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Aristotle's Treatment of Fallacious Reasoning in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics

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Aristotle's Treatment of Fallacious Reasoning in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 2 May 15th, 9:00 AM - May 17th, 5:00 PM Aristotle’s Treatment of Fallacious Reasoning in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics George Boger Canisius College Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Boger, George, "Aristotle’s Treatment of Fallacious Reasoning in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics" (1997). OSSA Conference Archive. 12. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA2/papersandcommentaries/12 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARISTOTLE ON FALLACIOUS REASONING IN SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS AND PRIOR ANALYTICS George Boger Department of Philosophy Canisius College ©1998, George Boger Abstract: Aristotle studies syllogistic argumentation in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics. In the latter he focuses on the formal and syntactic character of arguments and treats the sullogismoi and non- sullogismoi as argument patterns with valid or invalid instances. In the former Aristotle focuses on semantics and rhetoric to study apparent sullogismoi as object language arguments. Interpreters usually take Sophistical Refutations as considerably less mature than Prior Analytics. Our interpretation holds that the two works are more of a piece than previously believed and, indeed, that Aristotle's treatment of fallacious reasoning presupposes the results of the formal theory. *** 1. Introduction. Aristotle defines "sullogismos" (syllogism) in Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric, and Prior Analytics in virtually the same way: "a sullogismos is a discourse [logos] in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed necessarily results".1 Interpreters of Aristotle's logic customarily take a sullogismos to be a topic specific, object language argument or deduction and not to be a topic neutral argument form or pattern. Interpreters also customarily believe Sophistical Refutations and Topics to be considerably less mature than Prior Analytics, and, accordingly, they have not studied the one in relation to the other. While Aristotle does treat a sullogismos in Sophistical Refutations as an object language phenomenon, it is evident that he specifically treats the sullogismoi and non-sullogismoi in Prior Analytics A4-7 as topic neutral argument forms or argument patterns whose instances are either valid or invalid arguments. In Prior Analytics Aristotle establishes all the argument patterns whose instances are valid arguments-that is, all the sullogismoi of the three figures-by means of metalogical deductions. And he just as surely establishes metalogically all the argument patterns whose instances are invalid arguments-that is, all the non-sullogismoi-by means of the method of contrasted instances. His logical investigations at Prior Analytics A4-7 are strictly formal and syntactic. In Sophistical Refutations he defines a sullogismos just as at Prior Analytics, and he defines a refutation (elenchos) as "a sullogismos whose conclusion is the contradiction of a given statement". But there he systematically treats actual arguments, in particular, those than appear to be valid but are really only apparent or phainomenoi sullogismoi and sophistical refutations or sophistikoi elenchoi. The emphasis, then, in Sophistical Refutations is on semantic and rhetorical matters having to do with argumentation. Modern interpreters have referred to the subject matter of Sophistical Refutations as "informal fallacies" without regard to the formal results of Prior Analytics as both works bear on the practice of argumentation. We believe that Aristotle's logical investigations in Sophistical Refutations, which emphasizes semantics, are better understood in relation to his syntactic considerations in Prior Analytics, that Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics (indeed, that all the treatises of the Organon) are more of a piece that previously believed. We aim to show that Aristotle's treatment of the fallacies depending on and those not depending on language may presuppose the formal results of Prior Analytics A4-7. In this respect, we take Aristotle more determinately to distinguish semantics and logical syntax than have previous interpreters. Accordingly, we can better appreciate Aristotle's original contributions to formal logic and to the study of argumentation. 2. Misinterpreting Aristotle's project in Prior Analytics Three principal interpretive trends characterize studies of Aristotle's logical investigations. The deductionist interpretation mathematically models Aristotle's logic as a natural deduction system. J. Corcoran, T. Smiley, and R. Smith consider a sullogismos to be a deduction-a fully interpreted argumentation having a cogent chain of reasoning in addition to premises and conclusion. The axiomaticist interpretation takes Prior Analytics to lay out an axiomatized deductive system of syllogistic theorems. J. Lukasiewicz, I. M. Bochenski, and G. Patzig take a sullogismos to be a single, relatively uninterpreted, logically true conditional proposition. Only the traditionalist interpretation continues to hold that Prior Analytics is a logic manual for studying categorical arguments or syllogisms. Proponents such as J. N. Keynes, R. M. Eaton, and W. D. Ross usually treat a sullogismos as a fully interpreted, valid or invalid premise-conclusion argument. Notwithstanding important differences, these interpretations hold quite similar views concerning Aristotle's methods for establishing knowledge of invalidity. However, none of these interpretations provides an account that fits the text of Prior Analytics. On the one hand, traditionalists usually apply six rules of the syllogism, namely, those pertaining to quality, quantity, and distribution.2 This certainly does not resemble any practice of Aristotle. Axiomaticist and deductionist interpreters, on the other hand, equally take Aristotle (1) to consider arguments or deductions and (2) to use the method of counterargument. On both counts they are mistaken. First, Aristotle does not especially treat arguments or deductions in Prior Analytics A4-7. Rather, with a view toward their corresponding argument patterns, he expressly treats patterns of two categorical sentences or premise-pair patterns. Second, there is no instance of Aristotle explicitly using the method of counterargument as is commonly maintained by interpreters such as J. Lukasiewicz (1958: 70) and J. Corcoran (1974: 105, 1989: 31; cf. 1993: xxxi). Rather, he principally uses the method of constrasted instances (W. D. Ross 1949) to invalidate premise-pair patterns and, consequently, their four corresponding argument patterns. Our interpretive standpoint takes Aristotle in Prior Analytics as verifying the results of his constructing a natural deduction system. At A4-7 Aristotle exhaustively treats only and all possible combinations of three different terms in premise-pair patterns to demonstrate (1) which pair patterns are concludent and generate a sullogismos and (2) which pair patterns are inconcludent and do not generate a sullogismos (see G. Patzig 1968 and L. Rose 1968). Accordingly, we hold that a sullogismos as treated in Prior Analytics A4-7 is neither a valid or invalid premise- conclusion argument, nor a single, logically true conditional proposition, nor a deduction. Rather, as a relatively uninterpreted object, it is an elemental argument pattern in one of three figures, consisting in a premise-set of two categorical sentence patterns and a conclusion of a single categorical sentence pattern and having all valid argument instances. Aristotle recognized the epistemic efficacy of such elemental patterns and formulated them in corresponding sentences to express rules of deduction. Section three below addresses how Aristotle eliminates argument patterns unproductive of deduction rules and, thus, how he identifies invalid arguments and fallacious reasoning from formal considerations. 3.0 Some preliminary matters 3.1 Logic terminology. We use the following terminology, following J. Corcoran 1989 and 1993, to examine Aristotle's logic.3 An argument is a two part system consisting in a set of sentences in the role of premises and a single sentence in the role of conclusion; an argument is either valid or invalid. A sentence is either true or false. An argumentation is a three part system consisting in a chain of reasoning in addition to premises and conclusion and is either cogent, in which case it is a deduction, or fallacious, a non-deduction. A sentence, an argument, and an argumentation are object language phenomena. An argument pattern is a two part system consisting in a set of sentence patterns in the role of a premise-set and a single sentence pattern in the role of conclusion. A pattern is a metalinguistic object distinguishable from a form and is commonly represented schematically (see below note 11 on distinguishing "form" and "pattern"). An argument is said to fit or to be an instance of one or more argument patterns. A given argument pattern may have all valid instances, all invalid instances, or some valid and some invalid instances. An argument pattern is not properly valid or invalid, although logicians have used "valid" in this
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