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3. Recruiting European Judges in the Age of Judicial Self-Government 2017 JUDI-ARCH M1: A MULTILINGUAL BIBLIOGRAPHY Table of Contents 1. Beyond Judicial Councils: Forms, Rationales and Impact of Judicial Self-Governance in Europe . - 3 - 2. The Motivations of Individual Judges ........................................................................................ - 10 - 3. Recruiting European judges in the age of judicial self-government ......................................... - 14 - 4. Court Presidents: The Missing Piece in the Puzzle of Judicial Governance ............................... - 22 - 5. The Failed Expectations: Does the Establishment of Judicial Councils Enhance Confidence in Courts? .............................................................................................................................................. - 33 - 6. Court of Justice of the European Union .................................................................................... - 40 - 7. The Judicial Self-Government at the International Level – A New Research Agenda ............... - 46 - 8. European Court of Human Rights .............................................................................................. - 52 - 9. Germany .................................................................................................................................... - 58 - 10. Czech Republic ....................................................................................................................... - 65 - 11. France .................................................................................................................................... - 68 - 12. Ireland.................................................................................................................................... - 71 - 13. Spain ...................................................................................................................................... - 76 - 14. Italy ........................................................................................................................................ - 81 - 15. Netherlands ........................................................................................................................... - 84 - 16. Poland .................................................................................................................................... - 90 - 17. Romania ................................................................................................................................. - 94 - 18. Slovak Republic ...................................................................................................................... - 98 - 19. Slovenia ............................................................................................................................... - 103 - 20. Turkey .................................................................................................................................. - 110 - - 1 - - 2 - 1. Beyond Judicial Councils: Forms, Rationales and Impact of Judicial Self-Governance in Europe Alemanno, Alberto. 2015. “How Transparent is Transparent Enough? Balancing Access to Information Against Privacy”. In Michal Bobek (ed.). Selecting Europe’s Judges: A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European Courts. Oxford: Oxford UP, pp. 202– 221. Avbelj, Matej. 2018. “Contextual Analysis of Judicial Governance in Slovenia”. German Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 7, pp. 1901–1930. Belavusau, Uladzislau. 2013. “On Age Discrimination and Beating Dead Dogs: Commission v. Hungary”. Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 1145–1160. Benvenuti, Simone. 2018. “The Politics of Judicial Accountability in Italy: Shifting the Balance”. European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 369–393. Benvenuti, Simone and Paris, Davide. 2018. “Judicial Self-Government in Italy: Merits, Limits and the Reality of an Export Model”. German Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 7, pp. 1641–1670. Blisa, Adam and Kosař, David. 2018. “Court Presidents: The Missing Piece in the Puzzle of Judicial Governance”. German Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 7, pp. 2031–2076. Blisa, Adam; Papoušková, Tereza and Urbániková, Marína. 2018. “Judicial Self-Government in Czechia: Europe’s Black Sheep?” German Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 7, pp. 1951–1976. Bobek, Michal and Kosař, David. 2014. “Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe”. German Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 7, pp. 1257– 1292. Bonelli, Matteo and Claes, Monica. 2018. “Judicial serendipity: how Portuguese judges came to the rescue of the Polish judiciary: ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses”. European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 622–643. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1987. “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of Juridicial Field”. The Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 38, pp. 805–853. Çalı, Başak and Cunningham, Stewart. 2018. “Judicial Self Government and the Sui Generic Case of the European Court of Human Rights”. German Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 7, pp. 1977– 2006. Çalı, Başak; Koch, Anne and Bruch, Nicola. 2013. “The Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts: A Grounded Interpretivist Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights”. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 955–984. Castillo Ortiz, Pablo José. 2017. “Councils of the Judiciary and Judges’ Perceptions of Respect to Their Independence in Europe”. Hague Journal on The Rule of Law, Vol. 9, No.2, pp. 315– 336. Coman, Ramona. 2014. “Quo Vadis Judicial Reforms? The Quest for Judicial Independence in Central and Eastern Europe”. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 66, No. 6, pp. 892–924. - 3 - Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers. 2010. “Resolution CM/Res(2010)26 on the establishment of an Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as Judge to the European Court of Human Rights”. Available online at: http://vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/Res_2010_26_eng.pdf. Dallara, Cristina and Piana, Daniela. 2015. Networking the Rule of Law: How Change Agents Reshape Judicial Governance in the EU. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Davis, Christian. 2017. “Polish MPs pass judicial bills amid accusations of threat to democracy”. The Guardian, December 8, 2017. Available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/08/polish-mps-pass-supreme-court-bill- criticised-as-grave-threat. De Fine Licht, Jenny; Naurin, Daniel; Esaiasson, Peter and Gilljam, Mikael. 2014. “When Does Transparency Generate Legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context-Bound Relationship”. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 111–134. de S-O-l'E Lasser, Mitchel. 2018. “Judicial Appointments, Judicial Independence and the European High Courts”. In Tamara Perišin and Siniša Rodin (eds.). The Transformation or Reconstitution of Europe: The Critical Legal Studies Perspective on the Role of the Courts in the European Union. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, pp. 121-150. De Visser, Maartje. 2015. “A Critical Assessment of the Role of the Venice Commission in Processes of Domestic Constitutional Reform”. American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 963–1008. Dezalay, Yves and Rask Madsen, Mikael. 2012. “The Force of Law and Lawyers: PIerre Bourdieu and the Reflexive Sociology of Law”. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 8, pp. 433– 452. Dothan, Shai. 2018. “The Motivations of Individual Judges and How They Act as a Group”. German Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 7, pp. 2165–2188. Dressel, Björn; Sanchez-Urribarri, Raul and Stroh, Alexander. 2017. “The Informal Dimension of Judicial Politics”. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 13, pp. 413–430. Dumbrovský, Tomas; Petkova, Bilyana and Van der Sluis, Marvin. 2014. “Judicial Appointments: The Article 255 TFEU Advisory Panel and Selection Procedures in the Member States”. Common Market Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 455–482. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. 2017. “The Judicial Trilemma”. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 111, Issue 2, pp. 225–276. Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. “International Judicial Practices: Opening the ‘Black Box’ of International Courts”. Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 39, forthcoming. Ewald, William. 1998. “The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to “Rats”. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 701–707. - 4 - European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). 2018. “Romania. Preliminary Opinion on Draft Amendments to Law no. 303/2004 on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors, Law no. 304/2004 on Judicial Organization, and Law no. 317/2004 on the Superior Council for Magistracy”. CDL-PI(2018)007, July 13, 2018. Available online at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2018)007-e. European Court of Human Rights. 2008. “Resolution on Judicial Ethics”. Available online at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Resolution_Judicial_Ethics_ENG.pdf. Faissner, Lea C. 2018. Die Gerichtsverwaltung der ordentlichen Gerichtsbarkeit in Frankreich und Deutschland: Ein Rechtsvergleich. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Ferejohn, John. 1999. “Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence”. Southern California Law Review, Vol. 72, pp. 353–384. Garapon, Antoine and Epineuse, Harold. 2012. “Judicial Independence in France”. In Anja Seibert-Fohr (ed.). Judicial Independence in Transition. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 273–305. Garoupa, Nuno and Ginsburg, Tom. 2009. “Guarding the Guardians: Judicial
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