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2007 Minnesota Reparing Hrts Reputation [Compatibility Mode].Pdf REPAIRING OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPUTATION Hubert H. Humphrey Institute University of Minnesota Minneapo lis, Minneso tta Dean Harold Hongju Koh, Yale Law School November 13, 2007 Minnesota and Human Rights 30 Years Ago, Carter-Mondale Placed Human Rights at the Forefront of U.S. Foreign Policy “Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clearcut preference for these societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.” --Pres. Carter 1977 Inaugural Address “{T]he demonstration of American idealism [is] a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles [are] the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence.” --Carter, Keeping Faith Vice President Walter Mondale and International Human Rights • As Vice President, Mondale met with M ondale and the Constitution Vorster of South Africa in May, 1977 and M ondale’s career demonstrated respect for the constitution in several different ways. Both as a mem ber of Congress and as Vice President (w hich is, I believe, part of the Executive branch unless one believes form trumps substance) he was concerned that government behavior re f lectold t a n ap p rop him r iate allocatio that n o f p o wSouth er w h ich gen erally Africa m e ant that d uhad rin g the tim to es in wgive h ic h up he served he worked to make presidents more accountable in part by pushing Congress to assert its po w e rs. H e a lso w a s in vo lv ed in im p o rtan t stru gg les to m ake th e cr im ina l ju stice system wwork o rkapartheid fa irly and to ggive ive m eaningean in g to th e Equal E q u al P ro tectio n Clause C la use. W hat follows are a few snapshots, with m uch left out. Pre-Vice• Presidency In June, 1979, Mondale intervened to M o nd ale p la yed a n im p ortan t ro le in so m e co nstitu tio n al issu es b efo re h e w as V ice P residpersuade e nt w h ich are w o rth y oCarter f no te. and our allies to involve 1) G ideon v. W ainwright– He spearheaded an effort by the state Attorney Generals o f ne ar ly tw o do zen state s ( inc lu d in g T h o m a s F . E a g le to n o f M isso uri) to file an am icus b rief in su p poAlA rt omerican f G id e o n’s claim th atvesse he h ad a co nstituls tioin na l rigrescue ht to co un sel. Seoperations e A ntho n y L ew is, for G ideon’s Trumpet, pp. 145-48. 2) H e p la yed a lead ing ro le o n the S ena te S elec t C o m m ittee o n Inte llig ence A c tivVietnamese itie s (C hu rch C o m m ittee) w h icboat h in vestiga tedpeople, ab uses in in telligenc to e activincrease ities and w ro te th eU.S. FISA legislation which Congress passed in 1978. Mondale had withdrawn from the 1976 p resid ential ra ce and rea lly threw h im se lf in to th e w ork o f the C hu rc h C o m m ittee. financial3 ))g During the aid debates,,pg onand the Ea g letoto n A macce end m en t pto et nd moreth e b o m b in g ofrefugees. Cambodia on June 29, 1973, Mondale made a relatively novel suggestion as to how Congress co u ld assert its co n stitutio na l p o w er to end u n la w fu l pre s ide n tial m ilitary actio n. Y o u w ill recall that in June, 1973 N ixon vetoed a supplemental spend ing measure because it contained the Eagleton• Amendment When which Mondale would forbid not only wentthe use of funds to appropriated Indonesia, in that measure he to bomb Cambodia but also any other funds previously appropriated. Eagleton then put the am end m en t o n th e leg isla tio n to ra ise th e deb t c eiling and o n th e co n tin u in g reso lu tio n. F u lbr igh t worked out a comprom ise whereby such a restriction would not take effect for 45 days which N ixopersuaded n agreed to sig n. T he d o ves Suharto sp lit, w ith F u lbrigh t,to S ym inrelease gto n , M cG o vern ,100,000 C hurch , case, Javits, Nelson, pastore, etc. supporting the compromise and Eagleton, Mondale, M ansfield, M uskie, Kennedy opposed. Church argued that the opponents of the war had no choice because they could not override N ixon’ s vveto eto (esp(especially ecia lly in th e House) H o use) and th e refo re any legis la tio n w ith the Eagletonpolitical Am endm ent wasprisoners a non-starter. M ondale m ade the point that Church was wrong; C o ng ress co u ld s im p ly no t p ass an y leg isla tio n in w h ich case N ixo n w o uld hav e no m o ney w ith Vice President Mondale and Human Rights • WhenM ondale and the the Constitution Carter M o nd a le’s ca reer d em o n stra ted respe ct fo r the co nstitu tio n in se veral d iffe rent w ays. Both as a member of Congress and as Vice President (which is, I believe, part of the Executive branch unless one believes form trumps substance) he was concerned that government behavior re f lecCabinet t a n ap p rop r iate allocatio n o f p o w ermet w h ich ge n e rally mfor ea nt that d u rinthe g the tim es in lastw h ic h he served he worked to make presidents more accountable in part by pushing Congress to assert its popow w eers rs. HHe e aalso lso wwas a s in vo lv ed in im p o rta n t struggles stru gg le s to make m ake th e cr im ina l ju stice system w o rk fa irly and to g ive m ean in g to th e Eq u al P ro te ctio n C lause . time,W hat follows are a fewVP snapshots, withMondale m uch left out. made Pre-Vice Presidency M ondale played an important role in some constitutional issues before he was V ice P resid e nt w h ich are w o rth y o f no te . 1)Gid1) Gideon v. WiW a inwr ihtHig ht– H e sp ear hddh ead e d an e fftbthffort b y th e s ttAttta t e Attorney Generalsthis toast: “We kept the of nearly two dozen states (including Thomas F. Eagleton of M issouri) to file an amicus brief in su p po rt o f G id eo n’s cla im th at he h a d a co nstitu tio na l rig ht to c o un se l. See A ntho n y L ew is, G ideon’s Trumpet, pp. 145-48. 2) H e p laye d a lea d ing ro le o n the S enate S e lect C o m m ittee o n Inte llig ence A c tivpeace, itie s (C hu rc h C o m m ittee ) wwe h ich in ve stigated told ab use s in in tellige the nce activ ities truth,a nd w ro te th e FISA legislation which Congress passed in 1978. Mondale had withdrawn from the 1976 presidential race and really threw himself into the work of the C hurch C omm ittee. 3) During the debates on the Eagleton Amendment to end the bombing of Cambodia on June 29, 1973, Mondale made a relatively novel suggestion as to how Congress co u ld assert its co n stitutio nal p o w e r to end u n law fu l pres iden tial m ilitary a ctio n. Y o u w ill recall that inwe June, 1973 No ixon bbdvetoedeye a supplementald spend th ing measuree becausell”aw. it contained” the Eagleton Amendment which would forbid not only the use of funds appropriated in that measure to b o m b C am b o d ia b u t also a n y o ther fu nd s p re v io usly ap p rop r iated . E a g le to n th en p u t th e am end m en t o n th e leg islatio n to ra ise th e deb t ce iling and o n th e co n tin u in g reso lu tio n. F u lbr igh t worked out a comprom ise whereby such a restriction would not take effect for 45 days which N ixo n a gre ed to sig n.
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