Joint Board and the Panama Canal 1903-1919:Unfulfilled Hope
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RECALL USS Missouri and USS Ohio in the lower chambers of Miraflores Locks of the Panama Canal, 1915 Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu Unfulfilled Hope Naval Historical Center The Joint Board and the Panama Canal, 1903–1919 By JASON R. GODIN t is a fundamental principle,” the documents outlined a new “joint plan an effort to avoid the inter-Service rivalry wrote Acting Secretary of the Navy making body” composed of representa- displayed at the Santiago campaign in Cuba Franklin Roosevelt to Secretary tives from the State Department, Army during the 1898 Spanish-American War, I of State Robert Lansing on May General Staff, and Navy General Board. Secretary of War Elihu Root and Secretary 1, 1919, “that the foreign policy of our In the end, however, the civilian Service of the Navy William Moody created in July Government is in the hands of the State secretaries never translated the inter- 1903 an inter-Service body called the Joint Department. It is also an accepted agency plan into institutional practice. Army and Navy Board “for the purpose of fact that the foreign policy of a govern- The Secretary of State failed to acknowl- conferring upon, discussing, and reaching ment depends for its acceptance by other edge the memorandum, appearing never common conclusions regarding all matters nations upon the naval and military force to have opened it. calling for the cooperation of the two Ser- that is behind it.”1 In an effort to add Ironically, Secretary Lansing’s inaction vices.”2 More commonly called the Joint military muscle to civilian diplomacy, the proved the culmination of an unfulfilled Board, its creation marked the first formal future President submitted with his mem- hope that was born over 15 years before. In attempt to permanently institutionalize orandum an organizational chart pre- pared by the Naval War College. Together, Jason R. Godin teaches in the Department of History at Texas A&M University. 86 JFQ / issue 42, 3 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Godin Members of Navy’s General Board also served resulting diplomatic environment remained in on Joint Army-Navy Board in early 1900s effect for close to 50 years. By the turn of the century, the diplomatic climate changed as the United States expanded its official position regarding possession of the isthmian passage. As the commercial and strategic value of a canal became clear, Washington demanded exclusive rights to owning and controlling any future waterway. In February 1900, Secretary of State John Hay approached British Foreign Minister Sir Julian Pauncefote with the first of two treaties outlin- ing new stipulations regarding a canal. Known as the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty I, it allowed the United States exclusive jurisdiction over any future isthmian passage. While popularly sup- ported in principle, the final treaty in fact met strong opposition in the Senate. The legislators refused to ratify the treaty because it did not contain provisions allowing the United States Naval Historical Center cooperation and coordination between influence over a Central American canal. Acting Secretary of the Navy American military Services. Beginning in 1823, U.S. diplomats viewed Franklin D. Roosevelt While this institutional ancestor to the any European attempts to intervene in and Joint Chiefs of Staff showed early promise as a control Latin American affairs in the Western war-planning agency responsive to immediate Hemisphere as a threat to national security. national security threats, in the end it failed to Yet because the United States was a relatively translate such rapid, integrated Service coordi- weak military power, diplomacy served for the nation into lasting practice. This characteristic next 25 years as the only viable instrument for was most apparent in the formulation of U.S. addressing security concerns in the Caribbean Unfulfilled Hope military strategy regarding the Panama Canal. and Central America. Members of the Joint Board never developed The first U.S. foreign policy advance The Joint Board and the long-term, unified military strategies for toward securing a voice in the management defending and managing the isthmian Canal. of what became the Panama Canal occurred Prior to World War I, the admirals and gener- a quarter century after the Monroe Doctrine Naval Historical Center Panama Canal, 1903–1919 als who comprised the board additionally was adopted. Signed by the United States and antagonized their civilian superiors through Great Britain on April 19, 1850, the Clayton- to fortify the canal. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty a unilateral decision to change its statutory Bulwer Treaty stipulated that neither nation restrictions and unwanted British involvement authority and recommendations for a military- would exclusively control any trans-oceanic in construction remained. only Canal Zone government. canal built in the region. While no tangible Such diplomatic setbacks proved short gains were made, the treaty clearly marked lived. By November 1901, the United States Toward a Canal and Regional Influence a diplomatic victory for the United States. and Great Britain returned to the negotiation Prior to the creation of the Joint Board, European powers such as Great Britain, France, and Germany jockeyed to secure the Monroe Doctrine underpinned American diplomacy when construction rights to a short, safe water route it came to securing influence over a Central American canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. For its part, the United States continued to adhere to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and secured Signing the agreement affirmed the Monroe table to discuss new terms. Struggling in South a series of bilateral treaties beginning in the Doctrine, an action that recognized the Africa with the Boer War and facing the pros- mid-19th century. Together, these diplomatic importance of the United States as a Western pect of a Russian advance into Asia, British successes gained the United States a principal Hemisphere power. By signing the accord, diplomats gradually agreed to the proposals position in determining the fate of a Central Great Britain, at that point possessor of the American diplomats had outlined in the first American canal. most far-reaching maritime empire, assured Hay-Pauncefote talks. The Hay-Pauncefote Like Washington’s Caribbean policy in that any future diplomatic considerations for Treaty II nullified provisions of the longstand- general, the Monroe Doctrine underpinned a Latin American canal would include U.S. ing Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and guaranteed American diplomacy when it came to securing participation. The treaty provisions and the all canal protection and traffic rights to the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 42, 3 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 87 T he J O I N T B O ar D A N D the P A N A M A C A N al United States. A product of British diplomatic 17. The terms stipulated that Colombia military planners illustrated much about the necessity, Hay-Pauncefote II represented “the authorize the French Compagnie Nouvelle to state of inter-Service relations in the early conscious British recognition of the eventual sell all rights and concessions to the United 20th century. The Dewey memoranda to the United States supremacy in the Western States. Bogotá also conceded to Washington civilian Service secretaries demonstrated that, Hemisphere.”3 By the end of 1901, Washington exclusive construction and protection rights given a clear and immediate threat to national had achieved international recognition as the for a waterway along with a canal zone up to security, generals and admirals working primary administrator of any Latin American 15 miles wide. Hay-Herrán provisions addi- together could find a military response predi- isthmian passage. tionally granted a 100-year lease, which could cated on an integrated force approach. Success With the issue of sole jurisdiction over be renewed unilaterally by Washington. It in the Joint Board contingency plans outlined administration settled, attention next turned also authorized the United States “in cases of by Dewey required that land forces secure to location. An 1899 Isthmian Canal Commis- unforeseen or imminent danger” to intervene surrounding railways on shore while warships sion appointed by President William McKinley unilaterally in Colombian affairs in the name simultaneously controlled the Canal. Service set the parameters of the discussion, deliber- of canal defense. Not surprisingly, the treaty parochialism gave way to cooperation when ated between sites in Nicaragua and Panama, incited vehement opposition among Colom- faced with a pressing threat abroad. and recommended in its November 1901 final bian officials. Joint Board minutes and records, report that Nicaragua, rather than Panama, With title in hand, the United States however, revealed that short-term recommen- provided the best site. The commission con- sought to further strengthen its position in dations noted for their unified Service dimen- cluded that while a Nicaraguan canal would the region. On November 6, 1903, the U.S. sion never translated into standard operating cost more, Nicaragua had fewer entangling Government recognized Panamanian inde- procedure over time. Not until 6 months treaty stipulations with neighboring nations, pendence, and 12 days later made the recogni- later did the first hint of any substantive war and selecting it over Panama avoided diplo- tion official by signing the Hay-Bunau-Varilla planning concerning Latin America appear matic dealings with Colombia. Treaty. The accord also affirmed U.S. canal- again.