Framing Ethnic Minority Mobilisation in Central Asia: the Cases of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 59, No. 4, June 2007, 567 – 590 Framing Ethnic Minority Mobilisation in Central Asia: The Cases of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan MATTEO FUMAGALLI Abstract This article seeks to understand why, although widely predicted, very little ethnically motivated political mobilisation has occurred in post-Soviet Central Asia. Building on the contribution of frame analysis, the article examines the case of Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Different frames have been articulated by the elites and have been used to mobilise and demobilise the community. The more successful ones (those that resonated) were less confrontational, and ultimately led the Uzbek communities towards a non-confrontational path with the authorities. The article concludes that frame analysis sheds important insights on the process of the mobilisation of ethnic minorities in Central Asia, and also contributes to the literature on ethnic mobilisation. IN JUNE 1990 TENSIONS ORIGINATING FROM PERCEPTIONS OF UNFAIRLY distri- buted land and housing erupted in a sudden and short-lived, but particularly bloody series of riots in the south of Kyrgyzstan.1 Concentrated in the city of Osh2 and the nearby town of Uzgen, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek population clashed, leaving about 200 people dead and many more injured, in what seemed to announce an era of ethnic conflict in the region (Tishkov 1999, p. 581). The conflict was not an isolated case in Central Asia, as the clashes can be located in a broader trend of insurgencies and riots which marked the dusk of the Soviet period. Nevertheless the Osh conflict was one of the largest and most violent of its kind (Tishkov 1995, p. 134). Two years later, the Soviet-era arrangements between regional networks over the distribution of power and The author would like to thank Laura Adams, Allan Craigie, Nick Megoran, Paolo Sartori and Tommaso Trevisani, and the anonymous reviewers of the journal for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The author is also grateful to the British Academy Committee for Central and Inner Asia, the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies, and the British International Studies Association for their generous support of this research. 1‘Riot’ here is meant as a kind of conflict involving ‘no structured armed forces and organised long term fighting’ (Tishkov 1995, p. 148, fn. 1). 2I follow the international spelling of all names of locations indicated in the article. ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/07/040567-24 ª 2007 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130701289869 568 MATTEO FUMAGALLI resources in Tajikistan collapsed, precipitating the country in a five-year civil war, which cost the lives of at least 50,000 people and led to the displacement of many more. Although the Tajik conflict was not ethnic in nature,3 ethnic groups re-aligned themselves during the conflict, with Uzbeks mostly supporting the ruling faction challenged by the democratic-Islamic opposition.4 This article asks how these two conflicts, or better the memory of them, have been framed by the leaders of the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and what impact they have had on the course of Uzbek mobilisation.5 By examining the frames adopted by Uzbeks in both countries, the article aims to show how Uzbeks have adjusted to living in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.6 It will argue that an understanding of what issues have been framed and how widely they have resonated across the Uzbek community sheds light on the broader mobilisational process. The main contribution this article seeks to make is to understand the political behaviour of Uzbek ethnic minorities in Central Asia, a topic traditionally indicated as carrying significant implications for both state and regional stability, but rarely subject to empirical investigation (Bohr 1998; Horsman 1999; Lubin & Rubin 1999; Melvin 2000; Olcott 1994, 1995; Tabyshalieva 1999). The article also aims to contribute to the discussion on ethnic mobilisation through a focus on the role of frames in the mobilisational process. Building on the expanding literature on cultural framing, this article identifies what frames were available to the Uzbek communities in the two countries since independence, and which resonated more widely (Gorenburg 2003; Johnston & Noakes 2005; Renwick 2006; Schatz 1999; Snow et al. 1986; Snow 2004; Ukudeeva-Freeman 2003; Zald 1996). Following Gorenburg, frames are defined and understood as ‘interpretive schemes that condense and simplify a person’s experience by selectively highlighting and encoding certain situations, objects, events and experiences’ (2003, p. 11). In order to resonate, frames need to be familiar and hence build on the material as well as cognitive context. Frames do not emerge naturally, but are an essential tool used by political elites to mobilise or demobilise the broader community. Finally this article calls for more attention to be paid to the relational aspect of frames. Rather than being seen as fixed sets of ideas, perceptions and beliefs, the article shows that the same frame can be used to mobilise and demobilise the community.7 A brief caveat is 3For a discussion of the causes of the Tajik conflict see Abdullaev and Barnes (2001). 4This is of course a simplification. The conflict ran through the country’s multiple cleavages. 5Unlike most definitions of mobilisation that focus on claims and protests, my understanding of mobilisation follows Nedelman’s definition which refers to ‘the actors’ attempt to influence the existing distribution of power’ (1987, p. 181). This allows me not to assume a predetermined outcome (the movement from passivity to activity), or focus only on the ‘noisy’ part of mobilisation (claims and protests), but to gain an understanding of a ‘quiet’ phase too (e.g. electoral support for the authorities). 6I am not implying that the Uzbek communities have recently settled there. In fact, Uzbeks have lived in that part of the Ferghana Valley even during Soviet times, but the absence of ‘real’ borders made their being formally resident in Soviet Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan immaterial, given their physical proximity to Uzbekistan. The establishment of new interstate borders changed all this. 7For the purpose of this article I rely on Charles Tilly’s definition of demobilisation as ‘the process by which a group of active participants in public life becomes a passive collection of individuals’ (Tilly 1978, p. 54). Unlike mobilisation, demobilisation remains an unexplored process both empirically and theoretically. In most cases it refers to the process following a violent conflict through which former ETHNIC MINORITY MOBILISATION IN CENTRAL ASIA 569 necessary here. The article adopts the year 2003 as the cut-off point. This means that events which occurred after that year are not considered. The balance of power in Tajikistan has not been altered since then. The situation appears much more in flux and convoluted in Kyrgyzstan and any attempt to present an analysis of the impact of the fall-out of the 2005 events that led to the ousting of the regime of former President Akaev would risk being superseded by the current unfolding of events.8 I will briefly address their fallout on inter-ethnic relations in the later part of the article. This article is divided in the following manner. First I discuss the significance acquired by framing theory in recent explanations of ethno-political mobilisation. Next I provide a concise historical background of the case studies and discuss methodological issues. I then present the empirical findings. Concluding remarks then follow. The role of frames in explanations of ethnic mobilisation Structural explanations have traditionally dominated the debate in mobilisation studies.9 The concept of political opportunity structure (POS), first introduced by Peter Eisinger (1973), has traditionally been central to structural explanations.10 POS refers to the ‘dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure’ (Tarrow 1998, p. 41). Building on Tarrow’s work (1998), POS theorists tend to assign a crucial role to the state and state policies which would expand or constrain political opportunities.11 While structural factors, most notably the salience of the Soviet experience and the elite structure, certainly play an important role in explanations of Uzbek political mobilisation, changes within or across mobilisational processes are ascribed to factors that are external to the group itself, de facto depriving it of autonomous agency. combatants relinquish the use of violence and are integrated in the political process (see Walter 1999 for example). To capture the dynamics at play in Central Asia I find it more appropriate to follow the way the concept is used by Gagnon (2004), Remmer (1980) and Hipsher (1996) with regard to the strategy adopted by political elites in authoritarian systems to demobilise the population to prevent possible challenges and consolidate their position. 8Askar Akaev’s appearance on the Kyrgyz political scene is due to the fact that in October 1990 the two candidates running for the country’s presidency (Apas Jumagulov and Absamat Masaliev) did not obtain sufficient votes in the first round of voting in the Supreme Soviet and were thus prevented from re-running. He was then selected as a compromise candidate between the competing factions. Originally from the northern region of Chuy, Akaev spent some considerable time abroad, in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad), where he trained as a physicist and began his academic career. He returned to his native country in 1977. On the origins and implications of the so-called ‘Tulip Revolution’ see E. Marat, The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After (Washington, Jamestown Foundation), 2006, available at: http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/Jamestown-TulipRevolu- tion.pdf, accessed 15 April 2006. 9For examples of approaches emphasising the salience of context as enabling and/or constraining opportunities for mobilisation, see Gurr (1993), Kitschelt (1986), Koopmans (2000) and McAdam (1982).

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