DOCSLIB.ORG

Canadian Federalism, Abeyances, and Quebec Sovereignty

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Canadian Federalism, Abeyances, and Quebec Sovereignty Andrew McDougall A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Andrew McDougall 2016 Canadian Federalism, Abeyances and Quebec Sovereignty Andrew McDougall Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2016 Abstract This dissertation examines the changing patterns of intergovernmental relations among political elites toward sensitive constitutional issues implicated in the Quebec sovereignty movement, in particular after the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty-association. It extends David Thomas’ concept of constitutional “abeyances” to suggest that areas of constitutional ambiguity over which there are strong enough disagreements to lead to a national breakup can be successfully managed given enough political will. This depends on their being enough political actors who otherwise share a common interest in national unity willing to keep abeyances from escalating into a crisis. The exposure and politicization of such abeyances in the middle of the 20th century raised the salience of constitutional disagreements in Canada nearly to the point of national disintegration. The decline in the salience of these abeyances and the waning of support for sovereignty in Quebec since the last referendum has reduced this possibility substantially. Using a mixed method approach within an historical institutionalist framework, this dissertation argues that, along with other social forces, this is partially explicable in light of the fact actors such as the courts, federalist political leaders, and their parties have been willing to avoid discussing sensitive constitutional abeyances and leave them unresolved in the interests of avoiding a constitutional crisis. This has certainly not resulted in end of the sovereignty movement in Quebec, which remains very much alive. However, along with other political and ii social forces the willingness to keep deep constitutional disagreements camouflaged has permitted Canadian federalism to regain a measure of stability. iii Acknowledgments It goes without saying that this project was only made possible through the energy, dedication, and commitment of a remarkable team of academic supervisors. Grace Skogstad, David Cameron, Graham White, Robert Schertzer and Michael Keating are the people who deserve most of the credit for helping me bring it to completion. While the world knows many disaffected graduate students, I am not one of them, and they are the reason. More than anyone else, it was through their organization and encouragement that this project reached a conclusion. Along the way, Profs. Christopher Cochrane, Linda White, Rod Haddow, Ran Hirschl, Peter Loewen, Peter Russell, and Robert Vipond all stand out in particular for their help throughout the program. Furthermore, a note of recognition must go to Prof. Richard Simeon, who unfortunately passed away while I was writing this but whose work had a strong impact on me and the dissertation. Collectively, one would be hard pressed to find a better group of people under whom to study political science. Writing this dissertation was a joy, and they made it so. I would also like to acknowledge my fellow students at the Department of Political Science. A truly fine group of people, including: Matt Lesch, Evan Rosevear, Heather Millar, Lincoln Rathnam, Lindsay Mahon, Paul Thomas, Adrienne Davidson, Stefan Ferraro, Hamish van der Ven, Abe Singer, Noaman Ali, Anthony Sealey, Mathieu Mondou, Jessica Soedirgo, Jerry Sabin, Carey Doberstein, Anne Staver, Mauricio Suchowlansky, Marie Gagné, Sarah Zendel, Craig Smith, Kiran Banerjee, Marion Laurence, Zain Asaf, P.O. Bonin, Troy Lundblad, Mike Mordon, Jean Lachapelle, Luke Melchiorre and many others. Alexandre Paquin-Pelletier and Gabriel Arsenault were both truly vital for the insights and assistance they offered me on Quebec society, and helped so much in matters of cultural translation and perspective. And special mention to my buddy Abe Nasirzadeh, a trusted and a wonderful friend who was an unfailing source of encouragement and positivity. But for him my experience over the last few years would have been greatly diminished. Outside of the Department my parents John and Rowena McDougall and my siblings Kelly, David, and his wife Sundeep Virdi were always there for me, as they always have been. My friends Graham Scott, Mike Clark, Carol Kim, Adam Wakefield, Cathy Butler, Tiff Ing, Evan Schiller, Vanessa Scott, Noam Lior, Devin Glowinski, and Kfir Gluzberg were also constant companions through thick and thin. And of course to my partner, Jonathan McKay. Jon, I guess iv once one has already dedicated so much of one’s life to someone else, the only way to top it is to dedicate one’s book. So here it is. But when it comes to you, if I don’t stop myself now, I never will. All I want to say is thank you. v Table of Contents Contents Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. x List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi List of Appendices ........................................................................................................................ xii Chapter 1 Puzzle, Methodological Approach and Concepts ......................................................... 1 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 The context and the puzzle ................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Explanations for the decline of the sovereignty movement in Quebec .............................. 2 Research design and methodology ........................................................................................... 11 Historical institutionalism ................................................................................................. 14 Definitions ......................................................................................................................... 16 Chapter 2 The Abeyance Concept ................................................................................................ 21 2 Abeyances ................................................................................................................................ 21 2.1 Abeyances ......................................................................................................................... 21 2.1.1 Definition and origins of abeyances ..................................................................... 21 2.1.2 Why do abeyances become politicized? ............................................................... 24 2.1.3 Converting abeyances into taboos ........................................................................ 27 2.1.4 Abeyances as distinct from constitutional conventions, omissions, ambiguities, fictions and myths ............................................................................ 28 2.1.5 Abeyances and the crisis of Canadian federalism ................................................. 31 2.2 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 54 Chapter 3 Abeyances Collapse: 1960-80 ...................................................................................... 55 vi 3 Social evolution and politicization of abeyances ..................................................................... 55 3.1 Abeyances and sovereignty support .................................................................................. 57 3.2 Constitutional political strategies of Quebec political parties 1960-80 ............................ 59 3.2.1 The Union Nationale ............................................................................................. 60 3.2.2 The Quebec Liberal Party ..................................................................................... 69 3.2.3 The Parti Québécois .............................................................................................. 74 3.3 Federal Liberal strategy of Pierre Trudeau ....................................................................... 79 3.4 Growth of the IGR framework and Summit IGR ............................................................. 85 3.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 96 Chapter 4 Abeyances Exposed: The Constitutional Crisis1980-1993 .......................................... 98 4 Constitutional reform as political opportunity ......................................................................... 98 4.1 Abeyances and sovereignty support .................................................................................. 99 4.1.1 Federal and provincial Liberal commitment to “renewed federalism” ............... 105 4.1.2 PQ shift into constitutional discussions .............................................................
Recommended publications
  • Understanding Stephen Harper

    Understanding Stephen Harper

    HARPER Edited by Teresa Healy www.policyalternatives.ca Photo: Hanson/THE Tom CANADIAN PRESS Understanding Stephen Harper The long view Steve Patten CANAdIANs Need to understand the political and ideological tem- perament of politicians like Stephen Harper — men and women who aspire to political leadership. While we can gain important insights by reviewing the Harper gov- ernment’s policies and record since the 2006 election, it is also essential that we step back and take a longer view, considering Stephen Harper’s two decades of political involvement prior to winning the country’s highest political office. What does Harper’s long record of engagement in conservative politics tell us about his political character? This chapter is organized around a series of questions about Stephen Harper’s political and ideological character. Is he really, as his support- ers claim, “the smartest guy in the room”? To what extent is he a con- servative ideologue versus being a political pragmatist? What type of conservatism does he embrace? What does the company he keeps tell us about his political character? I will argue that Stephen Harper is an economic conservative whose early political motivations were deeply ideological. While his keen sense of strategic pragmatism has allowed him to make peace with both conservative populism and the tradition- alism of social conservatism, he continues to marginalize red toryism within the Canadian conservative family. He surrounds himself with Governance 25 like-minded conservatives and retains a long-held desire to transform Canada in his conservative image. The smartest guy in the room, or the most strategic? When Stephen Harper first came to the attention of political observers, it was as one of the leading “thinkers” behind the fledgling Reform Party of Canada.
  • Nopa,Μ~E.: Sorqali:~

    Nopa,Μ~E.: Sorqali:~

    Complimentary b i Fall 1 A Election coverage interviews with Audrey Mclaughlin Sheila Copps . ~. All-p~rty coverage of; Employm·ent Debt_ ·Healthcare refgrf::p·olicy En vi roJ1m:e1tt NAFTA Violen.ee: ' Abori.ginal Self Gov$rn·ment Social Pr9gr~ms Childcare Culture Humart Rights Agric·ullure Fisheri>es Abortion New Rl~p:ro· Also in thls Technologies::· issue:· .lmmigt.J:ltign .·ME!nopa,µ~e.: Sorqali:~. ··>·victory for:. Rape•·,crtslt· ·c··•· •.·.··.··•k··.·c· w·· e!n·tres .. u·c Uu' page 2 Fa/11993 Editor: Joan Riggs Womenspeak Managing Editor: Caitlin McMorran-Frost Editing and production staff: Catherine Browning, Saira Fitzgerald, Valerie Mclennon, Michelle Simms, Lynne Tyler, Viviane Weitzner. Dear Woman/st leadership of the Conservative Who helped with this issue: Lucy Chapman, Lyse party to make a difference. Blanchard, Noelle-Domenique Willems, Michelle Lemay, Laura Kim Campbell's clinching of Defence minister Campbell's McFarlane, Joanne Steven, Donna Truesdale. Alex Keir, Jane From Inside Out the Tory crown is not a victory new policy of zero incidence Vock, and Anne, Leah, Daniel, & Matthew Haynes. by Patricia Ellen for women in Canada. I do not has not changed anything for Cresswell agree that Campbell's win will victims of harassment and Special thanks to the people who have financially give women more courage to discrimination who have assisted us with this issue: Roberta Hill, Lil & Tim Tyler, have high expectations. grievances with the Canadian Campbell's win will not help Barbara Chapman, Lucy Chapman, Claire Fellows, Lucy Dear Womanist: Armed Forces. Fellows, Ted Riggs. women and girls to realize they I joined the (RCAF) Canadian can be winners too, in any field.
  • The 2006 Federal Liberal and Alberta Conservative Leadership Campaigns

    The 2006 Federal Liberal and Alberta Conservative Leadership Campaigns

    Choice or Consensus?: The 2006 Federal Liberal and Alberta Conservative Leadership Campaigns Jared J. Wesley PhD Candidate Department of Political Science University of Calgary Paper for Presentation at: The Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, Saskatchewan May 30, 2007 Comments welcome. Please do not cite without permission. CHOICE OR CONSENSUS?: THE 2006 FEDERAL LIBERAL AND ALBERTA CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP CAMPAIGNS INTRODUCTION Two of Canada’s most prominent political dynasties experienced power-shifts on the same weekend in December 2006. The Liberal Party of Canada and the Progressive Conservative Party of Alberta undertook leadership campaigns, which, while different in context, process and substance, produced remarkably similar outcomes. In both instances, so-called ‘dark-horse’ candidates emerged victorious, with Stéphane Dion and Ed Stelmach defeating frontrunners like Michael Ignatieff, Bob Rae, Jim Dinning, and Ted Morton. During the campaigns and since, Dion and Stelmach have been labeled as less charismatic than either their predecessors or their opponents, and both of the new leaders have drawn skepticism for their ability to win the next general election.1 This pair of surprising results raises interesting questions about the nature of leadership selection in Canada. Considering that each race was run in an entirely different context, and under an entirely different set of rules, which common factors may have contributed to the similar outcomes? The following study offers a partial answer. In analyzing the platforms of the major contenders in each campaign, the analysis suggests that candidates’ strategies played a significant role in determining the results. Whereas leading contenders opted to pursue direct confrontation over specific policy issues, Dion and Stelmach appeared to benefit by avoiding such conflict.
  • Inuit and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement: Supporting Canada's

    Inuit and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement: Supporting Canada's

    INUIT AND THE NUNAVUT LAND CLAIMS AGREEMENT: SUPPORTING CANADA’S ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY Terry Fenge Although the ice-strengthened navy patrol vessels to be deployed from Ikpiarjuk on Baffin Island are an important component of Canada's Arctic sovereignty strategy, there is more than one way to skin a cat, says Terry Fenge, formerly with the Inuit Circumpolar Conference Canada. The federal government should involve the Inuit in Canada's Arctic sovereignty, as supported by provisions in the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement dealing with monitoring and offshore management, he says. Yet, these have not been implemented, and Ottawa seems to have forfeited the opportunity to use them to shore up sovereignty. “[E]ngaging the region’s Inuit with a view to jointly ensuring that the obligations, duties, and objectives of the Nunavut, Inuvialuit, Nunavik and Nunatsiavut Land Claims Agreement are fulfilled,” he says, is key to the Integrated Northern Strategy, promised in the recent Throne Speech. Parmi les éléments clés de la souveraineté du Canada dans l’Arctique figure le déploiement dans cette région de navires à coque renforcée. Mais il y a plus d’une façon de parvenir à ses fins, estime Terry Fenge, ex-directeur de la recherche du Conseil circumpolaire inuit du Canada. Le gouvernement fédéral devrait ainsi intégrer les Inuits à la défense de notre souveraineté dans l’Arctique, d’autant plus que les dispositions touchant la surveillance et la gestion en mer de l’Accord sur les revendications territoriales du Nunavut de 1993 donnent corps à nos prétentions. Mais ces clauses n’ont toujours pas été mises en application, et Ottawa semble avoir renoncé à les utiliser à des fins d’affirmation de sa souveraineté.
  • Economic Consequences of Constitutional Uncertainty: Evidence

    Economic Consequences of Constitutional Uncertainty: Evidence

    SCOTLAND’s ECONOMIC FUTURE POST-2014 SUBMISSION FROM PROFESSOR AILSA HENDERSON, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH Summary This paper relates primarily to economic reactions to the 1995 referendum on sovereignty partnership in Quebec. The following occurred in 1995: the performance of Quebec-based firms on Montreal and Toronto Stock Exchanges decreased, bond market ratings decreased, the cost of government borrowing increased, and exchange rates suffered. Inflation, however, did not move throughout the ‘period of uncertainty’, which was thought to be a reward for anti-inflation policies pursued by the Bank of Canada. Background Quebec is a province within Canada whose government has jurisdiction over education, health, welfare, municipalities and transportation. With a population of just over eight million, 78% of whom have French as their mother tongue, it has 125 members in its National Assembly. Since the late 1960s there have been two main political parties in Quebec, the independence-seeking Parti Québécois and the federalist Liberal Party of Quebec. At times smaller third parties have had sizeable representation in the legislature. The Parti Québécois was created in 1968 and won its first election as a majority government in 1976, during which it called a referendum on sovereignty association in 1980. It lost the referendum (60% No, 40% Yes) but was re-elected with a majority government in 1981. It was elected again in 1994 and called a referendum on sovereignty partnership in 1995. It lost the referendum (50.6% No, 49.4% Yes) but was re-elected with a majority government in 1998. The PQ formed a minority government in 2012, called an election for 2014 but lost to the Liberal party.
  • The Meaning of Canadian Federalism in Québec: Critical Reflections

    The Meaning of Canadian Federalism in Québec: Critical Reflections

    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Revistes Catalanes amb Accés Obert The Meaning of Canadian federalisM in QuébeC: CriTiCal refleCTions guy laforest Professor of Political Science at the Laval University, Québec SUMMARY: 1. Introdution. – 2. Interpretive context. – 3. Contemporary trends and scholarship, critical reflections. – Conclusion. – Bibliography. – Abstract-Resum-Re- sumen. 1. Introduction As a teacher, in my instructions to students as they prepare their term papers, I often remind them that they should never abdicate their judgment to the authority of one single source. In the worst of circum- stances, it is much better to articulate one’s own ideas and convictions than to surrender to one single book or article. In the same spirit, I would urge readers not to rely solely on my pronouncements about the meaning of federalism in Québec. In truth, the title of this essay should include a question mark, and its content will illustrate, I hope, the richness and diversity of current Québec thinking on the subject. There are many ways as well to approach the topic at hand. The path I shall choose will reflect my academic identity: I am a political theorist and an intellectual historian, keenly interested about the relationship between philosophy and constitutional law in Canada, hidden in a political science department. As a reader of Gadamer and a former student of Charles Taylor, I shall start with some interpretive or herme- neutical precautions. Beyond the undeniable relevance of current re- flections about the theory of federalism in its most general aspects, the real question of this essay deals with the contemporary meaning of Canadian federalism in Québec.
  • Calgary Declaration Page 2 Freedom Flyer 33 June? 1998 Eec£6Ac We Get Fetters

    Calgary Declaration Page 2 Freedom Flyer 33 June? 1998 Eec£6Ac We Get Fetters

    THE OFFICIAL NEWSLETTER OF THE FREEDOM PARTY OF ONTARIO JUNE 1998 #33 Calgary Declaration Page 2 Freedom Flyer 33 June? 1998 eeC£6ac We get fetters ... Instead of bringing you our regular 'Openers' column this issue (which will return next issue), we thought we'd use this opportunity to let our readers do some of the talking, and to introduce you to a new regular feature of Freedom Flyer: Feedback. By no means exhaustive, the following selection of letters and e-mail represents a broad sampling of correspondence received by Freedom Pa~during the period January 1997 to May 1998. While many of these letters have already been personally responded to, others have not. Editorial responses, as they appear here, may be entirely new and/or edited versions of our original personal responses. To the greatest degree possible, original letters to Freedom Pa~ are left unedited, though there are exceptions with regard to length, structure and grammar (the latter applying particularly to e-mail and Usenet (news groups) correspondence). As always, we'd like to hear from you. Your comments, criticisms, suggestions, and occasional compliments are always welcomed. To contact Freedom Party, write: Box 2214, London, Ontario N6A 4E3, or fax us at (519) 681 -2857, or e-mail us at "feedback@freedomparty org". OJ NO DONATION up on freedom. To simply ignore the disastr· the text of Joe Armstrong's first-class ous consequences of drug prohibition and the speech to Kingston's Canadian Club. It's a Too bad you folks are still hung up on effect that such laws have on individual free· clarion call which, unfortunately, will not drugs! No donation.
  • The 1992 Charlottetown Accord & Referendum

    The 1992 Charlottetown Accord & Referendum

    CANADA’S 1992 CHARLOTTETOWN CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD: TESTING THE LIMITS OF ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM By Michael d. Behiels Department of History University of Ottawa Abstract.-Canada‘s 1992 Charlottetown Constitutional Accord represented a dramatic attempt to transform the Canadian federation which is based on formal symmetry, albeit with a limited recognition of some asymmetry, into an asymmetrical federal constitution recognizing Canada‘s three nations, French, British, and Aboriginal. Canadians were called up to embrace multinational federalism, one comprising both stateless and state-based nations exercising self-governance in a multilayered, highly asymmetrical federal system. This paper explores why a majority of Canadians, for a wide variety of very complex reasons, opted in the first-ever constitutional referendum in October 1992 to retain their existing federal system. This paper argues that the rejection of a formalized asymmetrical federation based on the theory of multinational federalism, while contributing to the severe political crisis that fueled the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession, marked the moment when Canadians finally became a fully sovereign people. Palacio de la Aljafería – Calle de los Diputados, s/n– 50004 ZARAGOZA Teléfono 976 28 97 15 - Fax 976 28 96 65 [email protected] INTRODUCTION The Charlottetown Consensus Report, rejected in a landmark constitutional referendum on 26 October 1992, entailed a profound clash between competing models of federalism: symmetrical versus asymmetrical, and bi-national versus multinational. (Cook, 1994, Appendix, 225-249) The Meech Lake Constitutional Accord, 1987-90, pitted two conceptions of a bi-national -- French-Canada and English Canada – federalism against one another. The established conception entailing a pan-Canadian French-English duality was challenged and overtaken by a territorial Quebec/Canada conception of duality.
  • Federal Spending Power: Practices, Principles, Perspectives

    Federal Spending Power: Practices, Principles, Perspectives

    Reflections on the Federal Spending Power: Practices, Principles, Perspectives Thomas J. Courchene IRPP Working Paper Series no. 2008-01 1470 Peel Suite 200 Montréal Québec H3A 1T1 514.985.2461 514.985.2559 fax www.irpp.org Reflections on the Federal Spending Power: Practices, Principles, Perspectives * Thomas J. Courchene ** I: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW1 The federal spending power (FSP) has returned to centre stage in public policy debates, in large part due to Stephen Harper’s call for “open federalism” replete with a commitment to respect the constitutional division of powers on the one hand and the subsequent Parliamentary proclamation that “the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada” on the other. Watts (1999,1) defines the spending power as “the power of Parliament to make payments to people, institutions or provincial governments for purposes on which Parliament does not necessarily have the power to legislate, for example, in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.” However, for the purposes of this paper the exercise of the federal spending power will be viewed more broadly and will encompass areas like federal regulation that can also affect the division of powers. In any event, the key issue here is that for Prime Minister Harper’s commitment to respect the constitutional division of powers to be credible it follows that the exercise of the federal spending power in selected areas must somehow be circumscribed. Not surprisingly, therefore, the October 2007 Speech from the Throne contained the following undertaking with respect to the narrower conception of the spending power: ...guided by our federalism of openness, our Government will introduce legislation to place formal limits on the use of the federal spending power for new shared-cost programs in areas of exclusive * This paper was prepared for the January 2008 symposium “Open Federalism and the Spending Power,” sponsored by Queen’s Law School and Queen’s Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.
  • Canadian Federalism and the Autonomy of Québec : a Historical Viewpoint

    Canadian Federalism and the Autonomy of Québec : a Historical Viewpoint

    The Library The Canadian federation Canadian federalism and the autonomy of Québec : A historical viewpoint: by Marc Chevrier Direction des communications Ministère des Relations internationales 1996 The author of this study proposes an interpretation of Québec's constitutional history and an overview of its key demands for reform. Table of contents Introduction A. The autonomy of a minority people in a unitary federation 1. A precarious autonomy from the conquest of 1760 to the creation of Canada in 1867 2. The creation of Canada in 1867: a quasi-federation sealing in Québec’s view a pact between two founding peoples B. Québec’s demands: forging a Québec national government to meet the needs of an open, pluralistic and modern society 1 The common denominator of demands since 1960 2. Critical moments in constitutional reform from 1960 to 1982 3. The unilateral repatriation of 1982: loss of status and jurisdictions for Québec a. Content of the 1982 reform b. A loss of status and jurisdictions for Québec c. The 1982 reform ran counter to two basic principles of political legitimacy in a federation: consent and continuity 4. After 1982: a diminished Québec seeking fair compensation a. A first attempt at compensation: the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 b. A second attempt: the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 C. The political situation of Québec following the October 30, 1995 referendum Notes Introduction The referendum of October 30, 1995 suddenly revealed to the world a federation in crisis and a people over seven million strong that nearly chose sovereignty. The close outcome of the vote surprised many foreign observers who, after the failure of the May 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association, had not expected such a strong revival of national feeling in Québec.
  • Table of Contents

    Table of Contents

    Table of Contents BOUCHARD QUITS: ABLOW FOR SOVEREIGNTY? Introduction ..........................................................................................................5 A Coup de théâtre ..................................................................................................7 For the Record........................................................................................................8 The Significance of Being Bouchard ......................................................................9 Et je dirais même plus ..........................................................................................11 Maître chez lui......................................................................................................12 Heir Apparent? ....................................................................................................16 Discussion, Research, and Essay Questions ..........................................................17 BOUCHARD QUITS: A BLOW FOR SOVEREIGNTY? Introduction Canada was less than two weeks into the new as a remarkable political leader. They com- year of 2001 when the nation’s political mended Bouchard for his intelligence, scene was rocked by an unanticipated devel- dynamism, and considerable talents in opment; Lucien Bouchard, the premier of governing Quebec. During his tenure as Quebec, announced that he was resigning premier, he brought the province’s balloon- and leaving public life. The man who had ing government deficits under control, played a key role in federal and provincial
  • Canadian Sovereignty: Climate Change and Politics in the Arctic

    Canadian Sovereignty: Climate Change and Politics in the Arctic

    ARCTIC VOL. 59, NO. 2 (JUNE 2006) P. iii– iv Canadian Sovereignty: Climate Change and Politics in the Arctic The Canadian Arctic Archipelago, as a defining landscape of the Canadian persona, quickly becomes a flash point when international politics are at issue. The effects of climate change on the archipelago are no exception to this rule. The Canadian Arctic as a whole is experiencing a warming trend as a result of climate change. The political interest of this trend lies in what Canada could lose if the ice of the archipelago disappears. Canada has met some opposition to its historical claim over the land, water, and ice of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, particularly over the Northwest Passage and mostly from the United States. The debate surrounding Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is not new, but as a result of climate change and the consequent warming of the Canadian Arctic, it has gained new vigor. This debate typically centers on three primary components: melting Canadian Arctic ice, increased international shipping via the Northwest Passage as ice cover decreases, and the threat to Canadian sovereignty implied by increased international shipping. A sense of alarm over melting Arctic ice tends to cloud the real issues affecting the archipelago, leaving society under the impression that sovereignty is indeed in danger. Warming does indeed imply the melting of ice (in general), but melting ice does not mean no ice, nor does it mean increased shipping. Often those who predict an ice- reduced or ice-free Northwest Passage tend to oversimplify the nature of the ice regimes in the archipelago, thus exaggerating the potential for increased shipping and the implied threat to Canadian sovereignty.