RECALL

USS Missouri and USS Ohio in the lower chambers of Miraflores Locks of the , 1915 Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu

Unfulfilled Hope Naval Historical Center The Joint Board and the Panama Canal, 1903–1919

By Jason R. Godin

t is a fundamental principle,” the documents outlined a new “joint plan an effort to avoid the inter-Service rivalry wrote Acting Secretary of the Navy making body” composed of representa- displayed at the Santiago campaign in Cuba Franklin Roosevelt to Secretary tives from the State Department, Army during the 1898 Spanish-American War, I of State Robert Lansing on May General Staff, and Navy General Board. Secretary of War Elihu Root and Secretary 1, 1919, “that the foreign policy of our In the end, however, the civilian Service of the Navy William Moody created in July Government is in the hands of the State secretaries never translated the inter- 1903 an inter-Service body called the Joint Department. . . . It is also an accepted agency plan into institutional practice. Army and Navy Board “for the purpose of fact that the foreign policy of a govern- The Secretary of State failed to acknowl- conferring upon, discussing, and reaching ment depends for its acceptance by other edge the memorandum, appearing never common conclusions regarding all matters nations upon the naval and military force to have opened it. calling for the cooperation of the two Ser- that is behind it.”1 In an effort to add Ironically, Secretary Lansing’s inaction vices.”2 More commonly called the Joint military muscle to civilian diplomacy, the proved the culmination of an unfulfilled Board, its creation marked the first formal future President submitted with his mem- hope that was born over 15 years before. In attempt to permanently institutionalize orandum an organizational chart pre- pared by the Naval War College. Together, Jason R. Godin teaches in the Department of History at Texas A&M University.

86 JFQ / issue 42, 3 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Godin

Members of Navy’s General Board also served resulting diplomatic environment remained in on Joint Army-Navy Board in early 1900s effect for close to 50 years. By the turn of the century, the diplomatic climate changed as the United States expanded its official position regarding possession of the isthmian passage. As the commercial and strategic value of a canal became clear, Washington demanded exclusive rights to owning and controlling any future waterway. In February 1900, Secretary of State John Hay approached British Foreign Minister Sir Julian Pauncefote with the first of two treaties outlin- ing new stipulations regarding a canal. Known as the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty I, it allowed the United States exclusive jurisdiction over any future isthmian passage. While popularly sup- ported in principle, the final treaty in fact met strong opposition in the Senate. The legislators refused to ratify the treaty because it did not contain provisions allowing the United States Naval Historical Center

cooperation and coordination between influence over a Central American canal. Acting Secretary of the Navy American military Services. Beginning in 1823, U.S. diplomats viewed Franklin D. Roosevelt While this institutional ancestor to the any European attempts to intervene in and Joint Chiefs of Staff showed early promise as a control Latin American affairs in the Western war-planning agency responsive to immediate Hemisphere as a threat to national security. national security threats, in the end it failed to Yet because the United States was a relatively translate such rapid, integrated Service coordi- weak military power, diplomacy served for the nation into lasting practice. This characteristic next 25 years as the only viable instrument for was most apparent in the formulation of U.S. addressing security concerns in the Unfulfilled Hope military strategy regarding the Panama Canal. and Central America. Members of the Joint Board never developed The first U.S. foreign policy advance The Joint Board and the long-term, unified military strategies for toward securing a voice in the management defending and managing the isthmian Canal. of what became the Panama Canal occurred

Prior to , the admirals and gener- a quarter century after the Monroe Doctrine Naval Historical Center Panama Canal, 1903–1919 als who comprised the board additionally was adopted. Signed by the United States and antagonized their civilian superiors through Great Britain on April 19, 1850, the Clayton- to fortify the canal. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty a unilateral decision to change its statutory Bulwer Treaty stipulated that neither nation restrictions and unwanted British involvement authority and recommendations for a military- would exclusively control any trans-oceanic in construction remained. only Canal Zone government. canal built in the region. While no tangible Such diplomatic setbacks proved short gains were made, the treaty clearly marked lived. By November 1901, the United States Toward a Canal and Regional Influence a diplomatic victory for the United States. and Great Britain returned to the negotiation Prior to the creation of the Joint Board, European powers such as Great Britain, France, and Germany jockeyed to secure the Monroe Doctrine underpinned American diplomacy when construction rights to a short, safe water route it came to securing influence over a Central American canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. For its part, the United States continued to adhere to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and secured Signing the agreement affirmed the Monroe table to discuss new terms. Struggling in South a series of bilateral treaties beginning in the Doctrine, an action that recognized the Africa with the Boer War and facing the pros- mid-19th century. Together, these diplomatic importance of the United States as a Western pect of a Russian advance into Asia, British successes gained the United States a principal Hemisphere power. By signing the accord, diplomats gradually agreed to the proposals position in determining the fate of a Central Great Britain, at that point possessor of the American diplomats had outlined in the first American canal. most far-reaching maritime empire, assured Hay-Pauncefote talks. The Hay-Pauncefote Like Washington’s Caribbean policy in that any future diplomatic considerations for Treaty II nullified provisions of the longstand- general, the Monroe Doctrine underpinned a Latin American canal would include U.S. ing Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and guaranteed American diplomacy when it came to securing participation. The treaty provisions and the all canal protection and traffic rights to the

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 42, 3 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 87 T he J o i n t B o ar d a n d the P a n a m a C a n al

United States. A product of British diplomatic 17. The terms stipulated that Colombia military planners illustrated much about the necessity, Hay-Pauncefote II represented “the authorize the French Compagnie Nouvelle to state of inter-Service relations in the early conscious British recognition of the eventual sell all rights and concessions to the United 20th century. The Dewey memoranda to the United States supremacy in the Western States. Bogotá also conceded to Washington civilian Service secretaries demonstrated that, Hemisphere.”3 By the end of 1901, Washington exclusive construction and protection rights given a clear and immediate threat to national had achieved international recognition as the for a waterway along with a canal zone up to security, generals and admirals working primary administrator of any Latin American 15 miles wide. Hay-Herrán provisions addi- together could find a military response predi- isthmian passage. tionally granted a 100-year lease, which could cated on an integrated force approach. Success With the issue of sole jurisdiction over be renewed unilaterally by Washington. It in the Joint Board contingency plans outlined administration settled, attention next turned also authorized the United States “in cases of by Dewey required that land forces secure to location. An 1899 Isthmian Canal Commis- unforeseen or imminent danger” to intervene surrounding railways on shore while warships sion appointed by President William McKinley unilaterally in Colombian affairs in the name simultaneously controlled the Canal. Service set the parameters of the discussion, deliber- of canal defense. Not surprisingly, the treaty parochialism gave way to cooperation when ated between sites in Nicaragua and Panama, incited vehement opposition among Colom- faced with a pressing threat abroad. and recommended in its November 1901 final bian officials. Joint Board minutes and records, report that Nicaragua, rather than Panama, With title in hand, the United States however, revealed that short-term recommen- provided the best site. The commission con- sought to further strengthen its position in dations noted for their unified Service dimen- cluded that while a Nicaraguan canal would the region. On November 6, 1903, the U.S. sion never translated into standard operating cost more, Nicaragua had fewer entangling Government recognized Panamanian inde- procedure over time. Not until 6 months treaty stipulations with neighboring nations, pendence, and 12 days later made the recogni- later did the first hint of any substantive war and selecting it over Panama avoided diplo- tion official by signing the Hay-Bunau-Varilla planning concerning Latin America appear matic dealings with Colombia. Treaty. The accord also affirmed U.S. canal- again. Even then, contingency recommenda- By early 1902, a sharp White House– building rights. Through skilled and opportu- tions flowed from the individual Services. The Senate debate became part of the canal discus- nistic diplomacy, the United States now held a inter-Service body returned to action when it sions. Beginning March 29 and continuing dominant position for controlling an isthmian advised during the second week of June 1904 for 19 days, Senate Democrats pushed for a waterway across Latin America. that both the Army General Staff and Navy Nicaraguan route while President Theodore General Board begin study on how the United Roosevelt and his Senate Republican col- Defending and Managing the States could most effectively “intervene in the leagues in the minority called for a Pana- Isthmian Passage affairs of an independent country in the West manian passageway. In the end, the Panama While American diplomats took comfort Indies or on the mainland of Central or South position prevailed, as evidence surfaced in from their string of successes, military strate- America” should it become necessary under June of recent heavy volcanic activity along gists acted with urgency. High-ranking Army the terms of the Monroe Doctrine.4 the Nicaraguan route. Roosevelt signed the and Navy officers on the Joint Board planned For almost the next 2 years, the generals Spooner Act into law on June 28, 1902. The together for possible military contingencies and admirals remained silent regarding the legislation authorized the President to spend in the region. Five weeks after signing the Panama Canal. Finally in April 1906, Dewey $40 million to purchase the French property Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the Joint Board reported to Secretary of War William Taft rights in the area, negotiate with Colombia, convened in Washington and recommended and Secretary of the Navy Charles Bonaparte and build a canal in Panama. a military response should war erupt between that the Joint Board resolved that both ends of Civil war in neighboring Colombia Panama and Colombia. Writing to the Secre- the Canal should be fortified. As the passage added urgency to the deliberations. Torn taries of War and the Navy, the board’s presid- neared completion, its defenses began to by internal strife, Bogotá found itself in a ing officer, Admiral George Dewey, advised concern civilian policymakers and military precarious bargaining position. Washington that in the event of war the United States strategists alike. Yet how to protect the isthmian passage remained a relatively low-priority issue. A Hay-Herrán provisions authorized the crushing Japanese naval victory over the Rus- United States to intervene unilaterally in sians at Tsushima in 1905, combined with a Colombian affairs in the name of canal defense 1906 San Francisco School Board referendum that segregated Chinese and Japanese students policymakers recognized the weakness and should occupy—by force if necessary—the in public schools, strained U.S.-Japanese capitalized quickly on the opportunity. The railroad, the Canal, and the Yavisa mining diplomatic relations to a point where many Colombian government appealed on Sep- storage facilities near the Panama-Colombia Americans leaders in 1907 perceived war as tember 11, 1902, for U.S. officials to mediate border. Dewey closed his reports by advising imminent. Dismissing Panamanian laborers a settlement of its civil war. Eight days later, immediate occupation of the Yavisa facilities. on the Canal as ungrateful yet law-abiding the United States seized the Panama Railroad. Hostilities never materialized between locals who numbered fewer than 50,000, U.S. The American-dominated talks culminated the two Latin American countries in Decem- military leaders attached a greater strategic with the Hay-Herrán Treaty, signed January ber 1903. However, in light of such military significance to the Japanese threat across the 22, 1903, and ratified by the Senate on March inaction abroad, the actions of American Pacific than to management issues in Panama.

88 JFQ / issue 42, 3 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Godin

The Joint Board finally returned to Since 1910, American Presidents and their staff, however, again never suggested any Canal defense in May 1910, when it consid- policymakers instead concerned themselves substantive change to the defensive measures ered and approved the seacoast armament increasingly with the political instability in protecting the Canal. According to the May recommendations as outlined by the Panama Mexico. By June 1911, Francisco Madero, a 5, 1913, meeting minutes, the generals and Fortification Board. Created in October 1909, rich landowner from northern Mexico, headed admirals referred to “the possibility of a the Fortification Board consisted of six Army what became a national revolt and removed Japanese attack on the Western termini of officers and two Navy officers appointed by Porfirio Díaz from office. Madero, however, the Panama Canal, and possible means of their respective Service Secretaries. Major did not hold power for long. Within 6 months, meeting such an attack,” but recommended no measures to meet such a threat.7 Ten days later, events occurred that the officers attempted, without the knowledge assured the Joint Board never would com- of the civilian superiors they were to advise, to grant the pletely resolve the issue. In response to a board authority to act independently rising fear of a Japanese advance against the Philippines, the members unanimously rec- ommended moving the cruisers USS Saratoga, General Leonard Wood, Army Chief of Staff, one of his former generals, Victoriano Huerta, Cincinnati, Albany, Rainbow, and Helena presided. In addition to Wood, all but one of ousted him from office, then captured and immediately from the Yangtze River in China. the remaining military officers who served assassinated him. Besides suggesting the movement of ships, the on the Fortification Board also served on the At virtually the same time Huerta generals and admirals decided the Joint Board Joint Board. assumed power in Mexico, Woodrow Wilson had authority “to initiate, as well as to act on Reporting their findings directly to entered the White House. Horrified by the subjects referred to it.”8 Originally empowered Secretary of War Jacob Dickinson, the Army Madero killing, Wilson refused to grant to function solely as an advising body, the and Navy members of the Fortification Board diplomatic recognition to the Huerta regime. eight officers attempted, without the knowl- found in April 1910 that both sides of the Consequently, the United States ceased the edge or consent of the civilian superiors they Canal contained strong geographical posi- shipment of military arms to Mexico. Yet as were to advise, to grant the board an unprec- tions “for defense against land operations of American businesses appealed for interven- edented authority to act independently. an enemy force.” The board recommended tion, the clouds of war loomed. Facing such This unilateral change ultimately antag- that the War Department garrison 12 coast bloody revolution to the south, the Joint onized relations with two highly influential artillery companies, 4 infantry regiments, 1 Board began immediate contingency plan- civilian policymakers. During the morning field artillery battalion, and a cavalry squadron ning for operations against Mexico in April of May 17, 1913, Admiral Bradley Fiske, for peacetime Canal Zone seacoast arma- 1912, again marginalizing the Panama Canal a vocal naval member of the Joint Board, ment defenses, with wartime reinforcements defense question. appealed to Secretary of the Navy Josephus dispatched according to enemy deployments. Not until March 1913 did U.S. military Daniels to follow the board’s advice concern- It estimated the peacetime cost of such a gar- leaders again raise the problem of defending ing the deployment of ships. Daniels rejected rison at $14 million a year.5 the Canal. According to a report by the U.S. the military counsel. Shortly after Fiske’s Army War College, the size of the garrison departure, according to the Navy Secretary, Volatility to the South stationed in Panama should be determined a reporter from a large newspaper entered Military leaders ultimately found that by calculating the number of troops needed his office and asked if he “had approved the the combination of nature, expensive coastal “to resist attack of a force which could be action of the Joint Board of taking all ships fortifications, and Army troops constituted landed from a fleet such as one of the great on the Pacific Coast and sending [them] to an incomplete defense against an invasion powers might be expected to have at sea.” Hawaii or .”9 from the west. According to the Committee Rather than finally seizing the initiative Following the meeting, Daniels on Land Defenses, a subcommittee of the offered by the Army to increase and modern- immediately went to the White House and Panama Fortification Board, a large enemy ize Canal defenses, the generals and admirals informed President Wilson of the unforeseen force could land on either the Atlantic or of the Joint Board reacted to this report with developments pertaining to the Joint Board. Pacific side of the Canal Zone, but topographi- relative indifference, suggesting blandly Wilson responded by stating that the Joint cal conditions— heavy rainfall and jungle that it was “most desirable” to conduct joint Board “had no right to be trying to force a terrain—made operations after an amphibious Army-Navy maneuvers “in order that, if they different course.” The President concluded landing on the Atlantic side “extremely unfa- exist, defects in the scheme of fortification by warning that “if this should occur again, vorable.” Given the right conditions, however, and defense of the Isthmus may be rectified there will be no General or Joint Boards. the committee concluded that the area around with the least delay.”6 They will be abolished.”10 the Pacific end could be penetrated and the Wilson’s anger never really subsided, opening of the Canal seized. The Board Drops the Ball and from that point on Joint Board influence As the Fortification Board findings Two months later, the Joint Board in formulating military strategy declined sig- raised the issue of the vulnerability of the explicitly identified Japan as the great power nificantly. Yet even after such a sharp rebuke Panama Canal, U.S. decisionmakers made no the U.S. Army War College referred to in from their Commander in Chief, the board effort to improve defenses for over 2 years. veiled terms. The inter-Service consultative members continued to deliberate on issues ndupress.ndu.edu issue 42, 3 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 89 T he J o i n t B o ar d a n d the P a n a m a C a n al

President with Secretary of the Senators and Representatives thus strongly Navy Charles J. Bonaparte, 1906 resisted a purely military jurisdiction in the Canal Zone. Goethals stated that the com- mission believed the President should not be “limited in his selection to either of the mili- tary branches of the Service, but that he could select a civilian” to serve as chief administrator for the Canal Zone.12 Civil-military debate over managing the isthmian passage continued into the following year, but without the Joint Board. By January 1914, the board still could not reach a col- lective recommendation, and the promising Army-Navy consensus of 2 months earlier evaporated. The Wotherspoon-Knapp sub- committee had yet to submit its final report. Influential Army generals, recognizing the impotence of the Joint Board, began voicing their opinions outside the organization. The Army War College Division became one such forum for Army response. The Army agreed with the Navy insofar as Canal administration and operations were primarily military affairs that required military consideration alone. The president of the Army War College concluded that the Army Corps of Engineers should maintain and operate the Canal. Absent the governor, the next highest Army officer should assume the functions of the office. Under the Army plan, the Navy would be relegated to a supporting role.

Naval Historical Center Army leaders also refuted civilian criticisms by arguing that the Panama Canal relating to the Panama Canal. However, the administer all government matters within the embodied a military necessity as much as a character of their debate changed. In rare Canal Zone. The governor would be an Army maritime commerce highway. General Leonard amended minutes, it is clear that the generals officer charged directly with command of troops Wood opined that the Canal “partakes of the and admirals concerned themselves more with and fortifications. The director of operations character of a well-guarded and secure defile who should govern the Canal Zone than how and maintenance of the Canal, the second- connecting our Atlantic seacoast and interests in it should be governed. highest government official, would be a Navy the Caribbean Sea with our Pacific seacoast and During the meeting of October 9, officer responsible for all Navy-related personnel possessions in the Pacific Ocean.”13 Defending 1913, Admiral Dewey commented to the and materiel in the zone. Two assistants under and managing the whole commercial American Joint Board that “war being imminent,” the command of the director of operations and empire required strongly protecting and militar- insular possession governments “should be maintenance—an officer from either the Army ily administering one of its most militarily vital in the hands of the Army.” Brigadier General Engineering Corps or Navy Civil Engineering parts—the isthmian pass. William Crozier responded, “the President Corps—would control the waterway and railway While civilian policymakers and military . . . goes farther, in that it is always to be respectively. When Captain Knapp read the strategists deliberated Canal Zone manage- under the Army.” Captain H.S. Knapp, board November 1, 1913, endorsement to the Joint ment, the shadow of war in Europe began to recorder, noted that the subject was “dis- Board as a whole, Admiral Dewey referred the influence discussions. In June 1914, the Senate cussed at length” until a “general consensus matter to a subcommittee composed of Knapp Foreign Relations Committee opened hear- of opinion seemed to be that the government and Brigadier General W.W. Wotherspoon. ings on how the United States should react to should always be a military one.” The discus- This “all-military” option encountered the possibility of a German-run Nicaraguan sion ended with Dewey insisting simply that strong civilian opposition. Colonel George canal. Although the hearings were not open to there be “no civilian control.”11 Goethals, chairman of the Isthmian Canal the public, national newspapers reported that Commission, informed the Joint Board that Nicaraguan ambassador General Emiliano The All-Military Option Congress believed commercial interests Chamorro testified that Germany was willing During this time, the Navy General Board dictated the need for an isthmian canal long to pay more than $3 million for a canal route. recommended that a single U.S. military Service before any demands of military strategy. On August 5, 1914, as World War I began in

90 JFQ / issue 42, 3 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Godin

Europe, U.S. and Nicaraguan diplomats signed Joint Board resume any serious discussion 3 J.A.S. Grenville, “Great Britain and the the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, wherein Nica- on Canal Zone defense. Even as the volatile Isthmian Canal, 1898–1901,” American Historical ragua allowed the United States 99 years to diplomatic conditions calmed, the inter-Service Review 61 (October 1955), 48. 4 Meeting minutes, June 10, 1904, JB 301, roll establish a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, consultative body never questioned the suscep- 1, M 1421; memoranda, Dewey to the Secretaries thus negating a rival waterway. tibility of the natural and artificial defenses to of War and Navy, June 24, 1904, JB 325-16, roll 9, The last notable action involving the foreign amphibious assault until two and a half M 1421. Joint Board concerned a Panama Canal Zone years later. Fortunately, no enemy attacked the 5 Meeting minutes, April 25, 1910, and May base. In late July 1916, as war raged Panama Canal during World War I, and a Japa- 31, 1910, JB 301, Roll 1, M 1421; memorandum, in Europe, Secretary Daniels informed the nese challenge to U.S. interests in the eastern Captain Stanley D. Embick to the Adjutant General, Joint Board that the Navy’s General Board Pacific never escalated into a real threat. April 23, 1910, JB Panama Canal File, serial 73, roll had recommended that a submarine base be The Joint Board failed equally when 12, M 1421; “Report of the Panama Fortification stationed at the Atlantic side. The naval con- dealing with management of the Canal Zone. Board,” Captain Stanley D. Embick, August 12, 1910, sultative body called for a primary submarine Its strict adherence to a military-only govern- JB Panama Canal File, serial 73, roll 12, M 1421. 6 base with a 20-boat capacity at Coco Solo ment antagonized Congress. Exacerbated Memorandum, Brigadier General William Crozier to Major General Leonard Wood, March 25, Point, and an auxiliary base with a 10-boat by the board’s attempt in 1913 to expand its 1913, JB Panama Canal File, roll 12, M 1421; memo- capacity on the Pacific side at Balboa Harbor. statutory authority, civil-military antagonism randa, Dewey to SECWAR and SECNAV, May 6, The Joint Board concurred, recognizing sub- reached the point that the U.S. Army War 1913, JB Panama Canal File, serial 7, roll 12, M 1421. marines as “an essential element of the defense College president and Army Chief of Staff 7 Meeting minutes, May 5, 1913, JB 301, roll 1, of the Canal Zone, including the Canal itself.” addressed civilian criticism by outside means. M 1421. The generals and admirals together found Such civil-military acrimony confirmed 8 Ibid. a necessary resource to counter that in the early 20th century, the goal for the 9 Diary entry, May 17, 1913, in The Cabinet possible amphibious assaults. By 1917, civilian Joint Board to permanently institutionalize Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913–1921, ed. E. David policymakers heeded the military advice and inter-Service cooperation and coordination Cronin (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, constructed a peninsular submarine base at remained an unfulfilled hope. JFQ 1963), 67–68. 10 the recommended site.14 Ibid. 11 Meeting minutes, October 9, 1913 (amended), Contingency planning following the N ot e s roll 1, M 1421. Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty suggested a highly 12 1 Memorandum, Franklin D. Roosevelt to Memorandum, George W. Goethals to Major responsive Joint Board, an inter-Service General Leonard Wood, November 15, 1913, JB consultative body attuned to the environment the Secretary of State, May 1, 1919, cited in Ernest R. May, “The Development of Political-Military Panama Canal Files, serial 10, roll 1, M 1421. facing American diplomats. With speed and 13 Consultation in the United States,” Political Science Memorandum, Major General Leonard Wood efficiency, the generals and admirals provided Quarterly 70 (June 1955), 167. to the Secretary of War, January 17, 1914, JB Panama their civilian superiors with an integrated 2 Navy Department General Order No. 136, Canal File, serial 10, roll 12, M 1421. 14 force plan of action should war occur between July 18, 1903, Joint Board [hereafter JB] 301, Nonse- Memorandum, JB senior member to the Sec- Colombia and the newly independent Panama. rial Documents, roll 2, M 1421, Records of the Joint retaries of War and the Navy, November 14, 1916, JB Yet in the end, such war planning initia- Board, 1903–1947, National Archives Microfilm Panama Canal File, serial 47, roll 12, M 1421; Paolo tive succumbed to periods of neglect. A dismal Publications, Washington, DC; Army Headquarters E. Colletta and K. Jack Bauer, eds., and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas (Westport, state of affairs followed, and such inattention General Order No. 107, July 20, 1903, JB 301, Non- CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 80. ultimately proved symptomatic of the Joint serial Documents, roll 2, M 1421, Records of the Board’s inability to translate short-term actions Joint Board, 1903–1947, National Archives Micro- into long-term procedures. The board failed to film Publications, Washington, DC. agree on concrete plans on how to manage and C-Class submarines moored alongside defend the Canal Zone. As Secretaries of State USS Charleston in Panama Bay, 1916 John Clayton, John Hay, and William Jennings Bryan successfully garnered diplomatic rights for the United States to construct a waterway across Latin America, the generals and admi- rals fumbled the two most basic tasks assigned to them. When it came to determining how best to defend the Canal, the board tabled discussion on the subject for 3 years. While understand- able considering the potential for war across the Pacific with Japan in 1907, and continued instability immediately south in Mexico begin- ning in 1910, not until the spring of 1910 and the final report of the Panama Fortification

Board manned by its own members did the Naval Historical Center ndupress.ndu.edu issue 42, 3 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 91