BT HCT Ideas I MFL the Basic Problems of Phenomenology; Die
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS BP The Basic Problems of Phenomenology; Die Grund probleme der Phanomenologie BT Being and Time; Sein und Zeit HCT History of the Concept of Time, Prolegomena; Prole gomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs Ideas I Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy; Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie LI Logical Investigations; Logische Untersuchungen MFL The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic; Metaphysiche Anfangsgrunde der Logik P translation of "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Article" PP Phanomenologische Psychologie (For full bibliographic information, see the Selected Bibliography at the end of this study) 265 Notes Introduction 1. The one notable exception to this, the essays written over the years by J. N. Mohanty, will be discussed in Part Four of this study. 2. Rudolf Bernet, "Husser! and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 21, 2 (1990), p. 136. 3. Bernet finds that Heidegger's analyses in these lectures not only contain a "correction of certain analyses by Husserl" (p. 136), but also, that they are "more phenomenological" Bernet, op. cit., (p. 147). 4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," in Philo sophical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), p. 169. 5. Dorian Carins, Conversations with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Mar- tinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 107. 6. Bernet, op. cit., p. 146. 7. Ibid. 8. Otto Poggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987), p. 286. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," in Phenom enology and the Human Sciences, ed. J. N. Mohanty (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985); pp. 60-61; "The Phenomenological Movement," op. cit., pp. 157-172; Truth and Method, trans. and revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroads Publishing Corporation, 1990), pp. 254-271. 13. See: John Caputo, "Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a 'Herme neutic' Phenomenology," Husserl Studies 1 (1984), pp. 157-178; Frederick Elliston, "Phenomenology Reinterpreted: From Husserl to Heidegger," Philosophy Today 21 (1977), pp. 273-283; Friedrich-Whilhelm von Herrmann, Der Begriff der Phltnomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981); Richard Schacht, "Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology," Philosophical Studies 23 267 268 NOTES/PART ONE (1972), pp. 293-314; Timothy Stapleton, Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983). 14. The unavailability of the Heidegger's Marburg lectures at the time when most of the literature on the Husserl-Heidegger relation was written may explain the lack of attention to the issue of the critical relationship between Heidegger's formulation of fundamental ontology and Husserl's account of intentionality. Notwithstanding this unavailability, the philolog ical inappropriateness of the tendency at issue here remains in my view. 15. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), German text Die Grundprobleme der Phllnomenologie (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975); Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), German text Sein und Zeit (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979); History of the Concept of Time: Prole gomena, trans. T. Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), German text Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt am Maim: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979); The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), German text Metaphysiche AnfangsgrUnde der Logik (Frankfurt am Maim: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978). Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), German text Ideen zu einer reinen Phllnomenologie und phllnomenologischen Philosophie, Vol. 1 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); Logical Investigations, trans. IN. Findlay, 2 Vols. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1982), German text Logische Untersuchungen, 2 Vols. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984); "Phenomenology," trans. Richard Palmer, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, II, No.2 (May 1971), pp. 77-90; German text "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Vierte, Letzte Fassung," in Phllnomenologische Psychologie (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 277-301. Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Erster Entwurf," with Heidegger's notes, in Phllnomenologische Psycho logie, op. cit., pp. 237-55; "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Versuch einer zweiten Bearbeitung," with Heidegger's notes, in Phiin omenologische Psychologie, op. cit., pp. 256-77. 16. It may be argued, on behalf of Bernet, that since the focus of his discussion is the lectures surrounding Being and Time, he is not obliged to consider their treatment of intentionality and consequent formulation of phenom enology-which is not explicitly hermeneutical-in regard to the method ologically hermeneutical formulation of phenomenology in Being and Time. However, this is hardly satisfactory in my view, since Bernet's discussion takes the liberty of drawing the conclusion that Heidegger's approach to intentionality is "more phenomenological" (my emphasis). NOTES/INTRODUcnON 269 17. Bernet, op. cit., p. 145. 18. Gadamer, to some extent, considers this. See "The Phenomenological Movement," op. cit., p. 131 and Truth and Method, op. cit., p. 244; For the most complete consideration of this, see J. N. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation Between Hussed and Heidegger," Man and World 11 (1978), p. 328; "Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness," in Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, ed. J. N. Mohanty (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 109, and §§ 9, 12, 92 below. 19. Bernet, op. cit., p. 145. 20. See note 18 above. Cf. also Ludwig Landgrebe, "Hussed's Departure from Cartesianism," trans. R. O. Elveton, in The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, ed. Donn Welton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 101 and § 39 below. 21. Bernet,op. cit., p. 147. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., p. 150. 26. Not only does Bernet not discuss the implications of Hussed's dif ferentiation of intentionality in terms of "actional" and "non-actional" modalities, but, considering Hussed's treatment of this as eady as Ideas I, he inexplicably considers it among those issues which, late in Hussed's development, were "imposed on Hussed almost against his own will" (Bernet, op. cit., p. 148). See especially § 24 below. PART ONE Introduction 1. As a result of the close textual reading that will comprise the basis of the following study, which will therefore necessitate a large number of textual citations, I have opted for the increasingly prevalent convention of citing all references to primary texts within the body of my text. All abbreviations are accounted for by the "Table of Abbreviations" appended at the end of this work. All page references are first to the English translation, when available, and then to the German. Chapter One 1. The term "phenomenal relief" will be used here and elsewhere in this study within the context of the phenomenological project of rendering explicit the pertinent subject matter-what in phenomenology is called "the matter itself" (Sache selbst)--of a philosophical discourse in accord 270 NOTES/PART ONE with the very nature of this subject matter itself. Hence, arguments, explanations and theoretical constructions about the nature of a subject matter at issue are eschewed by the phenomenolOgist in favor of what Hussed calls the "evidence" of something, and what Heidegger refers to as "the showing itself from itself" of something. In the present instance, my attempt at "bringing into bold phenomenal relief" the point of departure of Hussed's phenomenological method will, do so by focusing its considerations on the "matters themselves" of this method as they emerge within the context of his writings. 2. Hussed uses the term "lived-experience" (Erlebnis) to designate the special kind of "experience" that comprises the subject matter initially revealed by the phenomenological method. It belongs to the specific nature of lived-experience that it is entirely inaccessible to the empirical method and indeed unintelligible to its epistemology. In a certain sense, it can be said that for Hussed the meaning that appears in lived-experience, as well as what he refers to as the manner of appearing of such meaning, is taCitly appealed to yet in no way accounted for by empiricism. How Hussed argues that this is indeed the case, how he proposes to phe nomenologically overcome this empiricistic presupposition, and finally, precisely what he understands by the term "lived-experience," will be clarified in §§ 8-12 of this chapter. 3. In an effort to maintain a terminological consistency and accuracy, I have adopted the convention of altering translations. Due to the rather large number of alterations I have had to make in order to achieve this end, I have not noted these changes. 4. There is a tendency in the literature to understand any discussion on Hussed's part of "reflection"