Centripetal and Centrifugal Corruption in Post-Democratic Italy
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9 Centripetal and Centrifugal Corruption in post-demoCratiC italy Donatella della Porta, Salvatore Sberna, and Alberto Vannucci One enduring feature found in the latest examples of corruption in Italy, compared to those that emerged during the “clean hands” inves- tigations of the 1990s (also known as Tangentopoli), is the evidence of an “institutionalized” practice of corruption. Decisions, attitudes, negotiations, expectations, and language are based on pre-established scripts, following rules that are well-known to the people involved and informally codified, underpinning models of behavior that have become familiar as a result of their habitual and frequent use. Unwritten rules coordinate the behaviors of those who aspire to cor- rupt and to be corrupted: they facilitate identification and demonstrate the reliability of possible partners; they differentiate the roles that are played; they increase the expected profits; they soften any possible psy- chological unease with crime; they marginalize or punish those who show opposition or express disagreement; they socialize those who are coming into contact for the first time with the “laws” of corrup- tion.1 The obligation to pay “kickbacks” has re-emerged in many of the scandals that have come to light in 2014. Like other entrepreneurs in the 1980s and 1990s, Enrico Maltauro, who was involved in the Expo 2015 investigation, declared to the Milanese magistrates: “The system of large works is rotten and corrupt. If you want to get into it, you have Italian Politics: The Year of the Bulldozer 30 (2015): 198–217 © Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/ip.2015.300112 Centripetal and Centrifugal Corruption in Post-democratic Italy 199 to pay. I fell into line because if you don’t, you will not get work. I did it for the company, to move forward and to safeguard the jobs … In Italy, you have no choice: either you come to terms with this and pay the kickbacks, or someone else will do it instead of you. The first past the post wins. And gets the work.”2 Some of the scandals that unfolded in 2014 have allowed us to see the hidden dynamics that still govern the underground world of corrupt exchanges in Italy. According to the non-governmental orga- nization Transparency International, in 2014 Italy was still among the countries with the highest perceived level of corruption in Europe, along with Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. The scandals that fol- lowed one another in 2014 involved the various levels of government, from local to national. A large number of investigations looked into misuses of funds to reimburse councilors and regional council groups in almost every region in Italy (i.e., 18 regions out of 20), including, in two cases, regional presidents who were still in office at the time of the investigations.3 There were also numerous cases of corruption at the local level. The most notorious, as we shall see in the sections that follow, are those of MOSE in Venice and Expo 2015 in Milan. Among those who were elected to the Italian Parliament, there was no shortage of cases of requests for authorization to proceed or to use wiretapping for offenses such as corruption, embezzlement, or defrauding the state.4 In the following section, we shall provide a theoretical framework to enable us to see the evolution of corrupt exchanges in Italy. Then, in the next two sections, we will analyze the scandal around MOSE and the investigations into the corruptive activities involved with Expo 2015, which will help us to identify the various configurations of corruption in the country. Finally, in the conclusion we examine in greater depth the policies and initiatives to combat corruption that have been enacted by national governments in recent years. Post-democracy and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework Although corruption has remained systemic, it would be wrong to think that nothing has changed in the way it is organized and prac- ticed, that is to say, in the wide network of actors involved in it and in the resources exchanged.5 While corruption in the first of the Tan- gentopoli scandals of 1992 was often organized around the hidden structures of the political parties, then managed by party cashiers and “business politicians,” the corruption that has emerged from 200 Donatella della Porta, Salvatore Sberna, and Alberto Vannucci recent investigations has adapted to the reduced capacity of parties to run the corrupt machinery. In fact, it has played a part in weaken- ing not only the capacity of parties to create and represent identity in society, but also the efficiency of their management of public decisions.6 The parties are more and more internally fragmented and lacking in external legitimacy, and the party actors have in fact become rather weak partners in hidden exchanges. They continue to be an essential part of them, but often leave the governance of the exchanges to others. This loss of capacity in terms of controlling (even) corruption is magnified in Italy by the explosive effect of the 1992 scandals and by the institutions’ inability to face up to it. In any event, it can be seen as part of a general tendency resulting from the neo-liberal model of relations between state and market. In fact, while the free market had been extolled as the solution to corruption, its policies of liberaliza- tion, deregulation, and privatization have often produced opportu- nities for corruption.7 Neo-liberalism had promised the separation of state and market, but more recent studies by sociologists8 and economists9 have shown how political institutions can be “captured” by large firms in a context where the collusion between democracy and market is greater. Post-democracy, which provides the politi- cal front for neo-liberalism,10 is thus a minimalist version of liberal democracy: on the one hand, it would like to limit the participation of citizens in politics; on the other, it would allow the market and its firms considerable power to influence governments and public decision-makers. As in an elitist model, the competencies of the state over the market are reduced, with political power being handed over to the economic interests of the few.11 Commenting on the ensuing moral crisis, economist Joseph Stiglitz observes: “A political system that amplifies the voice of the wealthy provides ample opportuni- ties for laws and regulations—and the administration of them—to be designed in ways that not only fail to protect the ordinary citi- zens against the wealthy but also further enrich the wealthy at the expense of the rest of society.”12 Neo-liberalism introduces the moral imperative of competition, bearing with it an “ethos of competitive- ness at the centre of social life.”13 As happened in the first wave of liberalism, there was a spreading of amoral conceptions and practices of capitalism. As soon as these neo-liberal ideas took over, a form of “amorality also began to pervade society,” causing “grave anomalies” to emerge, “both on the free market front and in terms of the integrity of public institutions.”14 Rather than leading to greater competition, neo-liberalism has led to a greater concentration of capital, thereby causing a significant Centripetal and Centrifugal Corruption in Post-democratic Italy 201 distortion in the market mechanisms to the point where new forms of corrupt exchanges have become more widespread. This new expan- sion of corruption is in part the result of two factors. The first is the reduced allegiance of voters to their traditional political parties, which has brought about an increase in the costs of running election cam- paigns through visible and hidden forms of financing. The second is the product of a new reality: “Large firms are not just too big to fail, but also too big to jail … Already in the 1990s … fraud and corruption had reached all-time highs in the US … [b]ut what came after 2008 beat everything: ratings agencies being paid by the producers of toxic securities … offshore shadow banking, money laundering, assistance in large-scale tax evasion … [and] the leading banks worldwide fraud- ulently fixing interest rates and the gold price, etc.”15 As we shall see in the sections that follow, the new networks of systemic corruption have shown a capacity to adapt to the changed conditions in post-democracy—in particular, its Italian version. With a reduction in the centralizing capacity of parties, corrupt exchanges have found new forms of centripetal coordination or have developed centrifugal tendencies.16 The MOSE Affair and the Equilibria of Centripetal Corruption The scandal affecting MOSE (Modulo Sperimentale Elettromeccanico, or Experimental Electromechanical Module)17 came to light in two successive waves. A first series of arrests took place during the course of 2013 following a judicial inquiry that had begun two years ear- lier into accounting irregularities discovered during a tax audit by a small firm in Veneto and that involved senior figures in the Mantovani construction company and other entrepreneurs. In June 2014, the investigations moved forward, aided by the collaboration of some of those who were under investigation. This brought a real boost to the inquiry, which spread to cover the whole “MOSE system” and the leading political figures in the region. Thirty-five people were arrested and more than 100, including entrepreneurs, managers, offi- cials, and politicians, were under investigation for tax fraud, corrup- tion, misuse of public funds, and illicit financing. Among them were the ex-governor of the Veneto region, the then-mayor of Venice,