Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 293 Richard Hidary 10

Contents

Contributors ix Series Editor’s Preface xiii Editors’ Introduction xv Adam Mintz and Marc D. Stern Part I: Intermarriage 1. Intermarriage in the Early Modern Period 3 Judith Bleich 2. Diagnosing Challenges to Contemporary Modern Orthodox Families 47 Sylvia Barack Fishman 3. Intermarriage and Jewish Communal Policy : Challenges to Orthodoxy 65 Steven Bayme Part II: Conversion in the State of Israel 4. From “Who Is a Jew” to “Who Should Be a Jew” : The Current Debates on Giyur in Israel 109 Arye Edrei 5. Giyur in the Context of National Identity 151 Chaim I. Waxman

vi Conversion, Intermarriage, and Jewish Identity

Part III : History of Geirut 6. Conversion to Judaism in Tannaitic Halakhah 189 Lawrence H. Schiff man 7. Approaches to Conversion in Medieval European Rabbinic Literature : From Ashkenaz to Sefarad 217 Ephraim Kanarfogel Part IV: Current Contemporary Halakhic Approaches to Geirut 8. Modern-day Ashkenazi Psak regarding the Nullification of Conversion 261 Yosef Zvi Rimon 9. Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 293 Richard Hidary 10. Geirus Procedures and Standards Network 329 Yosef Blau Appendix B 345 11. The Contemporary Rabbinate and Conversion 347 Benjamin J. Samuels Part V: The Theological Foundations of Jewish Identity 12. “If You Were A Human Being” A Thought Experiment 385 Shalom Carmy Part VI: Orthodox Responses to New Paradigms of Jewishness 13. American Orthodox Responses to Intermarriage 409 Jonathan D. Sarna 14. The Jewish People – A Yawning Definitional Gap 427 Marc D. Stern 15. Actually Jewish: How Young American Jews See Their Status and How Orthodox Rabbis Respond 453 Yehuda Sarna List of Participants 479 Contributors

Dr. Steven Bayme serves as director of AJC’s Koppelman Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations and Contemporary Jew- ish Life Department. He is currently a visiting professor of history at the Jewish Th eological Seminary. His most recent publications include co-editing (with Steven Katz) Continuity and Change: A Festschrift in Honor of Dr. Irving Greenberg, and co-authoring (with Manfred Gerstenfeld) American Jewry’s Comfort Level. Rabbi Yosef Blau is the senior mashgiach at Yeshiva University and its affi liated Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Th eological Seminary. He serves on the Manhattan Beit Din for Geirut as part of the GPS of the Rabbinical Council of America. Dr. Judith Bleich is professor of Judaic Studies at Touro Graduate School of Jewish Studies and the Lander College for Women in New York City. She has written extensively on modern Jew- ish history. Rabbi Shalom Carmy teaches Jewish Studies and philosophy at Yeshiva University, where he is co-chair of the Jewish Studies Executive at Yeshiva College. He is the editor of Tradition. Dr. Arye Edrei is professor of law at Tel Aviv University. Dr. Sylvia Barack Fishman is chair of the Near Eastern and Judaic Studies Department at Brandeis University. Th e author of seven books, Professor Fishman teaches courses on contemporary Jewish life and is co-director of the Hadassah Brandeis Institute.

ix x Conversion, Intermarriage, and Jewish Identity

Dr. Richard Hidary is a graduate of Yeshiva University (1997), received semikha from Midrash Sefaradi in Jerusalem, and a PhD from New York University. He is an assistant professor of Judaic studies at Yeshiva University, Stern College for Women. He has published Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Plural- ism in the Talmud (Brown University Press, 2010), as well as articles appearing in AJS Review, Dine Israel, Encyclopedia Judaica, and Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception. Rabbi Robert S. Hirt (series editor of Th e Orthodox Forum Publica- tions), is vice president emeritus of the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Th eological Seminary, an affi liate of Yeshiva University. Rabbi Hirt co-edited Shimon Huberband’s critically acclaimed book on the Holocaust, Kiddush Hashem: Jewish Religious and Cul- tural Life in Poland During the Holocaust, and has contributed to Tradition, Th e Journal of Orthodox Jewish Th ought, and other educational publications. Dr. Ephraim Kanarfogel is the E. Billi Ivry University Professor of Jewish History, Literature and Law at Yeshiva University. A fellow of the American Academy for Jewish Research, Professor Kanarfogel is the author or editor of six books and a winner of the National Jewish Book Award. His most recent book, Th e Intellectual History and Rabbinic Culture of Medieval Ashkenaz, was awarded the prestigious international Goren-Goldstein Prize for Best Book in Jewish Th ought, 2010–2012, by Ben- Gurion University of the Negev. Rabbi Adam Mintz, PhD completed his rabbinical ordination at Yeshiva University and received his doctorate at New York University. Rabbi Mintz is a founder of Kehilat Rayim Ahu- vim, a Modern Orthodox synagogue in Manhattan, and an adjunct associate professor in Jewish history at City College, New York. Rav Yosef Zvi Rimon established the Halacha Center to disseminate knowledge about Jewish law around the world. He has written many books on the sources of halakhah. He is the rabbi of Alon Shvut South, a rabbi in Har Etzion Yeshiva, and the founder of JobKatif.

Contributors xi

Rabbi Benjamin J. Samuels has been rabbi of Congregation Shaa- rei Tefi llah in Newton Centre, Massachusetts, since 1995. He earned his semikha, as well as his BA and MA, from RIETS and Yeshiva University in the mid-1990s. He is currently the president of the Vaad Harabonim of Massachusetts and serves on its Beit Din. Dr. Jonathan D. Sarna is the Joseph H. & Belle R. Braun Professor of American Jewish History and chair of the Hornstein Jewish Professional Leadership Program at Brandeis University, and chief historian of the National Museum of American Jewish History. Rabbi Yehuda Sarna serves as the executive director of the Bronf- man Center for Jewish Student Life and university chaplain at New York University, as well as adjunct assistant professor at the Wagner School for Public Service. Dr. Lawrence H. Schiff man is the Judge Abraham Lieberman Pro- fessor of Hebrew and Judaic Studies at New York University and Director of the Global Institute for Advanced Research in Jewish Studies. He has served as the Chair of the Skirball Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies at New York Uni- versity and Ethel and Irvin A. Edelman Professor of Hebrew and Judaic Studies. He is a specialist in the Dead Sea Scrolls, Judaism in Late Antiquity, the history of Jewish law, and Tal- mudic literature. Marc D. Stern, Esq. is a graduate of Yeshiva University and Colum- bia University School of Law. Formerly of the American Jewish Congress, Marc is now general counsel for legal advocacy at the American Jewish Committee. Th e First Freedom Center awarded Marc its Religious Liberty Award in 2012. Dr. Chaim I. Waxman is professor emeritus of sociology and Jew- ish Studies at Rutgers University and senior fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. He specializes in the sociology of religion and the sociology of ethnicity with special focus on America’s Jews, Jews in Israel, as well as global Jewish identity and identifi cation. 9 Sephardic Approaches to Conversion

Richard Hidary

Ideally, a convert to Judaism should be motivated by a desire “to enter into the covenant, to take refuge under the wings of the Shekhinah, and to accept upon himself the yoke of Torah.”1 In reality, however, many proselytes “convert for an ulterior motive”2 and without full commitment. This paper will trace some of the major approaches to dealing with such problematic cases expressed by Sephardic poskim from the Rambam until contemporary authorities. In general, we should not regard Sephardic halakhah and Ashkenazic halakhah as two insular spheres since poskim from all countries have always read and cited each other.3 There is also no one Sephardic or Ashkenazic approach to conversion as both traditions contain voices of leniency and stringency. Nevertheless, it is possible to detect a major trend among many of the most prominent Sephardic poskim who identify themselves as being part of a Sephardic tradition of leniency in this regard. The Sephardic experience also includes several unique ap-

293 294 Richard Hidary proaches to conversion that may be instructive for all communities facing similar issues. We will begin with a review of the most relevant Talmudic sources that form the basis for all subsequent deliberation. We will then see how the Talmudic law is codifi ed by Rambam and Rabbi Yosef Karo. From there we will jump to modern times focusing on three poskim who have devoted much thought about how to apply the laws of conversion in a secular world. We will conclude with a historical overview of the unique ban against conversion currently in force in my own community. Mishnah Yevamot 2:8 addresses one who converts for ulterior motives:

One who was suspected of having relations with a maidservant who was then freed, or with a Gentile who then converted, he may not marry her but if he did marry her we do not remove her from him.

If a man is suspected4 of having had relations with a Gentile woman and the Gentile subsequently converts, the Mishnah rules that he may not marry her ab initio. However, ex post facto, if he violates the law and marries her, the court does not force him to divorce her. Furthermore, as the Talmud notes, she is free to marry any other Jew. This assumes that her conversion, although perhaps initiated by ulterior motives, is valid. The Gemara at Bavli Yevamot 24b elaborates:

Therefore, she is nevertheless a valid convert. However, another source states: Both a man who converts for the sake of a woman and a woman who converts for the sake of a man, and similarly one who converts for the sake of sitting at the table of kings, for the sake of being among the slaves of Solomon, they are not valid converts, so says R. Nehemiah. For R. Nehemiah used to say: “Converts on account of lions, converts on account Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 295

of dreams, converts of Mordechai and Esther are all not valid converts until they convert in this time.” 5 Do you think only in this time? Rather say, anytime like this time. It was already stated on this: R. Yishak bar Shmuel bar Marta says in the name of Rav, the halakhah follows the one who says they are all valid converts. If so, let also her marry him ab initio? Because of Rav Assi, for Rav Assi said: Remove from yourself crooked speech and devious talk keep far from you (Proverbs 4:24). The Rabbis taught: We do not accept converts in the days of the Messiah. Similarly they did not accept converts in the days of David nor in the days of Solomon. R. Eliezer says, what is the verse? “One who converts may convert while I am not with you. Whoever converts with you [in your impoverishment] will rest with you [in the world to come]” (Isaiah 54:15).

The Gemara expands the discussion to include many other cases of conversion for ulterior motives. The Gemara cites the opinion of R. Nehemiah that all such converts are invalid. However, it concludes with the opinion of Rav that these conversions should not be performed ab initio but are nevertheless valid ex post facto. Another Tannaitic source addresses the related problem of a convert who does not fulfi ll the commandments. Toseft a Demai 2:4 states:6

A convert7 who accepted upon himself all of the words of the Torah but is suspect about one matter, even [if he is suspect] about all of the Torah in its entirety, behold he is like an apostate Jew.

This source establishes that a lack of fulfillment of the commandments does not nullify a conversion. Bavli Yevamot 47b similarly states that even if a convert changes his mind and reneges on 296 Richard Hidary his conversion, “we call him an apostate Jew and his betrothal [to a Jew] is a valid betrothal.” The next halakha in the Tosefta adds an important caveat to this lenient position:

A convert who accepted upon himself all of the words of the Torah except for one, we do not accept him. R. Yose be R. Yehudah says, even a small matter from the details of the scribes.8

That is, if at the time of conversion, the candidate makes his conversion contingent upon non-acceptance of even one minor law, then the court must refuse him (though it is not clear whether such a conversion would be valid ex post facto). Thus, as long as a convert unconditionally accepts all of the mitzvot in principle, even if he violates all of them in practice, his conversion is valid. Th e halakhic literature also regularly cites various Talmudic narratives as precedents for dealing with problematic cases. One is a Baraita related in Bavli Shabbat 31a, among a series of similar stories, wherein a certain Gentile heard a teacher reciting a verse regarding the garments of the high priest. Th e Gentile decided then and there that he wanted to convert and become the high priest. He fi rst goes to Shammai and says, “Convert me on condition that you will make me high priest.” Shammai rejects him. He next goes to Hillel who agrees and converts him. Hillel then tells him he must learn before he can be appointed. Th e convert studies Torah and reaches Numbers 1:51: “Any outsider who encroaches shall die.” Realizing that, not having been born a priest, he is not eligible to become high priest, he nevertheless blesses Hillel for accepting him. Th e story concludes: “Once when the three of them were together in one place, they said: ‘Th e impatience of Shammai almost removed him [the convert] from the world; the humility of Hillel brought him under the wings of the Shekhinah.” Th e second story, found in Bavli Menakhot 44a, is about a man who was scrupulous in the mitzvah of sisit. Once he heard of a prostitute who charged four hundred gold dinars. He sent her the fee and scheduled an appointment. When the time came and he was Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 297

ascending the seven beds she had prepared for him, his sisit struck him in the face and he stopped himself from going through with the sin. She was so awed by his self-control and his righteousness that she applied to R. Hiyya to convert so she could marry him. R. Hiyya asked whether she set her eyes upon one of his students. She showed him the name of the student and R. Hiyya replied, “Go and take your acquisition.” Talmudic sources thus contain a range of views both in legal and narrative contexts, allowing for much debate and diversity among later halakhists. Let us now turn to two pillars of Sephardic psak: the Rambam and Rabbi Yosef Karo. Rambam Rambam first presents the ideal procedure for conversion in Hilkhot Isure Bi’ah 13:14:

The proper mitzvah is that when a man or a woman comes to convert, we check if he does so to receive money, or to attain power, or if he enters the religion because of fear, and if he is a man we check perchance he fancies a Jewish woman, and if she is a woman perchance she fancies a Jewish man. If we do not find any ulterior motive, then we inform him of the weight of the yoke of the Torah and the burden there is for common people in fulfilling it, so that they will withdraw. If they accept and do not withdraw and we see that they returned from love, we accept them as it states: “She saw that she persisted to walk with her and she ceased speaking to her” (Ruth 1:18).

Rambam continues to explain (halakhah 15) that since proselytes with ulterior motives are rejected ab initio, no converts were accepted during the days of David and Solomon. However, Rambam adds that many people did convert during the days of David and Solomon before laypeople. These converts remained under suspicion until the rabbinic court could determine how they would act: “The court would be suspicious of them. They would not reject them 298 Richard Hidary since they after all immersed, nor did they bring them close until they saw their outcome.” Rambam summarizes the law of these ex post facto cases (halakhah 17):

If they did not check the convert or did not inform him of the commandments and their punishments, and he is circumcised and immerses before three laymen, he is a valid convert.

Rambam establishes that the check of the convert’s intentions and the informing him of the commandments is required only ab initio, but even if this check is omitted the conversion is still valid ex post facto. We can assume as a default that the convert is sincere and that the very process of circumcision and immersion implies a commitment to Torah. However, what if even these default assump- tions prove false? The last part of halakhah 17 addresses these even more problematic cases:

Even if it became known that he is converting for an ulterior motive, since he was circumcised and immersed, he left the Gentile nations and we suspect him until his righteousness is clarified. Even if he returns and worships idolatry, behold he is like an apostate Jew whose betrothal is valid and one is obligated to return his lost objects. Once he immerses, he becomes as a Jew. For this reason Samson and Solomon remained with their wives even though their ruse was revealed.9

If the court finds that the convert did have ulterior motives, he enters a probation period. Those converted by laymen during the days of David and Solomon fall into this category since there was a general ban against conversion as it was assumed that all conversions then were for ulterior motives. During this probation period, the convert who already immersed is no longer a Gentile and for that reason the court does not push him away. However, the court also Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 299

does not bring him close or fully accept him. If he shows his sincerity and commitment to Judaism, then he is accepted as a righteous convert. But even if he reverts to idolatry, he nevertheless remains Jewish and has the status of an apostate Jew.10 Rambam does not specify for what specifi c behavior the court is to check. In Hilkhot Shabbat 30:15, however, he does provide details about the status of an apostate Jew:

Shabbat and idolatry are each as weighty as all the mitzvot of the Torah. Shabbat is the sign between the Holy One, blessed be He, and ourselves forever. Therefore, anyone who violates the rest of the mitzvot is included in the wicked of Israel. However, one who violates Shabbat in public behold he is like an idolater and both of them are like non-Jews for all matters.11

A Jew only becomes an apostate for violating these two commandments that define a person’s fundamental allegiance. Public violation of Shabbat and idolatry signify that the transgressor has renounced his Jewish identity. An apostate Jew remains technically Jewish and his marriage to a Jew is valid; however, he is treated like a non-Jew regarding eruv, minyan, ritual slaughter, writing a Sefer Torah, stam yenam, and similar laws.12 Similarly one who converts for ulterior motives must act in a way that reveals that he/she iden- tifies himself/herself as a Jew. “Until his righteousness is clarified” does not mean that he/she must be a perfect sadik but rather that because he/she had ulterior motives, he/she must renounce idolatry and act in some way that will show his/her Jewish identity in order to become a “righteous convert.” Th us according to the Rambam, under ideal circumstances a proper court checks that the convert has no ulterior motives and informs him/her of the commandments; if they fi nd him/her to be acceptable then the conversion applies immediately.13 Even if the court fails to check and inform the convert, the procedure is still valid ex post facto and the conversion applies immediately. However, even if the convert does have ulterior motives the conversion is still 300 Richard Hidary valid ex post facto but the convert enters a probation period to determine his/her exact status. During this probation period, wine that the convert touches will become prohibited as he is socially and halakhically ostracized.14 If the convert renounces idolatry and acts in a way so as to corroborate his/her Jewish identifi cation, then he/she is fully Jewish for all purposes. If the convert does revert to idolatry, he remains Jewish for the purposes of marriage but is treated like a non-Jew for other laws just like any other apostate Jew.15 For this reason, even though the wives of Solomon had ulterior motives and reverted to idolatry, once they immersed they became converts to Judaism and their marriages were valid. Besides the Mishneh Torah, Rambam also wrote a ground- breaking responsum related to this subject. He was asked about a certain Jewish bachelor who owned a Christian maidservant who slept on his property along with his father’s wife and her three young daughters. Th e man had a dispute with his brother who accused him before a judge of converting the slave to Judaism and of being intimate with her. Under Islamic law, Christians were permitted to convert only to Islam.16 Th e maidservant claimed she was born Jew- ish, which suffi ced to dismiss the charge before the Muslim judge who sent her back home. However, the people of his city continued to speak out against him. Th e questioner asks Rambam whether the bachelor is required to send her away because of the law of yichud or for any other reason. Rambam responds:17

Regarding this unfavorable report, the court must force him to either send her away or free her and marry her. Even though there is somewhat of a transgression in this [marriage] since one who was suspected of having relations with a maidservant who was then freed, may not marry her ab initio (Mishnah Yevamot 2:8), for we have already decided a number of times in similar cases that he should free her and marry her. We did this in order to encourage repenters (takanat ha-shavim) and we said it is better that he should eat gravy and not the forbidden fat itself.18 We relied on their words: it is time to act for God Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 301

by violating the Torah.19 We should help him to marry her with gentleness and tenderness and they should set a date by which he must either marry or send her away as did Ezra.20 May God correct our depravation as He promised and said, “I will remove all of your slag” (Isaiah 1:25).

Rambam boldly set aside the halakhah that one may not marry a maidservant with whom he was suspected of having relations in order to encourage the offender to repent and allow him to be properly married rather than remain in continual sin. As we will see, this responsum serves as an important precedent for many later poskim. Thus, in the Mishneh Torah, Rambam maintains strict requirements for conversion ab initio but ex post facto requires only the technical acts of circumcision and immersion to validate the conversion. Even in an ab initio case, Rambam goes out of his way in his practical responsum to accommodate those already in illicit relationships in order to encourage them to repent.21 Rabbi Yosef Karo In his Bet Yosef (Yore Deah 268) Rabbi Yosef Karo cites various opinions regarding marriage for ulterior motives. He begins by citing Mishneh Torah, according to which the court may not accept converts for ulterior motives ab initio. Bet Yosef then cites the more lenient view of Tosafot (Yevamot 24b s.v. lo). Tosafot ask how Hillel and R. Hiyya22 could convert people who wanted to be Jewish in order to be high priest and for marriage. Tosafot answers that these sages were sure that in the end the converts would convert for the sake of heaven. Even though their initial impetus to convert was for an ulterior motive, eventually they would be fully sincere such that even without the initial reason for converting, they would nevertheless desire to be Jewish.23 Bet Yosef then adds a crucial comment: “From here we can learn that everything follows the perspective of the court.” In his Shulhan Arukh (se‘if 12), however, Rabbi Yosef Karo does not repeat this comment nor the view of Tosafot but rather repeats the Rambam’s language. Regarding acceptance of commandments, Shulhan Arukh 302 Richard Hidary similarly quotes Rambam almost verbatim. However, earlier in the same siman (se‘if 3), he follows the Tur in ruling that the court must inform the convert of the commandments in order that he accept them and that failure to do so invalidates the conversion even ex post facto.24 Th e multiple stances Rabbi Yosef Karo seems to advocate both in his Bet Yosef and within Shulhan Arukh have allowed for much disagreement among later poskim about his views. Rabbi Benzion Meir Hai Uziel Rabbi BenZion Uziel (1880–1953) served as Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv- Jaffa from 1911–1939, except for three years (1921–1923) when he was called to be the Chief Rabbi of Salonika. In 1939 he succeeded Rabbi Yaakov Meir as the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of the British Mandate. In 1948 he became the first Sephardic Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel alongside Rabbi Yishak Halevi Herzog, the first Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi. Throughout his corpus of responsa, Rabbi Uziel maintained a broad view to ensure that halakhah will keep up to date with the needs of the modern world in general and of the new State of Israel in particular.25 Rabbi Uziel devoted about three dozen responsa to the issue of conversion, most of them dealing with problems stemming from lack of proper motivation and commitment to mitzvot.26 While serving as a rabbi in Salonika, Rabbi Uziel was asked about a Jewish man who married a non-Jewish woman, had children with her, and the woman now wants to convert and arrange a proper marriage to her husband.27 Rabbi Uziel fi rst quotes Mishneh Torah and Shulkhan Arukh that the court must check the motives of the convert and is not to accept them if they are converting because of marriage. However, he continues to cite Tosafot who allows conversion for marriage even ab initio if the judge anticipates that the convert will convert for the sake of heaven in the end. He further cites Bet Yosef’s comment on Tosafot that the court has discretion to accept or reject converts with ulterior motives.28 Rabbi Uziel follows the view of Tosafot, seemingly against Rambam and Shulhan Arukh,29 and reasons: Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 303

This non-Jewish woman is already married to a Jew, and by bringing her into the Jewish covenant she will get closer and closer to her husband’s family and his Torah, and furthermore, the children she bore and those who she will bear from now on will be completely Jewish, behold this is similar to the cases of Hillel and R. Hiyya who were sure that in the end they would be complete converts. They are therefore permitted, or better, commanded to bring them close and have them enter into the covenant of Israel’s Torah and remove the affliction of assimilation, which is an inflammatory affliction in the vineyard of the House of Israel.

Having established that the court may and even must allow the wife to convert, Rabbi Uziel next deliberates on whether she would be permitted to properly marry her husband considering that Mishnah Yevamot 2:8, cited above, prohibits such a marriage ab initio. Rabbi Uziel cites a responsum by Rabbi Yaakov Shaul Elyashar (Rishon LeSion, 1893–1906) who argues that we can recognize their civil marriage and therefore consider this like an ex post facto case where the Mishnah rules that we do not force them to divorce.30 Rabbi Uziel disagrees and writes that halakhah does not recognize civil marriage at all. Rather, Rabbi Uziel relies on the responsum of Rambam who permitted a man to marry his freed maidservant despite Mishnah Yevamot 2:8, since it is better that he violate a minor transgression than continually violating a major one. Rabbi Uziel concludes:

His [Rambam’s] precious words are our guides in any matter in which there is no complete transgression such as he who is suspected [of relations with a non-Jew before conversion] or he who was married to a non-Jewish woman who converted. For if we do not permit him to marry her after her conversion, they will remain married their whole lives while she remains not Jewish and their 304 Richard Hidary

children will be children of intermarriage and uprooted from the land of Israel.

In a responsum to Rabbi Hayyim Sabban, the Chief Rabbi of Istanbul, written in 1943, Rabbi Uziel addresses a case where the couple has not married yet.31 Rabbi Uziel writes that if the Rabbis see that they cannot discourage the couple from marrying, it is similarly permitted to convert the non-Jewish partner. Even though marriage for ulterior motives is permitted only ex post facto, “we may make ourselves as laymen and perform this conversion in order to save a Jewish man or woman from this terrible sin [of intermarriage], which is an inflammatory affliction in the house of Israel and is likely to bring on its heels destruction to our nation.”32 Rabbi Uziel’s leniency in the laws of conversion thus results from his stringency in avoiding intermarriage. Similarly regarding converts whose commitment to mitzvot is in question, Rabbi Uziel off ers multiple justifi cations to permit such conversions even ab initio.33 He notes that even under ideal circumstances, the court only informs the convert of a few of the major and minor commandments and their punishments in order to give him an opportunity to withdraw. Th erefore, it is impossible that the court could demand that he fulfi ll all of the mitzvot. In fact, if the court did not inform the convert of any mitzvot the conversion is still valid ex post facto. Furthermore, Rabbi Uziel writes: “Th e court does not need to know that he will fulfi ll the mitzvot, for if that were not the case, no converts would ever be accepted in Israel, for who can guarantee that this non-Jew will be trustworthy regarding all mitzvot of the Torah?” Rabbi Uziel quotes the language of Shulhan Arukh that a convert who reverts to idolatry is like an apostate Jew. He further argues that in our generation, closing the doors to conversion would cause many Jews to renounce their religion and assimilate. Many of those rejected would become enemies of Israel, as history testifi es. Rabbi Uziel concludes: Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 305

The condition of fulfilling commandments is not necessary for conversion even ab initio . . . One is permitted and it is even a mitzvah to accept converts even when we know that they will not fulfill all of the commandments because in the end they will come to fulfill them and we must open up for them this possibility. If they do not fulfill the mitzvot, they will bear their sin and we are innocent.34

Rabbi Uziel is especially concerned with the children of intermarriage:

Not only if they are children of a Jewish mother whose children are complete Jews, but even if they are children of a non-Jewish mother behold they are of Jewish seed and are like lost sheep. I am afraid that if we reject them completely by not accepting their parents for conversion, we will be brought to judgment and it will be said of us, ‘Those who went astray you did not return and the lost you did not seek’ (Ezekiel 23:4).35

Nevertheless, Rabbi Uziel does not permit a non-Jewish woman who is civilly married to a kohen to convert for that would be a mitzvah that results in transgression.36 In such a case, the court should encourage the man to divorce his wife. However, if he refuses, then the court should encourage the father to circumcise and convert his children, with permission of the mother.37 Rabbi Uziel cites the opinion of Yaakov of Kefar Nevoraia who permitted circumcision of the son of a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother even on Shabbat.38 Although his opinion is rejected, we still learn that such circumci- sions would be performed on a weekday. Converting the child will discourage the mother from religiously influencing the child who will then have a better chance of growing up as a Jew. Rabbi Uziel considers all cases of children of a Jewish man with a non-Jewish woman to be the seed of Israel (zera Yisrael).39 Although they are technically not Jewish, they are from Jewish stock and the Rabbis must therefore encourage such children to convert. 306 Richard Hidary

Rabbi Uziel derives this category from Bavli Kiddushin 78a, where “from the seed of the House of Israel” (Ezekiel 44:22) is interpreted to refer to the lineage of the father. 40 Similarly, Bavli Megilah 25a interprets “your seed” (Leviticus 18:21) to refer to the child of a Jew- ish father and a Cuthean mother. Rabbi Uziel concludes that if the court “pushes such a child away and uproots him from his source of life and seed, which is the father, then he will surely assimilate among the Gentiles and will reject the God of Israel and will greatly hate Judaism and its Torah.”41 Th erefore, the father and the court should do their utmost to convert such children from mixed marriages. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef Rabbi Ovadia Yosef received semikha from Rabbi Uziel and served as Chief Rabbi of Israel from 1973–1983. Rabbi Ovadia was asked about a Jewish man who civilly married a non-Jewish woman, had children, and now the wife wants to convert and raise a Jewish family.42 Rabbi Ovadia first establishes that the prohibition against accepting converts for ulterior motives is only rabbinic. Therefore, if the court is in doubt as to the motivations of a certain convert, he/ she should be accepted since, as a rule, one can be lenient in a doubt concerning a rabbinic law (sefeka derabanan lekulah). Aft er citing Rambam’s ruling against accepting conversions for ulterior motives ab initio, Rabbi Ovadia states:

In this case one can say that since she is already married to a Jew in the civil courts and she is living with him without anyone complaining, this conversion is not considered to be for marriage even though it is possible that she is doing so in order to be accepted by his family.43

Rabbi Ovadia here follows the reasoning of Rabbi Shlomo Kluger.44 Regarding the prohibition of the husband to marry the convert with whom he already had a relationship (Mishnah Yevamot 2:8), Rabbi Ovadia also relies on the responsum of Rambam who permitted this on the basis of “it is time to act for God.” Respond- ing to some who said we cannot rely on Rambam’s responsum since Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 307

Rabbi Yosef Karo did not quote it, Rabbi Ovadia writes that Rabbi Yosef Karo simply never saw it, but if he had, he surely would have relied on it. Rabbi Ovadia concludes that if the court sees that the wife is converting sincerely and accepts upon herself the commandments, and teaches her children Torah, then the court may convert her ab initio. Even if there is some doubt as to her motivations, the court can convert her ab initio since the Rabbis permit such conversions ex post facto. In another responsum from the time he served as the Rabbi of Cairo, Rabbi Ovadia discusses a case when a kohen is married civilly to a non-Jewish woman who wants to convert.45 Rabbi Ovadia fi rst reasons that relations with a non-Jew is more severe than marriage of a kohen to a convert so that converting the wife will reduce the level of the sin. Nevertheless, he concludes, that the court should not convert the wife since she is unlikely to keep the laws of family purity and that will result in far worse transgressions. Rather than help the husband into a state of sin, even if it is a lesser transgression, better to leave him be and hope that he will leave his wife. When it comes to the children of such a marriage, on the other hand, Rabbi Ovadia rules that they may be converted on two conditions: that the mother agrees and if the children are likely to observe Shabbat. However, even if the court accepts them without the second condition, the conversion is still valid.46 In all cases, the children are not considered halalim (disqualifi ed priests).47 Rabbi Ovadia’s responsa thus essentially agree with those of Rabbi Uziel except that Rabbi Ovadia puts greater emphasis on the acceptance of commandments ab initio. Speaking before a Knesset committee on November 16, 1976, Rabbi Ovadia delivered a detailed presentation of his general views on conversion.48 He fi rst notes that the Talmud speaks positively about sincere converts but negatively about converts who come with ulterior motives. Nevertheless, he recognizes the new political and social modern order in which couples can live together without get- ting married. If a Jew and non-Jew are already living together then their request for conversion is not for the purposes of marriage but rather for the sake of heaven. Rabbi Ovadia writes: 308 Richard Hidary

Some Ashkenazic Rabbis are stringent in this matter, such as Rabbi Shimon Greenfeld from Hungary and Rabbi Weiss from Chernobyl and others. On the other side, there are many who are lenient: at the head of them is Rabbi Shlomo Kluger from Galacia who says we can rely on this point [that they already live together], and so wrote Rabbi Shaul Elyashar in his book Yisa ish, and so wrote the Rabbis of Egypt Eliyahu Hazan and Rabbi Yosef Mesas, and others. Rabbi Uziel in his book Mishpete Uziel also permitted because of this new development. In practice, most of the judges of Israel today accept this change and therefore even when they know the woman comes to convert for marriage, they accept her.

Rabbi Ovadia places himself within a long tradition of Se- phardic poskim as well as a few Ashkenazic poskim who are lenient in this matter like Hillel and distances himself from the Shammai approach of other Ashkenazic poskim. This spirit of leniency is also apparent in Rabbi Ovadia’s stance on acceptance of commandments: “We cannot convert someone unless he fully accepts all of the written and oral Torah. However, even here, we say that it is likely that he has not yet tasted the taste of Torah and does not know, but in time he will learn more and will make teshuvah.” Rabbi Ovadia recalls that throughout his career, he was fortunate enough to always be associated with courts that took the lenient approach and who accepted with open arms any person whom they deemed possible to convert. He adds, “Only when there is a great suspicion that the person will be an obstacle or a parasite would we reject him.” As an example, he cites a man who converted, married a Jewish woman, reverted to Christianity, became a priest, and then refused to give a get to his wife. Th e Knesset was then deliberating about whether to set up a national religious court to handle all cases of conversion. Rabbi Ovadia opposed the idea because he feared that the judges on that court would not be suffi ciently experienced or courageous to deal with diffi cult cases. Th ese young judges will be wary of making bold Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 309

and quick decisions to permit conversions in such cases and this will result in delays and the perversion of justice. He explains: “In Shulhan Arukh, there are ambiguous sections that can be interpreted this way or that way and there are many poskim and commentaries. A person has to be an experienced sailor to know how to navigate this sea.” Even if he appoints liberal judges, writes Rabbi Ovadia, he cannot guarantee that they will remain so in the future and not be intimidated by elder judges who are strict.49 Rabbi Ovadia recounts that he decides on tens of conversion cases every year, which he always resolves within a few days. He writes, “I do not remember any case that I did not resolve. It is possible that there were isolated cases here and there of a stubborn person who declares explicitly that he does not want to accept the yoke of Torah and mitzvot. A person like this I certainly cannot convert. We cannot do everything we want. But even in a case like this, I attempt to convince not only the convert but also the spouse.” Rabbi Ovadia further recalls that when he headed the court in Tel Aviv, there were many diffi cult cases that his fellow judges refused to accept but that Rabbi Ovadia nevertheless accepted. He emphasizes that he performs all of these conversions quietly and without fanfare. Indeed, while in some places Rabbi Ovadia writes that acceptance of mitzvot is a requirement for conversion ab initio, in practice he would fi nd reasons in each individual case to be lenient. He concluded by inviting the members of the Knesset who encounter problems with conversion to send the candidates to him so that he can quickly accept them. In sum, Rabbi Ovadia remains within and upholds the Sephardic tradition of leniency with regard to conversions for ulterior motives and, although he emphasizes the importance of accepting commandments, he very rarely would reject a convert on that account.50 Rabbi Hayim Amsalem In his book Zera Yisrael, Rabbi Amsalem lays out comprehensively and in great detail the various sources and responsa from the Talmud up until present day poskim (Sephardic and Ashkenazic) concerning how halakhah deals with problematic conversions.51 While he cites 310 Richard Hidary

and comments on both stringent and lenient opinions, his major emphasis is to show a strong tradition of leniency across the centuries that is firmly grounded in the halakhah, perhaps even more so than the stringent approach, but is also preferable as a policy approach to solve contemporary conversion crises. Th e constraints of this article allow me only to summarize his major conclusions and hope the reader will consult his book for the details and sources. Rabbi Amsalem assesses that most Rishonim, including the Rambam and Shulhan Arukh, do not require ex post facto a separate act of acceptance of mitzvot. Conversion takes eff ect through the necessary and suffi cient rituals of circumcision and immersion before a proper court. Once a court performs a valid conversion, there is no possibility for it to be nullifi ed retroactively, no matter how the convert behaves aft erwards. Even for those Rishonim who do mention acceptance of mitzvot, circumcision and immersion for the sake of conversion to Judaism includes the acceptance of mitzvot by defi nition. Precisely because the commandments are such an integral part of the defi nition of being Jewish, a commitment to become Jewish implies an acceptance of the yoke of the commandments and so the validity of the conversion does not depend on any requirement other than circumcision and immersion.52 Rabbi Amsalem shows fl exibility in converting people who are likely to be masorati (traditional) as are most Israelis who attend synagogue, say kiddush, observe major holidays, but also drive on Shabbat and are not careful in eating kosher. He explains that Toseft a Demai 2:5, which prohibits converting someone who refuses to accept even one detail of any commandment, refers only to someone who explicitly rejects a specifi c law out of a sense of rebellion. How- ever, someone who simply does not know all of the laws, violates the mitzvot out of desire for pleasure or because he is infl uenced by the practice of the general Israeli public, or is just continuing his previous habits, does not fall into this category.53 Rather, Rabbi Amsalem applies here the precedent of Hillel who accepted a candidate who agreed to convert only on condition of learning the written Torah but not the Oral Torah (Bavli Shabbat 31a). Th erefore, even if a convert “does not intend to fulfi ll everything now and even admits that, but Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 311

does promise to learn and fulfi ll whatever he will be able to . . . it is proper to accept him even ab initio.”54 Regarding marriage for ulterior motives, Rabbi Amsalem writes that most contemporary poskim permit conversion for marriage ab initio if the couple is civilly married, is already living together, or will certainly live together even without conversion. Following the reasoning of Rabbi Kluger, since the couple is already living together, the conversion cannot be said to be for the sake of marriage and so can be considered for the sake of heaven. Rabbi Amsalem continues:55

Many of the great poskim, both Sephardic and Ashkenazic, wrote leniently in this matter even when it is clear to the court that the converts will not fulfill Torah and mitzvot after the conversion, as long as they perform the formal conversion process. This is for several reasons: 1. Th e primary act of conversion is circumcision and immersion for a man and immersion for a woman. 2. Since the converts accepted Torah and mitzvot generally, even if they had in mind not to fulfi ll them, words in the mind are not considered words. 3. If we do not accept them, they will be lost from the congregation of Israel and will assimilate among the nations and sometimes there is a threat of anni- hilation. 4. In order to save the children that were born or the children that will be born, both those who are halakhically Jews, since there is a worry that if we do not convert their fathers they and their mothers will be annihilated, as well as the children who are not considered halakhically Jewish, since there is nevertheless a mitzvah to bring them close to Judaism. 5. In order to save the husband or the wife from grave transgressions when they are living conjugally with 312 Richard Hidary

non-Jews and if they convert they will be saved from these transgressions.

The children of Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers, mentioned in the fourth point above, fall into the category of zera Yis- rael. Although not halakhically Jewish, Rabbi Amsalem, like Rabbi Uziel and others before him, considers their Jewish ancestry to be significant to the extent that every effort should be made to convert them. 56 Therefore, the court should not overly question their commitment and should convert them ab initio even if they know the convert will not fulfill all of the mitzvot.57 This has special applica- tion to the approximately 350,000 Russian immigrants to Israel who have Jewish lineage but who are not halakhically Jewish. If these immigrants are not converted they will nevertheless marry into general Israeli society, since they consider themselves to be Jewish, and thus multiply the problems of intermarriage. These immigrants were persecuted as Jews in Russia, now serve faithfully in the Israeli army, and identify with the Jewish people. Their rejection would thus cause a massive desecration of God’s name in the eyes of the public while their acceptance will encourage them and their family members to become more committed. Rabbi Amsalem qualifi es that this leniency only applies in Israel where these immigrants will in any case become part of Israeli society and are far from the infl uence of their non-Jewish families and culture in their homelands. Outside of Israel, however, it is the responsibility of each Rabbi to judge whether or not their conversion will encourage intermarriage within their congregations. Rabbi Amsalem thus sees himself as continuing the mainstream halakhic approach, and the Sephardic approach in particular, in advocating for leniency in the laws of conversion. He furthermore emphasizes the urgent necessity to adopt this approach in order to resolve the current conversion crisis in Israel. Other Sephardic Sages Although we have here analyzed only three recent Sephardic Rabbis in any depth, I believe that their approach is representative of the Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 313 vast majority of Sephardic poskim. A brief mention of a few more major figures will have to suffice for now. Rabbi Eliyahu Hazan (c. 1848–1908), who served as Chief Rabbi of Alexandria (1888–1908), wrote that in cases when a Jewish man lives with a non-Jewish woman, sometimes having children together, the regular policy in Alexandria by his rabbinic predecessors was to allow the woman to convert. Rabbi Hazan explains that they relied on the responsum of Rambam and “if that is what our Rabbi said in his time, all the more so in this era of freedom and emancipation that causes, in our great sins, the destruction of all religions.”58 Rabbi Refael Aharon ben Shimon (1848–1928), the Chief Rabbi of Egypt (1891–1921), cites Rabbi Hazan and adds that in such cases, “we look the other way and accept them”59 in order to save the man from sinful relations, to purify his future seed, and to save the husband from losing his religion.60 Rabbi Moshe Hakohen (1906–1966), a leading Rabbi in Tunisia and then in Tiberias, similarly allowed women who were married to Jewish men to convert even when they were living in secular towns and it was clear that they would not be observant. He explains that according to the Rambam, acceptance of the mitzvot does not mean a commitment to observe them but rather accepting that one is responsible to observe them and will be punished for violating them: “Even if at the time of his acceptance of the mitzvot he intends to transgress some of them, nevertheless he accepted that if he trans- gresses he will be punished and is a valid convert.”61 Many more Sephardic Rabbis followed this lenient approach including Rabbi Hayim Yosef David Azulai (Jerusalem, 1724–1806),62 Rabbi Haim ben Yaakov Palache (Izmir, 1788–1869),63 Rabbi Yaakov Shaul Elyashar (Rishon LeSion, 1817–1906), 64 Rabbi Mas‘ud Hako- hen (Morocco, d. 1950),65 Rabbi Hezekiah Shabtai (Salonika and Aleppo, 1862–1950),66 Rabbi Ovadia Hedaya (Aleppo and Jerusalem, 1889–1969),67 Rabbi Yosef Mesas (Morocco and Haifa, 1892–1974),68 and R. Hayyim David Halevi (1924–1998),69 to name a few.70 Each of these Rabbis cites those before him and all of them trace their reasoning back to the Rambam’s responsum. A few Sephardic Rabbis, however, have taken a more strin- 314 Richard Hidary

gent approach. Rabbi Yishak Ibn Walid (or Bengualid, Tetouan, 1777–1870) does allow a non-Jewish woman in a relationship with a Jewish man to convert but prohibits the couple from marrying.71 Another notable exception is Rabbi David Hakohen Scalli (Oran, 1861–1948) who not only prohibits converting a woman living with a Jewish man but even invalidates such a conversion ex post facto.72 He explains that the Rambam only permitted such cases ex post facto if the court found out about her ulterior motives aft er the conversion, but if they knew that before the conversion then she remains a Gentile and should be “pushed away like the Azazel.” Rabbi Scalli continues with a long vitriol against insincere conversions. He adds that young men are marrying non-Jews every day because they know they can always come to the Rabbi later who will accept their conversion. If only these young men “would see that conversion would be prohibited for them they would be deterred and stop themselves from coming close to them and would not come to this point for they would see that bitterness will come in the end when they are pushed away and their sons will not be circumcised and they will not be buried in their cemeteries.”73 Rabbi Scalli further worries about all of the young Jewish women who cannot fi nd anyone to marry on account of so many men marrying out. His advice to these women: “be-makom she-ein anashim, hishtadel lehiyot ish – In a place where there are no men, try to be a man” and instead of waiting for a man to seek you out, you should be proactive like a man and seek them out. The Syrian Edict Another important deviation from the lenient Sephardic approach is the ban against conversion in many Syrian communities. The ban was first implemented in the Syrian community of Argentina by Rabbi Shaul Setton Dabah (1850–1930).74 Rabbi Setton was born in Aleppo and moved to Buenos Aires in 1912.75 We are fortunate to have enough documentation to trace the development of Rabbi Setton’s views about conversion, an instructive story on its own. In 1915, a Christian Arab, also from Syria, applied to Rabbi Set- ton’s court to convert. Th is court checked him and found no ulterior motives and wanted to convert him. Rabbi Setton turned to Rabbi Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 315

Aharon Halevi Goldman for assistance in performing the conversion. Born in 1855, Rabbi Goldman fl ed in 1889 with his community from pogroms in Podolia, Russia, to Argentina to establish the village of Moises Ville, some 380 miles north of Buenos Aires. Rabbi Setton wrote a letter to Rabbi Goldman recommending the candidate and hoping that he would execute the conversion expediently, “since the importance of this mitzvah is well known and its reward is great.”76 Rabbi Goldman, however, refuses to convert him. He writes back that most of the Jews in Argentina are not observant even of Shab- bat and so this convert, aft er learning about the mitzvot, will wonder about the transgressions of the Jews and will curse Judaism and become an enemy. Rabbi Setton was also confronted with cases of Jewish men who had families with non-Jewish women and now would like to convert their wives and children. Again, he turns to Rabbi Gold- man for advice. Learned in Sephardic poskim, Rabbi Setton sends a copy of the rulings of Rabbi Eliyahu Hazan and Rabbi Refael Shim- shon ben Aharon, summarized above.77 Rabbi Goldman, however, explains that these lenient views apply only when the husband and the converted wife are sincere and accept upon themselves Torah and mitzvot. However, in Argentina, such couples continue to sin during this entire process and it is evident that they are only trying to cover up their rash debauchery and their shame.78 Aft er numerous correspondences between the two Argentin- ian Rabbis,79 Rabbi Setton adopts the view of Rabbi Goldman and, c. 1922, issues a ruling that “nobody is permitted to accept converts in Argentina forever.”80 He does, however, permit anyone who wishes to convert to travel to Jerusalem; if they are accepted by the rabbinic court there, then he would recognize their conversion. Rabbi Setton received letters of support for his ruling from Rabbi Goldman and Rabbi Yosef Yedid Halevi.81 Th e ban, however, was not accepted by all and some Rabbis continued to convert people. Over the next few years, the supporters of the ban obtained letters of support from Rabbi Yaakov Meir and Rabbi Avraham Yishak Kook, the Chief Rabbis of Israel, and others, but the feuding continued.82 Rabbi Hezekiah Shabtai, visiting from Jerusalem in 1929 and 316 Richard Hidary again in 1937, supported the ban publicly but also acknowledged the sincerity of its detractors and tried to arrange a compromise.83 Th e supporters of the ban ruled that the conversions of the defecting Rabbis are invalid and their children are to be rejected. Th e detractors were pushing to undo the ban. Rabbi Shabtai wrote letters to several leading Rabbis asking if the ban had the power to invalidate conversions even ex post facto. Rabbi Zvi Pesah Frank ruled that it did and so these conversions are invalid but that the children should be allowed to convert. Rabbi Isaac Halevi Herzog ruled that the validity of these conversions is uncertain and so these converts are not fully Jewish but their marriage to a Jew is legitimate.84 Rabbi Uziel begins by questioning the very basis of the ban. He acknowl- edges the right of Rabbis to make an enactment for the benefi t of his community. However, he had doubts as to whether this ban was benefi cial:

In this case we have to question the matter from its es- sence whether this is called a fence for a mitzvah? After all, there is an aspect of stringency that we should not lock the door before those entering the gates of repentance and leave them by force in sinful relationships and reject their children. Even though they are not called “sons,” they are of the seed of Israel from the father’s side. We must bring them close to Judaism and not push them away from the Torah of Israel and from Judaism forever. I wonder greatly whether there is in it a fence for the masses to prevent them from intermarriage or, quite the opposite, when they lose hope in acting with permission they will act in transgression and will pull themselves and their children out of the Torah of Israel and the congregation of Israel.85

Rabbi Uziel nevertheless stops short of rejecting the ban and even affirms its importance. However, he finds that the language of the original ban only prohibited Rabbis from performing conversions but did not include any language invalidating them – an action Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 317

that no court would have the power to do in any case. Hakaham Ovadia Yosef concurs with Rabbi Uziel.86 In the 1960s and ’70s, the ban was observed more in the breach by using loopholes to perform conversions without technically violating it. Some Rabbis would cross the border into Uruguay to perform conversions since the ban applied only to Argentina. Others would have a letter sent from Israel appointing the local Rabbis as their messengers and since the Rabbis of Jerusalem were allowed to convert Argentinians so were their messengers.87 In 1935, Rabbi Jacob Kassin, relying on the precedent of the Argentinian ban, issued his own similar ban on the Syrian community in New York.88 Rabbi Kassin was born in Jerusalem and was invited in 1933 to be the Chief Rabbi of the community at a time when most community children attended public school, Torah observance was generally low, and the threat of intermarriage was great. Th e proclamation reads, in part: “No male or female member of our community has the right to intermarry with non-Jews; this law covers conversions, which we consider to be fi ctitious and valueless.”89 Th e letter ruled that the children of couples who defy the enactment will not be allowed to marry within the community. Th is letter was signed by the bet din of the congregation including the names of fi ve community rabbis. Signifi cantly the Aleppian-born Rabbi Matloub Abadi, arguably the greatest posek of the community at the time, did not agree to or sign the ban.90 In 1946, with the advent of young men returning from World War II with non-Jewish girlfriends, Rabbi Kassin reaffi rmed that “our community will never accept any converts, male or female, for marriage.” Th is letter further added that couples who violate the enactment would be barred from using congregational premises for their religious ceremonies, would not be given an aliyah to the Torah or permitted to buy a seat in the synagogue, and would not be buried in the community’s cemetery. During these early decades, before a community yeshiva day school was established,91 hundreds of men and women from the community intermarried despite the ban and moved away. Th e ban was reaffi rmed again in 1972, 1984, and 2006. Th e 1984 document included not only the Syrian but also 318 Richard Hidary the “Near Eastern Jewish Communities of Greater New York and New Jersey,” and was signed by the Rabbis and presidents of all of the community’s major institutions in Brooklyn and Deal.92 Th e 2006 document included institutions in Manhattan and Florida as well. Th e Syrian ban has been applied more and more stringently over time. Th e language of the original enactment prohibits only conversion for marriage. In fact, in 1972, Rabbi Kassin himself permitted one man to marry a convert, saying: “She’s a refugee who has taken refuge under the wings of the Shekhina!”93 Nevertheless, Rabbi Kassin would not attend the wedding in order that people would not take it as a precedent for undermining the enactment. Twenty-eight years later, the daughter of this couple, who incidentally attended Stern College for Women, was almost engaged to a Syrian boy. How- ever, Rabbi Saul Kassin, the son of Rabbi Jacob Kassin, successfully persuaded the boy’s parents to break off the relationship, arguing that his father only said the conversion was valid but not that she would be accepted in the community. Th e Sephardic Rabbinical Council then voted to accept her but the damage was done. Th ere are many stories such as this.94 Today, the ban is interpreted so strictly that even children of those who converted in other communities cannot marry into the Syrian community. Th e ban has caused great harm to many, especially the children and grandchil- dren of converts. Some of these children who were denied the abil- ity to marry within the community ended up intermarrying. At the same time, it is almost universally accepted within the community that the ban has prevented many young people from developing serious relationships with non-Jews, knowing that there could be no recourse to conversion to be accepted within the community. It is diffi cult to know how diff erently the community would look today had there not been a ban. Most members, Rabbis and laymen alike, feel strongly that the ban was integral in saving the community from being lost, certainly during the decades before its day schools were established.95 Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 319 Conclusion In sum, while Talmudic sources require sincere motives and an expectation that the convert will accept the commandments ab initio, they also allow significant leeway for conversions under less than ideal circumstances. Rambam codified that conversions for ulterior motives are valid ex post facto even without fulfillment of commandments. In his responsum, he even went so far as to permit the conversion and marriages of couples already living together in a prohibited relationship. The Talmudic leeway, and Rambam’s responsum in particular, served as a precedent for most of the Sephardic poskim of the past few centuries, each of whom cited the Rabbis before him and saw himself as continuing a Sephardic tradition of leniency. Many Ashkenazim also adopted lenient positions based on these same sources, and Sephardic and Ashkenazic poskim of every generation would cite each other for support in their views. The goal of this approach, as expressed best by Rabbi Uziel, is to keep all Jews and their children within the community – even at the expense of lowering ideal standards – so that “nobody should be banished.”96 At the same time, there have also been voices of stringency in both communities, though certainly in the Sephardic world, they certainly represent a small minority. Th is view seeks to uphold high standards for conversion as protection against lax observance of halakhah and as a deterrent from marrying outside the Jewish community.97 While this may come at the expense of excluding wayward members of the community, supporters of this view maintain: “We are not responsible for them.”98 At least until recent developments in Israel, the most exclusionary approach to conversion has been that of the Syrian community. Th is example is noteworthy in that the impetus and major support for the ban derived from certain stringent Ashkenazic poskim while major Sephardic poskim have not been as supportive of the ban.99 If one can speak of a Sephardic approach, perhaps it would be fi nding the Rambam’s Golden Mean between policies that discourage insincere conversions but that also keep those who have strayed within the fold. 320 Richard Hidary

Amsalem, Haim. Mekor Yisrael. Jerusalem: Mekabes Nidĥe Yisrael, 2010. Amsalem, Rabbi Haim. Zera Yisrael. Jerusalem: Mekabes Nidĥe Yisrael, 2010. Angel, Marc. “A Discussion of the Nature of Jewishness in the Teachings of Rabbi Kook and Rabbi Uziel.” In Seeking Good, Seeking Peace, edited by Hayyim Angel, 112–123. Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1994. . Loving Truth and Peace: The Grand Religious Worldview of Rabbi Benzion Uziel. Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1999. Broyde, Joshua, and Michael Broyde. “Does Maimonides Require Acceptance of Commandments for Conversion?” Meorot 9 (2011):1–18. Edrei, Aryeh. “‘Ve-’en ‘aĥrayutam ‘alenu?’: ‘od le-fulmus ha-giyur.” Akdamot 24 (2010): 178–209. Ellenson, David, and Daniel Gordis. Pledges of Jewish Allegiance: Conversion, Law, and Policymaking in Nineteenth- and Twenti- eth-Century Orthodox Responsa. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012. Finkelstein, Menachem. Conversion: Halakhah and Practice. Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2006. Goitein, S. D. A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza. Berkley: University of California, 1967–1993. Harel, Yaron. Between Intrigues and Revolution: The Appointment and Dismissal of Chief Rabbis in Baghdad, Damascus and Aleppo 1744–1914. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2007 (Hebrew). Hen, Nitsan, and Anshil Peper. Maran: Ovadiah Yosef, ha-biografiah. Jerusalem: Keter hotsa’ah la-or, 2004. Hidary, Richard. Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Pluralism in the Talmud. Providence: Brown University, 2010. Kaplan, Dana Evans. “Conversion to Judaism: A Historical Perspec- tive.” Judaism 48, no. 3 (1999): 259–274. Kraemer, Joel. Maimonides: The Life and World of One of Civilization’s Greatest Minds. New York: Doubleday, 2008. Lau, Binyamin. “‘Ve-et ha-ovedet lo bikashtem’: musar ha-nevi’im Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 321

be-shikule pesikato shel ha-Rav Uziel be-nose ha-giyur.” Ak- damot 21 (2008): 96–110. Lichtenstein, Aharon. “Conversion: Birth and Judgment.” In Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Learning, 189–212. Jersey City, NJ: Ktav, 2003. Lieberman, Saul. Tosefta ki-fshutah. New York: The Jewish Theologi- cal Seminary of America, 1955–1988. Lieberman, Zevulun. “A Sephardic Ban on Converts.” Tradition 23, no. 2 (1988): 22–25. Picard, Ariel. Mishnato shel ha-Rav Ovadia Yosef be-‘idan shel temurot. Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2007. Sagi, Avi, and Zvi Zohar. Transforming Identity: The Ritual Transfor- mation from Gentile to Jew – Structure and Meaning. London: Continuum, 2007. Shapiro, Marc. “Review Essay of Transforming Identity: The Ritual Transformation from Gentile to Jew-Structure and Meaning by Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar.” Meorot 8 (2010): 1–14. Sutton, Joseph A.D. Magic Carpet: Aleppo-in-Flatbush, The Story of a Unique Ethnic Jewish Community. New York: Thayer-Jacoby, 1979. Yosef, Rabbi Ovadia. “Ba‘ayot ha-giyur bi-zmanenu.” Torah she-Be‘al Peh 13 (1971): 21–32. Zemer, Moshe. “The Rabbinic Ban on Conversion in Argentina.” Judaism 37, no. 1 (1988): 84–96. Zohar, Zvi. “Maimonides as Inspiration and Guide for Sephardic Halakhic Leadership in Modern Times.” Journal for the Study of Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewry 2 (2007): 102–115. . Ve-lo yidaĥ mi-menu nidaĥ: iyunim be-mishnato ha-hilkhatit shel ha-Rav Uziel bi-tĥum ha-gerut. forthcoming. Notes 1. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Isure Bi’ah 13:4, and see Rabbi Aharon Lichten- stein, “Conversion: Birth and Judgment,” in Leaves of Faith: Th e World of Jewish Learning (Jersey City, NJ: Ktav, 2003), 189–212, on the various aspects of conversions in its ideal form. 2. Hilkhot Isure Bi’ah 13:18. 3. Th is is especially true in modern times when the two communities have combined 322 Richard Hidary

geographically in Israel and America. In fact, sages such as Rabbi Benzion Uziel and Rabbi Sabato Morais have called for unifying the liturgies, customs, and laws of both traditions. See Richard Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Pluralism in the Talmud (Providence: Brown University, 2010), 17 n. 63. 4. According to Toseft a Yevamot 4:6, the same law would apply even if it is known for certain that he had relations with her. Most Rishohim interpret Mishnah Yevamot 2:8 in this light as well; see R. Hananel, Ramban, Rashba, Ritva, Meiri, and Nimuke Yosef on Bavli Yevamot 24b. Th is may not be the case for Rashi. See discussion at Saul Lieberman, Toseft a ki-fshutah (New York: Th e Jewish Th eological Seminary of America, 1955–1988), Nashim, 1:30–31. Lieberman includes Rambam, Hilkhot Gerushin 10:14 together with the majority of Rishonim; however, Mishpete Uziel 2, Yore De‘ah 41, argues that Rambam accords with Rashi’s explanation. 5. See parallel at Masekhet Gerim 1:3 and analysis of this source at Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar, Transforming Identity: Th e Ritual Transformation from Gentile to Jew - Struc- ture and Meaning (London: Continuum, 2007), 9–10. 6. Th is and the next source are also cited in Bavli Bekhorot 30b. See further textual witnesses .גוי as translated. Ms. Erfurt reads ,גר Ms. Vienna reads .7 at Lieberman, Tosefta ki-fshutah, Zeraim, 1:212. 8. Th is statement is also cited in Sifra, Kedoshim 8:3. 9. Ms. Vatican 123 includes an emendation that reads here “even though they returned to their ways.” 10. Th is is based on Bavli Yevamot 47b, cited above. 11. An idolatrous Jew is called an apostate (mumar) in Hilkhot Avoadah Zarah 2:5. See also Hilkhot Eruvin 2:15. 12. It is not clear why Rambam seemingly permits one to return the lost item of an apostate convert in Hilkhot Issure Bi’ah 13:17 contradicting his ruling in Hilkhot Gezelah vaAvedah 11:2. See Magid Mishneh and Kesef Mishneh to Issure Bi’ah 13:17 and Mishpete Uziel, Even Ha‘ezer 13, section 5. 13. See also Hilkhot Isure Bi’ah 12:13 and 14:1. 14. See Rabbi Haim Amsalem, Zera Yisrael (Jerusalem: Mekabes Nidĥe Yisrael, 2010), 52–93. A Geonic precedent for prohibiting stam yenam of a convert who reverts to idolatry law may be found in Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, siman 8, hilkhot milah, 152. Along the same lines, Sagi and Zohar, Transforming Identity, 166–70, explain that according to the Rambam even conversion without fulfi llment of commandments is valid ex post facto. Th e rabbinic court remains suspicious of the convert to determine whether or not they will socially ostracize him or allow him or her to marry a Jew. However, if this convert goes ahead and marries without the permission of the court, the marriage is nevertheless valid. 15. SSome poskim have explained that the suspect convert reverts to being a Gentile if he proves to be insincere. See Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, Iggrot Moshe, Yore Deah 3:108 and Even Ha‘ezer 2:4 and others cited at Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 82. Indeed, Yerushalmi Avodah Zarah 2:2, 41a and Bavli Gittin 45b, equate a convert who reverts to his previous ways with a Gentile. According to this interpretation, the Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 323

last line of halakhah 17 that states that a convert who reverts to idolatry remains an apostate Jew refers to the period aft er the probation stage. Once the convert with ulterior motives practices properly for a certain amount of time, his/her conversion becomes permanent. See also Joshua Broyde and Michael Broyde, “Does Maimonides Require Acceptance of Commandments for Conversion?,” Meorot 9 (2011), 9 n. 18. However, this interpretation does not fi t with the Rambam’s clear language at the beginning of halakhah 17: “Behold he is a convert…since he was circumcised and immersed he left the Gentile nations.” 16. S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: Th e Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza (Berkley: University of California, 1967–1993), I:136. 17. Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. Joshua Blau, (Jerusalem, 1986), no. 211. Th is responsum is also printed in Peer ha-Dor (Amsterdam, 1765), no. 132. See analysis at Menachem Finkelstein, Conversion: Halakhah and Practice (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2006), 251–255. 18. Th is phrase is based on Bavli Kiddushin 21a–b. 19. A midrash on Psalms 119:126 found in Bavli Berachot 63a. Rambam applies the Talmud’s derasha in other contexts as well; see Joel Kraemer, Maimonides: Th e Life and World of One of Civilization’s Greatest Minds (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 554 n. 35. Interestingly, however, Rambam diverges from the Gemara’s explanation in his commentary to Mishnah Berakhot 9:5. 20. See Ezra 10:14 21. David Ellenson and Daniel Gordis, Pledges of Jewish Allegiance: Conversion, Law, and Policymaking in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Orthodox Responsa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 34–35, argue that Rambam’s practical leniency for converts may refl ect his overall positive view of converts also manifest in his letters to Ovadiah the Proselyte. However, that positive view seems only to refer to righteous converts considering his negative view of insincere converts at Hilkhot Bi’ah 13:18. 22. See narratives cited above from Bavli Shabbat 31a and Bavli Menakhot 44a. 23. Th is is clearly true in the Shabbat story where the convert thanks Hillel for converting him even though he cannot become high priest. Th is is less explicit in the Menakhot story, although even there, the prostitute seems to be impressed not only by the student himself but also with his religion that taught him such self-control. 24. On the contradiction between 268:3 and his quotation of the Rambam in se‘if 12, see possible resolutions at Finkelstein, Conversion, 187–188; and Sagi and Zohar, Trans- forming Identity, 200–16. Th e solution of Rabbi Meir Posner is also advocated by Marc Shapiro, “Review Essay of Transforming Identity: Th e Ritual Transformation from Gentile to Jew-Structure and Meaning by Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar,” Meorot 8 (2010), 11–12. Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 104–08, 125–128, on the other hand, interprets Shulhan Arukh to say that no acceptance of mitzvot is necessary. 25. Marc Angel, Loving Truth and Peace: Th e Grand Religious Worldview of Rabbi Benzion Uziel (Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1999). 324 Richard Hidary

26. See discussions of Rabbi Uziel’s position on conversion at Angel, ibid., 164–175; ibid., “A Discussion of the Nature of Jewishness in the Teachings of Rabbi Kook and Rabbi Uziel,” in Seeking Good, Seeking Peace, ed. Hayyim Angel (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1994), 112–123; Sagi and Zohar, Transforming Identity, 52-53, 60–63, 87, 229; Binyamin Lau, “‘Ve-et ha-ovedet lo bikashtem’: musar ha-nevi’im be-shikule pesikato shel ha-Rav Uziel be-nose ha-giyur,” Akdamot 21 (2008), 96–110; and Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 204, 294–295; and Ellenson and Gordis, Pledges, 126–33. 27. Mishpete Uziel, Yore De‘ah 1:14 = Piske Uziel, 59. 28. See further elaboration on the view of Tosafot in Mishpete Uziel Yore De‘ah 2:53. 29. It is not clear if Rabbi Uziel sees Tosafot as arguing against the Rambam or as simply off ering a caveat that Rambam would also agree with even though Rambam does not say so explicitly. 30. Yisa ish, Even Ha‘ezer 7, citing also Hayyim sha’al 1:49. 31. Mishpete Uziel, Even Ha‘ezer 18 = Piske Uziel 63. 32. Ibid. It is interesting to note that whereas in Mishpete Uziel, Yore De‘ah 1:14 and 2:53, Rabbi Uziel relies on Tosafot’s view that conversion initiated by ulterior motives is permitted if they will result in sincere conversion, this responsum does not cite Tosafot. Th is implies that, for Rabbi Uziel, even if the conversion is solely for ulterior motives it is still permitted in order to avoid intermarriage. 33. Mishpete Uziel, Even Ha‘ezer 20 = Piske Uziel 65. 34. Ibid. See also Mishpete Uziel, Yore De‘ah 2:58. 35. Mishpete Uziel, Even Ha‘ezer 20. 36. Mishpete Uziel, Even Ha‘ezer 18. 37. Mishpete Uziel, Even Ha‘ezer 19 = Piske Uziel 64. 38. Yerushalmi Yevamot 2:6 (4a). See analysis at Hidary, Legal Pluralism, 278–280. 39. Ibid. 40. Th is is certainly true according to R. Yehuda. Other Tannaim interpret the verse diff erently but all agree that the phrase “seed of the House of Israel” refers at least to the father and that therefore the daughter of a father who was born Jewish may marry a priest. See also below nn. 47 and 56. 41. Ibid. 42. Yabia omer, Yore Deah 8:24. 43. Ibid. 44. See Sagi and Zohar, Transforming Identity, 39–40. 45. Yabia omer, Even Ha‘ezer 2:3. 46. Yabia omer, Even Ha‘ezer 2:4. 47. Rabbi Ovadia explains that the children are not halalim because “they have no rela- tion with the father at all.” Interestingly, Rabbi Ovadia also does not cite the concept of seed of Israel (zera Yisrael) as a reason to permit converting these children as does Rabbi Uziel. Perhaps it is for this reason that Rabbi Uziel encourages the courts to convert these children while Rabbi Ovadia only allows it in more limited cases. Nevertheless, Rabbi Uziel would presumably agree that the children are not halalim because he does not use zera Yisrael in a fully halakhic sense. Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 325

48. Th e minutes of this session, recorded as protocol 230, are printed at the end of Amsalem, Mekor Yisrael and Zera Yisrael. 49. See also Nitsan Hen and Anshil Peper, Maran: Ovadiah Yosef, ha-biografi ah (Jeru- salem: Keter hotsa’ah la-or, 2004), 219, who write that Rabbi Ovadia opposed these new courts because they would reduce the authority of the current religious courts and would transfer that power into the hands of his rival, Rabbi Shlomo Goren. Even if this is accurate, it does not negate the lenient approach towards conversion expressed in this protocol. 50. See further analysis of sources at Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, “Ba‘ayot ha-giyur bi-zmanenu,” Torah she-Be‘al Peh 13 (1971), 21–32; and discussions at Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 258–59; Finkelstein, Conversion, 262, 432 n. 110, 567 and 585; Ariel Picard, Mishnato shel ha-Rav Ovadia Yosef be-‘idan shel temurot (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2007), 119–123; and Ellenson and Gordis, Pledges, 133–36. Picard, Ellenson, and Gordis present Rabbi Ovadia’s views as exclusionary and stringent. Ellenson and Gordis neglect to note that Rabbi Uziel also rejects the conversion of a woman who is living with a kohen and they do not suffi ciently appreciate that most of his decisions and his practice, as refl ected in the Knesset protocol, show extreme leniency. Ellenson and Gordis are particularly unfair in their judgment that Rabbi Ovadia has no “acknowledged recourse to the social and contextual circumstances of the day” (ibid., 136), a point that contradicts what they themselves write two pages earlier. 51. See also sources collected in Haim Amsalem, Mekor Yisrael (Jerusalem: Mekabes Nidĥe Yisrael, 2010). 52. Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 146. 53. Ibid., 132. 54. Ibid., 275. 55. Ibid., 222. 56. “ Zera Yisrael” is used in Bavli Kiddushin 78a as a requirement for those eligible to marry a kohen. Rabbi Amsalem, however, like Rabbi Uziel, does not use this phrase in its halakhic sense. In a letter to Dr. Joel Wolowelsky on May 23, 2011, Rabbi Amsalem confi rms that a convert whose father is Jewish would still be prohibited from marrying a kohen. See also above nn. 40 and 47. 57. Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 308–11. 58. Neve shalom, Minhage No Amon, Yore De‘ah, Dine Gerim, 2. See also Ta‘alumot lev 3:29–32, and Zvi Zohar, “Maimonides as Inspiration and Guide for Sephardic Halakhic Leadership in Modern Times,” Journal for the Study of Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewry 2 (2007), 110–111. 59. On this phrase, see Aryeh Edrei, “‘Ve-’en ‘aĥrayutam ‘alenu?’: ‘od le-fulmus ha-giyur,” Akdamot 24 (2010), 201–204. 60. Nahar Misrayim, Hilkhot Gerim, p. 111. 61. VeHeshiv Moshe, Yore De‘ah, 51. See further at Zohar, “Maimonides,” 112–114. 62. Hayyim shaal 1:49. 63. Hayyim ve-shalom, 2:108. 326 Richard Hidary

64. See above, n. 30. 65. Pirkhe kohen, Even ha-Ezer, 10. See Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 201–203. 66. Divre Hizkiyahu, Yore De‘ah, 2:1. See Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 203. Rabbi Shabtai served as Chief Rabbi of Aleppo, 1909–1927, before moving to Jerusalem. See further at Yaron Harel, Between Intrigues and Revolution: Th e Appointment and Dismissal of Chief Rabbis in Baghdad, Damascus and Aleppo 1744–1914 (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2007) (Hebrew), 280–305. On his visit to Brooklyn, see Joseph A.D. Sutton, Magic Carpet: Aleppo-in-Flatbush, Th e Story of a Unique Ethnic Jewish Community (New York: Th ayer-Jacoby, 1979), 131. 67. Yaskil ‘avdi, Yore De‘ah, 3:16. 68. Osar ha-mikhtavim 2:765 and 830, and Mayim kedoshim, Yore De‘ah, 108. 69. Aseh lekha rav, 3:29. See also Edrei, “Ve’en,” 193–194. 70. See further at Yosef, “Ba‘ayot ha-giyur bi-zmanenu,” 24; and Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 198–209. 71. Vayomer Yishak, Even Ha‘ezer, 155. 72. Kiryat Hanah David, Yore De‘ah, 2:17–19. See also Amsalem, Zera Yisrael, 198–199, and Divre Hizkiyahu, Yore De‘ah, 2:1, p. 9. 73. Kiryat Hanah David, Yore De‘ah 2:17. 74. Th e history of this ban is documented in Moshe Zemer, “Th e Rabbinic Ban on Conversion in Argentina,” Judaism 37, no. 1 (1988), and Zvi Zohar, Ve-lo yidaĥ mi- menu nidaĥ: iyunim be-mishnato ha-hilkhatit shel ha-Rav Uziel bi-tĥum ha-gerut (forthcoming), ch. 7. 75. Rabbi Setton was an extremely controversial fi gure in Aleppo where many accused him of theft , bribery, corruption, and impiety. Rabbi Hizkiah Shabetai excom- municated Rabbi Setton in 1912, forcing him out of Aleppo. See Harel, Between Intrigues, 125–126, 128, 297, and 305. 76. Divre Aharon, 35. 77. Ibid., 36. 78. Ibid., 37. It is noteworthy to compare this reasoning that the lenient view of past poskim does not apply when few people are observant, to the reasoning of Rabbi Eliyahu Hazan who argued that the Rambam’s lenient responsum applies all the more so in the modern age of freedom. See above, n. 58. 79. Ibid., 35–38, and 40 = Dibber Shaul, 2. 80. Ibid., 4. Th is responsum is undated. Zemmer writes that the proclamation was made in 1927 while Zohar notes that Rabbi Goldman’s last recorded response to Rabbi Setton is dated to 1922 and so the proclamation more likely dates to that year or soon thereaft er. In any case, the proclamation must have been made before 1925 at which time Rabbi Kook writes a letter supporting it. 81. Rabbi Yedid was born in Aleppo and moved to Safed in 1890. See further at Zohar, Ve-lo, n. 28. 82. See Rabbis listed in Divre Aharon, 39, and letters printed in Dibber Shaul, pp. 14–31. 83. On this episode, see Divre Hizkiyahu, Yore De‘ah, 2:1, and Zohar, Ve-lo. 84. Both response are printed in Divre Hizkiyahu, Yore De‘ah, 2:1. On Rabbi Frank’s Sephardic Approaches to Conversion 327

general approach to conversion, see Sagi and Zohar, Transforming Identity, 89–90. On Rabbi Herzog’s views, see ibid., 243–244, 47; and Ellenson and Gordis, Pledges, 98–99, 136–142. 85. Mishpete Uziel, 13. 86. Yabia ‘omer, Yore De‘ah, 9:16. 87. Zemer, “Th e Rabbinic Ban on Conversion in Argentina,” 94–95. Rabbi Ovadia, ibid., suggests that the converts go to the Ashkenazic court and join the Ashkenazic community since they never accepted the ban. 88. Th e history of this ban is documented in Sarina Roff é, “Brooklyn’s Rabbinical Takana Prohibiting Syrian and Near Eastern Jews from Marrying Converts,” (Master’s Th esis, Touro College, 2006). Th e Syrian ban was not the fi rst such enactment in New York. Already in 1763, Shearith Israel issued a policy not to perform conversions or perform marriages for converts. See ibid., and Dana Evans Kaplan, “Conversion to Judaism: A Historical Perspective,” Judaism 48, no. 3 (1999), 259–274. 89. Th e text of the enactment is posted in almost every community building and also printed in Roff é, “Brooklyn’s Rabbinical Takana,” and Zevulun Lieberman, “A Sephardic Ban on Converts,” Tradition 23, no. 2 (1988), 22–25. In the language of the original Hebrew proclamation, only conversions for marriage are prohibited. Th e translation above accompanies the Hebrew letter on posted plaques but includes the heading: “Free translation of the original Hebrew decree.” Th e English translation includes a comma before, “which we consider to be fi ctitious and valueless.” Th is suggests that all conversions are valueless and prohibited and is indeed how the ban is widely understood today, but likely not how it was originally intended. 90. In 1958, Rabbi Matloub Abadi, Magen ba‘adi, 35, permitted the daughter of a convert to marry a kohen from the community. Rabbi Kassin signed off in agreement with the pesak and neither Rabbi so much as mentioned the ban. 91. Magen David Yeshivah Elementary School was founded in 1946. 92. Th e enactment was accepted by the Aleppan community of Mexico City in 1986. 93. Roff é, “Brooklyn’s Rabbinical Takana,” 45. 94. Many more examples are cited in Roff é, ibid. 95. It is interesting to compare the Syrian community of Panama where the ban was never accepted until very recently but where the intermarriage rate is relatively low. Indeed, the vast majority of community members marry within the community because of its tightly-knit social and familial bonds. All of these intuitions, however, need to be assessed by empirical research. 96. Mishpete Uziel, Even Ha‘ezer 19, based on 1 Samuel 14:14. See Zohar, Ve-lo. 97. Some of the popularity of this view may derive from a desire for racial purity, although such notions are not supported by halakhah. 98. A phrase coined by Hatam Sofer. See Edrei, “Ve’en.” 99. In a few cases, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef has encouraged the community in New York to accept people that he himself had converted, but he has only sometimes been successful.