US Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement Robert S. Pope Colonel, USAF Air University Press Air Force Research Institute Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Project Editor Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jerry L. Gantt Pope, Robert S., 1969- Copy Editor US interagency regional foreign policy implemen- Andrew Thayer tation : a survey of current practice and an analysis of Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations options for improvement / Robert S. Pope, Colonel, Daniel Armstrong USAF. Composition and Prepress Production pages cm Vivian D. O’Neal Includes bibliographical references and index. Print Preparation and Distribution ISBN ISBN 978-1-58566-232-6 Diane Clark 1. United States—Foreign relations administra- tion. 2. United States—Foreign relations—Decision making. 3. National security—United States— Administration. 4. National security—United AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE States—Decision making. 5. Interagency coordina- tion—United States. I. Title. II. Title: United States AIR UNIVERSITY PRESS interagency regional foreign policy implementation. JZ1480.P657 2014 353.1’30973—dc23 Director and Publisher 2013045865 Allen G. Peck Editor in Chief Oreste M. Johnson Managing Editor Demorah Hayes Published by Air University Press in June 2014 Design and Production Manager Cheryl King Air University Press 155 N. Twining St., Bldg. 693 Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6026 [email protected] http://aupress.au.af.mil/ http://afri.au.af.mil/ Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the organizations with which he is associated or the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any AFRI other US government agency. This publication is cleared Air Force Research Institute for public release and unlimited distribution. ii Contents Foreword vii About the Author xi Preface xiii 1 Introduction 1 2 Current Practices—Military 9 Military-Led Interagency Coordination Mechanisms 9 Political Advisors 9 Joint Interagency Coordination Group 10 Joint Interagency Task Force 14 Interagency Structures at the Geographic Combatant Commands 15 US Central Command 16 US Pacific Command 21 US European Command 25 US Southern Command 27 US Africa Command 32 Summary of Current Structures at the GCCs 35 3 Current Practices—US Civilian Agencies 45 State Department Structures for Civil-Military Coordination 45 Undersecretary for Political Affairs—Regional Bureaus 47 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 48 Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations 48 US Agency for International Development 50 US Embassies 53 US Regional Missions 54 The National Security Council 55 Other Interagency Structures 57 Department of Homeland Security 57 Office of the Director of National Intelligence 57 National Centers 58 Presidential Special Representatives 59 Summary of Nonmilitary Interagency Structures 60 iii CONTENTS 4 The Need for Improvement 67 Security Cooperation 67 Counterterrorism Engagement 71 Response to Disaster or Humanitarian Crisis 73 Complex Contingency Operations 75 Vietnam (1964–73) 76 Panama: Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty (1989–90) 79 Haiti: Operation Uphold Democracy (1994–95) 80 Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–Present) 82 Iraq: Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn (2003–11) 86 5 Options for Improvement 95 Reform Options at the Regional Level 96 A Regional Integrated Interagency Organization 96 State Leads at the Regional Level 102 Military Leads at the Regional Level 104 A Parallel Regional Structure 107 Reform Options at the Country Level during Crisis Operations 109 An Integrated Interagency Structure 111 State Leads 113 Military Leads 114 A Parallel Structure 115 6 Analysis and Recommendation 121 Objectives 121 Analysis 124 Crisis Operations Models 125 Regional Models 128 The Recommended Reform Model 132 Applying the Model 133 Implementation Considerations 136 Bureaucratic Resistance 136 Diplomatic Endorsement 138 Locating the US Regional Missions 139 Regional Boundaries 140 Cost 141 iv CONTENTS Personnel and Culture 143 Congressional Support and Legislation 144 What If There Is No Appetite for Interagency Reform? 148 Appendix Interagency Reform at the National Level 153 Abbreviations 169 Bibliography 175 Index 193 Illustrations Figures 1 JFCOM standard model for interagency coordination 12 2 CENTCOM structures for interagency unity of effort 16 3 PACOM structures for interagency unity of effort 21 4 EUCOM structures for interagency unity of effort 25 5 SOUTHCOM structures for interagency unity of effort 28 6 AFRICOM structures for interagency unity of effort 33 7 Department of State organizational chart 46 8 USAID organizational chart 52 9 MACV-CORDS organizational structure 77 10 Past and current US organizational structure in Afghanistan 86 11 Regional interagency model—the regional interests bureau 99 12 Regional state-led model—the regional interagency mission 104 13 Regional military-led model—the interagency COCOM 106 v CONTENTS 14 Regional parallel structure model—the regional chief of mission 109 15 Integrated interagency crisis task force 113 16 State-led interagency task force 114 17 Military-led interagency task force 115 18 Parallel structure—the interagency task force 117 19 Recommended regional- and crisis-level interagency structure 134 Tables 1 Analysis of crisis-level reform models 125 2 Analysis of regional-level reform models 129 3 Analysis of national-level reform models 164 vi Foreword In today’s ever-changing world, the United States depends upon a complex, multiagency structure to plan, synchronize, and execute its foreign policy and ensure its national security. The public servants who work to advance US interests and values overseas and keep our citizens safe at home and abroad invariably strive to coordinate with other agencies, the US military, and the intelligence community. But effective communication and coordination within and among the na- tional security and foreign policy bureaucracy can sometimes never- theless become a casualty of the exuberance and enthusiasm with which many managers and action officers go about their respective missions. In some ways, the working atmosphere among federal agencies to- day is similar to what the armed services experienced after the imple- mentation of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986: a steep learning curve on how to work with fellow military officers raised in a different bureaucratic culture. Even if an Army officer and an Air Force officer are superficially more similar than, say, a military officer and Foreign Service officer, it’s hard to dismiss the shock that the sud- den “jointness” brought to the services—even though it’s equally hard not to be impressed with the joint service culture that now prevails at the Department of Defense (DOD). Today, officials at all levels of State and Defense are going through the same process, albeit more gradually, in learning to speak the oth- er’s language. After overcoming a previous Pentagon leadership’s ex- clusion of State from involvement in postwar Iraq, military officers and diplomats went on to build a strong mutual respect on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This positive trend continues to- day. Communication between Defense and State—in Washington and around the world—is as strong and regular as I have seen in my 30 years working on political-military issues. In places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, not to mention the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, we have learned anew—and sometimes the hard way—that the US government must present a solid and united front in its dealings with other nations and its execu- tion of operations in various regions around the world. Strong re- gional interagency coordination is critical to the success of security cooperation, counterterrorism and counterproliferation engage- ments, and complex contingency operations, as well as—perhaps vii FOREWORD most importantly—how foreigners perceive the United States on a day-to-day basis. Globalization and instantaneous, around-the-clock media coverage have only served to underscore this requirement. In a thoroughly researched and well-documented study, Col Rob- ert Pope has analyzed how we have achieved regional interagency coordination in the past, how various organizations are presently structured toward this goal, what works and does not work, and how we can improve on the system. Enabled by a National Defense Fel- lowship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, he applied his diverse experience as a career Air Force officer to examine various organizational structures—past and present—and analyze them against an exhaustive reading of public policy and administration lit- erature relevant to his subject matter. By statute, the State Department is the lead agency for US foreign policy. In theory, its merit-based, professional diplomatic service is indispensable to its formulation and implementation. However, in practice, the much larger and better-funded DOD exercises an ever- increasing role in the conduct of US foreign policy activity—some- times with insufficient coordination with the State Department, over- seas embassies, or other relevant agencies. Over the past two decades, the military’s geographic combatant commands have