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The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities by Jaakko Hintikka Review By: Tyler Burge Source: Synthese, Vol

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The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities by Jaakko Hintikka Review By: Tyler Burge Source: Synthese, Vol Review Reviewed Work(s): The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities by Jaakko Hintikka Review by: Tyler Burge Source: Synthese, Vol. 42, No. 2, Philosophical Logic (Oct., 1979), pp. 315-334 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20115484 Accessed: 16-05-2018 19:58 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese This content downloaded from 131.179.58.33 on Wed, 16 May 2018 19:58:08 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms CRITICAL NOTICE Jaakko Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities, Synthese Library 90, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1975. xviii + 262 pp. This book consists of an introduction and eleven essays written by Professor Hintikka approximately between 1970 and 1975. All but one of the essays is published in some form elsewhere. But more than most such collections, this one has a measure of unity and continuity. All the essays involve applications of Hintikka's semantical approach to epistemic notions. And although the book contains few major alterations in Hintikka's previously published views, reading the essays from first to last provides a good overall picture of his philosophical stance in this area. Read this way, the book does have limitations. Several of the articles largely elaborate on viewpoints more fully stated in earlier work (especially in 'Semantics for Pro positional Attitudes,' 'Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Pr?supposions,' and 'On the Logic of Perception'- all collected in Hintikks's earlier Models for the Modalities). There is also an un usually large amount of repetition in matters great and small. Nonethe less, the volume conveys a broad, coherent, and important viewpoint that has been applied to an admirably large number of interesting issues. The method of this review will be to give the reader some notion of the contents of the book and then turn to a critical consideration of a few of its primary ideas. Chapter 1, 'Problems and Proposals,' argues that all constructions containing the expression 'knows,' or cognates, are reducible to the 'knows that' construction. The treatment of the 'knows how' construction is (to this reviewer) unintuitive; and the essay seems hurried - though perhaps this may be attributed to its purpose as a brief survey. 'The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology,' reprinted from Synthese 1970, maintains that cross-identification over possible worlds is not to be stipulated or taken for granted. Hintikka further agrees with Quine in holding that, at least with the 'logical' modalities, quantification into modal con Synthese 42 (1979) 315-334. 0039-7857/79/0422-0315 $02.00. Copyright ? 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A. 315 This content downloaded from 131.179.58.33 on Wed, 16 May 2018 19:58:08 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 316 TYLER B?RGE texts is strictly speaking inadmissable. He holds that no object (possibly excepting abstract objects like numbers) can be reasonably traced through all possible worlds. Use of modal logic is claimed to depend on assumptions about the kinds of worlds that are contex tually admissible for consideration. Quantified epistemic logic is sup posed to be better off since in this domain quantification depends on tracing an object only through all worlds compatible with what the subject believes. Here, as with the rejection of stipulation in cross identification, one feels that the issue could stand more clarification. A deeper consideration of what is at issue seems necessary to understanding how one could adjudicate between Hintikka's complex view and more common views among modal logicians. Both view points can enlist at least some of our pretheoretical intuitions. Chap ter 3, 'Objects of Knowledge and Belief: Acquaintance and Public Figures' discusses two methods of cross-identification based on con textual reference and description respectively. It is a compact and highly suggestive essay. Hintikka argues in 'Information, Causality and the Logic of Perception' that possible worlds analysis of the informational elements in perception is compatible with etiological conditions in the explication of perceptual statements. Chapter 5, 'Carnap's Heritage in Logical Semantics,' reprinted from Synthese 1973, contains an historical interpretation of the relation between possible worlds semantics and the tradition running from Frege through Carnap. 'Quine on Quantifying In: A Dialogue,' the only essay not published elsewhere, discusses Quine's doubts about the coherence of quantification into contexts governed by intensional operators. Chapter 7, 'Answers to Questions' defends the view, with various qualifications, that answers to Wh-questions purport to pro vide the questioner with knowledge of some particular individual. 'Grammer and Logic: Some Borderline Problems' is a rather rambling treatment of conundrums, discussed within linguistics, which hinge on the de re - de dicto distinction. In Chapter 9, 'Knowledge, Belief, and Logical Consequence,' Hintikka confronts the important problem that the most straightforward reading of the semantics of epistemic logic implies that a person believes all logical consequences of what he believes. He sketches a definition of the syntactical complexity of a This content downloaded from 131.179.58.33 on Wed, 16 May 2018 19:58:08 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms HINTIKKA ON PROPOSITION AL ATTITUDES 317 quantified sentence and maintains that a person necessarily believes all a belief's logical consequences whose derivation does not rely on sentences of greater complexity. The last two essays are historically oriented. 'The Intentions of Intentionality' takes up Husserl's view of noema. It argues that possible worlds semantics in epistemic logic provides an explication of the notion of intentionality which is superior to Husserl's. In 'Concept as Vision: On the Problem of Representation in Modern Art and in Modern Philosophy' Hintikka develops diverting comparisons between Husserlian and cubist concerns with perspective-free conceptual representation, and be tween cubist rejection of naturalistic perspective and the variations on intended interpretations characteristic of model-theoretic seman tics. There can be no question of reviewing each essay here. What I want to do is to consider Hintikka's general approach to the logical form of propositional attitudes against the background of an alter native approach. The issue must be joined on a variety of fronts, most of which I will ignore. My aim is to outline a critical viewpoint which may stimulate further discussion. Hintikka's approach to the semantics of propositional attitudes is founded on an analogy with the analysis of necessity in modal logic. Modal logic treats 'it is necessary that 2 + 2 = 4' as having the form of the application of an operator 'it is necessary that' to a sentence '2 + 2 = 4.' Hintikka sees 'John believes that 2 + 2 = 4' as the ap plication of the two-place operator expression 'believes that' to the sentence '2 + 2 = 4' and the term 'John.' Semantically, modal logic explicates the truth of the necessity sentence in terms of the truth of '2 + 2 = 4' in all possible worlds. Hintikka explicates the truth of the belief sentence in terms of the truth of '2 + 2 = 4' in all possible worlds compatible with what John believes. I shall call this general orientation 'the possible worlds approach' or 'the operator approach.' Hintikka's orientation to the syntax and semantics of propositional attitudes contrasts with a more traditional line, first expounded within a modern semantical system by Frege. According to this older approach, one treats the relevant belief sentence as having the form of an application of the predicate 'believes' to two terms 'John' and This content downloaded from 131.179.58.33 on Wed, 16 May 2018 19:58:08 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 318 TYLER B?RGE 'that 2 + 2 = 4'. The truth of the sentence is explicated in terms of John's standing in the relation of belief to the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4. My word 'proposition' here is something of a catch-all expression. There are a number of options for explicating it which are available within the traditional approach that I shall be calling 'Fregean'. Frege himself treated that-clauses as denoting abstract, language-independent thoughts, whose components were senses expressed (sometimes contextually) by linguistic expressions. Others have taken that-clauses to denote sentence types or tokens. There are various other possibilities: subjective psychological entities, and a variety of non-Fregean abstractions. I will not be distinguishing among these options in what follows. Needless to say, a genuine theory along 'Fregean' lines must do so. The traditional approach provides an immediate response to certain simple linguistic facts. For example, from our earlier mentioned belief sentence and the premise that the most frequently cited truth of arithmetic is that 2 + 2 = 4, we commonly deduce that John believes the most frequently cited truth of arithmetic. The Fregean view represents the deduction as a simple substitution of identity. But since the operator approach does not recognize a singular term, or noun phrase, in direct-object position within propositional attitude sentences, this simple representation is not available. More generally, it is undeniable that the sentential expression in propositional attitude sentences is dominated by a noun-phrase.
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