldwide threat as- eration, long-range strike bomber” (China Daily, sessment the Director of the Defense Intelli- September 2, 2016). General Ma did not reveal gence Agency presented to the U.S. Senate any details related to the new strategic bomber, Armed Services Committee, China is pursuing but subsequent Chinese commentary suggests not only air-launched cruise missiles for its it will be called the H-20, and that it will have aircraft but also “two, new air-launched ballistic both conventional and nuclear deterrence and missiles, one of which may include a nuclear strike missions. According to a February 2017 ar- payload.” [3] ticle that appeared in China Youth Daily and was published in English the next day on China Mili- tary Online, China’s new strategic bomber is

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The PLAAF and Nuclear Deterrence As the PLAAF pursues its “strategic air force” vision, however, it now appears to have strong in- A nuclear role for the PLAAF would also likely centives to pursue a revitalized nuclear deter- enhance its status within the PLA and help real- rence and strike mission and the associated nu- ize its goal of becoming a “strategic air force,” a clear capabilities as it modernizes its bomber concept that calls for it to play a decisive role in force. This judgment is based on comments and protecting Chinese national security interests, writings by Chinese strategists that advocate the field capabilities commensurate with China’s development of advanced bombers capable of status as a major power, and enjoy an institu- conducting nuclear as well as conventional mis- tional status on par with the other services. This sions. These actions would improve the aspiration apparently requires the PLAAF to survivability of China’s nuclear force if the strengthen its strategic deterrence and strike ca- bombers were operated in a survivable manner pabilities as well as to enhance its ability to per- to assure survivability from a short-warning at- form other warfighting and MOOTW missions. tack by potentially both increasing the number For the PLAAF, its transformation into a “strate- of targets for a potential adversary and allowing gic air force” is probably also focused on ensur- the bombers to escape an attack by launching ing its bureaucratic status and influence are for survival. They would also offer new strategic commensurate with those of the PLA’s other ser- signaling options and an additional layer of nu- vices, an important consideration in a tradition- clear strike options in the region beyond what is ally ground force-dominated military. currently available with China’s land- and sea- based strategic missile force. Some observers credit the PLAAF’s bomber From an organizational perspective, nuclear ca- force with at least a residual capability to deliver pabilities could help bolster the PLAAF’s “strate- nuclear weapons. [4] According to the 2017 edi- gic air force” reputation as it compares itself to tion of the China military power report, however, other major air forces like the USAF and Russian the PLAAF “does not currently have a nuclear Air Force. The PLAAF very likely sees its new stra- mission.” [5] The PLAAF clearly had some capa- tegic bomber in this context. The China Youth bility to airdrop nuclear weapons early on, as Daily article cited above indicates that the new demonstrated by China’s nuclear testing pro- strategic bomber marks the PLAAF’s “transfor- gram, but its nuclear bomber capabilities appear mation from a big force to a strong force,” and to have atrophied in the 1970s and 1980s. One states that a modern long-range strategic possibility is that Chinese strategists concluded bomber represents “an indispensable part of a at the time that the PLAAF’s antiquated bombers major country's strategic strike system” (China would be unable to penetrate enemy air de- Military Online, February 17). Specifically, ac- fenses, and thus provided little value in terms of cording to the authors, “The large long-range nuclear deterrence. Consequently, as China’s bomber has always been a weak point for the land-based strategic missile capabilities in- PLA Air Force, which is at the critical juncture of creased in numbers and sophistication, the moving from quantitative accumulation to qual- PLARF, (known as PLA Second Artillery Force un- itative change and from being a big force to a til December 2015) supplanted the PLAAF as the strong force.” Furthermore, they argue, “The cornerstone of nuclear deterrence in China. new-generation LRSB will considerably improve China's strategic attack capability and make the

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PLA Air Force a strategic air force in the true would need to develop and refine capabilities it sense.” Finally, turning from the bomber’s im- presumably has not maintained for many years. plications for the PLAAF, the authors emphasize Additionally, the costs of assuring the physical its importance “for countering nuclear blackmail security and operational reliability of the nuclear from superpowers, solving surrounding mari- weapons could be considerable. On balance, time disputes that impede China's rise, and pre- however, regaining a nuclear mission would serving world peace” (China Military Online, likely boost the PLAAF’s role and support its February 17). transformation into a “strategic air force,” while also giving China an increased menu of options From an institutional interests perspective, the for strategic signaling and regional nuclear de- status of PLA Rocket Force as China’s “core force terrence and strike operations. for strategic deterrence” and the rising prominence of the PLAN’s contribution to the nuclear Implications for the United States deterrence mission—reflected in its Jin-class SSBNs and its plans for follow-on SSBNs and The PLAAF appears to be moving toward a nu- SLBMs in the future—suggests the PLAAF could clear deterrence and strike role with the devel- lose ground if it doesn’t play a role in this area opment of new bomber capabilities. If realized, as well. In that sense, adding a nuclear capability China for the first time would have an operation- would likely give the PLAAF an opportunity to ally deployed nuclear triad. The possibility of an increase its prestige while bolstering its contri- emerging nuclear mission for the PLAAF, and of bution to the broader strategic deterrence mis- this change in China’s nuclear posture, high- sion. Other organizational incentives for regain- lights the importance of discussions related to ing a nuclear mission include strengthening of the implications for strategic stability and nu- the PLAAF’s status vis-à-vis the other services, clear issues in the US-China relationship. Such especially now that the PLAN has a nuclear mis- discussions should take place as part of the US- sion as well as the PLARF. Rather than ceding China military-to-military relationship, such as this area to the PLARF and PLAN, the PLAAF during senior leader and counterpart conversa- might seek a voice on matters of China’s nuclear tions and exchanges. Continuing to develop and strategy and force modernization, not to men- use a common lexicon to address nuclear issues tion a share of the budget associated with the is one critically important component of this di- PLA’s nuclear mission. Finally, the PLAAF might alogue. Although the PLAAF will need to display want its own capabilities to strike certain enemy its nuclear bomber capabilities if it wants them targets, rather than relying exclusively on other to be useful for deterrence purposes, the services to hold those targets at risk. longstanding reluctance of PLARF leaders to engage in detailed discussions of nuclear issues at There are also several possible bureaucratic an official level suggests that, at least initially, downsides for the PLAAF if it develops nuclear PLAAF leaders might not be receptive to such capabilities. One of these could be the risk of exchanges either. Thus, early discussions on the embarrassment or other more severe conse- PLAAF’s nuclear role would probably need to quences resulting from any potential error re- take place at a non-governmental, informal lated to nuclear weapons storage, handling, Track 2 level, or by incorporating more PLAAF transportation, or security, areas in which it

8 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 participants into existing Track 2 or Track 1.5 (in- Xi Jinping and China’s Tradi- formal, semi-official) exchanges. tionalist Restoration The United States will also need to consider the Zi Yang regional security implications of a nuclear PLAAF, particularly regarding concerns about In 1934, confronted with rising pro-communist extended deterrence and strategic stability in sentiments in his country, Chiang Kai-shek, Northeast Asia. U.S. allies, especially Japan, may leader of China’s Nationalist Party, launched the be concerned that PLAAF nuclear bomber capa- neotraditionalist New Life Movement (新生活运 bilities could be part of a more varied set of re- 动) as part of a comprehensive anti-communist gional nuclear strike options and might suggest program that sought to use traditional values as movement away from China’s longstanding nu- a counterweight against Bolshevik-inspired rev- clear no first use (NFU) policy. Any such devel- olutionist ideas. Fast forward to today’s China opments could create new challenges for ex- and the head of China’s Communist Party is tended deterrence, underscoring the im- actively promoting a wave of neotraditionalism. portance of continuing to strengthen U.S.-Japan Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping exchanges on these issues. has repeatedly emphasized the need to “ad-

vance and enrich outstanding traditional Chi- Michael S. Chase is a senior political scientist at nese culture (中华优秀传统文化)” (CCP News, RAND and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins July 22, 2015). Why is Xi following this strategy School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). and what are his end goals? In addition to im- Notes mediate political aims, Xi’s neotraditionalist pol-

icy is part of a long-term vision to remake Chi- 1. Annual Report to Congress, Military and nese culture and society by weaving together Security Developments Involving the selected traditional values with contemporary People’s Republic of China 2017 (CMPR national consciousness. 2017), May 15, 2017, p. 61,

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Doc- Xi Jinping’s Neotraditionalism uments/pubs/2017_China_Mili-

tary_Power_Report.PDF In politics neotraditionalism means “the deliber- 2. CMPR 2017, p. 61. ate revival and revamping of old cultures, prac- 3. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Worldwide tices, and institutions for use in new political Threat Assessment,” May 2017, p. 10, contexts and strategies” (Encyclopedia Britan- https://www.armed-services.sen- nica). After assuming the presidency, Xi has re- ate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stewart_05-23- peatedly touted traditional Chinese culture to 17.pdf. the public. Xi’s emphasis on culture mirrors the

strategy of his fallen rival Bo Xilai, whose signa- *** ture campaign as the party secretary of Chong-

qing was the neo-Maoist “Sing Red and Strike Black (唱红打黑),” a revival of Mao-era culture

9 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 and the suppression of criminality. While com- Xi’s analog to the “little red book,” titled Classi- parable to Bo on the “strike black” front, Xi’s cul- cal Aphorisms by Xi Jinping (习近平用典) was tural policy is less about “singing red,” yet it ap- published in 2015. The preface, “Draw Power peals to a much broader base of Chinese con- from Chinese Culture” trumpets Xi as a role servatives rather than just the extreme Left. model in learning and applying traditional eth- ics, and calls on the nation to build the present While Xi has emulated Mao’s statecraft in many and future with those values in mind. Unusually ways, his neotraditionalism deviates from the for a book dedicated to speeches and writings Maoist path (China Brief, March 6, 2015). In of the Communist Party’s general secretary, the sharp contrast to the iconoclastic Mao, who volume contains zero quotes from Marx and viewed the “old society” (旧社会) with contempt, Mao. Instead, reading like an emperor’s hand- Xi declared traditional thought and culture the book, it is divided into chapters on various as- “soul” (灵魂) of the nation (Xinhua, August 8, pects of governance filled with Xi’s favorite clas- 2016). “Outstanding traditional culture is a sical maxims. country and nation’s basis for continuation and development. Losing it is the same as severing a The Traditionalist Restoration country and nation’s lifeline” (Phoenix News, September 5, 2016). Thus, “A country and na- Following this spirit, the Party Central Commit- tion’s power and prosperity must always be sup- tee and the State Council released an outline of ported by a flourishing culture. The prosperous China’s cultural revival project in January 2017 development of Chinese culture is the prerequi- titled “Opinions on the Implementation of the site to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese na- Development of Outstanding Traditional Chi- tion” (Phoenix News, September 5, 2016). nese Culture” (Xinhua, January 25). Interestingly, Xinhua’s English-language service only pub- Xi’s use of traditional culture goes much further lished a brief synopsis of this document, perhaps than his predecessor Hu Jintao, who also used to minimize international attention (Xinhua, Jan- Confucian rhetoric. Xi believes outstanding tra- uary 26). ditional culture is the “foundation” of the Party’s culture and “vital wellspring” of the Party’s set of This is the first time the central leadership be- socialist core values (社会主义核心价值观)—an came directly involved in traditional culture-re- astonishing statement that positioned tradi- lated work (Xinhua, February 6). The Party will tional culture as the basis of the official code of lead the project with the whole society in partic- behavior that governs all party members ipation. Cultural revival will be selective depend- (Guangming Online, June 21; Qiushi, September ing on the Party’s vision and will affect all 13, 2016). In a November 2016 speech to the spheres of life including education, arts, archi- country’s writers and artists, Xi urged them to tecture, holidays, historic preservation, and even “devote major efforts in propagating traditional urban planning. Besides counterbalancing per- culture…. Extract essence and draw energy from ceived cultural xenophilia, the project’s goals in- the treasure vault of Chinese culture…. [And] not clude assuring the continuation of traditional to blaspheme ancestors” (Xinhua, November 30, culture, raising the public’s cultural awareness, 2016). safeguarding cultural security, strengthening

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China’s soft power, and the modernization of considering methods to promote universal Chi- national governance (Xinhua, January 25). nese values via the “One Belt One Road” initiative (Mingcheng News Online, April 16). In dis- A publicity campaign has also been in place to tant corners like Xinjiang’s Hutubi County and mobilize public opinion. On February 7, 2017, Wusu City, sworn Marxist cadres have now be- the People’s Daily published an editorial titled come eager pupils of Confucian and Legalist “Salute our Cultural Traditions” where it argues treatises (Sina News, May 16; Sina News, May a rising China needs self-confidence predicated 19). Even prisons are organizing traditional art upon traditional culture (People’s Daily, February performances and Confucianism lessons to 7). Two weeks later, another article suggests as- “awaken” the good conscience of inmates (Red signing greater value to “traditional culture ed- Net, May 19; Xinhua, May 8, 2016). A nationwide ucation” (People’s Daily, February 23). A March revival of traditional values is taking shape. 2017 article calls for greater traditional education among the Chinese youth, characterizing it Why is Xi Fixated on Neotraditionalism? as a “soul-casting project” (铸魂工程) (People’s Daily, March 23). Xi’s neotraditionalism is not a newly minted part of his public persona. Xi’s habit of using classical In June, Shandong Province became the first in allegories and adages in public communication China to institute outstanding traditional Chi- can be traced back to his early years as a county nese culture classes for all primary and second- administrator. [1] While his personal interest in ary school students. The curriculum will be traditional China might have to do with family based on the Four Books and Five Classics (四书 upbringing—his father Xi Zhongxun was from 五经) that constitute the core of Confucian the conservative northwest—the employment of learning (China News Online, June 26). Chinese neotraditionalism in politics benefits Xi and the teachers can now get a certificate in traditional Party both immediately and in the long run. culture education. The training program in- Marxism and its various incarnations has lost all cludes ancient philosophy, basic classical Chi- appeal with ordinary Chinese. The arcane lan- nese, traditional arts, pedagogical methods, and guage and concepts of Marxism were never high-level special subject studies (Sina News, popular with the public to begin with. Even dur- June 13). ing the heydays of socialism from 1949 to 1978, people were encouraged to read Mao’s vernac- Outside of the schoolyard, new television shows ular essays rather than Marx or Lenin’s works. are experimenting with ways to popularize tra- The Chinese additions to Marxism—Mao ditional culture (China Economic Net, April 12). Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Symposiums are being held across China to dis- Three Represents, and the Scientific Develop- cuss local modes of cultural revival (China Fi- ment Concept—although still serving as guiding nance Online, April 19). People’s Liberation Army ideologies to the Party, spark minimal interest servicemen were told to seek courage and de- with the common people. votion from traditional culture and lion-hearted heroes of ancient China (PLA Daily, February 9). The Party’s deep-seated fear of color revolutions Beyond business calculations, entrepreneurs are (颜色革命) means it needs a robust set of conservative cultural values to offset the attraction

11 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 of westernization and liberalization (Huffington however, Xi’s investment in the “spiritual mar- Post, August 27, 2016). Moreover, according to ket” repositioned himself as the defender of tra- veteran China watcher Willy Lam, one item ditional China in a kulturkampf against corrosive among Xi’s unpublicized agenda is to turn the social vices and foreign cultures—which almost Chinese Communist Party into a “perennial rul- one-in-three (28.9 percent) Chinese believe have ing party” (YouTube, July 16, 2015). In order for “adversely affected traditional Chinese culture” this to happen, a perennial ideology is a require- (Guangming Online, March 7). Aligning himself ment. Since adopting liberalism is not an option, as defender of traditional values fortifies his per- the only recourse is returning to the well-trod- sonality cult with more substance and appeal. den path of traditional China, where emperors This is a calculated move on part of Xi, as it en- and mandarins ruled for centuries based on clas- hances his popularity as a crusader for conserva- sical philosophy. tive aspirations, and diverts criticisms against the Party’s disastrous cultural policies in the past The breakdown of morality (道德) is an issue that are largely responsible for today’s spiritual concerning many Chinese. According to a survey crisis. conducted by China Youth Daily, 89.3 percent of respondents believe there is “cultural deficiency” Conclusion in present-day Chinese society, among which 45.7 percent think the “deficiency” is “very seri- Xi Jinping’s China is witnessing the unfolding of ous” (Guangming Online, March 7). A majority of a cultural revival campaign. Although state- Chinese feels that there is no moral constrain on driven cultural revival is a win with the mostly the behavior of anyone. Even soft-spoken ex- conservative Chinese, the Party-state’s leading Premier Wen Jiabao remarked: “the downward position in the campaign means it has all the spiral of morality has reached a very serious power to determine what is an “outstanding (优 point” (Sina News, April 18, 2011). While this 秀)” element of traditional culture. It is therefore “spiritual vacuum” has multiple origins, the very unlikely that China can truly achieve a cul- yearning for restoration of traditional virtues is tural renaissance based on the principle of “let a common. Research shows cultural conservatism hundred schools of thought contend (百家争 (文化保守主义) is making a comeback. In re- 鸣)”. Yet perhaps this campaign can open up fo- sponse to the question “How would you evalu- rums for debate about culture in contemporary ate the role of traditional Chinese culture in con- China—then the possibility is endless. In the temporary everyday life,” 28.9 percent of 2,976 coming months, expect more on the cultural survey participants chose “very important,” 47.4 front from China’s highest-ranking neotradition- percent “important,” and only 3.5 percent chose alist. “unimportant.” [2] In an era of materialism and greed, many are searching for spiritual fulfill- Zi Yang is a researcher and consultant on China ment (PRI, May 5). affairs. He covers Chinese politics, security, and emerging markets. Zi holds an M.A. from As a conservative and an outspoken critic of Georgetown University and a B.A. from George decadence, Xi has a personal interest in curing Mason University. Follow him on Twitter @MrZi- China’s social ills by bringing back time-tested Yang. values (Xinhua, January 16, 2014). [3] Politically,

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Notes fighter jets or aircraft carriers (Science and Tech- nology Daily, March 29; China News Network, 1. 知之深爱之切 (Zhizhishen, aizhiqie, De- November 2, 2016; China Military Online, De- cember 1, 2015, pp. 35–57. (Douban cember 31, 2016). Books). 2. Liu Shaojie (刘少杰), Ideological Shifts in Chinese advances in artificial intelligence, in- Contemporary China (当代中国意识形态 cluding deep learning techniques, have enabled 变迁), Central Translation Agency (中央编 considerable progress in swarm intelligence. 译局), 2015 (Google Books). There is technical and conceptual research, de- 3. Liu Wei (刘伟), “论习近平传统文化观的形 velopment, and testing ongoing across Chinese 成根据与实践要求,” Theory and Reform academic institutions, the private sector, de- (理论与改革), September 14, 2016, pp. fense industry, and military research institutes to 44–45. http://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/de- support such capabilities. At this point, given the tail/detail.aspx?recid=&File- limited information available and the relative Name=LLGG201605012&DbName=CJF opacity of these efforts, it is difficult to compare D2016&DbCode=CJFD U.S. and Chinese advances in swarm intelligence. Nonetheless, the PLA has closely tracked U.S. in- *** itiatives focused on swarm tactics (e.g., Science and Technology Daily, March 29; Science and Technology Daily, May 30, 2016) and seeks to Swarms at War: Chinese develop countermeasures and comparable capabilities. Looking forward, the PLA’s advances Advances in Swarm in intelligent unmanned systems and swarm tac- Intelligence tics could serve as a force multiplier for its future military capabilities. Elsa Kania

Chinese Breakthroughs in Swarm The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) an- Intelligence ticipates that future warfare will be “unmanned, invisible, and silent” (“无人、无形、无声”战争), During the fall 2016 Zhuhai Airshow, official me- with ever higher degrees of “intelligentization” dia prominently featured Chinese break- (智能化). [1] PLA strategists expect that future, throughs in swarm intelligence. To date, the ef- autonomous combat involving unmanned sys- forts of the China Electronics Technology Group tems, as well as the joint operations of un- Corporation (CETC) appear to be the most ad- manned and manned systems, will have a dra- vanced. In November 2016, CETC, in partnership matic impact on traditional operational models with Tsinghua University and Posong Technol- (PLA Daily, January 5, 2016). Future UAV swarm- ogy (泊松技术), revealed its progress in swarm ing (无人机集群) will involve “intelligentized” intelligence with a formation of sixty-seven and semi- or fully autonomous systems. [2] The small fixed-wing UAVs utilizing autonomous PLA recognizes the disruptive potential of these swarm control and dynamic centerless networks techniques, which could be used for saturation with communication and coordination among assaults (饱和攻击) to overwhelm the defenses UAVs (CETC, November 1, 2016; China Military of high-value targets, including perhaps U.S.

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Online, November 6, 2016). Such swarms could engaged in catapult-assisted takeoffs and be used for reconnaissance, strike, jamming, and demonstrated complex formations. At the time, other missions. For instance, CGI sequence avail- CETC commentary highlighted that swarm intel- able in media reports at the time showed the ligence is future of intelligent unmanned sys- swarm formation in action, first hunting and tems, and CETC UAV expert Zhao Yanjie (赵彦杰 then dive-bombing and destroying an enemy ) characterized future intelligent swarms as a missile launcher (Weibo, November 6, 2016). disruptive force to “change rules of the game” in This technique possesses advantages in effi- warfare (Xinhua, June 11). ciency and survivability due to the distribution of capabilities across the system, as well as lower Although it is difficult to compare the sophisti- osts for offense relative to the difficulty of de- cation of U.S. and Chinese efforts, these high- fending against a swarm. profile Chinese tests have seemingly deliber- ately followed U.S. tests and demonstrations In the spring of 2017, a formation of 1,000 UAVs with larger ones of their own. at the Guangzhou Airshow by a private company reportedly again broke records (Global Times, China’s National Initiatives in Artificial February 14). At the time, military experts Intelligence quoted in Chinese media similarly highlighted that this technique could be used to create a dis- China’s future capabilities in swarm intelligence, tributed system with payload modules mounted military-use AI, will be enabled by high-level on small drones (Global Times, February 14). plans and extensive funding. China’s new na- However, the actual sophistication of this partic- tional roadmap for artificial intelligence ad- ular effort—and potential linkage to military ef- vances an ambitious agenda for the develop- forts—is unclear. ment of this critical emerging technology

Once again, in June 2017, CETC demonstrated its through 2030 (MoST, February 16). According to advances in swarm intelligence with the test of Minister of Science and Technology Wan Gang, 119 fixed-wing UAVs, beating its previous rec- this framework will focus on building up national ord of sixty-seven (Xinhua, June 11). This swarm

14 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017 capabilities in artificial intelligence, the applica- nology company, Zhongbo Longhui (Beijing) In- tions of AI technologies, policies to handle re- formation Technology Company, Ltd. (中博龙辉 sulting risks (e.g. job losses), and international (北京)信息技术股份有限公司) (China Science collaboration (Xinhua, June 29). This develop- and Technology Online, November 28, 2016). ment plan will also establish a special fund for The institute has received support from the Na- research and development, while seeking to val Equipment Research Institute, the Army “rapidly gather AI talent,” including through en- Equipment Department, the Rocket Force’s Unit couraging foreign companies to establish R&D 96658, and other military organizations (People’s centers for AI technologies in China (South China Daily, November 4, 2016). It will pursue research Morning Post, June 29). This initiative, also re- in intelligent robotics, artificial intelligence, un- ferred to as “Artificial Intelligence 2.0,” will focus manned systems, and military brain science. on areas including big data, intelligent sensing, cognitive computing, machine learning, and Chinese national-level research and develop- swarm intelligence (Xinhua, November 18). ment efforts will likely enable civilian and military applications. In 2017, China established its Through China’s national strategy of military- first national deep learning laboratory. This lab, civil fusion (军民融合), the PLA will seek to take under the leadership of Baidu, one of China’s advantage of relevant civilian advances in artifi- premier technology companies, in partnership cial intelligence to enable military applications. with Tsinghua University, Beihang University, [3] At the CMC level, the PLA has reportedly es- and the Chinese Academy of Sciences will re- tablished an Intelligent Unmanned Systems and search deep learning, computer vision and sens- Systems of Systems Science and Technology ing, computer listening, biometric identification, Domain Expert Group (军委智能无人系统及体系 and new forms of human-computer interaction 科学技术领域专家组) (Hunan Daily via Weibo, (South China Morning Post, February 21, 2017). October 30, 2016). Such a group could be re- Of note, Beihang University is closely linked to sponsible for establishing strategic objectives the development of military aeronautical and as- and requirements, while perhaps also liaising tronautic technologies, including research fo- with academia and industry. For instance, mem- cused on UAV swarming and manned-un- bers of the group reportedly visited a new test- manned teaming (see below). ing area for self-driving cars, which was also to be used to test military unmanned combat vehi- Future Research and Development cles. Although the PLA’s research on a number of In practice, military-civil fusion could be topics and projects remains relatively nascent, it achieved through partnerships between military will be important to continue to track the pro- and civilian research institutes or companies. For gression of such research and development instance, in late 2016, the Military-Civil Fusion based on the available sources. The Central Mil- Intelligent Equipment Research Institute (军民融 itary Commission (CMC) Equipment Develop- 合智能装备研究院) was established as a collab- ment Department’s Scientific Research and Pro- oration between the North China University of curements Bureau (科研订购局) issued guide- Technology (北方工业大学) and a private tech- lines for pre-research funding under the 13th

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Five-Year Plan (Equipment Development De- tion, in order to achieve the integration, in- partment, August 1, 2016), through which intelligentization, and networking of advanced cluded funding will be directed to a number of aircraft (Beihang University) topics that relate to or could enable UAV swarming, including: At present, multiple military and civilian research institutes appear to be working on swarming ● research on “bee swarm” (蜂群) UAVs on self- UAVs, based on their published research and pa- organizing network architectures, associated tents on the topic, also including, but not limited monitoring and control technologies, swarm to: [4] networking and positioning technology, and network anti-jamming technologies. ● China Electronics Technology Group Corpo- ● highly reliable autonomous flight control ration technology for new energy ultra-long endur- ● China Aerospace Science and Industry Cor- ance UAVs poration’s (CASIC) Third Institute’s UAV Tech- ● technologies for intelligent identification of nology Research Institute targets and adaptive patterns for analysis ● Harbin Institute of Technology’s National Key based on deep reinforcement learning with Laboratory of Robotic Systems and Engineer- large-scale remote sensing data ing ● methods for brain-like learning algorithms ● Tsinghua University able to engage in sensing in unstructured en- ● Beihang University vironments ● Harbin Engineering University ● Northwestern Polytechnical University As of 2017, the National Defense Science and Technology Key Laboratory Fund (国防科技重点 The Disruptive Potential of Swarms at War 实验室基金) has also committed to fund multiple projects related to artificial intelligence and Looking forward, the PLA is clearly seeking the UAV swarming, including the following: capability to leverage adaptive, intelligent unmanned systems across multiple domains of ● intelligent task planning technology to im- warfare, including with swarming tactics and prove the management of unmanned manned-unmanned teaming. [5] The Academy swarms based on deep learning (China Aero- of Military Science’s authoritative textbook, The space Radio and Electronics Research Insti- Science of Military Strategy, anticipates future tute) unmanned systems that utilize intelligent, nano, and micro technologies will have an “increas- ● artificial intelligence methods for unmanned ingly prominent function” on future land, sea, vehicles to adapt in complex maritime envi- aerial, and space battlefields. [6] In the future, ronments (Harbin Engineering University) highly automated (自动化) and intelligent wea- ● comprehensive decision-making, manage- ponry composed of unmanned systems is also ment, and control technology for advanced anticipated to replace traditional weapons. UAVs, including control and management technology for manned-unmanned coopera-

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Indeed, PLA thinkers expect that future land, sea, China’s ‘Counter Offset’? – Competing to air, and space battlefields will be full of un- Innovate manned combat weapons, forming a ‘multi-di- mensional, multi-domain unmanned combat Chinese advances in swarm intelligence—and weapons battlefield system of systems’ (PLA the known research and development under- Daily, February 21). The PLA has closely, consist- taken to date—constitute a critical example of ently tracked U.S. efforts in swarm tactics its strategic competition with the U.S. in defense through DARPA within the framework of the innovation. For the PLA, certain disruptive tech- Third Offset strategy and related defense inno- nologies, including those associated with the vation initiatives (e.g., PLA Daily, May 18; Sohu, Third Offset, are believed to be “strategic com- April 22). Although its approach is thus informed manding heights” (制高点) in great power com- by U.S. efforts, the PLA’s future initiatives could petition, with the dual advantage of “effective diverge from that of the U.S., including with a deterrence” and victory in war-fighting (PLA focus on asymmetric applications that target Daily, May 7, 2016). For instance, future PLA in- high-value U.S. weapons platforms. telligent unmanned systems could also serve as an asymmetric means through which to target The PLA recognizes the disruptive operational high-value U.S. weapons systems, including air- potential of intelligentized unmanned systems craft carriers. and swarming tactics. Chinese advances in The PLA’s strategic objective of strengthening swarm intelligence enable this disruptive tech- the military through science and technology (科 nology, considered “a breakthrough for future 技强军) will take advantage of a coordinated na- unmanned combat,” according to Zhao Jie (赵杰 tional strategy of “innovation-driven develop- ), director of the 863 Plan Intelligent Robotics Ex- ment.” The PLA seeks to “overtake [the U.S. mil- pert Group (China Military Online, November 6, itary] around a corner” (弯道超车) through cut- 2016). In particular, the anticipated advantages ting ahead, rather than taking the same track, by of intelligent swarming UAVs include their func- achieving technological, conceptual, and organ- tional distribution, high system survivability, and izational innovation in strategic frontier (战略前 low operational cost, as CETC UAV export Zhao 沿) technologies. Ongoing U.S. defense innova- Yanjie has also noted (Sohu, April 22). These sys- tion initiatives must take into account the trajec- tems could engage in intelligence, surveillance, tory of Chinese military innovation in critical and reconnaissance (ISR), offensive operations, technological domains. whether independently or in coordination with other weapons systems, as well as electronic Elsa Kania is an analyst focused on the PLA’s stra- warfare, thus supporting critical areas of strate- tegic thinking on and advances in emerging tech- gic deterrence, operational confrontation, and nologies, including unmanned systems, artificial tactical operations (Sohu, April 22). intelligence, and quantum technologies. Elsa is also in the process of co-founding a start-up research venture. Her professional experience has included working at the Department of Defense, FireEye, Inc., the Long Term Strategy Group, Har- vard’s Belfer Center for Science and International

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Affairs, and the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for tailed analysis of China’s efforts in mili- Global Policy. She is fluent in Mandarin Chinese. tary-civil fusion, see: Greg Levesque and Mark Stokes, “Blurred Lines: Military-Civil

Fusion and the “Going Out” of China’s Notes: Defense Industry” Pointe Bello, Decem-

1. Academy of Military Science Military ber 2016, Strategy Research Department [军事科学 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5 院军事战略研究部], eds., The Science of 69925bfe0327c837e2e9a94/t/593dad03 Military Strategy [战略学], Military Sci- 20099e64e1ca92a5/1497214574912/062 ence Press, 2013, pp. 97–98. 017_Pointe+Bello_Military+Civil+Fu- 2. At this point, there are several different sion+Report.pdf terms used, seemingly somewhat inter- 4. The CMC Equipment Development De- changeably, to refer to concept of swarm partment, the successor to the former intelligence (e.g., “集群智能,” “群体智能”). GAD, and the new CMC Science and 军委科技委 According to the official PLA dictionary, Technology Commission ( ), intelligent weapon (智能武器) is defined which has been characterized as a Chi- as: “weapons that utilize artificial intelli- nese version of DARPA, may also under- gence technology for autonomously pur- take leading roles in this effort. suing, detecting, and destroy enemy tar- 5. This list has been compiled based on a re- gets, often, composed of information col- view of available patents related to UAV lection and management systems, swarming. It is likely not comprehensive knowledge base systems, assisting strate- but seeks to illustrate the range of re- gic decision systems, and mission execu- search institutes involved in relevant re- tion systems, such as intelligent ammuni- search areas. Further details are available tion and military-use robots.” All-Military upon request. Military Terminology Management Com- 6. For instance, there has been exploratory mittee [全军军事术语管理委员会], Peo- research on the command and control of formations of manned and unmanned ple’s Liberation Army Military Terminol- systems by researchers affiliated with the ogy [中国人民解放军军语], Military Sci- Navy Equipment Department. Chen Xiao- ence Press [军事科学出版社], 2011, p. dong [陈晓栋], Liu Yuefeng [刘跃峰], and 660. Chen Zhoudong [陈哨东], “Manned and 3. While this term might also be translated Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Formations “civil-military integration,” I choose to use Command and Control Systems, Deci- the translation “military-civil fusion” for sion-Making, and Distribution” [有人/无 the purposes of this piece. For a more de-

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人机编队指挥控制系统决策分配], Electro- Despite its relative obscurity, the United Front Optics and Control [电光与控制], 2013. Work Department (中共中央统一战线工作部) 7. The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], has a high place within the CCP hierarchy as a working organ (办事机关) of the CCP Central pp. 97–98. Committee (中共中央委员会), “the central ad-

ministrative and decision-making body of leading party, state, and military officials.” [1] This *** places the UFWD at an approximate level to other Central Committee organs such as the General Office, the Organization Department, The United Front Work the International Liaison Department, the Prop- Department: “Magic aganda Department, and the Policy Research Office, although the exact hierarchy remains po- Weapon” at Home and lemical. [2] Abroad Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle Sun Chunlan (孙春兰) heads the UFWD, assisted by seven deputy directors (一正七副). The lead- Earlier this year, the Sydney Morning Herald and ership also includes Su Bo (苏波), the group ABC Four Corners released in-depth investiga- leader for the Central Commission on Discipline tive reports on the influence of Chinese Com- Inspection for United Front Work Group. The munist Party agents in Australian politics (ABC, Department itself is divided into offices (办公厅 June 4; Power and Influence; Sydney Morning /室), bureaus (局), and subordinate units (所属事 Herald, March 3). These reports are based on a 业单位), namely mass organizations (人民/民众 longstanding investigation by the Australian Se- 团体). The nine numbered Bureaus each special- curity Intelligence Organization (ASIO), Aus- ize in either a particular facet of united front tralia’s counterintelligence agency, into Chinese work or a geographic location. Bureaus three, six Communist Party (CCP) efforts to exert influence and nine, for example, cover Hong Kong, Tai- in Australian politics. While the CCP employs wan, Overseas Chinese, Tibet and Xinjiang. How- many means for ‘soft-power’ influence, an im- ever, it is unclear how different bureaus manage portant but understudied organization involved their consequently overlapping responsibilities. in sub-official contacts at home and abroad is For instance, there is no clear guideline on how the United Front Work Department (UFWD). In the Tibet Bureau, responsible for “harmonizing addition to exerting influence abroad, the UFWD Tibetan socioeconomic development,” interacts has broad responsibilities for policies within with the Ethnic and Religious Work Bureau, and China. Further highlighting the central role of the Economics Bureau. the UFWD in CCP thinking, Chinese President and CCP Party Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the UFWD to China’s rejuvenation.

Organization

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United Front Work Department Structure Although a CCP-organization, rather than part First Bureau Party Work Bureau (党派工作局) of the Chinese state apparatus, the UFWD (一局) closely collaborates with the Chinese People’s Second Ethnic and Religious Work Bureau Bureau (二局) (民族、宗教工作局) Political Consultative Conference (中国人民政治 Third Bureau Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, & Overseas Liaison 协商会议 - CPPCC), an advisory body which (三局) Bureau (港澳台、海外联络局) meets every year at the same time as the uni- Fourth Bureau Cadre Bureau (干部局) (四局) cameral National People’s Congress (全国人民 Fifth Bureau Economics Bureau (经济局) 代表大会 - NPC). The CPPCC serves as a means (五局) of representation by interest group rather than Sixth Bureau Independent & Non Party Intellectuals Work Bu- (六局) reau (无党派、党外知识分子工作局) geographic focus for vast swathes of the popu- Seventh [Tibet Bureau] lation, but holds no executive power. Instead it Bureau (七局) makes recommendations to the Party leader- Eighth Bureau Bureau for New Social Class Representatives Work ship. In contrast to the NPC, where 60 percent of (八局) (新的社会阶层人士工作) Ninth Bureau [Xinjiang Bureau] delegates are party members, 60 percent of (九局) CPPCC delegates are either non-affiliated, with Note: “[ ]” indicates that the official title is unconfirmed any political party or part of the eight CCP- aligned “democratic parties”. [3] The CPPCC These bureaus display the outsized role ethnic Chairman, Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), is fourth in minorities and non-Party representatives (无党 Party hierarchy and is a member of the Politburo 派代表人士) play in the CCP’s efforts to secure Standing Committee, the highest organ of said groups’ support. The creation of a Tibet Bu- power in Chinese bureaucracy after the Party reau in 2006, and a Xinjiang Bureau in 2017, Chairmanship. He also heads the Central Com- demonstrate the Party’s desire to exert more di- mittee Coordinating Small Group for Xinjiang rect control in the civil government’s handling of Work (中央新疆工作协调小组) and the Central these regions, and perhaps also as a conse- Committee Coordinating Small Group for Tibet quence of the gargantuan security apparatus Work (中央西藏工作协调小组), roles he is well developing in those regions (South China Morn- suited for given his position at the CPPCC. [4] ing Post, May 5; China Brief, May 14; China Brief, Through these organizations, the Party is able to February 6). As the UFWD has grown in size and guide state and Party policy. As Chinese Presi- stature, it should come as no surprise that the dent Xi Jinping repeatedly emphasizes, united Party vanguard increases its role in reaching out front work has an important role to play in con- to those for whom China’s promised “Great Re- temporary Party policy, both within the China juvenation” (伟大复兴) has not yet materialized. and abroad. For instance, the UFWD has played an active role in promoting the CCP’s poverty alleviation poli- Rising Importance cies, especially in “old revolutionary base areas”—particularly Shaanxi province and North- Although the UFWD held 20 meetings between east China—left behind by the new market 1995 and 2006, no significant conference oc- economy (United Front, May 20; China Brief, curred until May of 2015, when the UFWD held February 20, 2016). its first work conference in nine years under the name of ‘CCP Central Committee’s Conference on United Front Work’ (中央统战工作会议). The

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‘Central’ qualifier represented a rise in status for athan bureaucracy of the CCP, indicating a will- a previously ‘national’ (全国) conference. The el- ingness to realize the lofty goals in his speeches. evation in status corresponded with Xi’s new vi- [5] sion for the department as laid out in a Septem- ber 2014 speech celebrating the CPPCC’s 65th Since the 2015 speech, the UFWD has formed birthday. In that speech he referred to united two new bureaus: the Xinjiang Bureau (this bu- front work as a ‘magic weapon’ for the ‘Chinese reau is not explicitly named as such), and the Bu- people’s great rejuvenation’, one to be used by reau for New Social Classes Work (新的社会阶层 the CCP to seize victory, construction, and re- 人士工作局). Although Xi frames united front form (Xinhua, July 30, 2015). At the 2015 confer- work as part of his comprehensive vision, the ence, Xi Jinping outlined a new direction of the groundwork for the establishment of the Bureau UFWD: for New Social Classes Work has been laid for years. [6] In support of this integration, the “Throughout our history, the Party United Front Work Department has carried out has always placed the United Front yearly, 50-student classes for New Social Class and united front work in an im- Representatives every year since 2004 (they portant position within party-wide were under the purview of the Sixth Bureau), work. [...] Presently, our situation thus creating a “New Social Class talent pool” and our mission have undergone (FMPRC, Accessed June 21). Hu Jintao would significant change. The larger the later emphasize the targeting of New Social change, the more the United Front Class representatives in his last United Front under the ‘new situation’ (新形势) Work Conference in 2006, without significant needs to be developed, the more bureaucratic outcomes (United Front, October 9, united front work needs to be car- 2010). Despite the significant emphasis placed ried out. [...] united front work is on domestic affairs, united front work has long party-wide work” (Xinhua, May 20, included overseas operations. 2015). While the CCP employs many means through Xi noted that students studying abroad are a val- which it seeks foreign intelligence, the UFWD is uable and new focus of united front work. Xi also distinct from other organizations in its overt and called on cadres to strengthen and perfect benign appearance. [7] United Front organiza- united front work targeting new media (新媒体) tions abroad often operate in the open with representatives so as to “allow them to struggle names alluding to ‘peaceful reunification’ (code to purify cyberspace” (Xinhua, May 20, 2015). for Taiwan work) or ‘friendship association’ (Sun Chunlan was elected to head the Chinese Over- Shortly thereafter, at a July 30 Politburo meet- seas Friendship Association in 2015) (The Paper, ing, Xi created a Leading Small Group (LSG) on August 17, 2015, COFA Official Website, Ac- United Front Work (中央统一战线工作领导小组) cessed June 6, 2017). (Xinhua, July 30, 2015). Xi has used LSGs as policy coordination centers to circumvent the levi-

21 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017

has chap- er- oned Qiu Yu-

The two main figures highlighted by the Sydney Morning Herald and ABC Four Corners reports 周 are Dr. Chau Chak Wing (AKA Zhou Zerong anping (裘援平) the head of the Overseas Chi- 泽荣黄向墨 ), and Huang Xiangmo ( AKA Huang nese Affairs Office of the PRC’s State Council (国黃暢然 Changran ). Dr. Chau Chak Wing is an 务院侨务办公室) during her visit to Australia Australian citizen, but a provincial-level member with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (OCAO Official of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Website, Accessed June 16; ABC, June 4; see in- 中国人民政治协商会议 Conference ( ) and owns a set photo – in blue on the left). The United Front newspaper in China and the Australian Express. work department and the overseas organiza- Despite Dr. Zhou’s claim that “as to the entity tions it liaises with play an important role in referred to by the ABC as the ‘united front work shaping political attitudes in their respective department’, I have no idea what this is,” countries and developing contacts for the Chi- netizens were quick to point to a meeting be- nese government and businesses. tween Dr. Zhou and the Tianhe UFWD (see inset image, center) (The Australian, June 27; Twitter, Conclusion June 26). While most observers have focused on united Tianhe Standing Committee Chairman, District front work in Taiwan, the scope of the depart- UFWD Head Xie Wei (谢伟), along with his dep- ment’s mission is both foreign and domestic. uty and Head of Taiwan Bureau Xue Jianbin (薛 Within China, the UFWD plays a vital policy de- 健斌) visited him at the Kingold Group, accom- velopment and coordination role, especially for panied by the Chairman for Chen Jiansheng (陈 ethnic and religious minorities. Abroad, the 健生). (Tianhe UFWD Website, March 1, 2016). UFWD has had a hand in developing political Huang Xiangmo is president of the Australian and business ties with overseas Chinese, bring- Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reu- ing investment and research benefits, as well as nification of China (澳洲中国和平统一促进会— helping the CCP shape foreign views of China. Xi ACPPRC Official Website, Accessed June 16), and

22 ChinaBrief July 7, 2017

Jinping’s repeated urging that the Party make 4. For a thorough description of Leading use of the UFWD as a “magic weapon” to realize Small Groups see: Alice Miller, “The CCP the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People Central Committee’s Leading Small makes it clear that he sees it as an important tool Groups” China Leadership Monitor, no. for the CCP. The bureaucratic changes he has 26, September 2, 2008, http://www.hoo- implemented lends further credence to this ver.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docu- judgment. As China continues to deal with comments/CLM26AM.pdf and “More Already plicated domestic issues involving minorities on the Central Committee’s Leading and attempts to shape opinions abroad, the Small Groups,” China Leadership Moni- United Front Work Department will undoubtedly tor, no. 44, July 28, 2014, http://www.hoo- be in the vanguard. ver.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44am.pdf; for a visual Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle is an independ- presentation of the most prominent LSGs ent researcher who has worked at the Center for and their Heads, see Jessica Batke and New American Security and the Jamestown Foun- Matthias Stepan, “The Who’s Who of dation. He is proficient in Chinese. China’s Leading Small Groups,” Mercator Institute of China Studies, updated May Notes 2017, https://www.merics.org/en/merics-analysis/china-mapping/the-whos- 1. China’s Political System, Mercator Insti- who-of-chinas-leading-small-groups/. tute for China Studies (MERICS), 2016 5. Miller, 2008, 2014. 2. Traditionally, the UFWD has been the 6. During the celebration of the CCP’s 80th lesser of the CC working organs, but anniversary in 2001, Jiang Zemin pointed given the personal prominence of De- out that Chinese social composition partment Head Sun Chunlan and Deputy changed after the reform and opening Wang Zhengwei within the Party, Groot with the introduction of new classes of has argued “that the Department ranks people included skilled workers, entre- marginally ahead of both the Central De- preneurs, employees of foreign owned partment of Organization and that of companies… “These new classes are Propaganda.” Given Wang’s premature united with workers, peasants, intellectu- departure from this position in early als, cadres, and PLA Commanders and 2016, it would be interesting to check if fighters. They are also builders of Social- the current deputies maintain this imbal- ism with Chinese Characteristics.” ance. See: Gerry Groot, “United Front Ex- (FMPRC, Accessed June 21) pands Under Xi Jinping,” The Australian 7. For a presentation of the various other Center on China in the World, Yearbook means employed, see: Peter Mattis, 2015, https://www.thechi- “China’s Espionage Against Taiwan (Part nastory.org/yearbooks/yearbook- I): Analysis of Recent Operations,” China 2015/forum-ascent/the-expansion-of- Brief, November 7, 2014, https://jame- the-united-front-under-xi-jinping/. stown.org/program/chinas-espionage- 3. China’s Political System, 2016 against-taiwan-part-i-analysis-of-recent-

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operations/; Peter Mattis, “China’s Espio- nage Against Taiwan (Part II): Chinese In- telligence Collectors,” China Brief, De- cember 5, 2014, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-espionage- against-taiwan-part-ii-chinese-intelligence-collectors/; and John Dotson, “Re- tired Taiwan Officer Exchanges Offer In- sight into a Modern “United Front,” China Brief, October 14, 2011, https://jamestown.org/program/retired-taiwan-officer-exchanges-offer-insight-into-a- modern-united-front/.

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