“Yugoslavia's Help Was Extraordinary”

Home , Agostinho Neto

“Yugoslavia’s Help Was Extraordinary” Political and Material Assistance from Belgrade to the MPLA in Its Rise to Power, 1961–1975

✣ Jovan Cavoškiˇ

“I must emphasize how constant, firm, and generous ...Yugoslavia’shelp was during our war of liberation.” The help “was extraordinary.”1 With those words Agostinho Neto, the long-time leader of the victorious Popular Move- ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), summarized for attendees at the MPLA’s first congress in December 1977 the nature and scale of material and political assistance that had been rendered to his movement by Yugoslavia. Other senior MPLA officials reiterated the general tone of Neto’s statement, claiming that Yugoslavia had stood by them “even, and especially, in our most difficult moments,” particularly when in the early 1970s the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries stopped providing material assistance to the MPLA. “Yugoslavia alone continued to help us.”2 Neto in his speech directly linked the crucial role that both Cuba and Yugoslavia had played in Angola’s long, desperate struggle for liberation from Portuguese colonial rule. Cuba’s activities during those years have been an- alyzed by numerous scholars, but Yugoslavia’s side of the story remains to be told.3 Today we know much more about Swedish and Danish assistance (which was mainly humanitarian in nature) to the MPLA than we do about

1. See Primer Congreso del Movimiento Popular de Liberación de Angola: Informe Central: Agostinho Neto; Discursos: Raúl Castro (Havana: Editora Política, 1978), p. 48. 2. Piero Gleijeses, Conﬂicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 243. The quotations are from Gleijeses’s interviews with MPLA leaders António dos Santos Franca (aka “Ndalu”) and Paulo Teixeira Jorge. In addition, Jorge, former Angolan minister of foreign affairs, told a Swedish historian that “one of the countries that did not suspend assistance and maintained its position was Yugoslavia.” See Tor Sellstrom, ed., Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional and Swedish Voices (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), p. 17. 3. For an in-depth analysis of Cuban policy in Africa and especially in Angola, see Gleijeses, Conﬂicting Missions. For more on Cuban involvement in southern Africa in the general Cold War context, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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Yugoslavia’s decisive role during some of the most difficult phases of the An- golan independence struggle. For the major part of the past four decades, academic awareness of Yugoslav participation in Angolan affairs has remained in the shadow of Cuban, Soviet, Chinese, U.S., or even other East European involvement in those events. Some excellent books that specifically deal with Yugoslavia’s relationship with the nonaligned world barely mention Angola as one of the “hot spots” of Josip Broz Tito’s policy toward Africa.4 Using newly available documents from the major Yugoslav/Serbian archives (Serbian Foreign Ministry Archives, Archives of Yugoslavia), this article reconstructs and analyzes the nature and process of Yugoslavia’s close connections and cooperation with the MPLA throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, up to the initiation of the final phase of struggle for power between competing liberation movements in 1975. During those crucial years of hardship for Neto and his comrades, Yu- goslavia repeatedly extended a major program of unconditional assistance to the MPLA. Although Yugoslav involvement in the Angolan civil war did not rise to the scale of Soviet or Cuban involvement, Belgrade’s aid was similar in scale to that provided by other East-bloc countries. Indeed, given Yugoslavia’s much smaller size and more limited capabilities, its assistance on a propor- tional basis arguably exceeded what was provided by many other members of the Communist camp. The history of Yugoslav-Angolan relations began at an auspicious moment for both sides. The start of the 1960s was a grand moment in history. Many African countries, especially in the western and central part of the continent, had recently gained independence from their colonial masters, but in the remaining Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozam- bique the ongoing struggle for liberation sharply intensified, swiftly entering into a phase of fierce armed conflict. In Angola this began in February 1961, when the MPLA initiated actions in Luanda and the Union of the People of Angola (UPA) started to wage guerilla warfare against the Portuguese in the countryside. The Yugoslav embassy in Guinea was constantly kept in the loop on these actions by the nationalist leaders, Mario Andrade and Roberto Holden.5

4. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). On Soviet involvement in Angola, see Vladimir Shubin, The “Hot Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008). 5. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Guinea,” 20 June 1961, in Diplomatic Archives of the Serbian Foreign Ministry (DAMSPS), Political Archive (PA), 1961, Folder (F.) 101, Doc. 419538.

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However, the political map of the Angolan liberation movement became fragmented early on. Nationalist dissent was split into ﬁrst two and then three political organizations, each advocating with equal fervor the idea of an independent Angola. All three, undoubtedly, thought the future state would be united under its own leadership. The differences between the MPLA, the UPA (from 1962 known as the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA), and, from the mid-1960s, the National Union for the Total Inde- pendence of Angola (UNITA) were the result less of ideological discrepancies than of (1) tribal antagonisms between the regions controlled by each movement (Bakongo, Mbundu, and Ovimbundu respectively); (2) class differences between the black and mulatto communities (the MPLA had many mulat- tos, unlike the FNLA and UNITA); and (3) personal animosity between the leaders of the three movements (Neto, Holden, and Jonas Savimbi).6 Yugoslav political leaders, unlike their Angolan counterparts, were united and certain about the political and economic interests Belgrade was pursuing in Africa and the nonaligned world in general. Besides a strategic alliance with Egypt in the north of the continent and equally important ties with Ethiopia and Sudan, in the late 1950s and early 1960s Yugoslavia was rapidly expand- ing its relations with newly independent countries in northern, western, and central Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Togo, Nigeria, Tan- zania, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, and Congo-Léopoldville/Kinshasa). Many of these countries played a prominent role in promoting Yugoslavia’s interests in Africa. Furthermore, they had substantially contributed to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), particularly during and after Tito’s visit to western and northern Africa from February to April 1961.7 The NAM’s First Conference, held in Belgrade in September 1961, symbolized how these countries had embraced Yugoslavia as an equal, a country that had considerable international prestige but could never become politically, eco- nomically, or militarily too dominant and thus encroach on or threaten the freedom of the newly liberated countries in Africa and elsewhere.8

6. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950–1962) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 13–120. The MPLA was Marxist oriented but mostly independent from the Soviet-bloc countries. The FNLA advocated a kind of nativist nationalism that was both strongly anti-Communist and anti-Western. Savimbi’s movement was far more ﬂuid in its ideological orientation (mainly nativist), but he also received material assistance from China. 7. “Tito’s Report Concerning the Trip to Some Friendly Countries of Western and Northern Africa,” 29 September 1961, in Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ), 837, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (KPR), I-2/13. 8. “Yugoslav Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries,” 26 April 1961, in National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, 668.00/4-2661; and Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, pp. 81–84.

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In addition to having strong nonaligned credentials and building close political, economic, and military cooperation with many African and Third World countries, Yugoslavia was one of the strongest champions of the national liberation struggle in the developing world. Years later the U.S. ambas- sador to Yugoslavia provocatively remarked that Tito “clearly enjoys his role as a patriarch of guerrilla liberation struggle.”9 In the early years this was certainly true, especially with regard to Algeria, where Yugoslavia provided extensive material and political assistance to the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the Algerian rebels ﬁghting against French rule. Years later, when Belgrade began to provide assistance to the Angolan liberation movement, Yugoslavia and Algeria still maintained close cooperation and coordination on many levels.10 Yugoslavia’s material assistance and contacts with national liberation movements were mainly pursued outside ofﬁcial ruling party channels. Since 1953, responsibility for this kind of work had generally been allocated to the popular-front organization known as the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ). The SSRNJ, whose role was similar to that of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, soon became the chief agency responsible for establishing contacts with the “progressive forces of the developing world.”11 The extensive contacts and connections Yugoslavia established in the nonaligned world (especially in Africa), together with the ever intensifying struggle of the Angolans against Portuguese colonial rule, set the stage for the establishment of a strong political partnership between the two sides.12

Balancing between the MPLA and the FNLA

The political split within the Angolan liberation movement often produced paralysis in the struggle against Portuguese rulers, not to mention confusion

9. Gleijeses, Conﬂicting Missions, p. 243. 10. Jovan Cavoški,ˇ “Jugoslavija, Alžir, nesvrstane zemlje i velike sile u Hladnom ratu 1954–1965,” in Miladin Miloševic,´ ed., Jugoslavija-Alžir (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2013), pp. 101–139. Along with China, Yugoslavia was one of the FLN’s most signiﬁcant sources of military assistance, and Yugoslav aid substantially contributed to the Algerian movement’s success. Many wounded Algerians were treated in Yugoslav hospitals, humanitarian aid was given on a daily basis, and hundreds of scholarships were given to Algerian students. As a result of this assistance, French-Yugoslav relations quickly deteriorated. 11. Vladimir Dedijer, “A Yugoslav View on the Problem of Collaboration in the International Workers’ Movement,” Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 10 (May 1953), pp. 7–8. 12. Yugoslavia also provided large-scale material assistance to the liberation movements in Guinea- Bissau and Mozambique.

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for Yugoslavia and other countries that were seeking to support the liberation movement. Yugoslav officials found it difficult to determine which of the three main parties had the best chance of ousting the Portuguese and gaining power. This became evident after Holden established his Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) in April 1962. The MPLA fiercely contested the new provisional government, but countries such as Algeria were initially more willing to provide military assistance to Holden’s political group, which was a better organized movement in the interior of Angola, than to the more “intel- lectually” oriented MPLA.13 After Holden’s provisional government gained the support of Tunisia, Nigeria, Congo-Léopoldville/Kinshasa, Algeria, and Morocco (as well as some backing from Ethiopia) and obtained full recognition from the government in Léopoldville in May 1963, members of the newly established Organization of African Unity (OAU) formed a six-country commission (comprising Alge- ria, Nigeria, Guinea, Congo-Léopoldville/Kinshasa, Senegal, and Tanganyika) that ultimately called on all African countries to recognize the new government. This recommendation was soon accepted and acted on by eighteen other African countries.14 The commission’s decision was a huge blow to the MPLA’s international prestige, especially because it came at a time when serious internal splits had emerged among the MPLA leaders. Disagreeing with Neto over the appropriate political stance to take toward the GRAE, Mario de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz decided to leave the movement.15 For many outside observers the situation was extremely confusing. Even the USSR, which had cooperated extensively with the MPLA and had no contacts with Holden, decided to recognize the provisional government—a decision it made while Neto was in Moscow seeking further material assistance for his movement. Although the Soviet Union quickly withdrew recognition from Holden’s government, this farcical episode encapsulates the incompre- hensibility and fractured nature of Angola’s liberation movements.16 After- ward, many countries in the Soviet bloc, despite harboring reservations about

13. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria,” 8 November 1963, in DAMSPS, PA, 1963, F. 102, 436524. 14. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution II: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare (1962–1976) (Cam- bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 62–99. 15. To counter the actions of the GRAE, the MPLA set up an organization of its own: the Demo- cratic Front for the Liberation of Angola. This “government” was strongly supported by the regime in Congo-Brazzaville. Marcum, Angolan Revolution II, pp. 86–92, 94–96. 16. Shubin, “Hot Cold War,” pp. 17–18; and Vladimir Shubin and Andrei Tokarev, “War in Angola: A Soviet Dimension,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90 (December 2001), pp. 608, 610–611.

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Holden, maintained unofficial ties with his movement, providing the FNLA leader with minor assistance while attempting to promote unity among the rival Angolan factions.17 Yugoslavia shared the sense of confusion about the situation in Angola, and many clarifications about developments had to be double-checked with Yugoslav embassies in multiple African countries. Some Yugoslav diplomats were convinced that the split inside the MPLA had allowed Holden’s movement to gain the upper hand in the struggle for diplomatic recognition.18 The confusion did not prevent international interest in the Angolan independence struggle from remaining sustained and widespread. The Soviet Union and its East European allies worked closely with the MPLA from 1961 onward, when Andrade and Cruz visited Moscow in July (they visited again a year later). That same year the Soviet Union initiated its program of financial assistance to the MPLA (the initial $25,000 climbed to $145,000 in 1966 and to $220,000 in 1973) and began providing arms and training to MPLA cadres.19 In those early years of struggle, the Chinese also were interested in Angola. At first, they gave support mainly to the MPLA, often providing valuable assistance, but after the split in the MPLA hierarchy and the official recognition of the GRAE by many influential members of the OAU, Beijing rapidly switched its support to Holden’s FNLA and ultimately to Savimbi’s UNITA.20 China was rumored to have incited the split inside the MPLA in 1963—or at least, Neto believed this was the case.21 On the other side of the Cold War divide, most of the leading Western countries maintained

17. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Czechoslovakia,” 20 April 1964, in DAMSPS, PA, 1964, F. 119, 418078; “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Hungary,” 5 May 1964, in DAMSPS, PA, 1964, F. 119, 419845; “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in East Germany,” 5 May 1964, in DAMSPS, PA, 1964, F. 119, 420333; and “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in the USSR,” 20 May 1964, in DAMSPS, PA, 1964, F. 119, 421948. 18. “Reminder about Roberto Holden’s visit to Yugoslavia,” n.d., in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70, p. 9. 19. Shubin, “Hot Cold War,” pp. 8–9, 15. Only half of the funds were provided directly by the USSR. The other half came from other Communist countries. Some authors claim that 70–80 percent of the MPLA’s arms in 1971 came from the Soviet Union and its “satellites” and that, through 1974, Soviet assistance amounted to $63 million. See Marcum, Angolan Revolution II, pp. 229. These ﬁgures have not been corroborated, and many authors consider them to be exaggerated. 20. Steven F. Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–1993,” The China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995), pp. 394, 396–397. Documentation in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives indicates that the MPLA was the party initially favored and actively supported by the Chinese. 21. During his visit to Yugoslavia in September 1965, Neto claimed that China had instigated a con- ﬂict within the MPLA so that individuals sympathetic to China could come to power. He also emphasized that at that time Yugoslavia had already helped a lot. “Transcripts of Talks between Milentije Popovic and Dr. Agostinho Neto,” 17 September 1965, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b, Angola.

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their distance from Angola, although some rendered open or covert assistance to António de Oliveira Salazar’s regime in Portugal (and, after Salazar’s death in 1968, to Marcelo Caetano’s government). Many of the inconsistencies faced by other international actors in their search for partners or clients in the Angolan fight for national liberation were also noted by Yugoslavia. Although Belgrade’s diplomatic network was contin- ually spreading across the African continent, it was not enough to resolve the discrepancies in Angolan affairs. At the outset, Holden’s movement had much closer ties to Yugoslavia, but ultimately Belgrade decided to put its political weight behind the MPLA. For example, Holden planned to visit Yugoslavia in 1960—well before the Angolan uprising began—and to initiate negotiations over Yugoslav assistance, but his visit had to be postponed until the late summer of 1961.22 Because Yugoslavia was a Communist country but situated outside the Soviet bloc, and because it was engaged in a low-intensity ideological quarrel with Moscow, the MPLA at first was slow to respond to the Yugoslav presence in Africa. Nevertheless, when MPLA officials approached Yugoslavia with a plea to mediate the release of Neto from a Portuguese prison, Belgrade readily accepted the role. Archival records do not shed much light on the outcome of this endeavor, but we do know that Neto, when he finally escaped Portuguese custody, sent personal greetings to the Yugoslav government, thanking it for assisting in his release.23 Holden was much more interested in nurturing ties with Belgrade, hoping to win favor with many important African countries that were also partners of Yugoslavia. In August 1961, Holden (traveling under his nom de guerre José Gilmore and joined by Savimbi) made an unpublicized visit to Yu- goslavia, where he met with Tito. The two discussed the situation in Angola in detail, and Tito promised that Yugoslavia would do whatever it could to help the Angolan struggle, first through the Yugoslav Red Cross (which would help refugees and provide medical assistance) and then by giving scholarships to Angolan students.24 Holden also asked for military assistance and gave the Yugoslavs a list of urgently needed weapons (including more than 2,000 rifles, submachine guns, and machine guns; 2,500 grenades; 1,000 mines; five bazookas; and all necessary ammunition). Two days later Tito personally

22. “Transcripts of Talks between Osman Djikic and Roberto Holden,” 20 April 1961, in DAMSPS, PA, 1961, F. 101, 415824. 23. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Guinea,” 28 August 1962, in DAMSPS, PA, 1962, F. 107, 425108. 24. “Minutes of Conversation between Tito and Gilmore,” 5 August 1961, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/3-1. This visit was not mentioned in any of the ofﬁcial Yugoslav newspapers.

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approved this first-ever shipment of weapons to the Angolan liberation movements, and he promised to help transport the materiel to Africa.25 However, as the situation in Angola grew more complicated, Yugoslavia decided to ship only humanitarian assistance and leave the arms for later, when the situation on the ground became clearer. This decision left Algeria as the Angolan liberation movement’s most reliable ally.26 A watershed for Yugoslavia’s relations with the Angolan liberation movements came a month later, when Holden (this time accompanied by Congolese [Léopoldville-Kinshasa] Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula) and the MPLA’s Andrade attended the First Conference of the Non-Aligned Coun- tries as joint representatives for Angola.27 The event demonstrated the gradual diversification of Yugoslavia’s contacts with the liberation movements in An- gola. Over the next few years, ties to both organizations were closely maintained through Yugoslav embassies in Conakry and Léopoldville, students from both movements were sent to Yugoslavia, and medical assistance to guerrilla fighters was provided on several occasions (e.g., in 1963, Benedito Conçalves, the MPLA’s military commander, underwent medical treatment in Yugoslavia).28 However, for the time being the Yugoslav government decided to focus its efforts on the relationship with Holden, primarily in response to the OAU’s decision to recognize the GRAE, while also staying in permanent contact with the representatives of the MPLA. In early 1966, MPLA Foreign Secretary Luis de Azevedo came to Yugoslavia to learn about Yugoslavia’s extensive guerrilla fighting experience. The training he received during this official visit emphasized strategic and tactical issues of partisan warfare, organizing operations behind enemy lines, and setting up government agencies on liberated territory. Azevedo also brought with him a personal letter from Neto asking Tito to “use his influence with certain African countries to change their attitude toward Holden.” Neto also asked Yugoslavia to render more assistance to the MPLA. SSRNJ officials eventually agreed to give money to the movement,

25. “Tito’s Letter to the General Secretary of the President,” 11 August 1961, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3- a/3-1. In conversations with Holden, Tito said he had been ready to give weapons to the Angolans, but he pointed out the problems that Yugoslav ships had had with the French over Yugoslavia’s assistance to the FLN. 26. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria,” 13 April 1963, in DAMSPS, PA, 1963, F. 102, 413007. 27. Marcum, Angolan Revolution I, pp. 180, 204. 28. “Reminder about Roberto Holden’s Visit to Yugoslavia,” n.d., in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70, pp. 10–11.

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send medical supplies to its units, and allow more Angolan students to enroll in Yugoslav schools for technical studies.29 By late 1965 the initial support and enthusiasm for Holden’s provisional government had diminished. Many African countries that had previously extended assistance slowly began to retract it. The FNLA was riven by internal strife, ultimately leading to the emergence of Savimbi’s UNITA.30 This was a major political opportunity for the MPLA. In 1965, thanks to its extensive diplomatic contacts, Neto’s movement gained the OAU’s support for its struggle and obtained some of the funds that had previously been allocated only to the FNLA. In addition, the MPLA intensiﬁed its struggle in the oil-rich province of Cabinda (an enclave between the two Congos) with the full backing of the government in Brazzaville, while also making simultaneous efforts to open another front inside Angola proper.31 In addition, the MPLA had another strong ally on the ground: Cuba. A detachment of Cubans, under the command of Jorge Risquet, was stationed in Congo-Brazzaville from 1965 to 1966, giving material assistance and training to the MPLA, sometimes even taking part in military actions against the Portuguese.32 However, Neto was critical of the Cuban participation, labeling it an attempt at foreign interfer- ence through the assumption of command of MPLA units in Cabinda. This in turn triggered Cuban reservations about Neto and a gradual reduction in assistance after 1966.33 The general shift in African attitudes toward the two main Angolan liberation movements opened the way for Yugoslavia to stand ﬁrmly behind the MPLA. As Azevedo was told during his second visit to Yugoslavia in Febru- ary 1965, the previous decision of the OAU and the MPLA’s passivity in its armed struggle had obliged Belgrade to maintain its distance from Angolan

29. “Information on the Visit of Luis de Azavedo,” 28 February 1964, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964– 70. Yugoslav representatives also agreed to train a limited number of MPLA members on how to steer bigger boats. This was particularly important because most communication routes between the Angolan enclave of Cabinda (the center of MPLA activity) and the rest of Angola were by sea or via the Congo River. 30. The inactivity of the FNLA raised suspicion among the OAU members, particularly in Ghana and Egypt, and eventually led to a fact-finding mission that called for more assistance to the MPLA. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Egypt,” 24 December 1964, in DAMSPS, PA, 1964, F. 119, 450166. 31. Marcum, Angolan Revolution II, pp. 169–178. In this period, the USSR and some of its allies resumed their material assistance to the MPLA, while propaganda broadcasts were also intensified. 32. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 160–184, 244–245; and Jorge Risquet Valdés, El segundo frente del Che en el Congo: Historia del batallón Patricio Lumumba (Havana: Casa Editora Abril, 2006). 33. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Congo (Brazzaville),” 6 March 1968, in DAMSPS, PA, 1968, F. 238, 49649.

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affairs. Because the MPLA was gaining prominence among African govern- ments and was actively engaged in the struggle in Cabinda, Yugoslavia had decided to recognize the MPLA as the only legitimate representative of An- gola and extend political and material assistance.34 Given that Belgrade also had obligations to other liberation movements (e.g., in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique) and that speciﬁc preconditions had to be met before any arms could be transferred, the SSRNJ decided to make a preliminary shipment of clothes, shoes, medicine, and food for a single military unit of the MPLA (valued at 3.5 million Yugoslav dinars or $280,000).35 In addition, $2,000 in cash was given to Azevedo with the understanding that further ﬁnancial assistance would be provided through the Yugoslav embassy in Brazzaville. Finally, the Yugoslav news agency Tanjung began to broadcast detailed reports on the MPLA struggle.36

Constructing a Long-Term Partnership

Neto, from the time of his first visit to Yugoslavia in September 1965 until the MPLA seized power in Angola a decade later, traveled to Yugoslavia on at least ten occasions. Twice he was granted an audience with Tito, a record of access that compares favorably to his official visits to other European countries. In turn, Yugoslav officials’ access to Neto provided them with valuable, continual insights into the day-to-day situation in Angola and how Yugoslavia could better help the ongoing struggle. At the same time, these visits, together with those from the leaders of the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC) and Mozambique (the Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO), elevated Bel- grade’s prestige and thus enhanced its bid to win favor from the peoples of the developing world, particularly in Africa.37

34. “Transcripts of Talks between Dobrivoje Vidic´ and Luis de Azevedo,” 1 February 1965, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b, Angola. Azevedo said they had 650 fighters and many refugees in Cabinda and needed $100,000 to support their struggle. He asked Yugoslavia to provide half of that sum, as well as clothes, food, medicine, weapons, and so on, particularly because the USSR had been slow in its response. 35. All subsequent amounts have been converted from dinars to U.S. dollars, the currency in which these transactions were ultimately denominated, using the official exchange rates published by the National Bank of Yugoslavia during the years in question. 36. “Recommendations for Assistance to the MPLA,” 5 February 1965, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964– 70. Yugoslavia also agreed to accept additional MPLA fighters to study technical sciences (radioteleg- raphy, navigation), guerrilla warfare, and so on. 37. According to recently declassified documents, Neto was officially in Yugoslavia in 1965, 1966, 1968 (twice), 1969, 1970 (twice), 1971, 1973, and 1974. Whether he also made secret visits cannot

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During Neto’s first visit to Yugoslavia, political and military developments boded well for the MPLA. Holden’s movement had become discredited among many of his former supporters in Africa, and the MPLA was gaining prominence thanks to its active struggle in Cabinda and was seriously contemplating extending its operations to parts of eastern Angola. Neto was relatively satisfied with the situation, often pointing out that many African countries were increasing their material assistance to the MPLA and that the movement still enjoyed military backing from the USSR and East Germany.38 However, Neto emphasized that “Yugoslavia helped [the MPLA] when the aid was most needed, without any preconditions,” and he asked for additional materiel support. Officials in Belgrade were already contemplating the provision of such support, but only after they “set conditions for the effective use” of Yugoslav- manufactured weapons and had resolved the major issue of how to ship the armaments.39 Violent changes and coups d’état in other African countries in 1966 brought about a gradual stagnation of African assistance to the MPLA. Many of the Angolan movement’s allies were themselves desperately trying to survive the harsh conditions of the Cold War. Neto was embittered when the OAU decided to stop providing material support to the MPLA, and he blamed the decision on “imperialist and Chinese influence” that sowed discord in Africa. After Mobutu Sese Seko rose to power in Congo-Kinshasa, the MPLA tried to improve relations with him, even asking Yugoslavia to reopen its embassy in Kinshasa and provide diplomatic support on the ground.40 Perhaps one of the reasons that Belgrade was slow to provide assistance in 1966 was the political rift that emerged between Yugoslavia and Cuba over the tricontinental conference in Havana in January 1966. Yugoslavia had been deliberately excluded from the meeting, and the MPLA representatives in attendance had become close to the Cubans. Still, the Yugoslav government gave another $6,000 to the MPLA and sent a large shipment of medicine, clothes, and food to frontline soldiers. Wounded MPLA fighters continued to receive medical treatment in

be determined from t the available archival evidence. Transcripts conﬁrm he held at least two meetings with Tito (likely there were more) 38. In 1965–1966, the MPLA had around 600 people undergoing training in military schools in the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and Algeria. These soldiers were then brought into Angola through Tanzania and Zambia. “Transcripts of Talks with Daniel Julio Chipenda in Dar es Salaam,” 16 September 1966, in DAMSPS, PA, 1966, F. 220, 436232. 39. “Transcripts of Conversation between Lazar Mojsov and Dr. Agostinho Neto,” 16 September 1965, in AJ 142, 553, Angola 1964–70. 40. “Ciphered Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Congo (Brazzaville),” 8 February 1967, in DAMSPS, PA, 1967, F. 221, 45172.

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Yugoslav hospitals, and the number of scholarships awarded to Angolan students for study in Yugoslavia increased. Neto asked for additional material and financial assistance from Yugoslavia, receiving in return a general promise that more would be supplied in 1967.41 In the meantime, Yugoslav leaders began considering whether to increase military assistance to the PAIGC and to initiate the first serious arms shipments to the MPLA and FRELIMO. Because all three movements enjoyed wide popular support and official backing from the OAU, advocated a progressive political orientation, and engaged in fierce combat against the Portuguese colonial regime, the SSRNJ recommended to the Secretariat of Defense that Yugoslavia provide the needed military assistance (e.g., rifles, machine guns, hand guns, mortars, anti-aircraft guns, light cannons, grenades, ammunition, long-range radio stations). “Dispatching our assistance at this moment,” one Yugoslav official declared, “would be a move of enormous political significance and not only would have serious reverberations among these liberation movements, but would also enhance the prestige of our country in the whole of Africa.”42 Although the relevant Yugoslav government agencies were still determining the details of future military cooperation with these movements, all three received around $20,000 in cash in 1967 as financial aid, together with new shipments of food, clothes, and medicine (worth $16,000).43 The following year (1968) was expected to be successful for the MPLA. Since 1966, the movement had been illegally sending men and materials to northern Angola (via Congo-Kinshasa). In 1968 it opened a new front in eastern Angola through Zambia. The rebellion by this point had engulfed fifteen provinces of Angola, and Neto was planning to intensify guerrilla actions against the Portuguese and expand control of liberated areas. However, the chances of a possible South African intervention were growing, and the MPLA needed further extensive support from its allies, including Yugoslavia. In 1968–1969, the center of MPLA guerrilla activity was concentrated in southeastern parts of Angola (the so-called Third Military Region), with 8,000 fighters dispersed around the country (only half of them armed). Most of the

41. “Transcripts of Talks between Tahir Camuran´ and Draskovic´ Branko with Dr. Agostinho Neto,” 1 December 1966, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70. In early 1967, an SSRNJ delegation visited Congo-Brazzaville and met with Neto and other MPLA leaders. 42. “Letter from Josip Djerdja to the State Secretariat for People’s Defense,” 6 April 1967, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b, Angola. 43. “Information on the National Liberation Movements of Portuguese Colonies and Their Relations with Yugoslavia,” 31 October 1967, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b, Angola.

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MPLA’s military actions were conducted in a hit-and-run manner, without in- flicting many enemy casualties, but they were generally popular with the local population.44 Even as the guerrilla war intensified in the southeast, the MPLA decided to open a new front in eastern Angola and to move many of its fighters from Cabinda to Tanzania. To this end, MPLA leaders asked Yugoslavia to provide transport ships for several hundred men and 250 tons of war material. Yugoslavia managed to gather funds to finance the operation, and the majority of the guerrillas were transported on Soviet planes to Tanzania and Zambia.45 When Neto visited Yugoslavia in January 1968, the SSRNJ had decided to provide him with $15,000 ($10,000 in cash, $5,000 worth of medical supplies and hospital treatment for wounded fighters) and readily accepted new candidates for the military and technical training. More important, the Yu- goslav government had finally decided to start shipping arms to the MPLA. SSRNJ officials were satisfied that Neto and other MPLA leaders had become much more realistic in their assessments of the internal and external situation and were now aware that only through concrete results of their armed struggle could they gain adequate international backing.46 As the fight against the Portuguese escalated in the border regions with Zambia, the first shipments of Yugoslav weapons arrived at the front via Tanzania and Zambia. Pleased with this support, Neto publicly declared in October 1968, when he was visiting Yugoslavia, that “Yugoslavia is the only country that is regularly sending assistance” to his guerrilla movement. He stressed that the weapons the MPLA had just received from Yugoslavia were “the first shipment of this kind . . . since the front on the Zambian border had been opened.” He even proclaimed that “Yugoslavia is helping [the MPLA] more than many rich countries and that it [Yugoslavia] stands in the first row among those who are giving assistance.” The October 1968 visit also included Neto’s first meeting with Tito. The two leaders discussed the general situation in Angola and surrounding African countries, and Tito advised Neto to create larger military formations that could inflict serious losses on the enemy and seize more weapons from

44. “A View on the Military-Political Situation in Angola,” 5 April 1970, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70. The biggest problems facing the MPLA were logistics, transport, and an insufficient number of qualified commanding officers. 45. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Congo (Brazzaville),” 29 April 1968, in DAMSPS, PA, 1968, F. 238, 416225. 46. “Information on the Visit of the MPLA Delegation to Yugoslavia,” 18–25 January 1968, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70.

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the Portuguese, pushing them out of the countryside into a few larger urban areas.47 Yugoslavia’s relationship with the MPLA was, however, adversely affected by the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia and Moscow’s enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Neto told Tito that Yugoslavia’s sharp criticism of Soviet actions might leave the MPLA with little choice but to choose between Belgrade and Moscow. Because Neto had come to Yugoslavia directly from East Germany, the only information he had on the Czechoslovak situation was from Soviet-bloc sources. During Neto’s meetings in Yugoslavia, especially those with Tito, the Yugoslav officials spoke harshly about the Soviet intervention, noting in particular the threat it implied for other small and medium Marxist countries that might deviate from Soviet preferences.48 Frictions over the matter loomed large ahead of a planned visit to Yugoslavia by delegations from three African liberation movements (MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO) in June 1969. The leader of the PAIGC, Amílcar Cabral, postponed his visit “because of prior obligations”—a decision clearly influenced by Moscow. Nev- ertheless, representatives of the MPLA and FRELIMO expressed their deepest gratitude to Yugoslavia for rendering precious material and political assistance and expressed a ‘high level of confidence” in Yugoslavia. The visit helped to preserve Yugoslavia’s ties with the MPLA and other liberation movements despite the shadow cast by the USSR.49 Two months later, confirmation came that the Soviet Union had placed enormous pressure on Neto not to visit Yugoslavia in June 1969. However, Neto had energetically rejected this “advice” and said that his movement was pursuing an independent policy course. In turn, the MPLA was “subjected to strong pressure by the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp,” as well as from the Algerians, who were much influenced by Moscow.50

Russians complained about Neto’s visit and conversations he had had in Yu- goslavia and Dr. Neto had very difﬁcult negotiations with them. After his visit

47. “Information on the Visit of Dr. Agostinho Neto to Yugoslavia,” 21–31 October 1968, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/3-3. Neto was promised Yugoslav trucks to help ship soldiers and equipment to the front line in eastern Angola. 48. “Transcripts of Talks between Tito and Neto,” 29 October 1968, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/3-3. Dur- ing this conversation Neto demonstrated an understanding of the Yugoslav position, but he refrained from expressing his own opinion. 49. “Information on the Visit of Delegations from the MPLA and FRELIMO,” June 1969, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70. One result of the visit was an agreement to open a large information center in Belgrade that could broadcast news from all three movements. 50. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Congo (Brazzaville),” 24 August 1969, in DAMSPS, PA, 1969, F. 233, 431063.

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to Yugoslavia, Russians have ceased their assistance and have not sent anything yet....However,Dr.Netoremainedﬁrmonhisposition,emphasizingtheim- portance of Yugoslavia’s assistance and the fact that Yugoslavia never raised any preconditions.51

Soviet pressure on the Angolans might have been the trigger Yugoslavia needed to supply the MPLA with much greater material aid than previously planned, especially once it became clear that the Soviet Union had ceased to furnish assistance.52 In 1969, Yugoslavia gave more than $270,000 in aid, including arms ($85,000), cash ($15,000), medicine, two trucks (almost $24,000), transport, and assistance through Yugoslav embassies.53 In 1970, after Soviet ofﬁcials discovered the increased Yugoslav assistance to the MPLA, the Soviet Politburo decided to reinstate military assistance, providing infantry weapons and wireless radio s equipment.54 In contrast to the interruption in Soviet aid, the consistency of Yugoslav support made Belgrade one of the movement’s most trusted suppliers of arms and other war materiel during this period.55 Because of the pressure applied by Moscow and its allies, the MPLA decided early on to diversify its ties with as many interested parties in the world as it could, including connections with West European social-democratic parties. For many of these contacts, Yugoslavia acted as a mediator; for example, between the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the British Labour Party. Both the SPD and Labour promised material assistance to the MPLA and greater media coverage of its struggle in their countries’ respective media. The MPLA’s establishment of a public working relationship with the West German ruling party, dismayed the East German regime, but the MPLA accepted the resulting frictions as the necessary price for its efforts to diversify its backers.56

51. “Transcripts of Talks between Babic´ Dimitrije and Angolan Student in Yugoslavia de Matos,” 20 August 1969, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70. In the 1970s, Alfredo de Matos, the student whose interview is documented in this transcript, became a prominent MPLA leader. He was educated in the Faculty of Economics, Belgrade University, and had a Yugoslav wife and two children. 52. In Conflicting Missions, Gleijeses mentions disagreements between Neto and the Soviet Union on the eve of Neto’s visit to Yugoslavia. Gleijeses dates the episode to 1967 but might have been misinformed. More likely the incident occurred in 1969 over the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict and not Chinese policies. See Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 242–243. 53. “Information about the Yugoslav Assistance to the MPLA,” February 1971, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a. 54. “Angola and the MPLA,” February 1971, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a. 55. Marcum, Angolan Revolution II, p. 226. 56. “Memo on the Demand of the MPLA That Yugoslavia Mediate Their Contacts with the SPD,” 27 November 1970, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b, Angola.

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A Friend in Need Is a Friend Indeed

In 1970–1971, the MPLA was at its peak both politically and militarily. Por- tugal considered the organization to be its “most dangerous foe” and “the single most significant threat for the future.” These statements suggest that the ongoing military assistance from Yugoslavia and other countries (but not the Soviet Union, whose direct military support was still limited, despite its generous financial support) had helped to transform the strategic situation in Angola. Recent developments in Angola likely had a serious effect on Soviet leaders, who in 1970 finally recognized the strategic importance of the liberation movements in southern Africa for their overall confrontation with the West and China.57 Yugoslav support may also have been the principal reason for the Soviet Union’s provision of full backing to the International Confer- ence of Solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies held in Rome in June 1970.58 Soviet relations with the MPLA were gradually stabilized after the brief interruption in 1968–1969, and in 1971 Neto readily accepted the full normalization of relations with the Chinese.59 As Vladimir Shubin notes: “Neto always behaved independently from Moscow,” preferring “to receive assistance from Yugoslavia, led by Tito, which he regarded as independent, as well as Marxist-Leninist.”60 In a further demonstration of the MPLA’s foreign policy independence, Neto took an active part in the proceedings of the Third Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka in September 1970, despite pressure from the Soviet Union not to attend the conference. The MPLA, Neto claimed, was “an independent movement fighting for an independent country.”61 In November 1970 an MPLA information center was established in Bel- grade. The SSRNJ paid all of the maintenance expenses for the center, which

57. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 237; and Westad, Global Cold War, pp. 215–216. 58. Shubin, “Hot Cold War,” pp. 12–13; and Marcum, Angolan Revolution II, pp. 229–230. 59. Chinese instructors came to Tanzania to train MPLA fighters, and their first shipments of arms arrived in 1970. MPLA military commander Carreira said the Soviet Union resumed its arms deliveries only after discovering that China was again shipping weapons to the MPLA. From the Soviet Union the MPLA received a “Grad” multiple-launch rocket system for use against fortified Portuguese positions. However, the USSR was still reluctant to deliver anti-aircraft missiles that could shoot down Portuguese helicopters. “Carreira’s Presentation on the MPLA Military Issues,” 7 January 1971, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73. 60. Shubin, “Hot Cold War,” p. 27. 61. “Telegram from the Yugoslav embassy in Tanzania,” 9 October 1970, in DAMSPS, PA, 1970, F. 271, 437755.

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was opened as a way for other European countries to learn about the MPLA. Throughout the year Yugoslavia also sent the MPLA financial assistance, of- fered additional scholarships to Angolan students, and provided medical treatment for wounded MPLA fighters.62 This brought Yugoslavia’s total assistance to around $255,000 for the year, most of which came in the form of arms shipments. Many Yugoslav officials were convinced that “politically and militarily the MPLA was stronger than ever before.”63 In 1970, MPLA units adopted a successful new strategy for engaging Portuguese troops. By working in bigger formations, the MPLA was able to flush the Portuguese from several garrisons and establish military outposts in the northern parts of the country. In adopting these new tactics, the MPLA was mainly following the advice of Yugoslav advisers, who were also training Zambian troops. New shipments of weapons from Yugoslavia also “came at the right moment.”64 MPLA leaders had sought greater trilateral military cooperation with Yugoslavia and Zambia in order to ease the job of conducting military training of the MPLA troops by Yugoslav instructors in Zambia and provide easier access to Yugoslav war materials that could be transported to the Angolan-Zambian border by air.65 The generous support from Yugoslavia convinced Neto he could extend his military operations into other parts of Angola.66 MPLA military commander Henrique (“Iko”) Carreira was invited to Yugoslavia in October 1970 as a special guest of the Yugoslav Secretariat of Defense. Although the main reason for the trip was to determine which arms shipments should be transported to Tanzania and from there to Angola, it was also a valuable opportunity for Carreira to familiarize himself with Yugoslav military schools (and the training they might be able to provide the MPLA’s officers), to visit army centers around Yugoslavia, and to acquaint himself with Yugoslavia’s wartime guerrilla tactics. He expressed general satisfaction with the latest arms shipments from Yugoslavia but provided new lists of weapons that were urgently needed at the front line, including special armor-piercing

62. “Transcripts of Talks between Dolanc and Carreira,” 14 October 1970, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73. 63. “Reminder on the MPLA and the MPLA-SSRNJ Cooperation,” n.d., in AJ, 142, A-11, Angola. Angolans also obtained a complete photo laboratory from Yugoslavia. 64. “Carreira’s Presentation on the MPLA Military Issues.” Yugoslav experts were also involved in decrypting Portuguese radio transmissions. 65. “Information on the Yugoslav Assistance to the MPLA,” in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a. 66. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Congo (Brazzaville),” 8 March 1971, in DAMSPS, PA, 1971, F. 159, 49009.

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mines.67 The MPLA also wanted to learn whether Yugoslavia could provide a means of communicating between command posts and units in the field (as well as technology to allow long-range communication between Belgrade and Lusaka). All in all, during 1970 Yugoslavia dispatched to the MPLA a vari- ety of weapons systems (rifles, machine guns, heavy machine guns, bazookas, recoilless cannons, mortars, etc.), as well as 7.62 mm ammunition, grenades, mines, and explosives.68 An internal Yugoslav document from 1971 emphasized that “the MPLA had become SSRNJ’s priority among the African national-liberation movements.” By way of explanation, the document noted the “further military suc- cesses in [the MPLA’s] armed struggle and high degree of maturity of the movement, which asserted itself as the most successful national-liberation movement in Africa.” After additional armaments were shipped in March 1971, the MPLA made no additional demands for new weapons deliveries until the following year. Large stockpiles of already-shipped arms were still held up in Tanzania (the MPLA had serious problems transporting these con- signments to eastern Angola). Nevertheless, Belgrade sent additional financial assistance of more than $27,000 to the MPLA and delivered large quantities (worth more than $60,000) of food, uniforms, spare parts for trucks, and so on. In addition, a study group of six MPLA officers spent four months in the army training center in Sarajevo, and the MPLA information center continued to expand its activities and broadcasts.69 Thus, Carreira could say at a public rally the following year that “Yugoslavia, according to its capabilities and compared to richer countries, is rendering the biggest [assistance]. We do not ask for more.”70 Following several brutal Portuguese counteroffensives in 1972–1973, the MPLA found itself on the brink of defeat. The movement had been pushed out of many of the regions it had liberated during the previous couple of years, and MPLA leaders faced serious internal strife that eventually split the movement into three factions. Daniel Chipenda’s eastern revolt (provoked by the

67. “Visit of the MPLA Military Commander Henrique Carreira,” 16 October 1970, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70. Carreira said the MPLA would like to train its officers in Yugoslavia because those who had undergone training in the USSR, Algeria, Cuba, and China “brought with them different influences and regulations that got some fighters scared and forced them to desert.” 68. “MPLA Demands for Assistance,” 20 October 1970, in AJ, 142, 553, Angola 1964–70. 69. “Information on the Visit of Dr. Neto,” 23–27 April 1971, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73. Another twenty officers were sent to North Korea for military training. 70. “‘Report on the Visit to the MPLA and Talks with Representatives of the Liberation Movements of Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Comoro Isles,’ 5 August to 5 September 1972, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73.

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possibility of a political rapprochement with the FNLA) had garnered substantial support from Zambia’s President Kaunda after it undermined Neto’s dominant position, squeezing him out of eastern Angola. The Neto faction of the MPLA was under siege.71 Outsiders, especially Soviet officials, were puzzled by the turmoil within the MPLA.72 Substantial military losses, political splits, and an impending political blockade from Zambia compelled Neto to pursue a compromise with his long-time rival, Holden. Although the OAU had withdrawn its recognition of Holden’s provisional government in 1971, he still enjoyed full support from Zaire’s President Mobutu. If Neto wanted to resupply and regroup his movement, he would have to do so through Zairian territory, and to ac- quire the necessary endorsements he would have to seek a compromise with the FNLA.73 Therefore, in December 1972 the two movements signed a reconciliation and unification agreement. Neto was acutely aware of the downsides of his fledgling alliance with Holden, but Yugoslavia expressed its understanding and pointed out that the compromise might further enhance the MPLA’s military capabilities and elevate its prestige in Africa. Belgrade further pledged that the MPLA would remain its main partner among the liberation movements.74 In these tense days, the MPLA also found itself squeezed between China and the Soviet Union, which were vying for influence among the southern African liberation movements. During a visit to Yugoslavia in November 1973, Carreira said in confidence that “rapprochement with China automati- cally creates problems for us with the USSR,” particularly because the MPLA had 200 fighters undergoing training in China and only 150 in the Soviet Union. “We need both the USSR and China,” Carreira said, but “it is ob- vious that the USSR and China have their own strategies and the MPLA is just a small fraction of it.” He then bitterly concluded: “While Portugal has unreserved backing from its allies, we [MPLA] always have problems with our allies.”75 The influence of the Sino-Soviet split on the MPLA’s internal affairs

71. Marcum, Angolan Revolution II, pp. 201–204; and Westad, Global Cold War, p. 217. In 1974, Andrade would organize a faction called “Active Revolt” in Congo. 72. Shubin, “Hot Cold War,” pp. 19–21. 73. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat to Embassies in Zambia, Tanzania, Congo, and Zaire,” 21 July 1972, in DAMSPS, PA, 1972, F. 199, 426687. 74. “Report on the Visit of the Delegation of the MPLA Headed by Dr. Agostinho Neto,” 16 March 1973, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73. 75. Carreira also said that both Tanzania and Zambia, China’s allies, were pressuring the MPLA to distance itself from the USSR. See “Transcripts of Talks between Stevovic´ and Carreira,” 7 November 1973, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73.

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was immediately noticed by the Yugoslav delegation visiting Angolan rebels in Tanzania in August–September 1972. Many of the fighters had Mao Zedong’s “Little Red Book” and were being trained by Chinese instructors. Despite a massive increase in Soviet aid—during the first eight months of 1972 Moscow sent more arms and equipment to the MPLA than it had in the previous ten years—China’s military assistance to the liberation movement was still “the most efficient and the largest.”76 As MPLA officials often pointed out, most of the Chinese and Soviet assistance, although generous, came with onerous strings attached. For various reasons (e.g., Neto’s ongoing conflict with Chipenda, the MPLA’s incapac- ity for military action, Soviet displeasure with the MPLA’s agreement with Holden, and Moscow’s suspicions about Neto’s ties with the Chinese), the Soviet Union provided only a “trickle of military and financial aid” in 1973.77 At the same time, the Chinese were slowly shifting toward the FNLA, expand- ing their material assistance to their old client.78 That is why the leaders of the MPLA prized the consistent, unconditional assistance rendered by Yugoslavia.

Although they [MPLA] are aware that our [Yugoslav] capabilities for giving assistance are not big and we cannot compete with China and the USSR, nevertheless our military assistance, although small in size, is more gladly accepted and it is appreciated more, because it is not conditioned and behind it stands the enormous political prestige of our country.79 The MPLA’s Soviet and Chinese interlocutors often heard similar expressions of the MPLA’s gratitude toward Yugoslavia. For the Angolans, Yugoslavia was a symbol of independence.80 However, in 1972, financial problems and structural changes in the Yu- goslav economy spurred a significant decrease in overall Yugoslav assistance to the MPLA. Although direct financial aid did not change, the value of other assistance dropped to only around $60,000, including additional training for

76. “‘Report on the Visit to the MPLA and Talks with Representatives of the Liberation Movements of Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Comoro Isles,’ 5 August to 5 September 1972.” Neto and Carreira, hoping to decrease the MPLA’s dependence on Chinese military instructors, de- manded that Yugoslavia expand its training camps in Zambia. 77. Shubin claims otherwise in “Hot Cold War,” pp. 15, 29. 78. Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 217; Shubin and Tokarev, “War in Angola,” pp. 611–612; and Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy,” pp. 401–402. 79. “‘Report on the Visit to the MPLA and Talks with Representatives of the Liberation Movements of Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Comoro Isles,’ 5 August to 5 September 1972.” 80. Ibid.

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a couple of MPLA officers, medical treatment of a few fighters (including Chipenda), and the visit of a high-profile delegation (not including Neto) to Yugoslavia. 81 The most significant event was an official visit by an SSRNJ delegation to the liberated territory in Angola, the first high-level delegation to visit the region. In addition to meeting with the leaders and fighters of the MPLA, the delegation was solemnly received in Zambia and Tanzania, where the SSRNJ officials also met with representatives of the liberation movements of Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Comoro Islands. The head of the OAU liberation committee in Dar es Salaam declared to his Yugoslav guests that the visit was “proof of the obligation toward human dig- nity and freedom that Yugoslavia set forward as its own principle.”82 In late January 1973, Neto again headed to the USSR and several East Eu- ropean countries to explain his decision to reach an agreement with the FNLA and to seek additional political and material support. Leaders in Moscow were unreceptive. Neto later complained that the USSR was too preoccupied with Vietnam and the Middle East to think about the MPLA.83 Yugoslavia was the last stop on his European tour, and on this occasion Neto was again granted an audience with Tito. During their conversation, Neto argued that “Yugoslavia should examine the possibility of increasing its assistance to the MPLA,” especially supplies of infantry weapons, recoilless cannons, and ammunition. In response, Tito promised that Yugoslavia would “continue to increase and expand the present amount of shipments” and that he would talk to Kaunda about organizing training camps in Zambia with Yugoslav military instructors.84 Subsequently, the SSRNJ decided to send two shipments of arms, each worth more than $128,000. In addition, the MPLA received $20,000 in mon- etary assistance. Financial support for the information center in Belgrade also continued, and long-range radio transmitters were sent to Angola. Along with the material supplies, Neto counted on Yugoslavia’s strong political action in his favor among the member-states of the NAM.85

81. “Reminder on the MPLA and the MPLA-SSRNJ Cooperation.” 82. “‘Report on the Visit to the MPLA and Talks with Representatives of the Liberation Movements of Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Comoro Isles,’ 5 August to 5 September 1972.” 83. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Tanzania,” 6 November 1972, in DAMSPS, PA, 1972, F. 199, 439472. 84. “Transcripts of Talks between Tito and Neto, Brioni,” 20 February 1973, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3- a/3-3. 85. “Report on the Visit of the MPLA Delegation Headed by Dr. Neto,” January 1973, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73. Yugoslavia, deeply dissatisﬁed with the work of the OAU liberation committee, decided to render assistance directly to the MPLA and other liberation movements.

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Even as relations with Yugoslavia remained strong, the MPLA’s relations with Zambia continued to deteriorate thanks to Chipenda’s rebellion. The most recent shipment of Yugoslav weapons got stranded at the Tanzanian- Zambian border and could not be delivered to MPLA headquarters. With Soviet assistance continuing to decline and the Chinese shift toward Holden, Yugoslavia was one of the MPLA’s (and Neto’s) few remaining international suppliers and allies. As Carreira said to his Yugoslav hosts, “this is the deci- sivemomentforAngola....Thewaywenoworganizeliberationstruggle will determine the future of Angola and the south of Africa.”86 The situation was becoming so desperate that Neto even sent an emotional letter asking Yugoslav officials to use their country’s influence and prestige among African leaders to mediate between the MPLA and Zambia, Zaire, and Tanzania and to encourage them to support the political unity of the MPLA. The Yugoslav government was generally ready to use its influence, but it was also careful not to risk antagonizing the three countries.87 At the beginning of 1974, the MPLA was still beset by serious internal and external problems. Neto’s movement was losing potential allies (Romania now supported the FNLA), and Zaire and Zambia were pushing for reunifi- cation of the Angolan liberation movements without Neto at the helm of the MPLA.88 Some of the rival factions in the MPLA even suggested negotiat- ing with the Portuguese to find a political solution for Angola. Neto rejected all of these proposals. However, as Yugoslav officials concluded, the pressure “demonstrates that the movement [MPLA] is stronger than expected and it represents such a force that potential negotiations with Portugal do not have any prospects for success as long as this kind of MPLA operates and present leaders and Dr. Neto are at its helm.”89 During Neto’s next visit to Yugoslavia, in February 1974, Yugoslav leaders decided to undertake a diplomatic initia- tive among the nonaligned countries to acquaint them with the situation inside the MPLA: “Yugoslavia will act resolutely to shatter the illusions and will try to convince our friends about the true aims of recent maneuvers.” Besides

86. “Transcripts of Talks between Ali Šukrija and Iko Carreir,” 12 November 1973, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73. 87. “Information on the Situation in the Liberation Movement of Angola Regarding the Message from Dr. Agostinho Neto and His Demand That We Intervene with Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere, and Mobutu,” 10 December 1973, in AJ, 142, 554, Angola 1971–73. 88. On Romanian support, see “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Romania,” 25 January 1974, in DAMSPS, PA, 1974, F. 225, 43838. 89. “Information on the Conversation between Dimceˇ Belovski and Dr. Neto,” 2 March 1974, in AJ, 142, A-11, Angola. For example, Zaire persuaded Sweden to end its assistance to the MPLA.

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taking political action inside the NAM and at the United Nations, Yugoslavia also agreed to increase its material assistance to the MPLA.90 During the visit, Neto expressed his displeasure that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the USSR had stopped aiding the MPLA and had maintained economic relations with the colonial regime in Portugal.91 When a military coup in Portugal in April 1974 brought about the fall of the Caetano dictatorship, the MPLA was still very weak. A month earlier, the Soviet embassy in Brazzaville had almost written off the movement.92 In contrast, Yugoslav diplomats in Zaire did not feel the MPLA’s circumstances detracted from its standing as the most important movement in Angola.93 Af- ter the April coup, Neto’s prospects began to improve dramatically. Many of his closest aides were convinced that the MPLA had the best prospects for success because of its presence in the large urban centers, Neto’s reputation in Angola and abroad, and his good connections with the Portuguese left.94 Still, many external observers, the USSR included, urged improved relations between the conflicting factions of the MPLA. Neto remained adamant, however, and by the end of the year he had succeeded in reclaiming his leadership role over the whole movement.95 This forced the Soviet Union to drop the idea for reconciliation and put its whole weight behind Neto. In December 1974, a month before the Alvor Agreement established a transitional government for Angola, Moscow drew up plans for significant arms shipments to the MPLA.96 Chinese, South African, Zairian, and U.S. military and financial assistance to the FNLA and UNITA was increasing by the day. The international power struggle in Angola had begun. Belgrade had never doubted that Neto was the best choice to lead Angola to independence, and many Yugoslav officials were dissatisfied that friendly countries such as Zambia and Tanzania had undermined Neto’s efforts for

90. “Note: Vice President Mitja Ribiciˇ cˇ Received Agostinho Neto,” 5 February 1974, in AJ, 142, A-11, Angola. 91. “Transcripts of Talks between Jakša Petric´ and Agostinho Neto,” 6 February 1974, in AJ, 142, A-11, Angola. 92. Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 218. 93. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Zaire,” 10 February 1974, in DAMSPS, PA, 1974, F. 225, 46539. 94. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Zambia,” 20 May 1974, in DAMSPS, PA, 1974, F. 225, 424601. 95. “Telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Tanzania,” 16 October 1974, in DAMSPS, PA, 1974, F. 225, 449635. 96. On the Alvor Agreement, see Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 222, 224–227; and Shubin, “Hot Cold War,” pp. 34–36.

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liberation by playing different political groups off against one another. Yu- goslavia in mid-1974 thus decided to intensify its political action among the nonaligned countries and to approve more than $700,000 in additional funds for the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa.97 In addition, a follow-on shipment of 320 crates of military equipment was sent to the MPLA in Congo in August 1974.98 However, as preparations began for a final showdown involving the three Angolan liberation movements, the MPLA still suffered from a chronic lack of weapons (shipments from the USSR had ceased), and the Zambians continued to block some shipments in Tanzania. In November 1974, Pedro de Castro van Dúnem, head of the MPLA’s military logistics, traveled to Yu- goslavia to seek additional military assistance because “only if they were well armed could they reach their goals” and become “the main military movement inside the country.” Van Dúnem also asked Yugoslavia to persuade Zambia, Tanzania, and Congo to resume their assistance for the movement. In addition, the MPLA expressed interest in long-term military cooperation with Yugoslavia (to include arms, military equipment, organization, and training of officers).99 These requests (and similar ones from FRELIMO) prompted the Yu- goslav authorities to reconsider their plans and to approve a much larger program of military assistance. Because the MPLA and FRELIMO were in the final stage of their liberation struggles, “rendering assistance at this moment is of the highest priority for our present and future relations with these countries,” Yugoslav officials observed. If Yugoslavia failed them now, it “could have negative consequences not only for our bilateral relations, but also for our positions in Africa in general.” SSRNJ officials, noting that “our assistance . . . would have special significance,” decided to provide the MPLA with almost $1.5 million in military assistance (the amount later reached $1.7 million), as well as 100 tons of food aid worth almost $140,000.100 The initial assistance

97. “Information on the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies in Africa, State of Negoti- ations between the New Portuguese Government and the Liberation Movements, and Our Ties with Them,” 27 June 1974, in AJ, 142, A-11, Angola. Some people criticized Yugoslavia for establishing diplomatic relations with Portugal, but the MPLA did not object. 98. “Telegram from the Foreign Secretariat to the Embassy in Congo,” 6 August 1974, in DAMSPS, PA, 1974, F. 225, 473593. 99. “Information on the Conversation between Aleksandar Bakoceviˇ c´ and Pedro Castro Van Dunem,” 25 November 1974, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b, Angola. 100. “Proposal for Giving Immediate Assistance to the Liberation Movements of Angola and Mozam- bique, MPLA and FRELIMO,” 17 December 1974, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b, Angola. FRELIMO and the MPLA received the same amount of ﬁnancial assistance, but the Angolans ended up with most of the weapons.

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encompassed full military equipment and weapons for two units of 1,000 soldiers. It was brought into Angola in April 1975 by Yugoslav planes (22 tons of weaponry) and by the ship Postojna (which ferried the remaining consign- ment of weapons, ammunition, jeeps, trucks, communications gear, ambu- lances, etc.). The MPLA also received financial assistance of $60,000.101 At the time, journalists and commentators referred to “the big cargo of weapons ...fortheMPLA[that]camefromYugoslavia”and“seemstobedecisive[in strengthening the MPLA].” “Until August 1975, the country that helped the MPLA the most was Yugoslavia,” Paulo Jorge later remarked.102 However, this was just the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between Yugoslavia and the MPLA. A key priority for the MPLA was its relationship with Yugoslavia, a fact that has generally been overlooked in the scholarly literature on the An- golan liberation struggle. Yugoslavia was also crucial to the MPLA’s efforts to gain national independence. Although this assistance cannot be compared to the enormous military, economic, and transport supplies over time from the USSR or even China, the continuity and reliability of Yugoslavia’s military, financial, and material assistance to the MPLA earned for Belgrade a special place in Angolan hearts and minds, as the newly declassified documents pre- sented in this article testify. Unlike Cuba, Yugoslavia did not send troops to fight in Angola (although it did send Yugoslav military instructors there), nor could the Yugoslav military airlift and transport huge amounts of heavy weaponry as the Soviet Union did (although later Yugoslavia clandestinely sent many tanks and other weapons to Angola). However, the aid and assistance Yugoslavia did man- age to provide the MPLA was given at critical moments, when it was most needed and when all others had doubts about Neto’s leadership. Unlike the USSR, which focused its efforts exclusively on the MPLA from the beginning (albeit with some lapses), Belgrade also maintained contacts with the FNLA for a considerable time. But after the Yugoslavs decided to stand by Neto, they never deviated from this choice and consistently increased their modest support, never doubting that the MPLA would eventually prevail in Luanda. Yugoslav support was not only material but diplomatic and rhetori- cal, and the importance of Belgrade’s solidarity with the MPLA must not be

101. “Notes on the Realization of the Assistance to the Liberation Movements of Angola and Mozam- bique, MPLA and FRELIMO,” 24 March 1975, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b, Angola. Because the Postojna was not allowed to unload its cargo in Luanda, it returned to Congo and unloaded the weapons at Point Noire. 102. Gleijeses, Conﬂicting Missions, pp. 348–349.

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underestimated. If Cuba’s direct military intervention and Soviet arms deliveries ultimately saved the day for the MPLA in late 1975 when South Africa invaded Angola, it was nonetheless Yugoslavia’s continual political and material assistance prior to that ultimate test of strength that prepared Neto and his comrades for their eventual triumph.

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