Review of Parliamentary Administrative and Statutory Framework

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Review of parliamentary administrative and statutory framework

Report on the Speaker’s visit to Australian Parliaments, March 2007

Forty-eighth Parliament June 2007

Presented to the House of Representatives

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Contents

Purpose 3 Australian experience 4 New South Wales 4 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 5 Victorian Parliament 5 Governance and administrative options for consideration 6 Determining members’ entitlements—the case for an independent body 6 Administering members’ entitlements—the case for a dedicated service 6 Management of entitlements—a member and party responsibility 7 Independent secretariat service for independent determining body 7 Definition of “parliamentary purpose” 8 Accountability for entitlements—a member and party leader responsibility 8 Alternative accountability regime 9 Separate Vote for members’ services 9 Determining members’ entitlements—role of members’ advisory body 10 Parliamentary consideration of determinations—role of Regulations Review Committee 10 Application of official information principles 10 Governance and management of parliamentary services 11 Management of the delivery of parliamentary services—the case for a CEO’s Office 11 Serjeant-at-Arms—responsibility for Chamber support services 12 Conclusion 13

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Review of parliamentary administrative and statutory framework—Report on the Speaker’s visit to Australian Parliaments, March 2007

Purpose On 12 October 2006 the Controller and Auditor-General reported to the House on Advertising expenditure incurred by the Parliamentary service in the three months before the 2005 General Election1 and directed me, as responsible Minister, pursuant to section 65Z of the Public Finance Act 1989, to report to the House in relation to the expenditure incurred in the 2005-06 financial year under Vote Parliamentary Service, which the Controller and Auditor- General had determined to be outside the scope of the relevant appropriations. More specifically as responsible minister, I was required to report on: • the nature and extent of any alleged breach of the appropriation that the Controller and Auditor-General had reason to believe had occurred • the events that gave rise to the alleged breach • the remedial action taken or proposed to be taken to correct the breach and prevent its recurrence. Accordingly I reported to the House on 12 October 2006.2 In my report I proposed a number of remedial actions, including review of the administrative and statutory framework. In this regard I visited the Australian Parliament and the State Parliaments of New South Wales and Victoria during the first week of March 2007. I am grateful for the opportunity to do so, provided by the Parliament of Australia hosting me as a guest of the Parliament. This report looks at the options for the governance of parliamentary services and the management of their delivery. I have provided the report to the Parliamentary Service Commission, the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the General Manager of the Parliamentary Service, for consideration. I am now reporting to the House to inform members of my views on the responsible governance, management and delivery of parliamentary services. My visit confirmed that the management and administration of members’ entitlements is a difficult question that vexes all parliaments from time to time. At the very time I visited Australia, issues were being raised in the media about Federal members’ use of their printing allowances. Parliaments have adopted different approaches. I had the opportunity to talk to presiding officers and parliamentary staff about these approaches and in this report attempt to set out options from these discussions that may usefully be considered for the New Zealand parliamentary environment.

1 Report of Controller and Auditor-General Advertising expenditure incurred by the Parliamentary Service in the three months before the 2005 General election, B.29[06c]. 2 Report of the responsible Minister for Vote Parliamentary Service pursuant to a direction of the Controller and Auditor- General issued under section 65Z of the Public Finance Act 1989, A.15.

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Australian experience

New South Wales The New South Wales Parliament has an independent Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal (PRT) that sets additional (non-salary) entitlements for members. Basic salaries are set by statute3 by reference to the salaries established for ordinary members of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives. The Tribunal consists of a judicial member or retired judicial member of the Industrial Relations Commission appointed by the President of the Commission. The Tribunal makes binding determinations akin to regulations, but which are not subject to disallowance. The Tribunal has set out general parameters that guide the Tribunal and members in the determination and use of entitlements. The presiding officers establish guidelines for the administration of the entitlements, by way of a Members’ Handbook, and are able to refer matters to the Tribunal for rulings. Such rulings may not be challenged in the Courts. The Tribunal’s determinations are required to be certified by the Secretary of the Treasury as to their fiscal impact. In practice this places an obligation on the Tribunal not to publish a determination until it has been certified. The two Clerks’ Offices administer the entitlements for members of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council. The very considerable experience of the Clerks has meant that members generally accept their administrative decisions and few matters have to be referred to the presiding officers. Oversight of expenditure on and the administration of members’ entitlements is undertaken by the Audit Office and through examination by estimates committees. There is no real concept of ministerial responsibility or accountability. The Tribunal is responsible for the broad policy and the determining of entitlements. The presiding officers are required to make guidelines and delegate to the Clerks the exercise of discretion in administering the entitlements. The ultimate discipline on members is that of the Members’ Code of Conduct and possible investigation by the Privileges Committee and that they may be investigated by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) if issues are raised about the use of their entitlements. If this is found to be outside the rules, a criminal prosecution may be initiated. An independent tribunal setting members’ salaries, allowances and entitlements has the advantage of removing such decisions from members themselves. However, in New South Wales, the presiding officers, who are themselves beneficiaries of the entitlements, still have a role to play in the administrative system. The system is not fully at arm’s length from members. The PRT is not responsible for the administration of the system, nor is it formally accountable for the expenditure. It was revealed to me that the administration of the system of members’ entitlement is a major distraction for the Clerks from their core function and can lead to them coming into unnecessary conflict with members as they seek to ensure as far as possible presiding officers are protected from decision-making in individual members’ cases. The system works because of the experience the Clerks bring to the exercise. They are able to make the necessary politically attuned judgments and have proven ability to operate in a non-partisan manner, thus retaining the necessary respect of the members in decision making. However, in a national Parliament with a House that meets far more frequently, there is considerable risk of compromising the role of the Clerk in such a way.

3 Parliamentary Remuneration Act 1989

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Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia In Canberra, members’ entitlements are administered by the Department of Finance and Administration, a government department. The Minister for State is responsible for the department and accountable in the House. A well-resourced system exists for determining entitlement policy and administering the entitlements. Client managers are allocated for each State and they develop relationships with members to assist them with the administration of their entitlements. These include travel, accommodation, printing and electorate allowances. A comprehensive record of inquiries and precedents is maintained in the form of a database to ensure decision-making is, as far as possible, consistent. Administration by a government department is an historical arrangement that developed out of concern about the closeness of members to the determination and administration of their allowances when these functions resided in the parliamentary organisations. Offices and the necessary infrastructure in Parliament House, Canberra, are provided by the Department of Parliamentary Services. This results in some confusion about ICT resources for members—what is available and from whom. Concern was also expressed about the level at which the entitlements are set under Government control and the cost of administering them. While consideration has been given to bulk funding members, the size of the annual bulk entitlement (estimated at $1 million per member per annum) is such that it is believed that this approach would be publicly unacceptable. Concerns were also raised about how a bulk funding system would accommodate different electorate sizes, marginal as opposed to safe seats and members who depart early. I do not believe that members would find it acceptable to have their allowances determined and administered by a government department. However, the systems developed by the Department of Finance and Administration are useful in examining how a system of entitlements should be managed. In addition, the confusion over the provision of ICT services is not helpful to members. The General Manager of the Parliamentary Services was of the view that ultimately the administration of members’ entitlements might be returned to a parliamentary department, thus overcoming this issue. Being administered by a government department, the administration of members’ entitlements is subject to freedom of information legislation. All members’ returns may be disclosed under the legislation, providing a means of public accountability not available in most other parliaments whose administrative systems are not generally subject to freedom of information legislation.

Victorian Parliament The Victorian Parliament has recently restructured its parliamentary departments, reducing the number from five to three: the Office of the Clerk of the Legislative Council, the Office of the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly and the Parliamentary Services. Members’ salaries, allowances and entitlements are established in primary legislation and regulations. They are administered by the Parliamentary Services. The parliamentary departments have their own appropriation Act and are not subject to the Finance and Administration Act, the equivalent of our Public Finance Act. However, as a matter of good practice the three departments have voluntarily adopted the reporting practices of the Act. The President and the Speaker are responsible for the departments and the administration of entitlements. In practice, decisions are based on precedent established in guidelines with the presiding officers making decisions only on generic or new policy issues. The Parliamentary Services have adopted proactive practices in administering entitlements. The number of entitlements has been reduced and members receive bulk entitlements for their

5 A.16 REVIEW OF PARLIAMENTARY ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK electorate offices. These are proactively managed with the Parliamentary Services providing regular budget reports and guidance about financial management. Staff in the Parliamentary Services have been encouraged to understand the parliamentary environment in which members operate and to provide advice to members that is politically sustainable. The Clerks’ Offices are led by the two Clerks and the Parliamentary Services by a General Manager. A triumvirate has been formed—the Parliamentary Executive Group (PEG)—to manage the total requirements of the two Houses and their members. The PEG reports to both the presiding officers and ensures the co-ordination and integration of service delivery. This encourages an informed approach to service delivery through all three departments. A Joint House Committee and other ad hoc committees of members, chaired by the presiding officers, still operate to provide members with a voice in parliamentary administration, but they have only an advisory role.

Governance and administrative options for consideration Here, from my observations, I set out options for parliamentary governance and administration. I do not develop a whole new schema, but rather I address a number of key issues that will require detailed consideration. Any new structure will involve consideration of legislative changes as well as organisational and cultural change. There may also be implications for the procedures of the House. Because of the importance of proper accountability, I have attempted to address the impact of some matters on the House’s own procedures.

Determining members’ entitlements—the case for an independent body In 2000, the Parliamentary Service Act 2000 and the Civil List Act 1979 were amended to provide for members’ salaries and allowances to be determined by the Remuneration Authority, but the determination of members’ (non-salary) entitlements was retained with the Speaker, on the advice of the Parliamentary Service Commission. An independent body that determines members’ salaries, allowances and other entitlements allows members and presiding officers to stand aside completely from the determination process. It provides a way, in the modern world, to address the need to be transparent about the application of public funding. However, the use of independent bodies to determine members’ entitlements has not been universally accepted because of the long-held right of Houses to regulate and manage their own internal processes. An independent body could also remove the Speaker from responsibility for deciding entitlement disputes on a case-by-case basis. Involvement in such disputes with individual members and parties can easily bring the Speaker’s impartiality into question and undermine the Speaker’s authority in the House.

Administering members’ entitlements—the case for a dedicated service An independent body charged with determining members’ salaries, allowances and entitlements might also take responsibility for an administering body—a members’ services organisation charged with administering members’ entitlements and the services provided to them for parliamentary purposes, both within the parliamentary complex and in their electorates or for electorate activities. Such an organisation would be responsible for developing entitlements policy, administering the entitlements and reporting on them. A dedicated administering organisation would allow experience to be built up along with the recording and retention of precedents giving members greater confidence in the administration of their entitlements. Members are more likely to accept the advice of

6 REVIEW OF PARLIAMENTARY ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK A.16 experienced staff, with a culture of excellent service, who are able to make consistent judgments. Advice and support provided by a members’ services organisation may include: • provision of guidelines for expenditure on entitlements • advice on expenditure on entitlements and services • budgeting systems, including regular reporting and monitoring • accounts payable and payroll systems • HR advice and recruitment services • ICT applications advice • centralised purchasing • accommodation services/contracting advice • security and health and safety advice • travel services • regular reporting to an independent determining body. While payroll and accounts payable functions may be contracted out, the Australian experience was that members’ entitlements were most successfully administered where staff had experience, a strong customer focus and good systems for recording enquiries and precedents, allowing consistent decision-making. Regular budget monitoring reports and budget management advice for members were also important. A proactive approach allowed members to manage their entitlement budgets successfully, anticipate problems and take advice rather than simply reacting to problems after the event. A members’ services organisation would also be responsible for developing any necessary guidelines for members’ entitlements for approval by the independent determining body. Experience in Australia has shown the need for detailed guidance for members in managing their entitlements. What is required is clear responsibility for the promulgating of any such guidelines and clarity about their status. An independent body would be responsible for the rules, but might delegate to officials within a members’ services organisation certain administrative decision-making powers.

Management of entitlements—a member and party responsibility While members’ entitlements might be determined by an independent body, members and parties should ultimately be responsible for managing and accounting for their entitlements. An administering organisation may provide advice and support, but the responsibility for expenditure should lie with the members and their parties. This may require legislative change to make the authority of members and parties to incur expenditure explicit. While bulk funding of members’ services has not been fully implemented in Australia, there is a certain logic to such an approach where members themselves have the authority to incur expenditure and are required to account in a highly transparent fashion. Further consideration needs to be given to bulk funding, particularly in terms of how it would work for different parties and list and electorate members.

Independent secretariat service for independent determining body Finally, an independent determining body should have its own secretariat to provide a degree of separation between it and the administering organisation. The secretariat could be

7 A.16 REVIEW OF PARLIAMENTARY ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK provided by the Clerk’s Office, which provides secretariat services to the House and its committees. Its role as Parliament’s secretariat could be seen more widely. The secretariat would be responsible for supporting the chair of the body, arranging the body’s meetings and ensuring it received the required advice and reports from the administering organisation. The secretariat would also be responsible for compiling any reports to the House from the determining body.

Definition of “parliamentary purpose” A definition of “parliamentary purpose” has posed difficulties for Australian parliamentary administrations. Definitions have been adopted, but over time have required considerable further guidance to be developed on an ongoing basis. Clarity is required about the authority to develop guidelines and their status. Is authority delegated to presiding officers, clerks, general managers or retained by the body that makes the determination? In New South Wales “parliamentary duties” are defined in statute.4 In Victoria members are accountable and must certify that usage is within the entitlement and that funds have been used for parliamentary or electorate purposes. There appears to be a clear acceptance that members’ parliamentary activities can contribute to their success at the ballot box and that the approach of the Auditor-General to exclude anything that is “tainted”5 with an electioneering purpose is simply to ignore the reality of politics in a modern democracy. It is recognised that incumbency and access to entitlements provides sitting members with a huge advantage. When this is pushed to the limits it will inevitably create tensions. However, to attempt to exclude totally the overridingly important activities for members of re-selection and re-election is to ignore political reality.

Accountability for entitlements—a member and party leader responsibility Under the Public Finance Act 1989, the Speaker as responsible Minister is accountable for all parliamentary expenditure. This retains a certain degree of control for the House over its own activities. However, this departmental model of ministerial responsibility does not work well for members’ services. The Speaker has no real means of control, and furthermore is not privy to information about the expenditure of individual party and member support appropriations. Members see the appropriation for member and party support as in effect benefits provided directly to them as members. (They are currently classified as “non-departmental appropriations”.) If it is the members and parties who incur the expenditure, it is they who should be held accountable. Such direct accountability would require legislative change to identify that the Speaker, while accountable for parliamentary services appropriated through Vote Parliamentary Service, is not accountable for members’ services appropriations.

4 Parliamentary Remuneration Act 1989 section 3: "parliamentary duties" of a member or recognised office holder means the duties that attach to the office of a member or recognised office holder, and includes the duties that a member or recognised office holder is ordinarily expected to undertake, including participation in the activities of recognised political parties, and includes any duties prescribed as being within this definition, but does not include any duties prescribed as being outside this definition. Section 10(1)(b) parliamentary duties of members and recognised office holders include participation in the activities of recognised political parties. 5 Report of Controller and Auditor-General Advertising expenditure incurred by the Parliamentary Service in the three months before the 2005 General election, B.29[06c], p.25—opinion of the Solicitor-General.

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An alternative accountability regime is required. The expenditure of public funds for members’ services must be transparent. There is no question of members’ not being held to account for their use of taxpayer provided funding.

Alternative accountability regime The Australian models differ, on the one hand relying on ministerial accountability and on the other internal codes of conduct and parliamentary privilege along with the added discipline of the potential for external investigation via independent commission and possible criminal prosecution. Neither fits the New Zealand situation well. If an independent body were established to determine members’ entitlements, this might also be given an accountability role, in respect of these entitlements, on behalf of members. The independent determining body could be required to report details of individual member and party expenditure on behalf of members. Such a report could be subject to audit by the Controller and Auditor-General and be presented to the House by the Speaker (in the absence of a responsible Minister) and be ordered to be published by the House. The report could take a form not unlike that of the report of the Registrar of Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament,6 which summarises information provided in annual returns and presents information for each member individually by category. The administering organisation for members’ services should also be required to make an annual report on its financial performance and be subject to audit. Whether these reports are subject to parliamentary scrutiny is a matter that requires further consideration. As in New South Wales, they could be examined by a select committee as part of the annual financial review. Alternatively, publication of the reports, audit, and the resultant media and electorate scrutiny could be considered sufficient, given that parliamentary scrutiny smacks of scrutiny by their own. If the annual reports of members’ returns and the administering organisation were subject to the House’s financial review procedures, consideration would need to be given to who would take the chair as responsible Minister in the committee of the whole House, in the absence of a responsible Minister. Finally while the New Zealand Parliament does not have a members’ code of conduct, the discipline of the potential to raise a matter of privilege is not available in the way it is in New South Wales.

Separate Vote for members’ services The distinction between parliamentary services and members’ services could be made clearer by creating a separate vote for members’ services, consisting of two appropriations: • party and member support • administering members’ services. The appropriations would be to the independent determining body, rather than the Speaker. The party and member support appropriation might be a non-departmental appropriation to make it clear that it is the members and parties who will incur expenditure in that appropriation, not the administering organisation. Giving the independent determining body responsibility for both appropriations may be seen to weaken the House’s control of parliamentary appropriations exercised through the Speaker. However, this slight weakening of control needs to be balanced against the value of clearly removing the Speaker from responsibility for administering party and member support.

6 Registrar of Pecuniary Interest of Members of Parliament Summary of Annual returns as at 31 January 2007, J.7.

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Clearly during the Estimates examinations by select committees and the Estimates debate in the House, the proposed spending of the members’ services administering organisation could be scrutinised, but consideration needs to be given to whether the appropriation for member and party support should be subject to such scrutiny, given the desire to remove members from the process of determining their entitlements. Allowing such scrutiny might undermine the role of the independent body charged with making the determinations. Changes might be made to the Public Finance Act 1989 to provide for a special type of vote for members’ services that is not included in the schedules to the Appropriation Bill that are the subject of detailed consideration by the House. This arrangement would also overcome the problem of who would take the chair (as responsible Minister) in the committee of the whole House during the Estimates debate.

Determining members’ entitlements—role of members’ advisory body The process for making a determination of members’ entitlements should provide for members to have an input through their advisory body—currently the Parliamentary Service Commission. The process would also need to recognise that the Government’s fiscal position will have to be considered in making any such determinations. The determinations having been made, a draft vote could be submitted each year through a process similar to that used for the budgets of the Officers of Parliament. A committee, such as the Officers of Parliament Committee, could consider the implications of the quantum of the determination and make a recommendation to the House for the inclusion of a vote in the Appropriation Bill. This process would formalise the opportunity for consideration of the implications of the draft vote on the Government’s fiscal position and provide an independent (non-Government) process for agreeing the vote and its inclusion in an Appropriation bill.

Parliamentary consideration of determinations—role of Regulations Review Committee Determining entitlements by regulation gives rise to the possibility of scrutiny by the Regulations Review Committee and disallowance. Again, given the desire to remove members from the process of determining their own entitlements, such scrutiny could be seen as potentially undermining the role of the independent body charged with making the determinations. In New South Wales the determinations of the Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal are not subject to disallowance. It would seem appropriate to adopt such an exclusion to protect the independence of the determination process. However, scrutiny by the Regulations Review Committee might be retained. The committee examines regulations against a number of grounds set out in the Standing Orders. It is not there to consider policy. Regulations Review Committee examination might be beneficial in ensuring fair process is followed in making the determinations.

Application of official information principles Ultimately consideration should also be given to whether the principles of the Official Information Act 1982 ought to apply to the provision of member and party support. The current Act does not apply to the proceedings of Parliament or to the operations of the Parliamentary Service. It is appropriate that the Act not apply to the proceedings of Parliament, so as to retain the House’s control over its own proceedings, most of which are open to the public or publicly reported. However, the provision of member and party support is not a proceeding in Parliament. Openness and transparency about members’ use of public funds could be enhanced by applying the principles of the Act. The Australian federal experience has shown that this can work.

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Governance and management of parliamentary services Three quite different parliamentary administrations were studied in Australia. All have upper houses, which adds a degree of complexity that New Zealand does not have. Both the Victorian and the Federal Parliaments have Parliamentary Services. One administers members’ entitlements, the other does not. The Victorian model is probably closest to that of New Zealand. Its governance structure provides for co-operation between the two Houses through joint meetings of the presiding officers who have responsibility for the administration of their own Houses and joint responsibility for the Parliamentary Services. The two Clerks’ Offices and the Parliamentary Services form a triumvirate for the management of services to the Houses. A Parliamentary Executive Group (PEG) made up of the two Clerks and the General Manager of Parliamentary Services has been formed. This body ensures a collective and co-ordinated approach to service delivery and helps to ensure that service delivery is informed by the business of Parliament. The PEG is a leadership group that sets the model for co-operation through all levels of the administration. As discussed above, at the parliamentary governance level, the New Zealand Parliament might adopt an approach where the Speaker is the responsible Minister for parliamentary services and an independent body is responsible for members’ services. An advisory body, the Parliamentary Service Commission, could be retained to advise the Speaker on parliamentary services and to provide submissions on behalf of members to the independent body responsible for member and party support. Most parliaments appear to have some sort of House-type committee that provides an opportunity for presiding officers to consult with members on matters of concern to them about the administration of their entitlements and the parliamentary complex. Most are less formal than the Parliamentary Service Commission, being established by their Houses rather than in legislation. Maintaining an advisory body, with representation from Whips of all parties, to which the Speaker may refer matters relating to the delivery of parliamentary services and their administration for advice has considerable value in terms of resolving issues in a way that ensures members and parliamentary parties can carry our their duties independently. Such an advisory body might also take over the role of the current Members’ Services Committee, which represents members’ interests to the Remuneration Authority.

Management of the delivery of parliamentary services—the case for a CEO’s Office The Victorian management triumvirate provides a balance that is possibly more difficult to achieve between a large disparate Parliamentary Service and a much smaller and very focused Clerk’s Office. The triumvirate is necessary to protect the equal positions of both Houses. This is not an issue for the New Zealand Parliament and a parliamentary chief executive’s office approach could be considered, which incorporates the leadership of: the Clerk’s Office, the Parliamentary Service and a members’ services organisation. A parliamentary chief executive’s office might be led by the Clerk, and include the statutory officers: the Deputy Clerk and the General Manager of the Parliamentary Service, and the General Manager of the members’ services organisation, with the following joint responsibilities: • long term strategic planning of parliamentary and members’ services • co-ordination of service delivery • provision of secretariat for Speaker’s own office • provision of a secretariat to the Parliamentary Service Commission

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• provision of a secretariat to the independent members’ services body responsible for determining members’ entitlements and reporting them • reporting on parliamentary services • independent parliamentary audit and risk management • leadership development • inter-parliamentary relations. The chief executive’s office would co-ordinate the leadership and management of: the Clerk’s Office, the Parliamentary Service and Members’ Services. Each would maintain autonomy in terms of responsibility for service delivery and the administration and management of their particular votes. The role of the Deputy Clerk would ensure that the professional role of the Clerk was not compromised by the overall leadership role. A Senior Management Team consisting of the managers of the ten service delivery divisions: House services, Reporting services, Select Committee services, Legal services, Corporate services, Information and Communication Technology services, Library and Research services, Building services, Security services and Members’ services, would ensure co-ordination of service delivery. The benefits of a united approach to service delivery are: • the business of Parliament informs the delivery of all services • the professional leadership and expertise of the Clerk permeates all aspects of parliamentary administration, allowing confidence in decision-making within the administration, rather than requiring decision-making to escalate to the political level • a culture of excellent parliamentary service permeates all service delivery • strategic planning is on a parliament-wide basis • common services such as ICT infrastructure, HR services and financial management services are centrally co-ordinated. An independent Audit Committee might be set up to provide independent assurance on the management of the Clerk’s Office, the Parliamentary Service and Members’ Services. The Audit Committee might report to both the chief executive’s office, the Speaker and the independent determining body for members’ services.

Serjeant-at-Arms—responsibility for Chamber support services In the Australian Parliaments, the role of Serjeant-at-Arms forms part of the responsibility of one of the senior Table officers (Clerks-Assistant) responsible to the Clerk of the particular House. This reflects that the Clerk is the principal officer of the House and responsible to the Speaker for the delivery of all Chamber support services. The role of the Serjeant-at-Arms in maintaining order in the galleries and assisting the Speaker to maintain order in the Chamber forms a part of the Clerk’s overall responsibility. The Serjeant-at-Arms also plays a major role in advising the Speaker on security matters relevant to the Chamber and liaising with those responsible for wider parliamentary security services. I endorse this approach to service delivery in that it enables a proper balance to be achieved between the desire to have an open and accessible Parliament, against the need for a secure environment in which members and parliamentary staff can work without undue security concerns. A professional approach to the role would also enable a more proactive approach to dealing with broadcasting, media and freedom of the press issues arising in the parliamentary context.

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Conclusion Achieving change in the governance and administration of Parliament as an institution will take time. There are many long-standing traditions that need thorough consideration before reforms are introduced. There is also a complex legal framework across a number of Acts: the Clerk of the House of Representatives Act 1988, the Civil List Act 1979, the Parliamentary Service Act 2000 and the Public Finance Act 1989. The legal framework will need detailed consideration and undoubtedly legislative change will be required to underpin any new more open and transparent governance structure with proper legal authority. While some changes are already being contemplated because of the need to address the expiry of section 7 of the Appropriation (Parliamentary Expenditure Validation) Act 2006, I consider further examination of the governance and administrative structures is warranted, along the lines I have suggested in this report.

Hon Margaret Wilson Speaker