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CHAPTER 4 Pride and Prejudice: Universal Monarchy Discourse and the Peace Negotiations of 1709–1710 David Onnekink In 1725, more than a decade after the Peace of Utrecht, the Frisian politician Sicco van Goslinga, now fifty-nine years old, spoke of ‘anti-French principles which after three wars had inspired all of the elder regents’.1 The wars against Louis XIV, which had commenced with the Year of Disaster in 1672 and which had lasted until the Peace of Utrecht, had marked a generation of politicians. Anti-French sentiments were deeply entrenched in the national consciousness and had not failed to leave their mark on policymakers. This in itself is no revelation. We know that ever since the late 1660s thou- sands of pamphlets had flooded the Dutch public with anti-French rhetoric, about French pride, deceit, ambition, arrogance, bad religion and corruption.2 All these qualities merged into a grand narrative about what has become known as Universal Monarchy. But historians have been less receptive to the fact that such notions also touched the attitude of diplomats and policymak- ers, even if the Dutch historian Johanna Stork-Penning, who wrote the authori- tive study on Dutch negotiations for peace during the War of the Spanish Succession, spoke of the ‘distrust of France which showed in all Dutch deci- sions’; she described it as a ‘substantial factor’ in the analysis.3 And yet, despite this observation, arguably the diplomatic history of this period has normally been studied through the lens of Realism, relying on intri- cate empirical analyses of day-to-day diplomatic manoeuvres and counter- manoeuvres—indeed the very method that Stork-Penning used and which has since then been faithfully followed by other historians studying the War of the Spanish Succession. In effect Dutch historians have all but ignored the impact of Universal Monarchy-discourse on the negotiations. Historians have been fully aware of the pervasiveness of the image of France as a Universal Monarchy, and have understandably located such discourses in such sources 1 Quoted in J.G. Stork-Penning, Het grote werk (Wolters: Groningen, 1958), 5n. 2 Donald Haks, Vaderland & Vrede (1672–1713). Publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in oor- log (Verloren: Hilversum, 2013), 8. 3 Stork-Penning, Het grote werk, 5. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004304789_006 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial-NonDerivative 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC 3.0) License. 70 Onnekink as pamphlets, satirical poems and songs,4 but have more or less ignored hard- core diplomatic and political sources such as memorials and correspondence. The overall purpose of this chapter is to attempt to bridge the methodologi- cal gap between cultural and diplomatic historians, to see whether Universal Monarchy discourse in fact pervaded all of these sources, in order to show how policymakers and diplomats did actually work within a wider cultural framework. Too often the compartments of popular culture and diplomacy are presumed to be strictly divided. I take my cue from recent developments in International Relations Theory, in particular from the Danish scholar Lene Hansen.5 In building up a case against Realism, she argues that foreign policy should not be explained by analysing a rational decision-making process but by understanding identity discourses, which are often steeped in popular culture. In her words, ‘Foreign policies need an account, or a story, of the problems and issue they are trying to address’.6 Such a story is built from a ‘basic discourse,’ a foundational story which is produced and reproduced in cultural and for- eign policy texts. Thus one could argue that cultural and political sources are connected through intertextuality.7 Hansen operates from the notion of Julia Kristeva that all texts are part of an intertextual web, and she differentiates between explicit textual connections (such as references to other literature) or implicit textual connections (such as comparable concepts or catchphrases like ‘clash of civilizations’).8 It is the second category of intertextual connec- tions I will be exploring in this chapter, focusing in particular on clusters of keywords and catchphrases. Hansen proposes an intertextual model in which discourses in various kinds of sources can be compared, in order to find out whether a specific discourse was prevalent.9 The purpose is to see whether a ‘basic discourse’ permeated both popular and political sources and thus to see how diplomats were in fact influenced by their cultural context. This also changes our notion on the nature of diplomatic negotiations. Whereas Realist historians assume that the language diplomats use was to describe reality, one could now argue that their language was self-referential, indeed shaped reality by means of the discourse employed. In the words of International Relations 4 E.g. Tony Claydon, ‘Protestantism, universal monarchy and Christendom in William’s war propaganda, 1689–1697,’ in Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International context, ed. E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007). 5 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 6 Hansen, Security as Practice, vi. 7 Hansen, Security as Practice, ch. 4. 8 Hansen, Security as Practice, 56–57. 9 Hansen, Security as Practice, 64. Universal Monarchy Discourse and the Negotiations 71 expert Ken Booth, ‘words shape as well as reflect reality,’ thus underscoring the performativity of diplomatic language.10 Such a method would help decom- partmentalize the study of international relations, which is now often studied in isolation by cultural, literary and diplomatic historians. Until now, such a method has not been specifically applied to early modern foreign policy. In order to test this contention I will conduct a short case study into the Franco-Dutch negotiations for peace in 1709 and 1710 and track the spread of Universal Monarchy discourse: the story Dutch politicians needed to address their concerns. It has normally been argued that the talks failed because of essential differences of opinion and a conflict of interest between the Dutch and the French as well as between the Allies themselves.11 I will investigate Dutch prejudices against French intentions that hampered the talks, in order to show how identity constructions formed the building blocks of foreign policy discourses and may have thus been more influential than rational differences of opinion. This will be done by a comparative analysis of the discourses used in three categories of sources: public news sources (the Europische Mercurius, a newsbook), official government sources (a resolution by the States General) and confidential political and diplomatic documents (a political memorial and a large number of diplomatic letters). These sources will be matched against a foundational text which generated the ‘basic discourse’ of Universal Monarchy in the first place, Petrus Valckenier’s Verwerd Europa ofte Polityke en Historische Beschrijving der waare Fundamenten en Oorzaken van de Oorlogen en Revolutiën in Europa, voornamentlijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden, sedert den jare 1664, gecauseert door de gepretenteerde universele Monarchie der Franschen . (1675) (Europe in turmoil, or the Political and Historical description of the true foun- dations and causes of the wars and revolutions in Europe . caused by the pre- tended Universal Monarchy of the French).12 The 1709–10 Peace Negotiations The Dutch negotiations for peace during the War of the Spanish Succession have been researched in detail.13 Between 1705 and 1710 a series of bilateral 10 Ken Booth, ‘Discussion: a reply to Wallace,’ Review of International Studies 23:3 (1997), 371–377, 374. 11 Stork-Penning, Het grote werk. 12 An updated version was published in 1688. 13 Stork-Penning, Het grote werk tracks the negotiations for peace between 1705 and 1710 in detail. See also A.J. Veenendaal, ‘The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe,’ in The New Cambridge Modern History VI, ed. J. Bromley (Cambridge: Cambridge University 72 Onnekink Franco-Dutch talks took place, which ultimately failed and opened the way for talks between the French and the English that would lead to the Peace of Utrecht. Wedged between their desire for peace, French ambition and conflicts of interests between the Allies, Dutch diplomats were left with very limited options and were ultimately unsuccessful in reaching a settlement. The talks in 1709 took place in several cities in the United Provinces, mainly Woerden near Utrecht, in utter secrecy between the French envoy Pierre Rouillé and the Dutch negotiators Willem Buys and Bruno van der Dussen, the pensionaries of Amsterdam and Gouda. The French were extremely anxious to conclude peace and started negotiating on the basis of turning over the whole of the Spanish inheritance to Archduke Charles, if the Allies were willing to provide Philip of Anjou with some compensation. In order to show his willingness, Louis XIV, reportedly crying in humiliation, decided to send his minister mar- quis de Torcy to The Hague in May 1709. Ultimately, however, the talks failed because the French were unwilling to ratify the preliminaries in June 1709, and war continued. In March 1710 the talks were resumed by the French diplomats marquis d’Huxelles and Melchior de Polignac and the Dutch negotiators Buys and Van der Dussen in the town of Geertruidenberg. Again the negotiations failed (in July) because of the insistence of the Dutch that Louis help the Allies to remove Philip from the Spanish throne, which he refused. The success of the negotiations hinged on whether Louis would be true to his word in persuading Philip of Anjou to vacate the Spanish throne. Ultimately, the Dutch believed he would not, and Louis refused to put troops at the disposal of the Allies to remove his grandson by force, as the agreement suggested.

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