Smarter Power, Stronger Partners, Volume II Trends in Force Projection Against Potential Adversaries
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C O R P O R A T I O N Smarter Power, Stronger Partners, Volume II Trends in Force Projection Against Potential Adversaries Duncan Long, Terrence K. Kelly, David C. Gompert Editors Scott Boston, Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Duncan Long Contributors For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1359z1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9704-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Until recently, it seemed that no enemy of the United States was capa- ble of successfully opposing U.S. military forces. If the U.S. military could liberate Kuwait, oust hostile dictators (in Panama, Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya), and deliver decisive blows to al Qaeda, all while providing humanitarian assistance to victims of tsunamis, earth- quakes, and other disasters, surely it could do whatever was asked of it. The combination of high-quality personnel, operational experience, technological superiority, ingenuity, versatility, and sheer scale lent confidence to the assumption that U.S. forces could meet any chal- lenge anywhere. The U.S. military remains unmatched, but the disappointing results of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—experiences that have left a large portion of the U.S. public gun-shy—have shaken the confidence that force always succeeds. Moreover, Americans might be wondering whether their country must be at war so much of the time: The United States has spent 15 of the past 25 years at war, not counting small-scale overseas operations. Looking to the future, Americans’ certainty that the United States could decisively defeat any state might erode with the growing ability of at least one power—China—to oppose U.S. forces in its region. In view of these developments and creeping doubts, it is impor- tant to look objectively and comprehensively at the future of U.S. force projection and to address some new and uncomfortable questions: What if technological and economic trends prohibit the United States from projecting offensive force wherever it chooses? Might U.S. mili- iii iv Smarter Power, Stronger Partners, Volume II tary superiority become increasingly nominal if the nation cannot use it successfully wherever the United States has interests and responsi- bilities? Will international peace suffer in regions where the United States cannot be confident of a military victory at acceptable cost? Will the United States still be a true global power if it can no longer pro- ject force globally? What alternatives, military or otherwise, does the United States have if the efficacy of force projection dwindles? If such questions sound declinist, U.S. interests dictate that decisionmakers face them nevertheless. Concern about China’s military power centers on its growing ability to strike U.S. forces based in or sent to the western Pacific. A conflict with such a determined, well-resourced, and advanced adver- sary would pose serious challenges to U.S. force projection, potentially deterring or altogether defeating U.S. operations with sophisticated anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities. Since the first Per- sian Gulf War, and with the ensuing transformation of U.S. forces to conduct decisive expeditionary combat operations globally, states with reason to fear U.S. force projection have stepped up investment in A2AD. These capabilities include advanced air defense, tactical air forces, coastal surface and subsurface naval combatants, ballistic and cruise missiles, and cyberwarfare capabilities—not to mention escala- tion options, such as nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction— all intended to raise the risks and costs to U.S. forces. The U.S. military has taken steps to mitigate these A2AD chal- lenges, but the focus has been primarily on incremental technical or tactical fixes—more missile-defense interceptors, stealthier aircraft with larger payloads, drones launched from large-deck aircraft carriers, and options to strike enemy forces before being struck. Meanwhile, the problem appears to be growing, whether measured in the prolif- eration of missiles with increasing ranges and accuracy; the market in advanced air-defense systems; or the advent of cheap, quiet, nonnuclear submarines. Furthermore, the trends seem to favor A2AD in terms of operational capability and cost. It is unlikely that the problem can be solved at the margin. Rather, the United States needs a different strategic approach, or suite of approaches, that can support its interests and responsibilities without Preface v such a heavy reliance on offensive force. Accordingly, this report exam- ines the motivations, technology, and economics of A2AD. It considers why, fundamentally, A2AD is so hard to counter and, in turn, whether the erosion of U.S. force projection is inexorable. It also assesses how long the United States has to respond or adjust to these changes. This report is the second in a two-volume series. The primary volume, Smarter Power, Stronger Partners, Volume I: Exploiting U.S. Advantages to Prevent Aggression, grapples comprehensively with the issues raised above. This volume features a set of warfighting scenarios aimed primarily at supporting a central contention of the analysis pre- sented in the first volume: that the ability of adversaries in key regions to challenge U.S. force projection will increase over time. This research was sponsored by the U.S. Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD136619. For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Operations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; FAX 310-451-6952; email [email protected]), or visit Arroyo’s web site at http://www.rand.org/ard/. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments ............................................................xxvii Abbreviations ...................................................................xxix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Smarter Power, Stronger Partners ................................................ 2 Scenarios: Illustrating the Nature and Significance of Trends in Anti- Access and Area Denial Versus Force Projection .......................... 6 CHAPTER TWO China–Taiwan ....................................................................13 China–Taiwan, 2015 ..............................................................13 China–Taiwan, 2025 .............................................................47 CHAPTER THREE China–Philippines .............................................................. 77 China–Philippines, 2015 ........................................................ 77 China–Philippines, 2025 ....................................................... 106 vii viii Smarter Power, Stronger Partners, Volume II CHAPTER FOUR Russia–Estonia ................................................................. 133 Russia–Estonia, 2015 ........................................................... 133 Russia–Estonia, 2025 ........................................................... 164 CHAPTER FIVE Iran–United States ............................................................. 181 Nonnuclear Iran–United States, 2015 ........................................ 181 Nonnuclear Iran–United States, 2025 ........................................ 212 An Excursion Worth Considering: A Nuclear Iran–United States, 2025 .......................................................................... 243 CHAPTER SIX Collective Assessment ......................................................... 259 Summaries of the Scenarios .................................................... 259 Important Differences .........................................................