Tearing the Guts out of the Wehrmacht: a Re-Examination Of
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LIBERTY UNIVERSITY TEARING THE GUTS OUT OF THE WEHRMACHT: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Master of Arts in History By Randall S. Wells Jr. August 2018 The thesis of Randall S. Wells Jr. is approved: ______________________________________ _________________ Dr. Martin Scott Catino Date Thesis Director _________________________________________ ___________________ Dr. David Jonathan White Date Second Reader i Acknowledgments I would like to offer my deepest gratitude to all those who have mentored me during my graduate studies at Liberty University, Virginia and who have assisted me in the completion of this project. Thank you to Dr. David Snead and Dr. Martin Catino whose courses in World War II and Modern European History piqued my interest in this field and inspired me to focus my thesis on a related topic. I would especially like to thank Dr. Cary Roberts for providing me the opportunity to finish my graduate degree with a thesis module and for his interest in this project, his time and guidance throughout the preliminary writing process. I would like to acknowledge Dr. Williamson Murray, Professor Emeritus of History at the Ohio State University for chatting with me over the telephone about my thesis and for steering me towards some truly valuable source material. Additionally, I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge my wife, Denise Wells, for her tireless support during the many hours I was busy with this project. Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my great uncle, Norris Byron Wells Jr, who gave his life fighting the Nazis in southern France on 28 August 1944. ii Table of Contents Signature Page i Acknowledgements ii Table of Contents iii Abstract iv Introduction 1 Chapter One 29 Chapter Two 70 Chapter Three 91 Conclusion 102 Bibliography 106 iii Abstract Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Hitler’s plan to annihilate Germany’s Eastern neighbor and populate the vast Russian expanse with his own people was as ambitious as it was adventuristic. Although it began successful, the Russo-German War quickly devolved into a quagmire as Russian troops outfought their German opponent and beat them back to Berlin. Contrary to prevailing historiography, the Wehrmacht’s loss on the Eastern Front cannot be solely attributed to a failure to equip German troops with proper winter clothing, an inadequate logistics network or Hitler’s interference in military decisions. For an army that had enjoyed rapid gains during late 1930s and 1940, only an enhanced tactical revolution, superior armor and a more aggressive martial ethos explains how the vaunted German military suffered ignominious defeat at the hands of what many consider a third-rate adversary. iv Introduction More than 2,000 years ago, King Solomon wrote, “Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall.”1 Perhaps in no other example is this verse more prescient than in the adventuristic German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. Considered the largest land invasion in military history, Hitler’s aspirations to expand Germany’s living space to the east constituted a monumental overreach that left an indelible stain upon the German people, which time itself cannot erase. Before the ink had barely dried on the Treaty of Versailles, Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich had been busy arming herself for yet another war. First, Hitler secretly mandated the German Army triple its strength from 100,000 to 300,000 men by October 1934. Second, he approved Admiral Erich Raeder’s project to assemble forbidden U-boats and third, he gave Hermann Goering the green light to establish the Luftwaffe. For all intents and purposes, the makings of the German Wehrmacht were falling into place.2 Up until April 1934, Hitler had worked clandestinely to rebuild the German military machine. The following year, the Führer openly repudiated the military stipulations of Versailles and introduced conscription.3 As early as 1936, just three years after becoming Chancellor, Hitler made the first of several bold moves to test Anglo-French resolve. Like a schoolyard bully, Hitler began pressing his luck to see if anyone would move to stop him. They did not. Rather than sending troops into Germany to punish Hitler for violating the Versailles Treaty, England and France squeaked out a mild protest and took the matter before the League of 1 Prov. 16:18 (KJV). 2 James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War II (New York: Harper Collins, 1980), 18. 3 Wolfgang Foerster, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Sein Kampf gegen den Krieg (Islar Verlag: Muchen, 1953), 22. 1 Nations. The League condemned Germany but did nothing. Conveniently for the Führer, an international incident captured the attention of the League of Nations in late 1935, which Hitler immediately exploited.4 Benito Mussolini, Italy’s fascist dictator, decided to invade Ethiopia in October 1935 as a matter of payback for Italy’s humiliating defeat during the First Italo-Abyssinian War in 1896. Again, France and England protested to the League of Nations, however, little was done and Mussolini defeated the tiny nation in 1936 after taking the capital. Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia, coupled with Anglo-French reactions, fractured the Locarno Pact and revealed the League of Nations to be an impotent attempt at collective security.5 With France, England and Italy’s attention focused on Ethiopia, Hitler reasoned that these nations would be less inclined to resist his attempt to remilitarize the Rhineland. Therefore, in the early morning hours of 7 March 1936, three battalions of German troops goose-stepped across the Rhine bridges and entered the demilitarized zone. Germany’s Foreign Minister announced to the ambassadors of France, England and Italy that their abrogation of the Locarno Pact justified the incident.6 Yet again, the League of Nations condemned Germany but took no concrete action. With the eruption of civil war in Spain later that summer, Hitler saw an opportunity to test his nascent Wehrmacht in combat. Along with Mussolini, Hitler sent military support to anti-Communist General Francisco Franco, which further linked the fascist dictators together and facilitated a 4 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 2000), 2-8. 5 Ibid., 5. 6 John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin, 1989), 37-38. 2 “dress-rehearsal” for German and Italian armies. France and England sponsored a non- intervention committee but did nothing.7 Seeing the handwriting on the wall, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, sent financial aid to pro-Communist forces in Spain, but refrained from dispatching troops. Additionally, Stalin viewed Anglo-French intransigence as a clear sign that they would likely sit back while Hitler did what he wanted in Europe. Stalin’s assumption proved prophetic as Hitler next targeted Austria and Czechoslovakia.8 Following the Nazi-orchestrated assassination of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss in 1934, Hitler began manipulating Dollfuss’ successor, Kurt Schuschnigg into agreeing to the unification of Austria and Germany. When Schuschnigg balked, Hitler replaced him with Austrian Nazi, Arthur Seyss-Inquart on 11 March 1938. As his first official act as Austria’s new chancellor, Seyss-Inquart requested that Hitler send German troops to “restore law and order.” Two days later, Hitler annexed Austria and gained not only Austria’s money but 85,000 troops to add to his burgeoning army.9 British and French reaction was similar to what had occurred the previous few years. Neither nation wanted a repeat of the Great War, and therefore sought diplomatic solutions in an effort to make the Führer behave. Hitler, however, had no intentions of playing nice and the following year, demanded the relinquishing of the German inhabited region of Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland.10 7 Stokesbury, A Short History of World War II, 37. 8 Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 13. 9 Keegan, The Second World War, 37-39. 10 Ibid., 40. 3 Eager to prevent an escalation into war, British Prime Minister Sir Neville Chamberlain met with Hitler in Munich and drafted the Munich Agreement, which effectively ceded the Sudetenland to Hitler. With the west floundering, Hitler then moved to secure his gains in Eastern Europe taking Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. Within three weeks of the signing of the Munich Agreement, he ordered the military to prepare to occupy the rest of Czechoslovakia and began terrorizing Jews and other non-Aryans.11 Finally, Britain took notice and Chamberlain began offering Hitler industrial loans and other concessions if he would only back down. Outraged at Chamberlain’s weakness and audacity to think he could push the Führer around, Hitler executed his plan to invade Poland on 1 September 1939. Since Britain and France had promised to come to Poland’s aid in the event she were attacked, they were forced to declare war on Germany three days later. However, their inaction during Germany’s annihilation of Poland and the days preceding the invasion of France in the summer of 1940 resulted in a period of relative inaction called the Phony War.12 With each move, Hitler paused to see if the Allies would act. They did not. Confident the Allies had no stomach for war, Hitler simply did what he wanted and acted with impunity. Indeed, by the time the Wehrmacht had cowed Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France into submission, much of the world stood in awe at the apparent unassailability of the Nazi juggernaut.13 Undoubtedly, many wondered where Hitler would strike next. In keeping with his strategic and ideological goals, Hitler had cast his gaze on the vast expanse of Russian territory to the east long before he decided to invade.