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WFDD

Faith and Development in Focus:

SUPPORTED BY THE HENRY R. LUCE INITIATIVE ON AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MAY 2016 About the World Faiths Development Dialogue

The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) is a not-for-profit organization working at the intersection of religion and global development. Housed within the Berkley Center in Washington, D.C., WFDD documents the work of faith inspired organizations and explores the importance of religious ideas and actors in development contexts. WFDD supports dialogue between religious and development communities and promotes innovative partnerships, at national and international levels, with the goal of contributing to positive and inclusive development outcomes.

About the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs

The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown , created within the Office of the President in 2006, is dedicated to the interdisciplinary study of religion, ethics, and public life. Through research, teaching, and service, the center explores global challenges of democracy and human rights; economic and social development; international diplomacy; and interreligious understanding. Two premises guide the center’s work: that a deep examination of faith and values is critical to address these challenges, and that the open engagement of religious and cultural traditions with one another can promote peace.

Acknowledgments This report is a product of the Berkley Center multi-country 2016 by Lauren Herzog, Wilma Mui, and Katherine Zuk, research program supported by the Henry R. Luce Initiative on former WFDD program associate. Crystal Corman, WFDD Religion and International Affairs. The Senegal research program program manager, provided valuable feedback and guidance benefited from a consultation event; the Berkley Center and throughout the entire process; Nathaniel Adams, WFDD WFDD invited a group of scholars and practitioners to review program coordinator, gave constructive comments on early research plans in Washington, D.C in January 2015 that drew on drafts. Katherine Marshall, WFDD executive director, provided initial desk research. During that meeting and over subsequent project oversight, participated in fieldwork, and edited the months, the group helped to identify gaps in knowledge and report. Saliou Mbacké offered invaluable feedback and priority topics for investigation. Participants included Erin Joanna insights on the religious landscape of Senegal, including a paper Augis, Robert Baum, Laura Cochrane, Julius E. Coles, Souleymane exploring trends within the confrérie. Christopher Bachir Diagne, Mamadou Diouf, Joanne Gleason, Philip Massey, Riley, former WFDD program assistant participated in initial Stephanie Saenger, and Leonardo A. Villalón. The Senegal research field research and conducted phone interviews, and Sabrina program centered on extensive and in-depth interviews in Senegal Khan, a Georgetown University undergraduate student, (several of them are online at http://berkleycenter.georgetown. researched the Catholic community in Senegal. edu/subprojects/country-mapping-senegal). We highlight the rich contributions of members of the Cadre des Religieux pour la Santé Comments on the draft report, notably from Laura Cochrane, et le Développement who offered deep insights on their respective Joanne Gleason, and Rebecca Blachly, were invaluable. religious communities. Reports by Rokhaya Thiam, Mouhamadou Barro, and Moussé Fall of the Réseau et Population enriched We express our sincere gratitude to all of those who shared our understanding of religious networks, media, and perspectives their experiences, knowledge, and insights with us through on reproductive health. interviews and exchanges. This report would not have been possible without their contributions. Development of this report was managed by Lauren Herzog, program coordinator at WFDD. She and Wilma Mui, WFDD Photographs in the report were taken by Lauren Herzog, Alice program associate, are the report’s principal authors. Fieldwork Liang, Katherine Marshall, Wilma Mui, Christopher Riley, Al was conducted in Senegal between June 2014 and February Hadji Sene, and Christopher Uller.

2 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 FOREWORD

his report, Faith and Development in Focus: Senegal, explores The report highlights the diversity of faith-inspired actors working the complex history and present links between Senegal’s in development and their differing ideological perspectives and distinctive Sufi Muslim organizations and significant, if far less approaches to the challenges of modernization and social change. In Tnumerous, Christian actors and the nation’s development challenges. Senegal’s complex and dynamic religious landscape, some actors are While few working in Senegal—among its public institutions, civil ambivalent about or even hostile to certain aspects of development society, and active international partners—are unaware that religious strategies, but many more contribute actively to mainstream institutions are particularly weighty players, there are notable gaps in development efforts, either directly as religious organizations and appreciating how they are involved in development strategies and communities or through the work of the many faith-inspired programs. There are few practical means of engaging them in the organizations. Significant gaps in understanding cut both ways— participatory processes that are vital to constructive and sustainable religious actors may not appreciate some imperatives and options for development approaches. In Senegal’s rapidly changing economic development policy, and secular actors may misunderstand religious and social landscape, there are gaps in understanding the changes that motivations and perspectives or actively eschew contacts with religious roles and actors are also experiencing and their national and religious counterparts. We hope that a solid base of information— local implications. Important international forces are at work, notably including recognizing diversity and the immense cumulative impact transnational links through diaspora communities, international of religious actors in everything from education to climate change programs colored by religious factors, and the rise of non-violent and adaptation—will challenge the all-too-common narrative of an violent extremism across the West African region. While Senegal has inherent opposition between religion and development. been largely immune to the latter, the nation’s openness to global forces and the rapid social change upending many traditional social The underlying purpose of the investigative work is to provide a resource patterns suggest that complacency would be a mistake. that can inform development policy and praxis in Senegal. It comes at an important time, as Senegal faces challenges on the economic, This report’s goal is to provide an accessible and thorough overview social, and political fronts in working to achieve the ambitious goals of Senegal’s religious landscape, tracing its history, contemporary reflected in the Emerging Senegal Plan and, more broadly, the global institutions, and the dynamics of change, all in relation to major Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Climate change is a far from issues for development. It highlights several areas that are sensitive abstract notion in the , including Senegal, with fresh memories and contentious (family code and gender roles); demand urgent of devastating droughts and erratic rainfall patterns. The challenges of attention (education policies); and, offer promise (family planning). adaptation and mitigation are real and immediate. The overall objective is to enhance understanding of the often misunderstood roles of religious actors, and in doing so, to contribute The report is part of a multi-year review of the roles that religious to enhancing the quality of development dialogue and programs. ideas, institutions, and leaders play in the wide-ranging fields of development and social welfare undertaken by the Berkley Center The report’s hypothesis is that ignoring or minimizing the for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University importance of religious factors detracts from development programs and the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD). Senegal in many respects. The fragmented nature of engagement both is one of four countries of focus for the Religion and Global among religious actors and with the Senegalese government and its Development Program supported by the Henry R. Luce Initiative international partners leads to a wide variety of suboptimal results on Religion and International Affiars (the others are Bangladesh, that include: the inefficiencies of overlapping programs; failures to , and Guatemala). Fieldwork in Senegal was led by Lauren learn from experience through lack of knowledge of what others Herzog (WFDD) working closely with Crystal Corman (WFDD), are doing; missed opportunities because of limited engagement and with significant inputs from Wilma Mui (WFDD). with communities; and even programs that are counterproductive through failure to appreciate the motivation of religious actors and This report addresses an immensely complex topic. It is thus part of a organizations. The report highlights the special significance of issues continuing effort as WFDD, the Berkley Center, and our partners in for educational reforms and their implementation; approaches to Senegal work to expand the knowledge base and improve understanding women’s roles and family planning; and effective (and less effective) of a critical topic. We welcome comments and observations. approaches to a variety of knotty problems facing vulnerable children. In each case, religious roles are especially significant and Katherine Marshall can be polarizing, yet religious actors have significant potential Senior Fellow, Berkley Center, Executive Director, WFDD through meaningful dialogue and action. [email protected]

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 3 Tables and Figures

Table 1 Senegal: Some key development facts Table 2 Senegal’s Millennium Development Goal Progress Table 3 World Economic Forum’ Global Gender Gap Index for Senegal, 2014 Table 4 Senegalese in the Diaspora by the Numbers

Figure 1 Gross National Income Per Capita Figure 2 Major Partner ODA to Senegal by Sector, 2013 (US$ million) Figure 3 Extent of Women’s Employment in Senegal, 2010-2011 Figure 4 Youth Population (15-34), Senegal in Context Figure 5 Traditional Beliefs among Senegalese Figure 6 Confrérie Affiliation Figure 7 Positive Interreligious Views among Senegalese Muslims Figure 8 Negative Interreligious Views among Senegalese Muslims Figure 9 Survival rate to the last grade of primary education, both sexes (%) Boxes

Box 1 Ethnicity in Senegal Box 2 Religious and secular discord: The Mbegue forest crisis Box 3 How far do extremist and fundamentalist religious views affect Senegal? Box 4 Senegal as a moderate Muslim ally Box 5 : A with special legal status Box 6 Religious media Box 7 Religion and Family Code Box 8 Muslim-Christian relations by the numbers Box 9 Types of schools in Senegal Box 10 Catholics and education Box 11 Talibés and Box 12 Youth and religious interventions Box 13 Female Genital Cutting: culture and religion Box 14 LGBTQI communities in Senegal: religious engagement Box 15 Religion and the Demographic Health Surveys

4 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Map of Senegal...... 6 Glossary...... 7 Acronyms...... 9 Timeline...... 11 Executive Summary...... 12 Introduction...... 15 Study objectives and research themes...... 16 Senegal’s Current Development Context...... 18 Priority development issues...... 19 Religious Landscape of Senegal, Past and Present...... 24 Religion and the state...... 25 Indigenous beliefs: Legacies and realities...... 28 Islam...... 29 Confréries of Senegal...... 30 Dahiras...... 35 Women and gender in Islam...... 36 Sunni reformists...... 37 Shi’a Islam...... 37 Christianity...... 38 Catholicism...... 38 Protestant Christianity...... 39 Other Christian groups...... 39 Interreligious relations...... 40 Religious networks and the Senegalese diaspora...... 41 Faith-Inspired Development Engagement...... 43 Civil engagement, including religious motivation...... 43 The civil society regulatory environment...... 44 Faith actors and development...... 44 Education...... 45 Orphans and vulnerable children...... 50 Women’s empowerment, men’s roles...... 54 Reproductive health...... 58 Peace and interfaith relations...... 61 Looking Ahead...... 64 Observations and lessons learned...... 64 Looking ahead...... 67 Endnotes...... 68

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 5 COUNTRY MAP: SENEGAL

Podor Ndioum Richard-Toll

Kaedi

Saint-Louis

Matam

Kebemer Linguere

Tivaouane Namari Bakel Thies Touba Bambey Mbour Senegal

Foundiougne Kaffrine Koumpenntoum

Velingara Gonasse Kolda Biganona Saraya Sedhiou Kedougou

0737.5 5 150 Kilometers

6 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Glossary

Adiya Contribution from talibés to Appel of the community celebrating the revelation of their founder Aqiqah Islamic term for the sacrifice of an animal on the occasion of a child’s birth Baay Fall Followers of Sheikh Ibra Fall Casamançais Individuals from the region of Senegal Confrérie A Sufi order A Qur’anic school; also, a Sufi religious community, typically rural-based and with strong historical links to agriculture, under the leadership of a Dahiras Community groups specific to Eid al-Adha Muslim holiday “festival of the sacrifice” Eid al-Fitr Muslim holiday “festival of the breaking of the fast” Enfants de la rue A French term meaning street children Familles religieuses French term meaning religious families, referring to the families associated with Senegal’s confréries (e.g., Sy, Niassène, Mbacké) Foulard French term used in Senegal usually referring to a headscarf that only covers a woman’s hair Gamou Senegalese term for the celebration of the birth of the ; often associated with the annual pilgrimage of Senegal’s Tidiane community Gris-gris A talisman or amulet used for protection, with origins in indigenous beliefs The pilgrimage to ; one of the A veil worn by Muslim women covering head and chest Ibadou Senegalese name for the hijab worn by Muslim women Jakka jigeen Spaces designated for women to pray within the , separate from the men Khalife Spiritual leaders of branches within a confrérie Khalife Général The leader of a confrérie Korité Term used in Senegal to designate Eid al-Fitr Laïcité French term meaning secularism A Sufi order specific to Senegal Magal Touba ’ annual celebration of Sheikh Mbacké’s return from exile In Islam, a figure who will come to Earth before the end of time to return Muslims to the path of righteousness Marabout General term in Senegal for a Muslim religious leader (serigne in Wolof or shaykh in ) Mouride A follower of the Muridiyya Muqqadam An appointed spiritual guide within Sufism Muridiyya A Sufi order Magal Touba Mourides’ annual celebration of Sheikh Amadou Bamba Mbacké’s return from exile Musoor Wolof term usually referring to a headscarf that only covers a

woman’s hair

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 7 Glossary (cont.)

Nasrul ‘ilm Islamic concept meaning knowledge benefiting humanity Ndigel An order or edict put forth by a religious leader to be adhered to by followers; often political Ndogou Wolof term referring to the breaking of the fast during Qadiri A follower of the Qadiriyya A Sufi order Salafi One who follows Salafism, the conservative movement within that seeks to return to the ways of the Prophet Mohammed and his original followers Serigne Religious leader in Senegal Serigne daara Qur’anic instructor law A legal framework based on Islam that regulates public and private aspects of life Sheikh Islamic religious leader Shi’a One of the two main branches of Islam Sufi A movement within Islam, whose followers seek to find divine truth and love through direct encounters with . Sunni One of the two main branches of Islam Tabaski Term used in Senegal to designate Eid al-Adha Talibé From the Arabic for “student”—used in Senegal to refer to either a religious follower or a Qur’anic student Tamkharit Term used in Senegal to designate the Islamic New Year Arabic for “path” or “way” and refers to a Sufi order Taṣawwuf Arabic word for Sufism Tidiane A follower of the Tijaniyya Tijaniyya A Sufi order Tikkun olam Hebrew phrase meaning “repairing the world” Turuq Plural form of tariqa Islamic religious scholar An Arabic word meaning nation or community Waqf Islamic term for ongoing charitable giving Prayers and litanies specific to a Sufi order Obligatory alms; one of the five pillars of Islam

Note on spelling: For several of the terms used in this report, there are various spelling options (Arabic, English, French, and Wolof). In this report, orthography choices reflect those commonly used in literature and do not connote a particular stance or orientation.

8 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Acronyms

AAII African American Islamic Institute AFID Association Femme Islam et Développement AJS Association des Juristes Sénégalaises AJWS American Jewish World Service ANIOS Association nationale des et oulémas du Sénégal ASBEF Association Sénégalaise pour le Bien-Être Familial AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic CBOs community-based organizations CEP Community Empowerment Program CIRCOFS Comité Islamique pour la Réforme du Code de la Famille au Sénégal COSEF Conseil sénégalais des femmes CPR contraceptive prevalence rate CRS Catholic Relief Services CRSD Cadre des Religieux sur la Santé et Développement DHS Demographic and Health Survey ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FAFS Féderation des associations féminines du Sénégal FGC female genital cutting FIOs faith-inspired organizations GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income HAI Human Appeal International HDI Human Development Index IBIOS Institution de bienfaisance islamique pour les orphelins au Sénégal IDA International Development Association IHDI Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index IMI Institut Mozdahir International ISSU Initiative sénégalaise de santé urbaine JIR Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane MDG Millennium Development Goal MFDC Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance NGOs non-governmental organizations NRM natural resource management ODA official development assistance OIC Organisation of Islamic Cooperation ONECS l’Office National de l’Enseignement Catholique du Senegal

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 9 Acronyms (cont.)

OVC orphans and vulnerable children PAP Priority Action Plans le Réseau des parlimentaires sénégalais pour la protection des enfants contre les violences et PEVA abus PFPC Platforme des Femmes pour la Paix en Casamance PSE Plan Sénégal Émergent RIP Réseau islam et population SCOPE Strengthening Community Opportunities for Peace and Equality SCPP Senegal Child Protection and Participation SNELAS Syndicat national des enseignants de langue arabe du Sénégal SNPE Stratégie nationale de protection de l’enfant UMC United Methodist Church UNDP Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNFPA United Nations Population Fund USAID Agency for International Development USOFORAL Comité Régional de Solidarité des Femmes pour la Piax en Casamance VVF vesicovaginal fistulas WFDD World Faiths Development Dialogue

10 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Timeline

8th century Present-day Senegal part of the Kingdom of . 11th century occupy lower Senegal valley; Islam introduced by North African merchants. 12-14th centuries Rise of the . 15th century Islam in Senegal spread widely with the rise of the Qadiriyya. 1440s Portuguese traders reach estuary. 1588 Dutch establish slave port on Gorée Island. French found Saint-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River; it becomes a key slave-trading 1659 port. 1677 French take over Gorée Island from the Dutch. Seven Years’ War: Britain takes over French posts in Senegal, forms colony of . 1756-63 regains its holdings during American Revolutionary War of 1775-83. 1816 Britain returns French holdings captured during Napoleonic Wars. El Hadj Tall, largely responsible for propagating the Tijaniyya in Senegal, makes the 1827 pilgrimage to Mecca Late 1800s France extends its influence, gains control of all the territory of Senegal. The Mahdi of the Layene community reveals himself as Limamou Laye on the Cap Vert 1883 peninsula of Senegal. 1895 Senegal becomes part of French West ; Sheikh Amadou Bamba is exiled. 1902 Sheikh Amadou Bamba returns to Touba. 1914 elected as Senegal’s first African deputy to French parliament. 1930s Sunni reformist movement begins in the urban areas of Senegal. 1946 Senegal becomes part of the French Union. 1956 National Assembly established. 1958 Becomes an autonomous republic, as part of the French Community. January, Senegal ratifies first constitution with Sudanese Republic; April, Federation, a 1959 union between Senegal and the Sudanese Republic, established. June, independence from France; August, dissolved after Senegal’s secession, 1960 becoming Senegal and the Republic of Mali; September, Léopold Sédar Senghor becomes president. 1962 Monseigneur Hyacinthe Thiandoum becomes first Senegalese of Dakar. 1975 Senegal joins ECOWAS. 1978 Three-party political system introduced. 1981 January, becomes president. 1982 begins. 1999 Parliament bans female genital cutting. 2000 April, becomes president. 2005 Law passed banning forced begging. 2012 April, becomes president.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 11 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Religious forces have shaped Senegal’s history in many ways, sometimes in an ad hoc manner in response to specific events from the colonial period to modern times, and they remain a or challenges. The most commonly cited example of successful vital part of national identity and institutions today. Religious engagement is collaboration with religious leaders in the late actors have long provided many social services (especially in 1980s to curtail the spread of HIV/AIDS, but there are others education), played important economic roles, and exercised (generally on a quite limited scale). The wide range of religious great political influence, notwithstanding a pronounced actors includes formal religious institutions—notably the secular veneer, the product of the French colonial heritage. distinctive Sufi confréries that dominate the religious landscape, Today, religious values and traditions influence many attitudes but also national Islamic and Christian organizations— and behaviors, and thus color development programs and and faith-inspired organizations that extend from large and approaches. Senegal, like other parts of the world, is undergoing international to national to local, community-based entities. profound social and economic changes that are also affecting Notwithstanding extensive involvement in wide-ranging facets religious institutions. Their roles are changing, with influence of development work, there are few formal mechanisms to eroding in some areas alongside expansion into new fields that foster collaboration, coordinate their activities, draw lessons include media, small business, health, job skills training, and from experience, and promote partnerships. water and sanitation. The significant development roles of religious actors, however, are generally quite poorly understood Few contest the observation that religious leaders and and appreciated. institutions have wide influence in Senegal, a country with especially high religiosity. Development actors often appreciate Senegal’s government and its international partners engage with the potential benefits of engaging religious actors, but efforts religious actors in various ways, sometimes deliberately and to translate that awareness into practice have been inhibited

12 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 by poor understanding of how the institutions function, Available surveys of religiosity, albeit limited, rank Senegal hesitations to cross lines between secular and religious, and high among nations in the weight given to religious the absence of effective communication channels. A tendency institutions and beliefs. Many Senegalese, even those working to instrumentalize religious actors—with development actors for secular organizations, draw on personal religious values hoping to have religious leaders simply help implement and their appreciations of the religious and cultural context in programs designed without their engagement—rather than shaping policies and programs. Religious undertones (Muslim true partnership can raise hackles within religious circles. and, in some instances, Christian) are omnipresent in many Some development actors write religious actors into action forms, albeit manifested in complex ways. Senegal’s active role plans without consultation, with predictably disappointing in international interreligious initiatives and promotion of outcomes. Engaging religious actors requires an understanding interreligious harmony and positive Islamic values reflect both of their approach, as well as a willingness to listen and take its high religiosity and a commitment to balance and peace. their experience and views into account. This is important even where ideology, language, and differing priorities may suggest Senegal’s deliberate and parallel secular and Islamic wide divides between secular and religious actors on topics traditions can complicate policy decisions, and there are such as gender roles and reproductive health. tensions between them (as well as creative complementarity) reflected in the constitution, as well as in various laws Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and regulatory mechanisms. Senegalese, especially among & World Affairs and the World Faiths Development Dialogue the elite, highlight and support Senegal’s commitment to undertook a “mapping” of the development roles of faith secularism. However, Senegalese secularism is distinctive, a actors in Senegal, exploring the religious dimensions of central unique “social compact” that inter alia implies that Islamic development issues in an effort to better understand the roles values are respected and understood as fundamental to national that religious institutions and beliefs play that are relevant identity. The education sector, especially, currently confronts for Senegal’s economic and social development. This report challenges in reconciling Senegal’s secular history and principles highlights development topics and sectors where religious with local realities, religious traditions, and public demand. factors have special significance; describes Senegal’s religious The dual traditions underlie complex—often unstated and not landscape, underscoring the influence of the four Sufi confréries, precisely defined—relationships between secular and religious as well as other religious communities; and emphasizes several authorities. key development sectors to illustrate both areas of focus and roles of religious actors. It aims to fill knowledge gaps One significant manifestation of religiously inspired about the changing religious landscape and the development institutions is the Sufi community groups (dahiras) that are activities of faith-inspired actors. The overall objective is to an integral part of local communities. They provide social enrich understandings of religious-secular interactions and, support and often take the form of specific groups for men, thus, contribute to better quality and impact of development women, and youth. Similar structures exist within Christian strategies and programs. communities. Dahiras support social functions and important events, such as , weddings, and baptisms. Some dahiras are actively involved in community mobilization, KEY FINDINGS OF THIS COUNTRY- tackling specific social issues like public health challenges. MAPPING STUDY INCLUDE: Strategic engagement with dahiras and other community groups in a development context has been limited, but we Senegal’s varied, complex, and dynamic religious landscape see their capacity for greater engagement as substantial. Some has important implications for development strategies and networks of dahiras link communities in different parts of approaches. The most obvious are the direct involvement of Senegal; these networks can be advantageous, often offering religious institutions, notably the Sufi confréries, in politics job opportunities and advice, promoting business endeavors of and sectors like education and agriculture. Notwithstanding those in the network, and influencing decisions on education. Senegal’s constitutional commitment to secular values and laïcité (secularism), especially in elite circles, religious attitudes color Religiously based networks beyond these community many policies and programs, as well as the ethos and tangible structures extend into the diaspora, with active religious approaches of institutions, public and private, even among those engagement among Senegalese abroad. Diaspora groups whose religious links are tenuous or limited. Senegal’s social organize religious conferences and come together during and religious diversity and deliberate commitment to religious religious holidays. They provide critical support to new arrivals tolerance is widely celebrated as a strength and a factor in in the community, helping in finding jobs and sorting out stability, social harmony, and the general absence of the social immigration matters. Remittances provide an important source strife that has affected neighboring countries. of development funding for religious communities across

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 13 Senegal. The financial strength of the diaspora gives Senegalese prevention, seen as domains where the approaches of national abroad significant influence on religious politics in Senegal. and international programs do not come into conflict with Religious networks abroad shape migration patterns, notably religious beliefs and values. Family planning has long been in determining top destinations for Senegalese and facilitating a sensitive issue, but faith actors are increasingly engaging movements. in supporting and promoting family planning with their stance based in religious teachings. Senegal’s Family Code has The extensive religious media has not been engaged provoked diverging opinions among various faith and secular systematically on development matters. Over 90 percent actors, centered on how it affects women’s rights and roles in of Senegalese watch or listen to religious media, often placing society. Debates around the Family Code underscore the divide considerable trust in religious media hosts. Diverse programs between religious and secular perspectives and values. target varying audiences—women, men, and youth—with topics ranging from religious practices to major social issues. Religious communities in Senegal are deeply involved in Traditional television and radio are quite popular media the education sector, with important implications for the outlets, but online media is a growing influence, especially future development of the national educational system. among youth. Senegal’s education system includes the official national system, heavily influenced by French secular principles; an array of Few formal channels exist that link the government’s Islamic run institutions, most operating outside the official development institutions and religious communities, system (and varying in scope and quality); and more formal though there are many informal channels. Levels of private schools, which are both secular and religious (especially dialogue and engagement between faith and secular actors Catholic). The public education system has expanded rapidly, have varied greatly. Some religious leaders contend that but frequent strikes, overcrowding, and limited resources result government officials approach them only for political support in quality problems. The central reform challenges are to adapt at election times, rather than engaging them as partners. Many the public system both to Senegalese economic realities and government officials and political leaders, however, have active to the demand for religious and cultural relevance, as well as ties to religious communities, specifically the major confréries, to integrate the official and non-official systems. A specific so there is considerable two-way communication. and contentious issue surrounds talibés (students) from some Qur’anic schools. As some students beg in the streets and there Faith and secular actors largely agree on Senegal’s core have been reported cases of abuse, various Senegalese and development strategies, but agreement and support international partners seek reforms to address what they see as have not been universal. Positive examples of engagement violations of human rights. Dialogue to generate better options include health issues, such as hygiene promotion and malaria for reform is urgently needed.

14 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 INTRODUCTION

Senegal is often described as an oasis of stability in the with robust growth. With 32 percent of the population between tumultuous West African region. Violent conflict has been rare, the ages of 10 and 24,3 perhaps the most difficult challenge and Senegal is renowned for its commitment to democratic is to stimulate the economy and society to generate jobs for institutions. Successive governments have focused consistently young people and to address youth aspirations more broadly. on development goals, with well-articulated strategies in Rapid urbanization set against a sharp urban-rural divide several sectors. Political stability explains in large part Senegal’s presents other challenges. The education and health systems attractiveness to international investors, and a wide range of both face important weaknesses (including those linked to development partners (public and private) have engaged there high population growth rates). Looking toward the future, over several decades. Senegal is one of six African countries that projections suggest significant negative impacts from climate achieved the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) goal of change, notably in accentuating the already erratic rainfall halving the poverty rate.1 Among African countries, Senegal’s patterns in this dry Sahelian country. improvements in gender parity, especially in regard to political representation, stand out.2 Senegal’s democratic institutions Senegal is a hub for international development actors; its have become stronger over the years, though notable geography and history lend it a role as a door to . governance weaknesses challenge progress. A vibrant and active The capital, Dakar, hosts many multilateral and bilateral civil society plays a variety of significant development roles. organizations, as well as international and regional non- Aspirations to achieve middle-income status are reflected in the governmental organizations (NGOs). Local NGOs, a host of ambitious Plan Sénégal Émergent (Emerging Senegal Plan, PSE, less formal community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith- 2012) that provides a policy framework for economic, social, inspired organizations (FIOs) work alongside international and security development. partners. It is not uncommon for development partners to choose Senegal as a pilot location to test new ideas and approaches.4 Senegal is nonetheless still a very poor country that faces many development challenges. Development progress varies widely Religious dimensions of Senegal’s development challenges are by sector and periods of disappointing progress have alternated significant but have received quite limited attention in the recent

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 15 past. Senegal has long been known as an especially religious Appreciating religious factors should be a key consideration for country, with harmonious interreligious relationships. The any development practitioner working in Senegal. The confréries population is 94 percent Muslim, mostly Sufis who affiliate with meet important social and economic, as well as spiritual, one of four main orders, or confréries (Layene, Mouride, Qadiri, needs. Each of the four confréries is deeply involved in local and Tidiane).5 These Sufi orders have deep and wide roots, in and community development. Their involvement sometimes the daily lives of Senegal’s people and in local politics, but also has deep historical roots—as with the case of Qur’anic schools crossing international borders—both through a large Senegalese and agricultural enterprise—or has been reshaped in reaction diaspora and with links to Sufi religious orders in other African to more contemporary social needs that have resulted from countries. The remaining six percent of the population are economic crises and dislocations and gaps in government Christians (4 percent) or follow traditional African and other service provision. Their changing roles, however, are only (2 percent). Senegalese pride themselves on strong, partially documented and understood. peaceful inter- and intra-religious relations (in marked contrast to religiously linked tensions in next-door Mali and across the 1.1 STUDY OBJECTIVES AND Sahel). Interestingly, interfaith initiatives and organizations are relatively undeveloped, perhaps because religious tensions have RESEARCH THEMES been so rare. This religious context is dynamic in large part due to urbanization, rising education levels, and active transnational The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) and the communication spurred by new technologies. Religious influences Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, with on political affairs, the economy, and social development are thus support from the Henry R. Luce Foundation, have focused on changing in important, largely uncharted ways. Senegal in a country-mapping project within the Religion and Global Development program. The project’s goal is to analyze, at the country level, the ways in which faith institutions and actors engage on development issues and to explore religious dimensions of these issues. The ultimate goal is that this knowledge will encourage dialogue and collaboration among religious and development communities, enhancing the quality of development programs in various ways.

The research and dialogue effort for Senegal began with a thorough literature review that identified gaps in knowledge and highlighted key development topics where religion is a factor. Scholars and practitioners met in Washington, D.C. in January 2015 to discuss research objectives, outputs, and potential entry points for more detailed investigation. A nuanced portrait of contemporary Senegal emerged from this preliminary work, affirming both knowledge gaps and priority topics for exploration. Fieldwork in Senegal followed. It included, above all, 50 plus semi-structured interviews with nationally influential faith leaders, international development agencies, FIOs, and CBOs. This ‘mapping’ focused on organizations identified through desk research and snowball sampling through local contacts. In sum, major research themes emerged from the preliminary investigations, from the consultation, and from field discussions and were explored in greater depth as the research advanced.

Substantial research documents Senegal’s contemporary religious institutions and trends, but knowledge is often narrowly focused, fragmented in different intellectual and disciplinary silos, and not fully up to date. Senegal’s religious institutions, beliefs, and practices are changing in important ways; two examples are shifts in leadership patterns and new roles A market in Kedougou. for traditional and new media. Researchers and practitioners

16 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 have tended to focus on the four Sufi orders that dominate the Senegal’s active civil society is generally seen as quite secular, religious scene. However, their power and influence are shifting but faith-inspired actors play critical social roles and should, in response to internal and external pressures. The Sufi orders for many purposes, be viewed as part of civil society. Religious face new governance challenges, though they are still seen as actors have long been intimately involved in education, the ensuring social cohesion and stability, even enforcing law and care of vulnerable children, peacebuilding, and the provision order. of other social services. Innovative roles of these organizations, as well as their social and political impact on policy and Rapid urbanization contributes to a diffusion or weakening governance, deserve attention in reflections about development of authority within several orders, disrupting traditional strategy. structures, especially around the fringes. The Sufi families grow larger with each successive generation, with the effect that Chapter two of the report presents a brief overview of Senegal’s power is no longer as concentrated as it once was in each order. development progress, focusing on successes and persistent Some see the orders as losing their traditional charisma, as well challenges. Chapter three traces the development of Senegal’s as their political and social influence, while others see change– religious institutions, emphasizing the historical and modern more than erosion–of influence. Adding to this complex and influence of Sufi Islam in the social and political realms and the changing Sufi context, different religious movements are more recent spread of Christianity in certain regions. It highlights growing in size and importance, notably the Sunni reformists. the social dimensions of , including traditions There are some leaders and movements that are seen as whereby religious communities provide resources and services, fundamentalist, with ties to the Gulf and other West African such as education. Chapter four outlines an initial mapping of countries. The Sunni reformist movement is quite popular the religious dimensions of development in Senegal by profiling among young people, reflecting a cultural and religious shift. the work of international, national, and local faith-inspired Christian organizations and leaders are important actors within organizations operating in each of the study’s focus areas. The the predominantly in Senegal, especially in the final chapter offers some conclusions and sets out ideas for education sector, and they too are undergoing change. further research and possible areas for action.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 17 SENEGAL’S CURRENT DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Senegal’s development performance and prospects are ment of new sectors to create wealth, jobs, and social in- mixed. Its strengths include favorable location, political sta- clusion, with a strong capacity to export and attract invest- bility, and an enterprising population, but it faces significant ment. resource limitations. The World Bank’s summary diagnosis in 2. significantly improving living conditions and a more sus- 2015 stated that while Senegal aspires to become an emerging tained fight against social inequality, while preserving the country by 2035, “it has been stuck in a low-growth equilibri- resource base; and um since 2006,” with an average GDP growth rate of only 3.3 3. Reinforcing stability, security, governance, the protection percent since 2006.6 Areas of progress include reductions in the of rights and liberties, and the consolidation of the rule of overall poverty rate and strides in gender parity, notably in the law in order to create optimum conditions for social peace ratio of girls to boys in primary education. Areas of weakness and to encourage the fulfillment of potential. include quality in both education and health. Senegal remains a very poor country despite progress on several indicators over Tables 1 and 2 highlight Senegal’s development progress in recent years. The World Bank estimated that 46.7 percent of broad terms. Table 1 and Figure 1 highlight GDP growth (rela- the population fell below the poverty line (2011), with poverty tively slow) and rankings in some widely used indicators. Table substantially higher in rural areas than in the cities.7 2 focuses on the Millennium Development Goals, where the 2015 deadline (the goals were defined in 2000) prompted in- The Senegalese government’s development strategies are set out tensive reviews of absolute and relative performance. The Sus- in the Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE), launched in November tainable Development Goals (SDGs), approved by the United 2012. It focuses on both social development and infrastructure Nations General Assembly in September 2015, will serve as a improvement. The PSE is to be implemented through five-year new set of benchmarks with a 2030 deadline. The 17 distinct Priority Action Plans (PAP) built on strategic pillars and sector SDGs range from No Poverty and Zero Hunger to Gender objectives.8 The PSE has three axes: Equality and Climate Action. With 169 indicators, opportuni- ties for engagement are plentiful. The SDGs provide an oppor- 1. A structural transformation of the economy through the tunity for Senegal to set its development priorities for the com- consolidation of current drivers of growth and develop- ing years. Religious leaders and communities have already been

18 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 engaged in many of the focus areas in one way or another, and Figure 1. Gross National Income Per Capita thus some targets and indicators are more natural entry points. 2500 Other areas may require more dialogue for engagement with religious communities. Religious leaders can provide a strong 2000 voice in focusing on priority objectives and defining how the SDGs are and are not significant for Senegal, as well as high- lighting and addressing obstacles to implementation. 1500

Senegal made important progress toward several MDGs, 1000 such as reduction of poverty and child mortality, but prog- ress in other priority areas, such as education and mater- 500 nal and child health, was disappointing. Women have seen increased empowerment through government representation, GNI per capita (current USD), thousands USD), GNI per capita (current 0 and girls now outnumber boys in primary education enroll- 1990 1995 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 ment; however, they are still underrepresented in higher educa- Years Lower middle Sub-Saharan Africa 9 Senegal tion (female-to-male enrollment ratio of 0.59 in 2010). Child income (developing only) mortality decreased, but infant mortality declined at a slower pace. Maternal mortality decreased significantly, but women Source: “GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$).” World Bank, 2015. still face reproductive health challenges with contraceptive Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/ countries/SN-ZF-XN?display=graph prevalence rates ranking among the world’s lowest (notwith- standing recent progress).10 Access to improved water and san- poorly documented, is the role of Senegal’s diaspora communi- itation facilities has increased, but there are stark differences ties (estimated at over 600,000 people22), that send remittances between access for urban and rural areas. and may be involved in specific development enterprises, for example founding schools or clinics. Development programs have strong Senegalese leadership. This includes government development programs, as well as Senegal has a wide range of international development various private actors: companies and local and communi- partners. It received significant official development assis- ty-based efforts that include faith-inspired actors. The latter tance (ODA), estimated at US$983 million in 2013,23 and are not well-documented in the aggregate. Also notable, but is, thus, one of the highest aid recipients in West Africa.24 Major partners (over US$100 million annually in ODA) are Table 1. Senegal: Some key development facts France, the United States, and the International Development Association (IDA) (see figure 2).25 ODA has nonetheless de- Indicator Current Status (Year) clined as a share of GNI since 1990, when it represented 14.7 11 Population 14,672,557 (2014) percent, to 6.7 percent in 2013.26 Many partners support Total area 196,710 square km12 Senegal with an active field presence; Dakar is filled with the Urban population 6,312,888 (2014)13 (about headquarters of international aid agencies, as well as local as- 50 percent) sociations and NGOs. Aid partners are engaged in many sec- Population growth rate 2.9% (2014)14 tors and regions. Numerous NGOs are active in widely varying roles, both providing humanitarian and development assistance Capital city population 3.14 million (2013)15 directly and as implementing partners for official development (Dakar) agencies. Among these are several active organizations that have 16 Population aged 0-14 years 6.62 million (2015) faith links and inspiration, including for example World Vision, GNI per capita, Atlas $1,050 (2014)17 Caritas, Secours Islamique (Islamic Aid), and American Jewish method (current US$) World Service. Private aid flows play increasing roles, and private GDP growth rate 3.9% (2014)18 companies are often involved explicitly in development strategies UNDP Human 170 of 188 (2014)19 and programs. An asset for Senegal is membership in the West African Economic and Monetary Union with trade agreements Development Index Rank 27 (2015 report) and a common currency. Corruption Perceptions 61 of 187 (2015)20 Index Rank Personal remittances, $1,613,911,186 (2013)21 received (current US$)

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 19 Table 2. Senegal’s Millennium Development Goal Progress TARGETS INDICATORS STATUS Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger Halve the proportion of people whose Proportion of population living below Not Achieved, down from 65.7 (1991) income is less than one dollar a day $1.25(PPP) per day (%) to 34.1 (2011) Halve the proportion of people who Prevalence of underweight children Not Achieved, down 20.4 (1992) to suffer from hunger under-five years of age 16.8 (2013) Goal 2: Achieve Universal Education Ensure that children everywhere, boys Net Primary Enrollment Not Achieved, up 44.7 (1990) to 79.5 and girls, will be able to complete a full (2014) course of primary schooling Reaching last grade of primary No Progress Literacy rate of 15-24 year old Not Achieved, up 49.1(2002) to 69.8 population (2015) Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women Eliminate gender disparity in all levels Gender Equality in primary education Achieved of education Women's equal representation in Proportion of seats held by women in Achieved national parliaments national parliament (%) Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality Reduce by two-thirds the under five Under 5 mortality rate Not Achieved, Significant Progress: mortality rate 141.1 (1990) to 55.3 (2013) Infant mortality rate Not Achieved, Progress: 70.5 (1990) to 43.9 (2013) Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health Reduce by three quarters the maternal Maternal Mortality ratio Not Achieved, Significant Progress: mortality ratio 530(1990) to 320 (2013) Achieve universal access to reproductive Contraceptive prevalence rate Low Access: 7.4% (1993) to 17.9 health (2013) Unmet need for family planning No change Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other diseases Halt and reverse the spread of HIV/ HIV prevalence Achieved AIDS Halt and reverse the incidence of TB TB prevalence Achieved and other major diseases No TB deaths Not Achieved, down 19% Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability Halve the proportion of people without Improved drinking water source Not Achieved sustainable access to safe drinking water Urban 89 (1990) to 93 (2015) and basic sanitation Rural 41 (1990) to 67 (2015) Improved Sanitation Not Achieved Urban 58 (1990) to 65 (2015) Rural 21 (1990) to 24 (2015) Source: “Millennium Development Goals Indicators.” United Nations Statistics Division, 2015. Available at: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx

20 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 2.1 PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ISSUES Figure 2. Major Partner ODA to Senegal by Sector, 2013 (US$ million) The following are brief introductions of key sectors where reli- 100 gious engagement is especially noteworthy. More detailed anal- IDA (total $140 million) ysis is provided in chapter four. 80 US (total $202 million) Poverty in Senegal has declined, but addressing extreme poverty France (total $210 million) remains a central development challenge. It is also a concern of 60 religious leadership; the focus and understanding of both caus-

es and manifestations of poverty may differ among the religious 40 and non-religious actors concerned. Poverty rates declined steadily from 2001 to 2005, but the pace of progress has since slowed. This was in large part due to shocks, including drought, floods, and 20 high global food and fuel costs.28 Poverty is not evenly distributed; there is a stark urban-rural divide (rural poverty is estimated at 57.1 0 Social Economic Multi-sector Production Program percent compared to 26.1 percent in Dakar and 41.2 percent in infrastructure infrastructure assistance other urban areas).29 Unemployment is high, and an estimated 32 percent of the working age population is underemployed.30 Many Source: “Data Lab: Senegal - Country Profile.” OECD, 2015. Available at: work in the informal sector (non-agricultural): approximately 2.2 http://www.oecd.org/statistics/datalab/oda-recipient-sector.htm million people, or 48.8 percent of the working population.31 maternal mortality (320 per 100,000 live births36, 37). In 2013, the total fertility rate for Senegalese women was 5.1 children per West and (including Senegal) currently have woman,38 and the contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) 13 per- the world’s highest birth rates and lowest contraceptive preva- cent.39 Unmet need for family planning stood at 29.3 percent in lence rates, and there is growing awareness that these rates are 2013.40 Performance has improved with active government and incompatible with development objectives.32 Senegal’s popula- partner programs, reflected in the CPR increasing to 20.3 percent tion has nearly doubled since 1990 to approximately 14.5 million in 2014, an increase of more than 8 percent in just two years, and people.33 Limited family planning use is one cause of poor health the unmet need for family planning dropping to 25.6 percent.41 indicators, including high rates of infant mortality (44 per 1,000 live births34), under-five mortality (55 per 1,000 live births35), and Women’s rights and empowerment have paradoxical aspects, with considerable progress in the public sphere contrasted with stubborn patriarchal norms common in private life. Senegalese women have seen increased political representation; the share of female lawmakers in Senegal’s national parliament increased from 13 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 2009 and 43 percent in 2014.42 A 2010 law on gender parity accounts for much progress43 and the 2012 national elections included fe- male presidential candidates for the first time.44 Today, girls out- number boys in primary school enrollment (female to male ratio of 1.08); however, gender imbalances persist, more intensely in secondary and tertiary education, with female-to-male ratios of 0.76 and 0.59, respectively.45 Primary education completion rates from 2014 show girls outpacing boys with 65 percent46 of girls finishing compared to only 57 percent47 of boys. While women are making gains, they face economic challenges. The employment to population ratio for women aged over 15 has barely increased since 1991, growing from 54 percent to just 57 percent in 2013.48 The 2014 Gender Gap Index for Senegal (see table 3) notes a female-to-male labor participation rate of 0.75.49

Women in Senegal are active in many public sectors, but long-standing traditions of gender inequality persist at the USAID funds a fishery products transformation center operated by household level, linked to cultural and religious norms. Polyg- women in Kayar. amy, which is legal and sanctioned by Muslim religious leaders,

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 21 presents challenges to women’s autonomy and health. With up Figure 3. Extent of Women’s Employment in Senegal, 2010- to four wives permitted per man in Senegal, wives often find 2011 themselves competing with each other for resources and the 60

attention of their husbands, including striving to have as many 50 children as possible.50 Women face limitations on their auton- omy in economic matters, notably customary and Islamic laws 40 that are commonly practiced restrict women’s access to and in- heritance of land.51 30 20 Senegal is experiencing a youth bulge that will have pro- found social and economic consequences if not addressed. 10 Percentage of women 15-49 of women Percentage The youth population (age 15-34) currently accounts for ap- 0 proximately one-third of the total population52 and already No work in last Not Currently Currently strains the education system and economy. At current rates, 12 months Employed Employed an additional 100,000 youth enter the workforce each year.53 Extent of employment Many young people work in the informal sector, comprising Source: “Senegal: Demographic and Health and Multiple Indicator Cluster an estimated 44 percent of this sector. Nearly half of the youth Survey (EDS-MICS) 2010-2011.” Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la entering this sector have no formal education.54 Another alter- Démographie, 2014. Available at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR258/ FR258_English.pdf native for many disillusioned youth is migration to ; between January and March of 2015, there were an estimated Figure 4. Youth Population (15-34), Senegal in Context 1,200 migrants from Senegal to , up 25 percent from the 35 same period in 2014.55 High unemployment rates spur much of the migration among Senegalese youth.56 If employment

Table 3. World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap 30 Index for Senegal, 201457 Female- Indicator Rank to-Male 25 Ratio

Economic participation and 71 15-34 of Population Percent opportunity Labor force participation 84 0.75 20 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Wage equality for similar 57 0.67 Years work France Sub-Saharan Africa Senegal Estimated earned income 89 0.57 Source: “2015 Revision of World Population Prospects.” UN Data, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Educational attainment 131 Estimates and Projections Section (POPPIN), 2015. Available at: http://esa. Literacy rate 131 0.61 un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm Primary enrollment 1 1.08 trends continue, they present serious threats to social and - Secondary enrollment 118 0.76 nomic stability, and Senegal risks losing valuable human cap- Tertiary enrollment 125 0.59 ital. Health and survival 82 The complex and integrated role that religion plays in Senega- Sex ratio at birth 1 0.97 lese society and economy has important implications for Sene- Healthy life expectancy 92 1.04 gal’s development. The same comment applies for politics. The Political empowerment 24 following chapters explore these roles and point to many faith Women in parliament 5 0.76 actors, including FIOs, currently involved in development work. The report explores ways in which religious beliefs, prac- Women in ministerial 70 0.19 tices, and organizations contribute to shaping attitudes toward positions development, including willingness to participate in or chal- Years with female head of 36 0.05 lenge development agendas. Religious leaders are often respect- state (last 50) ed and revered, and they have long-standing roles in society.

22 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 A women’s group learns to transform cereals into marketable products. Better religious literacy overall (including among development velopment efforts that they believe are counter to religious be- actors) could open avenues for conversation and potential col- liefs, with women’s roles a prominent example. The following laboration. Previous engagement of Senegalese faith leaders in chapter describes Senegal’s complex religious landscape with development efforts shows their potential for driving change, the goal of informing development practitioners interested in for example in promoting behavior change that stemmed the understanding religious perspectives and motivations for en- spread of HIV. Faith leaders also have the clout to hinder de- gaging in development.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 23 RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE OF SENEGAL, PAST AND PRESENT

Senegal’s distinctive religious institutions have wide-ranging movement, as well as small, but active, Protestant and Shi’a influence, affecting daily lives as well as national policies and communities. politics. Religious facets of Senegal’s national identity have deep historical roots and varied contemporary impact. By var- Religious beliefs and practices are evident in daily life in Sen- ious measures, religiosity in Senegal is especially high: a 2010 egal. Various holidays, , and pilgrimages are specific to survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found Senegal. The government officially recognizes both Islamic and that 98 percent of Senegalese surveyed said religion is ‘very im- Christian holidays, with Muslim holidays often referred to by portant’ in their lives; Senegal ranked the highest on this mea- their West African names: Korité (Eid al-Fitr), Tabaski (Eid sure among the 56 countries and territories surveyed.58 al-Adha), and the Islamic New Year, known locally as Tam- kharit. Traditions and religious gatherings particular to Senegal Senegal’s population is majority Muslim (94 percent) with sig- include pilgrimages specific to the different confréries, such as nificant and long-standing religious minorities, notably Chris- the Gamou (typically associated with the Tijaniyya, but cele- tians (4 percent). Followers of traditional African religions and brated by all confréries) that celebrates the birth of the Prophet, other beliefs make up the remaining 2 percent (though, as is the Mourides’ Magal Touba to commemorate Sheikh Amadou frequently the case, measuring traditional adherents is prob- Bamba Mbacké’s exile, the Layenes’ Appel to celebrate the rev- lematic because of considerable overlap with other traditions). elation of their founder, etc. Many Senegalese Catholics make Traditional African religions preceded Islam and Christianity an annual pilgrimage to the town of Popenguine on Senegal’s and have left their mark.59 Nearly all Senegalese Muslims today coast.60 follow Sunni Islam, and an estimated 92 percent of Senega- lese Muslims affiliate with one of four Sufi orders, or confréries Religious leaders, communities, and institutions have consid- (Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, Muridiyya, and Layenes). Catholics erable influence in many spheres, including many facets of de- constitute the majority of Senegal’s Christian minority. Apart velopment enterprises. Religious influences shape attitudes and from Sufi orders and Catholicism, there is a Sunni reformist decisions on topics like education, health care, political affili-

24 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Village elders in Mamadou Badeifa, Kolda pray on Eid al-Adha (Tabaski). ations, agriculture, and family dynamics. Religion has been at the forefront of recent debates in Senegal on gender, women’s Box 1. Ethnicity in Senegal health care, and educational reform. Senegal counts more than 20 ethnic groups, with diverse languages and traditions. The 2010-11 Demographic and 3.1 RELIGION AND THE STATE Health Survey (DHS) indicates that the predominant ethnic groups are Wolof (43 percent), Pulaar (24), Sereer Senegal inherited the French notion of secularism or laïcité (15), Diola (5), and Mandinka (4); the remaining 9 from its colonial era, and secular principles were reflected percent consist of other ethnicities, including smaller, in constitutional arrangements after independence in 1960. distinct groups, such as the Susu and Bassari.63 There are Scholar Alfred Stepan observes that “the clerically hostile sub-groups within the larger ethnic groups, such as the form of French laïcité does not actually apply to state-religion Lébou within Wolofs, as well as Toucouleur, Fulakunda, relations in Senegal, despite the fact that the opening articles and Fula Jalon within Pulaar. Conflict between ethnic in the constitutions in both countries refer to laïcité and are groups in Senegal is rare; jokes or playful insults are often virtually identical.”61 Secularism in Senegal has specific Sen- a sign of familiarity and friendship. egalese features, and its implications have come under con- siderable debate over the decades. In contrast to the French Historically, several ethnic groups have been more approach to laïcité, which involves the absence of religious receptive to Islam and others to Christianity. Solid data is involvement in government affairs and of government in- limited, but it is well understood that Wolofs and Pulaars volvement in religious affairs,62 secularism in Senegal focuses tend to be Muslims, and there are more Christians among more on freedom to practice one’s religion, equality among the Sereer and Diola than the other ethnic groups. traditions, and pride in pluralism. Senegal’s particular form

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 25 Box 2. Religious and secular discord: The Mbegue forest crisis The Mbegue forest crisis in 1991 illustrates the complex dynamics between religious and secular forces in Senegal, as well as the significant power that religious leaders can exert. The 1964 land law accorded the Senegalese government control of all land; users have rights as long as the land is used in an economically productive way. Local authorities officially administer land rights. With both religious and government authorities intervening in practice in implementation, misunderstandings can arise. An example occurred in 1991 when President Abdou Diouf signed an agreement with Sheikh Saliou Mbacké, Khalife Général of the Mourides, permitting him to use 45,000 hectares for peanut production in Mbegue.

The,Khalife Général summoned his followers to clear land for peanut cultivation with the following radio address: “Mouride faithful of Senegal, come forward and all for the glory of god! Come in all the strength of your numbers to the village of Khelcom, in the forest of Mbegue. Bring with you any hatchet, any axe, any saw, any machete; bring any instrument in your possession capable of cutting a tree or clearing a forest.”64 His followers heeded the call and soon after, a large area of the savannah forest (some five million trees) was decimated and ready for cultivation. However, 6,000 pastoralists protested that their grazing rights had been ignored. This led to a low-level conflict between the farmers and the pastoralists around borehole access. The Mourides, who had emerged as a powerful economic, political, and religious force, had the upper hand.

An international outcry arose about the incident. The 1970s Sahelian droughts had heightened awareness about threats to the environment, including awareness that forests were being cut without regulation. Governments wished to revive dormant protective measures and institute new ones, with encouragement from international partners. That translated inter alia into agreements to protect forests, including Mbegue. When the international and environmental community discovered what had transpired in Mbegue, they were appalled. The resulting discussions led to a sharpening of agreements on environmental protection, greater awareness of the implications of ambiguous land rights, and heightened attention to the rights of pastoralists versus settled farmers. Many of the issues and tensions involved in this incident persist to this day. Religious roles in land tenure remain complex and often poorly understood. Pressures on land have increased with rapid population growth, as have the environmental challenges that confront Senegal.

of secularism allows for government involvement in religion, as long as the government does not favor one religious com- munity over another and does not interfere with respect of human rights or law and order.65

Several articles in Senegal’s constitution detail the legal stance toward religion, and the preamble affirms that the republic is “secular, democratic, and social.”66 The Senegalese constitution (in its various iterations) has consistently provided protections for freedom of religion and equality for all Senegalese regardless of religious beliefs (Articles 1, 4, and 8, 2001 constitution). As such, any discrimination based on religion (or origin, race, or sex) is punishable under law.67 Article 4 also states that religious political parties (as well as parties based on race, religion, sex, language, or region) are not permitted under law. Both reli- gious and non-religious communities and institutions are rec- ognized by the state as legitimate providers of education (Ar- ticle 22). Senegalese are guaranteed the freedom to carry out religious practices and to serve as religious education providers as long as they maintain law and order (Article 23).68 Further- more, “religious institutions and communities have the right to develop themselves without constraint. They are not under the supervision of the State. They resolve and administer their own 69 affairs autonomously.” Many have separate spaces to accommodate women.

26 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Within this framework, the government does not shy away dent in the early 1990s is an example (See Box 2), as are efforts from engaging with religious communities in official, as well as to curtail talibé begging and reform schools and curriculum. unofficial, ways. Senegal’s first president, Léopold Sédar Seng- hor, set the precedent by participating in religious ceremonies The government has played various roles in relation to reli- and soliciting the support of religious leaders.70 Political lead- gious institutions, with both formal and informal relationships ers have frequently paid official visits to the country’s religious in practice. The relationships reflect a mutual respect between leaders, and political candidates court support from religious religious communities and the government.73 For example, the communities. Official government delegations are included in customary audience that takes place today between the lead- religious events and gatherings, such as the Mourides’ Magal er of the Mourides and government representatives during Touba and the Catholic pilgrimage to Popenguine.71 The con- the Magal Touba pilgrimage began during the colonial period frérie leaders have been seen as important players in political to show “mutual recognition” after a period of suspicion.74 A campaigns over the decades. Local religious groups can mobi- Ministry of Religious Affairs was established in 2010 following lize members to support preferred candidates, and candidates tensions between then-President Abdoulaye Wade and some of seek the blessing of the leaders of Sufi orders. Historically, some Senegal’s religious communities. During his presidency, Wade faith leaders issued ndigels, or orders, to their followers to vote promoted Muslim-Christian dialogue,75 seeking to present a specific way in a political election. While it is often said that Senegal as a worldwide model for achieving and maintaining certain religious leaders have the power to make or break a po- peaceful relations between Muslims and Christians. These ac- litical campaign, the roles of religious leaders have in practice tions contrasted with an incident in December 2009, when shifted over time to subtler (and less controversial) tactics.72 Wade said in a statement that “for Muslims, churches are for On some occasions, development issues have sparked govern- praying to someone who is not God.”76 Dozens of Christian ment-religious relationship tensions; the Mbegue Forest inci- youth found the statement so offensive that they took to the

Box 3. How far do extremist and fundamentalist religious views affect Senegal? With growing security challenges in West Africa—and especially in light of recent attacks in , Mali, and Côte d’Ivoire—Senegal’s government and partners have stepped up efforts to avert such incidents. This shines a spotlight on the possibility of violent extremist groups. As early as 2013, the Senegalese government publicly indicated that it was aware of dormant terror cells, citing this as a reason for their involvement in anti-terror initiatives in the Sahel.77 In early 2015, Senegalese news outlets reported new measures to fight terror threats, announced by the Ministry of the Interior, including new requirements for government authorization to open mosques and Qur’anic schools; the concerns center around funding sources.78 The government in January 2016 ordered a halt to construction of a mosque on the grounds of the airport in Dakar, citing security reasons and suspicions regarding project funding.79 In late 2015, the government cracked down on some imams it described as apologists for terrorism; several dozen imams and preachers accused of inciting or supporting terrorism were arrested.80

There is a keen awareness in Senegal about security threats in West Africa. A 2013 Pew study found that 75 percent of Senegalese Muslims surveyed were concerned about Islamic extremism, with 19 percent unconcerned.81 By contrast, a 2014 Pew study found that only 46 percent of Senegalese were concerned about Islamic extremism in their country (versus 47 percent unconcerned).82 A 2015 Pew Research Center study that asked Senegalese about ISIS found that a majority of Senegalese surveyed (60 percent) had an unfavorable view of the group; however, 11 percent held a favorable view.83 Senegalese scholar Abdoul Aziz Kébé notes that there are preachers on Senegalese media who justify radical discourse; Senegal must be aware of this and clearly denounce radical views, particularly as extremist views can seduce youth who are in precarious situations, especially those frustrated by a lack of work. Kébé expresses concern about the influence of extremist beliefs in Mali, , and on Senegalese youth, in light of widespread use of modern technologies and the Internet.84

Fundamentalist beliefs have been growing in Senegal in recent years. Kébé contends that Senegalese Islam is not going toward fundamentalism, but rather that there are increasing signs of fundamentalism; there have been visible changes in dress, and some young people, especially, are attracted to fundamentalist teachings and join fundamentalist organizations.85 Senegalese scholar Penda Mbow emphasizes the diversity within Senegal’s Sunni reformist movement; she sees three distinct categories within the movement: modernist reformism, conservative Salafism, and political fundamentalism.86 Several recent conferences in Senegal have focused on religious fundamentalism and extremism.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 27 Box 4. Senegal as a moderate Muslim ally Senegal has achieved a delicate balance between maintaining strong relations with Western countries and cultivating close ties with the . As a peaceful, democratic, Muslim-majority country in a region with many conflicts, such as the Mali crisis that began in January 2012, Senegal has long counted as an important “western” ally. Since independence, it has been a “development darling,” receiving substantial aid and support from, notably, the U.S., France, and .

U.S.-Senegal relations are cordial, with frequent state visits and sizeable USAID and Peace Corps programs. The U.S. supports Senegal economically, and Senegal has frequently backed the U.S. at the UN. The U.S. provides training to Senegalese armed forces and conducts joint training exercises for efforts that promote the interests of both countries.87 Specifically, the U.S. has provided Senegal with assistance to counter the narcotics trade and also supports Senegal’s involvement in the Trans- Counter-Terrorism Partnership, which aims to counter terrorism in North and West Africa.88 Senegal has taken a tough stance on terrorism in various forums.

France maintains close relations with Senegal today, although there has been some variability at times in the long history the two countries share. France is an important economic partner for Senegal: France is Senegal’s top bilateral donor89 and its top source for imports.90 Like the U.S., France supports Senegal’s anti-terrorism efforts. France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds the Plan d’action contre le terrorisme (Action Plan Against Terrorism) and has worked with the Senegalese government to strengthen the capacity of Senegalese magistrates, police, and military to respond to terrorist threats.91 France continues its military cooperation with Senegal, particularly through technical assistance, counted at nearly six million Euros in 2009.92

Senegal is also actively engaged in Muslim world institutions and is a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); it hosted the OIC’s 2008 Summit. The Islamic Development Bank has been active since 1976, aligning its programs with the Senegalese government’s target sectors, which include agriculture, health, transport, and public utilities, among others.93 Many Muslim-majority countries contribute to Senegal in various ways. , , and grant scholarships for Senegalese students to pursue higher education in these countries.94 Several countries, like Kuwait, , Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—whether through foundations or the government—support infrastructure and public works projects in Senegal, including the construction of health centers and Islamic schools.95 North African, Gulf, and Middle Eastern countries influence Senegalese culture through imported television shows and other media, as well as religious goods (videos, veils, posters, etc.).96

streets in protest, and Senegalese police used tear gas to disperse lics to , the Palestinian territories, and Israel by providing the protesters. The Archbishop of Dakar condemned Wade’s hundreds of free plane tickets to pilgrims each year.101 statement, commenting that it was humiliating to the Chris- tian community. The president’s son, (a govern- Government regulation of and direct involvement with reli- ment minister at the time) apologized for any statement that gious practice, communities, media, and clerics is quite limit- was in any way offensive to the Christian community.97 Gov- ed. Imams, mosques, churches, and religious media in Senegal ernment officials saw the new Ministry as a logical step to assist have traditionally operated independently of the government. governmental leaders to better communicate and work with However, growing security threats in the West African region religious leaders, as well as to avoid missteps and miscommu- have prompted Senegal’s government to implement new mea- nication.98 The Ministry was later abolished. Today, both the sures (see Box 3). President and Prime Minister have advisors on religious affairs. 3.2 INDIGENOUS BELIEFS: LEGACIES The government has taken steps to maintain and improve Sen- egal’s religious sites, both Islamic and Christian. Projects in- AND REALITIES clude a new highway from Dakar to the Mouride holy city of Touba, the inauguration of a modern complex in as A common observation about Senegal is that 94 percent of part of a program to modernize the Tidiane religious city,99 and Senegalese are Muslim, 4 percent are Christian, and 100 per- funds to restore sites of the Layene confrérie, such as the mau- cent animist. However, few Senegalese would claim to hold soleum of Seydina Issa Laye.100 The government supports the animist beliefs, and a more accurate observation is that there is annual pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca and of Roman Catho- a lingering legacy of the traditional African religions that pre-

28 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 dated Islam and Christianity. These traditions, which vary in Figure 5. Traditional Beliefs among Senegalese Muslims significant ways by ethnic group, involve a complex series of 80 76% 72% legacies and practices, including some that color both Islamic 70 and Christian practices; these include matrilinear and patrilin- 60 59% ear family structures, attitudes toward spirit worlds, and ven- eration of ancestors.102 A 2010 study conducted by the Pew 50 42% Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life found that 40 58 percent of Senegalese surveyed (Muslims and Christians) 30 28% admitted to believing that sacrifices to spirits or ancestors can protect them from misfortune.103 Senegalese Muslims also had 20 the highest reported use of amulets and religious healers among 10 Muslims in the Sub-Saharan countries surveyed (see figure 0 5).104 Many indigenous traditions have survived, with indige- Witnessed an Belief in Belief in the Use traditional Use nous beliefs often successfully integrated into both Muslim and exorcism witchcraft evil eye healers amulets Christian belief systems. Source: “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2010. Available at: http:// www.pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf Traditional beliefs are visible in daily practices. Various reli- gious traditions accommodate indigenous beliefs and culture; one’s desires and renouncing worldly matters lead to true today, belief systems are interwoven and a Senegalese might, freedom.112 Sufism is described as purifying the soul, devot- for example, wear a gris-gris (talisman or amulet) with Qur’an- ing oneself to God, and cultivating a spiritual link to the ic or biblical verses inside for protection.105 Likewise, many creator.113 households pour water across the threshold every morning to bar evil spirits from entering, while others sprinkle water Souleymane Bachir Diagne, a leading scholar and philosopher onto food before eating as protection from evil spirits. Some on Islam in Senegal, highlights the complexity involved in de- rub mixtures onto their skin or sacrifice animals, all in the fining Sufism: hope of providing protection, luck, and support.106 It is not possible to give a definition of Sufism, for it is Women traditionally held central positions among sever- not one of the major divisions created by the schisms al Senegalese ethnic groups (see Box 1); they were political that have characterized the Islamic world (Shiites, leaders, social leaders,107 priestesses, and traditional healers.108 Sunni, Khariji); nor is it one of the several juridical The rise of Islam and Christianity, patriarchal traditions with or theological schools existing in Islam; Sufism refus- predominantly male leadership, resulted in a diminution of es the designation of a philosophical doctrine, even if women’s religious influence and leadership. There are few eminent scholars in the field have written treatises set- women in formal religious leadership roles in Senegal today, ting forth the metaphysical bases of what is, above all, but at the community level, women have opportunities for in- a spiritual way. In short, the ‘je ne sais quoi’ designated formal leadership roles within local religious women’s groups. by this term, the origin of which is not known, is bet- ter explained as being an attitude, a disposition of the 3.3 ISLAM spirit, a way of life that can be found in all the sects and schools and which thus transcends them all.114 North African merchants introduced Islam in Senegal during the eleventh century.109 Some suggest that the region Senegalese Sufism places great emphasis on the relationship be- was originally receptive to Islam in great part due to leaders’ tween the marabout and talibé, or religious leader and disciple. In desire to facilitate trade relationships.110 Islam did not spread the Senegalese context, this is seen as a reciprocal relationship of quickly or widely until the fifteenth century, which saw the voluntary submission (by the talibé) characterized by discipline notable rise of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, known locally as a and spiritual surrender. In this system of patronage, marabouts confrérie—and later, the Tijaniyya, Muridiyya, and Layenes serves as spiritual guides, as well as advising the talibé in oth- during the nineteenth century. The majority of Muslims in er matters, sometimes helping their talibés directly in obtaining Senegal practice Sufism, or tasawwuf, often referred to as jobs.115 Each party has an obligation toward the other. Themar - the mystical path of Islam. Sufism stresses the importance about receives adiya (contribution) from his talibés and uses it of inwardness and reflection, with a focus on “God’s mercy, to help others who need assistance.116 Historically, many talibés gentleness, and beauty more than of the wrath, severity, and have worked the fields of their marabouts. In return, the talibé majesty...”111 Senegalese Sufi leaders have described Sufism gains job skills performing what is viewed as a soul-purifying as a spiritual fight against desires, saying that controlling exercise. The marabout may even help his talibé to find a spouse.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 29 Portraits of distinguished Senegalese religious leaders are for sale on streets throughout Senegal. 3.3.1 Confréries of Senegal Each confrérie is led by one or more familles religieuses, or reli- gious families. Typically, this is the family of the order’s found- Senegal has a distinctive form of Islam, as it has one of the er (as in the case of the Muridiyya) or an individual that trained highest—if not the highest—percentages of Sufis among the under a master in that order abroad (as in the case of several world’s Muslim-majority countries. Adherents of Sufi Islam families of the Tijaniyya). Senegal’s Sufi religious families re- belong to various orders, which are often referred to in Senegal main a strong social force today, notwithstanding important by their Arabic name—tariqa (singular) or turuq (plural). Each changes in recent decades. With each successive and larger gen- order pays heed to the teachings of its founder and consequent- eration of the religious families, power has become less con- ly has its own practices, rituals, and leadership structures. These centrated. Some scholars believe that the confréries, longtime orders are commonly known in Senegal as confréries.117 mainstays of Senegal’s religious landscape, may be on the de- cline. Alternative social and religious structures have been on Senegal’s four principal confréries are without question the the rise, including a Sunni reformist movement and a small dominant feature of the country’s religious landscape and have movement of Senegalese who have converted to Shi’a Islam,118 great influence in the social, religious, and political spheres. perhaps in an attempt to withdraw from the ideological mo- There is no precise data, but an estimated 92 percent of Sene- nopoly of the Sufi orders.119 Despite these changes, the vast galese belong to the Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, Muridiyya, or Lay- majority of Senegalese Muslims are still adherents of Senegal’s ene communities; the Tijaniyya and Muridiyya have the largest Sufi orders. numbers of adherents (see figure 6). The quite different histo- ries of each of these four orders affect their modern structure Confréries usually have a pyramidal hierarchy. Typically, each and roles. confrérie has a Khalife Général, (General Khalife) who is the leader of the confrérie, including all of its branches, in Sene- Figure 6. Confrérie Affiliation gal.120 However, there are also Khalifes who serve as spiritual 121 6.0% leaders of branches within an order. Khalife Générals and Khalifes are the eldest son, grandson, great-grandson, etc. of 10.9% Layene the religious family within a confrérie. The termsmarabout , serigne, and sheikh are all used to designate religious leaders Qadiriyya (of varying levels of seniority), sometimes interchangeably. The 51.0% term marabout may also refer to one who makes amulets or to Muridiyya an instructor (also called serigne daara) at a Qur’anic school. A 30.1% Sufi instructor may also confer the title of sheikh on one who Tijaniyya has completed spiritual training. Within these religious fami- lies, power is passed to each successive generation; succession normally passes through the living males of one generation be- fore passing to the next generation. Although the line of suc- Source: “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2010. Available at: http:// cession is usually quite clear, some of the confréries have seen www.pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf struggles and infighting over succession.

30 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Imams lead prayers at Senegal’s numerous mosques, offering permitted their followers to receive both the Qadiri and Tid- practical spiritual leadership with weekly, if not daily, interac- iane wird (prayers and litanies specific to an order)—often to tion with followers. In Senegal, imams are commonly selected minimize divisions between the orders and loss of followers— by the communities based on their religious knowledge, reputa- Tidiane leaders believed that the wirds were not compatible, tion, and demeanor. The typical has completed extensive forcing its followers to choose between the two orders.130 studies in Islam, although there are no official requirements for training. The majority of Senegal’s imams are affiliated with the In the late 1980s, Qadiri leaders attempted to revitalize the or- confréries; others are independent. Imams of confrérie-specific der in Senegal to attract new followers. However, in 1989, with mosques are typically appointed by the Khalife Général or the conflict along the Senegal- border, largely over graz- of a confrérie. The Lébou community, an ethnic group ing rights,131 tens of thousands of Mauritanians in Senegal were largely specific to the , traditionally appoints the repatriated, diplomatic relations were strained, and the border Imam Ratib of Dakar, who receives a monthly stipend from between the two countries was closed.132 The conflict, which Senegal’s government—this “official” relationship is a unique lasted until 1991, sparked animosity toward Mauritanians in case.122 Senegal (and vice versa) that left a lasting legacy. Limitations on travel between the two countries appear to have weakened Notwithstanding the various distinctions that mark the Sufi relationships within the Qadiriyya.133 Negative perceptions of orders, there are few considerable differences between them Mauritania made it difficult for the order to attract more fol- in terms of religious beliefs and practices. A Tidiane religious lowers in Senegal, but Senegalese Qadiri leaders claim that the leader in Senegal observed, “We perform the same rites, we conflict has not harmed their connections with the religious have the same models, and we have the same struggles.”123 A communities in Mauritania.134 few noteworthy differences do exist; for example, the Layenes hold beliefs that distinguish them from the other confréries Historically, the Qadiriyya’s principal activities were agriculture (e.g., a belief in the Mahdi and the second coming of ). and commerce,135 but today their principal focus is religious Mourides place great emphasis on work as a spiritual source. education. Qadiris are engaged in various other social activities, Although many of Senegal’s mosques are specific to a certain such as job training to youth. A preoccupation with high rates confrérie, it is not uncommon for a follower of one confrérie to of unemployment has spurred different activities and groups to attend the mosque of another.124 seek to engage youth. The confrérie provides medical care and other social aid to the needy and skills training to women.136 3.3.1.1 Qadiriyya 3.3.1.2 Tijaniyya Originally founded in Baghdad in the eleventh century CE, the Qadiriyya was named for Sheikh Abd al-Qādīr al-Jīlānī. El Hadj Omar Tall had the largest responsibility in propagating The order is thought to have come to through scholars who the Tijaniyya in Senegal. He was born in the Fouta Toro region had come into contact with al-Jīlānī and then spread south to on the border of Senegal and Mauritania. He made the pilgrim- present day Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal. Scholars disagree age to Mecca around 1827, where he met and studied under as to exactly when the Qadiriyya made its way to Senegal, but al-Ghali, a Tidiane Khalife of Hajiz (a region in it may have been as early as the fifteenth century CE.125 The present-day Saudi Arabia), who revealed the secret of the Tijani- Qadiriyya has a small representation today among Senegal’s yya137 to him.138 Tall became a Tidiane Khalife and returned to Muslim population, but it was once more widespread there, spread the Tijaniyya throughout Senegal and the sub-region.139 and “[t]o the extent that these Muslims had a Sufi affiliation He envisioned West Africa as an Islamic state based on Tidiane in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, it was Qa- inspiration. In order to realize this vision, Tall sought to purify diriyya.”126 The Kounta family is the principal religious family Islam in the region and eliminate non-Islamic beliefs (typically of the Qadiriyya in Senegal; it maintains strong ties with the held by pagans and Christian colonists).140 For Tall, this meant Qadiriyya community in Mauritania, where the order is active. spreading the Tijaniyya order through aggressive, often military, means. He also took up arms against the French colonists. While During the nineteenth century, many followers affiliated with he did not succeed in his goal of creating an Islamic state, he the Qadiriyya were attracted by the propagation of the Tijani- propagated the Tijaniyya throughout the region.141 yya, another confrérie that focused on religious duties, morality, and prayer,127 in comparison to the Qadiriyya emphasis on an Several active Tijaniyya branches in present-day Senegal are led intellectual pursuit of Islam.128 The Qadiriyya values spiritual by prominent Senegalese families. These include the Niassène devotion and hard work highly, believing that “it is necessary family, the Omarien community, the Tall family, and the Sy to adore God as if one was about to die, and it is necessary to family. There are no doctrinal differences among these branch- work as if one will never die.”129 Whereas some Qadiri sheikhs es; Senegalese Tidiane leaders say that all share the same beliefs

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 31 and cooperate regularly on activities. They also maintain strong Omariens links with Moroccan Tidianes, and many Senegalese Tidianes The Omarien community, one of the oldest branches of the make a pilgrimage to Fez, where the of the Tijaniyya’s Tijaniyya in Senegal, takes its name from El Hadj Omar Tall, founder is located. who was largely responsible for the spread of the Tijaniyya in West Africa. Like the Niassène family, the Omariens are very Niassène invested in the promotion of religious education. They have The Niassène family is a key religious family in Senegal and constructed Qur’anic schools, as well as modern schools that the sub-region today. The order’s founder, El Hadji Abdoulaye complement an Islamic education with French, English, and Niass, was born in Senegal in 1848.142 He came into direct science curricula. They also engage with many issues affecting contact with the Tidianes and received permission to put oth- those who are impoverished, such as access to health care and ers on the path of the Tijaniyya.143 His son, Sheikh Ibrahima nutrition; they have organized free health screenings for com- Niass, played a critical role in expanding the Niassène fami- munities in need.146 They also host conferences highlighting ly’s foothold in the Tijaniyya in West Africa. The Niassènes are concrete actions the Omariens can take to reduce poverty in headquartered in Medina Baye, Senegal. Senegal. The Omariens’ influence extends to Mali, Nigeria, Mauritania, and .147 Although most religious families focus on providing a religious education to followers, the Niassène family has built its rep- Sy utation on the high quality of the education it provides. The The Sy family, an important branch of the Senegalese Tijaniyya, name is so synonymous with quality education that parents is based in Tivaouane, which is considered the center of the Ti- from several countries send their children to study with the Ni- janiyya in Senegal. El Hadj , who was born in the 1850s assène family. Children come from as close as and and pursued extensive studies, founded this Tijaniyya branch. Sy and as far away as Nigeria and beyond. The Niassènes maintained a civil, and at times collaborative, relationship with have followers in many different countries, and Sheikh Ahmad French colonial authorities and aimed to demonstrate to the Tijani bin Cisse (of the Niassène family) was named by a French that not all Tidianes used militaristic means to propagate Jordanian Islamic institute as the thirteenth most influential the Tijaniyya as El Hadj Omar Tall had done.148 Sy studied with Muslim in the world.144 some of the great Muslim intellectuals of the period and received the Tidiane wird at age 18. He opened his own Islamic center in The Niassène family, in view of its size and power, maintains Tivaouane and is credited with helping to spread the Tijaniyya a highly organized structure: “[it] functions like a state...and within the area that is present-day Senegal.149 The Sy family has all its members and representatives work for the Khalife. They been actively involved in promoting peace, solidarity between work so that things are done as they should be. For example, the confréries, and Christian-Muslim dialogue.150 the Khalife cannot travel everywhere, but he has representa- tives—ambassadors and ministers—so that his direction and 3.3.1.3 Muridiyya objectives are fulfilled.”145 The Muridiyya, or Mouride order, was founded by Sheikh Ama- dou Bamba Mbacké during the late nineteenth century. The son of a Qadiriyya marabout, Sheikh Amadou Bamba Mbacké was born around 1853 in the village of Mbacké, Senegal.151 His fa- ther transmitted the Qadiri wird to him.152 In his early twenties, Amadou Bamba taught in the school of Islamic sciences that his father had established and began writing his first works on Is- lam.153 Amadou Bamba traveled extensively throughout Senegal and Mauritania in his twenties to gain as much knowledge as he could from leading Sufi masters and works. During his travels, he wrote his two most prominent works.

Sheikh Amadou Bamba established an educational system in the area that is today Touba. As the number of his followers grew, this system could no longer accommodate them all. He left Touba in 1895 with those he felt were the most genuine talibés, but he drew others to him. The French colonial administration, already Many public transportation vehicles are decorated to demonstrate wary of Bamba’s influence, saw this as a sign that Bamba had the owner’s religious affiliation. amassed a following that might undermine their authority. They

32 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Graffiti of Sheikh Amadou Bamba Mbacké in Dakar. arrested Bamba and exiled him; he spent seven years in exile in the diaspora. He’s like the minister of foreign affairs. (1895-1902).154 There was a surge of new Mouride fol- We all do it. We all travel, but he’s the main one.159 lowers on his return, reviving the colonial authorities’ suspicions of Bamba. He was exiled again in 1903, this time to Maurita- The Mourides are active in community development, most nia.155 After four years in exile, he returned and there was another prominently because they administer all of Touba’s affairs sep- influx of followers. He spent the rest of his life under house arrest, arately from the government (see Box 5). They organize and but Bamba continued to attract followers to his movement. finance the construction of mosques, Islamic schools, health infrastructure, and public works projects. Various Mouride as- The Mourides are not the largest order in Senegal, but the or- sociations, such as the Association culturelle religieuse islamique der has had perhaps the greatest influence on Senegal’s social, mouride, promote Islamic education, culture, and charitable economic, and political development. Mourides have been ac- acts. Mourides are also active and organized in the diaspora. tive in agriculture, a mainstay of the Senegalese economy. By Regardless of distance, they tend to remain devoted to the the end of the 1970s, Mouride became synonymous with pea- Mouride community and Touba; Mourides in the diaspora are nuts; the Mourides’ role in peanut production brought them among the city’s most important financial backers. Remittanc- significant economic gains.156 Mouride leaders held large tracts es are used to develop the infrastructure of Touba and help of land, and their talibés helped cultivate the crops in exchange to build and maintain the Grande Mosquée de Touba (Great for a stake in the crops and spiritual guidance.157 In 2002, the Mosque of Touba). Khalife was still Senegal’s number one producer of peanuts through his many daaras.158 Baay Fall Sheikh Ibra Fall, who joined Sheikh Amadou Bamba in The Mouride hierarchy resembles that of the Niassene family. Touba, shaped the marabout-talibé relationship within the For members of the religious family of the Mourides Muridiyya.160 Fall was one of Bamba’s closest advisors and There are commissions with administrative responsi- revered him. Fall favored hard work at the expense of car- bilities, for example education and health. Each tends rying out typical Muslim rites, such as praying, fasting, and to be assigned by the Khalife to a branch of the family completing religious studies.161 His example spurred a small (there are twelve families). Each [branch] is responsible offshoot of the Muridiyya. His followers, who call themselves for a different area. One of the grandsons travels within the Baay Fall, do not emphasize religious instruction, pray-

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 33 ing, and fasting; instead, they praise through their hard second coming of Jesus, known as Issa in Islam.167 Today, the work. Some in the Mouride community believe that Baay Layenes are principally centered in , a part of Dakar. Fall distorted what they believe to be Ibra Fall’s honorable model.162 The Layenes consider themselves to be socially conservative. One Layene leader commented that the Layenes are very se- 3.3.1.4 Layenes rious, do not allow dancing (even though it is an import- ant part of Senegalese culture), pronounce the name of God Like the Muridiyya, the Layene confrérie was born in Sene- frequently, and are known for their purity. Layenes typically gal. Layenes represent only a small proportion of the coun- marry young so that children are protected from perdition.168 try’s Muslim population, with estimates of five to ten percent Children in the Layene community generally begin Muslim at most. The Layene community’s belief system differs from rites, such as fasting and ablutions, at younger ages (some- that of the other three major confréries in noteworthy ways, times even before age 5) than most Muslim children.169 The but most significantly in the belief that the Mahdi163 revealed teachings of the Mahdi (Limamou Laye) start with educating himself as Limamou Laye in 1883 on the Cap Vert peninsula youth about purity, sincerity, non-violence, and non-discrim- of Senegal.164 He was a pacifist, but he attracted the atten- ination. The emphasis on non-discrimination and equality tion of colonial authorities because he had been gaining a is a core element demonstrated by referring to each other, following. The French colonial authorities briefly imprisoned Layenes, as “Laye” instead of using last names. The use of him, believing that he was gathering arms for an anti-colo- this term places all Layenes on an equal level, eliminating nial movement.165 They tried, unsuccessfully, to arrest him discrimination based on names (which can be linked to the in 1887, but he went into voluntary exile on Gorée Island traditional system).170 Despite these confrérie differenc- three days later.166 Following Limamou Laye’s death in 1909, es, the Layenes say that they are able to interact easily with his son, Issa, became the Layenes’ leader. Layenes believe that the other orders.171 Limamou Laye’s son, Issa, was the second coming of Jesus. Issa had declared himself to be an envoy of God; according The Layenes, like the other confréries, engage in community to Layene beliefs, the Mahdi’s successor could only be the development and social works. The Layene leadership and

Box 5. Touba: A holy city with special legal status Touba, the holy city for Mourides, is located nearly 200 kilometers from Dakar and has a special status, both spiritually and legally. Sheikh Amadou Bamba Mbacké settled the area that is now Touba in 1887 with a vision that it would become a spiritual center. Mouride Khalifes (the descendants of Bamba) are the de facto rulers of the city and sponsor infrastructure projects largely based on plans that Bamba laid out. The monumental Great Mosque of Touba is especially prized.172 The city has grown rapidly from a small village at independence to a sprawling city today, with a population estimated at about 600,000 in 2014—one of Senegal’s largest cities (many Mourides have publicly contested official census data, asserting that Touba has more than one million inhabitants). The city population swells to several million during the annual Mouride pilgrimage, Magal Touba.

Touba’s administration is unique in Senegal. The Mouride leadership are the rulers, de facto and in law. The city’s layout, services, and administration reflect its special religious status.173 Some compare it to the Vatican as an autonomous and religiously run entity with a global character (through links to the Mouride diaspora).174 Touba was recognized in 1976 as a communauté rurale autonome, or autonomous rural community. This designation allows Touba to manage most of its own affairs. The religious leadership oversees the educational system, health care, and public works, though in practice, the government generously supports much of the infrastructure, such as water, electricity, and telecommunications.175 Voluntary contributions from Mourides, both in Senegal and abroad, support many projects, such as a sewage system, Franco-Arabic schools, a hospital, and an Islamic library.176 Activities legal in other parts of Senegal, such as dancing, consumption of alcohol, and loud noise, are not permitted within the boundaries of Touba.177 Touba’s insulation from Senegalese law has at times resulted in smuggling (including pharmaceutical products and arms) and money laundering operations.178

Touba’s status has come under debate in recent years, for example as to how far Senegalese law applies to those who live there. In 2014, Touba did not comply with Senegal’s gender parity law,179 presenting a list of 100 percent men in its list of political candidates. Opinions in Senegal were sharply divided on the topic. The government took no action against Touba’s noncompliance.

34 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Layene associations aim to educate the community on Layene teachings, with a particular focus on Islamic schools and li- Box 6. Religious media braries.180 Certain Layene members believe that religious com- There is an active religious presence in Senegalese media, munities must be key actors in community development in with religious newspapers, radio shows, and television Senegal. Thus, they see Christian efforts to establish schools shows, as well as an increasingly active social media and health centers as reinforcing the relationship with the com- presence. In line with Senegal’s religious composition, munity.181 The Layenes work to establish media programs on most religious media is Islamic. The majority of hosts are the television and radio.182 Leaders have been forthright in sup- men, but there are popular woman hosts. Programs aim porting the government’s development objectives set forth in primarily to increase the public’s religious knowledge, the Emerging Senegal Plan.183 and they compete to attract more viewers.186

3.3.2 Dahiras Traditionally, religious leaders—and particularly the highest leaders of the confréries—have been tasked with Community groups known as dahiras are specific to Senegalese providing education and advice to their communities. As Sufism and play a major role in the lives of Senegalese Mus- religious media and social media expand in Senegal, some lims who wish to be actively involved in their religion beyond Senegalese, especially youth, turn instead to these sources 184 attending mosque for Friday prayer. There are many such for news and information. Technological innovations are groups, and their aim is to promote solidarity among their thought to contribute to the changing power dynamics members, support members’ spiritual needs, and provide mu- in the confréries of Senegal because they allow religious tual aid. These community-level associations reinforce unity leaders outside the traditional confrérie hierarchy to gain among members of the same confrérie or followers of the same public exposure and followers.187 spiritual guide. The expansion of religious media has changed the way that Traditionally, dahiras provided a critical form of social sup- Senegalese live out and discuss their religion. Religious port for Senegalese who moved from rural to urban areas of shows allow Senegalese to understand Islam and the Senegal. Men often used these networks to advise newcomers different traditions within the religion more fully. The on economic opportunities, and many dahiras in the diaspo- popularity of religious media gives hosts an important ra fulfill this role. The Mourides, in particular, are known for platform, which they use to discuss a broad spectrum their tight-knit communities and for assisting members to find of subjects. Topics can range from world affairs to more 185 entrepreneurial opportunities in their new locales. Members specific religious issues (praying, fasting, ablutions, etc.) to the position of Islam on birth spacing and family dynamics. Events of particular religious importance in Senegal or internationally are also broadcast. Quality control of shows and hosts is a concern for some who focus on the widely varying backgrounds and knowledge of religious sponsors and hosts.188

of dahiras, both in Senegal and abroad, typically pay a small monthly membership fee.

Dahiras are typically organized into federations (often by con- frérie and geographical location) both in Senegal and in the diaspora, such as the Fédération des Dahiras Layenes du Sénégal (Federation of Layene Dahiras of Senegal) and the Fédération des Dahiras Mourides du Grand Sud de la France (Federation of Mouride Dahiras of the South of France). Dahiras are generally independent, but federations can at times mobilize dahiras for specific events. As an example, the Federation of Layene Dahi- ras of Senegal works to organize collective marriage ceremonies for couples who do not have the means to marry without cus- A mosque in Saint-Louis, the former capital of Senegal under tomary wedding and dowry expenses. French colonial rule.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 35 Dahiras are often segregated by gender. Some women’s groups values. They also mobilize to support different causes, such as are a branch of a dahira with both men and women, but other environmental protection, and perform charitable work in the women’s dahiras are independent and self-organizing. An im- community. When youth face unemployment, the dahiras can portant function of women’s groups is to provide social and provide a sense of solidarity and spiritual guidance for those material support to each other at critical life moments, such who may feel hopeless.194 as the birth of a child or the death of a family member. Wom- en in dahiras also support their confrérie by raising money for 3.3.3 Women and gender in Islam religious events and gatherings, or even for new religious insti- tutions (e.g., daaras, clinics). An important activity of women’s Senegalese Muslims admire women in their roles as mothers and associations is logistical support for religious gatherings, such wives. Senegalese point to examples of revered women within as pilgrimages (e.g., Magal Touba, l’Appel) in the form of cook- their Islamic traditions (such as , mother ing or other such assistance.189 of Sheikh Amadou Bamba) to demonstrate respect for women in the confréries. Given that Islamic leadership in Senegal has Men’s and women’s dahiras are active on various social issues, historically been patriarchal, women religious leaders are rare for example in raising awareness and mobilizing their mem- (and confrérie leadership passes through a patriarchal hierarchy). bers for different causes. Dahiras have instructed members on There are, nonetheless, some examples of women religious lead- proper health and food preparation measures to religious ers within confréries, notably in the Niassène family, which ap- pilgrimages to prevent the spread of illness, including during points women as muqqadam (spiritual guides).195 The absence the Ebola crisis in West Africa.190 Some provide information of women in religious leadership positions may have strong ties about universal health coverage.191 Many dahiras also perform to Senegalese culture. A Pew study found that only six percent charitable acts, such as collecting donations for prisoners192 and of Senegalese Muslims surveyed believe that women should be organizing free medical consultations.193 allowed to hold religious leadership positions, significantly lower than other Sub-Saharan countries surveyed.196 Youth participation in dahiras is often active, with activities paralleling those of men’s and women’s groups. Like other Muslim have access to religious education dahiras, youth-focused groups hold informational and train- and are instrumental in religious rituals. Very few attend Friday ing sessions on different issues, including religious and moral prayers; a Pew Forum study found that 26 percent of Senega-

Box 7: Religion and Family Code The Code de la Famille, or Family Code, enacted in 1972, defines Senegalese law in cases of divorce, inheritance, filiation, adoption, marriage, death, etc. Senegal’s constitution explicitly guarantees religious freedom and gender equality, but Senegal’s Family Code represents a de facto compromise between secular principles (based in the French inheritance) and Islamic principles and practice (for example, in the option of polygamy). The Family Code has been a source of debate over the years, pitting advocates of a secular Code against those arguing for a Code based more strictly on Muslim religious law. A central issue is the degree to which the law is implemented in practice. A common observation is that there are wide gulfs between laws and their application.

In 1996, the Comité Islamique pour la Réforme du Code de la Famille au Sénégal (Islamic Committee for the Reform of Senegal’s Family Code, CIRCOFS) was formed with the goal of pushing the government to reform the Family Code based on sharia law. CIRCOFS claimed to have the backing of all of Senegal’s main religious families. However, some of Senegal’s most prominent Muslim intellectuals, such as El Hadj Moustapha Guèye, did not support the work of CIRCOFS.197 The group’s proposal sparked tense debates throughout Senegal, notably around its implications for secularism and women’s rights.

CIRCOFS stated that they would not require the application of sharia law to every Senegalese citizen—meaning that Christians would not be required to comply—but some, especially in the Christian community, were concerned that Senegal’s secular nature was at risk. He was not referring specifically to CIRCOFS, but then Archbishop of Dakar, Théodore Adrien Sarr, addressed his concerns to the Christian community: “Sometimes, we perceive signs that are sources of worry, and we ask ourselves if this secularism, which up to present is the glory of Senegal and a guarantee of peace, will not be cut back more and more.”198 To put an end to the debate and growing tensions, President Abdoulaye Wade in 2003 announced that Senegal, as a secular country, would not be implementing sharia law.199

36 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 lese female Muslims had never attended a service at the mosque, in Dakar. It maintains strong ties with Saudi Arabia.211 JIR has in comparison with a mere one percent of Senegalese men.200 been particularly active in promoting its values through edu- Many Senegalese believe that women need not attend mosque cation; the association purports to educate more than 5,000 services and that young women, in particular, should not attend, students each year in its schools, which complement the official as they can be distractions (post-menopausal women are more national curriculum with studies in Arabic and the Islamic sci- welcome in mosques).201 Mosques in Senegal have less space to ences. Sunni reformists appeal to youth through active campus accommodate women than men. Some mosques have jakka ji- groups at the .212 geen, or spaces designated for women to pray, that are small and separate from the men’s prayer space.202 However, it is mostly Despite ideological differences, Sunni reformists claim that older women who attend the mosque in Senegal.203 Interestingly, they maintain close relations with the confréries. JIR sends the practices of Sunni reformist women tend to buck Senegalese medical teams to religious events organized by the confréries, Sufi tradition; they receive a more profound religious education such as the Magal Touba or Gamou pilgrimages within Sen- than Sufi women and attend the mosque regularly (see section egal, to assist pilgrims.213 However, some leaders within the 3.3.4).204 confréries comment that JIR members avoid Sufi mosques and would dislike being led in prayer by a Sufi. This differs from Senegalese women are active in communities, participating in the Shi’a community, whose members sometimes pray in the religious groups (such as dahiras) and secular women’s groups. Sufi mosques, and are thought to have a more Sufi approach to There is an evident secular-religious divide, though, with few religion than Sunni reformists.214 women able to straddle the line and participate in both reli- gious and secular women’s associations. Some secular women’s In contrast to Senegalese Sufi orders, the reformist movements groups argue that Islam either oppresses women or that men often have an international perspective and view themselves as have distorted Islam to oppress women. Religious women, on part of the larger international Muslim ummah.215 Increasing the other hand, often believe that members of women’s secular access to technology makes it easier for young Senegalese to groups are jaded and anti-religion.205 Tensions are further exac- access media and information from other Muslim countries. erbated by groups at odds on socially and religiously sensitive Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, for example, have invested subjects, such as abortion. Collaboration among associations in Senegalese public works projects (health structures, Islamic that all work to improve the well-being of Senegalese women schools, etc.), and many offer scholarships to Senegalese stu- is quite limited. dents.216

3.3.4 Sunni reformists Women members of the Sunni reformist movement often choose more conservative dress than women among Senegal’s For decades, some Senegalese (numbers are not known precise- Sufi community. Although much of the movement’s growth ly, but are small) have turned to the Sunni reformist movement came in the 1970s, it was during the 1980s that many wom- for what they often view as a more authentic or pure prac- en in the movement began wearing the hijab217—this is of- tice of Islam.206 The movement began in the 1930s in urban ten called ibadou in Senegal after Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane. areas of Senegal, largely in reaction to the religious practices Many young women in the Sunni movement regard this as an of the Sufi confréries.207 Sunni reformists viewed the hierarchi- external manifestation of their piety and a way to demonstrate cal structure of the confréries as an obstruction that hindered a their Sunni identity.218 Except when they enter a mosque, Sen- believer’s direct relationship with God. Senegalese intellectuals egalese women outside the movement typically either do not of the movement studied Salafi Islam abroad and returned to cover at all or wear a headscarf that covers the hair only (foulard Senegal to launch organizations, such as Al Falah or Jama’atou in French or musoor in Wolof). Ibadou Rahmane (JIR), that have been proactive in promoting their religious ideals in Senegal.208 3.3.5 Shi’a Islam

Al Falah (founded in 1940) and JIR (founded in 1979) share There are two principal segments of the Shi’a community in Sene- similar objectives. Al Falah seeks to return all Muslims to what gal: the Lebanese diaspora community (which began immigrating they view as the right path, following the teachings of the to Senegal at the turn of the twentieth century in pursuit of eco- Qur’an and the in the image of the Salafis.209 JIR, in a nomic opportunity) and Senegalese who converted from Sunni to similar vein, aims to educate Senegalese to promote a “truly Is- Shi’a Islam as a result of an intellectual movement largely inspired lamic society.”210 Both associations focus on disseminating their by the in 1979.219 In 1969, the Lebanese sheikh message and have been active in the media. Al Falah has its own Abdul Monem el-Zein came to Senegal to provide for the spiritual mosques and schools, as well as summer camps for children. needs of the Lebanese community there, but also to guide Senegal’s The association organizes conferences and has a health center tiny Shi’a community220—and possibly to convert Senegalese.221

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 37 Most Senegalese who have converted to Shi’a Islam did so as youth around the time of the Iranian Revolution. As they stud- ied the Iranian Revolution, they learned about Shi’a Islam and began to question the dominance of the confréries and Sufism in Senegalese society.222 The Iranian embassy promoted Shi’a Islam in Senegal by disseminating materials; their “propagan- da” led the Senegalese government to close the Iranian embassy in Dakar in 1984 for several years.223 Leaders of the Shi’a move- ment in Senegal still maintain strong relations with Iran.

The Shi’a community constitutes a very small percentage of Senegal’s Muslim population, though precise data is not avail- able. The community is focused on expansion and has opened schools and launched charitable projects through Shi’a devel- opment associations, such as the Association Ali Yacine and the Institut Mozdahir International (IMI), with an eye to generat- ing publicity for the movement and gaining new members.224 Projects focus on economic development, health care, environ- mental protection, and agriculture.225 The community is ac- tive in the media, disseminating knowledge in their effort to dispel stereotypes about Shi’a Islam. As first and foremost an intellectual movement, Senegalese Shi’a seek to expand their community while maintaining the intellectual quality of the movement with members who have a solid foundation in the principles of Shi’a Islam.226

3.4 CHRISTIANITY The Abbaye de Keur Moussa, located just outside Dakar, is an founded by Benedictine . Christians are a small minority in Senegal (about four percent of the population), but Christianity in various forms has played siders.230 Various congregations worked in Senegal, notably the important roles in Senegal’s history and in contemporary soci- Sisters of Saint-Joseph de Cluny.231 In 1848, three Senegalese ety. Christianity was first introduced in West Africa in the fif- were ordained, setting a precedent for a native, Senega- teenth century by Catholic Portuguese explorers who founded lese priesthood. churches and sought to convert the local populations. Early in the sixteenth century, Pope Leo X encouraged the King of French missionaries established Catholic schools and provided Portugal’s chaplain to enlist converted Africans in mission ac- health care.232 Catholics were pioneers in education; the Sœurs tivities, believing that they would be more successful in con- de l’Immaculée Conception de Castre established the first school verting local communities than the Portuguese.227 Catholicism for girls in Dakar.233 Missionary-founded education expand- was the dominant faith of the French colonizers, and it played ed across Senegal in the mid to late 1800s, including training significant roles as part of the colonial legacy. Concerted evan- schools for Catholic educators.234 The Catholics also taught gelizing efforts by Protestants came later. The great majority about Christianity in local languages. The French 1905 anti- of Senegalese Christians today are, therefore, Catholic, though clerical law (which also applied in the colonies)235 slowed the Protestant communities are also active. growth of Catholic schools; a result was the establishment of a secular education system (20 years later, the French governor 3.4.1 Catholicism general reversed the ban on Catholic schools).236, 237 In 1962, Monseigneur Hyacinthe Thiandoum became the first Senega- Early French colonial efforts were closely associated with the lese Archbishop of Dakar, more firmly grounding the Catholic and its missionary work, as, from the 1800s, Church of Senegal as a Senegalese institution. the French expanded their foothold in Senegal.228 Missionaries came first to St. Louis and then established a post in 1845 near Senegalese Catholics (who number about 500,000 today) are Dakar, as well as several others on Senegal’s coast.229 Conver- concentrated in the areas that missionaries could initially most sion was slow; Islam was firmly rooted in Senegal by then, and readily reach—the Sine- region on the coast of Sene- the Europeans advancing Catholicism were seen as foreign out- gal and the Casamance in the south. The Catholic Church of

38 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Senegal has its headquarters in Dakar and is overseen by the from Finland still work closely with the Lutheran Church of Archbishop of Dakar. The Church consists of seven dioceses Senegal, but Senegalese now lead the church. It is present in six under the Ecclesiastical Province of Dakar: Dakar, Ziguin- of Senegal’s 14 regions, primarily in areas of northern and cen- chor, Kaolack, Saint-Louis, Thiès, Tambacounda, and Kolda. tral Senegal, with several dozen congregations through these The Church works with Catholic NGOs, notably Caritas and regions. A great part of the church’s following is in the region Catholic Relief Services (see chapter 4). of Fatick, where the headquarters of the Lutheran Church of Senegal is located. There are approximately 6,000 Lutherans Senegalese Catholics, like Muslims, actively promote and sup- in Senegal today,243 making the Lutheran Church one of the port community-based groups. Church groups may be specific larger Protestant churches in Senegal. The community is grow- to youth, women, and others. As with dahiras, these Catholic ing and ordained six new Senegalese pastors in February 2016. groups provide social support to members and encourage their Lutherans are active in social and charitable works, supporting spiritual growth. They support each other in times of birth and health clinics, literacy courses, and agricultural projects, among death. Groups often help organize and manage logistics for others.244 religious events. Beyond these activities, the Church supports community development. It provides skills training to youth, 3.4.2.2 United Methodist Church literacy training to rural women, health education to girls, and funding for microfinance projects, among others.238 The first United Methodist Church (UMC) missionaries ar- rived in Senegal in 1998 when the first congregation in Senegal 3.4.2 Protestant Christianity was chartered.245 The UMC has since expanded to 16 churches, with nine ordained pastors as of 2015. The church is growing, Protestants represent a small percentage of the Senegalese but retains a foreign missionary presence. Current goals include Christian minority, with numerous active denominations. creating self-sufficient churches and becoming a member of the spread originally through the efforts of the Provisional Annual Conference. Most financial support comes Evangelical Mission Society, which was largely supported by from the U.S., but a missionary aim is to develop agricultural the Reformed Church of France.239 It became active in Senegal programs that will sustain local churches.246 in 1863, focusing its evangelization efforts largely in the Casa- mance and in Saint-Louis.240 From the middle of the twentieth The UMC is involved in various development activities. Wom- century, the number of Protestant missionaries increased,241 en’s skills centers in Dakar and Mbour promote entrepreneurship and there is a quite active presence today in Senegal. by teaching sewing and cooking skills, and the church conducts leadership and skills training for prisoners.247 A microcredit pro- 3.4.2.1 Lutheran gram targets groups of women and includes financial manage- ment classes; the program boasts a repayment rate over 90 per- The Lutheran Church of Senegal, founded in 1974 by the cent to date. The headquarters in Dakar hosts a health clinic, Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, was recognized as a re- and an active nutrition program serves high-protein, low-carbo- ligious association of Senegal in 1987.242 Lutheran missionaries hydrate meals to up to 50 children one to three times a week.248 3.4.3 Other Christian Groups

The Assembly of God Church, the Baptist Church, and the Presbyterian Church are among other churches active in Sen- egal. Many maintain a strong foreign missionary presence and have not yet achieved the same level of Senegalese ownership as the Lutheran Church of Senegal.

A tiny, but active, Jehovah’s Witness community has encoun- tered resistance to its efforts to expand. The Ligue des imams et prêcheurs du Sénégal (League of Imams and Preachers of Senegal), an Islamic association, is particularly combative toward the ap- proach of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, claiming that the church is at- tempting to corrupt Senegal’s youth through dangerous means, particularly by trying to convert populations they see as vulner- able—such as women, youth, and children—at times when the The ordination of six Lutheran pastors in Fatick in February 2016. man of the house is not present.249 Objections have gone beyond

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 39 3.5 INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS Islam is Senegal’s dominant religion, but the Christian com- munities and minority Muslim groups have achieved a careful balance within society, and interreligious relations are gener- ally characterized as peaceful and cooperative. Religious toler- ance and cooperation serve as a point of pride for the Senega- lese; they also constitute an element of the Senegalese identity. There are many examples of Senegalese openness to dialogue and religious tolerance. However, wise observers comment that continued efforts and dialogue are needed to realize true religious tolerance, understanding, and cooperation (see Box 8), especially in light of regional, religiously-linked tensions. Senegalese point to interreligious marriages, including those of several Senegalese presidents, as evidence of the tolerant There are several Muslim-Christian cemeteries in Senegal, like this culture. Some Senegalese families count both Christian and one in Joal-Fadiouth. Muslim religious leaders among their numbers—18 percent verbal criticism: in 2011, a Jehovah’s Witness temple in Da- of Senegalese Muslims responded in a survey that they have 253 kar was vandalized.250 Other churches, particularly evangelical an immediate family member who is Christian. A fami- churches, have also been the targets of vandalism in Senegal in ly that has both Muslim and Christian members, they say, recent years251 linked to complaints that they were attempting to would not persecute based on religion. Abbé Jacques Seck turn Muslim and Catholic youth away from their faith.252 comments:

Box 8. Muslim-Christian relations by the numbers In 2013, Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life released a study that examined Muslim-Christian relations in nineteen sub-Saharan African countries, including Senegal. In Senegal, researchers conducted 1,000 public opinion surveys (given few responses from Senegalese Christians, data is from surveyed Muslims only). It highlighted many positive aspects of Muslim-Christian relations (see figure 7). Involvement in interreligious activities and a focus on religious commonalities point to the cooperation, understanding, and respect on which Senegalese pride themselves.

However, responses about perceptions of hostility and religious conflict indicate that interreligious relations are perhaps not as idyllic as many Senegalese present (see figure 8). Low rates of understanding of Christianity among Senegalese Muslims suggest that efforts are needed to achieve true understanding between Muslims and Christians. Figure 7. Positive interreligious views among Senegalese Figure 8. Negative interreligious views among Senegalese Muslims Muslims 100 80 76% 92% 70 80 60 67% 61% 50 60 40

40 30 23% 22% 20 16% 20 13% 10 2% 0 0 View Attend Islam and View Hold an All, most, or All, most, or Religious Know very little Christians interreligious Christianity Christians overall many Christians many Muslims conflict a big or nothing about as immoral meetings have a lot as devout positive view hostile toward hostile toward problem Christianity in common of Christians Muslims Christians

Source: “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society.” Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2013. Available at: http://www.pewforum.org/ files/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf

40 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 The reason for this mutual respect is also cultural. Our religious traditions. Elisabeth Diouf, the first lady during Abdou African ethnic heritage has traditionally focused on Diouf’s 20-year presidency, is a devout Catholic, and it is widely cultivating a common vision, a common peace within believed that Viviane Wade, wife of Senegal’s third president, is villages, cities, and throughout Senegal … Many fam- Catholic (she is quite private about her religious beliefs). Abbé ilies are in fact interfaith themselves, so it would not Jacques Seck, a Senegalese Catholic leader, doubted that this was be very practical to live with intolerance. During my likely to happen again, suggesting that Senegal’s Muslim charac- lifetime, there have also been explicit outreach pro- ter is more politically noteworthy today and that Catholic influ- grams, including a commission whose mission was to ence has waned at least to a degree.255 Religious intolerance has improve dialogue between the religions of Senegal.254 often been marked by strong public objection and outcry. For example, public outcry followed after Jeune Afrique published a Senegal’s government recognizes both Islamic and Christian cartoon in January 2016 widely seen as insulting to the Mouride holidays, including Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, Christmas, Eas- founder Sheikh Amadou Bamba Mbacké; the publisher removed ter, and Ascension. Offices are closed and both Christians and the cartoon from its website. Muslims take time off during each other’s holidays. These hol- idays form part of Senegal’s shared inheritance. Muslims often 3.6 RELIGIOUS NETWORKS AND THE invite Christian friends and neighbors to their houses to share food for Muslim holidays, and vice versa. Some mosques in SENEGALESE DIASPORA Dakar even decorate with lights during the Christmas season. Tolerance and cooperation are apparent in the existence of Growing numbers of Senegalese—mostly men—have emi- Muslim-Christian cemeteries. grated to countries abroad, especially since the 1970s, to seek economic opportunities, spurred by high poverty and unem- National leadership demonstrates religious tolerance and diver- ployment rates at home. In addition to other West and Cen- sity. Senegal’s first president following independence, Léopold tral African countries, France, the United States, Italy, Canada, Sédar Senghor, was Catholic. All subsequent presidents have Spain, Greece, and South Africa are popular destinations. Re- been Muslims, though some first ladies have come from other mittances from emigrants represent an important contribution

The Cathédrale du Souvenir africain de Dakar.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 41 to Senegal’s economy—in 2011, remittances accounted for 11 Table 4. Senegalese in the Diaspora by the Numbers261 percent of Senegal’s GDP.256 Emigrants 636,200 The Senegalese diaspora tends to be active in their religious com- Emigrants as percentage of 4.9% munities, maintaining strong ties. Dahiras of the various con- population fréries in the diaspora provide support to emigrants not only by Emigration rate of tertiary- 17.7% catering to their spiritual needs, but also material needs—for educated population example, advising on legal matters and entrepreneurial strat- 262 egies.257 The dahiras create a sense of solidarity, and members Emigration rate of physicians 51% typically send as much money as they can spare back to Senegal born in Senegal to support religious leaders and communities. Mourides in the Top destination countries in The Gambia diaspora are known for their generous contributions to infra- Africa Mauritania structure and development projects in the Mouride holy city of Côte d’Ivoire Touba. Gabon Mali The Mouride community, in particular, has strong links with- Guinea-Bissau in the diaspora. Significant Mouride emigration began in the Top destination countries France 1970s and 1980s in response to droughts and falling peanut outside of Africa Italy prices. New arrivals are welcomed by Mouride dahiras set up Spain in various global cities, making them popular destinations United States with fairly comprehensive support that could include hous- ing, financial, spiritual, and employment opportunities.258 The Among the Tidiane communities, the Niassène family, for ex- Mourides are known for giving credits and loans to each other ample, has made great efforts to cultivate strong ties with its to support entrepreneurial endeavors. The Mouride commu- U.S. communities through regular visits and the establishment nity has established the Kara International Money Exchange, of religious centers in New York.263 Many Niassène-affiliated which functions much like a rapid, low fee version of Western Tidianes in the U.S. today are African American. The Niassène Union.259 Kara is designed for ease of use so even illiterate ven- family has promoted marriages between Senegalese and Afri- dors can participate. Little documentation is required for trans- can American followers, and there are opportunities for Amer- fer, but this does not make the system more vulnerable to theft ican followers to study Islam among the Niassène community or fraud, as users are bound by the values of the confrérie.260 in Senegal.264

Senegalese Tidianes often gather separately within diaspora Senegalese Christians have also established organizations in communities based on affiliation—the Sy family of Tivaouane, the diaspora. The Senegalese Catholic Association of America, the Niassène family of Medina-Baye, Kaolack, etc. However, for example, provides spiritual guidance to members and sup- they come together for religious events and celebrations, such ports development efforts in Senegal by offering assistance for as the Gamou celebration of the birth of the Prophet, as well poverty reduction projects, an orphanage in Dakar, and clinics as conferences and visits of religious figures from Senegal. throughout the country.265

42 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 FAITH-INSPIRED DEVELOPMENT ENGAGEMENT

4.1 CIVIL ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING revive societal bonds that were diluted during the colonial era and disrupted by modernization, notably urbanization. Many RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION early civil society organizations were local grassroots entities that revolved largely around religious, cultural, and ethnic A wide variety of organizations with religious links and linkages. Formal non-governmental organizations (NGOs)— inspiration are part of Senegal’s vibrant civil society, and they both national and international—began to multiply in the late are intricately involved in many facets of development work. 1970s. As in other world regions, there is ambivalence as to whether faith institutions should be considered as civil society or are A major transformation began with the droughts of the early better treated in a distinct category. The wide range of faith- 1970s that devastated Senegal and neighboring countries, linked institutions—and the degree to which their faith sparking a severe agricultural crisis. It continued with the affiliation is formal and explicit—further complicates the issue. worldwide economic downturn of the late 1970s and early Nonetheless, faith-linked institutions operate within the broad 1980s. Government budgets for social sectors, such as health context of civil society for many purposes, and many civil and education, were severely strained, prompting communities society organizations are, formally or informally, inspired by to take on additional responsibilities. The government faith or affiliated with religious entities. In Senegal, those with introduced tax exemptions to encourage civil society religious links are subject to the same regulatory mechanisms involvement in economic activities to spur development and and coordination arrangements, such as they are, as other civil encouraged Senegalese to establish economic interest groups.267 society organizations. The 1990s saw a shift as the efforts of locally oriented groups were supplemented by organizations that took on more active Senegal’s contemporary civil society reflects legacies from involvement in national issues and advocacy, including human colonial rule and responses to evolving political and social rights. Political interventions by civil society increased.268 The developments.266 Civil society institutions helped to preserve or focus was on various issues related to democratic institutions

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 43 and governance, with groups targeting women’s rights, as well of these organizations are difficult to assess in a generalized as human and civil rights.269 Mass mobilization of social groups manner because their work is localized, and many make contributed in significant ways to reforms and social change, little use of marketing materials and public communication including advances in gender equality and activism around channels. education reform.270 4.2 FAITH ACTORS AND In a comparative framework, Senegal’s CBOs, NGOs, and other civil society groups are numerous and active in a region DEVELOPMENT of Africa where governments can be suspicious of civil society and, at times, work actively to restrict it.271 A 2011 Civicus Virtually all development activities and issues in Senegal have report highlighted both strengths and weaknesses of Senegalese religious dimensions. Religious beliefs are a factor in attitudes civil society. Strengths include its diversity and often active role and decision-making at all levels and influence many behaviors. as a mediator between state and society. Challenges include Thus, religious beliefs have many, often complex, implications competition for scarce resources and funding, as well as weak for development. Faith communities in Senegal—notably coordination. The report highlights the central historical and Islam and Christianity—have long traditions of involvement social significance of religious aspects of civil society, but also in activities that span many sectors of the development notes important questions and unresolved issues, starting agenda. The most striking instance is education, formal and with definitions of civil society and its roles. The following informal, but religious traditions and engagement are features comment is telling as a perception of where fault lines lie: “the in various sectors. The centrality (and complexity) of these role of religious groups, especially the marabous [sic], is still religious dimensions emerged in many WFDD interviews problematic when they act as an intermediary between the state with both secular and faith-inspired organizations. Religion and the population. At times the stabilising forces of religion are was highlighted as a motivating factor for social work and the same forces which prevent citizens from demanding their for charitable contributions—including among employees of rights, at the right moment and in an organized manner.”272 secular organizations—and in determining priorities. Both faith and secular actors asserted that faith calls them to action, 4.1.1 The civil society regulatory environment with many citing a belief, often expressed in religious terms, that everyone deserves a dignified life. Senegal’s constitution recognizes freedom of association and many groups form and operate in a relatively free environment. This report uses the term faith-inspired organization (FIO), in The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Women, contrast to the commonly used faith-based organization (FBO), the Family, and Social Development oversee registration and to highlight the range of organizations engaged in development regulation.273 All types of organizations are legally prohibited work and their complex and varied faith or religious beliefs. The from identifying with a race, ethnic group, sex, sect, language, FIO designation aims to capture a wider range of actors than or region. Formally registered organizations in Senegal operate FBO, which suggests direct organizational links. The mission in three legal forms: associations, foundations, and NGOs. and vision of an FIO is inspired or guided by the teachings of Associations are the easiest to form and operate, whereas NGOs a religious tradition or traditions, or an organization’s history have the highest legal barriers to formation, typically requiring may be deeply rooted in such traditions. This definition reflects an initial two years as an association.274 the wide diversity among FIOs in Senegal and the different roles that religious institutions and beliefs play in their missions Some 11,600 associations currently operate in Senegal; they and operations. Many organizations cite religious values as are counted as 5,000 community associations; 2,500 sporting the primary motivation for their work, but the ways in which and cultural associations; 2,000 religious associations; 700 religious values and development work are understood and professional associations, including 250 trade unions, 300 advanced differ; one example is how directly religious language educational, and 150 health associations; and more than 200 or efforts to gain religious followers should, and should not, be political associations. There are 487 registered NGOs—303 involved in service provision. FIOs fall broadly along a range national and 184 foreign.275 There are no restrictions on faith- extending from large well-funded transnational organizations based organizations per se, so long as they do not discriminate like World Vision, Islamic Relief, and Caritas Internationalis based on race or religion. to smaller Senegalese NGOs and associations to informal local organizations. Links to religious institutions may be unstated Many entities exist informally as organisations communautaires and rather complex. Some organizations appear on the surface de base, or community-based organizations (CBOs). Typically to be secular but are colored by the faith of their staff, which working at the local level, CBOs rarely have legal status, and no emerges in conversations about motivations for social and specific legal framework governs them.276 The scope and impact community development.

44 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Larger and more formal civil society institutions are easily of Franco-Arabic schools—both public and private—that offer identifiable and attract the most focus. However, local FIOs are a instruction in both French and Arabic and include both secular common feature of communities, and they also play vital roles in and religious aspects within the curriculum. With a significant development. There is, however, no overall “mapping” or sound number of private, religiously-operated schools (from pre-school estimate of numbers and reach. Situated within the community, to Catholic and Islamic universities), a wide range of religious these organizations operate with an intimate understanding of the organizations play important, direct roles in education. context and are often respected in part because of their religious ethos. Their work is often, though not always, transparent and Senegal has seen significant gains in school enrollment and they are directly accountable to the communities.277 CBOs, literacy rates in recent decades, the result of both a culture many of which have faith links, respond to specific needs, for that values education and government policy focus and example mobilizing resources to install wells with pumps. CBOs investments. However, there are significant gaps and problem may strategically seek the support of local religious leaders, who areas. Priority in public discourse is reflected in significant are often aware of those most in need, especially marginalized budget outlays: education accounted for 41 percent of individuals and communities. The potential for religious leaders the total government budget in 2012278 and education to quickly mobilize their community is a valuable asset; however, expenditures increased by 62.5 percent between 2003 and as is true in many community-driven strategies, careful oversight 2006.279 In 2013, Senegal’s primary school enrollment (7-12) and coordination may be needed to mitigate inconsistency, counted 1.58 million students and lower secondary (13-16) repetition, or exclusionary activities. 1.23 million, with 7,795 public primary schools and 1,189 private schools. An estimated 87 percent of students at the Field research between June 2014 and February 2016 to map primary level attended public schools, while the rest attended the activities of FIOs in Senegal focused on Islamic, Christian, registered private schools (2013).280 Jewish, and multi-faith organizations working at the local, national, and international level, as well as on specific issues Official data on education highlight steady increases in net focused on areas where development and faith agendas are primary school enrollment, which doubled between 1981 closely linked. Christian FIOs were often the easiest to identify and 2014, to 73 percent.281 Attendance rates at primary level in Muslim-majority Senegal for various reasons, including vary widely from well over 90 percent of school-age children name recognition (several international organizations), web in urban areas to as low as 10 percent in some rural areas. presence, and explicit faith affiliation. Contributions of FIOs Student performance is a significant issue. The gross primary to development efforts extend across many domains, ranging completion rate in 2014 was 61 percent,282 and of those who from education and health to peacebuilding and food security. continue to secondary school, a great number drop out—the Broad generalizations about FIOs working in Senegal are lower secondary-level completion rate was only 41.2 percent.283 problematic given patchy data and wide diversity. This chapter Literacy rates are low by international standards, with 70 provides a broad introduction to several key development percent of youth aged 15-24 literate,284 and 56 percent of the sectors, highlighting their religious dimensions, then presents population aged 15 and over.285 selected organizations and their work, to illustrate the range and nature of engagement. The analysis does not seek to Disparities within the education system are a central issue with compare or assess their effectiveness or their overall impact. the major gaps being rural/urban and boys/girls. UNDP’s 2014 Such an evaluation would illuminate the contributions of FIOs Human Development Report noted that Senegal’s Human to broader development strategies and their distinctive inputs, Development Index (HDI) is 0.485—ranking 163 of 187— but was beyond the scope of the present research project. and its Inequality-Adjusted HDI (IHDI) was only 0.326.286 The HDI is calculated based on health, education, and income, 4.2.1 Education representing the national average on human development achievements.287 The IDHI provides a more comprehensive Religion plays a central role in both education delivery and policy outlook on a country, showing how the human development in Senegal, with debates dating back to the pre-independence achievements are distributed. Senegal lost nearly one-third of its era. There are parallel secular and religious education systems, HDI value, and education inequalities accounted for nearly 45 and the balance or intersections of these are complex and often percent of this loss.288 not well understood. Poor management of some informal Qur’anic schools, for example, is clearly problematic but there The number of girls attending schools has increased rapidly are also examples of excellence among them. Despite Senegal’s in recent decades and in some cases, enrollment rates for girls secular constitution and traditions, there have been continuing are higher than for boys. In 2012, the ratio of 1.09 girls in demands, now enacted in policy, to include religious instruction primary school for every boy was a notable change from 0.73 in the public school curriculum. This is reflected in the growth in 1990.289 However, more boys continue to the secondary

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 45 level than girls—in 2011, 91 girls were enrolled in secondary Figure 9: Survival Rate to the Last Grade of Primary school for every 100 boys,290 though this represents substantial Education, Both Sexes (%) progress from 1990 when the secondary gross enrollment ratio 80 was 0.50.291 Beyond access to education, girls and women lag in other ways. Only 51 percent of females ages 15-24 were literate in 2013,292 and the literacy ratio of females to males 70 ages 15-24 was 0.83, an increase from just 0.57 in 1988.293

Senegalese children can attend public or private schools, 40 but quality is a major challenge for both. Education is compulsory and free for children ages 6-16,294 though costs for materials, unofficial costs, and registration fees, while low, 50 can be prohibitive for the poorest families.295 Public schools are largely accessible to communities throughout Senegal. However, rising enrollments have strained resources, leading 40 to inadequate infrastructure, double-shift schooling, and large 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Years class sizes. Political and social turbulence have long affected Sub-Saharan Africa World Senegal education quality, notably teacher strikes that abbreviate (developing only) academic years.296 This undermines the popularity of public Source: “Survival rate to the last grade of primary education, both sexes schools and is one reason that parents send their children to (%).” World Bank, 2015. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SE.PRM.PRSL.ZS/countries/1W-SN-ZF?display=graph alternative, often religious, schools.297 Compared to private school students, who had an 88 percent success rate on primary Private sector education helps to fill the gaps and it includes a leaving certificate exams, the rate for public school students significant number of religiously run schools. Private schools stood at only 53 percent.298 provide education not only for the children of the elite; middle

Box 9. Types of schools in Senegal Public schools: Government run institutions comprise a majority of schools in Senegal. Reforms in 2004 allowed up to four hours of religious education in the public schools. Some FIOs in partnership with the government construct classrooms to meet the demands of growing enrollments and poor infrastructure (temporary classrooms, etc.).

Private, secular schools: Privately run institutions, recognized by the government. These schools are required to follow the government-approved curriculum, use government recommended textbooks, and employ licensed teaching staff. Some receive government subsidies for operating expenses.

Traditional Qur’anic Schools, daaras: These schools are largely informal schools established by a Qur’anic teacher, marabout, and largely teach the Qur’an. This system is very decentralized and the government regulates few schools. (See Box 11. Talibés and Daaras.)

‘Modern’ daaras: Privately run, but are regulated and approved by the government as private schools; some receive government support. This group of schools is a small segment, but seen as a potential area for expansion. Modern daaras may offer trilingual instruction, with Arabic, French, and national languages.299

Franco-Arabic private schools: hybrid form of school that teaches both in Arabic and French and that includes religious education (Qur’anic studies, etc.) and the normal public curriculum. These schools are generally licensed by the government.

Franco-Arabic public schools: With the 2004 reforms, these schools were incorporated into the government school system. Their basic structure is similar to their private counterparts. Public Franco-Arabic schools have increased steadily in number, from 9 schools in 2003 to 103 schools in 2009.

Private Christian Schools: The majority of private Christian schools are Catholic, however some Protestant affiliated schools exist. (See Box 10. Catholics and education.)

46 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 and working class families make enormous sacrifices to pay for 1.3 percent public Franco-Arabic, 6.1 percent private and private education because they believe it offers a more secure secular, 2.9 percent private Franco-Arabic, 1.7 percent private economic future for their children and instills sound values. Catholic, and 0.1 percent private Protestant.­306 The share of Students from registered private institutions are admitted to private education is higher at the secondary level than primary state examinations and may receive state diplomas. In 2009, (33.6 percent versus 13.2 percent).307 about 88 percent of primary schools were public and secular, Religious education is a significant issue and the focus of policy debate and practical action. The education reform of 2004 allowed Box 10. Catholics and education for optional religious education in public school curriculum, The Catholic Church in Senegal plays an active role reflecting longstanding demands in political discourse.308 Up to in education and l’Office National de l’Enseignement four hours of religious education a week are permitted in Senegal’s Catholique du Senegal (National Office of Catholic public elementary schools, and parents can choose to enroll their Teaching of Senegal, ONECS) oversees their educational children in religious classes, with the option to select either a efforts. During the 2013-2014 school year, there were Muslim or Christian curriculum.309 The same education reform 298 formal Catholic schools in Senegal, ranging from recognized Franco-Arabic schools and aimed to create modern pre-schools to two universities (in Dakar and Ziguinchor, daaras and to modernize existing daaras by integrating trilingual part of l’Université Catholique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, or instruction—Arabic, French, and national languages.310 Islamic the Catholic University of West Africa), and educating and Arabic schools have long appealed to families in Muslim- over 107,000 students.300 In addition to its formal majority Senegal. Language is an important issue in the education schools, Catholic Church initiatives provide informal sector; literacy rates often do not take into account those literate education to 50,000 children in rural villages who do not in Arabic or local languages. Some statistics do not include those have access to other institutions. enrolled in daaras in gross and net enrollment rates.311

The Catholic teaching philosophy focuses on the Apart from formal and informal educational institutions development of an individual as a whole, including (including universities and various technical training colleges), material knowledge, values, and the spiritual.301 Catholic there are a wide variety of institutions and programs focused on school students come from Senegal’s various faith informal education, particularly adult education. These include traditions, where the majority of students are Muslim, literacy programs and a range of traditional and modern and while a spiritual education is included, proselytism apprenticeships. Various religious institutions and FIOs are is explicitly excluded and other faiths are respected. involved in such programs. Catholic schools today appeal to those seeking a rigorous education, and they have a reputation for providing a The following organizations and profiles illustrate the work of quality education;302 students typically perform well on FIOs in the education sector and trends in religious education. exams.303 Brother Jean Marie Thior, the National Secretary Those selected serve as examples of approaches and engagement of ONECS attributes this to teacher training, where they but are not fully representative of all education activities relating are taught to communicate knowledge, know-how, and to religion, given their wide range and diversity. social skills, as well as leading by example. At the primary school level, the teachers are all Catholic by design, but at 4.2.1.1 Caritas Senegal higher levels, there are about 400 non-Catholic teachers who, while not Catholic, are expected to respect the spirit Caritas Senegal, established in 1966, shortly after Senegal’s of Catholic education.304 independence, gained NGO status in 1995.312 The mission of Caritas Internationalis, the international FIO that Caritas Senegal The Catholic Church and ONECS foster a positive is part of, is to serve the poor and to promote charity and justice relationship with the government and the Ministry of throughout the world.313 It serves as the official “helping hand Education. ONECS sees that its formal schools adhere of the Church.”314 Caritas Senegal draws on the social teachings to government requirements, including school hours and doctrine of the Catholic Church to inform its work and and curriculum content. The government in return does not proselytize, but works to transmit the values within the provides a small annual subsidy to reward mutual efforts Gospel that it views as universal values.315 Caritas Senegal avoids in education.305 Private Catholic schools are a popular all forms of discrimination: ethnic, political, and religious.316 option for many families. However, they can be much Projects are centered on education, food security, migration more expensive than public schools, and are out of reach assistance, and improved access to water and sanitation. In each for many families. area, at both the local and national levels, the goals are to raise awareness and to contribute to improving lives.317

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 47 Caritas’ Senegal team aims to tailor its projects to social demand. Given parental demand for better quality education and the importance of education within the Catholic tradition, it has been especially active in this sector. Two focus areas have been improving facilities and teacher training. Caritas has worked with the Senegalese government to expand educational facilities, building public elementary and high schools for which the government provides teachers.318 The Catholic Church is known for its emphasis on teacher development, and Caritas extends that to teachers within the public school system.

Caritas offers a child sponsorship program that assists children from the poorest families in Senegal and provides students with school supplies. Their child sponsorship program is need-based and available to children of all faiths. This program covers the A daara in Thiès, where students study the Qur’an alongside public school fees, which can be prohibitive for some students. French, Arabic, and English.

Box 11. Talibés and Daaras Many parents in Muslim-majority Senegal seek an Islamic education for their children. Daaras, or Qur’anic schools, are seen to provide children with both a religious and moral education. Daaras are outside the formal, regulated educational system and vary greatly in structure, hours of instruction, educational content, and instructor training. Many daaras focus exclusively on religious education, typically through rote memorization of the Qur’an and instruction in the Islamic sciences and practice. Some daaras function as a complementary form of education through afterschool or weekend programs, while others are the primary source of education for children and operate as boarding schools. The schools typically provide room and board for students, often at low or no cost.

Students at the daaras are known as talibés. Recent estimate show that ten percent of school age Senegalese children attend only Qur’anic school (164,000), whereas many children attend both Qur’anic and modern schools (820,000).319 Many boys are sent to live in these schools—typically in another city—while studying and memorizing the Qur’an, whereas girls typically receive a Qur’anic education close to home. Parents may choose to send their sons to study in the daaras, thus fulfilling their obligation to provide them a religious (and moral) education. Many Senegalese entrust their children to the instructors, called marabouts, trusting them as selfless religious leaders motivated by their faith. Students come not only from Senegal, but also surrounding countries.

Traditionally, daaras offered education, with room and board, in rural areas. Talibés carried out farm work in the daaras’ fields, which provided for the needs of the daaras and the marabouts’ operating expenses. The 1970s droughts spurred the rural exodus, and led to transfer or establishment of daaras in the cities.320 A new system emerged where many marabouts faced difficulties providing for their talibés without the agricultural system they had previously depended upon. To make ends meet, some marabouts began sending the talibés into the streets between classes to ask for money. It is common today to see talibés in the streets asking for money, rice, and sugar throughout the day.

The daara system has come under scrutiny because of reported cases of child mistreatment. Many daaras provide their students with a quality education and proper care, but some have poor living conditions and require their students to go into the streets to ask for money. There have been reports of marabouts abusing children who do not raise the required amount of money.321 A 2010 Human Rights Watch report indicated that at least 50,000 children in Senegal’s daaras may live in poor conditions, at times facing abuse or exploitation.322 Dr. Rudolph T. Ware III, a scholar on , provides a contrasting perspective on Qur’anic education in Senegal, explaining the roots of and motivation for several practices of knowledge transmission that are often perceived as controversial.323 Senegal’s government, NGOs, and religious leaders are involved in a variety of efforts to modernize and better regulate the daara system, but there is no consensus or coherent reform program at present.324

48 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Children study the Qur’an on weekends and school vacations at this daara in Dakar. 4.2.1.2 Franco-Arabic Schools325 add religious education into the school system. Mbow said, “We need to create a model that will be at the intersection The first Franco-Arabic school in Senegal opened its doors between the classic educational model and the demand for in 1963. A private institution, it sought to combine the state a religious education.” sponsored curriculum with an Arabic and Islamic education. The number of private Franco-Arabic schools had grown to The motivation for school reform was the perceived gap in the 233 as of 2009, comprising almost three percent of all formal curriculum and its secular focus, but it was also in reaction primary schools. More than half of the schools are located in to the classification of schools. The majority of the leaders of Dakar. Public Franco-Arabic schools began to be established in the reform were current or former members of SNELAS, and 2002, although the education reform law officially sanctioning they viewed the divide between the formal education system such schools was not passed until 2004. and the informal system, which was often religious education, as unjust. Their advocacy resulted in the facets of education The reforms were successfully enacted as previously reform that involved religious education. disjointed actors and efforts came together with a common goal of incorporating Arabic and into the 4.2.1.3 African American Islamic Institute public educational system. Key actors included Cheikh Mbow, the Director of the Division of Arabic education, The African American Islamic Institute (AAII) was founded members of Syndicat national des enseignants de langue in Senegal’s in 1988 by Sheikh Hassan Ali arabe du Sénégal (The National Union of Arabic Teachers of Cisse, a leading member of the influential Niassène family of Senegal, SNELAS), and members of Islamic organizations. the Tijaniyya, with operations in 17 countries; headquarters Many of these actors held strategic positions within the today are in the United States. AAII’s work is rooted in the Ministry of Education and were at the center of initiatives to Islamic concept of nasrul ‘ilm, or knowledge benefiting

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 49 humanity, which promotes the practices of feeding the hungry; is open for ten months of the year and had 600 students as caring for the sick; protecting the interests of women and of 2008.332 Anecdotal reports suggest that graduates of the children; teaching and pursuing knowledge; and fostering program go on to succeed in both the secular and religious peace among mankind.326 AAII is involved broadly in human worlds, including one young woman who is now in medical development, with a particular focus on education, health, school.333 The pre-primary school teaches 250 children from women’s empowerment, child welfare, hunger, poverty, and ages three to five reading, Islamic manners, memorization of peacebuilding. short chapters of the Qur’an, pre-computational skills, and socialization in an Islamic environment.334 AAII views universal education, for both girls and boys, as a basic human right supported by Islamic teachings, especially 4.2.2 Orphans and vulnerable children in passages about literacy and the pursuit of knowledge. It holds that providing an Islamic education can counter radical Children’s welfare presents multiple and overlapping challenges ideologies and promote peace in Senegalese society.327 AAII has in Senegal and is a central focus for various FIOs. Orphans branches in Medina-Baye, Kaolack, and Kossi-Atlanta and it and vulnerable children (OVC) are “orphans and other groups operates an International Islamic Schools Program consisting of children who are more exposed to risks than their peers,” of three schools (a Qur’anic school, an Arabic school, a pre- as defined by the World Bank. Many factors contribute to primary school) and two adult literacy initiatives (a women’s varying degrees and types of vulnerability.335 Critical issues literacy project, and an adult literacy and education project). for Senegal include child labor, female genital cutting (FGC; The women’s literacy initiative has taught over 5,000 women see box 13), malnutrition, some instances of trafficking, and to read and write in their local languages. The adult literacy limited access to education and its poor quality. The most initiative operates in Kossi-Atlanta and offers both academic visible vulnerable children are those on the streets, some and computer literacy for men and women in rural areas in of them talibés and others orphans. Youth, an important order to improve their economic stability and give them the category at the borderlines of OVC, face many challenges. ability to educate their children.328 The government’s Stratégie nationale de protection de l’enfant (National Strategy for Child Protection, SNPE),336 aims to AAII’s education programs respond to the demands of establish an integrated national system of child protection, Senegalese society, while also offering an education in Senegalese including public and private sector actors, to support and Sufi scholarship, which appeals to African American and other promote positive social change. Various FIOs are directly or international Muslim students. The International Islamic Schools indirectly involved in aspects of the strategy. program is open to international students from Africa, America, and Europe, preparing them for higher education opportunities. Faith communities globally have through history given high The program offers language courses in English, French, Arabic, priority to care of OVC, and especially orphans; this tradition and Wolof, as well as a variety of academic courses needed to is significant in Senegal. In Islam, the Prophet taught that those continue in conventional educational systems.329 who care for others will be highly esteemed and rewarded337 and Christianity also highlights care for the most vulnerable. The Qur’anic school offers year-round classes for 1,800 An estimated seven percent of Senegalese children under students, both boys and girls. It has an international faculty 18 years old are paternal, maternal, or double orphans. In and the curriculum focuses on teaching students to read, write, 2005, approximately 250,000 children were living without a and memorize verses of the Qur’an. Students work toward the mother, 370,000 without a father, and 67,000 had lost both goal of becoming , or one who has committed the entire parents.338 Socially, many Senegalese count les enfants de la rue Qur’an to memory.330 Most students begin Qur’anic education (street children) within the larger category of orphans (see around age ten, spend two or three years completing their quote). These children often have living parents, but they Qur’anic education, and then continue studies in secular or receive little (if any) support from their families—education, Arabic schools. A visit by (founder) Imam Cisse to the United food, etc. There are few orphanages in Senegal, but those that States in the 1970s and 1980s motivated African American exist are typically faith-inspired. The extended family often parents to send their children to study with him; many of those takes in orphans, possibly explaining the low prevalence of students are now imams.331 institutional facilities for orphans. More common are a range of child sponsorship programs that support children within a The Arabic school offers an immersive Arabic primary and community framework. secondary school education with a full academic curriculum that complements conventional coursework with a religious Other children besides orphans face various vulnerabilities. curriculum. Courses include Islamic jurisprudence, Arabic Some religious groups focus on these issues in specific programs grammar, literature, mathematics, and history. The school and as advocates. Child labor, linked to limited access to

50 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 education in part due to poor living conditions. school overcrowding and “The generic and general definition of an orphan Christian involvement with high cost, is a leading issue. is a child that has lost both his parents, or a vulnerable talibés is sensitive, Under-education is a critical child that has lost one of his parents. But in especially following the 2013 challenge with only 27.4 arrest of a Brazilian Christian percent of appropriate age Senegal, people have the tendency to expand missionary who ran a center children attending secondary this definition to children who roam the streets, for talibés and street children school.339 Many work instead. even if both parents are alive because we don’t in Mbour; he was imprisoned DHS 2014 data indicate that consider them very different from orphans given for several months on 26.5 percent of children in that they are without support. We have a narrow suspicion of attempting to Senegal age five to 17 worked definition of orphan and another that is broader. convert and corrupt minors, during the week prior to the but was later released.347 survey (economic activities We focus on the broader definition because or domestic tasks), and boys that definition allows us to support childhood 4.2.2.1. Secours Islamique were more than twice as likely development. It is the child that interests us. France to work as girls.340 Child We believe that a child must be aided, assisted, labor is three times higher educated, and cared for.” Secours Islamique France in rural than in urban areas (Islamic Relief France, SIF), (35.8 percent compared to a humanitarian aid and relief 11.7 percent).341 Agriculture, -Issa Diop, coordinator of the Institut de organization founded in a mainstay of the Senegalese bienfaisance islamique pour les orphelins au France in 1991, is a member of economy, is one of the largest Sénégal the Islamic Relief Worldwide employers of child laborers: network. It grounds its 85.6 percent of children ages activities in the values of 7-14 engaged in economic activities in 2011 were working in Islam, particularly peace and caring for the most impoverished agriculture.342 populations, focusing its work in areas that have symbolic and important meaning in the Qur’an—water, orphans, and food Malnutrition affects many Senegalese children and has long- for the most vulnerable.348 Inspired by the values of Islam and lasting effects on their wellbeing; the stunting rate for children the preservation of human dignity, many SIF projects are based under five was 18.7 percent (2014), with the rate in rural areas on Islamic principles, such as waqf (ongoing charity), aqiqah almost double that in urban areas (23.2 percent versus 12.4 (animal sacrifice), and zakat al maal (charitable contribution), percent).343 Stunting, or low height for age, is a sign of chronic or around the of Ramadan and Eid al-Adha.349 malnutrition and can lead to decreased cognitive, motor, and SIF’s Senegal mission opened in 2009, largely focusing on food language development in the short-term, and affect school security, welfare for the poor, and vulnerable children.350 Since performance, work capacity, and work productivity in the its Dakar office opened, SIF Senegal has progressively increased long-term;344 proper nutrition before age five is particularly its emphasis on childhood projects; eight percent of the important. Some FIOs recognize this vulnerability and have mission’s programming funds supported childhood activities responded with programs that include efforts to combat in 2009,351 increasing to 59 percent in 2014 (of a total budget malnutrition, including food fortification, deworming, and for 2014 of US$776,772).352 vitamin supplements.345 However, this is rarely a central priority. There are various individual sponsorship programs, Child sponsorship is a central SIF activity globally. The some of which address nutrition and food security specifically. Senegal program specifically targets orphans and began with 28 sponsored children in 2009,353 growing to 520 orphans in The OVC issue that has attracted the most active FIO Dakar alone in 2015.354 The sponsorship program provides involvement is the situation of the talibés (see Box 11), with a monthly scholarship distributions to the child’s guardian, variety of community-based care facilities and advocacy efforts. who acts as the child’s representative. The SIF team conducts Christian missionaries run some programs. Talibé centers regular home visits to children in the program to ensure that typically give children a safe space to relax and have fun, and the scholarship funds are put to proper use. The team can provide showers, meals, and clothes washing. Certain centers then check on the child’s welfare, namely living conditions, also offer basic medical care.346 While some missionaries educational progress, and health.355 Through partnership hope their acts of compassion will lead to conversion, they with a government health structure, beginning in 2013, describe a broader mission of providing direct support and SIF-sponsored children receive free health screenings. SIF breaking the cycle of sending children to institutions with Senegal also has a stock of medications that they can provide

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 51 to sponsored children with a prescription from a health before implementing programmatic activities. Staff members center. SIF aims to prepare sponsored children and their say that this ensures sustained community engagement and guardians for the future through skills training. Guardians a participatory approach.368 This approach has shaped HAI are provided with training on best childcare practices and Senegal 2014 programs in 51 communities, which include well they are offered elective training in income-generating building, construction of classrooms and places of worship, activities.356 and sponsorship of a few individuals’ pilgrimages to Mecca.369 HAI Senegal staff comment that they do not approach religious SIF is also involved with the talibé issue. In 2014, their authorities when working in new communities because they program included 2,000 talibés from 15 daaras in Dakar.357 want to avoid religious politics.370 The organization’s talibé activities fall into four categories: improvement of the material living conditions of talibés, HAI Senegal also focuses on orphans, particularly their education, modernization of the daaras, and professional education and health. The orphan program began by sponsoring integration.358 SIF works to provide talibés with access to clean 279 orphans, growing steadily to supporting 3,800 orphans water and improve general hygiene. Working with daaras as of 2015.371 HAI Senegal provides bimonthly stipends for (which provide training in Arabic), SIF integrates French health, education, and social needs. A team of social workers language training into the curriculum. Teachers trained in follows up with each orphan to ensure that the money is being French assist the children in gaining French language skills spent for the child’s well-being and that his/her needs are to make the transition into traditional schools—if desired— being addressed. The staff organizes free consultation days for easier. School supplies kits are distributed to talibés.359 children in its programs to monitor their health and provide necessary medications. HAI UK and HAI donors and SIF Senegal also has food security and malnutrition sponsors help fund the orphan program.372 HAI Senegal’s social initiatives.360 Following the tradition of the Prophet, the Aqiqas development program accounted for 87 percent of its 2014 project allows families to donate a sacrifice in honor of their budget of US$3,290,638. This program includes HAI Senegal’s newborn children to provide meals for vulnerable children in projects to aid orphans and their families; send individuals on Dakar.361 During Islamic holidays, in particular, SIF provides pilgrimage to Mecca; and construct infrastructure, such as food assistance to the most vulnerable populations. SIF Senegal wells and places of worship.373 has been involved in malaria prevention efforts through the distribution of mosquito nets and provides aid following HAI Senegal provides training to families of orphans—both emergencies such as fires, floods, and droughts.362 single and double—especially widowed mothers.374 This program assists women with income generating activities so 4.2.2.2 Human Appeal International that they are better able to support their children and families. In 2014, HAI Senegal began more actively promoting micro Human Appeal International (HAI) Senegal is a field office projects and funded 31 such projects in various domains, of HAI United Arab Emirates. In 1988 HAI succeeded the including agriculture, sewing, and micro gardening.375 HAI Comité des Œuvres de bienfaisance (Committee of Charitable Senegal maintains that by supporting beneficiaries within their Works) founded in 1984 in the UAE. The Senegal office was own areas of interest, it can strengthen the women’s capacity established in 1992.363 HAI Senegal considers itself, first and and encourage sustainable enterprises that will have long-term foremost, a humanitarian, political, non-denominational benefits for children and families.376 NGO that serves all Senegalese in need, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or geographical location.364 Projects include care of 4.2.2.3 L’institution de bienfaisance islamique pour les orphans, aid to victims of natural disasters, and assistance for orphelins au Sénégal the most vulnerable in society (children, elders, and those with disabilities). As with many other HAI field offices, The Institution of Islamic Charity for Orphans in Senegal several of HAI Senegal’s activities are centered around Islamic (IBIOS), founded in 1988 and legally recognized the same holidays. However, HAI Senegal states that it has no religious year, is located in in the suburbs of Dakar. This small affiliation.365 This contrasts with HAI UK, which highlights organization works to help local children with an emphasis the Islamic principle of zakat in its work.366 on orphans, children in difficult situations, and children from impoverished families. Sadio Diop, who serves as the In line with its humanitarian orientation, HAI Senegal projects organization’s coordinator, explains that his parents founded focus on community development, aiming inter alia to improve the organization because “every Senegalese must contribute socio-economic living conditions, reinforce relationships to the development of his country,” and his parents did so by with the government, and build private structures.367 HAI investing in orphans, who are the most vulnerable population. Senegal consults with communities to identify local needs Diop and his sister run the organization today, observing that

52 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 “the Prophet (PBUH) [taught] that there is great grace in aiding an orphan.” They aim “to give these children the same opportunities that other children have.”377

IBIOS identifies as an orphanage but its definition of an orphan is broad: children without one or both parents, as well as children who have two living parents but without proper support or care. Diop argues that this definition is important to IBIOS’ work because staff believe that all children deserve to be cared for, aided, and educated. Thus IBIOS provides for students’ basic needs, including clothing, medical care, and an education.

IBIOS services and programs are available to all children in need, regardless of religion, gender, or race. In 2014, IBIOS worked with 180 children, 90 percent of whom it considered “very vulnerable.” At one site, IBIOS hosts a school, health center, and mosque. The Ministry of National Education recognizes their primary school, a Franco-Arabic school that offers instruction in both languages to ease transition into secondary options. About 50 percent of the students are orphans, and the others come from families unable to assure an education for their children. IBIOS has a policy that they will not deny a child an education if the child’s parent(s) is unable to pay school fees. Diop says that this sets the school apart from others.

In addition to formal education, IBIOS provides supportive services for students after their primary education and extends medical support to the community. As IBIOS provides only primary education, it stays in contact with students as they A girl brewing aataaya, traditional Senegalese tea, in Belle Kelel, continue to secondary school, assisting them as necessary. Saint-Louis. If a student does not succeed in his or her studies, IBIOS its scope to health, water and sanitation, education, food encourages the child to pursue vocational training. IBIOS built security, and child protection. a health center, originally for its students, but opened its doors to community members when the need became evident. The A core tenet of World Vision is placing children at the forefront health center is officially recognized by Senegal’s Ministry of of its work.381 WV/Senegal cross-sector programs target Health and Social Action, and children in IBIOS’ programs children–directly or indirectly–through programs that work receive free consultations and medications as needed. Under to improve the overall well-being of communities. Health the leadership of Diop’s parents, IBIOS ensured funding programs target children directly, such as baby weighing, through personal connections with Saudi funders; however, deworming, vitamin A supplementation, and immunizations. new funds are being sought to build a three-story building to The organization also assists women in creating small businesses house the orphans to better ensure their safety and well-being. as part of a food security program, which in turn affects the well-being of children in the women’s households. WV/ 4.2.2.4 World Vision Senegal’s 2014 budget was US$21,755,703, approximately 70 percent of which came from sponsorship funds.382 World Vision has been active in Senegal since 1975 and established an office in 1983.378 World Vision International World Vision is active on child protection issues, defining (one of the world’s largest FIOs) “work[s] with the poor child protection as “all efforts to prevent and respond to abuse, and oppressed to promote human transformation.”379 The neglect, exploitation, and other forms of violence against organization’s ideals, rooted in Christianity, inspire its work children––especially the most vulnerable.”383 This definition and approach, which value all people and leads them to act as includes the physical, emotional, psychological, and spiritual stewards and partners.380 Initially focused on the droughts of needs of children. WV/Senegal work ranges from girls at risk the 1980s, World Vision/Senegal (WV/Senegal) has expanded for FGC to talibés. Starting early, WV/Senegal works with

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 53 communities to raise awareness about the importance of birth for the Protection of Children against Violence and Abuse, registration and supports parents in obtaining birth certificates PEVA)388 to strengthen policy for child protection.389 for their children.384 4.2.3 Women’s empowerment, men’s roles WV/Senegal works at the national level, including advocacy and partnership development. WV/Senegal has been involved Improving women’s status is a central development goal for in the government’s National Strategy for Child Protection,385 Senegal and for many of its development partners. Many aimed at establishing an integrated national system of child FIOs and religious communities emphasize the importance protection, including public and private sector actors and, more of addressing women’s poverty, enhancing education for broadly, supporting and promoting positive social change. In girls, ending harmful practices affecting girls, and supporting 2014, World Vision launched a three and a half year project, vulnerable groups, such as widows and orphans. Religious the Senegal Child Protection and Participation (SCPP) project, actors are engaged in various, targeted gender-specific which promotes community initiatives that address child labor, development activities along these lines. This section early marriage, and FGC.386 Activities have included advocacy reviews progress and challenges that arise in various gender through art,387 marches against early marriages, and creating development activities, focusing on the positive involvement partnerships. In 2015, World Vision formed a partnership of religious actors or religious elements. It also explores with le Réseau des parlimentaires sénégalais pour la protection des more contentious aspects; in a context where certain features enfants contre les violences et abus (the Parliamentary Network of gender agendas are especially contentious among some religious communities and the traditions of a patriarchal

Box 12. Youth and religious interventions Senegal, like many of its West African neighbors, has a young population, with 19.6 percent of the 2015 population between the ages of 15 and 24.390 This youth bulge strains already limited education, health, and employment systems: youth unemployment is significantly higher than unemployment overall (13.0 percent of those 15-24 years versus 10.0 percent overall in 2014).391 Poor youth literacy (ages 15-24)—at 56 percent in 2013392—limits youth employment options. Youth who do obtain higher education also have difficulty finding employment; unemployment among Senegalese with higher education degrees was 31 percent in 2011. Employment opportunities for those with university-level education have not kept pace with the number of graduates; in fact, college graduates experience the highest rate of long-term unemployment (greater than one year) at 74 percent. In contrast, those with no formal education have a long-term unemployment rate of 41 percent, many working informal jobs.393 With weak employment prospects domestically, many youth migrate,394 frequently to Europe. Migration to Italy between January and March 2015 counted 1,200 Senegalese, up 25 percent from the same period in 2014.395

Religious leaders share the broad concern about the challenges of youth unemployment. There is a range of responses that aim variously to support individuals and groups and, more generally, reach out with approaches to discourage illicit behavior (like drug taking) or the lure of radical messages, especially those that encourage violent action. These programs are not well mapped, but are taking on increasing importance. Several FIOs, including the National Association of Imams and of Senegal, Caritas, and the Lutheran Church of Senegal, provide literacy and job skills training to youth. Some faith communities and institutions do not separate youth from other programs, but do explicitly engage youth in overall efforts, such as through health and peacebuilding activities. Caritas highlights the importance of engaging youth: “We don’t see youth as the future of the world; the youth are the world and they are the agents of their own growth, development, and fulfillment.”396

At the same time, within the confrérie structure in Senegal, religious leaders often see the role of youth as sustaining and passing on traditions and spreading messages. Youths have their own dahiras—composed of both males and females— which often take up social action; for example, the youth dahira, Asfiyahi, coordinates blood drives, cleanup campaigns, and ndogous (breaking of the fast during Ramadan) for vulnerable populations.397 While youth dahiras are one way to engage in social action, one of the most prominent youth led movements, Y’en a marre (“Fed up”), does not have an explicit religious connection. Founded in 2011 in response to corruption, school strikes, and frequent power outages,398 this group led by young rappers and journalists who wanted to translate discontent into action, rallied youth to speak up during the 2012 elections. They have continued to strengthen youth leadership and encourage grassroots efforts.

54 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Senegalese children have many options, both religious and secular, for education. society still have a significant hold, approaches and views on 12 religious or professional women’s associations involved in gender equality can be polarizing. Following an introduction charity and outreach,401 FAFS has grown to include more than of these dynamics, a series of examples illustrates entry points 400 associations that work to ease the work burden of women; and FIO activities. promote family planning and reproductive health; decrease illiteracy; reduce poverty and poor living conditions; improve Senegal has made significant strides toward gender equality, nutrition; and increase knowledge of women’s rights.402 Conseil reflected in its move from a ranking of 102 among 134 countries sénégalais des femmes (Senegalese Council of Women, COSEF) in the 2009 World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap pushed legislation to outlaw FGC in 1999 and enact tax reform Report to 72 among 145 countries in 2015.399 The improved in 2001.403 The Association des Juristes Sénégalaises (Association rank is explained above all by gains in women’s political of Senegalese Women Lawyers, AJS) focuses on family law, empowerment. However, change in other categories has been education, violence against women, health and sexual rights, limited: economic participation and opportunity; educational and FGC. Yeewu Yewwi, a Senegalese feminist organization, attainment; and health and survival. Senegalese women and focuses on the “liberation” of women. Another example of girls are well-represented in primary education and politics but women’s social involvement is the tradition and organization face challenges in many other domains, such as participation in of the Bajenu Gox (roughly translated as neighborhood secondary education and economic activities. godmothers). Linked to local governments, these women, normally unpaid, are involved in counseling families on topics Women in Senegal have worked hard to advance women’s rights such as nutrition, child welfare, family planning, and avoiding and welfare. Women’s groups and associations take various Ebola. The Minister of Health emphasizes their constructive forms, ranging from social activism to political advocacy.400 roles.404 Following the socio-economic crisis in the late 1970s, many groups formed including the Féderation des associations Such activism has resulted in the government’s embrace féminines du Sénégal (Federation of Senegalese Women’s of international frameworks for women’s rights and other Associations, FAFS), founded in 1977. Initially composed of important legal changes. The Convention on the Elimination

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 55 of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ratified by discord. Some religious women—including women media Senegal in 1985,405 and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on hosts—discount or discourage the work of secular women’s Women in Beijing have shaped legislation on women’s rights. organizations, especially when their activities encourage In 1999, parliament voted to ban the practice of female genital explicit notions of feminism.416 Senegal’s Family Code has cutting (FGC, see Box 13), and in 2010, legislation (Loi n° been the subject of active debate with religious issues at its 2012-11) required gender parity in all Senegalese institutions core (see Box 7). Implementation of the Code has been mixed; that are partially or totally elective, as well as on candidate many villages regulate their own affairs with little regard to lists.406 Between 2011 and 2012, the percentage of women in the law. Some conservative Islamic groups have contested the Senegal’s national parliament jumped from 23 to 43 percent.407 Family Code, arguing that it is largely based on French secular Progress has lagged in local politics, with only 13 female mayors traditions rather than local Islamic traditions; they contend out of 557 municipalities in 2015.408 that the Qur’an accords great importance to women, as well as the necessary protections, so the Code is an unnecessary The role of religious leaders and communities, including intrusion.417 religious women, on gender issues and reform agendas has been complex, not without tensions and areas of In contrast to some Muslim-majority countries, issues of women’s mobility or dress rarely prevent Senegalese women from seeking work outside the home. However, there are Box 13. Female Genital Cutting: Culture and religion other barriers to employment. Women in Senegal are active in Senegal has gained international attention for relatively agriculture,418 but overall levels of employment have changed successful interventions to reduce and end female genital slowly; the share of women over 15 working increased from cutting (FGC), which is common among some ethnic 54 percent in 1991 to 57.5 percent in 2014.419 Although groups. The practice was formally outlawed in 1999.409 The significantly more women are now engaged in the formal sector government has prosecuted some of those who engage in than 25 years ago,420 unpaid family workers and own-account or encourage FGC.410 In 2014, 24.7 percent of surveyed workers represent a significant share of those employed (68 women between ages 15 and 49 said that they had undergone percent in 2011).421 Women represent a higher proportion FGC,411 a decrease from 28.2 percent in 2005.412 During of the unemployed workforce: 12.9 percent compared to 7.5 the same period, UNICEF reported that FGC prevalence percent for men.422 among women aged 15-49 was at 25.7 percent, but only 18 percent for daughters, signaling a generational shift.413 Women’s roles are changing, but there are some persistent Public support for the practice was 14.2 percent (2014).414 features—some broadly linked to cultural traditions and some The practice persists, but targeted programs, as well as other with more direct and explicit religious links. Women’s double changing social trends, account for rising support among burden of household duties and income-generating activities Senegalese communities to abandon FGC. outside the home is commonly dictated by cultural norms and religious traditions that affect women’s roles in the family. The Religious leaders have often been reluctant to become role of the mother is greatly revered in Muslim and Christian involved in such sensitive traditional practices, deeming communities, with a high premium on childrearing. The pro- them to fall outside of religious practices; however, adherents natalist mindset and the expectations to have a large family often, and incorrectly, believe that religious traditions are considered to be both cultural and religious. It is the require them. FGC is largely a culturally driven practice. norm for Senegalese women of all faiths to assume household It differs among Senegal’s faith and ethnic traditions—39 and childrearing responsibilities, but they may have limited percent of women ages 15-49 with indigenous beliefs influence in family decision-making. Polygamy is legal and quite experienced FGC compared to 25.3 percent of Muslims commonly practiced in Senegal among Muslims; the country’s and 8.3 percent of Christians.415 Various organizations— Muslim religious leaders generally sanction the practice. local and international—advocate and work to end the Polygamy can have negative impacts for women—for example practice, including UNFPA, the Association Sénégalaise fostering competition among co-wives for resources and the pour le Bien-Être Familial (ASBEF), Tostan, Enda Tiers attention of their husband. In some instances, polygamy has Monde, and World Vision. The work of Tostan is well encouraged women to compete in having children, sometimes known internationally and offers an example of purposeful for reasons of inheritance.423 and sensitive engagement on religious issues with religious leaders. Tostan highlights the cultural character of Girls and young women are especially vulnerable to child and practice, emphasizing that it is not supported or marriage, which is common in Senegal. The legal marriage age is perpetuated by Islam or Christianity. 16 for girls and 18 for boys. However, between 2002 and 2012, 12 percent of children married by age 15, and 32.9 percent

56 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Box 14. LGBTQI communities in Senegal: Religious engagement Although religious values and cultural norms (taboos) have led people who identify as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer/Questioning, and Intersex (LGBTQI) to be largely invisible in Senegal—with some even in hiding424—their human rights have emerged as a point of contention, especially with some external partners. No law outlaws LGBTQI identity, but the penal code (Article 319:3) criminalizes homosexual acts and includes no protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

A 2013 Pew study on global attitudes on homosexuality found that high religiosity correlates with low acceptance rates. In 2013, 96 percent of Senegalese surveyed responded that homosexuality should not be accepted by society, a finding similar to a 2007 survey.425 In response to a query from President Barack Obama during an official visit to Senegal in 2013, President Macky Sall stated, “Senegal is a tolerant country that does not discriminate in terms of rights. But we are not ready to decriminalize homosexuality. That is the option of Senegal for the moment. That isn’t to say that we are homophobic. But it is necessary for society to absorb, take time to answer the questions without pressure.”46 In March 2016, he said that homosexuality would never be legalized in Senegal under his leadership.427

Organizations in Senegal (including some linked to religious communities) approach the issue differently. The Islamic organization, Jamra, with the support of Catholic and Muslim religious leaders and some 30 other organizations, established Mbañ Gacce, which operates as a watch group defending religious and cultural values. It advocates against the decriminalization of homosexuality.428 In contrast, several organizations support the LGBTQI community in direct and indirect ways. AIDES Sénégal and l’Association Prudence work primarily on HIV/AIDS issues, and, in part given the connections among the issues, support LGBTQI individuals, while Rencontre Africaine pour la defense des droits de l’homme (RADDHO) supports LGBTQI victims of violence, with one option to facilitate extradition to Europe or the U.S.

by age 18.429 The negative consequences of early marriage for 4.2.3.1 African American Islamic Institute girls are well-documented: those who marry at a young age have higher risks of becoming a victim of domestic violence, The African American Islamic Institute (AAII) (introduced contracting HIV and AIDS, and dying during childbirth. The above in the context of education) also has explicit strategies and Senegalese government advocates against child marriage. The programs directed at women’s empowerment.431 These focus practice is often rooted in tradition; data does not suggest that on three avenues: health, education, and economic autonomy. any one religious tradition is more prone to early marriage, AAII runs the Shifa-al-Asqam Socio-Medical Center in and no particular religious affiliation is associated with the Kaolack, constructed with UNFPA and UNICEF assistance.432 practice.430 However, to date religious leaders have not emerged The clinic’s primary focus is maternal and child health, offering as strong opponents of the practice. There are some resources primary and reproductive healthcare to women, including available for vulnerable mothers and single mothers; for pre-natal care, family planning services, and information example, the Maison Rose in Dakar, whose ethos is linked to a aimed at reducing child and maternal mortality.433 Since it broad spirituality, provides lodging and support to women in was established in 1997, the clinic reports that its efforts have difficult situations. led to a 50 percent decrease in maternal mortality and a 35 percent decrease in under-five mortality in its coverage area.434 The following profiles illustrate a range of approaches where Other AAII health initiatives include FGC awareness raising faith leaders or religious elements are engaged in development at the community level, establishing a hospital for treating projects. Economic empowerment and education represent the vesicovaginal fistulas (VVF),435 and operating a mobile health most common activities involving faith leader and FIOs on clinic.436 issues for women and girls. Activities include health literacy training, microfinance projects, skills training, financial AAII job training and microfinance programs aim to promote literacy training, intergenerational mentoring, and access the economic empowerment of women. AAII founded the to capital. Various efforts (both by secular and faith-linked Hazrat Zainab Women’s Collective that provides women with organizations) address the complex links between religious and the opportunity to work in textile design and manufacturing.437 cultural aspects of harmful practices such as FGC. A few rather Launched in AAII’s Boston office over 20 years ago as a way pioneering efforts address the roles of men in gender dynamics. to promote Senegalese manufacturing among its global The organizations and projects presented illustrate the diversity community, it has since focused on developing women’s trade of interventions. skills in Senegal.438 AAII training programs support the design

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 57 and implementation of microcredit projects that integrate integrated and participative approaches have engaged over health education and good business practices.439 42,000 women in improving their reading skills.449

4.2.3.2 Tostan 4.2.3.3 Association Femme Islam et Développement

Tostan (‘breakthrough’ in Wolof), an NGO with no religious The Association of Women, Islam, and Development (AFID) affiliation, was founded in Senegal in 1991 by Molly Melching, was founded by a group of Muslim women in 1997 to aid the an American who has worked in Senegal for several decades.440 It poor and empower women and advance various humanitarian has since expanded its work to other African countries. Tostan’s causes. Based in Dakar with smaller branches throughout mission is to “empower African communities to bring about Senegal, AFID’s mission is to support women’s rights and their sustainable development and positive social transformation position in Senegalese society by promoting the benefits that based on respect for human rights.”441 Tostan, well known for its Islam accords to women. AFID argues that Islam’s codification dedication to community empowerment, has received numerous of women’s roles and privileges can potentially improve women’s awards for its work.442 Its work involves various sectors, including status in disadvantaged contexts, and therefore the association health, education, environment, empowerment of women draws on the teachings of the Qur’an regarding women’s roles and girls, FGC, and child protection, under the umbrella of a and value in society. It also works to raise awareness of Muslims’ consciously holistic approach.443 Tostan works deliberately to duty to respect women’s rights and asserts that women should engage religious leadership in its efforts to promote women’s and know their rights as granted to them in the Qur’an. human rights. Tostan’s annual budget for programs in 2014 was US$6,765,516 (among six West African countries). AFID programs engage women through various avenues, beginning with adult literacy classes, as it believes that women Tostan is keenly aware of the important role that religious can learn about their rights through reading; with literacy and beliefs play in everyday life in Senegal. In the Dakar office, knowledge of women’s rights, women will not be marginalized. Imam Mouhamed Chérif Diop, a staff member who advises AFID members also target especially vulnerable women, visiting on the role of religion in Tostan programs, works to ensure and collaborating with incarcerated women. Viewing women that there are no conflicts with Islamic principles and beliefs in as the pillars of the Senegalese family, AFID is particularly the organization’s programs.444 Tostan’s approach is to engage concerned for women without family support whose children community members and leaders, among them religious live in the prisons with them. AFID provides small-scale leaders, on project objectives. support that typically involves microcredit loans or grants to individual female entrepreneurs active in agricultural, textile, Tostan is especially well known for its work to end the or small enterprise sales. These entrepreneurs learn a skill, practice of FGC.445 With support from, inter alia, American gain economic independence, and contribute to the family. Jewish World Service (AJWS) beginning in 1992,446 Tostan’s AFID also hosts meetings for men and women that emphasize approach centers on education, raising awareness about the positive Islamic messages around women’s rights. Exchange harms of the practice, and encouraging community dialogue. visits throughout Francophone Africa and other regions are Given the topic’s sensitive nature, Tostan’s strategy includes designed to encourage Senegalese Muslims to cooperate and building trust between project leaders and community leaders, share experiences transnationally. Charity activities include including religious leaders, in order to create a safe space sponsoring annual meals for the poor, as funding permits.450 for dialogue. A central feature of Tostan’s approach is public declarations by communities of their commitment to end 4.2.4 Reproductive health FGC. Tostan’s community-driven approach highlights the benefits of engaging religious communities. The Senegalese Reproductive health has long been a challenge for Senegal’s government has modeled its action plan to end FGC on the development, and the repercussions of decades of high fertility Tostan approach.447 rates are evident in the indicators of infant, child, and maternal health and in strains on education systems.451 The challenge Tostan works in communities that express interest in its is not exclusive to Senegal; West Africa currently has the programs through a whole-community approach, which world’s highest maternal mortality and lowest contraceptive is central to the organization’s Community Empowerment prevalence rates (CPR).452 The Senegalese government accords Program (CEP)448 Integrating the community’s culture and a high priority to family planning, and concerted efforts to beliefs into their work, Tostan works to earn the trust of the promote maternal and child health have led to great changes communities. One program aims to empower women through to certain indicators. Senegal’s CPR is low by international teaching them to read and write in local languages, gain standards, but has increased significantly in the past few years: basic math skills, and send and receive SMS messages. Such 12.1 percent of married women ages 15-49 used a modern

58 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 Box 15. Religion and the Demographic and Health Surveys The DHS, the most frequently performed and extensive health surveys carried out in Senegal, provide a rigorous source of information on attitudes and behaviors. Its multiple editions, international scope, and detailed questionnaires permit in-depth quantitative analysis across time and geographic area. DHS results have strengths and shortcomings; conclusions drawn from any analysis need a firm, qualitative grasp of the underlying societal context. Unfortunately, for the purposes of our analysis, religious adherence and personal practice of faith are not central to the questionnaire; however, the DHS provides useful data on religious affiliation and religious beliefs as a barrier to family planning use. The addition of a section dedicated to religious practices would be helpful for development practitioners working on health-related development topics.

contraceptive method in 2010-2011,453 but with a push for improved reproductive health that number increased to 20.3 percent in 2014.454 However, in 2014, 25.6 percent of married Senegalese women ages 15-49 still had unmet needs for family planning,455 with Senegal showing higher unmet needs than several other West African countries.456

Religious and cultural beliefs have been viewed by many observers as a significant obstacle to positive reproductive health outcomes, accounting in part for limited acceptance of family planning and relevant behavior change. Attitudes and behaviors are shaped by aspirations to large family size and differing views on which A grandmother weaving a traditional cover for milk jug in Belle family planning practices (if any) are permissible for pious Kelel, Saint-Louis. families. Some religious figures have encouraged fears that family planning represents an attempt to limit and control family size.457 attitudes about family planning in Senegal. Local organizations, Development partners, working with the government, support such as ASBEF, have regularly engaged with religious leaders in programs that aim to convince the population (including religious family planning activities.461 International NGOs, notably Marie leaders) that family planning is morally acceptable within their Stopes International462 and IntraHealth,463 have also worked respective faith traditions and is beneficial for families.458 There with local religious leaders to raise awareness about the benefits have been reported cases of religious leaders providing moral and of family planning. Such initiatives have generally targeted financial support for health structures that offer family planning faith leaders at the grassroots level, but have not systematically services, but they prefer a “behind the scenes” approach.459 engaged the leadership of Senegal’s religious communities.

Senegal’s religious leaders and communities were not actively Notwithstanding the stated intention to engage faith leaders engaged on issues of demography and family planning until and communities in a systematic fashion, implementation was recently, but there is increasing conviction within government uneven at the beginning of the 2012-2015 National Family and partners that their support is vital. Faith leaders had limited Planning Action Plan. The following organizations and profiles roles in developing the 2012-2015 National Family Planning highlight current initiatives that focus on engaging faith leaders Action Plan prepared by the Ministry of Health and Social both at the local level and at the highest levels of religious Action,460 which addresses religious leader roles in specific terms. leadership. They include exchanges with imams and other Planned actions include nominating “champions” in the religious religious actors at various conferences and workshops where community to speak publicly in favor of family planning. In religious dimensions of family planning and family health are 1996, USAID began to explore the role of religious beliefs in discussed. Consistent with the government’s policy to promote

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 59 birth spacing, these discussions typically center on birth spacing population, and development; and sharing Islamic perspectives for maternal and child health rather than on “family planning” on other questions of Islam and society. RIP was part of the per se; some Senegalese link the term “family planning” to birth Initiative sénégalaise de santé urbaine (Urban Reproductive limitation and population control. Health Initiative, ISSU), a Gates Foundation-funded initiative established in 2009 to inform the urban population about 4.2.4.1 Réseau Islam et Population family planning and provide services to poor urban women.470 Between 2011 and 2015, RIP conducted many small-scale, TheRéseau islam et population (Islam and Population Network, grassroots trainings, which reached approximately 1,000 local RIP) was created in 1995 with UNFPA support to build a imams.471 The idea was that local imams would then conduct network of religious leaders and Islamic scholars in support radio shows, conferences, and discussion groups for their of family planning programs.464 A “Muslim association of communities.472 reflection, education, and awareness on population issues,”465 RIP works to address socio-cultural and socio-religious barriers 4.2.4.2 Cadre des Religieux sur la Santé et le relevant to population that were first highlighted in a UNFPA Développement survey.466 It operates as a largely informal network, without a permanent office, working primarily on specific and funded Established in September 2014, the Cadre des Religieux sur project interventions. RIP’s objectives are threefold: first, la Santé et Développement (Group of Religious Leaders on to offer guidance to the Senegalese public on the teachings Health and Development, CRSD) works to improve maternal of the Qur’an and the sunnah as they relate to development and child health outcomes through an initial focus on family problems; second, to educate the public on Islamic teachings planning. Its focus is on engaging Senegal’s religious families and about social issues; and third, to raise awareness on family communities at senior leadership levels. CRSD grew from the planning through public outreach targeting religious and agreement of a group of religious leaders (supported by WFDD) traditional leaders, community leaders, NGOs, women, and to support reproductive health and family well-being within youth. RIP has sought to build a diverse membership of imams their faith communities. The faith leaders represent Senegal’s and Islamic scholars, teachers, legal experts, sociologists, main faith traditions—including the four Sufi confréries—and social workers, and doctors providing technical expertise and religious institutions (both Muslim and Christian), as well as a engaging in outreach activities.467 representative from the Ministry of Health and Social Action. A primary goal of CRSD is to counter a quite widely held RIP was an early adopter of context-sensitive health belief that Islamic teachings forbid or discourage the practice of development, led by Senegalese for Senegalese. Though the family planning, as well as to further a positive understanding size and programs of RIP have ebbed and flowed—in part of religious support for maternal and family health. due to changing narratives and priorities in the development community around population issues—its approach has The group’s initial action involved a series of visites de courtoisie consistently included awareness campaigns and strategic (courtesy visits) to faith leaders of various traditions across operational work with secular stakeholders.468 RIP has largely Senegal. This traditional, respectful approach allowed members focused its activities at the grassroots level, with training sessions to launch a constructive dialogue with other faith leaders and for locally prominent imams and other religious leaders who discuss views on the permissibility of family planning based on can speak directly with their constituents about reproductive various religious interpretations.473 In November 2014, CRSD health. RIP has thus worked over the years to increase awareness members visited Morocco, which has successfully integrated in Senegal of reproductive health issues through an Islamic lens. religious leaders into family planning initiatives, to better Its 1998 booklet, La Declaration de politique de population à la understand the roles that faith leaders can play in promoting lumière des enseignements islamiques (Declaration of Population maternal and child health and the benefits of family planning Policy in Light of Islamic Teachings), prepared in partnership for society. Members met with Morocco’s Ministry of Health, with UNFPA, reviews population policy with an Islamic religious leaders, and various organizations working on family perspective on family planning and other reproductive health planning.474 topics.469 A summary version was issued as a pamphlet and audio cassette, available in French, Arabic, and Wolof. RIP also CRSD published an Argumentaire islamique sur l’espacement developed a toolkit for religious networks and has disseminated des naissances (Islamic Arguments for Birth Spacing) in July messaging—in multiple languages, including Wolof—through 2015. The document presents the Islamic justifications for radio and television programs and at seminars. birth spacing and highlights family planning methods that are permissible in Islam. Written by two Senegalese Islamic RIP aims to inform the public, particularly through training scholars, the document draws on the Qur’an, the sunnah, and workshops; reports and studies on the question of Islam, , in addition to the teachings of Islamic scholars, both

60 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 international and Senegalese.475 TheArgumentaire has formed the basis for CRSD-led media outreach and trainings. In mid- 2015, the group initiated a series of radio advertisements and radio talk shows with CRSD members as guests. In 2015 and 2016, CRSD hosted regional training workshops in the Casamance and Kaolack with local community members and religious leaders to discuss religious perspectives on birth spacing. Group members are working with a midwife to educate women—and, at times, their husbands—in dahiras about the religious and medical perspectives on family planning.

4.2.5 Peace and Interfaith Relations

Senegal is often heralded as one of the most economically and politically stable countries in West Africa. While several countries in the region confront instability brought on by coups, rebel attacks, social unrest, and dictatorships, Senegal has experienced little social tension and—since independence Religious leaders discussing over coffee. from France in 1960—has never had a coup d’état or military rule. Senegalese generally enjoy social harmony and Jewry recognized then-President Wade for his commitment to interreligious peace within a functioning democracy. The promoting interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance. In recent country is quite safe, too, with homicide and crime rates that years, the government has hosted international interreligious are low for the region.476 Although West Africa faces growing meetings about nutrition and vaccination. Serigne Mansour threats from violent extremists, such as Boko and Al- Sy Djamil serves as a co-president of the global interreligious Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel, Senegal organization Religions for Peace. Sheikh Saliou Mbacké has been largely immune within its borders. (related to the former Khalife Général of the Mourides of the same name) has held leadership in an Africa wide interfaith Interreligious relations within Senegal are largely harmonious group, Interfaith Action for Peace in Africa. Abbé Jacques Seck, and are often cited as a source of pride. The country is clearly a Catholic , has coordinated interfaith networks within Muslim-majority, at 94 percent, with Christians consisting Senegal, speaking often on the topic in the media. In part of four percent (see chapter 3 for inter-religious relations). because of limited religious tensions within Senegal, organized This pride in amicable interfaith relations is evident in a interreligious engagement has been quite limited. 2010 Pew survey in which Senegal’s Muslims were most likely (at a rate of 92 percent) to hold overall positive views Various faith communities also work to maintain and of Christians among all surveyed Sub-Saharan countries.477 strengthen interreligious relations in Senegal by collaborating Socially, Senegalese of different faith traditions intermingle for within and across the different Sufi orders, as well as with holidays, thus building social cohesion; Muslims often invite the various Christian denominations. The Lutheran Church Christian friends and neighbors to their houses to celebrate of Senegal, for example, has a department of peacebuilding, Muslim holidays and vice versa. Legally, Senegal honors and one of its pastors works with Muslim religious leaders and religious diversity, and the constitution guarantees freedom of offers trainings on Islam to Christians. The program targets religion. Senegal is rated low on a Pew Research Center 2013 Christian leaders, informing them about Islamic beliefs and Government Restrictions Index at 1.2, indicating the limited values, even teaching the Arabic language through reading restrictions the government places on religious institutions and Bible passages in Arabic.481 Imam Oumar Diène, the Secretary practice.478 However, Senegal received a moderate score of 1.7 General of the Association nationale des imams et oulémas du on the Social Hostilities Index, signaling a moderate amount Sénégal (National Association of Imams and Ulamas of Senegal, of social hostility based on religion;479 cases of vandalism of ANIOS), argues that interreligious dialogue is a tool to preserve religious property have increased in the past few years.480 the dignity of each religion without provoking the other, while promoting mutual appreciation. Diène says that ANIOS values Senegalese (including the national government) take pride in interreligious dialogue to explore how religious communities their leading role in various global interreligious organizations can better live together in peace.482 Many religiously affiliated and initiatives. Senegal and Senegalese hold leadership positions organizations explicitly state non-discriminatory intentions and and have been honored for them; for example, in 2011, the an openness to work with individuals from different religions. Anti-Defamation League and the American Council for World Muslim and Christian leaders generally accept children of all

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 61 faiths in their schools and try to create an environment that a body and “when one part hurts, it is the entire body that feels fosters relationships and understanding between children of pain.”491 Various international organizations492 including FIOs493 different religions.483 are involved in reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts in the Casamance—with varying approaches—seeking a lasting peace A low-level protracted conflict in the Casamance region agreement between the MFDC and the Senegalese government. of southern Senegal stands in contrast to Senegal’s overall A 2014 ceasefire was the result of multi-year discussions between stability and peace. The region is a strip of Senegal between the two parties, mediated by the Community of Sant’Edigio. The Gambia to the north and Guinea Bissau to the south, Commentators report a weariness of the Casamance people thus effectively isolated geographically from the rest of the about the violence and suffering caused by the conflict.494 The country. This geographic separation, as well as demographic following examples illustrate different approaches and actors, and historical differences, has contributed to the distinctive ranging from FIOs to mobilizing local religious leaders. identity of the Casamançais. Religiously, 20 percent of the population practices Christianity or traditional African 4.2.5.1 American Jewish World Service religions, compared to 5 percent nationally.484 Further, 60 percent of Casamançais are from the Diola ethnic group, versus American Jewish World Service (AJWS), with headquarters four percent nationally.485 France did not extend its foothold in New York, provides grants to human rights advocates in into the Casamance until the late 1800s, and thereafter the developing countries and lobbies in the United States for better Casamance and northern Senegal developed under separate policies toward the developing world.495 Inspired by the idea of administrations until independence.486 Efforts by Senegal’s tikkun olam, Hebrew for “repairing the world,” AJWS supports government to implement nationwide policy and unification more than 500 local advocacy organizations in 19 countries.496 measures have at times met with resistance in the Casamance, Their approach to local development is to support local advocates where residents do not always feel that the government and communities in solving their problems.497 AJWS is committed understands or prioritizes their realities. to working on human rights, and they intervene in the areas of civil and political rights, land and water rights, sexual health and TheMouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) rights, ending child marriage, and disaster relief.498 AJWS provides has pushed for Casamance autonomy from Senegal since 1982. long-term flexible grants where grantees are able to renew grants. Originally established as a political party in 1947, MFDC Through four different grant types—general support, project transformed into a separatist movement that was led for many based, capacity building, and hybrid—they support a diverse years by Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Catholic priest (who group of grantees.499 An AJWS representative in each country died in 2007). Violent clashes have flared periodically between provides additional accompaniment, including assistance in the Senegalese military and the MFDC, with particular intensity monitoring and evaluation, budget support, and identification of in 1993 and 1998. Civilian and military deaths between 1982 potential grantees.500 Since 1992, AJWS has granted over US$7 and 2005 were estimated at 1,200.487 Following each violent million to support human rights efforts in Senegal. outbreak, a ceasefire is declared and peace agreements signed, but the agreements have, again and again, broken down. The AJWS has been especially dedicated to promoting a resolution most recent ceasefire was declared in April 2014. to the conflict in the Casamance region. As of 2015, AJWS support to grantees in the Casamance for various initiatives Both the conflict and efforts to bring it to an end have, like many for peace totaled US$1.16 million.501 Since 2010, AJWS has other conflicts, different causes and facets that include religious supported 17 grantees,502 who are working to reconstruct elements. The fact that the movement’s leader over several decades infrastructure and negotiate peace in the Casamance, (Father Senghor) was a Catholic priest led many to emphasize including: Comité Régional de Solidarité des Femmes pour la the influence of religious differences between the region and the Paix en Casamance (USOFORAL),503 Platforme des Femmes rest of Senegal as a driver of the conflict. The mix of factors is, pour la Paix en Casamance (Platform of Women for Peace however, complex with geography, demography, history, and in Casamance, PFPC), and World Education Senegal.504 disputes over natural resource management playing important Grantees have secured commitments from Senegal’s leaders roles.488 Religious actors are among those who have worked to to prioritize peacemaking in the Casamance; represented over bring the conflict to an end. Religious leaders from various Sufi 40,000 women from 210 women’s groups; increased women’s orders and Christian denominations have preached about peace in political power; freed hostages held by armed rebels; worked the Casamance in sermons and led prayers for peace.489 Christian to reintegrate displaced citizens and former combatants into and Muslim leaders have come together at different moments their communities without reigniting conflict; and supported to hold interreligious prayers.490 Imam Mame Libasse Laye of a coalition of nine peace organizations to provide strategy and the Layene community notes that, “peace [in the Casamance] leadership and, ultimately, represent civil society in the official should be a concern for all Senegalese” because the region is like peace process.505

62 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 AJWS awarded its first Casamance grant to USOFORAL, CRS Senegal focuses much of its efforts on peacebuilding and and has supported its efforts since. USOFORAL, a grassroots interreligious dialogue, particularly in the Casamance region. organization founded in 1999, utilizes and builds upon During a lull in the Casamance conflict in the early 2000s, the traditional role of Senegalese women as mediators in CRS Senegal launched The Casamance Rehabilitation and peace movements. USOFORAL has established local peace Peace-building Project, a community-driven reconstruction committees to mediate conflicts, direct reconciliation and project funded by USAID. A 2012 CRS conflict analysis in negotiation activities, and engage women as leaders in their the region found that 80 percent of conflicts arising within and communities. It also co-founded PFPC, a coalition of over 200 between communities were related to poor natural resource women’s groups that puts women at the center of solutions for management (NRM).513 peace in the Casamance.506 Thus in 2013, CRS launched a three-year, US$1.2 million Other AJWS grants have supported organizations that work USAID/Conflict Management and Mitigation project in the with youth, such as Y’en a Marre, and community development Casamance, Strengthening Community Opportunities for Peace in the regions of Kolda and Sedhiou.507 It has backed efforts to and Equality (SCOPE).514 The SCOPE project uses a people-to- end the practice of female genital cutting (FGC) in Senegalese people approach to promote peaceful exchanges between people communities.508 and communities, focusing on NRM, engagement of women and youth in community peacebuilding, economically sustainable 4.2.5.2 Catholic Relief Services community connector projects, savings and internal lending communities, and the creation of intra- and inter-community Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Senegal, founded in 1960, peacebuilding structures. A key project goal is to create a diverse was one of the first international organizations working there and representative body that will lobby the government of Senegal post-independence.509 It is an affiliate of CRS, created in 1943 and the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance by the Roman Catholic Bishops of the United States to help (MFDC), as well as advocate for peace and development in Europe and its refugees recover from World War II. CRS assists Casamance.516 Local inter-village committees promote dialogue the poor and vulnerable, working to preserve and uphold the and help to resolve conflicts, thus setting the stage for a larger sacredness and dignity of all human life, foster charity and representative body that includes other stakeholders, such as justice, and embody Catholic social and moral teaching.510 NGOs, associations, and community-based organizations. CRS CRS works in collaboration with a wide range of local partners has worked in the Casamance with organizations comprised of in Senegal, including Caritas Senegal.511 Programs support members of different faiths—Islam, Christianity, and traditional food security, nutrition, agricultural resilience, and community religions. The different faith groups have jointly organized prayer health services.­512 ceremonies and sensitization sessions.517

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 63 LOOKING AHEAD

Senegal stands out among West African countries for its stability This report provides a preliminary mapping of the contemporary and robust democracy, but it faces significant development religious landscape, set in the context of the development challenges. The central premise of this report is that Senegal’s strategies of Senegal and its partners, which center on complex religious institutions and traditions are critical both addressing widespread poverty and low human development to Senegal’s strengths and to its challenges. They are part of the indicators. It underscores the multidimensional links between national identity, shaping public policy and private behavior. those strategies and religious beliefs, practices, institutions, and The profound social and economic changes that Senegal is leadership. These are particularly apparent in the attitudes and experiencing are intricately linked to the religious landscape, behaviors that underlie education, health care, and conflict/ which in turn is undergoing profound change, affected by conflict resolution, as well as in the changing roles of women. global and local forces. The research on Senegal did not set out to offer specific policy The distinctive social and political roles of religious institutions recommendations. Rather, the goal is to direct attention to and beliefs in Senegal have been the subject of quite extensive areas where appreciation of religious elements might enrich research. This has highlighted the roles that Sufi confrérie leaders understandings of development potential and of obstacles that have played in politics, dating back to the French colonial stand in the way. The conclusions thus center on highlighting period and extending throughout the life of independent relevant experience and identifying topics that merit further Senegal—in effect amounting to a unique “Senegalese social research. bargain.” It has also underscored the economic roles of these distinctive Senegalese religious institutions, notably in the 5.1 OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS agricultural sector and in the Senegalese diaspora. In the initial phase of this Berkley Center/WFDD research, consultation LEARNED with experts identified significant knowledge gaps, above all in understanding how contemporary changes are affecting The religious landscape of Senegal is varied, complex, religious institutions, and also in linking Senegal’s development and dynamic, and it matters in development debates strategies to various aspects of religious institutions and beliefs. and implementation of development strategies. In some

64 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 respects, and notwithstanding the overlay of Senegalese laïcité, Sufi traditions and the widespread presence and authority the religious attitudes and narratives of most Senegalese of the Sufi confréries color many aspects of society and are reflected in language and approach across virtually all politics. In some settings, this appears to translate into an institutions, including within the government. Among private openness to new ideas, while in others it can lie behind or organizations, there is a gamut from explicitly religious to exacerbate resistance or negative attitudes toward social change. others whose religious ties are tenuous or limited (for example, Examples include strong religious support for some forms of an institution that ascribes to Islamic values but with no formal modern education and conflicting views on women’s roles, institutional affiliation). The many FIOs active in Senegal, especially within the family setting. with explicit links to various faith traditions, are engaged in a wide range of development activities. Of these, many have Complications arise from Senegal’s deliberate and parallel clearly stated religious tenets at the core of their efforts. Secular secular and Islamic traditions, as well as their imprint in organization employees also often cite their religious values as a constitutional and legal instruments. A commitment to motivation for development work. Interviews with Senegalese secularism is vaunted by significant parts of Senegalese society, staff members of secular organizations suggested that many rely especially among educated elites, who hold fiercely to the values on their understanding of the religious and cultural context they ascribe to secularism. However, laïcité à la Sénégalaise to develop programs and approaches. Islamic and Christian (Senegalese brand of secularism) also implies that Islamic values and language are thus an undertone in many of Senegal’s values are not only respected, but that they are fundamental organizations. to national identity. In areas like education, this has important implications, as the public education system—which has long In analyzing these religious influences on policy and programs, been distinctly secular in nature—faces challenges in adapting this backdrop of complexity and dynamism is important. It to Senegalese realities, as well as to the values that are part of affects, inter alia, the way in which institutions or attitudes both Islamic traditions and multi-religious ethos. The dual are appropriately labeled as religious, non-religious, or secular. traditions (secular and Islamic) offer opportunities to build Within this context, the degree to which religious values and on a unique social compact that underlies complex—often institutional links affect approaches and operations falls along unstated and not precisely defined—relationships between a wide spectrum, rarely with identical implications. In short, secular and religious authorities. an assumption of religious affiliation is not a hard and fixed matter, but it requires explicit inquiry. Muslim and Christian communities have great impact within local communities, but they also have significant Senegalese, whether from elite groups or in poor networks beyond, both nationally and internationally. communities, emphasize the central role that religious Sufi community groups (dahiras) provide material, as well as traditions and institutions play in all aspects of life. Available spiritual, support in many local communities, especially in rural surveys of religiosity, albeit fairly limited, affirm that Senegal areas. Dahiras serve primarily social roles, facilitating logistics ranks high among nations in the significant weight given to for religious gatherings, holidays, and rites of passage, such religious institutions and beliefs, even in highly religious Africa. as weddings and funerals. Men’s, women’s, and youth dahiras The operational question for development practitioners is how can address community-specific issues, in addition to offering this affects both development programs and policies. opportunities for fellowship within the group. Some networks have taken on explicit roles in mobilizing communities to Positive interreligious relationships are an important address issues, such as hand washing and vaccinations, and feature of Senegal’s history, and they affect development they have the potential to expand into other domains. They approaches in various ways. Many Senegalese highlighted the often play financial roles, for example in facilitating non-formal strength and benefits of social and religious diversity and the credit arrangements. Similar community groups also exist in resulting social harmony that Senegal has enjoyed. The general Senegal’s Christian communities. Development programs have absence of social strife and religiously-linked violence that have on occasion worked deliberately through such communities affected neighboring countries is attributed to a history of and networks, but we see their capacity for greater engagement embracing religious diversity. This traditional commitment to as significant. religious diversity is a factor in the relatively limited influence of Islamic fundamentalist teachings in Senegal, despite Religious networks extend internationally in diaspora important links to the Arabian Gulf (studies abroad, financing communities, especially in West Africa but also in Europe of mosques, etc.). It also has inspired Senegal’s often active, and and the United States. Diaspora groups organize religious at times, leading role in African and international interreligious conferences and gather to celebrate religious holidays. The initiatives. Senegal is seen and wishes to be seen as a leader both networks also provide critical support to newcomers, offering for interreligious harmony and for positive Islamic values. job leads and legal assistance on immigration matters.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 65 Remittances through religious channels are an important source of development financing, notably for the Mouride capital of Touba, but also in communities across Senegal. The financial power wielded by the diaspora can influence religious politics in Senegal. Religious networks linking diaspora communities influence Senegalese migration patterns and business relationships.

The omnipresent religious media is an important channel for passing information to the general public, but has not been engaged systematically. More than nine out of ten Senegalese listen to religious radio or watch religious television programs, and many place considerable confidence in religious hosts and personalities. Hosts are diverse—men, women, and youth—allowing them to reach many segments of the population. Topics are as diverse as the hosts and range from proper religious practices to world affairs to social Village elders gather to pray in Mamadou Badeifa, Kolda. issues. Radio and television programs are the most popular religious outlets, but new media forms, such as Facebook and Diverging opinions on development issues among various online videos, have growing reach and impact. Between 2009 faith and secular actors have at times represented obstacles to and 2014, the percentage of Senegalese using the Internet development progress. Various debates about reforms to the increased from 7.5 to 17.7 percent.518 Youth, in particular, Family Code are an example of frustration and contention look to new media sources for information, including that have arisen largely from how it affects women’s roles and religious material. rights. Some view the existing code as an unnecessary intrusion based on inherited French secular traditions. At present, no There are few formal channels for engagement between meaningful forum exists where differing sides can voice government development policy institutions and their opinions and work toward solid solutions. The debates religious bodies, but informal channels abound. Dialogue, highlight the complex and not well understood tension and engagement, and cooperation among faith and secular leaders division between religious and secular feminist approaches and institutions on development topics have varied greatly in to the issue. Another area of tension has surrounded land the years since independence. In many areas, coordination tenure. Religious roles in agriculture and land management are and regular communication are weak. Perhaps the most significant, but the implications for development strategies are dramatic instance of communication failure was the early not clearly understood. 1990s Mbegue Forest debacle (see Box 2), but there are others reflecting both gaps in “commission” and, above all, failures by Religious communities in Senegal have a keen interest in “omission.” A point of contention for some religious leaders education strategies and management, and they are actively is that government officials approach them only for political involved through networks of schools and other educational support at election times, though traditions of paying respect institutions. This has important implications for the future of to religious leaders are part of expected behavior for politicians. the national educational system. Senegal’s complex education Many government officials and political leaders have ties to system includes diverse state-operated public schools and religious communities, specifically the major confréries. private schools (Islamic, Christian, and secular). With frequent teacher strikes, overcrowding, and limited resources in public Faith and secular actors have generally agreed, even if schools—as well as a desire to instill what they perceive as often tacitly, on Senegal’s core development priorities and appropriate values in their children—parents are drawn to strategies. However, there are significant areas of diverging the private alternatives. Many private options, and especially opinions. Positive examples of engagement include health Catholic schools, are viewed as providing higher quality issues, such as hygiene promotion and malaria prevention. education. These issues are seen as domains where public approaches entail no conflict with religious beliefs and values. Family planning Schools offering a Qur’anic education are quite popular in is an issue that straddles the line, with an increasing number Muslim-majority Senegal (especially for very young children). of faith actors actively engaged in the topic and beginning They vary widely in terms of curriculum, quality, and structure; to promote family planning, preferring to base activities on there is no uniform system for setting standards and oversight. religious teachings. Both curriculum and management of the large and diverse

66 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 network of Qur’anic schools are topics of active debate, as is These shifts also have important ramifications for women its role within the overall education system. An active concern and their roles in the family and society, as economic changes is the phenomenon of talibé students from Qur’ranic schools encourage more women to participate in the labor force. begging in the streets; this behavior demonstrates financial pressures and is explained as a deliberate strategy of encouraging Senegal’s education system is at a crossroads and is the subject humility as part of religious training. Among a minority of of active national debate and significant partner engagement. schools and teachers, it is simply abuse. It has attracted wide How to incorporate the various religious dimensions is an and longstanding interest among Senegalese and international important, if not always explicitly stated, challenge; issues partners as a human rights issue. Dialogue that can generate include how to integrate teaching about religion in the public better reform options is urgently needed.519 curriculum and how to link, if not integrate, different school systems—and especially religious schools—into a national 5.2 LOOKING AHEAD framework. The education system overall has expanded rapidly, but there are many quality challenges. The protracted and This report represents a preliminary exploration of Senegal’s unresolved transition from the two major distinct systems— religious landscape, outlining religious elements of different Qur’anic and French—to the introduction of newer hybrid sectors and highlighting areas where religious actors engage options, entails efforts to address the issue of how to link the with development topics and partners. It has underscored traditional and religious to the modern and secular. important links, but also topics, that merit further research. The complex intersection between religion and development, Recent years have seen initiatives engaging various stakeholders particularly the influence of the confréries, leaves many questions to address educational content and improve quality of unanswered. Additional research is needed to better understand instruction. Active issues involve language of instruction, how urbanization and social media have influenced or interface curriculum elements, and the extent to which civic and religious with shifting dynamics within religious institutions and beliefs; values can and should be incorporated. Various experiments connections between religion and agriculture; the engagement underway (both public and private) aim to bridge the gaps. of religious institutions on current and projected impacts of Arabic instruction is a focus, with expanded opportunities for climate change; and religious dimensions of education reform, the small, but growing, Arabisant (Arabic-speaking) elite. The including core national curricula and evolution of the parallel future of Arabic as a language of instruction in Senegal is at education systems. issue, as the country aims to position itself globally, especially with parallel initiatives seeking to expand instruction in French The strong, traditional roles of the confréries, especially the and national languages. Senegal is in search of a viable path Mourides, in agriculture and farming has been well documented; forward that will better align the educational offer with public however, the scope of their contemporary operations and the demand. extent to which they continue to influence agriculture today are less well understood. The role of religious communities A sensitive and important issue is approaches to vulnerable in evolving land tenure patterns, sustainability and water use, children. A traditional area of religious concern, the various government subsidies, and labor (particularly the role of talibé initiatives of religious communities and FIOs to address the followers) remains unclear. These issues are further complicated issue should be explored in greater depth. The long-standing by climate change, which presents new challenges, including issue of talibé exploitation within the urban daara context (and ever more erratic rainfall, droughts, and flooding. the visible manifestation in widespread begging and reported child abuse) calls for dialogue and action. Severe droughts in the 1970s accelerated urbanization in Senegal. Many members of Senegal’s religious families are Efforts to engage religious leaders on issues around family based in urban areas today, but they often maintain homes in health and family planning (long sensitive topics in Senegal rural religious locales, as well. These changes have implications and the broader West African region) are promising and not only for the economic base, which previously relied heavily should be carefully watched. There are two important aspects: on farming and agriculture, but also for confrérie training first, the recognition that religious support for reforms and and philosophies, as traditional marabout-talibé relationships efforts to shift traditional norms and behaviors is essential; and in rural, agricultural settings change to accommodate new second, the deliberate effort to engage religious communities urban realities. Economic and social ties have been maintained at a senior level. This systematic effort is described by religious during these changing times, though; many trade and business leadership as new and a breakthrough. If the experience is decisions are colored by affiliation (for example, a Mouride positive, it suggests a formula that could be applied in other landlord will often give preference to a Mouride plumber). sectors.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 67 Endnotes

1. “MDG 2014 Report: Assessing progress in Africa toward the Millennium 24. Burkina Faso receive $1,040 million, Cote d’Ivoire received $1,262, Ghana Development Goals.” United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, received $1,331 million, and Mali received $1,391 million; “Aid statistics 2014. Available at: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ by donor, recipient and sector.” OECD, 2015. Available at: http://www. MDG_Africa_Report_2014_ENG.pdf; among , Egypt, The compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=oecd&lg=en# Gambia, Guinea, and . 25. Ibid 2. Ibid 26. “Net ODA received (% of GNI).” World Bank, 2015. Available at: http:// 3. “The State of World Population 2015.” United Nations Population Fund, data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS 2015. Available at: http://wcaro.unfpa.org/sites/wcaro/files/pub-pdf/ 27. According to the World Bank (2013), the economic and monetary union SWOP 2015_ENGLISH_Report_Lo-Res_Web Ready.pdf was formally created in January 1994, based on the West Africa Monetary 4. See for recent examples: Sanchez, Dana “Gates Wants To Bring Water- Union of the CFA franc zone, with eight members, a currency guaranteed From-Poop Technology To Senegal.” Gates Foundation, 2015. Available at fixed parity to the Euro (656 to 1) through an operations (overdraft) at: http://afkinsider.com/84517/gates-wants-to-bring-water-from-poop- account arrangement with the French Treasury coupled with stringent technology-to-senegal/; “Sénégal: Un programme d’éducation numérique zone-wide fiscal and monetary rules. Patterned after the , dans des pays d’Afrique.” Afriquinfos, 2014. Available at: http://www. with a Commission located in Ouagadougou financed by a share of a one afriquinfos.com/2014/12/06/senegal-programme-deducation-numerique- percent levy on all imports into UEMOA, the Commission is spearheading dans-pays-dafrique-260731.php; and “Projet sur le développement efforts to establish a customs union, harmonize investment incentives, du secteur énergétique Le et le Sénégal pour la phase pilote.” public financial management procedures, and taxation, and monitor key Institut de la Francophonie, 2014. Available at: http://news.icilome. macroeconomic convergence criteria—including fiscal deficits, inflation, com/?idnews=794738&t=Projet-sur-le-developpement-du-secteur- public sector wages, and government arrears. Regional institutions include energetique-Le-Togo-et-le-Senegal--pour-la-phase-pilote a common central bank—Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de 5. The terms confrérie and order are used interchangeably in this report. l’Ouest—BCEAO, a Regional Banking Commission, a regional Stock 6. “Senegal: Overview.” World Bank, 2015. Available at: http://www. Exchange since 1998, and a partially functioning Securities Exchange worldbank.org/en/country/senegal/overview Commission. The BOAD (Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement) is 7. “Senegal Country Indictors.” World Bank, 2016. Available at: http:// considered as an independent, specialized institution under the UEMOA povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/SEN treaty. Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/FKHEP1VQF0 8. “Plan Sénégal Émergent.” Government of Senegal, 2015. Available at: 28. Kireyev, Alexei. “New Plan Sets Senegal On Course to Become Emerging http://www.gouv.sn/IMG/pdf/PSE.pdf Economy.” IMF, 2014. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 9. “Millennium Development Goals Indicators.” United Nations Statistics survey/so/2014/CAR122414A.htm Division, 2015. 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BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 69 86. Ba, Mame-Penda. “La diversité du fondamentalisme sénégalais : Éléments 109. Babou. Cheikh Anta. Fighting the Greater : Amadu Bamba and the pour une sociologie de la connaissance.” Cahiers d’Études Africaines 206- Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913. New African Histories, 207(2012): 575-602. 2007. 87. “Senegal (03/07).” US Department of State, 2015. Available at: http:// 110. Fage, John and William Tordoff. A History of Africa, Fourth Edition. www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/senegal/82314.htm Routledge, 2002. 88. Arieff, Alexis. “Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations.” Congressional 111. Ohtsuka, Kazuo. “Sufism.” Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2016. Available Research Service, 2013. Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ at: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0759 R41369.pdf 112. WFDD e-mail exchanges, confidential. July 2015. Dakar, Senegal. 89. “Relations politiques.” Ambassade de France à Dakar, 2014. Available at: 113. WFDD e-mail exchanges, confidential. July 2015. Dakar, Senegal. http://www.ambafrance-sn.org/Relations-politiques 114. Diagne, Souleymane Bachir. “Religion and the Public Sphere in Senegal: 90. “Senegal Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values.” World Bank: World The Evolution of a Project of Modernity.” Institute for the Study of Integrated Trade Solution, 2014. Available at: http://wits.worldbank.org/ Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series (2009):09-008. CountrySnapshot/en/SEN/textview Available at: http://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ 91. “Plan d’Action Contre le Terrorisme (PACT) : 460 millions de FCFA ISITA_09-008_Diagne.pdf pour soutenir le Sénégal.” Ambassade de France à Dakar, 2016. Available 115. Gellar, Sheldon. Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa. at: http://www.ambafrance-sn.org/Plan-d-Action-Contre-le-Terrorisme- Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005. PACT-460-millions-de-FCFA-pour-soutenir-le 116. WFDD e-mail exchanges. November 2015. Dakar, Senegal 92. “Relations politiques.” Ambassade de France à Dakar, 2014. Available at: 117. The term brotherhood, often used in the past as an English translation, http://www.ambafrance-sn.org/Relations-politiques can be confusing as the Senegalese orders are not related to the Muslim 93. “Member Country Partnership Strategy (2013-2015): Senegal.” Islamic Brotherhood. Development Bank Group, 2013. Available at: http://www.isdb.org/irj/ 118. Leichtman, Mara A. “Revolution, Modernity and (Trans)National Shi`i go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/CM/ Islam: Rethinking Religious Conversion.” Journal of Publications/Parnership_Strategies/Senegal_2013-2015.pdf 39.3(2009): 319–351. 94. Augis, Erin. “Les jeunes femmes sunnite et la libéralisation économique 119. Leichtman, Mara A. “Defying Sufism? Senegalese Converts to Shiite Islam.” à Dakar.” Radiofiffusion television Sénégalaise, 2013. Available at: http:// ISIM Review 17(2006): 40-41. www.rts.sn/articles-de-presse/education/teheran-envisage-daugmenter-les- 120. Kane, Oumar. “Les relations entre la Communauté Tijane du Sénégal et bourses-detudes-offertes-a-dakar-journal.html la de Fèz.” Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines 95. Ibid 24(1994): 59-68. 96. Ibid 121. Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. Muslim Communities of Grace: The Sufi Brotherhoods 97. “Les propos d’Abdoulaye Wade portant sur les chrétiens provoquent des in Islamic Religious Life. Columbia University Press, 2007. échauffourées à Dakar.” Jeune Afrique, 2009. Available at: http://www. 122. WFDD e-mail exchange. December 2015. Dakar, Senegal jeuneafrique.com/156932/politique/les-propos-d-abdoulaye-wade- 123. WFDD interview with religious leader. November 2014. Rabat, Morocco. portant-sur-les-chr-tiens-provoquent-des-chauffour-es-dakar/ 124. WFDD e-mail exchange. July 2015. Dakar, Senegal. 98. “Sénégal: creation d’un minstère des Affaires religieuses.” Jeune Afrique, 125. Mbacké, Khadim. Sufism and religious brotherhoods. ed. John O. Hunwick, 2010. Available at: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/96780/ trans. Eric Ross. Markus Wiener Pub, 2005. politique/senegal-creation-dun-ministere-des-affaires-religieuses/ 126. Robinson, David. “French ‘Islamic’ Policy and Practice in Late Nineteenth- 99. “Inauguration de nouvelles infrastructures : Macky célèbre la renaissance de Century Senegal.” Journal of African History 29.3(1998): 419. Tivaouane.” Le Quotidien, 2015. Available at: http://www.lequotidien.sn/ 127. Johnson, G. Wesley. The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle index.php/component/k2/2015-12-19-10-29-29 for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920. Stanford University Press, 100. “DIAMALAYE: le Chef de l’Etat annonce 38 milliards pour la 1971. modernization de la Cité religieuse.” Dakaractu, 2015. Available at: 128. Adogame, Afe. The Public Face of African New Religious Movements in http://www.dakaractu.com/DIAMALAYE-le-Chef-de-l-Etat-annonce-38- Diaspora: Imagining the Religious ‘Other.’ Ashgate, 2014. milliards-pour-la-modernisation-de-la-Cite-religieuse_a89809.html 129. WFDD interview with member of a religious family. March 2015. Dakar, 101. “Senegal 2013 International Religious Freedom Report.” United States Senegal. Department of State, 2013. Available at: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/ 130. Mbacké, Khadim. Sufism and religious brotherhoods. ed. John O. Hunwick, senegal/323264/pdf/Senegal_IRF_2013_Report.pdf trans. Eric Ross. Markus Wiener Pub, 2005. 102. Sow, Fatou. “Fundamentalisms, globalization and women’s human rights in 131. Parker, Ron. “The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: a Fragile Senegal.” In Women Reinventing Globalisation, edited by Joanna Kerr and Equilibrium.” The Journal of Modern 21.01(1991): 155-171. Caroline Sweetman, 69-76. Oxfam, 2003. 132. Ibid 103. “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 133. Villalón, Leonardo A. Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2010. Available at: http://www. and Citizens in Fatick. Cambridge University Press, 2006. pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf 134. WFDD interview with member of a religious family. March 2015. Dakar, 104. Ibid Senegal. 105. Sow, Fatou. “Fundamentalisms, globalization and women’s human rights in 135. Ibid Senegal.” In Women Reinventing Globalisation, edited by Joanna Kerr and 136. Grosz-Ngate, Maria and Toba Diagne Haïdara. “The Qadiri Community Caroline Sweetman, 69-76. Oxfam, 2003. of Buh : Interview with Soxna Astuh Kunta.” Diversity & Tolerance 106. Ibid of Islam in West Africa, 2011. Available at: http://aodl.org/islamictolerance/ 107. Bop, Codou. “Roles and the Position of Women in the Sufi Brotherhoods.” ndiassane//object/37-157-61/ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 73.4(2005): 1099-1119. 137. Sheikh Ahmad al-Tījānī, the founder of the Tijaniyya, was born in 108. Sow, Fatou. “Fundamentalisms, globalization and women’s human rights in around 1727 CE. After completing the hajj in 1762, al-Tījānī visited Senegal.” In Women Reinventing Globalisation, edited by Joanna Kerr and several Sufi centers in the Maghreb and became familiar with a few existing Caroline Sweetman, 69-76. Oxfam, 2003. Sufi orders. He then settled in Fez, Morocco, where he had previously studied, and began teaching others about Sufism. It is said that the Prophet Muhammad appeared to Sheikh Ahmad al-Tījānī and told him to leave

70 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 the other orders he had been following, educate others, and transmit the will coincide with the second coming of Jesus (Issa) so the two can together wird given to him by the Prophet. The Tijaniyya doctrine states that only a combat the Antichrist. Although different groups (for example in ) Tidiane master can transmit the wird to others. recognize the coming of a Mahdi, adherents of the Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, 138. Willis, John Ralph. In the Path of Allah: ‘Umar, An Essay Into the Nature and Muridiyya confréries believe that the Mahdi has not yet come. of Charisma in Islam’. Routledge, 1989.; Mbacké, Khadim. Sufism and 164. This prophesized redeemer of Islam arrived in the form of a fisherman religious brotherhoods. ed. John O. Hunwick, trans. Eric Ross. Markus named Limamou Thiaw, thus transforming him into the newly named Wiener Pub, 2005. Limamou Laye. Following the revelation that he experienced, Limamou 139. Ibid Thiaw’s family, friends, and community ostracized him before many of 140. Cissé, Blondin. Confréries et communauté politique. L’Harmattan, 2007.; them came to accept his teachings. Mbacké, Khadim. Sufism and religious brotherhoods. ed. John O. 165. Glover, John. “The Prophet Muhammad reincarnated and his son, Jesus: Hunwick, trans. Eric Ross. Markus Wiener Pub, 2005. re-centering Islam among the Layenne of Senegal.” Journal of Historical 141. Mbacké, Khadim. Sufism and religious brotherhoods. ed. John O. Hunwick, Geography 42(2013): 24-35. trans. Eric Ross. Markus Wiener Pub, 2005. 166. Laborde, Cécile. La Confrérie Layenne et les Lébou du Sénégal. Centre 142. Seesemann, Rüdiger. The Divine Flood: Ibrāhīm Niass and the Roots of a d’etude d’Afrique noire, Institut d’etudes politiques de Bordeaux, Universite Twentieth-Century Sufi Revival. Oxford, 2011. Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV, 1995. 143. WFDD interview with El Hadji Baye Lamine Niass. November 2014. 167. “Issa Rohou LAHI Fils de l’Imam de tous les Imams, Imam des Deux Rabat, Morocco. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ Lieux Saints.” Layene. Available at: http://www.layene.sn/new/l_francais/ interviews/une-discussion-avec-el-hadji-baye-lamine-niass-famille- rohoulaye.php niassene-de-la-confrerie-tidiane-au-senegal 168. WFDD interview with Cheikh Djibril Diop Laye. November 2014. Rabat, 144. “Sheikh Ahmad Tijani bin Ali Cisse.” The Muslim 500, 2016. Available at: Morocco. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- http://themuslim500.com/profile/sheikh-ahmad-tijani-ali-cisse discussion-with-cheikh-djibril-diop-laye-imam-and-member-of-the- 145. WFDD interview with El Hadji Baye Lamine Niass. November 2014. layene-order-of-senegal Rabat, Morocco. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ 169. Ibid interviews/une-discussion-avec-el-hadji-baye-lamine-niass-famille- 170. Ibid; Glover, John. “The Prophet Muhammad reincarnated and his niassene-de-la-confrerie-tidiane-au-senegal son, Jesus: re-centering Islam among the Layenne of Senegal.” Journal 146. WFDD interview with religious leader. November 2014. Rabat, Morocco. of Historical Geography 42(2013): 24-35.; Laborde, Cécile. La Confrérie 147. WFDD interview with religious leader. November 2014. Rabat, Morocco. Layenne et les Lébou du Sénégal. Centre d’etude d’Afrique noire, Institut 148. Glover, John. Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal: The Order. d’etudes politiques de Bordeaux, Universite Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV, University of Rochester, 2007. 1995. 149. Wright, Zakariya. “Al-Hajj Malik Sy.” The Tariqa Tijaniyya, 2016. Available 171. WFDD interview with Cheikh Djibril Diop Laye. November 2014. Rabat, at: http://www.tijani.org/al-hajj-malik-sy/ Morocco. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- 150. Mané, Mamadou. “Les Valeurs Culturelles des Confreries discussion-with-cheikh-djibril-diop-laye-imam-and-member-of-the- Musulmanes au Senegal.” UNESCO, 2012. Available at: http:// layene-order-of-senegal www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Dakar/pdf/ 172. Gellar, Sheldon. Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa. EtudeconfreriesSenegal4Dec2012.pdf Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005. 151. Babou, Cheikh Anta. Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the 173. See Ross, Eric. “Touba & more.” Eric Ross, academic, 2015. Available at: Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913. Ohio University Press, https://ericrossacademic.wordpress.com/touba-more/ 2007. 174. Ross, Eric. “From Marabout Republics to Autonomous Rural Communities: 152. This draws largely on Mbacké, Khadim. Sufism and religious brotherhoods. Autonomous Muslim Towns in Senegal,” in African Urban Spaces in ed. John O. Hunwick, trans. Eric Ross. Markus Wiener Pub, 2005. Historical Perspective. Edited by Steven J. Salm and Toyin Falola, 243-265. 153. Babou, Cheikh Anta. Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the University of Rochester Press, 2009. Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913. Ohio University Press, 175. Gellar, Sheldon. Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa. 2007. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005. 154. Mbacké, Khadim. Sufism and religious brotherhoods. ed. John O. Hunwick, 176. Ibid trans. Eric Ross. Markus Wiener Pub, 2005. 177. Ross, Eric. “From Marabout Republics to Autonomous Rural Communities: 155. Babou, Cheikh Anta. Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Autonomous Muslim Towns in Senegal,” in African Urban Spaces in Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913. Ohio University Press, Historical Perspective. Edited by Steven J. Salm and Toyin Falola, 243-265. 2007. University of Rochester Press, 2009. 156. Thiam, El Hadji Ibrahima Sakho. “Les aspects du mouridisme au Sénégal.” 178. Gellar, Sheldon. Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa. Universite de Siegen, 2010. Available at: http://d-nb.info/1005315116/34 Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005.; Guèye, Cheikh. Touba: La capitale 157. Diouf, Mamadou. “The Senegalese Murid Trade Diaspora and the Making des mourides. Karthala Editions, 2002.; “2012 International Narcotics of a Vernacular Cosmopolitanism.” Translated by Steven Rendall. Public Control Strategy Report (INCSR)--Volume II: Money Laundering and Culture 12(2000): 679-702. Financial Crimes Country Database--Montenegro through Suriname.” 158. Guèye, Cheikh. Touba: La capitale des mourides. Karthala Editions, 2002. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 159. Interview with Sheikh Saliou Mbacké, July 2014. Dakar, Senegal. Available Enforcement Affairs, 2012. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/ at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with- nrcrpt/2012/database/191293.htm sheikh-saliou-mbacke-continental-coordinator-of-ifapa 179. Senegal’s law on gender parity requires half of the candidates on party lists 160. Babou, Cheikh Anta. Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the to be women. Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913. Ohio University Press, 180. “Presentation de l’Association Nurul Mahdi.” Layene. Available at: http:// 2007. www.layene.sn/new/nurul_mahdi.php 161. Ibid 181. Dramé, Babacar Mbaye and Idrissa Sané. “Seydina Kane, membre du 162. WFDD conversation with religious leader. March 2015. Dakar, Senegal. groupement central des layenes-« Nous travaillons à renforcer les moyens 163. Many Muslims believe that the Mahdi will come to Earth before the end of de la communauté ».” Le Soleil, 2010. Available at: http://fr.allafrica.com/ time to return Muslims to the path of righteousness and that his appearance stories/201007061051.html

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 71 182. Ibid handle/1887/16844/ISIM_11_Women_Claiming_Space_in_Mosques. 183. Cisse, Serigne Mansour Sy. “Sénégal: Séjour à Gorée - Les enseignements pdf?sequence=1 de Seydina Limamoulaye revisités.” Le Soleil, 2015. Available at: http:// 205. WFDD conversations with religious women, confidential. March 2015. fr.allafrica.com/stories/201503101857.html Dakar, Senegal. 184. Babou, Cheikh Anta. “Brotherhood Solidarity, Education, and Migration: 206. Augis, Erin. “Les jeunes femmes sunnites et la libéralisation économique à The Role of the Dahiras Among the Murid Muslim Community of New Dakar.” Afrique contemporaine 3(2009): 77-97. York.” African Affairs 101.403(2002): 151-170.; Villalón, Leonardo A. 207. Ibid Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick. 208. Ibid Cambridge University Press, 2006. 209. “Al Falah.” 2015. Available at: http://alfalah-sn.org/spip/spip.php?page=rub- 185. Babou, Cheikh Anta. Brotherhood Solidarity, Education, and Migration: f&id_mot=42 The Role of the Dahiras Among the Murid Muslim Community of New 210. “Présentation.” Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane. Available at: http://www. York. African Affairs 101.403(2002): 151-170. jironline.org/index.php/presentation 186. Barro, Mouhamadou. “Présentation des Medias religieux et santé maternelle 211. Cantone, Cleo. Making and Remaking Mosques in Senegal. Brill, 2012.; au Sénégal.” WFDD internal report. 2014. “Présentation du bureau.” Alfalah. Available at: http://alfalah-sn.org/spip/ 187. WFDD consultation. January 2015. Washington, D.C. spip.php?page=art-f&id_article=62 188. Barro, Mouhamadou. “Présentation des Medias religieux et santé maternelle 212. Augis, Erin. “Les jeunes femmes sunnites et la libéralisation économique à au Sénégal.” WFDD internal report. 2014. Dakar.” Afrique contemporaine 3(2009): 77-97. 189. Thiam, Rokhaya. “Etude sur les associations et réseaux de femmes religieuses 213. “Présentation.” Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane. Available at: http://www. au Sénégal.” WFDD internal report. 2014. jironline.org/index.php/presentation 190. Ciss, Alioune Badara. “Règles sanitaire et hygiénique : Ebola hante les 214. WFDD interviews. July 2015. pèlerins.” Le Quotidien, 2015. Available at: http://www.lequotidien.sn/ 215. “Présentation.” Jama’atou Ibadou Rahmane. Available at: http://www. index.php/politique/regles-sanitaire-et-hygienique-ebola-hante-les-pelerins jironline.org/index.php/presentation 191. “Tivaouane: Journée de sensibilisation sur la couverture maladies 216. Augis, Erin. “Les jeunes femmes sunnites et la libéralisation économique à universelles.” Thies Info, 2015. Available at: http://www.thiesinfo. Dakar.” Afrique contemporaine 3(2009): 77-97. com/tivaouane-journee-de-sensibilisation-sur-la-couverture-maladies- 217. Cantone, Cleo. Making and Remaking Mosques in Senegal. Brill, 2012. universelles/ 346. 192. Traore, Paule Kadja. “Sénégal: Solidarité avec les détenus - Le Dahira 218. Augis, Erin. “Les jeunes femmes sunnites et la libéralisation économique à Khimatoul Khadim montre l’exemple.” Walfadjiri, 2011. Available at: Dakar.” Afrique contemporaine 3(2009): 77-97 http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201109151286.html 219. Leichtman, Mara. “Defying Sufism? Senegalese Converts to Shiite Islam.” 193. “Fondation Sonatel : Accueil.” Sonatel. Available at: http://www. ISIM Review 17(2006): 40-41. fondationsonatel.sn/index.php/mecenat-sante/16-prise-en-charge- 220. Ibid medicale-gratuite-des-personnes-agees 221. Pham, Peter. “Sh’ia in Senegal: Iran’s Growing Reach into Africa.” World 194. Gueye, Mame Safiétou Djamil. Genre et Gouvernance urbaine au Sénégal: La Defense Review, 2010. Available at: http://worlddefensereview.com/ participation des femmes à la gestion urbaine. Vol 260. Presses Universitaires pham021810.shtml de Louvain, 2009. 222. WFDD interview with Imam Cherif Mballo. March 2015. Dakar, Senegal. 195. Hill, Joseph. “’All Women are Guides’: Sufi Leadership and Womanhood Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion- among Taalibe Baay in Senegal.” Journal of Religion in Africa 40.4(2010): with-imam-cherif-mballo-founder-of-the-ali-yacine-associationhttp:// 375-412. Available at: http://www.academia.edu/351030/_All_Women_ berkleyce are_Guides_Sufi_Leadership_and_Womanhood_among_Taalibe_Baay_ 223. Leichtman, Mara. “Defying Sufism? Senegalese Converts to Shiite Islam.” in_Senegal ISIM Review 17(2006): 40-41. 196. “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 224. WFDD interview with Imam Cherif Mballo. March 2015. Dakar, Senegal. Pew Forum of Religion & Public Life, 2010. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion- pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf with-imam-cherif-mballo-founder-of-the-ali-yacine-associationhttp:// 197. Dahou, Tarik and Foucher, Vincent. “Le Sénégal, entre changement berkleyce politique et révolution passive.” Politique africaine 4(2004): 5-21. 225. “Rapport d’Activité 2008.” Mozdahir Développement, 198. Ndiaye, Demba. “Les islamistes à l’assaut de la laïcité.” RFI, 2003. Available 2008. Available at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/1b1eb6_ at : http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/040/article_21539.asp ebf79f90e3394eb7acc8ea9a27663e73.pdf,; Leichtman, Mara. 199. Brossier, Marie. “Les débats sur le droit de la famille au Sénégal.” Politique “Revolution, Modernity and (Trans)National Shi`i Islam: Rethinking africaine 4(2004): 78-98. Available at: http://www.cairn.info/zen.php?ID_ Religious Conversion in Senegal.” Journal of Religion in Africa 39.3(2009): ARTICLE=POLAF_096_0078 319-351. 200. “Chapter 2: Religious Commitment.” Pew Research Center, Religion & 226. WFDD interview with Imam Cherif Mballo. March 2015. Dakar, Senegal. Public Life, 2012. Available at: http://www.pewforum.org/2012/08/09/ Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion- the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-2-religious-commitment/ with-imam-cherif-mballo-founder-of-the-ali-yacine-associationhttp:// 201. Cantone, Cleo. “Women Claiming Space in Mosques.” ISIM Newsletter, berkleyce 2002. Available at: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/ 227. Roger de Benoist, Joseph. Histoire de l’Eglise catholique au Sénégal: Du handle/1887/16844/ISIM_11_Women_Claiming_Space_in_Mosques. milieu du XVe siècle à l’aube du troisième millénaire. Karthala, 2008. pdf?sequence=1 228. Hesseling, Gerti. Histoire politique du Sénégal: institutions, droit et société. 202. Cantone, Cleo. “The Shifting Space of Senegalese Mosques,” in New Afrika-Studiecentrum, 1985. Perspectives on Islam in Senegal. Edited by Mamadou Diouf and Mara 229. Ibid Leichtman, 51-70. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009. 230. Ibid 203. Ibid 231. Paule, Brasseur. “Les missionnaires catholiques à la Côte d’Afrique pendant 204. Cantone, Cleo. “Women Claiming Space in Mosques.” ISIM Newsletter, la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle face aux religions traditionnelles.” 2002. Available at: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/ Mélanges de l’École française de Rome 109.2(1997): 723-745.; Berkley Center interview with Brother Jean Marie Thior. July 2015. Dakar, Senegal.

72 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 232. WFDD interview with Abbé Jacques Seck. March 2014. Dakar, Senegal. 255. Ibid Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion- 256. “Personal remittances, received (% of GDP).” World Bank, 2014. Available with-abbe-jacques-seck-vicar-general-and-curate-of-dakar--retired at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS 233. Berkley Center interview with Brother Jean Marie Thior. July 2015. Dakar, 257. Kane, Ousmane. The Homeland is the Arena. Oxford University Press, 2011. Senegal. 258. Easterly, William. The Tyranny of Experts. Basic Books, 2014. 234. Ibid 259. Ibid 235. Harrison, Christopher. France and Islam in West Africa, 1860-1960. 260. Golub, Stephen and Jamie Hansen-Lewis. “Informal Trading Networks Cambridge University Press, 2003. in West Africa: The Mourides of Senegal/The Gambia and the Yoruba of 236. Berkley Center interview with Brother Jean Marie Thior. July 2015. Dakar, Benin/Nigeria,” in The Informal Sector in Francophone Africa: Firm Size, Senegal. Productivity, and Institutions. Edited by Nancy Benjamin and Ahmadou 237. The Catholic school system in Senegal has expanded significantly since Aly Mbaye. Agence Française de Développement and The World Bank, the 1950s. With a strong reputation for academic excellence, they are a 2012, 173-193. desirable option even among Muslim families. Most students at Catholic 261. “The Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011.” World Bank, 2011. schools are Muslim. With 298 Catholic educational institutions in Senegal Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/ in 2014, there were approximately 107,000 students in formal schooling Resources/334934-1199807908806/Senegal.pdf and some 50,000 more in informal schooling. 262. Clemens, Michael A., and Gunilla Pettersson. “A New Database of Health 238. WFDD interviews with two Catholic leaders. March 2015. Dakar, Senegal. Professional Emigration from Africa.” Center for Global Development, 239. Stiller, Brian. Evangelicals Around the World: A Global Handbook for the 21st 2006. Available at: http://www.queensu.ca/samp/migrationresources/ Century. Thomas Nelson, 2015. Documents/DB_HealthProfessional_Emigration.pdf 240. Badiane-Labrune, Céline. “La Société des Missions Évangéliques de 263. Kane, Ousmane. The Homeland is the Arena. Oxford University Press, 2011. Paris en Casamance (Sénégal) 1863-1867 : Sédhiou, un laboratoire 264. Ibid du protestantisme dans une colonie française ? ” Histoires et Missions 265. Ibid chrétiennes 1(2008): 125-152. 266. Mbaye, Moussa. “Engaging Together for Real Change: Civicus Civil Society 241. “Senegal.” SIM, 2016. Available at: http://www.sim.org/index.php/ Index, Analytical Country Report for Senegal.” Civicus, 2011. Available at: country/SN ; WFDD interviews. February 2015; Stanley, J. “ Bassari of http://civicus.org/downloads/CSI/Senegal.pdf Senegal.” In Unreached peoples: Clarifying the task. Edited by H. Schreck and 267. Ibid D. Barrett. MARC, 1987. 268. Mbaye, Moussa. “Engaging Together for Real Change: Civicus Civil Society 242. WFDD interviews with employees of the Lutheran Church. March 2015. Index, Analytical Country Report for Senegal.” Civicus, 2011. Available at: Fatick, Senegal. http://civicus.org/downloads/CSI/Senegal.pdf 243. WFDD interview with Reverend Adama Faye. March 2015. Fatick, 269. “NGO Law Monitor: Senegal.” International Center for Not-for-Profit Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- Law, 2015. Available at: http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/Senegal. discussion-with-reverend-adama-faye-lutheran-church-of-senegal html 244. Ibid 270. Ibid 245. “Senegal Mission Initiative.” The United Methodist Church, 2016. 271. “NGO Laws in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Global Trends in NGO Law 3.3. Available at: http://www.umcmission.org/Give-to-Mission/Search-for- Available at: http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends3-3.pdf. Projects/Projects/12594A 272. Mbaye, Moussa. “Engaging Together for Real Change: Civicus Civil Society 246. WFDD interview with Methodist missionaries. November 2015. Dakar, Index, Analytical Country Report for Senegal.” Civicus, 2011. Available at: Senegal. http://civicus.org/downloads/CSI/Senegal.pdf 247. Ibid 273. “Comment créer une association ou une ONG ?” Agence De l’informatique 248. Ibid de l’Etat, 2006. Available at http://www.servicepublic.gouv.sn/index.php/ 249. “Pour contrer les menaces que planent sur l’Islm au Sénégal: Les Imams demarche_administrative/faq/2/55 décidés à combattre les «Témoins de Jéhovah» jusqu’au «Royaume de Dieu»” 274. “NGO Law Monitor: Senegal.” International Center for Not-for-Profit Seneweb, 2011. Available at: http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/pour- Law, 2015. Available at: http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/Senegal. contrer-les-menaces-qui-planent-sur-l-rsquo-islam-au-senegal-les-imams- html decides-a-combattre-les-laquo-temoins-de-jehovah-raquo-jusqu-rsquo- 275. Ibid au-laquo-royaume-de-dieu-raquo-hellip_n_43875.html 276. Ibid 250. “Sénégal: Mobilisation de la gendarmerie après le saccage d’un temple 277. “Social protection policy brief 3.” PASGR, 2014. Available at: http://r4d. des Témoins de Jéhovah à Dakar.” Citizenside, 2011. Available at: http:// dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/PASGR/Policy-Brief-3_Governance-of-Social- www.citizenside.com/fr/videos/politique/2011-06-26/39678/senegal- Protection.pdf mobilisation-de-la-gendarmerie-apres-le.html 278. “Annuaires statistiques de 2002 à 2013.” Government of Senegal, 251. “Saccage de sept eglises evangeliques a Dakar: Les pasteurs évangéliques 2014. Available at: http://www.education.gouv.sn/root-fr/files/index2. accusent les imams et l’église catholique.” Seneweb, 2011. Available php?rubrique=Chiffres clés&id=280 at: http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/saccages-de-sept-eglises- 279. Guèye, Hady et al. “AfriMAP Senegal: Effective Delivery of Education evangeliques-a-dakar-les-pasteurs-evangeliques-accusent-les-imams-et-l- Services.” AfriMAP, 2009. Available at: http://www.afrimap.org/english/ eglise-catholique_n_47503.html images/report/AfriMAP_Senegal_Education_Full_EN.pdf 252. “Visages du protestantisme au Sénégal.” Cevaa, 2014. Available at: 280. “Annuaires statistiques de 2002 à 2013.” Government of Senegal, http://www.cevaa.org/actualites/archives/2014/septembre/visages-du- 2014. Available at: http://www.education.gouv.sn/root-fr/files/index2. protestantisme-au-senegal php?rubrique=Chiffres clés&id=280 253. “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 281. “Net enrolment rate, primary, both sexes (%).” World Bank, 2014. Available Pew Forum of Religion & Public Life, 2010. Available at: http://www. at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf 282. Country Profile: Senegal.” UNESCO, 2014. Available at: 254. Interview with Abbé Jacques Seck, March 15, 2014. Available at: http:// http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/country-profile. berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-abbe-jacques- aspx?code=SEN®ioncode=40540 seck-vicar-general-and-curate-of-dakar-cathedral-retired

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 73 283. “Lower secondary completion rate, both sexes (%).” World Bank, 2014. discussion-with-brother-jean-marie-thior-national-secretary-of-the- Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS; national-office-of-catholic-teaching-of-senegal “Country Partnership Strategy (FY 2013-2017) for the Republic of 305. Ibid Senegal.” World Bank, 2013. 306. Villalón, Leonardo A., and Mamadou Bodian. “Religion, Demande Sociale, 284. Country Profile: Senegal.” UNESCO, 2014. Available at: Et Réformes éducatives au Sénégal.” African Politics and Power Programme http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/country-profile. Research report, 2012. aspx?code=SEN®ioncode=40540 307. “Annuaires statistiques de 2002 à 2013.” Government of Senegal, 285. Country Profile: Senegal.” UNESCO, 2014. Available at: 2014. Available at: http://www.education.gouv.sn/root-fr/files/index2. http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/country-profile. php?rubrique=Chiffres%20cl%C3%A9s&id=280 aspx?code=SEN®ioncode=40540 308. “Loi 2004-37 du 15 Décembre 2004.” République du Sénégal Journal 286. “Human Development Report 2015.” UNDP, 2015. Available at: http:// Officiel, 2005. Available at: http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article2689; hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/SEN.pdf Villalón, Leonardo A., and Mamadou Bodian. “Religion, Demande 287. “Frequently Asked Questions – Inequality-adjusted Human Development Sociale, Et Réformes éducative au Sénégal.” African Politics and Power Index(IHDI).” UNDP, 2015. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/faq- Programme Research report, 2012. page/inequality-adjusted-human-development-index-ihdi - t293n88 309. “Senegal 2014 International Religious Freedom Report.” U.S. 288. “Human Development Report 2015.” UNDP, 2015. Available at: http:// Department of State, 2014. Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/ hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/SEN.pdf organization/238466.pdf 289. “Gross enrolment ratio, primary, gender parity index (GPI).” World Bank, 310. Villalón, Leonardo A., and Mamadou Bodian. “Religion, Demande Sociale, 2013. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ENR.PRIM. Et Réformes éducatives au Sénégal.” African Politics and Power Programme FM.ZS/countries Research report, 2012. 290. Versus 1.06 in 2011 for primary education. “Gross enrolment ratio, 311. Mbow, Penda. “Secularism, Religious Education, and Human Rights in secondary, gender parity index (GPI).” World Bank, 2013. Available at: Senegal.” Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ENR.SECO.FM.ZS Working Paper Series, 2009. Available at: http://buffett.northwestern.edu/ 291. Ibid documents/working-papers/ISITA_09-007_Mbow.pdf 292. “Youth literacy rate, population 15-24 years, female (%).” World Bank, 312. “Caritas Senegal.” Caritas, 2016. Available at: http://www.caritas.org/ 2013. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524. where-we-are/africa/senegal/ LT.FE.ZS 313. “Mission.” Caritas, 2016. Available at: http://www.caritas.org/who-we-are/ 293. Ibid mission/ 294. “Loi 2004-37 du 15 Décembre 2004.” Journal Officiel 6202(2005). 314. “Who we are.” Caritas, 2016. Available at: http://www.caritas.org/who-we- Available at: http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article2689 are/ 295. “Annuaires statistiques de 2002 à 2013.” Government of Senegal, 315. Ibid 2014. Available at: http://www.education.gouv.sn/root-fr/files/index2. 316. WFDD interview with Abbé Ambroise Tiné. March 2015. Dakar, Senegal. php?rubrique=Chiffres clés&id=280 Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion- 296. Charlier, Jean-Émile. “Les écoles au Sénégal: de l’enseignement fficiel au with-abbe-ambroise-tine-secretary-general-of-caritas-senegal daara, les modèles et leurs répliques.” Cahiers de la recherche sur l’éducation 317. Ibid et les savoirs 3(2004): 35-53. 318. Ibid 297. Villalón, Leonardo A., and Mamadou Bodian. “Religion, Demande Sociale, 319. Huet-Gueye M., and M. De Léonardis. “Représentations de la société Et Réformes éducatives au Sénégal.” African Politics and Power Programme et pratiques éducatives en contexte disparité culturelle : les choix de Research report, 2012. scolarisation de l’enfant chez des parents sénégalais.” Psychologie française 298. Delaunay, Karine. “Education in Senegal: inequality in development.” 52.2(2007): 183-197. Institute de Recherche pour le Développement, 2014. Available at http:// 320. WFDD interview with Imam Mouhamed Cherif Diop. July 2014. Dakar, en.ird.fr/the-media-centre/scientific-newssheets/397-education-in-senegal- Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- inequality-in-development; “Lower secondary completion rate, both sexes discussion-with-imam-mouhamed-cherif-diop-program-coordinator-at- (%).” World Bank, 2014. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ tostan-senegal SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS; “Country Partnership Strategy (FY 2013-2017) 321. “Off the Backs of the Children: Forced Begging and Other Abuses against for the Republic of Senegal.” World Bank, 2013. Talibés in Senegal.” Human Rights Watch, 2010. Available at: https://www. 299. Villalón, Leonardo A., and Mamadou Bodian. “Religion, Demande Sociale, hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/senegal0410webwcover.pdf Et Réformes éducatives au Sénégal.” African Politics and Power Programme 322. Ibid Research report, 2012. 323. Ware III, Rudolph T. The Walking Qur’an: Islamic Education, Embodied 300. WFDD interview with Brother Jean Marie Thior. March 2015. Dakar, Knowledge, and History in West Africa. The University of North Carolina Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- Press, 2014. discussion-with-brother-jean-marie-thior-national-secretary-of-the- 324. “Cérémonie de lancement du Projet d’appui à la modernisation des national-office-of-catholic-teaching-of-senegal daara- allocution de son excellence Monsieur Macky Sall, President de 301. WFDD interview with Catholic leader. March 2015. Dakar, Senegal. la Republique du Senegal,” Office of the President Press Release, 2013. 302. Villalón, Leonardo A., and Mamadou Bodian. “Religion, Demande Sociale, Available at: http://www.presidence.sn/content/ceremonie-de-lancement- Et Réformes éducatives au Sénégal.” African Politics and Power Programme du-projet-d%E2%80%99appui-la-modernisation-des-daara-allocution- Research report, 2012. de-son 303. “Examens 2014 : l’Enseignement privé catholique enregistre plus de 85% au 325. Villalón, Leonardo A., and Mamadou Bodian. “Religion, Demande Sociale, Bac et au BFEM.” Seneweb, 2014. Available at: http://www.seneweb.com/ Et Réformes éducatives au Sénégal.” African Politics and Power Programme news/Education/examens-2014-l-rsquo-enseignement-prive-catholique- Research report, 2012. enregistre-plus-de-85-au-bac-et-au-bfem_n_132137.html 326. “About AAII.” African American Islamic Institute, 2008. Available at: 304. WFDD interview with Brother Jean Marie Thior. March 2015. Dakar, http://aaii.info/?page_id=8 Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- 327. “Education.” African American Islamic Institute, 2008. Available at: http:// aaii.info/?page_id=23

74 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 328. Ibid 361. “Une belle action pour fêter l’arrivée du nouveau né.” Secours Islamique, 329. Ibid 2012. Available at: http://www.secours-islamique.org/international/490- 330. Ibid aqiqa-un-moment-de-partage.html 331. WFDD phone interview with AAII staff. September 2015. 362. “Rapport Annuel 2009.” Secours Islamique, 2009. Available at: https:// 332. Ibid www.secours-islamique.org/images/pdf/2009/Rapport-Annuel-2009.pdf; 333. WFDD phone interview with AAII staff. September 2015. “Rapport Annuel 2011.” Secours Islamique, 2011. Available at: https:// 334. Ibid www.secours-islamique.org/images/pdf/2012/Rapport2011WEBFINAL. 335. Tovo, Maurizia, Menahem Prywes, Anne Kielland, Catherine Gibbons, pdf; “Rapport Annuel 2010.” Secours Islamique, 2010. Available at: https:// and Junko Saito. “Toolkit for Programming Assistance to Orphans and www.secours-islamique.org/images/pdf/2011/Rapport_2010.pdf Vulnerable Children (OVC) in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 2005. Available at: 363. “Rapport d’activités 2014.” HAI Senegal, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/6239718/toolkit- 364. WFDD conversation with HAI Senegal. November 2015. Petit Mbao, programming-assistance-orphans-vulnerable-children-ovc-sub-saharan- Senegal. africa 365. Ibid 336. “World Vision Senegal launches a national project for child protection 366. “The basics of Zakat.” Human Appeal, 2015. Available at: https:// and participation.” World Vision, 2015. Available at: http://www.wvi.org/ humanappeal.org.uk/zakat/ senegal/pressrelease/world-vision-senegal-launches-national-project-child- 367. “Rapport d’activités 2014.” HAI Senegal, 2015. protection-and 368. WFDD conversation with HAI Senegal. November 2015. Petit Mbao, 337. WFDD interview with Institut de bienfaisance islamique pour les orphélins Senegal. au Sénégal, August 2015. Dakar, Senegal. 369. “Rapport d’activités 2014.” HAI Senegal, 2015. 338. “Africa’s Orphaned and Vulnerable Generations: Children Affected by 370. WFDD conversation with HAI Senegal. November 2015. Petit Mbao, AIDS.” UNICEF, 2006. Senegal. 339. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue).” 371. Ibid Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2014. Available 372. Ibid at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR305/FR305.pdf 373. “Rapport d’activités 2014.” HAI Senegal, 2015. 340. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue).” 374. WFDD conversation with HAI Senegal. November 2015. Petit Mbao, Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD), 2014. Senegal. Available at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR305/FR305.pdf 375. “Rapport d’activités 2014.” HAI Senegal, 2015. 341. Ibid 376. WFDD conversation with HAI Senegal. November 2015. Petit Mbao, 342. “Child employment in agriculture (% of economically active children Senegal. ages 7-14).” World Bank, 2014. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ 377. WFDD interview with Institution de bienfaisance islamique pour les indicator/SL.AGR.0714.ZS orphelins au Sénégal. August 2015. Dakar, Senegal. 343. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue).” 378. “Senegal.” World Vision, 2015. Available at: http://www.worldvision.org/ Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2014. Available our-impact/country-profiles/senegal at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR305/FR305.pdf 379. “Who we are.” World Vision, 2015. Available at: http://www.worldvision. 344. “Global nutrition targets 2025: stunting policy brief.” WHO, 2014. org/about-us/who-we-are 345. “Annual Report 2014.” World Vision Senegal, 2014. Available at: http:// 380. Ibid www.wvi.org/sites/default/files/WVS 2014 Annual Report.pdf 381. “How we work.” World Vision, 2015. Available at: http://www.worldvision. 346. WFDD interview, confidential. June 2014. Dakar, Senegal. org/about-us/how-we-work 347. WFDD interview, confidential. June 2014. Dakar, Senegal. See also: 382. “Rapport Annuel 2014.” World Vision, 2014. Available at: http://www. ”Arrestation d’un Pasteur brésilien qui convertissait des enfants au wvi.org/sites/default/files/WVS%20rapport%20annuel%202014.pdf christianisme.” Rewmi. Available at: http://www.rewmi.com/arrestation- 383. “Child protection.” World Vision, 2015. Available at: http://www. d-un-pasteur-bresilien-qui-convertissait-des-enfants-au-christianisme_ worldvision.org/our-impact/child-protection a71443.html; “Brazilian’s ordeal in Senegal prison over, but legal challenges 384. “Senegal.” World Vision, 2015. Available at: http://www.worldvision.org/ remain.” World Watch Monitor, 2013. Available at: https://www. our-impact/country-profiles/senegal worldwatchmonitor.org/2013/04/article_2420590.html/ 385. “World Vision Senegal launches a national project for child protection 348. WFDD e-mail exchanges with SIF Sénégal. October 2015. and participation.” World Vision, 2015. Available at: http://www.wvi.org/ 349. Ibid, “Notre histoire.” Secours Islamique France, 2015. Available at: https:// senegal/pressrelease/world-vision-senegal-launches-national-project-child- www.secours-islamique.org/qui-sommes-nous/20-ans-d-actions.html protection-and 350. “Mission Senegal.” Secours Islamique France, 2015. 386. Ibid 351. “Rapport Annuel 2009.” Secours Islamique, 2009. Available at: https:// 387. “Ensuring protection and participation of children, especially the most www.secours-islamique.org/images/pdf/2009/Rapport-Annuel-2009.pdf vulnerable.” World Vision, 2015. Available at: http://www.wvi.org/senegal/ 352. “Rapport Annuel 2014.” Secours Islamique, 2014. Available at: https:// gallery/ensuring-protection-and-participation-children-especially-most- www.secours-islamique.org/images/stories/rapport/2015/RA2014.pdf vulnerable-2 353. “Programme Parrainage: Sénégal.”Secours Islamique France, 2015. 388. “World Vision signs first of its kind MoU with Senegal MPs to provide 354. WFDD e-mail exchanges with SIF Sénégal. October 2015. greater protection of children.” World Vision, 2015. Available at:http:// 355. “Programme Parrainage: Sénégal.”Secours Islamique France, 2015. www.wvi.org/senegal/article/world-vision-signs-first-its-kind-mou-senegal- 356. “Mission Senegal.” Secours Islamique France, 2015. mps-provide-greater-protection 357. “Rapport Annuel 2014.” Secours Islamique, 2014. Available at: https:// 389. Ibid www.secours-islamique.org/images/stories/rapport/2015/RA2014.pdf 390. “World Population Prospects 2015.” United Nations Department of 358. “Mission Senegal.” Secours Islamique France, 2015. Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015. Available at: 359. “Mission Senegal.” Secours Islamique France, 2015. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ 360. “Rapport Annuel 2013.” Secours Islamique, 2013. Available at: https:// 391. “Unemployment, total (% of total labor force).” World Bank, 2013. www.secours-islamique.org/images/pdf/2014/RA13-web.pdf Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS; “Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 75 ILO estimate).” World Bank, 2013. Available at: http://data.worldbank. 412. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé.” Agence Nationale de la org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS Statistique et de la Démographie, 2005. Available at: http://dhsprogram. 392. “Youth literacy rate, population 15-24 years, both sexes (%).” World Bank, com/pubs/pdf/FR177/FR177.pdf 2013. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524. 413. “Senegal statistics.” UNICEF, 2013. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/ LT.ZS infobycountry/senegal_statistics.html 393. “Plan Sénégal Émergent,” Government of Senegal, 2014. Available at: 414. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue).” http://www.gouv.sn/IMG/pdf/PSE.pdf Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2014. Available 394. Diané, Lanfia, “Migration au Sénégal : document thématique 2009.” at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR305/FR305.pdf International Organization for Migration, 2009. Available at: http:// 415. Ibid www.iomdakar.org/profiles/sites/default/files/migrations_regulieres_et_ 416. WFDD conversation with women’s association, confidential. March 2015. irregulieres_au_senegal_2009.pdf Dakar, Senegal. 395. Flynn, Daniel, “Weary of poverty, Senegalese migrants head for Europe,” 417. Augis, Erin “Dakar’s Sunnite Women: The Dialectic of Submission and Reuters, 2015. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/24/ Defiance in a Globalizing City,” in Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in us-europe-migrants-senegal-idUSKBN0NF16B20150424 Senegal. Edited by Mamadou Diouf. Columbia University Press, 2013. 73- 396. WFDD interview with Abbé Ambroise Tiné. March 2015. Dakar, Senegal. 98. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion- 418. Creevey, Lucy E. “The Impact of Islam on Women in Senegal.” The Journal with-abbe-ambroise-tine-secretary-general-of-caritas-senegal of Developing Areas 25.3(1991): 347–68. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/ 397. “Le Volet Humanitaire.” Asfiyahi, 2009. Available at: http://www.asfiyahi. stable/4191991 org/Le-Volet-Humanitaire_a38.html 419. “Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) (modeled ILO 398. “‘Fed Up’ with corruption, rappers inspire a new generation to create a estimate).” World Bank, 2013. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ better Senegal.” American Jewish World Service. Available at: https://ajws. indicator/SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.FE.ZS org/stories/yen-a-marre/ 420. “Vulnerable employment, female (% of female employment).” World 399. “Global Gender Gap Report 2015 Rankings.” World Economic Forum, Bank, 2013. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.EMP. 2015. Available at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap- VULN.FE.ZS/countries/1W?display=default report-2015/rankings/ 421. Ibid 400. Gueye, Ndeye Sokhna “Mouvements Sociaux des femmes au Senegal.” 422. “Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) (modeled ILO UNESCO, 2013. estimate).” World Bank, 2013. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ 401. Ibid indicator/SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.FE.ZS 402. “FAFS - Fédération des Associations de Femmes Sénégalaises.” Courants 423. WFDD conversation with women’s association, confidential. March 2015. de Femmes, 2009. Available at: http://courantsdefemmes.free.fr/Assoces/ Dakar, Senegal. Senegal/FAFS/fafs_senegal.html 424. “La situation actuelle des personnes homosexuelles: Senegal.” La Division 403. Palmeri, Joelle. “Mouvements de femmes en Afrique: de de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra, l’institutionnalisation à la démocratie directe.” 2013. Available at https:// 2014. Available at: https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ joellepalmieri.wordpress.com/2013/09/27/mouvements-de-femmes-en- didr_fiche_thematique_senegal_la_situation_actuelle_des_personnes_ afrique-de-linstitutionnalisation-a-la-democratie-directe-les-exemples-du- homosexuelles_ofpra_15.05.2015.pdf senegal-et-de-lafrique-du-sud-joelle-palmieri/ 425. “The Global Divide on Homosexuality.” Pew Research Center, 2014. 404. Diouf, Adame, “CIPF: Awa Marie Coll Seck fait le point sur les avancées Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/05/Pew-Global- dans la prévalence contraceptive au Sénégal.”Agence de Presse Sénégalaise, Attitudes-Homosexuality-Report-REVISED-MAY-27-2014.pdf 2016. Available at: http://www.aps.sn/actualites/societe/sante/article/cipf- 426. “La situation actuelle des personnes homosexuelles: Senegal.” La Division awa-marie-coll-seck-donne-le-ton-sur-les-avancees-et-defis-du-relevement- de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra, de-la-prevalence-contraceptive-envoyee-speciale-adama-diouf-ly 2014. Available at: https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ 405. “Chapter IV: Human Rights.” United Nations Treaty Collection, didr_fiche_thematique_senegal_la_situation_actuelle_des_personnes_ 2016. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. homosexuelles_ofpra_15.05.2015.pdf. Translation by author. aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en 427. “Jamais l’homosexualité ne sera légalisée au Sénégal selon Macky Sall.” 406. “LOI n° 2010-11 du 28 mai 2010.” République du Sénégal Journal Officiel, PressAfrik, 2016. Available at: http://www.pressafrik.com/Jamais-l- 2010. Available at: http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article8213 homosexualite-ne-sera-legalisee-au-Senegal-selon-Macky-Sall_a146890. 407. “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%).” World html Bank, 2016. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN. 428. Broqua, Christophe. “Les pro, les anti et l’international : mobilisations PARL.ZS autour de l’homosexualité en Afrique de l’Ouest.” in Collective Mobilisation 408. “Women in Senegal: Breaking the chains of silence and inequality.” United in Africa: Enough is Enough. Edited by Kadya Tall, Marie-Emmanuelle Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2015. Pommerolle, and Michel Cahen, 183-204. Brill, 2015. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. 429. “Senegal statistics.” UNIEF, 2013. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/ aspx?NewsID=15857&LangID=E infobycountry/senegal_statistics.html 409. Shell-Duncan, Bettina, Katherine Wander, Ylva Herlund, and Amadou 430. Malhotra, Anju. “The Causes, Consequences, and Solutions to Forced Moreau. “Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Child Marriage in the Developing World.” ICRW, 2010. Available at: Genital Cutting in Senegal.” Law and Society Review 47.4(2013): http://www.icrw.org/files/images/Causes-Consequences-and Solutions-to- 803-835. Available at: http://tostan.org/sites/default/files/resources/ Forced-Child-Marriage-Anju-Malhotra-7-15-2010.pdf legislatingchange2013_-_bettina_shell-duncan.pdf 431. “About AAII.” African American Islamic Institute, 2008. Available at: 410. “Senegal: Country Gender Profile.” The Inter Africa Network For Women, http://aaii.info/?page_id=8 Media, Gender Equity And Development (Famedev), International 432. WFDD phone interview with AAII staff. September 2015. Cooperation Agency (JICA), 2007. 433. “Empowerment of Women.” African American Islamic Institute, 2008. 411. Ibid Available at: http://aaii.info/?page_id=15 434. “Health.” African American Islamic Institute, 2008. Available at: http:// aaii.info/?page_id=20

76 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 435. Ibid seulement en cas de nécessité (imam).” Seneweb, 2010. Available at: 436. WFDD phone interview with AAII staff. September 2015. http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/l-islam-autorise-la-planification- 437. “Empowerment of Women.” African American Islamic Institute, 2008. familiale-seulement-en-cas-de-n-cessit-imam_n_35930.html Available at: http://aaii.info/?page_id=15 462. “Myth: family planning and religion don’t mix.” Marie Stopes International, 438. WFDD phone interview with AAII staff. September 2015. 2014. Available at: http://mariestopes.org/news/myth-family-planning- 439. “Empowerment of Women.” African American Islamic Institute, 2008. and-religion-dont-mix Available at: http://aaii.info/?page_id=15 463. “Senegal.” IntraHealth International, 2016. Available at: http://www. 440. Molloy, Aimee. However Long the Night: Molly Melching’s Journey to Help intrahealth.org/page/senegal Millions of African Women and Girls Triumph. HarperOne, 2014. 464. WFDD interview with Imam Ousmane Samb. November 2014. Rabat, 441. “Mission & History.” Tostan, 2016. Available at: http://www.tostan.org/ Morocco. about-us/mission-history 465. “Réseau islam et population, association musulmane de réflexion, 442. “Awards & Recognition.” Tostan, 2016. Available at: http://www.tostan. d’éducation et de sensibilisation sur les problèmes de population.” RIP. org/about-us/awards-recognition 466. WFDD interview with Imam Ousmane Samb. November 2014. Rabat, 443. “Impact Areas.” Tostan, 2016. Available at: http://www.tostan.org/impact_ Morocco. areas 467. “Réseau islam et population, association musulmane de réflexion, 444. WFDD interview with Imam Mouhamed Cherif Diop. July 2014. Dakar, d’éducation et de sensibilisation sur les problèmes de population.” RIP. Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- 468. WFDD interview with Imam Ousmane Samb. November 2014. Rabat, discussion-with-imam-mouhamed-cherif-diop-program-coordinator-at- Morocco. tostan-senegal 469. “La Declaration de politique de population à la lumière des enseignments 445. “Female Genital Cutting.” Tostan, 2016. Available at: http://www.tostan. islamiques.” RIP, 1998. org/female-genital-cutting 470. “Aperçu issu.” Initiative Sénégalaise de Santé Urbaine, 2015. Available at: 446. “Tostan.” American Jewis World Service, 2016. Available at: https://ajws. http://issu.sn/issu/apercu-issu/ org/stories/tostan/ 471. Tyson, Jeff. “Senegal’s family planning challenge.” Devex, 2015. Available at: 447. WFDD interview with Imam Mouhamed Cherif Diop. July 2014. Dakar, https://www.devex.com/news/senegal-s-family-planning-challenge-86009 Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- 472. WFDD interview with Imam Ousmane Samb. November 2014. Rabat, discussion-with-imam-mouhamed-cherif-diop-program-coordinator-at- Morocco. tostan-senegal 473. See also: “Engaging Faith Leaders in Senegal to Promote Women’s and 448. “Program structure.” Tostan, 2016. Available at: http://www.tostan.org/ Family Health.” WFDD, 2015. Available at: http://repository.berkleycenter. tostan-model/community-empowerment-program/program-structure georgetown.edu/150427WFDDEngagingFaithLeadersSenegal 449. “Education.” Tostan, 2016. Available at: http://www.tostan.org/area-of- PromoteWomensFamilyHealth.pdf impact/education 474. See also: “Visit to Morocco by Senegalese Religious Leaders to Review Family 450. Interview with AFID president. June 2014. Dakar, Senegal. Planning Activities.” WFDD , 2014. Available at: http://berkleycenter. 451. See also: “Senegal’s Reproductive Health Challenge: Religious Dimensions georgetown.edu/events/visit-to-morocco-by-senegalese-religious-leaders- and Engagement.” WFDD, 2015. Available at: http://berkleycenter. to-review-family-planning-activities. georgetown.edu/publications/senegal-s-reproductive-health-challenge- 475. See also: “L’Argumentaire Islamique sur l’Espacement des Naissances.” religious-dimensions-and-engagement WFDD, 2015. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ 452. “Addressing unmet need in West Africa.” Marie Stopes International, 2014. publications/l-argumentaire-islamique-sur-l-espacement-des-naissances Available at: https://mariestopes.org/sites/default/files/WA-Factsheet_AW_ 476. “Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Contexts, Data.” United v2-FINAL.pdf Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2013. 453. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé à Indicateurs Multiples 477. “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” (EDS-MICS).” Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, Pew Forum of Religion & Public Life, 2010. Available at: http://www. 2012. Available at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR258/FR258.pdf pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf 454. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue).” 478. “Latest Trends in Religious Restrictions and Hostilities.” Pew Research Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2014. Available Center, 2015. Available at: http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/02/ at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR305/FR305.pdf Restrictions2015_fullReport.pdf 455. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue).” 479. Ibid Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2014. Available 480. “Rapport International 2012 sur la liberté religieuse au Sénégal.” U.S. at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR305/FR305.pdf Department of State, 2012. Available at: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/ 456. “Unmet need for family planning, total, percentage.” United Nations senegal/323264/pdf/irf2012sn_fr.pdf; “Rapport 2013 sur la Liberté Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Indicators, de Religion dans le Monde : Sénégal.” U.S. Department of State, 2013. 2014. Available at: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail. Available at: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/senegal/323264/pdf/senegal- aspx?srid=764&crid=686 religion-fr-final.pdf 457. Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh. “Islam and Family Planning.” PRB, 2004. 481. This information is based on interviews conducted in Senegal in February Available at: http://www.prb.org/pdf04/islamfamilyplanning.pdf 2015 with pastors from the Lutheran Church of Senegal. 458. WFDD interviews with religious leaders. June 2014 and April 2015. 482. WFDD interview with Imam Oumar Diene. March 4, 2015. Dakar, Dakar, Senegal. Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- 459. WFDD interviews with health workers. June 2014. Diourbel, Senegal. discussion-with-imam-oumar-diene-secretary-general-of-the-national- 460. “Plan d’action national de Planification Familiale 2012-2015.” Senegal association-of-imams-and-ulemas-in-senegal Ministry of Health, 2012. Available at: http://www.fhi360.org/sites/ 483. WFDD interview with Brother Jean Marie Thior. March 4, 2015. Dakar, default/files/media/documents/senegal-plan-action-national-planification- Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- familiale-2012-2015.pdf discussion-with-brother-jean-marie-thior-national-secretary-of-the- 461. Diagne, Codou. “Sénégal: Planification familiale - L’Asbef implique les national-office-of-catholic-teaching-of-senegal; This information is based Imams dans la sensibilisation.” Le Soleil, 2010. Available at:http://fr.allafrica. on interviews conducted in Senegal in February 2015 with pastors from com/stories/201010010430.html; “L’islam autorise la planification familiale

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE — MAY 2016 77 the Lutheran Church of Senegal and in August 2015 with the Institution de 497. “Who we are.” American Jewish World Service, 2015. Available at: https:// bienfaisance islamique pour les orphelins au Sénégal. ajws.org/who-we-are/ 484. Evans, Martin. “Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la 498. “What we do.” American Jewish World Service, 2015. Available at: https:// Casamance (MFDC).” Chatham House Africa Programme, 2014. Available ajws.org/what-we-do/ at: http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/Martin-Evans.pdf 499. WFDD phone interview with AJWS representative. November 2015. 485. “Sénégal: Enquête Démographique et de Santé à Indicateurs Multiples 500. Ibid (EDS-MICS).” Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 501. “AJWS’s Contribution to the Peace Movement in Senegal.” American 2012. Available at: http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR258/FR258.pdf Jewish World Service, 2015. Available at: https://ajws.org/wp-content/ 486. Fall, Aissatou. “Understanding the Casamance Conflict: A Background.” uploads/2015/10/CaseStudy_Senegal_v20-lowres.pdf Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2010. Available 502. AJWS. Case Study 2: AJWS’s contribution to the Peace movement in at: www.kaiptc.org Senegal. 2015. Available at: https://ajws.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ 487. “Armed Conflicts Report.” Ploughshares, 2005. Available at: http://www. CaseStudy_Senegal_v20-lowres.pdf justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Senegal.pdf 503. “Supporting Women Peacemakers in Casamance.” American Jewish World 488. Eriksson, Mikael and Roland Kostic. Mediation and liberal Peacebuilding: Service, 2015. Available at: https://ajws.org/stories/usoforal/ Peace from the Ashes of War? Routledge, 2013; “CRS in Senegal.” Catholic 504. “Promoting Human Rights in Senegal.” American Jewish World Service, Relief Services, 2015. Available at: http://www.crs.org/our-work-overseas/ 2015. Available at: https://ajws-americanjewishwo.netdna-ssl.com/wp- where-we-work/senegal content/uploads/2015/05/ajws_senegal_country_profile.pdf 489. “L’Imam Ratib de la capital du Fouladou prie pour le Retour de la paix 505. Ibid en Casamance.” APS, 2015. Available at: http://www.aps.sn/actualites/ 506. WFDD phone interview with AJWS representative. November 2015. societe/article/fin-du-jeun-a-kolda; “Paix en Cassamance dans le sermon 507. WFDD phone interview with AJWS representative. November 2015. des Imams Lors de la Priéré de la Korité.” Rewmi. Available at: http:// 508. “Senegal.” American Jewish World Service, 2015. Available at: https://ajws. www.rewmi.com/paix-en-casamance-dans-le-sermon-des-imams-lors-de- org/where-we-work/africa/senegal/ la-priere-de-la-korite_a66308.html; “Des imams de Vélingara Ferlo prient 509. “CRS in Senegal.” Catholic Relief Services, 2015. Available at: http://www. pour la paix en Casamance.” Seneweb, 2014. Available at: http://www. crs.org/our-work-overseas/where-we-work/senegal seneweb.com/news/Societe/des-imams-de-velingara-ferlo-prient-pour-la- 510. “Mission Statement.” Catholic Relief Services, 2015. Available at: http:// paix-en-casamance_n_115614.html www.crs.org/about/mission-statement/ 490. Diallo, Ibrahima. “Musulmans et chretiens prient ensemble our la paix 511. “Senegal Partners.” Catholic Relief Services, 2015. Available at http://www. en Casamance.” Seneplus, 2013. Available at: http://www.seneplus. crs.org/senegal/partners.cfm com/article/musulmans-et-chretiens-prient-ensemble-pour-la-paix-en- 512. “Senegal.” Catholic Relief Services, 2015. Available at http://www.crs.org/ casamance our-work-overseas/where-we-work/senegal 491. “Paix en Csamance dans le sermon des Imams Lors de la Priéré de la Korité.” 513. “SCOPE Annual Report- Fiscal Year 2014.” CRS, 2015. Rewmi. Available at: http://www.rewmi.com/paix-en-casamance-dans-le- 514. WFDD e-mail exchanges with CRS. October 2015. sermon-des-imams-lors-de-la-priere-de-la-korite_a66308.html 515. Ibid 492. Including USAID and the World Bank 516. “SCOPE Annual Report- Fiscal Year 2014.” CRS, 2015. 493. Including Sant’Egidio, American Jewish World Service, and Catholic Relief 517. “The Church & Christian-Muslim Collaboration in West Africa – A CRS Services Perspective.” CRS, 2007. Available at: https://cpn.nd.edu/assets/16703/ 494. “Paix en Casamance : la médiation de Sant’Egidio continue. Approbation the_church_and_christian_muslim_collaboration_in_west_africa_a_crs_ d’un document sur les questions humanitaires.” Sant’Egidio, 2014. Available perspective_2_.pdf at: http://www.santegidio.org/pageID/3/langID/fr/itemID/9439/Paix- 518. “Statistics.” International Telecommunication Union, 2014. Available at: en-Casamance--la-mdiation-de-Sant-Egidio-continue-Approbation-d-un- https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx document-sur-les-questions-humanitaires.html 519. For more information, see Education and Vulnerability: The Case of the 495. “Who we are.” American Jewish World Service, 2015. Available at: https:// Talibés of Senegal. Available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ ajws.org/who-we-are/ publications/policy-brief-education-and-vulnerability-the-case-of-the- 496. Ibid, “What inspires us.” American Jewish World Service, 2015. Available -in-senegal at: https://ajws.org/who-we-are/resources/what-inspires-us/

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