Reconciling a Policy of Neutrality with the Prospect of Integration:
Ireland, the European Economic Community, and Ireland’s United Nations Policy,
1965-1972
Greg Thomas Spelman B.Soc.Sc. (Psych), B.A. (Hons)
School of Humanities and Human Services Centre for Social Change Research Queensland University of Technology
Submitted in full requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2003 KEY WORDS
• Ireland • European Community • United Nations • Neutrality • Integration • Diplomatic History • International Relations • Foreign Policy • Disarmament • Non-Proliferation • Cold War • Decolonisation
TECHNICAL ASPECTS
The technical aspects of the presentation of this dissertation have been dictated by various authorities.
• The structure, format and order of the thesis conform to the QUT Requirements for Presenting Theses. • The format is in accordance with the Word 2000 program, and the layout of the presentation is attributable to this software. • The Collins Gem Irish Dictionary (1995) has been the reference for the presentation and spelling of Gaelic terminology.
i ABSTRACT
The decade of the 1960s was a period of significant evolution in the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Ireland. On 31 July 1961, Ireland applied for membership of the European Community. That application was vetoed in January 1963 by the French
President, Charles de Gaulle. Nevertheless, it was an indication of the growing
“Europeanisation” of Irish foreign policy, which was secured in May 1967 in a renewed and ultimately successful application by Ireland for membership of the Common Market.
Because of the overlapping interests of the European Community and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), however, these initiatives towards integration with
Western Europe posed a dilemma for the decision-makers in Dublin given that, in the
Irish context, foreign policy was predicated on neutrality. Since Ireland’s admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1955 and especially from the reinstatement of Frank Aiken as
Minister for External Affairs in 1957, the diplomatic component of Ireland’s neutrality was defined largely by its UN policy. Ireland’s continued attachment to neutrality, despite its application for European Community membership, caused significant frustration to the governments of the member-states, especially France under de Gaulle, and was seen to be an obstacle to Ireland’s accession. These concerns were communicated explicitly to Dublin, along with the view that Ireland needed to demonstrate a greater propensity to support Western interests on major international issues. Pressure of this kind had dissuaded other European neutrals (Austria, Finland,
Malta and Sweden) from pursuing membership of the European Community until 1995 – after the Cold War had ended – but it did not deter the Irish.
ii Despite the pressure from the European Community, Irish policy continued to be characterised by neutrality and, almost invariably, conflict with French UN policy. This included, amongst other matters, policy in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the financing of peacekeeping, the Vietnam War, representation of China at the
UN, and various decolonization problems in Southern Africa. This insulation of Ireland’s foreign policy from the imperatives of the application for membership of the European
Community was largely the product of the fragmentation of decision-making in the formulation of Irish diplomacy.
This research project takes a unique perspective on the topic by focusing, in particular, on the period 1965 to 1972 and, also, breaks further new ground in utilizing documentary material only recently released by the National Archives in Dublin, the
University College Dublin Archives, the Public Record Office, London, and the UN
Archives in New York, along with published diplomatic records and secondary sources.
Consequently, it offers an original contribution to our understanding of Irish foreign policy in this crucial period of its development and the capacity of the Irish Government to reconcile the two fundamental and apparently conflicting pillars of its foreign policy – neutrality and membership of the European Community.
iii REFEREED PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS RELATED TO THE THESIS
Spelman, G. T. (2000). ‘Ireland at the United Nations: The Impact of the 1967 Application for EC Membership on Ireland’s UN Policy’. Conference Presentation at The 11th Irish-Australian Conference at Murdoch University/University of Notre Dame, 26-29 April 2000.
Spelman, G. T. (2001). ‘Ireland and the European Communities: The Renewal of the Application for Accession in 1967’. Melbourne Historical Journal, 29, pp. 143-151.
Spelman, G. T. (2002). ‘From Independence to Interdependence: the Changing Nature of Irish Identity’. Conference Proceedings of the Conference for Social Change at Queensland University of Technology on 22 November 2002, forthcoming publication.
Spelman, G. T. (2002). ‘Ireland’s Neutrality Policy in World War II: The Impact of Belligerent Pressures on the Implementation of Neutrality’. UCLA Historical Journal, 20, forthcoming publication.
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
Keywords and Technical Aspects i
Abstract ii
Refereed Publications and Presentations Related to the Thesis iv
Table of Contents v
Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations xii
Glossary of Irish Terms xiv
Glossary of Leading Characters xv
Statement of Original Authorship xvi
Acknowledgements xvii
Preface xx
1. The Origin of Irish Neutrality at the UN, 1957-1961 1
2. From Independence to Interdependence: The Impact of the Application for EC Membership in 1961 on Ireland’s UN Policy 44
3. The Renewed Application for EC Membership in 1967: Implications for Irish Foreign Policy 80
4. The Fragmentation of Ireland’s Foreign Policy 105
5. Ireland’s Peace Policy at the UN, 1965-1972 122
6. Ireland and the Cold War at the UN, 1965-1972 159
7. Ireland and Decolonisation at the UN, 1965-1972 213
Conclusion 258
Appendices 275
Bibliography 280
v Chapter 1: The Origin of Ireland’s Neutrality at the UN, 1957-1961 1
¾ Ireland’s History of Neutrality 2
¾ Ireland at the United Nations 5
¾ Ireland’s Peace Policy at the UN 8
• Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 9
• The Suspension of Nuclear Testing 15
• The Disarmament Committee 16
• Areas of Law 18
• Other Aspects of Ireland’s Peace Policy 20
¾ Ireland and the Cold War at the UN 21
• The Middle East 22
• Tibet 26
• The Representation of China at the UN 29
¾ Ireland and Decolonisation at the UN 32
• Algeria 33
• French Togoland 36
• Namibia 37
• Apartheid in South Africa 38
• Transmission of Information for Administered Territories 41
¾ Conclusion 41
Chapter 2: From Independence to Interdependence: The Impact of the First Application for EC Membership in 1961 on Ireland’s UN policy 44
¾ Ireland’s Application for EC Membership and Concerns about its Neutrality and UN Policy 45
vi
¾ The Clarifications of the Irish Government to Reconcile Neutrality and Integration 46
¾ Lemass’ Clarifications of Government Policy to International Audiences 48
¾ Lemass’ Clarifications of Government Policy in the Domestic Sphere 50
¾ Ireland’s Peace Policy at the UN 52
• Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 52
• Peacekeeping 53
¾ Ireland and the Cold War at the UN 54
• The Representation of China at the UN 55
• The UN in Korea 58
• The Bay of Pigs Invasion 60
• The Cuban Missile Crisis 62
¾ Ireland and Decolonisation at the UN 64
• Algeria 64
• Tunisia 66
• Southern Rhodesia 68
• Rwanda 68
• Apartheid in South Africa 69
• Other Aspects of Ireland’s Policy on Decolonisation 70
¾ Other Issues at the UN 70
• South-Tyrol 70
• Proposals for Ireland to Join a New Moderate Bloc 74
vii ¾ Conclusion 75
Chapter 3: The Renewed Application for EC Membership: Implications for Irish Foreign Policy 80
¾ The Implications for Sovereignty Posed by Membership of the EC 82
¾ The Impact of the EC Application on Ireland’s UN policy 87
¾ Reconciling Neutrality and Non-Membership of NATO with the EC Application 88
¾ European Integration and the Issue of Partition 91
¾ The Link Between the Irish and British Applications: The Objective of Simultaneous Admission 93
¾ Charles de Gaulle and Opposition to Expansion of the EC and the Inclusion of the UK 94
¾ Ireland’s Continued Commitment to the EC 101
¾ Conclusion 102
Chapter 4: The Fragmentation of Ireland’s Foreign Policy 105
¾ The Foreign Policy of Newly Independent States 105
¾ The Separation of External Economic Policy from Political and Security Matters 107
¾ Responsibility for the Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy 110
¾ Aiken’s Focus on the UN and the Insulation of UN Policy 112
¾ Hillery’s Succession to the Post of Minister for External Affairs 116
¾ A Recent Challenge to the Hypothesis of Ireland’s Foreign Policy Fragmentation 118
¾ Conclusion 120
viii Chapter 5: Ireland’s Peace Policy at the UN, 1965-1972 122
¾ The Conflict Between Irish and French Policy on Peace Issues 122
¾ The Financing of Peacekeeping Operations 127
¾ Disarmament 142
• Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 143
• The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 152
• Other Disarmament Issues 155
¾ Conclusion 157
Chapter 6: Ireland and the Cold War at the UN, 1965-1972 159
¾ Ireland and its Context Within Western Policy in the Cold War 160
¾ Aiken’s Proposals for Détente and their Relation to the Cold War 166
¾ Domestic Criticisms of Ireland’s Policy on Cold War Issues 170
¾ The Representation of China at the UN 173
¾ The UN in Korea 186
¾ The Vietnam War 188
¾ Czechoslovakia 1968 194
¾ The Middle East 201
¾ Conclusion 210
Chapter 7: Ireland and Decolonisation at the UN, 1965-1972 213
¾ Ireland’s Support for Decolonisation and the Ramifications for its EC Application 213
¾ Northern Ireland 216
¾ Gibraltar 225
ix
¾ Southern Africa 229
• Namibia 232
• Apartheid in South Africa 239
• The Portuguese Territories in Africa 243
• The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 245
• Southern Rhodesia 246
¾ Ireland’s View of Voluntary and Mandatory Sanctions 247
¾ Western Influences on Ireland’s Policy on Decolonisation 249
¾ Criticisms of Ireland’s Policy on Decolonisation 252
¾ Patrick Hillery and Ireland’s Policy on Decolonisation 255
¾ Conclusion 256
Conclusion 258
Appendices
1. Structure of the Irish Department of External Affairs 275
2. The Organs of the United Nations 276
3. The General Assembly and its Subsidiary Bodies 277
4. The Irish Peacekeeping Proposals of 1966 278
Bibliography 280
1. Primary Sources 280
1.1 Archival Records 280
1.2 Interviews 289
x 1.3 Published Records 289
2. Secondary Sources 290
2.1 Books 290
2.2 Articles 296
2.3 Web Sites 305
2.4 Newspapers 307
2.5 Unpublished Papers 307
xi GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A/C.1 Verbatim Records of the First Committee of the General Assembly
A/C.4 Verbatim Records of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly
A/PV Verbatim Records of the Plenary Session of the General Assembly
A/SPC Verbatim Records of the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly
DFA Department of Foreign (External) Affairs of Ireland
DO Dominion’s Office (UK)
DT Department of the Taoiseach
EAEC European Atomic Energy Community
EC European Community (established 8 April 1965 and effective from 1 July 1967)
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ENDC Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GA General Assembly of the United Nations
GCD General and Complete Disarmament
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRA Irish Republican Army
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
xii NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
ONUC Force de l’Organization des Nations Unis en Congo
PMUN Permanent Mission to the United Nations
RTE Raidió Teilifís Éireann (government funded and prime television network of Ireland)
S/ Verbatim Records of the Security Council
SC/ Security Council Documents from the UN Archives
SG Secretary-General of the United Nations
SPC Special Political Committee of the United Nations
UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence (by Southern Rhodesia)
UN United Nations
UNCURK United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WEU Western European Union
WEO Group Western European and Others Group
xiii GLOSSARY OF IRISH TERMS
Ard-Fheis: National Convention.
Córas Tráchtála: The Irish State Export Board.
Dáil Éireann: Lower house of the Irish Parliament.
Fianna Fáil: The governing party of Ireland during the period 1957-1972.
Fine Gael: The major opposition party of Ireland, 1957-1972.
Garda Síochána: Irish Police.
Oireachtas: The Irish Parliament.
Raidió Telifís Éireann (RTE): Government funded and prime television network of Ireland.
Seanad Éireann: Senate or upper house of the Irish Parliament.
Tánaiste: Deputy Prime Minister of Ireland.
Taoiseach: Prime Minister of Ireland.
Teachta Dála (TD): Member of the Dáil, or Dáil Deputy.
xiv GLOSSARY OF LEADING CHARACTERS
Aiken, Frank: Tánaiste, Minister for External Affairs and Chairman of the Irish delegation at the United Nations 1957-1969.
Brown, George: British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1966-1968.
Colley, George: Ireland’s Minister for Industry and Commerce, 1966-1970.
Cremin, Cornelius: Secretary of the Irish Department of External Affairs, 1958-1963, Irish Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1963-1974.
De Valera, Eamon: Taoiseach, 1957-1959 and President, 1959-1973, of Ireland.
De Gaulle, Charles: President of the Republic of France, 1959-1969.
Hammarskjold, Dag: Secretary General of the United Nations, 1953-1961.
Hillery, Dr Patrick: Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1969-1972.
Lemass, Sean: Taoiseach, 1959-1966.
Lynch, Jack: Taoiseach, 1966-1973.
McCann, Hugh: Ireland’s Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 1963- 1974
O’Brien, C. C.: Member of the Irish delegation to the UN (1956-1961), UN Secretary-General’s Representative in Katanga (1961), academic (1962-1969), Labour Politician (1969-1977), commentator on international affairs and the Chairman of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Ireland.
Thant, U.: Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1962-1972.
Wilson, Harold: British Prime Minister, 1964-1970.
Waldheim, Kurt: Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1972-1982.
xv
STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Signed: ………………………….
Dated: …………………………..
xvi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis could not have been completed without the varying degrees of support from a large number of people. Most fundamentally I must thank both of my supervisors for their tireless efforts in giving advice to the direction and enhancement of the dissertation.
My Principal Supervisor, Dr John Ainsworth, has been instrumental in my personal and academic development since my days as an undergraduate and honours student. I must also thank my Associate Supervisor, Dr Catherine Manathunga, for lending me her expertise in the realm of Irish UN policy, and for contributing to my thesis to a significantly higher degree than that customary for an associate-supervisor. Both of my supervisors have been generous with their time and advice and I must also thank them for being my friends as well as mentors, and managing to balance the difficult tasks of professional distance and personal interest. Their support has been crucial in a school, which has been small, multi-disciplinary and that has had the added strain of having undergone several transformations during my studies there.
The completion of my PhD would have been an untenable prospect without the financial support of various parties. My research trip to London, New York and Dublin was funded by my scholarships, but also with generous contributions from the School of
Humanities, the Centre for Community & Cross Cultural Studies (now the Centre for
Social Change Research), and the university. I presented papers of my work at a number of conferences and this was also assisted by contributions from the Centre and the
School, as well as the University of Melbourne.
xvii
Many individuals during my research trip gave generously of their time and efforts. I must especially thank Frank Jnr., Eileen and the Aiken family for welcoming me into their home, allowing me free range of the Aiken library, giving me a personal tour of
‘Bandit Country’, providing their recollections and experiences of Frank Snr., and helping me to contact Dr Patrick Hillery. I must also thank the former Foreign Minister and President for his insights into his time in the Irish Government. Thank you also to my friend Darren Cheal, who happened to be living in Dublin at the time I visited and provided me with a place to stay, not to mention, dragged me away from the archives, libraries and the laptop for personal tours of the sites and pubs of the city. I was also fortunate to have had the opportunity to discuss Ireland’s contemporary foreign policy and its diplomatic history with the Irish Ambassador in Canberra, Richard O’Brien, and the First Secretary of Ireland’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations and Political
Advisor to the Irish Permanent Representative in New York, John Deady. I thank them both for giving of their time.
A number of academics in Ireland, the UK and the USA provided excellent advice in the early days of my research, especially in the framing of my research question and the direction of my inquiries. I cannot mention them all, but they included Professor Patrick
Keatinge, Dr Joseph Skelly, Professor Paul Sharp, Professor Nicholas Rees and Dr Gary
Murphy. I also thank the archivists and others for their assistance and understanding of the limitations of inter-continental travel and research. These included the staff and researchers at the National Archives in Dublin, Seamus Helferty at the University
xviii College Dublin Archives, Victor Lange at the Military Archives in Rathmines and especially Aurora Tangkeko at the UN Archives in New York, who allowed me access to the collection, despite turning away other scholars because it was closed for relocation.
The bulk of the work on the thesis was undertaken in Australia, where I have had an excellent support network. A number of my postgraduate colleagues imparted encouragement and advice, which was useful, especially in the early years, to navigate the bureaucracy of the post-graduate experience. I must also thank the various academics who provided kind and encouraging words and for taking an interest in my progress, especially those with whom I worked closely on teaching and research projects.
Finally, I thank my family and network of friends for providing invaluable support. I must recognise the contribution given by the support and friendship of my parents, Peter and Robyn Spelman, as well as my siblings Derek, Brett, Luke and Lauren Spelman. My family has given its support in many ways, most often outside the realm of the thesis, but whose assistance allowed me to better concentrate on the project. I must also especially acknowledge my father for providing the computer that I have used to write my thesis.
He assembled it from spare parts he had accumulated, at a time when I could not afford to purchase one and had significant problems accessing the one provided by QUT. But I reserve my most heartfelt tribute for my partner Emma Cain, who has made the journey with me for the last two years. I thank you for your love, support and patience in enduring those days when I could not emerge from the study and in suffering the many limits imposed on our life by my burden – this thesis.
xix PREFACE
The 1960s saw a reappraisal and significant adjustment of Ireland’s foreign policy orientations. This situation was stimulated by the election of Sean Lemass as Taoiseach in 1961 and a consequent re-evaluation of national priorities. Lemass instituted a departure from the policies of independence, neutrality and protectionism that characterised the government of his predecessor, Eamon de Valera. Instead, he envisaged Ireland’s future as embracing integration and engagement with Western
Europe. Therefore, under Lemass, political idealism became of secondary importance behind economic advancement and prosperity. Ireland’s application for membership of the European Community (EC)1 in 1961 and its renewal in 1967 confirmed this
“Europeanisation” of foreign policy.
The major problem with an effort to distance Ireland from policy positions associated with de Valera – especially with respect to neutrality2 – was that they were embedded in national identity, pervaded the political culture and had widespread support in the electorate. Although Lemass was a product of the revolutionary era of Irish politics, his views were representative of an evolving approach to government. His period of government signalled a change in Ireland’s political culture but, nevertheless, many of the revolutionary generation, who subscribed to de Valera’s policy priorities,
1 From the amalgamation of the executives of the three pre-existing European Communities (EEC, ECSC and EAEC) in July 1967, the constituent bodies of the Common Market were customarily and collectively referred to as the European Community (EC). This dissertation spans the period 1959-1972 and because the bulk of it involves research into the post-1967 period, EC has also been used to refer to the individual bodies prior to 1967 for the sake of simplicity and consistency. 2 It is acknowledged that many authors prefer the term independence, rather than neutrality, as an epithet to describe Ireland’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, throughout this thesis the term neutral has been employed to avoid confusion and an overt conflict of terminology that would be engendered with the use of independence. The recurrent theme of the thesis is the interdependence of the regional theatre of Western Europe, which necessitated Ireland’s application for membership of the EC because of the obsolescence of
xx were still heavily involved in government. Consequently, neutrality remained a fundamental component of Ireland’s diplomacy during the 1960s.
The growing acceptance by the Irish political establishment of the need to sacrifice neutrality to further Ireland’s aspirations of integration was, in part, a response to external pressure. The integration envisaged by the EC was perceived to be mutually exclusive to a policy of neutrality, primarily because the fundamental qualifications for membership of the EC were an acceptance of the objectives of both economic and political union. These commitments were in direct conflict with neutrality which was, in essence, premised on a capacity to exercise sovereignty in diplomatic affairs. Thus, the member-states of the EC were reluctant to support the Irish application for membership and exerted pressure on Dublin to rescind its neutrality and conform to a policy more aligned with that of the members of the community.
Ireland entered into negotiations for membership of the EC as an acknowledged neutral, but the accuracy of this epithet subsequently came into question. On 1 January
1973, Ireland became the first neutral to join the EC, when it acceded along with the
United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark. Other neutral states, such as Austria, Finland,
Malta, and Sweden, maintained that their neutrality precluded membership of the EC and only pursued full membership in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War. Switzerland also considered its neutrality as precluding membership of the EC and until 2002 refused to join the United Nations (UN) for similar reasons. The concerns of these other neutrals derived from the close relationship between the EC and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO). The emphasis in the 1960s on coordination of foreign policies
economic policies of independence. Also, this research involves frequent comparisons of Irish and French policy, and the neutrality of Ireland and the independence of France were quite distinct kinds of policies.
xxi within the EC to bolster its influence in international affairs further exacerbated these concerns.3
Neutrality had been a fundamental component of Irish foreign policy since World
War II. Nevertheless, some critics have rejected the suggestion that Ireland was ever a neutral state after 1945.4 This argument is fundamentally premised on the legalistic basis of the policy of neutrality which, as defined by the Hague Conventions, exists only during time of war.5 Although this argument is technically correct, the reality is that during the Cold War and especially in multi-lateral diplomatic forums, such as the UN, neutrality acquired diplomatic and political characteristics in addition to legal obligations.
The Irish Government has always perceived neutrality as involving obligations beyond those simply prescribed by international law, largely because the defence of Ireland’s neutrality lay almost entirely within the diplomatic arena.6 The strictly legal concept of neutrality, as defined by the Hague Conventions, was ingenuously predicated on a clear distinction between war and peace that often does not exist. For this reason, nations such as Sweden, Austria, Finland, Switzerland and Ireland claimed to be neutral, and were recognized as such by other states, even though wars were not being waged.
This is confirmed by the conventional and universal acceptance of neutrality in diplomatic language, both within Ireland and the international community as a whole, as
3 H. I. Kearsley, (1993), “The Evolution and cost effectiveness of peace-keeping: the Republic of Ireland as a Case Study.” Conference Paper for Southeastern Lousiana University, p. 12; T. Salmon, (1989), Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy, Oxford: Clarendon Press [hereafter Salmon, Unneutral Ireland], pp. 61-63. 4 Most notably T. Salmon, (1982), ‘Ireland: A Neutral in the Community’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 20: 30, 205-227 [hereafter Salmon, ‘Ireland: A Neutral in the Community’, in Journal of Common Market Studies]; T. Salmon, (1984), ‘Neutrality and the Irish Republic: Myth or Reality?’ In The Round Table, 290, 205-215; Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, p. 2. 5 J. B. Scott, (Ed.), (1918), The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, New York: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, pp. 121-123. 6 General Files on Neutrality, Documents from the Military Archives of Ireland, Dublin.
xxii recognition of a policy that exists outside the limits of war. Even Trevor Salmon, a vociferous critic of the use of neutrality to describe a peace-time policy, has employed the term ‘European neutrals’ or ‘neutral countries’ as expedient collective references to
Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland.7 Furthermore, the frequent quotations cited by Salmon of diplomats, foreign policy experts and politicians indicates the prevalent usage of the word as the most common descriptive label of a policy operating during both war and peace. To a large extent the persistence in the use of neutrality lies with the widespread understanding of its meaning and the lack of unambiguous alternatives.8
Although Irish UN policy was heterogeneous, manifesting many aspects of typical Western policy and certain elements common to non-alignment, it was most commonly deemed neutral. Indeed, Ireland satisfied the fundamental criteria for being considered a neutral – it regarded itself as neutral, was viewed by others as being so and maintained a policy of non-membership of military alliances.9 Even today, Irish diplomats continue to describe their country’s foreign policy as being neutral, though with various qualifications, such as a preference for the term ‘military neutrality’.10 Also,
Ireland continues to be briefed about the security policies of Switzerland, Sweden,
Austria and Finland, specifically because they all share a commitment to neutrality.11
Since World War II, Ireland’s reputation as a neutral has been perpetuated largely by its policy at the UN. This was a consequence of the Irish, with only a small
7 Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, pp. 42, 44. 8 Ibid., cited throughout the text. 9 P. Keatinge, (1984), A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, [hereafter Keatinge, A Singular Stance] p. 55. 10 Interview with the First Secretary of Ireland’s PMUN, John Deady at 1 Dag Hammarskjold Place, New York, 26 September 2000 [hereafter Interview with John Deady]. 11 General Files on Neutrality, Documents from the Military Archives of Ireland, Dublin.
xxiii diplomatic corps and sparse diplomatic representation elsewhere, utilizing their UN delegation in New York as the most active, visible means of participating in the deliberation and even determination of issues of international significance. Therefore, examination of Ireland’s neutrality necessarily involves analysis of its UN policy.
The study of foreign policy has been a relatively recent phenomenon in the context of Irish history. This is partly because the files of the Irish Department of
External Affairs were only released in 1991, with restriction of access limited by the thirty-year rule. Patrick Keatinge is among the original scholars of Irish foreign policy and his research into the organisation, policy formulation, decision-making structures and other major issues for the Department of External Affairs provides an excellent framework with which to approach the wider primary sources and the more recently released documentary evidence.12 His work has been complemented in more recent years by Paul Sharp, who took a similar approach to the subject.13 Another useful work on Irish foreign policy is that by Denis Maher, which provides an excellent analysis of diplomatic interactions between Dublin and the Western European capitals from the end of World War II until accession in 1972, focussing on the application for membership of the EC.14
12 His works include: P. Keatinge, (1973), The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration [hereafter Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy]; P. Keatinge, (1978), A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irish Foreign Policy, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration [hereafter Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations] ; Keatinge, A Singular Stance. 13 P. Sharp, (1990), Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community: A Study of the Impact of Interdependence on the Foreign Policy of a Small State, Aldershot: Dartmouth [hereafter Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community]. 14 D. Maher, (1986), The Tortuous Path: The Course of Ireland’s Entry into the EEC, 1948-73, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration [hereafter Maher, The Tortuous Path].
xxiv The research focus of this dissertation extends the earlier work of Joseph Skelly15 and Catherine Manathunga,16 which examined Irish UN policy respectively from 1945-
1965 and 1957-1961. But it also advances a new interpretation of Irish UN policy in this early period of Ireland’s diplomacy in New York. Both Skelly and Manathunga suggest that Ireland’s policy on geo-political issues of the Cold War and its relationship with the
USA underwent a profound change in 1961 to become suddenly supportive of
Washington’s policies. The interpretation argued in this thesis is that Ireland’s foreign policy had always been guided by its relationship with the USA, but that various circumstances relating to the UN system and international relations combined to more clearly accentuate that relationship from 1961. This point will be further elaborated in chapters one and six. Skelly also takes the view that Ireland increasingly adhered to US policy on geo-political Cold War matters from 1961 in order to gain Washington’s support for its efforts to achieve EC membership. This thesis examines this argument in chapter one and provides another new interpretation of policy in this period by suggesting that not only did Ireland’s relationship with the USA not substantially alter in 1961, but that the EC application had little impact on Irish UN policy.
In addition to providing new interpretations of existing research into Irish UN policy, this project also contributes to existing scholarship by its reference to previously unreleased documents. Ireland’s UN policy between admission to the UN in late 1955 and accession to the EC in 1973 is crucial to understanding Irish foreign policy because during this period the UN was its primary stage. There has been no significant research
15 J. M. Skelly, (1997), Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-1965: National Interests and the International Order, Dublin: Irish Academic Press [hereafter Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations].
xxv into Irish UN policy in the period 1965-1972. Yet, from 1965, Ireland’s policy in this arena came under increasing stress as Dublin began to enhance its regional economic integration, as indicated by the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement of that year and the renewal of the application for membership of the EC in 1967. Lobbying and, later, negotiations for accession preoccupied the Irish Government until integration was achieved in January 1973. Thus, the national interest was defined primarily by accession to the EC. This resulted in pressure on Ireland’s neutrality as there was an expectation, especially from France, that the applicant states would conform to a more Western
European policy on major international issues as an indication of their commitment to integration. The history of Ireland’s international relations entered a different phase from
1973, when the country began to operate within the context of the EC. The period 1965-
1972 was an important phase in Irish foreign policy, therefore, as it marked a clear period of transition for Ireland in the international arena.
Certainly there are scholars who have addressed Irish foreign policy in this period,17 though their concentration has been more on the course of entry into the EC, rather than on UN policy about which there has been no significant research to date.
Thus, this research project provides a contribution to existing knowledge by examining the period 1965-1972 specifically, and on the basis of newly released documents by the
National Archives of Ireland, the University College Dublin Archives, the Public Record
Office, London, and the UN Archives in New York.
16 C. E. Manathunga, (1995), The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy 1957-61: “Maverick” Diplomacy and the Interaction of “Possession” and International “Milieu” Goals, PhD thesis, University of Queensland [hereafter Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy]. 17 Most notably Maher, The Tortuous Path.
xxvi Although the dissertation spans the years 1965-1972, it emphasizes the period
1965-1969 in particular, because this was a crucial time in the context of the research question, when Ireland’s application for membership of the EC was in limbo. These years were dominated by the perennial veto of Charles de Gaulle and French reluctance to support expansion of the EC. That changed in 1969, when de Gaulle resigned as
President of France. In mid-1969, the new French Government signalled its support for expansion of the EC and, in December, the member-states of the Common Market agreed to open negotiations with the four applicants at the summit meeting of the Heads of State and Government at The Hague.18 From 1970, pro-expansion governments were in power in all the member-states and negotiations for accession were opened with the applicants.
Thus, Irish accession was more assured than it had been previously and, as a consequence, there was considerably less pressure on Ireland to demonstrate conformity with Western European policies as a precondition for entry to the EC.
In addition to offering new interpretations of existing scholarship and analyses of newly released documents this project is valuable in terms of the significance of the foreign policy issues considered. The period between Ireland’s first overtures for membership of the EC in 1961 and its admission to that organization in January 1973 was the origin of Ireland’s reconciliation of the two fundamental, yet apparently conflicting pillars of its foreign policy – neutrality and EC membership. It was in this period that the
Irish Government developed the ambiguous approach to the coexistence of these policies that it continues to promote today. Furthermore, Ireland’s accommodation of neutrality and membership of the EC functioned very much as a test-case of the capacity of a policy of neutrality to function within a regional economic entity. It was not for another twenty
18 Ibid., pp. 249-250.
xxvii years and after the end of the Cold War that other neutral states followed Ireland’s lead and pursued membership of the EC.
Frank Aiken is a central figure in developments relating to Irish UN policy during the period 1965-1969. This is because as Tánaiste, Minister for External Affairs and
Chairman of the Irish delegation at the UN, he was the figure primarily responsible for formulating Ireland’s UN policy. By 1965, the Irish delegation had become significantly more hierarchical than it had been previously. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there had been a much more dynamic interaction among the delegation members. During that period, Aiken had not established his authority as chairman of the delegation and the powerful personalities and dissident views of members, such as Conor Cruise O’Brien and Frederick (Freddy) Boland, were given more weight. But, by 1965, Aiken had cemented his reputation at the UN and his authority over the delegation. Consequently, from that date, Ireland’s UN policy was formulated in a much more hierarchical fashion with delegation meetings usually consisting of Aiken articulating his views rather than inviting open discussion. And, as a matter of course, all significant issues had to be referred to him personally before the Irish delegation took a position. This was in contrast to the convention that existed prior to 1965, where the Irish representatives on the various UN committees were granted the latitude to formulate extemporaneous policies. Aiken also enjoyed significant liberty in his role as Minister for External
Affairs from 1966, because the Taoiseach was preoccupied with holding together the dissident elements of the Fianna Fáil party.19
19 D. Keogh, (1994), Twentieth-Century Ireland: Nation and State, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan [hereafter Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland], p. 295.
xxviii Conor Cruise O’Brien, an outspoken voice inside Ireland’s UN delegation between 1957 and 1961, provided significant public criticism of Aiken’s policies from
1961 following his resignation from the diplomatic service. Indeed, according to
O’Brien, he resigned to gain the capacity to go public as a critic of both the Irish
Government and the United Nations Secretariat.20 Given his experience in this respect,
O’Brien was regarded by many as an expert on Ireland’s UN policy and he frequently entered the media to voice criticism of the official position, especially in the late 1960s as he campaigned to become a Labour member of the Dáil. Consequently, because he was so vocal and assumed a role as the most prominent critic of Irish UN policy during the period under examination in this dissertation, O’Brien’s analyses of Ireland’s positions on various relevant issues also feature prominently in this study.
Approach to the Project
A qualitative analysis of Irish UN Policy has been undertaken in this research project, because it offers the most effective means of addressing the question of the perpetuation of Ireland’s neutrality under integrative pressures. Thus, it is not a complete study of Irish foreign policy, or even Irish UN policy. The research focuses on issues that caused a conflict for Ireland in striving to balance a policy of neutrality with efforts to become a member of the EC. In particular, this study seeks to discern if the application for membership of the EC changed Irish UN policy. This was achieved by selectively assessing Ireland’s policy on major international issues involving conflict between neutrality or the previous policy positions of the Irish delegations and the policy line of
20 C. C. O’Brien, (1962), To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History, Dublin: Simon & Schuster [hereafter O’Brien, To Katanga and Back], p. 2.
xxix EC member-states. These conflicts most commonly occurred on peace issues
(peacekeeping, disarmament, and other efforts to confine Cold War tensions), the geo- politics of the Cold War and decolonization.
This research project was made more difficult by the vast distance between
Australia and Ireland. This problem inhibited the research from including documents released by the National Archives in the years following the primary research trip in
2000. It is also a problem that has impacted upon the access to the expanse of secondary literature specific to Irish politics and diplomacy, which are not available in Australia.
Whilst it is hoped that an Australian perspective on these issues of Irish history can provide useful insights, it is also recognized that an immersion in Ireland’s political culture would have been of benefit in interpreting many of the nuances of Irish politics.
Also, although the author’s inability to speak French did not appear relevant at the inception of the project, as the thesis unfolded and the importance of French policy with respect to Ireland’s EC application became more apparent, it became obvious that a familiarity with French language would have vastly increased the source base of the research.
The dissertation commences with a segment delineating Ireland’s UN policy during the high-point of its neutrality in the period 1957-1961. It surveys Irish policy on various issues and contributions to UN responses, as an indication of how neutrality was implemented by the Irish delegation. The second chapter deals with Ireland’s first application for membership of the EC and the impact of this development on Irish UN policy. This is followed by a chapter addressing the renewal of Ireland’s application for membership of the EC in 1967 and the implications that posed for its neutrality and UN
xxx policy. Chapter four discusses the fragmented approach to decision-making in Ireland’s foreign policy that would impact on Irish UN policy, as delineated in the following three chapters. It applies the interpretive framework of Patrick Keatinge, which was later employed by Paul Sharpe to this more contemporary and comparatively overlooked period of Irish UN policy. Chapters five, six and seven analyse the actual impact of the renewed application for EC membership on Ireland’s UN policy, particularly its approach to peace issues at the UN, the geo-politics of the Cold War and decolonisation.
xxxi CHAPTER 1: THE ORIGIN OF IRELAND’S NEUTRALITY AT THE UN, 1957-1961
On 10 May 1967, Ireland renewed its application to join the EC. The application was precipitated by the impending amalgamation of the executives of the three pre-existing
European Communities - European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), in July
1967. The Irish Government was conscious of the acceleration of European integration and eager to be included, particularly because it offered a way of relieving the nation of what was perceived to be a humiliating economic dependence on the United Kingdom
(UK). The reality also was that this economic dependence necessitated the Irish application, because the UK had signalled its intention to seek membership of the EC.
The renewed application of 1967 followed the vetoing of expansion of the EC in 1963.
The application for admission to the EC was a dilemma for Ireland, as the aims of the EC and NATO often overlapped. Both were established to strengthen Western
Europe cooperation and were politicized by the antagonistic nature of the Cold War and the Soviet perception that the EC, as well as NATO, was established to isolate the
Communist bloc. The prejudicing of neutrality by economic integration was a factor that had resulted in Austria, Finland and Sweden eschewing membership of the EC until the
1990s, largely because of Soviet pressure. Prior to accession in January 1973, Ireland had been classed as one of the European neutrals with a comparable UN policy to those
1 of its continental associates.1 In this respect, since World War II, Ireland had taken pride in its policy of neutrality, but this was jeopardized by its EC application.2
Ireland’s History of Neutrality
Neutrality and non-alignment3 were common foreign policy choices for newly independent nations. This is because these policies were commonly linked to sovereignty and independence, with neutrality often merely being a manifestation of these aspects of policy, rather than possessing an impetus of its own.4 For this reason, throughout the course of the development of Irish foreign policy, neutrality derived most of its support from Ireland’s first generation of political leaders, especially Eamon de
Valera and Frank Aiken. It was later politicians who, not being as attached to neutrality as their predecessors, came to view it as a flexible and even negotiable policy. The problem that these later generations encountered was that by the time they had risen to
1 J. W. Burton, (1965), International Relations: A General Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 214; P. Lyon, (1963), Neutralism, Leicester: Leicester University Press, p. 33. 2 Ireland’s aspirations for neutrality dated back as far as the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and even the objectives of nationalists during World War I. 3 Non-alignment was a policy embraced by a loose grouping of a large number of states, most of whom were of the Third World and gained their independence after World War II. It purported to reject the polarisation of the Cold War system, but it differed from neutrality as it was much more multi-dimensional. In addition to rejecting the Cold War, the tenets of non-alignment included the advocacy of anti- colonialism, the economic development of the Third World and the democratisation of international relations. There was significant latitude in the application of the policy, with the Arab states often adhering to Soviet policy and the Latin Americans often supporting US policy. The origins of non- alignment lay in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955, where the states present defined the guiding principles of their foreign policies. States claiming to adhere to non-alignment formed the Non- Aligned Movement in 1961 in Belgrade (L. Acimovic, 1969, ‘The Role and Place of Nonalignment in the World of Today’, in L. Acimovic, Nonalignment in the World of Today, Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, p. 38; M. Cusic, (1979), The Freedom, Independence and Integrity of Non-aligned Countries, Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, p. 6; R. Ogley, (1970), The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, New York: Barnes & Noble, pp. 18-19; J. Tito, (1979), The Original Principles of Non-Alignment - A Permanent Inspiration and Vision, Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, pp. 3-4.). 4 R. Fanning, (1982), ‘Irish Neutrality - An Historical Review’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 1 (3), 27-38 [hereafter Fanning, ‘Irish Neutrality - An Historical Review’, Irish Studies in International Affairs], p. 30.
2 positions of power in the late 1950s, neutrality had gained widespread acceptance in the electorate and become an entrenched component of the national ethos, which made it difficult to alter.5 This increasingly diminished commitment to neutrality on the part of the political establishment has given the impression of Irish neutrality being equivocal and ad hoc; the product of circumstances as much as principle.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Ireland’s policy of neutrality pre-dated the Cold War world and the forces of European integration that would emerge to challenge it. Ireland had been committed to neutrality since the failure of collective security by the League of
Nations in 1936, with the collapse of sanctions against Italy for its aggression in
Ethiopia.6 The Taoiseach at that time, Eamon De Valera, was the instigator of Ireland’s neutrality with the rationale that if collective action could not protect the small nations of the world they would be compelled to make provisions for their own defences and, therefore, remain neutral in international conflicts.7 For this reason, Ireland declared neutrality in 1939 and instituted a range of policies to ensure its maintenance. During
World War II, Ireland’s neutrality prevailed despite the exertion of considerable economic and diplomatic pressure from both the United States of America (USA) and the
UK for Dublin to reconsider this stand.8 The Irish Government also faced internal threats to its status as a neutral, including IRA operations against the UK. Nevertheless, Ireland
5 R. J. Raymond, (1983), ‘Irish Neutrality: Ideology or Pragmatism’, International Affairs, 60 (1), 31-40 [hereafter Raymond, ‘Irish Neutrality: Ideology or Pragmatism’, International Affairs], p. 40. 6 M. Kennedy, (1996), Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919-1946: International Relations, Diplomacy and Politics, Dublin: Irish Academic Press [hereafter Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919- 1946], pp 221, 225. 7 C. C. O’Brien, (1969), ‘Ireland in International Affairs’, in Owen Dudley Edwards (Ed), Conor Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland, London: Andre Deutsch [hereafter O’Brien, Ireland in International Affairs’, in Conor Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland], p. 115. 8 N. Quirke, (1990), Irish Foreign Policy, 1945-1955: The Relationship Between Neutrality and Sovereignty in a Changing Domestic and International Environment, PhD thesis, University of Queensland, [hereafter Quirke, Irish Foreign Policy, 1945-1955], pp. 41-45.
3 managed to survive World War II with its neutrality intact, which entrenched the association between neutrality and national identity.9
This relationship imbued the policy of neutrality with a significant degree of immutability in the ensuing decades. Although partition was proclaimed as the primary obstacle to Ireland’s membership of NATO,10 neutrality was the indirect hurdle. Dublin specifically cited partition as the reason for rejecting NATO membership in 1949, because it refused to engage in a military alliance with the UK, which it considered to be illegally occupying Northern Ireland.11 Ireland had a history of colonial struggle against the UK to free itself from occupation and that history was symbolised by the continued existence of partition. Although neutrality and partition were linked, Ireland’s neutrality policy had wider foundations.12 The most pressing reason for rejecting NATO membership in the late 1940s was its potential to impact on the Inter-party Government’s re-election chances. The Government had been elected on a policy platform, which included economic and social spending at the expense of the military and a reversal of policy on that issue would have alienated much of its constituency. Also, the persistence of partition was a prominent issue in domestic politics, which made it difficult for the government to engage in an electoral battle with the opposition parties on NATO membership, particularly considering the record of the opposition, under de Valera, in preserving neutrality in World War II. The tenuous nature of the governing coalition
9 Fanning, ‘Irish Neutrality - An Historical Review’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, pp. 32-33. 10 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, p. 92. 11 Salmon, ‘Ireland: A Neutral in the Community’, Journal of Common Market Studies, p. 208. 12 O’Brien, ‘Ireland in International Affairs’, in Conor Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland, p. 122.
4 made it reluctant to provide the Fianna Fáil opposition with any avenues for damaging public criticism.13
After 1949, Irish neutrality was consolidated as a bi-partisan policy and achieved a sanctity that made it an enduring part of Irish foreign policy. In 1951 and 1952, the de
Valera Government rejected a continuation of US aid under the Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program, in part because Washington made it contingent on strengthened collective defence measures and Dublin was concerned that such an agreement would violate Irish neutrality.14 After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Marshall aid increasingly became of a military nature at Washington's insistence. Although Ireland participated in the scheme until that point, Dublin had always been concerned about the strings attached; though economic necessity was its paramount consideration in accepting assistance.15 But Ireland’s participation in the program was the origin of Dublin’s reconsideration of neutrality, its position with respect to the West in general and Western Europe in particular.16
Ireland at the United Nations
Although neutrality was not enshrined in the Irish Constitution, the significant political commitment to the policy resulted in questions at the highest levels of
13 Raymond, ‘Irish Neutrality: Ideology or Pragmatism’, International Affairs, pp. 37-38. 14 B. Whelan, (2000). ‘Integration or Isolation? Ireland and the Invitation to Join the Marshall Plan, in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (Eds), Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism, Dublin: Four Courts Press, [hereafter Whelan, ‘Integration or Isolation? Ireland and the Invitation to Join the Marshall Plan, in Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66], pp. 217-218; Quirke, Irish Foreign Policy, 1945-1955, pp. 96-97, 102-103. 15 Whelan, ‘Integration or Isolation? Ireland and the Invitation to Join the Marshall Plan, in Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66, pp. 217-218. 16 T. Geiger, (2000), ‘The Enthusiastic Response of a Reluctant Supporter: Ireland and the Committee for European Economic Cooperation in the Summer of 1947’, in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (Eds), Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism, Dublin: Four Courts Press, p. 244.
5 government about the appropriateness of UN membership for a neutral state. This surrounded the reality of having to cast votes and make speeches on divisive issues, but also the dilemma of neutrality being compromised by participation in collective security actions under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. This latter reservation was the central concern of both the Government and the Opposition in the Dáil when Fianna Fáil under de Valera proposed membership.17 Nevertheless Ireland had pursued membership of the
UN since 1946, though for almost a decade it was denied admission at the insistence of the Soviet Union.
In late 1955 Ireland finally gained admission to the UN and from this time, the primary manifestation of Irish neutrality proved to be at the UN in New York.18 Thus,
Ireland’s UN policy, particularly in the period 1957-1961 when Fianna Fáil resumed government and Frank Aiken was appointed Minister for External Affairs, was fundamentally designed to advance Irish prestige and status in the international community. Although prestige in international relations was usually displayed through the use of force and the exertion of influence, these avenues were not available to small states.
For Ireland and for many other historically disempowered and disenfranchised states, the pursuit of prestige and status were important because they symbolised independence and, therefore, the legitimacy of these newly independent governments.
The governments of these nations were under pressure to demonstrate to their constituencies their sovereignty and capacity to ensure the cultural, economic and
17 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 102 - 24 July, 1946 - Membership of United Nations Organisation – Motion: 1317-1324.
18 Quirke, Irish Foreign Policy, 1945-1955, pp. 297, 301-302.
6 independent existence of the state. This was achieved by procuring goodwill and enhancing their reputations in the international sphere, which in turn served the purpose of fashioning a particular national image in the domestic sphere. The emphasis on the international arena was aimed at serving a nationalistic and ideological purpose which, in
Ireland’s case, was a means of differentiating Ireland from its former colonial master – the UK. This took the particular form of participation in the UN, where the Irish
Government was prepared to face significant criticism from both domestic and international sources to promote its vision of Irish national identity.19
The establishment of multi-lateral avenues of diplomacy, such as the UN, allowed small states the opportunity for interactive diplomacy on the major issues of international relations. Ireland exercised prestige through the provision of peacekeepers and, more specifically, through polices in the General Assembly that demonstrated its credentials as a good international citizen. Thus, Ireland expanded its international agenda to include disarmament, decolonisation and peacekeeping to demonstrate it was above merely pursuing objectives of self-interest, such as ending partition. Ireland’s efficacy in providing mediation at the UN was premised upon a disinterested perspective in international disputes, which made it more acceptable to the parties involved.20
The most significant departure from neutrality, in terms of Ireland’s UN policy, occurred during its first session at the UN in 1956.21 At this time, Ireland was governed by a coalition led by Fine Gael, which subscribed to a blatant pro-Western ideology.
This conservative policy line manifested in an open hostility towards communism, and
19 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 20 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, pp. 40-41. 21 D. Armstrong, L.Lloyd, & J. Redmond, (1996), From Versailles to Maastricht: International Organisation in the Twentieth Century, New York: St Martin’s Press, [hereafter Armstrong, Lloyd, &
7 especially, the Soviet Union. But this deviation from neutrality was short-lived and, when Fianna Fáil wrested back the reins of government prior to the sitting of the Twelfth
General Assembly Session in 1957, neutrality again became the central feature of Irish foreign policy.22 Fianna Fáil was responsible for Ireland’s neutrality during World War
II and was strongly predisposed to the assumption of a neutral approach to international diplomacy. This was especially the case with the party leadership, notably the Taoiseach,
Eamon de Valera, and the Tánaiste, Frank Aiken, who were both advocates of a return to neutrality. Frank Aiken was the Chairman of the Irish delegation in New York from
1957 to 1969 and became the architect of Ireland’s neutrality at the UN.
IRELAND’S PEACE POLICY AT THE UN
‘Peace Policy’ was a term first employed in the context of Irish diplomacy by Patrick
Keatinge, as a collective term to refer to policies designed to promote international order and peace supporting measures,23 such as peacekeeping, disarmament and détente.24 This designation views these policies as designed to promote international order and circumscribe Cold War geo-political rivalry. “Preventative diplomacy” was the terminology used by the UN Secretary-General (1953-1961), Dag Hammarskjold, to describe such policies aimed at managing the conflict of the Cold War, rather than necessarily resolving it, and became identified with his tenure as UN Secretary-General between 1953 and 1961. In this respect, a distinction is made between Ireland’s policies
Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht], pp. 88-89; Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 29-30. 22 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 26-29, 86-89. 23 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 50. 24 In the context of this thesis, the term détente is used to refer to a condition of international relations, such as that which characterized the Concert of Europe post-1815, rather than necessarily support for the Soviet policy of détente, as engineered by Nikita Khrushchev.
8 on adversarial Cold War geo-political issues and Irish efforts to contain its spread through the intervention and auspices of the UN. Most nations made distinctions between these aspects of policy, including Ireland and even the superpowers, whose diplomacy on issues such as disarmament were characterized by noticeably greater efforts at rapprochement. The Irish delegation was compelled to take a position on geo- political Cold War issues at the UN as they were constantly raised in the General
Assembly for propaganda purposes by both the USA and the Soviet Union. These were issues where the superpowers had direct interests and competed for influence and hegemony in the international community. Consequently, on geo-political Cold War issues Irish policy was reactive, as the UN membership was required to declare allegiance to either of the rival superpower blocs. By contrast, Ireland’s peace policy was much more pro-active and Irish proposals were frequently forwarded on issues including peacekeeping, non-proliferation, other aspects of disarmament and the establishment of Areas of Law and Limited Armaments. The peace policy of the Irish delegation encompassed those issues upon which its UN policy was most active and also, from 1965, those that brought it into most open conflict with French diplomacy and the potential to undermine its application for accession to the EC.
The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The most significant contribution of the Irish UN delegation to the process of disarmament was its advocacy of the “collateral measure” of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the convention of a non-proliferation treaty. In 1957, Aiken spoke out in the General Assembly in support of general disarmament. He argued that non-
9 proliferation was an issue of relevance to both nuclear and non-nuclear powers, because there was a danger of the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organisations or even smaller nations with fewer economic and strategic interests to jeopardise. From 1958, Irish momentum behind non-proliferation gathered speed as
Aiken received the backing of de Valera and the Cabinet.25 When speaking in the general debate of that year, Aiken expressed the view that preliminary measures were required in the absence of an agreement on complete nuclear disarmament, which remained a distant, if not unrealistic objective. Therefore, Ireland sought a treaty restricting nuclear weapons to the acknowledged nuclear powers26 and proscribing all other states from the manufacture, purchase, possession or supply of nuclear weapons.27
Aiken’s proposal was amended to accommodate the suggestions of other delegations and was eventually introduced into the First Committee’s general disarmament debate on 17 October 1958. The draft resolution called for the establishment of a committee to investigate the dangers posed by further proliferation of nuclear weapons and formulate proposals about how such dangers could be averted.28
The proposition received positive support from several neutral and non-aligned states, as well as the tacit endorsement of certain members of the Cold War blocs. The problem for
Ireland was that the nuclear powers of the West – France, the UK and the USA – vehemently opposed the measure. France’s intransigence was related to the fact that it was about to conduct its first nuclear test and resented any international instrument that could be viewed as limiting its sovereignty, while the UK and the USA remained
25 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 248-250. 26 This included the USA, Soviet Union, the UK and, although at this stage they were only on the threshold of developing nuclear weapons, France and the People’s Republic of China. 27 A/PV.751, 19 September 1958.
10 skeptical of Soviet adherence to an international treaty without an effective monitoring program.29 This skepticism on the part of the UK and the USA was fuelled by the
Soviets’ initiative in 1957 of deploying nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe.
Washington realized this meant that US forces in Western Europe were now more vulnerable to a Soviet attack and Western Europe was terrified that they could be withdrawn.30
The Irish delegation engaged in furious diplomatic negotiations to persuade the intransigent Western nuclear powers to abstain, rather than actively oppose its non- proliferation measure. Nevertheless, France, the UK and the USA announced that they would oppose Ireland’s draft resolution. US opposition doomed the draft resolution to failure and, consequently, on 4 November 1958, it was withdrawn by Aiken who referred the issue of non-proliferation to the Disarmament Commission in Geneva.31 But before doing so, Aiken requested the First Committee vote on the second paragraph, which called on the Assembly to recognise the danger posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although Aiken’s proposal was successful and unopposed, it drew numerous abstentions from the Western bloc.32 It should be noted that abstention on disarmament issues was an indication of disapproval. Nations were reluctant to actively vote against a
28 A/C.1/PV.953, 17 October 1958. 29 C. Manathunga, (1997), ‘The Evolution of Irish Disarmament Initiatives at the United Nations, 1957- 1961’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 7, [hereafter Manathunga, ‘The Evolution of Irish Disarmament Initiatives at the United Nations, 1957-1961’, Irish Studies in International Affairs], pp. 104- 107. 30 W. Bader, (1993), The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, New York: Pegasus, [hereafter Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons], p. 38. 31 Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 38. 32 A/C.1/PV.970, 31 October 1958.
11 particular resolution for fear that it could be perceived as opposition to the principle of disarmament.33
In 1959, the Irish delegation sought to resurrect its non-proliferation draft resolution. It was believed that the lack of progress in Geneva, doubts about the future of the UN Disarmament Commission and a possible change in Washington’s recalcitrance enhanced the prospects of the draft resolution securing the required two-thirds majority.34
In particular, increased publicity detrimental to the nuclear industry in the West ensured that the issue could not easily be dismissed as easily as it had been previously.
Consequently, Aiken had non-proliferation inscribed on the agenda of the Fourteenth
General Assembly and, in mid-November 1959, introduced a draft resolution into the
First Committee. It proposed that the Disarmament Committee35 consider ways of averting the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the viability of an international agreement and subjection to international inspection and control. Because the draft resolution called for the discussion of a treaty, rather than a commitment to one, and also endorsed inspection procedures, the USA decided to support it. Aiken had modified the resolution to accommodate US interests, by ensuring that it referred to control of nuclear weapons, rather than merely possession.36 Consequently, the resolution passed both the First Committee and the plenary without opposition.37 The
Soviet Union refused to support the Irish resolution on non-proliferation in 1959,
33 Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 42. 34 Manathunga, ‘The Evolution of Irish Disarmament Initiatives at the United Nations, 1957-1961’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, pp. 109-110. 35 The Disarmament Commission was a large unwieldy body with representation from all the UN member- states. The Disarmament Committee was a smaller body with more limited membership and where the details of disarmament initiatives were formulated. 36 Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 41. 37 Report on the 14th General Assembly Session, National Archives of Ireland, Department of the Taoiseach File S 16051B [hereafter NAI, DT].
12 however, because it permitted the relocation of weapons to various strategic positions provided control of those weapons was not relinquished.38 Nevertheless, the Irish resolution was the first step towards the formulation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that eventuated in 1968.
When the Disarmament Committee convened in 1960, it was prevented from addressing non-proliferation after the Soviet Union boycotted the talks in June. This failure to make any progress prompted Aiken to seek the reinstatement of non- proliferation on the agenda of the Fifteenth Session. After the failure of the Disarmament
Committee to achieve any progress, he was determined to make his next resolution more forceful, though he realized that this would engender greater opposition. The draft resolution called for all governments to endeavour to reach an agreement regarding non- proliferation and, in the meantime, for the nuclear powers to refrain from disseminating such weapons or the technology to produce them, and for the non-nuclear nations to desist from attempting to acquire them. On 20 December 1960, the General Assembly adopted the Irish resolution by a vote of 68 to 0 with 26 abstentions. Ireland received the support of most of the non-aligned states, four NATO nations – Canada, Denmark,
Iceland and Norway – as well as the Soviet bloc.39
But the large number of abstentions included France, the UK, the USA and most other NATO nations. The overt justification for this was that the text did not recognise the responsibility of the nuclear powers to halt vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons
38 United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, (1985), The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1985, New York: Author [hereafter UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament], p. 73. 39 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 261.
13 and, also, did not specify a duration for the commitment.40 But the reality was that the
Irish resolution of 1960 went further than the resolution of the previous year, and referred to control of information and not just control of weapons. This was the foundation of the objections of the USA and its NATO allies. For, at that time, they were considering proposals for the use and control of nuclear weapons within NATO. The Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe, General Norstad, and the European members of NATO, were putting pressure on Washington to upgrade the nuclear technology of the European member-states. Support for the Irish resolution was untenable, therefore, because it would have undermined any such future nuclear arrangement with NATO and ruled out the ‘European option’, where Western Europe developed its own nuclear force.41
The objections of NATO were rescinded in 1961 when, prior to the sitting of the
General Assembly in September, the USA and the UK announced that they had incorporated the quest for a non-proliferation treaty in their disarmament policies. The
Irish delegation responded by proposing a new draft resolution calling for the expeditious conclusion of a permanent non-proliferation treaty, which abandoned all references to voluntary or temporary measures. It was unanimously adopted by the First Committee and, four days later, by the General Assembly.42 This non-proliferation initiative was one of the primary components of Ireland’s neutrality policy and responsible for significantly enhancing its prestige in the international arena, especially with respect to facilitating disarmament.
Ireland’s advocacy of a non-proliferation treaty marked an important evolution of its peace policy. The establishment of nuclear free zones was characteristic of the
40 UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament, p. 74. 41 Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 42-43, 46-47.
14 Soviets’ preferred means of disarmament, not the formulation of a comprehensive treaty.
Initially the USA, NATO and the West were hostile to any efforts to prevent dissemination and, prior to 1961, Washington attempted to ‘nullify’ or modify the Irish efforts to achieve a non-proliferation treaty.43 Irish persistence proved to be effective in altering the view of the USA and the West and ensuring support for a treaty on the issue became the hallmark of the NATO preference for progress on non-proliferation.44 The
Irish contribution was important in reconciling the positions of the USA and the Soviet
Union, as it would be bi-lateral support from the superpowers that would ensure the formulation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968.
The Suspension of Nuclear-Testing
Though not assuming a similarly active role as it had regarding non-proliferation, the Irish delegation also supported measures at the General Assembly designed to suspend nuclear testing. In this respect, there was a strong link between Ireland’s policies on non-proliferation and the suspension of nuclear testing. At the Thirteenth
General Assembly Session in 1958, a group of seventeen Western nations introduced a draft resolution into the First Committee calling for the suspension of nuclear tests for a period of one year from 31 October of that year. It provided for the perpetuation of the moratorium if the control system proved to be competent and there was further progress towards disarmament. The Soviet Union also submitted a draft resolution addressing the issue, which called for the immediate termination of tests, recommended superpower agreement to facilitate this and called for all nations to abide by this covenant. Aiken
42 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 263. 43 Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 36.
15 intended to support any resolution that could garner widespread, if not unanimous support on the issue. When a compromise proposal sponsored by India and Yugoslavia failed, the Irish delegation transferred its support to the Western measure, which was adopted.45
This new international regime was challenged almost immediately, as France prepared to test a nuclear device in the Sahara. France’s intentions focused international attention on the issue of nuclear testing, as a group of African nations lodged protests with Paris. Through its Ambassador in Paris, William Fay, Ireland also expressed its concerns about the ramifications of the impending tests.46 In the General Assembly’s debate, Aiken expressed Ireland’s unease about the tests and if they were inevitable, he urged France to mollify the African nations by conducting them underground. The Irish delegation supported the General Assembly resolution articulating these views. Though it failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority in the First Committee, the resolution was adopted by the Assembly at a vote of 46 to 26 with 10 abstentions.47
The Disarmament Committee
In 1957, the Irish delegation to the UN also furthered the process of disarmament with its mediation in the dispute on the composition of the Disarmament Committee. In
November of that year, the progress towards détente was seriously undermined when the
Soviet Union commenced a boycott of the Disarmament Committee and its sub- committee. The Soviet grievance was based on the membership of the committees,
44 UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament, p. 73. 45 Report on the 13th General Assembly Session, NAI, DT S 16051A. 46 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 117-118. 47 Ibid.
16 which disproportionately favoured the West, whose delegates steadfastly refused to consider any expansion to accommodate Soviet concerns. The Disarmament Committee encompassed the 12 members of the Security Council and Canada, while the sub- committee comprised the Soviet Union, the UK, France, the USA and Canada. The
Soviet Union’s preference was for the constitution of the committee to be expanded to include all of the members of the General Assembly.48
Speaking in the First Committee, Ireland’s Permanent Representative to the UN,
Freddy Boland, expressed his concern that the sub-committee’s progress was hampered by the Cold War political rhetoric that accompanied public scrutiny. Consequently, the
Irish delegation believed that the problems of the Disarmament Committee would only be exacerbated by increased or ubiquitous membership. He pointed out that when the sub- committee had been established, keeping its deliberations classified had been proposed as a means of averting this dilemma. This prompted Ireland to oppose the Soviet draft resolution to provide universal membership, as well as an Albanian draft resolution
(introduced at the behest of the Soviet Union) to increase membership to 32 and, also, to abstain on a compromise proposal from Canada, India and Yugoslavia to increase membership to 25. Although the compromise proposal was adopted, the stalemate continued as the Soviet Union refused to engage with either the UN Disarmament
Committee, or the sub-committee.49
Prior to the convocation of the Fourteenth General Assembly Session in 1959, the
USA, the UK, France and the Soviet Union had agreed upon the reconstitution of the
Disarmament Committee. The revamped body would comprise ten members, including
48 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 118-120. 49 Ibid., pp. 120-121.
17 five each from the Soviet and Western blocs. Concerned at the prospect of an adverse reaction by the non-aligned states to this arbitrary circumvention of the UN by the superpower blocs, a cadre of neutral and non-aligned nations agreed to introduce the draft resolution to facilitate its acceptance in the interests of détente. This group consisted of the neutrals, Ireland and Sweden, as well as four non-aligned states – India, Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic50 and Ecuador.51 The resolution was accepted unanimously by the Disarmament Commission on 11 September 1959. Ireland’s role in the acceptance of the resolution was indicative of its efforts to style itself as a neutral mediator between the blocs to assist in the facilitation of détente.
Areas of Law
On 23 September 1959, Aiken presented one of his most significant contributions to the process of détente in an address to the Fourteenth General Assembly during the general debate. Aiken proposed that certain regional areas, particularly those functioning as focal points of tension between the Cold War blocs, guarantee their intention to uphold the UN Charter and the ascendancy of international law, in return for security assurances from other member nations. In practice, this meant that non-nuclear states would agree to an embargo on the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or others of mass destruction, in return for the promise of defence by a UN force. Aiken earmarked central Europe and former colonies as these possible Areas of Law. His intention was to lessen tension by focusing on collective security administered by the UN, rather than antagonistic, national
50 The United Arab Republic was the name given to the union between Syria and Egypt from 1958-1961. Although Egypt continued to use this name between 1961 and 1971, in this dissertation Egypt has been used to refer to the nation from 1961.
18 defence arrangements. Such a proposal would also function to increase the authority of the UN.52 Aiken’s initiative was received without enthusiasm by the superpower blocs, which did not have sufficient trust in each other to voluntarily adhere to such a proposal.
But this initiative on Aiken’s part resulted in the enhancement of Ireland’s reputation as a neutral nation and demonstrated its commitment to the containment of tension as an issue of particular priority.53
Aiken’s Areas of Law initiative for Central Europe stemmed from his proposals for disarmament in the region during the 1957 debate on the report of the Special
Committee on Hungary, which had been instituted by the Eleventh General Assembly in
1956. Speaking on the first day of the deliberations, he articulated his desire to see a withdrawal of foreign troops on both sides of the iron curtain. The Irish Minister for
External Affairs suggested that such a retreat should occur in stages and be based on geographical distance, rather than political boundaries. Accordingly, NATO and the
Warsaw Pact would have to agree to withdraw their forces a certain number of kilometers from their border in Western Europe, rather than evacuate particular countries. The objective of this solution was to remove the loss of prestige and other emotional variables associated with geo-political competition for hegemony. Aiken also suggested that a UN inspection force, comprised of nations not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, observe the withdrawal as witnesses.54
The Tánaiste made the speech against the advice of Ireland’s Permanent
Representative to the UN, Freddy Boland, who was concerned that it could appear to
51 Cable from the Irish delegation in New York to Dublin, 11 September 1959, National Archives of Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs File 440/8/4 [hereafter NAI, DFA]. 52 A/PV.805, 23 September 1959.
19 have been inspired by a similar initiative from the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev.
Nevertheless, Aiken persevered because he had de Valera’s support and thought that it would stimulate a resolution amenable to both the Soviet Union and the USA.55 The speech was well received by the non-aligned states, though both the Soviet bloc and the
NATO alliance remained skeptical about its viability. Though an idealistic rather than realistic proposition, and one ultimately abandoned by Aiken himself, nonetheless, it was the product of his conception of Ireland’s neutrality wherein small states could perform constructive roles.56
Other Aspects of Ireland’s Peace Policy
In 1961, the Irish delegation’s commitment to détente and a policy of neutrality were recognised. Ireland was nominated to fill a non-bloc position in the revamped
Disarmament Committee, which would include five NATO nations, five Warsaw Pact nations and eight non-bloc states. In the end, however, Aiken was compelled to refuse the nomination because the delegation did not have the personnel to take up the appointment. But the fact that Ireland was recognised as a neutral nation contributed to its ability to make an impact on issues pertaining to détente and disarmament.57
Most of the crises requiring the insertion of UN peacekeepers were problems inherited from colonial occupation. The Secretary-General of the UN, Dag
Hammarskjold, believed in the necessity of involving European nations in assisting with the solution to these problems, but his choices in this regard were limited to those nations
53 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 113; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 163. 54 A/PV.669, 10 September 1957. 55 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 53-54.
20 without histories as colonial powers. Ireland, along with Sweden and Yugoslavia, were amongst a minority of European states deemed suitable for such roles. Consequently,
Irish soldiers served in both observer and peacekeeping missions. For example, Ireland deployed two battalions of troops and lost twenty-six soldiers in the course of the operation in the Congo (1960-1964) – Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC).
Ireland also despatched officers to the observer missions in Lebanon, the Sinai and West
Irian. Thus, in the early 1960s, Ireland commenced a tradition of peacekeeping that has evolved into one of its most significant contributions to the UN and became the hallmark of Irish peace policy.58
IRELAND AND THE COLD WAR AT THE UN
Ireland’s peace policy developed on issues that were related to the Cold War and in an effort to contain its spread. But, although Ireland’s peace policy gave it an avenue of forwarding proposals for disarmament and détente, by the nature of the UN system,
Ireland was compelled to take a stance on most geo-political Cold War issues. The strategy of the Irish delegation in dealing with this dilemma was usually to minimize its interventions in debate, except on issues where criticism of communist policies could be justified in the context of neutrality. Irish diplomats would not criticize Washington in circumstances similar to those that resulted in its criticism of Moscow or Beijing, and this was given further weight by frequent votes in support of US policy.
The Middle East
56 Ibid., pp. 129-131; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 111-113. 57 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 256-258.
21 At the 12th General Assembly in 1957, Ireland’s neutrality on Cold War matters was best exemplified by its stance on the Middle East. Aiken’s general debate speech acknowledged that, though the crisis in the Suez in 1956 had been alleviated, there was concern the Middle East remained the object of competition between the superpower blocs seeking to attract new adherents. He implored the superpowers to cease their diplomatic rivalry in the region, as it was responsible for the escalation of tensions, the incitement of civil strife and national war, as well as being antithetical to independence.
Furthermore, Aiken argued for the establishment of a UN commission to promote rapprochement between the rival states of the region and the apolitical economic development of the area.59 Both Israel and the Arab nations received the proposal positively, though it did provoke consternation in Western circles.
In July 1958, tensions in the Middle East were exacerbated when an anti-western faction overthrew the Hashimite dynasty in Iraq, which had been central to the Baghdad
Pact and the containment of the spread of communist influence through the region. In response to the coup, the USA and the UK sent troops to Lebanon and Jordan, respectively, to protect their interests in these nations and ensure the revolution did not spread. At the urging of Krushchev, on 13 August 1958, an Emergency Session of the
General Assembly was called to discuss the US and British actions. The USA sought to have the UN provide a moral endorsement of the Anglo-American intervention. But this was opposed by the Soviet bloc which, with support from certain Arab and African nations, called for the condemnation of the UK and the USA.
58 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 269-270, 275-276. 59 A/PV.682, 20 September 1957.
22 The Irish delegation was convinced of the necessity for neutral and non-aligned nations to attempt to mediate between the polarised positions of the Cold War blocs to achieve a workable compromise.60 On 14 August 1958 at the Special Session, Aiken called for the adoption of various proposals to address the major international issues plaguing the Middle East, rather than just the immediate cause of the convocation of the session (the presence of foreign troops in Lebanon and Jordan). The basis of his proposals was the endorsement of the status quo in the region and recognition of the state of Israel. This precondition was perennially the defining criteria of the Western position on the situation in the Middle East and was, as one commentator on Irish UN affairs has noted, ‘extremely provocative since no Arab state had yet recognized Israel; indeed, they all considered it a mortal enemy.’61 Most of Aiken’s proposals were aimed at satisfying the necessary conditions for this to occur, including the signing of non-aggression pacts between Israel and its Arab neighbours and guaranteeing of nations’ free access to the resources of the region. This last point was largely a reference to Israel’s access to the
Suez Canal, resource pipe lines and oil reserves, which was disavowed by the Arab states.62 As a consequence, Ireland’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Freddy
Boland, unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade Aiken from advancing the proposals because he believed it to be ‘a great mistake… [that] no Arab government would make the concession suggested at any price… [and it] would associate Ireland with the West as an enemy of Arab nationalism’.63
60 C. C. O’Brien, (1998), Memoire: My Life and Themes, Dublin: Poolbeg Press, [hereafter O’Brien, Memoire], p. 192. 61 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 152. 62 Ibid. 63 Cited in Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 70.
23 Despite Arab hostility to the substantive elements of Aiken’s proposals (those purporting to address the underlying causes of regional tension), a number of the humanitarian aspects received widespread support, including the internationalisation of the Holy Places, establishment of a UN fund for the economic development of the region, and quarantining of the region from the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Though, it must be noted that the general solution to the refugee problem entertained by Aiken was resettlement or repatriation, the first of which was inimical to the Arab position.64
The Emergency Session’s final resolution, which was sponsored by ten Arab nations, excluded most of Aiken’s proposals, especially those that purported to address the underlying causes of tension in the region. The resolution was passed unanimously and, in September, the British and US troops withdrew from the region.65 Nevertheless, some of Aiken’s proposals were included in the resolution, including the UN’s endorsement of the Arab League’s aspiration for closer unity, a plea for the cessation of foreign interference in Arab affairs and a call for the Secretary-General to help resolve the crisis and examine the plausibility of establishing an economic development fund.
Despite Aiken’s attempts to resolve the more permanent issues plaguing the Middle East, the advocates of the Arab states preferred to concentrate on the immediate objective of securing the withdrawal of foreign troops from Jordan and Lebanon. The Irish delegation was disappointed with the outcome as it remained only a provisional settlement and, moreover, did not guarantee the right of existence to Israel, which Aiken believed to be the underlying cause of regional tension.66
64 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 155. 65 Report on the 3rd Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, NAI, DT S 16057C. 66 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 72-74; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 156-158.
24 The debate on the Middle East was significant because Ireland openly declared its support for the recognition of the legitimacy of Israel’s existence, which was a specifically Western objective. This was despite the fact that at this stage Ireland had not yet extended de jure recognition to the state of Israel.67 Aiken’s efforts in New York reiterated that Ireland perceived its neutrality at the UN to include the obligation of facilitating détente and the necessity of addressing the underlying causes of international tension. But the UN’s discussion of the issue was also momentous, because it was the first sign of the USA’s moral majority in the General Assembly being undermined by the influx of newly independent non-aligned states, with their anti-colonial agendas.
Washington was forced to face the realisation that it could no longer use the General
Assembly to provide moral sanction to its policies and, thus, it became more tolerant of delegations not subscribing completely to US policies. The consequence for the Irish delegation was that, from 1958, it could pursue a policy of neutrality with less interference and pressure from the USA, especially on issues where there had been previous conflict between the delegations such as the representation of China at the UN.68
67 P. Wylie, (2000), ‘The Virtual Minimum’: Ireland’s Decision for De Facto Recognition of Israel, 1947- 9. In Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (Eds), Irish Foreign Policy. Dublin: Four Courts Press, [hereafter Wylie, ‘The Virtual Minimum’: Ireland’s Decision for De Facto Recognition of Israel, 1947-9, in Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66], p. 154. 68 O’Brien, Memoire, p. 192.
25 Tibet
Ireland’s policy on Tibetan independence was a case where two fundamental components of Irish foreign policy overlapped – support for the rights of small nations and anti-communism. When the issue of Tibetan independence arose in the late 1950s,
Ireland’s position entailed strident criticism of Communist China. The Tibetan revolt of
1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to asylum in India acted as catalysts for the raising of this issue at the General Assembly. On 12 April 1959, Aiken delivered a speech during a Fianna Fáil convention in Dundalk, which condemned Communist China’s suppression of Tibet. The Minister for External Affairs’ speech articulated the concerns of numerous small nations around the world, including both European neutrals and non- aligned Asian nations (who were reluctant to articulate their concerns due to their geographical vulnerability to Communist China).69 Ireland’s neutral diplomatic posture, as well as its geographic distance from Beijing, made it well suited to the provision of such a critical commentary. At the same time, it is significant that Aiken, who was initially reluctant to speak on the issue, was convinced to do so by Boland who was the member of the Irish delegation most in favour of a closer relationship to the USA and most opposed to the policy of neutrality.70
Aiken wanted to raise the issue of Tibet at the UN and so, on 28 September 1959,
Ireland, in association with Malaya,71 co-sponsored the inscription of the issue of Tibet on the Assembly’s agenda. It was agreed that UN’s intervention would be confined to a discussion of Beijing’s human rights record and efface the matter of Tibetan sovereignty.
69 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 102; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 174-175. 70 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 202-204.
26 On 7 October, Aiken spoke in favour of inscribing the issue of Tibet on the Assembly’s agenda. But in doing so, he found himself compelled to respond to Soviet accusations that he was acting at the behest of the USA. Affirming that Ireland’s UN policy was motivated by respect for the UN Charter, not by Cold War politics, Aiken declared that it was the duty of small nations, such as Ireland, to advocate the rights of other small nations. He also argued that the UN had a responsibility to discuss violations of human rights, irrespective of whether or not the offender was a member of the organization, insisting that the UN Charter’s endorsement of sovereignty over domestic affairs did not preclude discussion of human rights violations. Aiken’s speech was persuasive and instrumental in having the General Committee place Tibet on the agenda of the General
Assembly. On 20 October, Aiken seconded a draft resolution on the issue after its introduction by Malaya – which proved to be successful – calling for negotiations between Communist China and the Dalai Lama for peaceful relations that would permit
Tibet self-determination.72
In 1960, the Dalai Lama approached Aiken and requested that Ireland sponsor another draft resolution concerning the situation in Tibet. He emphasised a recent press statement by the International Commission of Jurists, which reported that acts of genocide were being conducted in Tibet and that the state had been autonomous at the time of the intervention by Communist China. After serious consideration, Aiken refused to sponsor inscription of this issue because he believed support had deteriorated since the
71 Malaya, or West Malaysia, was the key constituent of the Federation of Malaysia, which was later formed in 1963. In 1963 Malaya joined with East Malaysia and Singapore to form Malaysia, though Singapore withdrew two years later. 72 A/PV.831, 20 October 1959.
27 last session.73 Nevertheless, Ireland joined Malaya, Thailand and El Salvador as co- sponsors of the draft resolution, which was again confined to the violations of human rights perpetrated by Communist China. At the Dalai Lama’s behest, several non-aligned
Afro-Asian nations sought to have the resolution amended to include a reference to
Tibet’s right to self-determination. Ireland opposed this addition because it diminished the probability of the draft resolution being passed.74
In May 1961, the Dalai Lama approached the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, about again raising the issue of Tibet at the General Assembly. Lemass responded that
Ireland’s course of action would be dictated by the probability of success and, therefore, it could not consider the inclusion of references pertaining to Tibet’s right to self- determination.75 Again, Ireland took no part in the inscription of the item on the
Assembly’s agenda. Nevertheless, on 19 December, in response to persistent requests from the Dalai Lama, Aiken spoke on the Tibetan issue in the Plenary. He expressed his belief that the terms of the “Declaration on the Rapid Ending of Colonialism”, adopted by the Assembly on 14 December 1960, applied to Tibet and called on Communist China to open negotiations. His draft resolution, which expressed the urgency of such a course of action, was adopted by a vote of 56 to none with 29 abstentions.76
Aiken’s support for Tibet was driven by a variety of different motivations. In accordance with Ireland’s interests, he was an advocate of small nations’ rights in a world where great power interests dictated international relations. At the same time, though, Irish policy on Tibet enabled Aiken to pursue a policy compatible with
73 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 202-204. 74 Memorandum on resumed 15th General Assembly Session, NAI, DT S 16051C. 75 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 235. 76 A/PV.1084, 19 December 1961.
28 neutrality, which could also repair some of the damage done in relations with the West over this same neutrality. Thus, while the Irish delegation seized the opportunity to criticise Beijing over Tibet, it also insisted on realistic and tempered resolutions.
In the case of both the Middle East and Tibet, Ireland pursued objectives aimed at solving underlying regional tension but, at the same time, various aspects of Irish policy betrayed its Western leanings. Thus, in the case of the Middle East, the Irish delegation sought recognition of the existence of Israel, which was a specifically Western objective.
On the Tibetan issue, Aiken took a leading role in the debates, labelling the occupation by Communist China as colonial and accusing Beijing of violating the human rights of the Tibetan people. Ireland would not have taken such a leading and strident position against the USA in a similar situation. This was why the Soviet delegation accused
Aiken of acting at the behest of the USA and questioned Irish neutrality when it came to
Cold War issues.
The Representation of China at the UN
As a consequence of Ireland’s role in these debates at the UN as well as its policy on other Cold War issues, notably support for the UN intervention in Korea, the Irish delegation came under increasing criticism that its neutrality was prejudiced by Cold War
Western loyalties. The most controversial manifestation of Irish neutrality at the UN concerned the representation of China and was designed to reverse this perception. Since the inception of the UN in 1945, China’s seat had been occupied by the nationalist regime. But, in 1949, Chinese communist forces defeated their nationalist opponents in the civil war and declared the existence of the People’s Republic of China. Thus, from
29 1949, the Chinese seat at the UN had been occupied by the regime that actually governed only Taiwan, with the vast majority of the Chinese populace on the mainland remaining unrepresented.
At the Steering Committee’s discussion of the agenda for the General Assembly in 1957, India, with the backing of the non-aligned African and Asian states, raised the question of the representation of China. When the USA scuttled the proposal at the
Steering Committee, India responded by instituting an amendment to its proposition that would have seen the question placed on the General Assembly’s agenda. Although this amendment was defeated, Ireland voted with India, most of the African and Asian nations, the Soviet bloc and the Scandinavian nations, against the USA’s perennial resolution to suspend this question.77
Aiken had forewarned the US delegation of his voting intention two days prior to the controversial vote. The US Secretary of State, John Dulles, responded by convincing the Catholic Archbishop of New York, Cardinal Spellman, to intervene and attempt to persuade Ireland to reconsider its position. The US Ambassador in Dublin, Scott
McLeod, also called upon the Taoiseach, de Valera, as well as Aiken, to express his government’s disappointment with Ireland’s voting intention. The USA was concerned that Ireland’s dissent from the US led Western bloc would encourage other nations to adopt maverick positions, thereby eroding the unity of the West and undermining
Washington’s moral authority in the General Assembly. The US intervened in this instance, because Irish policy on the issue was uncharacteristic for a nation that was usually a reliable supporter of US diplomacy. Nevertheless, Washington’s interference
77 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 69; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 115.
30 in the formulation of Irish policy only succeeded in further entrenching Ireland’s position on the issue.78
On 23 September 1957, Aiken clarified the reasons for the Irish position in an address to the General Committee of the General Assembly. He stated that Ireland did not sympathise with the ideology of the Beijing regime and, in fact, condemned its aggression, but believed that refusal to discuss the issue would be counterproductive.
Aiken insisted that there should be no circumscription of the subjects discussed at the
UN, irrespective of the political investments of the superpower blocs. The issue of concern to Ireland was not the communist nature of the regime in Beijing, but the right of the UN to discuss the issue. The USA traditionally used the annual resurrection of the issue of Chinese representation to display its hegemony in the General Assembly. As such, this issue offered the perfect opportunity for Ireland to articulate its independence from the Western bloc in the most significant avenue of the UN – voting. Aiken attempted to mollify other nations of the Western bloc by delivering a scathing reproach of the communist government’s civil rights record.79 Nevertheless, although an uncharacteristic departure from US policy, Ireland’s vote against the US resolution was largely responsible for enhancing the nation’s reputation for neutrality, particularly amongst the non-aligned states.
At subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, when the issue arose again, the
USA continued its resort to coercion in an attempt to persuade the Irish to oppose discussion of the representation of China. The Irish delegation also endured considerable pressure to reverse its policy from various other avenues. In particular, the Taiwanese
78 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 46-48; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 115-117.
31 Embassy in Washington, representatives of Irish missionaries in Asia, the Irish press and the Catholic Church all articulated concern at Ireland’s policy, on the basis of Beijing’s poor human rights record. Despite these protests, the Irish delegation continued to support inscription of this issue until the USA ceased its opposition to any discussion of
China’s representation at the UN in 1961.80 Ireland’s intransigent position on the matter was one of the most prominent manifestations of its neutrality at the UN and continues to be highlighted as an example of the positive contribution of the Irish to international diplomacy.81 But it should be noted that in the context of Cold War issues at the UN,
Ireland’s position on the discussion of the representation of China was significant because it was an exception to the Irish policy trend on such issues, which explains the consternation it engendered in Washington.
IRELAND AND DECOLONISATION AT THE UN
Irish diplomacy with respect to decolonization, which was often partisan, has been responsible for much of the ambiguity about the suitability of neutrality as an epithet to describe Ireland’s UN policy. But such a criticism would be equally applicable to all of the neutral and non-aligned states, who took varying stances on a multitude of issues according to their particular national interests. At the UN, Ireland was an ardent supporter of decolonisation, and at times this meant providing a mediatory role in disputes, whilst at others an aggressive pursuit of decolonization that was often adversarial to Western interests. Therefore, in the context of decolonisation, Ireland’s
79 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 115. 80 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 66-68, 99-101. 81 For further consideration about the rationale underlying Ireland’s stance on the representation of China, refer to chapter six.
32 neutrality was an ambiguous policy, defined often by its independence from Western influence, but in other cases by taking a middle position on the issues. Ireland particularly demonstrated its independence in the debates on French colonial territories, such as Algeria and French Togoland, which were the most prominent decolonization issues before the UN, as well as those of Southern Africa, which were gaining increasing exposure in the General Assembly.
Algeria
In the late 1950s, issues of decolonisation dominated the Assembly agenda and the issue of the independence of Algeria was one of the most bitterly fought. It was a perennial issue at the UN and strained relations between the Irish and French delegations in New York. France’s recalcitrance in granting independence had sparked an escalation of violence from pro-independence Algerian nationals. But, instead of granting independence, France had merely redefined the legal relationship between Paris and
Algeria. In the General Assembly’s general debate in 1957, Aiken addressed the issue, calling for Algeria’s independence to be facilitated under internationally supervised elections. The speech provoked consternation in the French media and within the French
Government as the French Sous-Secrétaire d’ Éta à la Marine Marchande canceling meetings with his Irish counterpart, Erskine Childers, over the speech.82 In December,
Ireland’s resolve on the issue was challenged when the Afro-Asian bloc introduced a draft resolution into the First Committee invoking Algeria’s right of self-determination.
The wording of the draft resolution ensured that it would never be acceptable to France or its allies in the Western bloc. Ireland, Canada and Norway proposed two amendments
33 to the wording of the proposal to make it more acceptable to France and, also, to acknowledge the fact that the General Assembly could not effectively compel action.
The amended resolution failed, however, as it was deadlocked with a vote of 37 to 37 with 6 abstentions. Later in December, when the report of the First Committee came before the plenary, a compromise resolution co-sponsored by Ireland was unanimously endorsed. This compromise resolution confined itself to registering the UN’s concern over Algeria and expressing a desire to see negotiations held to find a solution to the crisis. The French were satisfied with this result and with Ireland’s efforts to achieve a universally acceptable outcome. Irish support for Algerian self-determination at this time, despite strong Western and particularly French opposition, proved to be the harbinger of the future mediatory role of this small, neutral state and helped to establish the nation’s anti-colonial credentials.83
Ireland’s efforts to forge further compromise resolutions in response to other developments of the Algerian issue continued at subsequent sessions. On 11 December
1958, the Counsellor of the Irish delegation, Conor Cruise O’Brien, argued in the First
Committee for the right to self-determination of the Algerian people and called upon
France to open negotiations with the primary Algerian independence organisation, the
Front de libération nationale (FLN). Again, Ireland was instrumental in amending some extreme language in an Afro-Asian draft resolution to enhance the proposal’s prospect of success.84 But, despite these efforts on the part of the Irish delegation, the draft resolution failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority, albeit by only one vote.
82 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 128-130. 83 Ibid., pp. 36-38; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 129-131. 84 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 64-65.
34 This failure hardened the stance of the Afro-Asian nations, which were no longer willing to compromise on the language of the draft resolution. As a result, it had little hope of achieving the requisite two-thirds majority, though the Afro-Asian sponsors were more intent on making a political statement than attaining a viable resolution. Despite pleas from Boland to revise the text of the draft resolution to enhance the prospect of it being adopted, the sponsors remained obstinate because of the FLN’s opposition to such amendments. Boland expressly stated that the draft resolution would fail without the amendments, which was the result sought by France. Thus, when the draft resolution was introduced to the First Committee without any amendments, Ireland decided to abstain in the voting. As Boland predicted, the proposal was defeated more decisively than it had been in the vote at the previous session.85
In December 1959, there were efforts to resurrect the Irish amendments in order to achieve a compromise resolution. The French Ambassador, Berard, pressured Boland to cease his efforts to produce a resolution along such lines. But, despite French opposition, the Irish amendments were incorporated into the draft resolution, though the
Afro-Asian delegates refused to remove certain contentious paragraphs. Consequently,
Ireland abstained on the controversial second paragraph and, when it passed, on the draft resolution as a whole. Again, the draft resolution was defeated.86 Nonetheless, the incident demonstrated Ireland’s determination to strive for a compromise between the protagonists in this contentious matter.
On 15 December 1960, in a speech to the First Committee, Aiken promoted the idea of an internationally supervised referendum in Algeria under the aegis of the UN.
85 Ibid., pp. 81-83. 86 Ibid., pp. 91-93.
35 Due to more conciliatory language in the Afro-Asian draft resolution, Ireland elected to give its support this time, despite France lobbying against the measure. Four days after the vote on this matter in the First Committee, the French Ambassador in Dublin complained about Ireland’s voting position and requested an abstention on the plenary vote, irrespective of whether or not the draft resolution was modified. But, Ireland still supported the measure, along with a considerable majority in the General Assembly.87
Indeed, during the regular, ongoing discussion and debate of the Algerian issue, the Irish delegation persistently supported Algerian self-determination and, despite French pressure to the contrary, resolutely engaged in efforts to achieve workable resolutions.
French Togoland
At the General Assembly Session of 1957, the Irish delegation attempted to repair its relations with France and provided mediation in the deliberations concerning French
Togoland. The UN Commission established by the Eleventh General Assembly to investigate the colony’s capacity for self-rule reported its findings. The report advocated holding another referendum on whether French Togoland should have independence, or autonomy within France. Ireland was heavily involved in negotiations to produce a draft resolution amenable to both parties in the dispute. In mid-November, Ireland co- sponsored a resolution that had the agreement of both parties, whereby France would transfer all powers excluding defence, foreign affairs and currency to Togoland and hold
UN supervised elections for a Legislative Assembly. This representative assembly would then be invested with the power to decide Togoland’s status. The Fourth Committee and the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted the resolution, with France expressing its
87 Ibid., p. 184-186. 36 appreciation for Ireland’s contribution to the compromise.88 Ireland’s role in the process signified that its neutrality was not just about voting on conscience, but also involved mediating between the adversaries of disputes in order to facilitate workable compromises.
Namibia
In the late 1950s, a number of issues in Southern Africa emerged that would, within a decade, come to dominate the deliberations of the General Assembly. Although
Ireland’s position on these issues reinforced its neutral disposition on decolonization, it did not have the significance that it would have a decade later. In Namibia,89 the South
African Government had instituted apartheid soon after the National Party assumed power in Pretoria in 1948. This was exacerbated by a blatant disregard for the UN
Charter in the administration of the territory and a distinct lack of progress towards instituting self-government for the indigenous population.
The issue grew in significance throughout the late 1950s as an increasing number of recently decolonized African nations gained admission to the UN. In a speech to the
Fourth Committee in 1957, the Counsellor at Ireland’s Permanent Mission, Eamon
Kennedy, insisted that the UN was responsible for the territory and, therefore, needed to take action.90 The following year, Kennedy introduced a compromise draft resolution following the report of the Good Offices Committee on Namibia. It registered the concerns of the committee members over the suggestion that Namibia be partitioned and
88 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 89 In 1968, the UN proclaimed that South-West Africa would be called Namibia. Throughout this dissertation Namibia has been used to refer to the territory for the sake of consistency. 90 A/C.4/PV.666, 10 October 1957.
37 part of the territory ceded to South Africa. Though it was amended, the Irish compromise resolution was adopted by the General Assembly.91
The temperature in the debate rose when the Fifteenth Assembly reconvened in
March 1961. Ireland supported a draft resolution articulating frustration at the lack of cooperation exhibited by the South African Government. With growing exasperation at the intransigence of Pretoria, certain Afro-Asian nations sought the implementation of economic sanctions against South Africa. But, although Ireland condemned Pretoria’s policies, as did most Western states, it was reluctant to consider the implementation of sanctions until all other avenues of diplomacy had been exhausted.92
Apartheid in South Africa
Pretoria’s actions in Namibia brought the attention of the General Assembly to apartheid in South Africa. In 1956, Ireland had supported a resolution that was mildly reproving of the policy of apartheid employed by Pretoria and the treatment of people of
Indian descent. At subsequent sessions, Ireland assumed a far more strident approach. In
1958, the Irish delegation co-sponsored inscription of the issue of race conflict in South
Africa on the agenda of the General Assembly. Ireland and Greece were the only
European nations to do so. This decision was influenced by the Catholic Church’s repudiation of apartheid and Ireland’s own experience of ethnic discrimination during
British occupation. Ireland’s support for the inscription prompted the Afro-Asian sponsors to successfully seek Irish co-sponsorship of a draft resolution in the Special
Political Committee to censure South Africa for its refusal to implement previous
91 A/C.4/PV.768, 22 October 1958. 92 A/C.4/PV.1115, 23 March 1961.
38 resolutions. On 14 October, Eamon Kennedy spoke on behalf of the Irish delegation in favour of the draft resolution, which passed both the Special Political Committee and the
General Assembly by convincing margins.93
By 1959, the situation in South Africa had not improved. In November, Ireland
(as the only European nation) along with 34 other nations, introduced a draft resolution into the Special Political Committee, which expressed the same concerns about South
Africa’s policy of apartheid as the one approved by the 13th General Assembly in the previous year. Conor Cruise O’Brien introduced the draft resolution, rejecting the argument that Article 2.7 of the UN Charter – pertaining to national sovereignty over domestic affairs – precluded discussion of apartheid, because it was an international issue not confined to the limits of South Africa and with ramifications for peace in the region.
The draft resolution was adopted overwhelmingly by the Special Committee and then by the General Assembly, with opposition coming primarily from the Western bloc.94
Ireland’s stance on the issue resulted in a deterioration of its relations with South Africa, with the South African Minister for External Affairs, Eric Louw, being particularly critical of Ireland.95
In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre96 and South Africa’s intransigence during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference of 1960, there was a growing push from the African bloc to impose sanctions against South Africa. In April 1961, the Special
Political Committee took up the issue of apartheid and considered two draft resolutions.
The first of those was based upon the Assembly’s earlier measures, and included a call
93 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 61-63; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 191-192. 94 Report on the Special Political Committee at the 12th General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 417/167/9. 95 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 189-190.
39 for UN member-states to consider taking action to bring about an end to apartheid. The second draft resolution was sponsored by the Afro-Asian bloc and recommended sanctions against, and the severance of diplomatic relations with, South Africa. Ireland voted for the first and against the second, though both managed to pass the Special
Political Committee. In the plenary, Ireland again voted for the first, which passed and, along with the rest of Western Europe, voted against the second, which failed to secure the requisite two-thirds majority. This was an indication that Ireland, while being one of the most strident rhetorical critics of apartheid, intended to abstain on any vote for the implementation of punitive action, such as sanctions. Ireland’s justification for this stand was that such methods of coercion had proven unproductive historically, especially in their use by the League of Nations.97 In the late 1960s, however, Irish policy on decolonisation would shift to encompass support for the implementation of sanctions and other coercive measures.
Transmission of Information for Administered Territories
In early November 1957, the non-aligned Afro-Asian nations sought to examine the overall process of decolonization, initiating a UN investigation into the transmission of information regarding all administered (that is colonial) territories. The General
Assembly was divided over the draft resolution, which Western nations perceived to be a direct attack on their administrations. In the end, the battle was fought over the procedural issue about whether the transmission of information should be considered by the General Assembly as an “important” or an “ordinary” question; the significance in
96 On 21 March 1960, South African security forces opened fire on a demonstration killing 67 and wounding 200 demonstrators.
40 this respect was that “important” questions required a two-thirds majority vote whereas,
“ordinary” questions required a simple majority to pass. The Fourth Committee endorsed the Afro-Asian resolution suggesting that it was not an “important” question, though the proposal was defeated in the plenary session. Ireland conspicuously abstained on the votes in both the Fourth Committee and the plenary and, along with Greece, was the only
Western European nation not to oppose the resolution of the Afro-Asian nations.
Significantly, Ireland maintained this position despite being engaged at the time in crucial trade talks with Portugal, a colonial power in its own right. Indeed, Portugal complained through diplomatic channels that Ireland’s neutrality policy conformed too closely to the non-alignment of the African and Asian nations.98
Conclusion
Although various scholars have suggested that Ireland’s neutrality was confined exclusively to the military realm, it is clear from its UN policy that Irish neutrality had a more fundamental foundation. Neutrality was Ireland’s initial expression of independence and, therefore, intertwined with national identity. The policy was also intrinsically linked to the perpetuation of partition. Even though partition served more as an excuse than a reason for neutrality, the reality was that the Irish Government had convinced the Irish people of the link.99 As a consequence, neutrality was a largely uninterrupted tradition of Ireland’s foreign policy arguably until the present day, but certainly until admission to the EC in 1973.
97 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 196-198. 98 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 136-138. 99 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, pp. 200-202.
41 The origins of that neutrality in the context of Ireland’s UN policy can be traced back to the period 1957-1961, when Frank Aiken assumed the reigns as Minister for
External Affairs and Chairman of the Irish Delegation to the UN. This was a period when the balance of the General Assembly gave disproportionate weight to neutrals, such as Ireland. During this period, Ireland sought to make constructive contributions to debates at the General Assembly. Significant issues of the Cold War, such as the crises in the Middle East and the human rights situation in Tibet, provided opportunities for
Ireland to intervene in debate under the banner of neutrality, albeit in a fashion that also served its ideologically Western leanings. On issues of decolonisation, independence and self-determination, such as in the instances of French Togoland, Algeria, Namibia, and apartheid in South Africa, Ireland voted consistently alongside the non-aligned states. In many instances, Ireland was the only Western nation to do so, although it usually took care to phrase its declaratory speeches in conciliatory language in consideration for the relevant Western nation. The Irish delegation’s peace policy was characterised by the promotion of détente and disarmament. And in this respect, Aiken was instrumental in the campaign to secure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, also, to give the small nations of the UN a voice on an issue previously dictated by the nuclear powers. He also supported efforts to forge a Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, as well as making proposals for troop withdrawals in Europe and the quarantining of geographical regions from superpower influence. In many of these cases, Ireland actively promoted and supported positions vehemently opposed by the Western bloc.
As the 1960s progressed, the influx of recently decolonised nations changed the nature of the General Assembly in a fashion which ensured that Ireland would never
42 again wield the influence it did between 1957 and 1961. But even though, from 1961 onwards, Ireland no longer exercised sufficient influence to broker compromises or facilitate resolutions with the efficacy that it had in the past, the Irish delegation’s voting record remained true to the principles of neutrality forged between 1957 and 1961, despite the numerous challenges that arose during the ensuing years, particularly in relation to the prospect of increasing integration in Western Europe.
43 CHAPTER 2: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO INTERDEPENDENCE:
THE IMPACT OF THE APPLICATION FOR EC
MEMBERSHIP IN 1961 ON IRELAND’S UN POLICY
In 1961, Irish neutrality at the UN, which had been established over the preceding
four years, was strained by the new foreign policy objective of securing admission to
the EC. When it became apparent that Ireland’s most significant trading partner, the
UK, intended to seek membership of the Common Market, Dublin was impelled by
economic circumstances to follow suit. Ireland’s exports to the UK in 1960
constituted more than 80% of its total export trade.1 Furthermore, as a result of severe unemployment, Ireland had suffered a massive exodus of emigrants, amounting to
400 000 over the preceding decade.2 Consequently, on 31 July 1961, Ireland applied
for membership of the EC, ten days prior to the lodging of applications from the UK
and Denmark. This was an indication of the growing Western orientation of Ireland’s
foreign policy, which was reinforced by numerous statements by the Taoiseach and
members of the Irish Government. The EC application complicated Ireland’s UN
policy, because although its neutrality was slanted towards the West that policy still
maintained a significant degree of independence.
1 Report of the Interdepartmental Working Party on the Implications of the Participation of Ireland and the UK in the EC, undated document, NAI, DFA CM/16. 2 D. Keogh, (1997), ‘The Diplomacy of ‘Dignified Calm’: An Analysis of Ireland’s Application for Membership of the EEC, 1961-1963’, Chronicon, 1, Available: http://www.ucc.ie/chronicon/keogh.htm [16 August 2002], [hereafter Keogh, ‘The Diplomacy of ‘Dignified Calm’’, Chronicon], p. 2.
44 Ireland’s Application for EC Membership and Concerns about its Neutrality and UN
Policy
Ireland’s neutrality at the UN was prejudiced by the potential for membership
of the Common Market, because the EC had political as well as economic objectives.
The prospect of membership of the Common Market was additionally problematic for
Ireland because the aims of the EC and NATO were perceived in many quarters to be
parallel, with all members of the EC at that time also being members of NATO.3 In
more recent years the links between the EC and NATO have become more explicit as
former Eastern bloc nations have discovered as membership of the European Union
now automatically involves membership of the Western European Union (which
functioned as the European pillar of NATO until 1984 when it began to concentrate
on specifically European concerns), as the latter has evolved into the defence
component of the European Union.4 In the early 1960s, Dublin anticipated this
growing political cooperation within the EC and was concerned that the nation’s
neutrality would prejudice its application. This concern was highlighted just prior to
the lodging of the EC application on, 18 July 1961, by the issuing of the Bonn
Declaration,5 heralding the enhanced political integration of the Community.
Dublin’s concerns were realised soon after the application, when it was informed
through diplomatic channels that Ireland’s neutrality had induced doubts among the
EC member-states about the nation’s commitment to political union because
neutrality could not co-exist within a collective union with political aspirations.
The reservations of the member-states about Ireland’s neutrality were
compounded by the USA’s influence over the expansion of the EC. On 13
3 It should be noted that France withdrew from NATO in 1966, though it did not repudiate the treaty and, ultimately, remained politically committed to its objectives. 4 G. Segal, (1996), The World Affairs Companion, London: Simon & Schuster, p. 147.
45 November, the officer in charge of the British and Irish desk at the US State
Department, Joseph Sweeney, notified the Irish Ambassador in Washington, Thomas
Kiernan, that the USA expected Ireland’s application to join the EC to fail and would lobby for its continued exclusion, because of the country’s neutrality.6 Sweeney’s
concerns were specifically related to Ireland’s voting record in New York.7 At the
same time, Washington was also opposed in principle to the admission to the EC of
neutral states, which included Ireland, because that would have undermined its vision
of a greater Atlantic Alliance and the creation of a wider and more solid anti-
communist front than provided by NATO.8 At this stage in the evolution of European
integration, the USA exercised considerable influence in the EC and was exerting it to pressure the member-states to veto the admission of any neutrals.9 As an indication of
the USA’s influence on this issue, the diplomatic tours of the EC member-state
capitals by neutral nations aiming at accession incorporated visits to Washington.10
The Clarifications of the Irish Government to Reconcile Neutrality and Integration
The Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, sought to obscure the pillars of Irish foreign policy in the wake of these concerns about Ireland’s neutrality. His statements were often ambiguous, asserting that Ireland was ideologically, sympathetically and politically committed to the West, at the same time as proclaiming neutrality and rejecting NATO membership, only to endorse it later as a possibility. As there was little consistency from the Taoiseach on the matter, there was significant ambiguity
5 The Bonn Declaration invested the Fouchet Committee with the responsibility of drawing up proposals for the acceleration of political integration. 6 D. Dinan, (1994), Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community, London: Macmillan, [hereafter Dinan, Ever Closer Union?], p. 49; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 207-209. 7 Circular from the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Cornelius Cremin, 28 November 1961, NAI, DFA CM/3. 8 Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, Kevin Rush, to Cremin, 14 November 1961, NAI, DFA, CM/3. 9 Telegram to the Ambassador in Brussels, 29 March 1962, NAI, DFA CM/9/3IB.
46 about Ireland’s position on whether membership of the EC precluded a policy of
neutrality. The ambiguity occurred because of the vague legal definition of European
integration and the constantly changing nature of the process.11 There was a
distinction between the objectives of the EC, which were political as well as
economic, and the existing state of integration, which was at a purely economic stage.
Lemass’ statements in the domestic sphere (to the Dáil, the Irish press and the
Irish public) and his statements to international audiences (European and US
journalists and diplomats) were deliberately ambiguous and often contrary. To the
former, Lemass emphasised the perpetuation of neutrality and insisted that
membership of the EC required no military links or obligations. But, he provided
more negative statements about neutrality to the international press and foreign
diplomats. In these contexts, Lemass frequently and explicitly suggested that
neutrality was a negotiable policy and that Ireland was aware that military obligations
could accrue from membership of the EC.12 In 1962, the Opposition leader, James
Dillon, reproached Lemass for making such statements to foreign audiences, but
eschewing making them in the Dáil.13
This policy of promoting ambiguity about the compatibility of neutrality and
European integration was designed to restrict discussion of the issue and increase the latitude of manoeuvre for the government. Over the course of two years, whilst the
Irish application was open and negotiations were taking place, government policy was
never clarified beyond this vague position.14 But Ireland’s neutrality, even during
World War II under de Valera, had always been premised on ambiguity. This
10 Irish Ambassador in Bonn, William Warnock, to Cremin, 17 May 1962, NAI, DFA, CM/9/3IB. 11 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 25-26, 85. 12 Extracts of Statements Made by Sean Lemass, 23 July 1969, NAI, DT 2000/6/228. 13 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 68. 14 Ibid., p. 45.
47 confusing commitment to neutrality was continued by Lemass and various other
members of the Irish Government.15
Lemass’ Clarifications of Government Policy to International Audiences
In 1962, Lemass increased his rhetoric about the necessity of entering the EC,
irrespective of the direction it led in terms of foreign policy.16 The Irish Government had received significant feedback from the member states of the EC that Ireland’s neutrality and its UN policy were viewed as serious obstacles to accession.17 In order to allay some of these reservations, in mid-January 1962, Lemass made a statement
suggesting that entry into the EC would have an impact upon Irish UN policy, but he
did not elaborate on the nature or the scope of this change. His comments were made
at the Fianna Fáil Ard-Fheis, but was primarily political rhetoric directed at the
international audience, where it was favourably received. The Irish delegation in New
York was informed by the Assistant Secretary of State for West European Affairs,
William Tyler that Washington was particularly pleased by Lemass’ avowal that
Ireland would not remain neutral on issues that polarised the international community.
To overseas newspapers, especially in the USA, Lemass continued to make
statements about the negotiable status of Irish neutrality, many of which were even
more explicit.18
The exigency of openly embracing the political and possible defence
obligations of membership was also the common theme in the communications
15 Ibid., p. 67. 16 G. FitzGerald, (1989), ‘Ireland and the European Challenge – Robert Schuman Inaugural Lecture’, in D. Keogh (Ed.), ‘Ireland and the Challenge of European Integration’, Hibernian University Press, p. 22. 17 Notes on Political Aspects as Possible Objections to Admission by the EEC Council, 1 October 1961, NAI, DFA 305/57/363/28. 18 Salmon, ‘Ireland: A Neutral in the Community’, Journal of Common Market Studies, p. 210; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 237-239.
48 between Irish delegations and the member-states of the EC.19 This was the course of
action that had been recommended by the US Department of State to the Irish
Ambassador in Washington.20 In fact, since the Bonn Declaration of July 1961, the
Irish Government had been informed that acceptance of political cooperation, as well as economic collaboration, was a condition of membership.21 It was specifically for
this reason that when the Irish application was launched in 1961, the Secretary of the
Department of Finance, Dr Kenneth Whitaker, and the Secretary of the Department of
External Affairs, Cornelius Cremin, were despatched on a tour of the EC capitals to
reassure the member-states specifically of Ireland’s acceptance of the political
obligations of membership.22
The efforts of Lemass and the Irish Government to make clear Dublin’s
acceptance of the political ramifications of EC membership were necessary because
of the tenuous nature of its application. Although members of the executive of the EC constantly assured Dublin that there were no concerns about Irish eligibility for membership, there were also numerous indications suggesting the reverse. For example, in July 1962, the President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, articulated concerns that Ireland was not eligible for treatment under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, pertaining to the accession of new members. The primary concern of the commission remained Ireland’s neutrality and aversion to membership of NATO, which the Vice-President of the European Commission, Sicco Mansholt, suggested would be ‘decisive’ in the consideration of the application. The Irish
Ambassador to Belgium, Frank Biggar, met separately with both Hallstein and
Mansholt to reassure them of Ireland’s commitment to the Treaty of Rome and the
19 Ambassador in London to Cremin, 20 December 1961, NAI, DFA, CM/16. 20 Rush to Cremin, 14 November 1961, NAI, DFA CM/3. 21 Speech by Lemass to the Annual Dinner of the Cork Chamber of Commerce at the Imperial Hotel Cork, 11 November 1961, NAI, DFA CM/16.
49 Bonn Declaration.23 Mansholt suggested that the Irish application would be furthered
if Dublin openly endorsed the possibility of NATO membership and the abandonment
of neutrality if it was to accede to the EC.24
Of even greater concern to Dublin was that French and Italian delegates also openly opposed Ireland’s admission on the basis of its neutrality and non-membership
of NATO. Biggar urged Dublin to make high level representations to the French and
Italians to reassure them of Ireland’s suitability for admission to the EC, and also to
more openly articulate its acceptance of the political, and possible security,
obligations of membership.25 The significance of these interactions was that the
efforts of the Taoiseach and the other members of government over the preceding
year had failed to convince the decision-makers in the EC of Ireland’s intention to adhere to the requirements of the Treaty of Rome.
Lemass’ Clarifications of Government Policy in the Domestic Sphere
Lemass’ interpretation of the implications of integration for Ireland’s foreign
policy was distinctly different in the domestic arena of the Dáil.26 Although there was
bilateral political support for accession, there remained concerns about the impact it
would have on neutrality. As aforementioned, Lemass had admitted in the Dáil in
1962 that Ireland’s UN policy would be affected by the approach to Europe. He had
made similar comments in the Dáil in 1961, which were also ambiguous about
whether or not Ireland’s UN policy would alter.27 The Irish press was particularly
22 Keogh, ‘The Diplomacy of ‘Dignified Calm’’, Chronicon, pp. 4-6. 23 These international agreements articulated the measures providing for the enhanced integration of the EC. 24 Chargé d’Affaires in London, Francis Biggar, to Cremin, 23 February 1962, NAI, DFA CM/16II; Note from Dept of Finance on the Position of the Irish Application for Membership, 1962, UCDA, FAP, P104/5649. 25 Ibid. 26 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, pp. 78-79. 27 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 201.
50 critical of Lemass’ admission, with one such editorial declaring that such a revision of
Ireland’s diplomacy was unacceptable, as it was a source of immense pride for the
Irish nation.28 In response to the backlash, Lemass was forced to make a speech in the
Dáil ruling out any change in policy on the major issues before the UN.29
In his Dáil speeches, the Taoiesach incessantly endorsed NATO, its objectives and the necessity of its existence, but was always careful to avoid any suggestion that
Ireland would be required to join. For example, Lemass stated that the Government believed “the existence of NATO is necessary for the preservation of peace and for the defence of the countries of Western Europe, including this country”.30 The White
Paper on the European Economic Community, which was tabled in the Oireachtas on
30 June 1961, mirrored Lemass’ approach. It dealt primarily with the implications of
the Treaty of Rome on economic policy, particularly trade, customs duties, tariffs and
other restrictions in the realms of agricultural and social policy. The document
refused to address other possible implications of membership, especially political
ramifications, because its authors maintained that those issues would be determined
by negotiations.31 In New York, the Minister for External Affairs and Chairman of
the UN delegation, Frank Aiken, was given the task of attempting to reconcile the two
apparently conflicting policy schemas of neutrality and integration within the EC.
This was particularly the case on issues pertaining to Ireland’s peace policy, Cold War
matters and decolonisation issues before the General Assembly.
28 For example, Sunday Review, 21 Jan 1962. 29 Debates of the Dáil Éireann – Volume 193 – 14 February 1962 – Ireland's UN Role: 29. 30 Debates of the Dáil Éireann – Volume 193 – 14 February 1962 – Ceisteanna, Questions, Oral Answers – Common Market: Membership of NATO: 7. 31 The White Paper on the European Economic Community Laid before the Oireachtas, 30 June 1961, University College Dublin Archives in Ireland, Frank Aiken Papers, P104/5644 [hereafter UCDA, FAP].
51 IRELAND’S PEACE POLICY AT THE UN
Ireland’s peace policy at the UN prior to the lodging of the EC application had
involved a number of confrontations with Western nations, especially France. The
French delegation had been particularly hostile to Ireland’s efforts to achieve
recognition of the dangers of non-proliferation and a suspension of nuclear testing.
As such, the EC application should have undermined its vigorous pursuit of these
peace measures, which tended to antagonise France and the other EC member-states.
But, due to the high tensions in the Cold War during the early 1960s and the fact that
there was little prospect of cooperation between the superpowers, the contribution the
Irish delegation could make to peace-supporting measures at the UN was limited.
The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
In the preceding sessions at the UN, securing support for non-proliferation was
the primary objective of Irish diplomacy. In 1961, the Irish delegation was successful
in having its resolution on non-proliferation, of which it was the sole sponsor,
unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. Ireland had initially faced quite
strident opposition from the NATO nations, especially France, the UK and the USA,
who marshalled their support to prevent the General Assembly from passing the Irish
resolution.32 By September 1961, however, the USA and the UK had removed their
opposition to the Irish initiative and announced that they had incorporated support for
a non-proliferation treaty into their disarmament policies. France was reluctantly
persuaded not to oppose the resolution, guaranteeing the unanimity of its passage.
Most of the sensitive diplomatic activity on this issue had been undertaken by the
Irish delegation prior to Dublin lodging its application for EC membership.
32 For more detail on the opposition of these nations to Ireland’s non-proliferation initiatives, refer to chapter one.
52 Nevertheless, it was worth noting that it was the sponsorship of Ireland, as a neutral
nation, which was instrumental in securing the support of both nuclear and non-
nuclear nations for the treaty. The passage of Resolution 1665 (XVI) in 1961
signalled the suspension of multi-lateral diplomatic efforts to forge a non-proliferation
treaty until 1968. In the years between the passage of this resolution and the
convention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, the issue was referred to bilateral
negotiations between the Soviet Union and the USA so that they could arrive at a
treaty that would have bi-partisan support in the General Assembly. When the treaty
was brought before the UN in 1968, Ireland was again instrumental in the diplomatic
activity aimed at securing its adoption. But it was the Irish resolution of 1961 that
paved the way for the conclusion of the treaty in 1968 and in recognition of Ireland’s
role; Frank Aiken was invited to Moscow to be its first signatory.33 The early 1960s
were a period of significant tension in the Cold War and, as a consequence, after the
passage of the Irish non-proliferation resolution there was little progress at the UN on
disarmament issues.
Peacekeeping
In many respects, Ireland’s neutral responsibilities manifested most overtly in the realm of peacekeeping, and these persisted throughout the period of the negotiations for EC membership. It was evident from the early stages of the Cold
War that collective security was untenable in the ideologically and militarily polarised world, where nuclear weapons were possessed by both sides. Instead, the UN was intent on a policy of preventative diplomacy to limit the spread of conflict. The policy concentrated on containing hostilities to the periphery of bloc disputes to
33 For more information on the Irish efforts to secure adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, refer to chapter five.
53 ensure that they did not escalate and provoke the intervention of the superpowers. It was designed to contain and reduce tensions – not to distinguish a particular state as the aggressor, or attribute responsibility for a conflict.
This concept of preventative diplomacy meant that the UN would insert impartial forces into a volatile environment with the consent of both antagonists. The necessity for the peacekeeping forces to be impartial meant that they were primarily composed of troops from neutral and non-aligned nations. These states, which ostensibly assumed mediatory positions on issues before the UN, were granted the somewhat ambiguous label – “middle powers”. Peacekeepers were granted the right of self-defence but, generally, they were expected to operate with little coercion and provide services such as mediation, military patrols and riot control. Peacekeeping remained an important function of Ireland’s UN policy during the early 1960s, especially as a result of the deterioration in relations between the two superpowers.
The Secretary-General consistently sought contributions of contingents from Ireland because it was considered to be one of the neutral states at the UN and, thereby, most suitable for the role.34
IRELAND AND THE COLD WAR AT THE UN
As a neutral state, Ireland’s policy on Cold War issues should have provided a significant dilemma for its application for EC membership. At preceding sessions, however, the Irish delegation had demonstrated a general propensity to be guided by
US policy, with the notable exception of its stance on the representation of China.
Ireland’s identification with Western Europe through its application for membership
34 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 170-173.
54 of the EC and the similar objectives of that organisation and NATO provided an
incentive for Ireland to consolidate its pro-US orientation on Cold War issues.
The Representation of China at the UN
Since 1957, Ireland’s stance on geo-political Cold War issues had been
overshadowed by the single, but significant, issue of the representation of China at the
UN. Although 1961 was one of the most intense years of the Cold War, the 16th
General Assembly Session of that year commenced with an atmosphere of rapprochement. After years of constant obstructionism, the USA finally agreed in
1961 to the discussion of the representation of China at the UN. Although
Washington still opposed this measure, the increased representation of non-aligned states at the UN and the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement meant that the State
Department could no longer prevent its discussion.
The USA wanted the issue to be raised under the title, “Question of Chinese
Representation”, and sought the participation of eight nations, including Ireland, to co-sponsor this title. The response from the Irish delegation was that Ireland would clarify its position in the debate and would not take a leading role on the US initiative.
In preceding sessions of the General Assembly, Ireland’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Freddy Boland, had always been an advocate of closer diplomatic relations with the Western bloc. Nevertheless, over the years, Boland developed a grudging acceptance of neutrality and it was he who was concerned that declaring allegiance with the USA on the issue could bind Ireland to Washington’s policy line.35 The
wording of the US title preference was politically motivated and the Soviet Union
responded in kind by proposing the inscription of “Restoration of the Lawful Rights
35 Ibid., pp. 23-25; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 228-229.
55 of the PRC in the UN”. Both measures were adopted and, on 25 September, Ireland
supported the report of the General Committee, which merged the two resolutions into
simply “The China Question”.
It was clear that the USA had attempted to use Ireland’s neutral reputation for
the expediency of furthering its own agenda. But the Irish delegation was approached
by its US counterpart because, although Ireland was a neutral state, Washington
though it might accede to the request because of its undoubted Western predilection on Cold War issues. At the same time, the Irish delegation was not merely being requested to support a US proposal, it was asked to be in the vanguard. Thus, concern about being a pawn in Cold War politics prompted the Irish delegation to refuse to co- sponsor the US phrasing and, in the end, New Zealand was the only nation that agreed to provide sponsorship. Although the USA was not a member of the EC, because of its influence in the capitals of the member-states Washington’s opinion was an important element in the consideration of the Irish application. Unfortunately for
Ireland, the USA remained reluctant to support Ireland’s admission because it was a neutral. Clearly, concern in Dublin about the status of Ireland’s application for membership of the EC did not prejudice its UN policy in this case.
Although the China question was on the General Assembly’s agenda for the first time in 1961, any thaw in Sino-American relations was terminated when the USA unveiled its contingency strategy to circumvent discussion of the issue. On 15
December 1961, the USA co-sponsored a resolution declaring that the representation of China was an important question, which would have meant that resolutions on the issue required a two-thirds majority for their passage. The US proposal passed with the support of most of the West, including Ireland. This made it more difficult for the passage of any resolution on the issue of Chinese representation and effectively
56 perpetuated the status quo, excluding the People’s Republic of China from the UN.
The General Assembly also rejected a Soviet proposal calling for the expulsion of
Taiwan and its replacement by the communist regime. Although Ireland opposed the
Soviet measure, various Western nations, including some NATO members, such as the UK, Denmark and Norway joined the Soviet bloc and the Afro-Asian bloc in supporting the replacement of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China.36
Ireland’s voting record on the proposition demonstrated that although it was reluctant to be active on Cold War issues, it was still inclined to vote in support of the USA.
At General Assembly Sessions prior to 1961, Ireland had established its neutral credentials by supporting the right of the People’s Republic of China to have its absence discussed, despite pressure to the contrary from the USA and certain other
Western nations. The Irish stance on the Chinese question in 1961 did not engender a change in policy because previously Ireland had not been compelled to take a stance on the actual issue of the representation of China. In fact, de Valera, Aiken and
Boland had always gone to great lengths to ensure that the Irish position on this issue remained unclear.
The Irish delegation advocated any change in China’s representation being deemed an important question because, ultimately, the delegation was characterised by a significant degree of anti-communist sentiment. Ireland was apprehensive about the record of the People’s Republic of China on human rights, its use of force against its neighbours, its continued control of Tibet and the tenor of its relations with
Taiwan. Furthermore, the Irish media, the Irish populace and Ireland’s political culture all contained a historic aversion to communism.37 Thus, the concerns of the
Lemass Government about the Beijing regime and its admission to the UN had been
36 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 232-233. 37 Ibid., pp. 233-234.
57 shared by the de Valera Government that preceded it. Aiken forecasted Ireland’s
policy when it came to a debate on the substantive issue of Chinese representation, in
a statement to the Irish press on 5 December 1960. He indicated that Ireland would
not support the People’s Republic of China being represented at the UN unless it gave guarantees on improving human rights, that it would respect international law in its relations with its neighbours and would guarantee its conformity to the UN Charter.
A memorandum of 27 August 1958 indicated that this was not mere rhetoric but was an articulation of the policy that the de Valera Government would have followed when it came to a vote in the UN.38 It specified that support for the accession of the
People’s Republic of China was to remain contingent on guarantees pertaining to
human rights and the reunification of Korea and Vietnam. Without these, Ireland
would abstain on any vote seeking to alter the representation of China but would
unconditionally support the granting of ordinary membership to Taiwan. In 1961,
when these two matters were brought together in one resolution, Ireland was
compelled to vote against the admission of Communist China because it would have
been at the expense of Taiwan. Thus, the pro-US policy on the representation of
China at the UN embraced by the Lemass Government was not motivated by the EC
application, but was a continuation of that engineered by Aiken under the
Government of de Valera and during the period of Ireland’s maverick neutrality.39
The UN in Korea
This Western affinity was further evinced by Ireland’s position in the
discussion on the Korean issue. Debate on this matter occurred in mid-December
1961 and quickly followed the discussion of the representation of China. The Soviet
38 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 65-66. 39 For more detailed analysis of Ireland’s policy on the Representation of China, refer to chapter six.
58 bloc sought to have North Korea represented at the debate, in addition to South Korea.
Washington responded with its perennial proposal to exclude North Korea on the
basis that Pyongyang refused to acknowledge the authority of the UN to discuss the
situation on the peninsula. Greece and Thailand proposed an amendment to the
Mongolian draft resolution of the Soviet bloc welcoming both parties to the
deliberations, which would make North Korea’s invitation contingent upon
ratification of UN authority to conduct the debate. This served Washington’s agenda
and, consequently, the USA dropped its draft resolution and shifted its support to the
Greek and Thai amendment. The amendment passed and so did the resolution, with
support from Western Europe, the USA and Ireland, and with opposition from the
communist bloc.40
When Pyongyang again refused to recognise the UN’s authority to debate the
matter, the USA introduced a motion aimed at preventing North Korean
representatives from attending the debate. The resolution was carried, with the
General Assembly divided along Cold War lines and Ireland supporting the US
position. Ireland also supported, both in the First Committee and in the plenary session, a resolution reaffirming the UN objective of establishing a unified Korea with a representative government and endorsing the work of the UN Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.41 This was significant because the objective
of the West was to perpetuate and legitimise the UN presence on the peninsula, whereas the communist nations sought to remove the UN, whose intervention it viewed to be illegal.42 Irish policy on Korea was determined by Cold War
40 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 235. 41 Ibid., p. 236. 42 The basis of the communist argument that the UN presence was illegal was Chapter V of the UN Charter. Article 27.3 required the support of all the permanent members before the UN could act on threats to international peace and security. The UN operation in Korea was instituted without the
59 considerations, especially the nation’s long-standing Catholic-influenced though
wide-spread aversion to communism and was a continuation of its policy of previous
sessions.
The Bay of Pigs Invasion
Ireland’s pro-Western policy on geo-political Cold War issues at the UN was
clearly exposed in 1961. Much of the volatility of the Cold War in the early 1960s
was a result of tense US-Cuban relations. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs Invasion
of April 1961,43 Romania and Czechoslovakia introduced a resolution into the First
Committee in February 1962, denouncing an alleged imminent invasion of Cuba by
US troops. The draft resolution called for an end to US interference in Cuban affairs and for a peaceful resolution to the differences between the two nations. The USA opposed the adoption of the text because the exhortation for peaceful relations embodied the allegation that the USA was preparing aggression against Cuba. Only one of the four clauses of the draft resolution passed when put to individual votes.
The salvaged clause was relatively innocuous, reaffirming the objective of the UN to facilitate the establishment of amicable relations between nations on the foundation of equal rights, self-determination and non-interference in domestic affairs. It was passed without opposition, but with an overwhelming number of abstentions.44
The Soviet bloc instituted a debate in the Assembly by tabling a draft
resolution that mirrored the successful clause. The USA remained determined to
obstruct the adoption of any kind of resolution and it marshalled the support of the
West, including Ireland, to defeat the draft resolution. Just before the vote was cast,
support of the Soviet Union, who had boycotted the Security Council over Communist China’s continued exclusion from the UN. 43 An abortive attempt made by 1500 Cuban exiles to invade Cuba under the direction and financing of the United States Government.
60 the Swedish delegation was instructed by Stockholm to join Finland and abstain on the draft resolution, as that would be a better representation of its policy of neutrality.
Ireland’s opposition to the Soviet draft was premised on the conviction that support for it would be perceived to be endorsement of charges of impending US aggression against Cuba, which Dublin rejected.45
It was for similar reasons that on 27 February 1962, Ireland joined with the
Western nations in the Security Council (Ireland had been elected for a one year term) to reject consideration of a complaint made by Cuba. Cuba argued that its expulsion from the Organisation of American States and the imposition of an economic embargo by Washington were contrary to the UN Charter and, furthermore, that it was again the target of impending aggression by the USA.46 The course of the UN deliberations about the consequences of the Bay of Pigs invasion resulted in direct diplomatic attacks on the USA, which made it distinct from the other issues of the Cold War that had been raised previously. Considering that Irish policy on geo-political Cold War issues was tempered by a propensity to be guided by US policy, it was inevitable that the Irish delegation would categorically reject such direct diplomatic attacks on
Washington.
The attack on the USA over the failed Bay of Pigs invasion reflected the changing nature and composition of the General Assembly. In 1960, a large number of states were admitted to the UN with most being African, non-aligned and recently decolonised.47 They were situated firmly within the Afro-Asian bloc, which facilitated domination by this group of the General Assembly as UN membership
44 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 237-238. 45 Ibid., pp. 238-239. 46 Ibid., p. 239. 47 The nations admitted to the UN in 1960 were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Democractic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia and Togo.
61 expanded by seventeen nations to ninety-nine member states. Although the policy of non-alignment had existed since the end of World War II, in 1961 these nations made a concerted effort to coordinate their foreign policies and create an association to strengthen their position in the international community – the Non-Aligned
Movement. The Non-Aligned Movement was largely composed of the weaker military nations with developing economies seeking strength through a collective voice. Thus, they were invariably marginalised nations pursuing greater democratisation of international affairs and a more equitable distribution of economic wealth, which despite professions of impartiality, meant that they were often in conflict with the more wealthy and powerful nations of the West.48 Because of the large and inevitable anti-colonial majority possessed by the Non-Aligned Movement, these nations became bolder and there was less opportunity for debate, negotiation or compromise in UN deliberations. Consequently, from 1961, the Afro-Asian proposals in the UN became increasingly radical and, therefore, Irish voting was pushed into an even greater correspondence with the Western bloc on a vast range of issues.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
In October 1962, US-Cuban relations deteriorated even further and tension in the Cold War escalated when it was discovered that the Soviet Union was installing missile bases with nuclear capabilities on Cuba. On 22 October, the USA blockaded
Cuba and the US President, John F. Kennedy, made it clear that any missile fired at the USA would provoke retaliation not just against Cuba, but also the Soviet Union.
In response to a personal request from Kennedy, Ireland decided to support a US
48 M. Thee, (1982), Towards a New Conceptualisation of Neutrality: A Strategy for Conflict Resolution in Asia, Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, p. 7.
62 proposal at the UN calling for the removal of offensive weapons and military bases from Cuba under UN inspection. This was the US condition for the lifting of the blockade of Cuba. On 24 October 1962, Aiken joined with delegates from France, the
UK, Taiwan, Chile, and Venezuela in the Security Council to condemn the Soviet
Union’s actions as a threat to international peace. Aiken also rejected an overture from the Afro-Asian bloc to participate in a neutral and non-aligned compromise initiative. Four days later, tension was alleviated when the Soviet leader, Nikita
Khrushchev, agreed to a request by the Secretary-General, U Thant, that the UN supervise the dismantling of Soviet bases in Cuba.49
Not only had Ireland supported the US position on the Cuban Missile Crisis at
the UN; it rejected an overture from the Non-Aligned Movement to be involved in
compromise efforts. It further illustrated that Ireland’s neutrality policy at the UN
was moderated by a Western predilection when it came to Cold War issues.
Washington could especially count on this support on occasions where crucial US
interests were directly threatened, such as had occurred during the Cuban Missile
Crisis.50
A nation’s stances on Cold War issues at the UN provided the most significant
test cases for assessing the legitimacy of any neutrality policy. Ireland was a Western
state in terms of culture, political ideology, religious affiliation, history, geography,
economic partnerships and national interests. Consequently, on many geo-political
Cold War issues, the Irish UN delegation had a propensity to be guided by US policy.
This was highlighted in the early 1960s as the USA came under significantly more
scrutiny and criticism than it had been at preceding sessions, due to the changing balance of the General Assembly. This occurred in temporal conjunction with
49 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 241-243. 50 The reasons for this will be explored in greater depth in chapter six.
63 Ireland’s application for EC membership and seemed to suggest that Ireland underwent a shift of policy to become more Western. In reality, the EC application
was of less significance than the altering composition of the General Assembly, which
changed the nature of the issues on the UN’s agenda, thereby bringing the US under
closer scrutiny and Ireland’s US predilection more into the open.
IRELAND AND DECOLONISATION AT THE UN
The most significant dilemmas for Ireland’s neutrality at the UN, after the lodging of
the nation’s application for membership of the EC and its renewal six years later,
involved the debates on various issues of decolonisation. This was because many of
the member-states of the EC, most notably France, were heavily involved in the
debates and in open confrontation with members of the anti-colonial movement,
which included Ireland.
Algeria
During the early 1960s, France was a major target of the anti-colonial movement, especially over the issue of Algerian independence. In 1961, there was little progress on that issue and, consequently, the Afro-Asian bloc placed the issue on
the agenda of the 16th General Assembly. Ireland’s voting intention was
circumscribed by similar considerations that it faced in previous years – support for
Algerian independence constrained by the necessity of maintaining congenial
relations with France.
On 15 December 1961, 31 Afro-Asian delegations introduced a draft
resolution into the First Committee calling for a resumption of negotiations to settle
the issue. Aiken’s speech in the General Assembly expressed his disappointment that
64 the measure did not acknowledge de Gaulle’s recognition of Algeria’s right to self-
determination or France’s establishment of contact with delegates of the primary
Algerian independence organisation, the Front de libération nationale (FLN).51 This
was consistent with previous Irish policy on disputes of this nature, which had
involved advocacy of bilateral negotiation, rather than UN censure, as the best means
of attaining a solution. It was a stance reflective of the historical reality that bilateral
negotiations had often proved more productive than multilateral diplomacy though,
undoubtedly, the Irish position also reflected the French preference for the handling of
the issue.
When it came to the vote, Ireland adopted a similar position to that which it had supported at previous sessions. The Irish were concerned about the paragraph of the draft resolution that legitimised the FLN with the reference – “Provisional
Government of the Algerian Republic”, even though the organisation did not possess a democratic structure or mandate, or even recognition from France. At the same time, this concern did not preclude Ireland from supporting the resolution, which passed without opposition, though a significant proportion of abstentions. Ireland and the Scandinavian nations were the only Western European states to support the pro-
Algerian resolution.52 Although up until this point decolonisation matters during
Ireland’s term at the UN had been overshadowed by the Algerian issue, this was the
last time that it would be debated in the forum of the General Assembly. In March
1962, France and the FLN signed a cease-fire that culminated, four months later, in
the granting of Algerian independence.
51 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 219-221; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 219-221. 52 A/PV.1085, 20 December 1961.
65 Tunisia
France’s problems with the anti-colonial movement extended beyond Algeria
and included its continued presence in Tunisia. Tunisia gained its independence from
France in 1956, but permitted the French army to provisionally maintain several
military bases while its incessant conflict with Algeria persisted. In July 1961,
demonstrations were held by Tunisian civilians near the bases in response to French
efforts to increase its military presence in the country. Hostilities erupted between the
French troops and the Tunisian demonstrators, during which 1300 Tunisians were
killed and independent Tunisian territory occupied. The crisis was exacerbated when
France refused to accede to a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate
cease-fire and a withdrawal of French troops from the occupied territory.
It was inevitable that the influential bloc of non-aligned Afro-Asian nations
would respond and they hastily called for a convention of a Special Session of the
General Assembly. The Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, requested certain of
the more moderate non-aligned nations, alliance members and neutral nations,
including Ireland, support this move. Some of the nations approached by
Hammarskjold, notably the NATO members Denmark, Norway and Canada refused,
insisting that the convention of a Special Session would serve little constructive
purpose and would be used to humiliate France. Hammarskjold’s démarches to the
non-aligned nations – Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay and Mexico, as well as to the neutrals Sweden, Finland and Ireland were more successful. The Special Session met on 21 August 1961 with the absence of France, who boycotted the session and refused to sanction UN intervention, though it declared its willingness to engage in bilateral
negotiations with Tunisia.53
53 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 222-224; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 212-213.
66 The draft resolution prepared by the non-aligned convenors of the session expressed Tunisian sentiments, calling for the withdrawal of French troops from the territory, and a declaration that France’s actions constituted a violation of Tunisian sovereignty and posed a threat to international peace and security. Both sides in the dispute launched frenetic diplomatic campaigns to secure votes.54 The Irish delegation viewed the Tunisian plight with great sympathy, because it was a small nation whose sovereignty was violated to further a great power’s military interests.
Ireland, influenced by its own colonial past, had a history of advocating small nation rights and of supporting anti-colonialism. At the same time, Ireland had traditional ties with France and, more immediately, France was a powerful member of the EC.
Therefore, Ireland’s support for the non-aligned motion would be politically inexpedient. It was this concern that influenced Denmark, who was also engaged in negotiations for accession to the EC, to unsuccessfully attempt to solicit Ireland’s support in lobbying other nations to abstain on the vote.55
In the end, the measure received an overwhelming majority, though French
allies such as the USA, Western Europe and the members of NATO abstained rather
than oppose the non-aligned proposal. The only Western-European nations to have
supported the resolution were Ireland, Austria and some of the Scandinavian
nations.56 The Irish vote was consistent with its neutral stance and remained unaltered by considerations for the fate of the EC application. Although France did not explicitly express its disapproval of Ireland’s vote, Cremin was informed by the
54 Although France boycotted the debate, it still attempted to influence the results of the session. 55 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 214-216. 56 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 222-224; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 212-214.
67 Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Ministry that the voting positions had been
closely scrutinised.57
Rwanda
In 1961 and 1962, while the EC negotiations were taking place, Ireland also
continued to be an advocate of self-determination on many other issues of
decolonisation. This was despite the fact that this position continued to bring the
nation into conflict with many of the Western powers, notably the USA and members
of the EC. In particular, when the issue of the future of the Belgian colony of Rwanda
arose at the 16th Session, Ireland was instrumental in performing a crucial mediatory role in drafting a resolution acceptable to both Belgium and the Afro-Asian members of the Non-Aligned Movement.58
Southern Rhodesia
It was in the late 1950s and early 1960s that the volatile problems in Southern
Africa began to be brought before the UN. In 1961, an issue that would recur in the
deliberations of the UN later in the decade arose before the General Assembly for the
first time – Southern Rhodesia. The General Assembly approved a resolution
sponsored by certain Afro-Asian members of the Non-Aligned Movement, which
recommended the establishment of a UN Committee to investigate the degree of self-
government exercised by Southern Rhodesia. The objective of the proposal was that
the committee would determine that self-government remained unattained because the
apartheid of the minority white regime excluded the indigenous populace from the
electoral process. The majority of the West opposed the measure, but Ireland
57 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 217-218. 58 Ibid., p. 277.
68 abstained in the voting on the resolution.59 The abstention was instrumental in
articulating dissatisfaction with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, as it was
conspicuous and a significant deviation from the voting norm of the other Western
European nations.
At the Seventeenth General Assembly Session in 1962, the Irish delegation
went a step further and supported an Afro-Asian resolution advocating that the UK
sponsor a new constitution expanding political and civil rights to the entire population
of Southern Rhodesia and calling for the intervention of the Secretary-General to
facilitate a solution. Despite being subjected to considerable diplomatic pressure from
the UK to abstain in the voting, the Irish delegation elected to support the resolution
in accordance with an instruction by Lemass. Ireland even performed a crucial role in
amending the wording of the resolution, pertaining to the role of the Secretary-
General, to expand its appeal and guarantee its passage. By contrast, the majority of
the West supported the British position and abstained on the justification that
Southern Rhodesia was a sovereign nation and, therefore, the UN had no authority to
intervene.60
Apartheid in South Africa
After 1961, the changing composition of the General Assembly made it more
difficult for Ireland to support Afro-Asian initiatives on decolonisation. For example,
until 1962, Ireland had supported and even co-sponsored resolutions on apartheid.
But, from 1962, these resolutions comprised more extreme rhetoric and advocated more belligerent action on the part of the UN. It was in 1962 that the General
Assembly began to recommend the termination of diplomatic relations with, as well
59 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 277. 60 Ibid., pp. 277-278.
69 as the imposition of economic sanctions against, South Africa and Ireland was not yet
ready to support such action.61 Aiken supported the condemnation of apartheid, but feared that the severance of relations would remove the only genuine avenue of exerting pressure on Pretoria.62
Domestic Reactions to Ireland’s Decolonisation Policy
Ireland’s policy on decolonisation issues prompted an attack on the
Government by the Opposition in the Dáil in 1962. James Dillon accused Aiken of
alienating the USA and the EC member states with Ireland’s policy on decolonisation and what he described as Aiken’s self-appointed role as ‘the defender of Africa’.63
He pointed out that Ireland’s interests lay with the EC, rather than with the African states, and suggested that Aiken would better serve Ireland’s interests by exerting his influence over the Africans to solicit their conformity to Western European policy.
After all, he argued, the European presence in Southern Africa was essential to
‘resoue [sic] Africa from the threat of chaos and disorder’, as well as possible communist infiltration.64 Nevertheless, the Irish delegation continued to play a
mediatory role in African decolonisation throughout the early 1960s on a variety of
other issues, despite this criticism.
OTHER ISSUES AT THE UN
South Tyrol
The issue that manifested the greatest conflict of interest between Irish
neutrality and the EC application emerged in Central Europe in 1960, with a dispute
61 Voting Record on Apartheid at the UN, undated, NAI, DFA 96/3/95. 62 Dáil Questions Concerning Sanctions Against South Africa, undated document, NAI, DFA 96/3/95. 63 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume – 5 April 1962 – Committee on Finance, Vote 49 External Affairs (Resumed): 1392.
70 between Austria and Italy. Austria was concerned that Italy’s unification of the
provinces of South Tyrol and Trentino, as Alto Adige, had engineered an artificial
Italian majority in the reconstituted province. This concern was reinforced by
allegations from the new German minority that the Italian Government had instituted
discrimination in education, housing and government appointments, as well as the
emergence of a violent Austrian nationalist movement on the border. The breakdown
in bilateral negotiations between Vienna and Rome prompted Austria to have the
issue inscribed on the agenda of the 15th General Assembly in 1960.65
Consistent with Ireland’s response to such disputes (including Algeria and
Tunisia), the Irish delegation preferred the issue to be resolved in a bilateral or regional forum, rather than through the UN. On 25 October 1960, the Counsellor in
the Irish delegation, Conor Cruise O’Brien, addressed the Special Political Committee
and called for continued negotiations. He emphasised the injustices faced by minority
populations, pointing out the parallels in the situations of Alto Adige and Northern
Ireland.
It quickly became clear that the intransigent positions of both the Austrians
and the Italians diminished the possibilities of a negotiated settlement. Because of
Ireland’s history of partition, the Irish delegation initially believed that it was well
suited to provide a mediatory role. But, irrespective of how productive those efforts
managed to be, Dublin was determined that Ireland would abstain on any vote to
preserve the nation’s amicable relations with both parties. Austria was a fellow
64 Ibid.: 1392. 65 J. M. Skelly, (2000), ‘National Interests and International Mediation: Ireland’s South Tyrol Initiative at the Untied Nations, 1960-1’, in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (Eds), Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism, Dublin: Four Courts Press, [hereafter Skelly, ‘National Interests and International Mediation’, in Irish Foreign Policy], p. 291.
71 neutral, but Italy was a powerful member of the EC and, along with France, one of the
principal opponents of Ireland’s admission.66
Two draft resolutions appeared in the Special Political Committee with one
sponsored and supported by Austria, and the other sponsored by the Latin-American
nations and supported by Italy. The deliberations of the committee were stalemated as neither proposal could attract bi-partisan support. Aiken, along with the
representatives of nine other delegations helped produce a compromise resolution that
ensured there was no loss of prestige by either party. The draft resolution was co-
sponsored by Ireland and sixteen other nations and called for the resumption of
bilateral negotiations and, if these failed, recourse to the International Court of Justice
or any other peaceful solution that accorded with the UN Charter. It was adopted by
the Special Political Committee and then unanimously by the General Assembly.67
This may have appeared to be a diplomatic success for Ireland as neither party
lost prestige and both Austria and Italy publicly congratulated Ireland on the
achievement of a compromise. But the reality was quite different because the
compromise emerged at a time when Italy was on the verge of achieving a resounding
defeat of the Austrian proposal. The Austrians were grateful because the Irish initiative prevented a humiliating defeat for them, but the Italians were privately seething that the compromise averted their victory. Despite gracious public recognition for Ireland’s efforts, the Italian Ambassador to Dublin, Enrico Martino, was privately furious with Ireland’s principal role in forging the compromise and, on
27 October, he registered a complaint with Lemass about Ireland’s interference.68
66 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 181. 67 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 182-185; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 222-223. 68 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 223-224.
72 The failure of bilateral negotiations, the ineffectiveness of the Italian
commission established to investigate the issue and the deterioration of Austrian and
Italian relations in the wake of further violence, resulted in Austria inscribing the
issue of South Tyrol on the agenda of the General Assembly again in 1961. On 11
September, the Press Attaché at the Austrian Legation in Paris, Arthur Zideck, called
on Aiken in Dublin to seek Ireland’s support. The Irish Minister for External Affairs
expressed his belief that a resolution would have difficulty passing and recommended
that Austria confine its efforts to seeking the raising of the issue in the general debate
speeches of member nations instead. Aiken was concerned that a resolution would
merely serve to inflame the tension between Austria and Italy and cause difficulties for nations with friendly relations with both nations, most notably Ireland. Lemass supported this approach and actively discouraged Aiken from allowing himself to become drawn into conciliation negotiations again. In September, Lemass had stressed to Aiken the importance of avoiding any course of action that would cause conflict with the Italians or deteriorate relations with Rome, to ensure that Ireland’s position on the issue did not undermine the EC application.69 It was clear that
Martino’s objections to the Irish role at the previous session had influenced the
Taoiseach. An explicit warning from the Italian Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
S. Russo, to the Irish Ambassador in Rome, Thomas Commins, that Ireland’s conduct
would have ramifications for its EC relations apparently reinforced this policy. As a
result of Russo’s warnings, the Italian Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs was assured
that Ireland would keep a low profile in the negotiations.70
When the General Assembly took up the issue in late November 1961, the
Irish reversed their policy, but only because it came at the behest of the Italians. The
69 Skelly, ‘National Interests and International Mediation’, in Irish Foreign Policy, p. 305.
73 Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio Segni, sought Irish assistance in achieving a settlement. As a consequence, the Irish delegation assisted in producing a resolution calling for further efforts to find a solution to the dispute, which was universally adopted by the General Assembly. On 5 December, the new Italian Ambassador,
Vittorio Winspeare, expressed his gratitude for Ireland’s role in producing the resolution. Thus, despite incessant warnings about the adverse implications for
Ireland’s EC application from both the Taoiseach and members of the Italian Foreign
Ministry, the Irish delegation was instrumental in the mediation that helped resolve the South Tyrol dispute.71
Proposals for Ireland to Join a New Moderate Bloc
In mid-January 1962, Boland was approached by representatives of the USA
and the UK about forming a bloc of states, which included the neutrals (Sweden,
Finland and Austria), as well as the more moderate members of the Non-Aligned
Movement and NATO. Washington and London were concerned at the growing
propensity of the more radical proponents of non-alignment to invoke the collective
security provisions of the UN Charter against the states outside the movement, but
refusal to even condemn the transgressions of its own members. Western concern
heightened as a result of the Indian invasion of Portuguese Goa and increasing
Indonesian belligerence towards the Netherlands over Irian Jaya, which were seen as
signalling a greater tendency to resort to force in ending colonial administrations. The
large majority of the Non-Aligned Movement in the General Assembly and the Soviet
veto in the Security Council meant that such actions could be employed with impunity
from the reaction or even reproach of the UN. The USA and the UK advocated the
70 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 182-185; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 222-224.
74 formation of a new moderate group, which would lend its moral backing to the
opposition of non-aligned proposals that they considered could prove to be
detrimental to the image of the UN.72
Boland acknowledged the potential danger of the radicalisation and
partisanship of the General Assembly and was prepared to promote the idea among
suitable nations, but Aiken was averse to either initiation of, or involvement with,
such a coalition. The Irish Minister for External Affairs was concerned that such a
coordination of states would resemble a bloc and that this, in turn, would imply a pre-
judged approach to international issues. Aiken argued what was needed was a more
active role in the capitals of the non-aligned states by the major powers and a more
vocal presence in the General Assembly by the moderate states. The Irish Minister
for External Affairs was satisfied with Ireland’s performance in this respect, but was
disappointed with the reticence of some of the other neutral and uninvolved nations.73
What was clear was that Ireland rejected an opportunity to retain a comparatively moderate diplomacy that was more closely aligned with the West, in preference for a perpetuation of independence and neutrality. Embracing the Anglo-American proposal would have proved an expedient reconciliation of neutrality and European integration, but Ireland was not yet ready for such an explicit departure from neutrality.
Conclusion
From 1961, European integration became a principal consideration of
Ireland’s foreign policy, but it did not determine its direction in all aspects of
international relations. Most notably, although the application for membership of the
71 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 224-226. 72 Ibid., pp. 279-280.
75 EC did encroach into the considerations of the Irish delegation to the UN, it was
infrequent and seldom engendered any change in policy. On a broader scale, although neutrality retained its place in Ireland’s national identity, it was required to evolve again and was reinterpreted to accommodate the changing international environment.
Lemass had held the position of Minister for Industry and Commerce for 18 of the 21
years prior to becoming Taoiseach and during this period he had presided over
Ireland’s external economic relations during economic war with the UK – a situation where politics, rather than economics determined foreign policy. He was determined to reverse that situation during his time as Taoiseach. This could also be seen in his approach towards the situation in Northern Ireland, where he emphasised that engagement, pragmatism and economic cooperation could provide a solution.74
Lemass’ rise to Taoiseach was characterised by the foreign policy priority of embracing free trade and he was responsible for distancing Ireland from the protectionism that was the hallmark of the economic policy of his predecessor. He believed that the best means of achieving that objective was via regional association through the EC and later through the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. He also had little compunction about sacrificing neutrality to achieve his objectives, but was circumspect about explicitly advertising that fact.75
But ultimately, in terms of Ireland’s UN policy, this reinterpretation of
neutrality had little impact on either the nature of Ireland’s declaratory speeches or its voting records. The Irish delegation continued to advocate non-proliferation of nuclear weapons despite NATO concerns, and decolonisation, often in direct conflict with Western interests. The Irish delegation also performed a mediatory role in the
73 Ibid., pp. 279-280. 74 J. Horgan, (1997), Sean Lemass: The Enigmatic Patriot, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, [hereafter Horgan, Sean Lemass], p. 67; Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 66. 75 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 66-67.
76 quest for a resolution on minority rights in South Tyrol, despite being warned against doing so by Italy. In this period, Italy and France were the members of the EC most hostile to the Irish application, and all the members of the EC were also members of
NATO.
Nevertheless, from 1961, Irish neutrality at the UN undoubtedly underwent a retreat from the activism that it had displayed at previous sessions. It was not the immediate product of a change of Taoiseach, with the replacement of de Valera by
Lemass, but did evolve under the leadership of Lemass. This was a product of the change in the composition of the General Assembly, not the influence of the application for membership of the EC or any kind of “Europeanisation” of Irish foreign policy.
The activism of Irish neutrality had always been contingent on the existence of a balance of power at the General Assembly. Until the early 1960s, this balance had been wielded by the neutral and more moderate states of the UN, including Ireland.
But, from the early 1960s, this balance was disrupted by the influx of a large number of non-aligned states. Throughout the decade, more and more of these states entered the UN to erode further the efficacy of nations such as Ireland to influence events.
Because of the large anti-colonial majority that these nations brought, the more left wing elements of the Non-Aligned Movement became far bolder in their positions on international issues and the terminology of their resolutions. They frequently sought to embarrass and humiliate colonial powers, which they viewed as including Western
Europe and the USA. As a result, there was far less opportunity for debate, negotiation or compromise in UN deliberations.
Consequently, Irish foreign policy did not regress from the fundamental principle of neutrality, it merely became less distinctive. This meant that Ireland
77 decreased its efforts in forging compromise resolutions and in being a leading nation of mediation. Ireland’s neutrality policy was re-evaluated and, for several years, manifested largely by its voting positions.
Also, as a result of this change in the balance of the General Assembly, there emerged in 1961 and 1962, certain issues that compelled Ireland to firmly vote alongside the Western bloc. These primarily involved direct attacks on the USA, which had not occurred previously and, considering the historical relationship between the two countries, Lemass acted as any of his predecessors would have done in ensuring that Ireland voted with the USA. Thus, Irish policy did not change to become more pro-US from 1961, but the nature of issues at the UN changed, forcing
Ireland to more openly declare its loyalty to the USA. Ireland did come to exert more influence in the General Assembly again in the period 1967-1969, specifically with respect to decolonisation matters, when it re-assessed its neutrality and became more receptive to the policies of non-alignment on those issues.76
It is easy to associate the evolution of Irish policy with certain statements made by the Taoiseach, Lemass, particularly when these comments are assessed as isolated excerpts. But when Lemass’ remarks on a possible shift in policy are viewed in the context of a general review of his speeches on foreign policy, it becomes clear that they involved expedient rhetoric formulated with specific audiences in mind. It is
true that Lemass impressed upon Aiken the necessity for exhibiting greater
consideration for the sensibilities of the EC members-states and even interceded on
certain issues to give such directions. There were also explicit warnings from EC
diplomats that Ireland’s speeches and voting behaviour would have adverse
ramifications for the pending decision on Ireland’s application. The implication was
76 For further discussion of Irish neutrality at the UN in the late 1960s and early 1970s, refer to chapters five, six and seven.
78 that the EC member-states would be more reluctant to support the Irish application or would perhaps even openly oppose it. Nevertheless, Irish neutrality was not
surrendered, though it became less demonstrable. There is no doubt that declaratory
speeches were more sensitive to the sensibilities of the members of the EC,
nevertheless, Ireland’s voting patterns continued to be consistent with a perpetuation
of previous policies. Aiken was the architect of Ireland’s neutrality in its UN context
under de Valera and he retained his position in the Lemass Government.77
In mid-January 1963, negotiations between the EC and the applicants were
suspended when the French President, Charles de Gaulle, effectively vetoed the UK
application. De Gaulle stated that he doubted the political will of the UK to join the
EC. De Gaulle’s concern was that the UK and Ireland were Atlanticists, rather than
continental Europeans and would act as advocates of US interests within the EC.78
Irish neutrality was perpetuated at the UN despite considerable pressure for a reversal of this policy. Consequently, the character of the missive from the EC, suspending negotiations, was distinct from those despatched to Denmark and the UK. The EC remained skeptical about Ireland’s economic capacity to integrate into the Common
Market, but also remained concerned about Ireland’s commitment to enhanced political integration. This was a reference to Ireland’s historic policy of neutrality and the refusal to contemplate NATO membership.79 Thus, the tenor of the communication on Ireland’s application for membership of the EC in the early 1960s had significant ramifications for the renewed application of 1967.
77 A more detailed explanation for the maintenance of neutrality at the UN, at the same time as Dublin cast shadows over the future of neutrality in its bid for accession to the EC, will be explored in chapter four. 78 Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht, p. 161; Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, pp. 52-54; News America Digital Publishing, (1999), Timeline: The Road to the Euro, [Web Document], Available: http://www. foxmarketwire.com/background/euro/timeline2.sml [28 May 1999], Foxmarketwire. 79 National Archives of Ireland. (1999). Guide to Sources Relating to European Unity, [Web Document]. Available: http://www.nationalarchives.ie/eec.html [20 July 1999].
79 CHAPTER 3: THE RENEWED APPLICATION FOR EC MEMBERSHIP
IN 1967: IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH FOREIGN POLICY
Despite the French veto on further negotiations with the applicants for accession to
the EC in January 1963, Dublin remained positive about eventual admission. There
was a growing momentum in favour of unconditional expansion amongst the officials
in the EC capitals and bureaucracy, which seemed to be stalled almost exclusively by
the recalcitrance of Charles de Gaulle. As a consequence of this increasing support,
Irish Government policy from 1963 was predicated on the assumption that Ireland
would be a member of the EC by 1970.1 And, in 1967, Ireland renewed its
application for membership of the EC. But the renewal of the application had a
number of implications for Irish foreign policy and posed various problems for its
existing policy schemas. Most notably, integration remained incompatible with
neutrality and, therefore, had ramifications for various components of Irish diplomacy, such as sovereignty, UN policy, and the nation’s refusal to enter NATO or other collective defence arrangements. Ultimately, in these respects, it was the
French President, Charles de Gaulle, that Irish policy had to satisfy because he was the principal opponent of EC expansion. It was also widely accepted that de Gaulle
“made, and closely directed, French policy in many important domains, not least in relation to the UN itself”.2 Ireland’s application for membership of the EC was not
only undermined by the conflict between neutrality and integration; it was also prejudiced by the link between the Irish and British applications.3 This was because
de Gaulle’s opposition to enlargement of the EC was fundamentally premised on
concern about admitting the UK.
1 D. Fisher, (1967), ‘Transforming the Economic Picture’, Statist, 31 March 1967, p. 19. 2 Cremin to McCann, 26 May 1969, NAI, DFA 2000/14/472.
80 When enlargement of the EC was suspended in January 1963, the Irish
Government responded by implementing its Second Program for Economic
Expansion. This involved the application of voluntary transitional arrangements to better prepare for admission to the EC and assuage concerns in Ireland, as well as
Brussels and the EC capitals about the nation’s capacity to acclimatise to the conditions of full membership. Under the program, unilateral tariff cuts of 20% were
instituted and the dependence of industry on other forms of protection was also
reduced. New export-orientated industries were established and existing industries
were restructured to withstand the expected evolution in conditions that would occur
after accession.4
The most important of the arrangements implemented by Dublin that were
aimed at easing the transition of membership to the EC was the forging of the Anglo-
Irish Free Trade Area Agreement in 1965. Its objective was the gradual elimination
of trade barriers between Ireland and the UK by 1975. The Agreement was perceived
by the Irish Government, and presented to the Irish public, as the first stage towards
membership of the EC, as the increased competition prepared the Irish economy for
the competitive economic climate involved in integration. The Agreement was
certainly viewed favourably by the EC, as evidence of the Irish economy’s capacity to
engage with the expanded market and embrace integration with the Common Market.5
These transitional arrangements culminated on 11 May 1967 in Ireland applying to renew6 its application for membership of the EC.7
3 Refer to page 92 for an explanation of the link between the Irish and British applications. 4 Background Note, 31 October 1967, Public Record Office in London [hereafter PRO], Records of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Predecessors [hereafter FCO] 20/101. 5 Ibid. 6 Ireland renewed its application of 1961 because this application was never rejected. In October 1962 the Council of Ministers had agreed to open negotiations with Ireland. But this decision was not enacted due to the suspension of negotiations on the British application in January 1963 (Lynch to EEC President, Van Elslande, 10 May 1967, PRO, FCO 62/32).
81
The Implications for Sovereignty Posed by Membership of the EC
The focus of the Irish Government in its campaign for admission to the EC was assuaging doubts about its commitment to the political objectives of the Treaty of
Rome, both within the executive of the EC and the capitals of the member-states.
This had been a major obstacle to Irish accession during the initial application. Thus, from the outset of the renewal of the application in 1967, the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch,
reiterated assurances that his government would “fully share the ideals” of the Treaty
of Rome and “accept the aims” of membership without qualification, including those
in the political realm.8 Although traditionalists within Fianna Fáil remained fixated
on the pre-eminence of policies of independence, the Government under Lynch had clearly signalled its intentions to pursue EC membership whatever the cost to sovereignty.
Lynch was the Taoiseach who renewed the Irish application and would eventually sign the Treaty of Accession in 1972. He was the first head of the Irish
Government that was not of the generation that fought in the Easter Rising, the War of
Independence or the Civil War. As a consequence, he and his generation perceived
Ireland’s political future to involve the pursuit of economic prosperity, not the consolidation of independence. This meant that there was less controversy about the
Irish application in 1967 than there had been in 1961. Support for the application was also given impetus by the endorsement of the agricultural sector, which was dissatisfied by the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement of 1965. This was
7 The application was prompted by the increasing moves towards integration that took place in July 1967 with the implementation of the ‘Merger Treaty’ of July 1965. On 1 July 1967, European integration entered a new phase as the three individual councils and commissions of the European Economic Community (EEC), European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were merged to form one Council. 8 Lynch to EEC President, Van Elslande, 10 May 1967, PRO, FCO 62/32.
82 important because this section of the electorate was influential and politically inclined to support isolationism.9
The articulation of support for the obligations of membership of the EC was essential because the reservations about admitting neutrals to the organisation had not faded by the time Ireland renewed its application. The concern was that the admission of a neutral state would preclude any possibility of the EC evolving into a political entity with a unified standpoint in world politics. On 17 August 1967 the
German Chancellor, Dr Kurt Kiesinger, addressed the National Press Club in
Washington and expressed his reservations about the admission of neutrals to the
EC.10 Although Kiesinger announced his reluctant preference for a loose but
expansive union, rather than a small well-integrated body, this view was openly
opposed by other member-states, especially France. At the meeting of the Irish
Council of European Movement in Dublin, the Acting President of the High Authority
of the ECSC, Albert Coppe, candidly stated that the EC was not a neutral entity in international politics, and he believed Ireland’s neutrality would be a factor in the consideration of its application.11
Therefore, the visits by the Taoiseach, and various ministers and government
officials from late 1966 until the endorsement of expansion of the EC in December
1969 were primarily designed to assuage concerns that Ireland was not committed to
the political aspects of European integration.12 Lynch gave repeated assurances that
Ireland embraced all the objectives of the EC pertaining to integration, including
those of a political nature. Although he acknowledged that the envisaged political
9 M. Hederman O’Brien, (2000), ‘The Way We Were’, in Rory O’Donnell (Ed) Europe: the Irish Experience, Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, [hereafter Hederman O’Brien, ‘The Way We Were’, in Europe], p. 11. 10 Irish Ambassador in London, Eamon Kennedy, to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Hugh McCann, 22 August 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/76. 11 Irish Times, 7 March 1967, p. 11.
83 integration could be problematic for Ireland as a neutral state, he indicated this was
far less detrimental than the political turmoil and economic stagnation that would ensue from exclusion from the EC.13 Although the Taoiseach was the primary spokesman on Ireland’s EC application, other members of the government, such as the Minister for Industry and Commerce, George Colley, echoed these statements that
Ireland would embrace the political implications of accession.14
Lynch’s approach in dealing with the possible dissent in the Dáil and the Irish
press about the contradiction between integration into a community with political
aspirations and the perpetuation of neutrality echoed that of his predecessor. That is,
Lynch dichotomised his audiences and varied his addresses to accommodate their
views. To foreign diplomats and the international press he emphasised Ireland’s
acceptance of the political ramifications of accession, but to domestic audiences he
was much more circumspect.
Between 1967 and 1972, the Irish Government focused its domestic campaign
to promote integration with the EC on emphasising the economic consequences of
membership, rather than those of a political nature. This was because the impetus for
the application for membership came from the economic advantages of accession and
fear of the economic ramifications of being excluded. As Patrick Hillery recalled
almost thirty years later, ‘It seemed that our survival as a nation depended on our
economic growth and there seemed no other way to achieve that outside the E.E.C.’ 15
Although the political obligations were foremost in the minds of the EC member- states, they were a secondary consideration for Ireland. As a consequence, Lynch’s speech in the Dáil justifying the application for EC membership ignored the political
12 British and Irish Applications for Entry into the EEC, PRO, FCO 20/96; Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 229. 13 Background Note, 31 October 1967, PRO, FCO 20/101. 14 Irish Times, 7 July 1967, p. 11.
84 and security implications of accession. The vast majority of his speech was devoted to extolling the economic advantages that would accrue from membership. He attempted to confine debate to these boundaries by insisting that discussion be based on the obligations delineated in the White Paper of April 1966, the objective of which was primarily to elucidate the economic advantages of accession. Lynch did acknowledge that Ireland would conform to all political requirements that may arise, but stressed that these remained undefined and that the EC had made very little progress toward any manifestation of political unity.16 These vague arguments were
resurrected whenever he was questioned by the Opposition in the Dáil about the
ramifications of membership.17 It was also the rhetoric espoused by other
Government ministers and was clearly a deliberate ploy of Fianna Fáil to avoid debate
on the political consequences of integration.18
Lynch’s explanation for the stagnation of integration in the EC was also aimed at undermining any suggestion that accession would detract from Irish sovereignty.
The Taoiseach insisted that the treaties underpinning the EC remained primarily concerned with economic, commercial and social matters, not political or security issues. He also noted that there was prevalent disagreement within the EC about the extent of sovereignty that should be surrendered to supra-national community institutions and that Ireland would be best able to contribute to this debate from inside the organisation.19 The implication of Lynch’s speech was that Ireland would have no
immediate political obligations, and though integration was inevitable in some form,
15 Interview on-line with Dr Patrick Hillery, 30 March 2002. 16 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 754. 17 Irish Times, 11 May 1967, p. 1. 18 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 26 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 1105. 19 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 744- 747.
85 it would not have to compromise its neutrality or any policy crucial to national interests.
Avoiding discussion about the potential political obligations was an aspect of
Government policy that elicited significant criticism from the Opposition as an attempt to mislead the public. For example, the leader of Fine Gael, Liam Cosgrave, suggested that defence was the principal objective underlying the Treaty of Rome.
Furthermore, he suggested, that although the Irish Government had emphasised the economic and social aspects of integration in a bid to promote membership of the EC to the Irish public, the political implications were prominent in the considerations of the EC member states and the UK. The Irish Government came under even more strident criticism from the Labour Party about the loss of sovereignty that would ensue from integration.20 The leader of the party, Brendan Corish, criticised Fianna
Fáil for selling political sovereignty to gain economic advantages and of misleading the electorate about the extent of this loss of sovereignty.21 Labour also criticised the general lack of information disseminated by the government about possible disadvantages of integration, especially the impact on sovereignty.22 In July 1967, the
Labour Party even unsuccessfully attempted to amend the government motion to approve the renewal of Ireland’s application for membership of the EC in a fashion that would defer such approval until Fianna Fáil fully disclosed the implications of membership.23
20 The Cork Examiner, 9 February 1967, p. 8; Irish Times, 12 May 1967, p. 6. 21 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 793- 794. 22 Ibid.: 857-860, Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 26 July, 1967 - European Economic Community (Resumed): 902, 1030. 23 Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 219.
86 The Impact of the EC Application on Ireland’s UN policy
The prospect of membership in a regional organisation, such as the EC,
continued to pose a challenge to Ireland’s diplomatic culture at the UN.24 This
conflict was pointed out by Cosgrave in the Dáil in 1967.25 His concerns were
answered by the Taoiseach in his statement introducing the motion relating to the re- activation of Ireland’s application for EC membership. In that statement, Lynch rejected the suggestion that the application would prompt any change to Ireland’s UN policy. In fact, he stated that Ireland’s approach to the UN would be the foundation of its policy within the EC.26 George Colley supported the argument of the Taoiseach in
the Dáil27 and in a speech to the Foreign Press Association in July 1967. In the latter,
the Minister for Industry and Commerce insisted that Ireland’s ‘unique relationship of
friendship and understanding’ with the developing nations especially those of Africa,
would be advantageous to its application because it would facilitate closer ties
between these new nations and the EC.28 The view of the Irish Government was that
Ireland’s UN policy would remain unaffected by the application of membership of the
EC and, in fact, should be considered beneficial.
This had not been the case in 1961, where Ireland’s neutrality at the UN was
perceived to be evidence of Ireland’s incompatibility with the objectives of the EC.
For this reason, the Labour Party contended that the Irish Government’s courting of integration would inevitably undermine Ireland’s UN policy. Denis Larkin pointed out that Irish UN policy was premised on the clarification that Ireland was devoid of any confounding influences, that it provided an independent voice in international
24 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 84. 25 Irish Times, 12 May 1967, p. 7. 26 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 747. 26 Irish Times, 11 May 1967, p. 1. 27 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 26 July, 1967 - European Economic Community (Resumed): 921-922.
87 affairs and that it was representative of small nations across the globe. He insisted
that it could no longer make these claims, as it was distancing itself from ‘the
emergent nations’ to join ‘a European bloc’.29 Furthermore, Larkin suggested that
membership of the EC was a step towards membership of NATO.
Reconciling Neutrality and Non-Membership of NATO with the EC Application
During the first application for membership of the EC, Ireland’s neutrality and
non-membership of NATO had been the most significant obstacles to accession,
specific to the Irish application.30 When addressing the Dáil, Lynch’s preferred policy
line was to reiterate that there were no defence provisions in the Treaty of Rome, and
that Ireland would be in a position to influence measures for the intensification of integration, provided that it was a member of the EC.31 The government came under
intense criticism from the Labour Party for these statements. Lynch was accused in
the Dáil of misleading the electorate about the security implications of membership of the EC and of suggesting to the international media and in foreign capitals that Ireland would be willing to join NATO. Brendan Corish pointed out that other European
neutrals were reluctant to join the EC, because of a fear that it would compromise their neutrality.32 Michael Murphy succinctly explained that this was because
‘membership [of the EC] does mean the abandonment of the neutrality policy’.33
James Tully also expressed concerns about Fianna Fáil’s approach to neutrality, independence and partition. to allow the electorate to make the decision about the continuation of neutrality, rather than ensuring that it was ‘settled behind closed
28 Irish Times, 7 July 1967, p. 11. 29 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 858. 30 The major obstacle to the Irish application was, in fact, its association with the British application. 31 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 27. 32 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 793- 795.
88 doors’.34 He argued that Ireland had fought for 700 years to achieve independence
and it should not ‘go marching into the Common Market under the Union Jack while
the six north-eastern counties are still tied up with Britain’.35 The Labour Party was a perpetual critic of the Government on this issue and a major actor in the campaign against integration in the lead-up to the referendum of 1972 to approve accession.36
Fine Gael also believed that accession to the EC would signal the end of
Ireland’s neutrality. Cosgrave pointed out that the evolution of a common security
policy was inevitable. Although he acknowledged that there was no specific
reference to defence obligations in the Treaty of Rome, he argued that commonality
of interests and coordination of institutions and economies necessitated a collective
response in the event of an attack on a member-state.37 The difference between the
Labour Party and Fine Gael was that the former regretted this eventuality, while the
latter supported it.
In response to these comments and criticisms, Lynch maintained that Fianna
Fáil remained committed to neutrality.38 As with his successor, he endorsed the
existence of NATO and the principles of its establishment, but he maintained that the
sovereignty over the decision to enter a war would remain with the Dáil, irrespective
of how integration unfolded.39 Lynch also indicated that Ireland had not been
required to join NATO as a condition of membership of the EC.40 Members of the
Cabinet reiterated Lynch’s assertion that Ireland was not obliged to join NATO.
Ireland’s Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, categorically stated that in the
33 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 26 July, 1967 - European Economic Community (Resumed): 910. 34 Ibid.: 1068. 35 Ibid.: 1069. 36 Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 348. 37 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 832. 38 Irish Times, 9 March 1967, p. 6. 39 Questions in the Dáil Éireann, 9 May 1968, NAI, DT, 2000/6/228. 40 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 23 July, 1969 - Membership of EEC: 1161.
89 context of Ireland’s negotiations for EC membership ‘We have never been asked to join NATO.’41 The Minister for Finance, Charles Haughey, commented, ‘neither individually nor collectively have the Governments of the member countries of the
Community at any time suggested that we would have to join NATO if we were to become a member of the Community’.42
Technically the members of the Irish Government were correct, as the association between membership of NATO and the EC was not explicitly contingent.
At the same time, during both applications, members of Irish delegations to Brussels and the EC capitals were pointedly reminded that Ireland was not a member of
NATO, with an implication that its intransigence on this issue would have a detrimental impact on its application for EC membership.43 This pressure was extremely oppressive and frequently applied during the initial application in 1961. In
1967, Ireland’s non-membership of NATO remained a ubiquitous hindrance to Irish aspirations of accession, but not to the same extent. This was because, although
France remained committed to the Western European Union (WEU), its withdrawal from NATO in 1966 relaxed the pressure on the Irish Government to declare its intention to join that organisation.44
But, although Fianna Fáil was always careful to reject the possibility of NATO membership, it was open to the possibility of participation in collective defence measures through an alternative forum. Haughey explicitly stated this in the Dáil, during the debate on the application for membership of the EC in mid-1967. The
Minister for Finance asserted ‘The achievement of political unions…necessarily
41 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 26 July, 1967 - European Economic Community (Resumed): 891. 42 Ibid.: 1104. 43 Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 220. 44 The WEU arose out of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, although it was not established until the revisions to that treaty in 1954. Its aim was to provide military and security coordination between its members
90 implies the formulation of a common defence policy and the working out of common
defence arrangements. That is clear.’45 Lynch was more circumspect, but did suggest that neutrality would be revised in the event of an attack on a member-state of the EC, just as it could no longer be maintained if Ireland was attacked. He stated, however,
that it was the policy of Fianna Fáil to remain neutral unless in these circumstances.46
European Integration and the Issue of Partition
The Irish Government had been forced to openly reject membership of NATO, because of the historic association of that issue and the situation in Northern Ireland.
Although the rationale for rejecting NATO membership was complex, the public
justification was that participation was unacceptable as it would have involved
acknowledgement of the existing borders of member-states, including the UK. This
was unpalatable because it would have meant legitimising the border of Northern
Ireland.
But, during the time of the renewed application, Fianna Fáil promoted
integration as a positive factor in its relations with Northern Ireland. In the Dáil on 17
November 1966, the Taoiseach stated his belief that membership of the Common
Market would affect Partition, as the Customs Border would become superfluous.
Also, he suggested that Ireland’s prosperity would more closely equate to that of the
UK, which would rectify a major concern that had impeded unification. Furthermore,
Lynch argued that mutual membership of the EC would engender greater harmony on
who were at this stage the six member-states of the EC and the UK. It functioned as the European arm of NATO and, when France withdrew in 1966, a bridge between France and NATO. 45 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 26 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 1105. 46 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 23 July, 1969 - Membership of EEC: 1158-1161.
91 both sides of the border.47 These views were echoed by George Colley in a speech to
the New Ireland Society of the Students’ Union at Queens University Belfast on 20
February 1967. He argued that economic cooperation between North and South was an inevitability of both Ireland and the Six Counties being incorporated into the EC.48
Much of this revision in Dublin’s attitude towards Northern Ireland was a result of the meeting between the Taoiseach at the time, Sean Lemass, and the Prime
Minister of Northern Ireland, Terence O’Neil, in Belfast in January 1965. Their discussion was confined to facilitating economic and administrative cooperation but, importantly, the avoidance of constitutional and political matters allowed cross-border relations to evolve a pragmatic and functional focus.49
Thus, there was a feeling within the Irish Government that the issue of
partition should not influence the attitude towards the EC and, therefore, by
implication NATO. This was particularly the case because there was such accord
between the ideological thinking of the Irish Republic and the NATO member-states.
Members of the Irish Government had frequently declared that Ireland was a Western
state and was not neutral in the ideological division of the Cold War. The President of the European Commission, Jean Rey, recognised Ireland’s changing attitude when he made the statement that ‘Ireland alone among the neutral or unengaged countries of Europe has always declared itself ready to contribute actively to the evolution of an economic community into a political community when the time comes.’50
The debate on reconciling admission with a continuing neutrality policy did
not intensify until 1970 when admission became probable with the opening of
47 British Ambassador in Dublin, Andrew Gilchrist, to Commonwealth Office, 14 March 1967, PRO, FCO 62/31; Relations with the E.E.C, Records Created or Inherited by the Dominions Office & of the Commonwealth Relations & Foreign & Commonwealth Offices [hereafter DO] 215/20. 48 Irish Times, 21 February 1967, p. 11. 49 Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 287. 50 J. Rey, “Europe – ‘From Ireland to the Urals’”, Statist, 31 March 1967, p. 7.
92 negotiations, and later in 1972, just prior to the referendum for accession. At these
times, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael argued that there was no immediate threat to
neutrality, but also that that policy was malleable, ad hoc and negotiable, which was
qualified by other Irish national interests, rather than the defining feature of those
interests. As with the first application, the Irish Government was careful to
distinguish between the possible evolution of political and security obligations of EC
membership, and membership of NATO.51 The Labour Party responded that
membership of NATO was inevitable following admission to the Common Market
and that any defence arrangements of the EC would be founded upon NATO.52 For these reasons and the loss of sovereignty that would be involved in accession, Labour deputies advocated association with the EC, rather than full membership.53
The Link Between the Irish and British Applications: The Objective of Simultaneous
Admission
The Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement with the UK and the various
other measures related to Ireland’s voluntary transitional period in preparation for
accession to the EC had resulted in intensifying the relationship between the
economies of Ireland and the UK. In 1966, only 11% of Irish exports went to the
Common Market, whereas 70% were directed to the UK. In addition to this, 50% of
Ireland’s imports were from UK.54 This dependence was a result of geographic
proximity, historical habituation and the nature of commodity production in the two
51 Maher, The Tortuous Path, pp. 344-347; Salmon, ‘Ireland: A Neutral in the Community’, Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 211-212. 52 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 27. 53 Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 273. 54 Background Note, 31 October 1967, PRO, FCO 20/101.
93 nations.55 Disruption to this trading relationship would have severely damaged the
Irish economy and, thus, Ireland’s participation in the EC independently of the UK
was an untenable proposition.
Consequently, as with the initial application for membership in 1961, Ireland’s
intention was simultaneous accession with the UK. Any time discrepancy in the
accession of the two nations would be considerably detrimental to Ireland’s trading
relations.56 As a consequence, between 1961 and 1973 there were frequent meetings
at the highest levels of the Irish and British Governments concerning the applications
and their progress. The Irish application was lodged at 9:15 am on 11 May 1967,
fifteen minutes after the lodging of the British application. This was manifestly
indicative of Ireland’s desire for simultaneous negotiation and accession with the
UK.57 This objective, which was constantly impressed on the decision-makers in the
EC,58 along with Ireland’s economic relations with the UK, had led to perceptions in
the Common Market that Ireland was an economic satellite of the UK. For these
reasons, the fate of the Irish application was fundamentally contingent on the destiny
of its British counterpart.59 Irish delegations to the capitals of the EC member-states
were explicitly informed that Ireland would only be admitted to the organisation if the
application of the UK was approved.60
Charles de Gaulle and Opposition to Expansion of the EC and the Inclusion of the UK
As a consequence, concerns about the British application were a significant
obstacle to Ireland’s objective of participation in the EC. France was reluctant to
55 The economies of Ireland and the UK were complementary, which stimulated bi-lateral trade. Ireland’s economy was primarily agricultural and the UK’s was primarily industrial. 56 G. T. Spelman, (2001), ‘Ireland and the European Communities: The Renewal of the Application for Accession in 1967’, Melbourne Historical Journal, 29, p, 145. 57 Irish Times, 12 May 1967, p. 1. 58 Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 217.
94 support expansion in general and the inclusion of the UK in particular. Paris’
opposition to expansion was led by the French President, Charles de Gaulle, who
under the Fifth Republic,61 was invested with significantly broader powers than his
predecessors had been. The Presidency became the coordinating center of major
decisions of military, foreign and colonial policy. In most cases de Gaulle personally took control and delineated the objectives of diplomacy, especially matters pertaining to NATO, the EC, and disarmament.62
De Gaulle’s fundamental philosophy was that the nation state was the centre of international relations and, more importantly, that nationalism overshadowed all other policy exigencies. The necessary pre-requisites for furthering national interests were political and military power, as well as independence. This has often been called France’s “policy of grandeur” or “quest for rank”.63 The objective of this
policy was the restoration of pride in a nation that, as a result of its experiences in two
world wars, as well as post-war defeats in Algeria and Indochina had adopted a
psychology of defeatism, vulnerability and dependence.64
Consequently, de Gaulle’s foreign policy was characterised by attempts to
remain independent in bloc conflicts, spread French influence and aggrandise
France’s image in the international community. The perception of subordination to
any other state or interests was unacceptable.65 As a consequence, de Gaulle’s foreign
policy was particularly designed to distance France and, ultimately, Western Europe
59 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 766. 60 Cabinet Office Memo, 2 May 1967, PRO, FCO 62/32. 61 The Fifth Republic came into existence in 1958 with the election of de Gaulle to the Presidency and his revision of the constitution. 62 R. C. Macridis, (1989), ‘French Foreign Policy: The Quest for Rank’, in R. C. Macridis (Ed), Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions (7th ed), London: Prentice-Hall, [hereafter Macridis, ‘French Foreign Policy’, in Foreign Policy in World Politics], pp. 42-43, 49. 63 S. Berstein, (1993), The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969, translated by P. Morris, Paris: Cambridge University Press, [hereafter Berstein, The Republic of de Gaulle] pp. 153-154. 64 H. Kissinger, (1994), Diplomacy, Touchstone: New York, [hereafter Kissinger, Diplomacy], p. 602- 603.
95 from US influence. The French President nurtured relations with states of the Non-
Aligned Movement and undertook an extensive diplomatic tour of Latin America to
cultivate French influence in that region. He repeatedly denounced US policy in
Vietnam through diplomatic forums and in the international media, most notably
during a speech made in Cambodia in 1966.66 De Gaulle also drew closer to the communist states to further his vision of a cooperative Europe as a counter-balance to
the superpowers. The objective of increasing France’s independence was also the foundation of de Gaulle’s withdrawal of France from NATO in 1966. This was de
Gaulle’s reaction to the rejection of his proposal to secure the independence of his nation’s capacity to act unilaterally and with nuclear weapons, when it determined a
“critical threshold of aggressiveness” in a situation where France was directly threatened. This would have allowed France to act within the NATO alliance, but
also have the capacity to act contrarily to NATO’s collective interests when it deemed
it appropriate.67
In essence, de Gaulle’s presidency was characterised by the view that
independence, rather than regionalism or internationalism, furthered French interests.
It manifested most openly on issues such as military independence, especially the
possession of nuclear weapons, reconciliation with West Germany and the creation of a Paris-Bonn axis to control Western Europe, the independence of Western Europe under French influence, and the elevation of French status to enable it to participate in global diplomacy alongside the Soviet Union and the USA.68
65 Ibid., p. 605. 66 P. G. Cerny, (1980), The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University, [hereafter Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur], p. 146. 67 A. Hartley, (1971), Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement, London: Routledge [hereafter Hartley, Gaullism], p. 208; Macridis, ‘French Foreign Policy’, in Foreign Policy in World Politics, pp. 39-40, 44, 52. 68 Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur, pp. 133-134.
96 De Gaulle was the primary advocate within the EC of evolution into an
organisation with inter-governmental, as opposed to supranational links. Therefore,
whilst the other five members of the EC deemed their national interests to be served
by a more expansive community, France, under de Gaulle, sought to perpetuate the limited membership of the EC because it preserved French power. As a consequence, de Gaulle had unilaterally vetoed negotiations for expansion in 1963 and the suspension of discussions in 1967. But it should be noted that de Gaulle did support
European integration, provided that it served French interests and was under French leadership. He believed that the EC should operate on a Paris-Bonn axis, with deference from the Benelux nations and Italy. Furthermore, in return for supporting
West Germany against pressure from the Soviet bloc, reinforced with threats to recognise the legitimacy of the communist regime in East Germany, he expected adherence from Bonn to French policies. Ultimately, de Gaulle’s vision of the EC was that of an organisation independent of the USA and dependent on France.69
The admission of the UK would have disrupted de Gaulle’s vision. The
French President expressed his reservations about the UK application and, therefore,
reluctance to support expansion of the EC less than one week after it had been lodged.
His ostensible rationale was that a larger community would have made negotiation,
coordination and cohesion of policy more difficult, due to the increase in the number
of centrifugal forces of independence.70 But de Gaulle’s reluctance to contemplate
expansion was fundamentally predicated on an unwillingness to admit the UK. His
underlying concern was that the UK was too subordinate to US leadership in the
realm of foreign policy and that this undermined efforts at political unity within the
69 Hartley, Gaullism, pp. 208-209; W. Laqueur, (1992), Europe In Our Time, New York: Penguin, [hereafter Laqueur, Europe in Our Time], p. 325; Macridis, ‘French Foreign Policy’, in Foreign Policy in World Politics, pp. 46, 51. 70 Irish Times, 17 May 1967, pp. 1, 8.
97 EC. These concerns in the 1960s proved to be prophetic as, from the 1990s, NATO’s
role in Europe has been led by the Anglo-American axis. De Gaulle’s concerns about
expansion were also related to apprehension about the dilution of French influence
with the accession of the applicants, whom he expected would manifest a powerful
voting bloc in the legislative bodies of the EC subordinate to British economic and
political interests.71 De Gaulle was also concerned with the UK’s suitability for
accession for a number of more technical reasons, most notably in respect of
agricultural policy72 and currency issues.73
The admission of the UK was also unpalatable to the Gaullist regime for
domestic reasons. In 1967, de Gaulle was facing growing domestic pressure,
especially within student and union ranks, which would eventually lead, in May and
June 1968, to a general strike and the worst rioting ever to occur in mainland France.
The French economy had not expanded at the rate promised by de Gaulle or necessary
for the implementation of his vision of France’s role in the world and suffered from
repeated balance of payment deficits. The Gaullists won only a very small majority at
the legislative elections of 1967.74 At the heart of this tension were economic and
social grievances, including the wages and working conditions of industrial workers.75
According to French Government sources, French industry would need a further ten years to prepare for competition from British industrial exports. Furthermore, Europe
71 MacWhite to McCann, 17 February 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/70. 72 De Gaulle was concerned that the UK’s food was obtained largely from cheap Commonwealth imports and that accession (with its adherence to EC agricultural agreements) would destroy its balance of payments, have an inflationary effect on food prices and wages, as well as British production in general. 73 The fact that the sterling was a reserve currency (where large numbers of nations around the world held sterling reserves) was problematic as it made it more unstable and not a constant value relative to the currencies of the EC states. De Gaulle believed that this would be detrimental to the operation of the Common Market. 74 P. Goubert, (1988), The Course of French History, translated by M. Ultee, London: Routledge, [hereafter Goubert, The Course of French History], p. 310; E. L. Morse, (1973), Foreign Policy and Independence in Gaullist France, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [hereafter Morse, Foreign Policy and Independence in Gaullist France], p. 95. 75 Laqueur, Europe in Our Time, pp. 347-348.
98 was in the midst of a currency crisis where the overvalued franc was endangering the
stability of the British pound and the US dollar.76 But de Gaulle was reluctant to
either devalue the franc, or support British entry to the EC until there had been a
further devaluation of the pound. Of course, a further weakening of the British
currency would only strengthen the UK’s export competitiveness against French
industry.77 All of these reasons reinforced de Gaulle’s inclination to maintain the
status quo of the EC and postpone the intensification of competition that would ensue
from enlargement.
Although France was the only opponent of the admission of the UK, some of
its concerns were shared by the other member-states. London was widely perceived
to be ambivalent about entry, seeking the benefits of membership but also the
maintenance of its preferential trading relationships in the agricultural sector with
third parties, especially the Commonwealth and the European Free Trade Association.
This was viewed as being contrary to, and undermining of, the Treaty of Rome, which
had been designed to be inward looking and preclude the kinds of exceptions that the
UK desired.78 Concerns in this respect were exacerbated by the British Prime
Minister, Harold Wilson’s announcement of the UK’s application for membership of
the EC. He called for revision of the Treaty of Rome to accommodate the applicants
and for exceptions to be made with respect to the UK’s existing international agreements.79 Although these conditions were modified one week later, they antagonised France and undermined the success of all the applications for EC membership.
76 P. Richardson, (1972), Britain, Europe and the Modern World, 1918-1968, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 205. 77 Kennedy, to McCann, 21 December 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/76. 78 Irish Ambassador at the Hague, Eoin MacWhite, to McCann, 17 February 1967, NAI, DFA, 98/3/70. 79 Irish Times, 4 May 1967, p. 1; Irish Times, 11 May 1967, p. 1.
99 As an indication of French animosity towards the inclusion of the UK within
the EC, France singled out its application in the suspension of expansion. At a
meeting of the Council of Ministers of the EC on the 19 December 1967, France
registered an effective veto on the opening of negotiations when the French Foreign
Minister, Couve de Murville, refused to sanction expansion of the EC. It was
precipitated by comments by de Gaulle on 27 November, who used the opportunity of
the British Government’s devaluation of the pound to signal that France would not engage in negotiations with the applicants.80 The veto was reiterated in the meeting
of the Council of Ministers on 9 March 1968,81 and periodically by de Gaulle in press
conferences until his retirement.82
There was open and unequivocal criticism of the French position from the
governments of the other member-states. They had expressed their unified support for the immediate opening of negotiations at the meeting in December 1967.83 The
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands viewed the French decision as
disastrous and accused France of deliberately and perennially obstructing expansion for self-serving reasons.84 There was more muted criticism from West Germany,
largely as a consequence of Chancellor Kiesinger’s efforts to promote closer relations
with France.85 The remaining member-states supported expansion, but were cautious
about their criticism of France for a number of reasons. There was a concern that any
rift between the member-states could precipitate the disintegration of the EC.86 Also,
the governments of West Germany, Italy and Belgium were in precarious electoral
positions and due to face the polls in 1968 and, therefore, were not in a position to
80 Maher, The Tortuous Path, pp. 231-233. 81 Circular from Donal O’Sullivan in the Department of External Affairs to the Irish Ambassadors in the European capitals, 16 May 1968, NAI, DFA 2000/14/415. 82 Irish Ambassador in Paris, Thomas Commins, to McCann, 18 September 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/71. 83 Position Paper on Ireland and the EC, 16 May 1968, NAI, DFA 2000/14/415. 84 Statement by Dutch Foreign Minister, Luns, to Parliament, December 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/82.
100 openly confront de Gaulle.87 But in private, the Italians were extremely incensed, charging Paris with serving the Soviet aim of undermining the EC.88
Despite the French veto on immediate negotiations with the applicants, the
communiqué drawn up at the meeting clearly stated that the applications for
membership remained on the table and would be on the agenda of every future meeting of the Council of Ministers. The five member-states of the EC supportive of expansion, resolved to maintain their contacts with the applicants and intensify their
cooperation across various realms of policy.89
Ireland’s Continued Commitment to the EC
Though Dublin was prepared for a negative reaction from France to its
application, it was concerned at the degree of negativity. Nevertheless, the Irish
Government believed that the postponement of the negotiations was merely the
opening gambit in the process of discussions, not the final decision. It remained the
intention of the Irish Government and the governments of the other applicants, the
UK, Denmark and Norway, to accede to the EC. Thus, from December 1967 the onus
was on the applicants to be sufficiently accommodating and flexible to reverse de
Gaulle’s decision.90
The uncertainty about the status of the Irish application ended in 1969. On 28
April, de Gaulle resigned as President of France in the wake of his defeat in a national
referendum, where he attempted to institute regional and Senate reforms. His
successor as President was Georges Pompidou and the new government, though
85 Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 209. 86 Talking points for the Visit of the Taoiseach to London, 9 February 1968, PRO, FCO 62/92. 87 Irish Ambassador in Brussels, Francis Biggar, to McCann, 19 March 1968, NAI, DFA, 98/3/72. 88 Kennedy to McCann, 21 December 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/76. 89 MacWhite to McCann, 20 December 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/82.
101 Gaullist, was dominated by committed “Europeans”. The new Prime Minister was
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who quickly signaled the new regime’s support for
expansion of the EC. The opening of negotiations to promote enlargement was
confirmed at a summit conference of the heads of state and government of the
member-states at The Hague in December 1969. Thus, from 1970, Dublin could be
relatively confident of the imminence of accession and so its foreign policy was
focused on preparing for negotiations and the process of integration.91
Frank Aiken was replaced as Minister for External Affairs by Dr Patrick
Hillery in June 1969, only two months after de Gaulle retired. Aiken was unhappy
about his forced retirement, but also was not surprised.92 In 1968, Lynch had
signalled his intentions to remove Aiken with the elevation of Pádraig Faulkner to the
Cabinet, which gave County Louth two representatives in the Ministry. Lynch
reshuffled his ministry, conscious that the retirement of de Gaulle made the expansion
of the EC probable. The elevation of Hillery was an indication that from 1969,
Dublin would focus its foreign policy on Brussels, rather than New York. The
replacement of Aiken also effectively devolved responsibility for the formulation of
policy at the UN from the Minister for External Affairs to the Permanent
Representative in New York. This was because Hillery’s primary role as Minister for
External Affairs was to coordinate the effort to achieve membership of the EC.93
90 Fortnightly summary of British Ambassador in Dublin, Andrew Gilchrist, 19 May 1967, PRO, FCO 62/32. 91 Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 244-253. 92 Interview with Frank Aiken Jnr and Eileen Aiken, Greenvale Mill, Cappocksgreen, Ardee, County Louth, Ireland, 31 August 2000 [hereafter Interview with Frank Aiken Jnr and Eileen Aiken]. 93 On-line Interview with Dr Patrick Hillery, 30 March 2002.
102 Conclusion
Since the failure of the initial application for membership of the EC in January
1963, the Irish Government remained convinced of the inevitability of accession.
Consequently, government policy was orientated from this time to providing for this eventuality, with unilateral demolition of protection barriers and the forging of the
Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. Ultimately, in May 1967 Ireland renewed its application of 1961, and the other applicants, the UK, Denmark and Norway, also lodged applications to join the EC. This was done in anticipation of the impending merger of the executives of the three existing European Communities under the
“Merger Treaty” of 1965, which would come into force in July 1967 and be indicative of increasing integration.
When the application for membership of the EC was made in 1961, and renewed in 1967, Irish political figures went to great lengths to argue Ireland’s case for accession. In particular, they downplayed the significance of Irish neutrality and accentuated their commitment to Western European ideals. The paramount and over- arching objective of foreign policy for the Irish Government from 1967 (until 1973) was accession to the EC and convincing the member-states of Ireland’s suitability. At the same time, neutrality was a crucial icon of Irish national identity and, thus, members of the government argued in domestic circles that Ireland was only bound by the economic obligations of membership of the EC. As a consequence, there was significant ambiguity about the direction that Ireland’s UN policy would take with the effort to secure accession to the EC. This was particularly the case during the period
1967-1969, when the Irish application was at its most vulnerable and Irish delegations to the European capitals desperately argued Ireland’s case for membership of the EC.
Nevertheless, despite the effective veto, both Ireland and the UK remained intent on
103 securing membership of the EC and were constrained by the need to prove their commitment to the objective of integration.
104 CHAPTER 4: THE FRAGMENTATION OF IRELAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
After the renewal of Ireland’s application for EC membership in 1967, Dublin’s most pressing task was to convince the member-states of Ireland’s commitment to political union. Nevertheless, during the period 1965-1972, while the Irish application was being promoted and negotiated, there was very little change in Ireland’s UN policy from its position of neutrality. This was due to the fragmentation of decision-making in Ireland’s foreign policy formulation. Responsibility for Ireland’s external economic relations and links was invested in the economic departments,1 not the Department of External Affairs.
At the same time, the Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, was allowed significant authority over UN policy and he was one of the primary supporters of neutrality. As a consequence, the UN delegation was insulated to a large degree from the influence of economic imperatives in general, and the exigencies of Ireland’s application for EC membership in particular.
The Foreign Policy of Newly Independent States
Ireland’s application for membership of the EC was typical of evolving political priorities for newly independent nations.2 Although Ireland achieved its self-government in 1921 many other aspects of independence, including the elimination of foreign bases on its territory and republican status were only achieved over the ensuing decades. In historical terms this forty years of independence made Ireland a comparatively newly
1 The economic departments included the departments of Industry and Commerce, Labour, as well as Agriculture and Fisheries. The department of Finance was also one of the economic departments, though it was also the senior department of the Irish civil service. 2 Lerche & Said, Concepts of International Politics, pp. 6-20, 284-288.
105 independent state. The EC application marked the supplanting of Ireland’s traditional priorities of foreign policy – most notably asserting sovereignty and other manifestations of independence, such as neutrality – by the enhancement of economic prosperity.
Accession to the EC was a relatively recent objective of the foreign policy of the Irish government, and although its origin was in the mid-to-late 1950s, it did not become a realistic goal until the early 1960s.
Prior to the formulation of this objective, the fundamental priority of Irish foreign policy, especially as manifested at the UN, had been the adoption of policies that reinforced its independence, primarily through support for decolonisation, disarmament, and peacekeeping. Overt demonstrations of independence in the international arena have been a common preoccupation of small and relatively new independent states, as they validate the legitimacy of their government.3 This is achieved by demonstrating sovereignty, capacity to provide leadership of the nation and formulating a foreign policy that clearly differentiates from that of former ruling nations. In the case of Ireland, these aspects were demonstrated through neutrality in World War II and were primarily continued by the pursuit of an active and neutral UN policy in the Cold War world.
But, as small nations become increasingly interdependent with their regional partners, there is an inevitable evolution in terms of the foundations of foreign policy.
International activism, the objective of prestige and the pursuit of independence are increasingly supplanted by the exigencies of greater economic engagement with the world as stimulating economic growth becomes a higher priority.4 In Ireland’s case, this was signalled by the application for EC membership in 1961 and its renewal in 1967.
3 R. Petkovic, (1979), Non-Alignment and the Big Powers, Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Stvarnost, pp. 7-9. 4 Lerche & Said, Concepts of International Politics, pp. 6-20.
106 Irish foreign policy during the 1960s, especially 1967-1969, was compelled to accommodate these conflicting pressures – independence and interdependence – with disagreements between the Irish policy-making elite about their comparative importance.
Responsibility for the Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy
Control over the formulation of foreign policy within the Irish Cabinet did not rest in one ministerial office, but was diffused amongst a number of ministers, only one of whom was the Minister for External Affairs. The problem with this shared responsibility was that it led to an arbitrary and misleading view of foreign policy as being separated into spheres of economic policy and political and security matters.5
Responsibility for Ireland’s external economic affairs and the pressing of
Ireland’s application for EC membership lay with the Taoiseach and the ministers of the economic departments of the government. These included the ministers of the departments of Industry and Coimmerce, Finance, Labour, as well as Agriculture and
Fisheries.6 This was the way that Ireland had approached the negotiations for accession to the EC during both the initial and renewed phases of the application and even during the late 1950s when the then Minister for Industry and Commerce, Sean Lemass, was responsible for the negotiations with the Organisation for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).7 While Aiken
5 E. L. Morse, (1981), ‘The Transformation of Foreign Policies’, in Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (Eds), Perspectives on World Politics, Croom Helm: London, p. 153. 6 Document entitled ‘The Accession of Ireland to the European Communities’, laid by the government before each house of Parliament, 1972, UCDA, FAP, P104/5769. 7 M. Hederman, (1983), The Road to Europe: Irish Attitudes, 1948-61, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, [Hederman, The Road to Europe], p. 83; G. Murphy, (2000), “‘A Wider Perspective’: Ireland’s View of Western Europe in the 1950s”, in Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism, Dublin: Four Courts Press, [hereafter Murphy, ‘A Wider Perspective’, in Irish Foreign Policy], p. 263.
107 was Minister for External Affairs between the renewal of Ireland’s application in 1967 and Patrick Hillery’s appointment as his successor in 1969, it was the Secretary of the
Department of Finance, Dr Ken Whitaker, who usually led the delegations to the EC. At a ministerial level, most responsibility during this period lay with George Colley
(Minister for Industry and Commerce, and later Finance and the Gaeltacht), Charles
Haughey (Minister for Finance), Patrick Hillery (Minister for Industry and Commerce,
Labour and then Aiken’s successor in External Affairs) and Jack Lynch (Taoiseach), rather than Aiken.8
Although Patrick Hillery assumed primary responsibility for conducting the negotiations for accession after he was appointed Minister for External Affairs in 1969, the collaborative interdepartmental approach to European integration continued. In the early 1960s an interdepartmental committee, sponsored by the Department of Finance and commonly referred to as the “Committee of Secretaries”, was established specifically to deal with Irish policy towards the EC. It was composed of the secretaries and assistant-secretaries from the economic departments, with only occasional representation from other governmental departments (including External Affairs). This was the principal policy-making body of the Irish Government concerning EC policy in the years leading up to accession, including the coordination of the negotiations for accession in the early 1970s. Therefore, with its chairing of this body, the Department of Finance became the section primarily responsible for external economic policy during the
8 Hederman O’Brien, ‘The Way We Were’, Europe, p. 8; Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 131.
108 negotiations and the role of the Department of External Affairs remained extremely limited.9
An indication of the Department of External Affairs’ isolation from involvement in the efforts to achieve integration was explicit in the “Report of the Public Service
Organisation Review Group” in 1969.10 The Report was critical of the general lack of involvement played by the Department of External Affairs in the formulation of foreign policy pertaining to economic matters and suggested reform of the department’s responsibility in overseeing and executing external economic policy. It recommended that authority over this aspect of foreign policy should cease to be shared amongst the
Departments of Finance, Labour, Agriculture and Fisheries, Industry and Commerce and
External Affairs and, instead, be coordinated and concentrated in the latter. It was believed that likely approaching integration with the EC necessitated a coordinating centre, to navigate the increasingly diversified external economic policy that would be entailed in membership. Despite the urgency of the recommendations, however, none were implemented during the period of the negotiations for accession to the EC.11
This dichotomy of Irish foreign policy was primarily a product of the role played in Irish politics by Sean Lemass. When Fianna Fáil returned to power in 1957 and Aiken was appointed Minister for External Affairs, Lemass was appointed Minister for Industry and Commerce and it was he who became the principal government spokesman for
European matters and Ireland’s external economic relations.12 The fragmentation of Irish foreign policy continued when Lemass acceded to the position of Taoiseach in 1959,
9 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 130-131; Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, p. 214. 10 Also called the Devlin Report. 11 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 118.
109 because it allowed him to continue to direct Ireland’s external economic policy. In this capacity, Lemass was the primary figure in efforts to achieve integration with the EC during Ireland’s initial application between 1961 and 1963.
The problem with this approach to government, however, was that Ireland’s dichotomous foreign policy undermined its efforts to achieve integration with the EC.
Although the EC was ostensibly an organization based on economic union, the primary distinguishing feature between it and the EFTA was that the EC had the additional objective of political union. In fact, the members of the EFTA refused to consider participation in the EC specifically because of their aversion to political integration.
The Separation of External Economic Policy from Political and Security Matters
Because Irish foreign policy was conceived in this dichotomous framework,
Ireland’s UN policy remained unaltered while the government was pressing its application for membership of the EC.13 This was not a unique occurrence in Europe, as various nations struggled to reconcile nationalism with increasing interdependence.14
This dichotomy of Irish foreign policy allowed often-contradictory objectives to be pursued and thereby engendered perceptions of ambiguity about Ireland’s foreign policy directions.15 Thus, during the period of the application for membership of the EC, the
Irish Government was able to satisfy two competing foreign policy pressures – European integration and neutrality. The former was necessary to assure the future prosperity of
12 Ibid., pp. 60, 94-98. 13 Although in the Irish Cabinet political and security issues included UN policy, ultimately they were defined by what they were not. That is, they were those realms of foreign policy that excluded matters pertaining to external economic links and issues. 14 M. A. East, (1981), ‘The Organizational Impact of Interdependence on Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of Norway’, in Charles W. Kegley & Pat McGowan (Eds), The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behaviour, Los Angeles: Sage, pp. 139-150.
110 the Irish electorate. But the perpetuation of neutrality, especially with respect to UN policy, was also necessary because of its cultural, psychological and ideological value.
Irish policy concerning European integration was reactive, whereas in the case of neutrality and the UN it was assertive, which explains its association with national pride.
The regional and international context of Ireland’s economic relations had been an issue of policy concern prior to the return of the de Valera Government in 1957. But it was the ministerial roles of Lemass and Aiken under this administration, which was primarily responsible for removing such considerations from the province of the Minister for External Affairs. During Lemass’ time as Minister for Industry and Commerce, substantial government intervention in the economy occurred, which resulted in the ever- increasing influence of the economic departments. The inertia of this diplomatic division of labour established under Lemass continued when he acceded to the position of
Taoiseach, as well as into the government of Lynch, who was compelled to maintain many of the policies instigated by his predecessor, because of the more fractious nature of the Fianna Fáil party under his leadership.16 The fragmentation of foreign policy decision-making of this nature continued until 1969, and in a diminished capacity beyond that year. Prior to the return of Fianna Fáil to government in 1957, and most notably under the ministry of Sean MacBride from 1948-1951, the Department of External
Affairs was heavily involved in external economic policy, especially with respect to the
Marshall Aid Program.17
The dichotomous approach to foreign policy could explain the Irish Government’s presentation of the application for admission to the EC in terms of technical and
15 Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, p. 228. 16 Horgan, Sean Lemass, p. 191.
111 economic adjustments, rather than in relation to a diplomatic or political change in
Ireland’s national policy.18 But it is probably more correct to suggest that this suited, rather than explained, the Irish Government’s presentation of this as a Common Market, rather than a political integration issue. In essence, an economic agreement was easier to sell to the Irish public than the potential political ramifications, as the supranational objectives of the Treaty of Rome were a direct challenge to Ireland’s values of national identity – independence and neutrality. Although Dublin was willing to concede to the reality of economic interdependence, it was reluctant to admit that its political independence was in any way being circumscribed.19
Aiken’s Focus on the UN and the Insulation of UN Policy
Much of the responsibility for the low profile of the Department of External
Affairs in pursing Ireland’s application for membership of the EC can be attributed specifically to Aiken.20 In 1966, Aiken was criticized in the Seanad for speaking only 58 words relating to Europe out of a total of 20,000 words during his speeches in the preceding three years. Fine Gael claimed that Aiken and the Irish embassies abroad had been negligent in failing to sufficiently press the Irish case for admission to the EC. Dr
Garret FitzGerald argued for the appointment of a parliamentary secretary with responsibility for UN policy, to allow Aiken to concentrate on other aspects of his role.21
Therefore, in July 1966, Fine Gael tabled a motion that, amongst other things, called on
Aiken to reorganize the Department of External Affairs and overseas missions to be
17 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, pp 70-71. 18 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 25 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 754. 19 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, pp. 74-79. 20 Ibid., p. 131.
112 better able to carry out policy designed to ensure Irish membership of the EC.22 This criticism intensified after Ireland’s application for membership of the EC was renewed in
1967. Patrick Donegan of Fine Gael remonstrated in the Dáil that ‘the Minister has been in Brussels once in three years and that was by accident.’23 Michael Murphy of the
Labour Party indicated that concern about Aiken’s focus on New York was the
‘consensus of opinion’ of the Opposition.24 There was indeed a common view that
Ireland’s application would be better pressed by a Minister of External Affairs who spent less time at the UN in New York.
Aiken made very little contribution to policies concerning European cooperation because he viewed the application for admission to the EC as being a constitutional matter and, therefore, the Taoiseach’s affair.25 It appears that Aiken’s reticence with respect to integration was of such significance, that he appeared to have made ‘a tacit agreement’ with his colleagues not to intervene on the question.26 When confronted by the Irish media about Ireland’s application, Aiken often explicitly refused to comment because he considered it to be the province of the Taoiseach.27 Similarly, in the Dáil,
Aiken frequently refused to deal in any depth with questions pertaining to trade and economic matters of foreign policy, and referred the questions to the Taoiseach or other ministers.28 At times Dáil deputies were cautioned for asking questions about such matters, as they did not fall within the province of External Affairs. Similarly, questions
21 Ibid., p. 98. 22 Debates of the Seanad Éireann - Volume 61, 14 July 1966 - Irish Membership of EEC: 1834. 23 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 26 July, 1967 - European Economic Community: 1018. 24 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 26 July, 1967 - European Economic Community (Resumed): 897. 25 Murphy, ‘A Wider Perspective’, in Irish Foreign Policy, p. 263. 26 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 87. 27 Hederman, The Road to Europe, p. 67.
113 on European matters were usually dealt with by the Department of the Taoiseach or
Industry and Commerce. When Aiken did refer to Europe in the Dáil or the Irish media, it was usually in the context of events at the UN, rather than either the Irish application for EC membership or bilateral relations. As would be expected, the Minister for
External Affairs was often included in delegations negotiating for accession to the EC.
But it is significant that Aiken was rarely accorded primary responsibility for conducting any of these negotiations and his focus remained on New York. In fact, during the initial application for membership of the EC, Aiken avoided any involvement in the negotiations until 1963 when it became evident that they were on the verge of being vetoed by de Gaulle.29
It has been purported that between 1961 and 1969, Aiken had evolved from a
Minister for External Affairs to ‘a minister for United Nations affairs’.30 Aiken, like de
Valera, had reservations concerning Irish participation in a unified Europe.31 His interest in European affairs was framed in the general context of his view of the international arena. Nevertheless, the Tánaiste remained circumspect about how he expressed his concerns about integration and repeatedly asserted his support for the idea of the EC in an effort to ensure uniformity in the position of the Irish Government.32
The Economic Division of the Department of External Affairs played a role in the efforts to achieve integration,33 although that role remained small and ‘reactive’.34 The
28 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 226 - 08 February, 1967 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45— External Affairs: 869. 29 Hederman, The Road to Europe, p. 74; Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 73. 30 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 94. 31 Hederman, The Road to Europe, p. 36. 32 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 76. 33 M. Kennedy, & J. M. Skelly, (2000), ‘The Study of Irish Foreign Policy from Independence to Internationalism’, in Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism, Dublin: Four
114 unit of the Economic Division concerned with the EC remained very small up until 1969-
1970, when Hillery was appointed as Minister for External Affairs and the Irish application for EC membership was reinvigorated with the retirement of de Gaulle. Also, throughout the period leading up to accession to the Common Market in 1973, the function of the EC unit of the Department of External Affairs’ Economic Division was to primarily act as a channel of information between the EC and the economic departments.
But it is important to note that the Department of External Affairs did act in a policy- making role in collaboration with the economic departments and the Ambassador to the
EC.35
Although government departments outside External Affairs increasingly interacted in the realm of foreign policy on economic matters, they did not encroach upon issues customarily within the sphere of the Department of External Affairs, such as political and security matters. While Aiken did not have sole authority over foreign policy even within his department, he did maintain considerable sovereignty over UN policy.36 This explains why there was seldom any reference by the UN delegation to events in Europe, the EC, or Ireland’s EC application, in either the formulation or explanation of its UN policy. This also explains why Ireland was able to maintain a UN policy that was often hostile to French interests, at the same time as Irish delegations visited Paris to press the Irish application and convince the French Government that
Ireland shared the interests and objectives of the EC member-states and France. This was particularly significant because of the concerns communicated by Paris to Dublin over
Courts Press, [hereafter Kennedy & Skelly, ‘The Study of Irish Foreign Policy from Independence to Internationalism’, in Irish Foreign Policy], p. 24. 34 Murphy, ‘A Wider Perspective’, in Irish Foreign Policy, p. 263.
115 Ireland’s neutrality and other aspects of its diplomacy, such as UN policy, that did not demonstrate concordance with the interests of Western Europe.
There is no doubt that Aiken made a constructive contribution to the UN. He engineered numerous resolutions advocating disarmament measures and decolonisation, most notably his initiation of a resolution calling for the establishment of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. When he left his position as Minister for External
Affairs, his efforts were applauded in the New York media for his ‘impact on world affairs far out of proportion to the size or power’ of the nation he represented.37
But it was an untenable approach to diplomacy to have a Minister for External
Affairs who demonstrated such little interest in Ireland’s efforts to achieve membership of the EC. As a consequence, in June 1969, Aiken was replaced by Dr Patrick Hillery, a committed “Europeanist”, once Ireland’s accession was made probable with the retirement of Charles de Gaulle. Aiken’s replacement came at a convenient time for
Ireland’s EC application. And, as Lynch had long recognised the necessity of having a
Minister for External Affairs with a focus on Europe, it had been his objective in any event to replace Aiken soon after Ireland renewed its application for membership of the
EC in 1967.38
Hillery’s Succession to the Post of Minister for External Affairs
Hillery’s expertise lay in the economic ministries, where he had been heavily involved in the efforts to achieve membership of the EC, and he was expected to continue
35 Hederman O’Brien, ‘The Way We Were’, Europe, p. 8; Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 118-119, 131. 36 Extended Notes on instructions for delegates, 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA, 2000/14/370. 37 New York Times, 10 July 1969, p. 34.
116 that involvement in his new role.39 After his appointment to the position of Minister for
External Affairs and during the formal negotiations for accession in 1970 and 1971,
Hillery was given primary responsibility for negotiations on behalf of the Irish
Government.40 But because Hillery’s expertise lay in economic relations, rather than UN affairs, policy formulation in New York was delegated to a large extent to Ireland’s
Permanent Representative to the UN, Cornelius Cremin.41 Cremin was a conservative, seasoned diplomat, inclined to simply follow orders. As such, although he had a strong interest in economic matters from his time as ambassador to France in the late 1950s where he dealt with Irish policy towards the Organisation for European Economic
Cooperation, he was used to implementing policy and, in any case, tended to support
Aiken’s application of neutrality at the UN. As a result, Ireland’s UN policy did not demonstrate any significant change between 1969 and 1972 from the policies instituted by Aiken.
The diminishment of emphasis given to Ireland’s role at the UN under Hillery was in part a result of his expertise and mandate to pursue the EC application, but there were also other relevant factors. Most noticeably the outbreak of Troubles in Northern
Ireland combined with a shortage of diplomatic resources and the treatment meted out to
Ireland by the UN in its raising of the Northern Ireland crisis resulted in a downgrading of importance in events in New York. From 1969 Ireland’s political establishment was gripped by the need to protect the domestic security of the state, ward off civil war, as well as deal with turmoil in the Cabinet.
38 Interview on-line with Dr Patrick Hillery, 30 March 2002. 39 Ibid. 40 Maher, The Tortuous Path, p. 253. 41 Cremin to Holmes, 18 November 1969, NAI, DFA 98/3/273.
117
A Recent Challenge to the Hypothesis of Ireland’s Foreign Policy Fragmentation
This view of the fragmentation of Irish foreign policy has recently been challenged by Joseph Skelly,42 in his analysis of Ireland’s approach to the South-Tyrol issue during the UN consideration of the matter in 1961.43 Skelly contends that, because of the sensitivity of its application for membership of the EC, Ireland needed to cultivate support for it admission. Therefore, in an effort to avoid alienating Italy, Lemass instructed Aiken not to become involved in any moves to reach a compromise on the
South-Tyrol question. Lemass undoubtedly gave directions to his Minister for External
Affairs in order to contain any detrimental ramifications for Ireland’s application for membership of the EC.
The Taoiseach had never been completely happy with Aiken’s policy of neutrality at the UN, because he believed that it interfered with Ireland’s relations with the UK, the
USA and, ultimately, the EC.44 Nevertheless, Aiken had acquired a well respected reputation in New York, which reflected extremely favourably upon Ireland.
Consequently, Lemass was reluctant to intervene in UN matters and his intervention on the South-Tyrol issue was an isolated occurrence. Lemass’ instruction on that issue also proved to be out of touch with the unfolding nature of events, as it was the Italians who would later seek Ireland’s intervention. Study of Irish UN policy during the initial phase of its EC application indicates very little evidence of intervention by Lemass across the
42 Skelly, ‘National Interests and International Mediation’, in Irish Foreign Policy, p. 306. 43 This issue and its relation to Ireland’s neutrality and application for membership of the EC are discussed in chapter two. 44 Horgan, Sean Lemass, pp. 193-194.
118 range of issues, including many that involved sensitive relations between Ireland and member states of the EC.45
Government documents also demonstrate that Aiken was accorded full sovereignty over policy decisions on political and security matters, most notably UN policy. It was policy on external economic issues and other technical matters where his authority did not extend.46 This is given further weight by the structure of delegation meetings, where increasingly the delegation would defer to instructions given by Aiken, rather than enter a dialogue. The reality was that it was extremely rare for considerations of the application for EC membership, or any instructions from the Taoiseach, to feature in deliberations at the UN. Of course, the Taoiseach had the power to give directions to the Minister for External Affairs. Lemass’ intervention on South-Tyrol demonstrated this to be the case, but the reality was that both Lemass and Lynch were generally disinclined to do so. The issue of concern in discerning whether or not there was fragmentation in decision-making in Irish foreign policy is not whether directions were given by Dublin to the Chairman of the Irish UN delegation; it is the frequency, scope and impact of those directions.
Lynch was even more disinclined to intervene in the affairs of the Minister for
External Affairs than Lemass had been. Lynch had a far more tenuous grip on power and lacked the widespread support of his predecessor. He was appointed Taoiseach as a compromise to avoid the possible disintegration of Fianna Fáil. This situation changed over the ensuing years, as Lynch came to exercise greater control over the party and became one of the most popular leaders Ireland has had. But, initially, he was a reluctant
45 For further examination of this issue, refer to Chapter Two. 46 Extended Notes on instructions for delegates, 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA, 2000/14/370.
119 leader, having refused an earlier démarche from Lemass to be his successor.47 Thus, he inherited an ‘uneasy coalition of rival tendencies and factions’, which he was compelled to preserve by balancing appointments.48 There was conflict in the party between the new and more established members about Fianna Fàil’s future directions. It was clearly evident in the open antipathy between Aiken and Haughey. Aiken did not want to retire and his prominence amongst the old guard of the party ensured that Lynch reappointed him Tánaiste and Minister for External Affairs, and granted him significant latitude in these roles.49
Conclusion
Ireland’s application for membership of the EC in 1961 and its renewal in 1967, and the general “Europeanisation” of Irish diplomacy that accompanied them, were indicative of changing foreign policy imperatives. Ireland’s foreign policy was primarily orientated from 1961 to securing membership of the EC. Nevertheless that imperative failed to have an impact on its UN policy, specifically because of the fragmented nature of Ireland’s foreign policy formulation. In the Irish Government, there was a separation of responsibility for policy governing external economic relations and the realm of politics and security, which primarily included UN policy. Responsibility for the former was shared between the ministers of various economic departments, whereas authority over the latter lay with the Minister for External Affairs. The insulation of Irish UN policy was advanced by Aiken’s propensity to detach himself from events in Europe. Dr
47 Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 295; L. McRedmond, (1996), Ireland’s Millennium People, History & Politics: Jack Lynch, [Web Document], Available: http://wwa.rte.ie/millennia/people/ lynchjack.html [30 August 2002], Radio Teilifis Éireann. 48 Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 295.
120 Patrick Hillery, who was chosen in the role as Minister for External Affairs specifically because he was actively involved in the efforts to achieve integration, replaced Aiken in
1969. Nevertheless, this had only minimal impact on Ireland’s UN policy, as responsibility over this aspect of policy was effectively delegated to the Permanent
Representative in New York, who had a long history of service under Aiken.
49 Interview with Frank Aiken Jnr and Eileen Aiken.
121 CHAPTER 5: IRELAND’S PEACE POLICY AT THE UN, 1965-1972
By the time of the renewal of Ireland’s application for membership of the EC, its UN
policy had evolved to become most active in terms of peace issues (especially
disarmament and peacekeeping). This element of Irish UN policy had maintained its significance despite Ireland’s marginalisation in the General Assembly following the large influx of non-aligned states in the early 1960s. This was due to the fact that the mid-late 1960s were characterised by increased disharmony in the Security Council that resulted from rising tensions in the Cold War, which had the effect of
undermining UN efforts to maintain international peace and security.1 Despite the
renewal of the Irish application in 1967, Ireland’s UN policy on peace issues did not
change and, therefore, did not deviate from neutrality. This was despite previous Irish
diplomacy in New York on such issues being divergent from Western norms and in
direct conflict with the various policies of EC member-states.
The Conflict Between Irish and French Policy on Peace Issues
With respect to peace issues, Ireland’s application of neutrality often brought
it into conflict with French policy. On matters, such as the financing of peacekeeping
and disarmament, the UN membership was divided between the permanent members of the Security Council and the small states that comprised the bulk of the General
Assembly. France’s President, Charles de Gaulle, was intent on protecting the
privileges that accrued to his country as a result of its elevated status in the Security
Council. De Gaulle’s approach to international relations was premised on the view that France’s national interests were furthered by protecting its capacity to act
1 C. Lerche & A. Said, (1963), Concepts of International Politics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, [hereafter Lerche & Said, Concepts of International Politics], pp. 299-301.
122 independently of other nation-states and of UN constraints. It was common for
nations to apply policies determined in some fashion by self-interest, but few as
relentlessly and with such little regard for other states as France under de Gaulle.2 By
contrast, Ireland’s peace policy was characterised by strong support for multi-lateral
diplomacy and various initiatives aimed at curbing the privileges of the more
powerful states in the UN, such as France. This policy represented a common
commitment by small and neutral states to multi-lateral diplomacy. The Irish
delegation felt a particular exigency to protect the rights of small states because
Ireland was unique amongst the European neutrals, as its neutrality was not heavily
armed and, therefore, it required a strong and capable UN to ensure its security. As a
consequence, the Irish delegation was often in open confrontation with French UN
policy on peace issues.
Irish peace policy at the UN was the fundamental component of its efforts to
pursue ‘milieu goals’.3 It has been particularly in the interests of small states to advance conditions necessary for maintaining a stable international environment.
Consequently, the pursuit of milieu goals has been a recurrent theme in Irish foreign policy4 and has been traced back to its performance at the League of Nations and its later articulation in Article 29 of the Irish Constitution. Whilst Ireland’s foreign policy has often exhibited concern for international justice, its peace policy has focused on facilitating the conditions necessary for stabilising international order. In many cases, justice and order can be mutually exclusive milieu objectives.5 Ireland’s support for international order in the pursuit of its peace policy has involved the
2 Berstein, The Republic of de Gaulle, pp. 153-154. 3 A. Wolfers, (1962), Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, p. 74. 4 For further information on Ireland’s pursuit of milieu objectives in terms of its UN policy, refer to Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy.
123 promotion of cooperation in the international community, in recognition of the
interdependence of nation-states. Specifically this has entailed supporting the
application of international law, the roles of international organisations, and often the
‘rules of the game’ in world politics irrespective of their relation to a just international environment.6 In essence, this often meant that Irish diplomacy supported the
perpetuation of the status quo in an effort to avoid conflict.
This diverged significantly from the foreign policy agenda of Charles de
Gaulle. Under de Gaulle, France was opposed to the existing international order and,
particularly, the bi-polar nature of the Cold War environment. De Gaulle sought a revision of the status quo that would allow greater participation and recognition of
France’s role as an independent actor. This was not designed to elevate France to
parity with the superpowers, but ensure that it maintained a key role in issues
involving its vital interests.7 This vision of a resurgent France was a principal aspect
of de Gaulle’s foreign policy and, consequently, its failure, as signalled by the Soviet
suppression of Czechoslovakia in 1968, was one of a multitude of factors that resulted
in his retirement in early 1969.8
This conflict in the Irish and French perceptions of international order was
mirrored by a similar contrast in the conception of the role of the UN. The Irish view
of the UN was similar to that of other small states and, in particular, the neutral and
non-aligned states outside the alliance system. Clearly these nations were much more reliant on the multi-lateral avenue of the UN for its offices in the peaceful settlement of disputes and collective action should it be necessary. International organizations,
5 It should be noted that whereas Ireland’s peace policy prioritized international order over international justice, other aspects of Ireland’s UN policy reversed this hierarchy, especially with respect to decolonisation. For further information, refer to chapter seven. 6 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, p. 152. 7 Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur, pp. 146, 194. 8 Morse, Foreign Policy and Independence in Gaullist France, p. 95.
124 such as the UN, had long functioned as instruments for the preservation of stability in
the international milieu by small states, which had a limited capacity to make an
impact upon international relations.9 The multi-lateral approach to diplomacy and the
democratisation of international relations had also been among Ireland’s primary
objectives in the nation’s participation in the League of Nations.10 This was in
contrast to the interests of France and the other permanent members of the Security
Council that wanted to preserve their power as independent actors, as well as
consolidate their privileged position in the UN. This was most evident on the issue of
peacekeeping as the permanent members of the Security Council did not have the same exigency to ensure a viable system, because their defence capabilities and alliances meant that they had a greater resort to unilateral or collective action outside the UN.
France did not directly raise with the Irish delegation in New York the consequences that its UN policy would have on its EC application. Nevertheless, it had done so on a number of occasions in discussions with other Irish officials.11
Ireland was not necessarily singled out, but the French definitely considered it to be part of a broad ‘troublesome’ UN front.12 Furthermore, de Gaulle’s postponement of
negotiations on the applications for EC membership in 1967 was a result of concerns
that the admission of nations such as Ireland and the UK would undermine French
influence within the organisation. Although French criticisms of Irish policy
remained vague and ambiguous, what was clearly communicated to Dublin was that
there was an onus on Ireland to demonstrate that it was a Western-European nation
9 P. Mackernan, (1984), ‘Ireland and Political Cooperation’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 1 (4), [hereafter Mackernan, ‘Ireland and Political Cooperation’, Irish Studies in International Affairs], p. 17; Skelly, ‘National Interests and International Mediation’, in Irish Foreign Policy, p. 289. 10 Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919-1946, p. 76. 11 The Irish Times, 5 June 1969, p. 4. 12 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 69.
125 with concordant interests, especially in the realm of foreign policy. Usually diplomatic pressure was exerted through indirect channels such as editorials in authoritative media outlets, or comments from public figures.13 The problem, particularly as seen in Paris, was that Ireland’s neutrality was perceived to have greater compatibility with the policies of the Non-Aligned Movement than with the
West and this posed problems for the ultimate EC objective of political cooperation and union. As a result of these concerns, when he was Taoiseach during the initial application for EC membership, Sean Lemass had indicated that Ireland’s EC application and the concerns of the member-states would inevitably affect ‘in some degree’ Irish UN policy.14
Thus, Ireland’s peace policy frequently brought the Irish delegation into conflict with French diplomacy. This was not merely because Ireland occupied positions inimical to those of France, but also because it provided leadership roles that were hostile to French interests. This was not a deliberate ploy to antagonise France, but was the inevitable result of Ireland’s neutrality in the context of the UN. The success of the application for membership was dependent primarily on France, as the sole opponent of expansion and, therefore, ultimate arbiter of the applications. The other members of the EC were all openly and unconditionally supportive of expansion, the only concern being that expansion should not be contemplated without the endorsement of all members, including France.
Most of the initiatives of the Irish delegation on peace issues occurred during the time of Frank Aiken and at his instigation. This was understandable, as he was a diplomat with over a decade of experience at the UN, where he was held in significant esteem. The Under-Secretary General to the UN, Ralph Bunch, described Aiken as
13 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 69. 14 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 193 - 14 February, 1962: 23.
126 having a ‘towering (literally and figuratively) presence here [at the UN].’15
Consequently, he was held in considerable respect by the members of his delegation, as evinced by the hierarchical structure of meetings. In addition, Aiken’s time was right for Ireland to assume a role-playing persona. Various issues emerged and came before the UN as opportunities that were conducive to Aiken’s intervention.16 Issues such as peacekeeping and non-proliferation were either solved or consigned to the UN
bureaucracy by the time that Hillery succeeded Aiken as Minister for External
Affairs.
The Financing of Peacekeeping Operations
From 1965, Ireland’s peace policy was most active in terms of the specific
issue of the financing of peacekeeping operations. In that year, the Irish delegation
submitted proposals to reform the system of peacekeeping, focusing on the restoration
of mandatory assessments of UN member-states. These initiatives set Irish diplomacy
on a collision course with the policies of the Soviet Union and, in particular, France.17
The clash of French and Irish policy over this issue arose as a result of the
crisis of the 19th General Assembly Session of 1964. The crisis was engendered by
the refusal of both France and the Soviet Union to pay their peacekeeping
contributions for the operations in the Congo and the Middle East. This meant that
they were both in arrears of their financial contributions for the preceding two
consecutive years and, therefore, in violation of Article 19 of the UN Charter. Under
this article, both nations should have been punished by the forfeiture of their votes at
15 Letter from Under-Secretary General to the UN, Ralph J. Bunch, to Frank Aiken, 1 October 1969, UCDA, FAP, P104/6990 [3]. 16 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 62. 17 For the details of the Irish proposals for the restoration of mandatory financing, refer to Appendix 4.
127 the UN,18 but in June 1965, the General Assembly waived Article 19 and sought
voluntary contributions to clear the debts of the defaulters.19 Out of principle, Ireland
initially refused to accept payments for its peacekeeping contingents from the
voluntary fund, but reversed this decision a year later in response to budgetary
pressures.20
The opposition of French and Irish policies on the financing of peacekeeping
was indicative of a rift in the membership of the UN – between the permanent
members of the Security Council and their adherents, and the small states of the
General Assembly. France and the Soviet Union led the campaign of the permanent
members to preserve their hierarchical position, whilst Ireland was among the
protagonists seeking to safeguard the powers of the General Assembly and the rights of the majority.
The focus of Irish neutrality at the UN was engagement with the world, rather than isolationism, and at the heart of this engagement was the use of peacekeeping
forces. This required the commitment of significant resources for such a small state
and, therefore, the Irish delegation had a particular interest in ensuring reliable
financing of those missions. The crisis of 1964 and the institution of a voluntary
financing system for peacekeeping missions had left the UN substantially in debt to
the Irish Government. This precarious financial situation had concerned Aiken since
1961 and became the focus of Ireland’s UN policy after the crisis of 1964.21 As a
consequence, in 1965 Frank Aiken formulated his proposals to return the financing of
18 Article 19 of Chapter IV of the UN Charter, in Paul Henk, Miss & Endre (Eds), (1958), UN Textbook (3rd ed), Leiden: Leiden University Press, [herafter Henk, Miss & Endre (Eds), UN Textbook], p. 31. 19 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the General Assembly of the UN – 22nd Session, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300. 20 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 61. 21 Address by Aiken to the Irish UN Association in the Shelbourne Hotel, Dublin, 21 April 1967, UCDA, FAP, P104/6872, University College Dublin Archives.
128 peacekeeping to a sound basis in order to ensure the continued viability of
peacekeeping.22
The proposals were driven by the concern that future operations were not
viable, as they could be terminated for financial reasons, as had happened with respect to the Congo operation in 1964. The Tánaiste also feared that without progress on the issue of the financing of peacekeeping, the UN’s role was in danger of being limited to providing an international forum for debate, capable only of applying moral pressure, thereby, disabling its capacity to maintain international peace and security.23
He feared that this incapability of effectively inserting peacekeepers would result in small nations turning to great powers to supply their security, thereby, consolidating the alliance system and its antagonistic and polarising influence on international relations.24
It was Ireland’s leading role as well as the openness of its opposition to the
French position that caused the dilemma for Irish diplomacy in New York. Aiken
assumed responsibility for having the financing of peacekeeping inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly at every session25 from 1965 until his absence in
1968, and retirement in 1969.26 The Irish delegation also took the lead in the
discussions of the issue and in the campaign to restore the reliable funding of
peacekeeping operations. Aiken’s proposals for the reinstitution of mandatory
assessments were translated into draft resolutions in 1965, 1966, and 1967. At the
20th General Assembly Session in 1965, the proposals broadly addressed the issues of
authorisation and financing of peacekeeping operations but, by the following session,
22 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 50. 23 The Cork Examiner, 9 February 1967, p. 6. 24 Address by Aiken to the Irish UN Association in the Shelbourne Hotel, Dublin, 21 April 1967, UCDA, FAP, P104/6872. 25 This was except for the Fifth Emergency Special Session of 1965 whose agenda was confined to address the crisis in the Middle East that resulted from the Six-Day War.
129 they had been revised to deal only with the issue of financing. The Irish proposals, in resolution form, had been adopted by a narrow margin in 1966 at the 21st General
Assembly Session by the Special Political Committee, though they was not pressed to
a vote in the plenary.27
Although all the permanent members of the Security Council opposed the Irish
proposals, the opposition of France and the Soviet Union was particularly vehement.
This opposition to mandatory assessments was political, rather than financial. Under
the system of voluntary financing, contributions came only from a select number of
member-states, in particular, the permanent members of the Security Council.
Therefore, the perpetuation of voluntary subscriptions would give them an effective
financial veto over the UN, in addition to the veto in the Security Council. This
would allow the permanent members an avenue of scuttling an operation, but
avoiding the public fallout ensuing from a veto or the penalties engendered by
breaching Article 19 of the UN Charter.
France’s public justification for its opposition to the Irish proposals was based
on the insistence that peacekeeping was an enforcement action and, therefore, under
the authority of the Security Council. The Irish proposals attempted to reinstate a
financing system premised on the principles that had existed prior to the defaulting of
France and the Soviet Union. This implied responsibility for the crisis of 1964 was of
political will, notably the recalcitrance on the part of France and the Soviet Union,
and attributed responsibility to them, rather than the system of mandatory financing.
But most importantly, France was adamant that the Irish proposals would not be
implemented because it had become a matter of prestige, as the French delegation had
26 The issue was insribed thus: ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations’. 27 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the GA of the UN – XXII Session, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300.
130 invested significant diplomatic energy into preventing them.28 To express solidarity with France, most Western countries were implacably opposed to the Irish proposals,
including four of the five EC members of the UN (France, Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands). Only Italy was sympathetic, but not to the extent that it would
support the Irish position.29
The delegations of the UK and the USA also considered the Irish initiatives to
be contrary to their interests, as they were to the interests of all the permanent
members of the Security Council. The USA supported the concept of mandatory assessments, but could not support the particular method prescribed by Ireland
because its apportionment of expenses to the USA exceeded the level permitted by
Congress. Ultimately, neither the UK nor the USA could support the Irish proposals,
but they did support Aiken’s attacks on France and the Soviet Union for holding the
UN to ransom. During the debate in the Fifth Special Session in 1967, Lord Caradon
of the UK stated that Aiken had ‘come amongst us like a prophet calling on us to
repent, to escape from the wrath to come’.30 In the Committee of 33,31 the US
delegate had described Aiken as ‘the conscience of the UN in the area of
peacekeeping’.32 These comments were an indication that the delegates of the UK
and the USA respected the Irish position, even if they could not support it. The
USA’s rivalry with France and the Soviet Union, however, prompted Washington to
support the principle of the General Assembly retaining sovereignty over
apportionment. This allowed Cremin in March 1967 to extract an assurance from the
28 K. R. Legg, & J. F. Morrison, (1981), ‘The Formulation of Foreign Policy Objectives’, in Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (Eds), Perspectives on World Politics, Croom Helm: London, p. 55. 29 Cremin to McCann, 8 February 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/322. 30 Report on the Fifth Special Session – Peacekeeping, NAI, DFA 417/249/1. 31 This was the Special Political Committee on Peacekeeping that had been established in 1965 to discuss in depth the problems of peacekeeping and formulate proposals to review all aspects of the question. 32 Cremin to McCann, 30 March 1967, NAI, DFA 417/249/1.
131 member of the US delegation in charge of peacekeeping affairs, Ambassador Max
Finger, that the USA would not veto a scale of mandatory assessment or the Irish
proposals as a whole. The result of this was the brief neutralisation of the USA in the debate on peacekeeping.33
It is also important to note the criticisms of Aiken’s proposals by the former
Irish diplomat Conor Cruise O’Brien, because of his prominence in Ireland as a
commentator on international affairs. O’Brien had been the head of the political
section of the Department of External Affairs and a member of the UN delegation
until 1961 when he was seconded to the UN secretariat as the representative in
Katanga. O’Brien’s denigration of Aiken’s UN policy was the most prominent of the
increasing criticism in the Dáil and the Irish media from the mid-1960s.34 On 28
October 1969, in his first speech in the Dáil as a Teachta Dála (TD), O’Brien stated
that Ireland’s time at the UN had seen ‘the good Aiken years and the bad Aiken
years’. The former referred to the years 1957-1961 when O’Brien was a member of the Irish delegation and when Ireland’s reputation for neutrality at the UN had been
established. The latter referred to the years after 1961 and O’Brien’s resignation.35
The most disparaging of O’Brien’s criticisms appeared in two articles he wrote for The Irish Times in 1968.36 With respect specifically to Ireland’s proposals
on the financing of peacekeeping, O’Brien supported the position of France and the
Soviet Union. That is, he insisted that the General Assembly had no responsibility for
peacekeeping and launched a lengthy attack on the substance of the Irish proposals.
He also criticised Aiken’s speeches in the General Assembly, his approach to the UN
33 Cremin to McCann, 27 April 1967, NAI, DFA 417/249/1. 34 Most notably: C. C. O’Brien, (1967), Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa, public Lecture delivered in Dublin on 20 July 1967, published by the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement, September 1967 [hereafter O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa]; O’Brien, Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10; O’Brien, Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10; C. C. O’Brien, (1968), ‘Ireland at the U.N. – 2’, Irish Times, 4 June 1968, [hereafter O’Brien, Irish Times, 4 June 1968], p. 10.
132 system, the Irish delegation as a whole, and even the intellectual acumen of the delegates who supported the Irish proposals.37 O’Brien’s criticisms were crucial
because they were the focus of an attack upon Aiken and the Government by the
Opposition in the Dáil.38
Although O’Brien was held in high esteem in Ireland and in the Irish media as
a commentator on international affairs, his attack on Aiken elicited trenchant
responses in New York. The Secretary-General and the Secretariat were made aware
of the contents of the articles in The Irish Times39 through contacts in London, and
made press statements in defence of the Irish proposals. In private, they were even
more scathing in their view of O’Brien’s comments. The Secretariat was shocked by
the ‘severity of the judgements’ made by O’Brien and the ‘erroneous premises’ upon
which they were based.40 The Under-Secretary General to the UN, Ralphe Bunch,
described O’Brien as ‘intellectually dishonest’, not particularly well informed about
the UN and went on to suggest that O’Brien had a history of fabrications,41 pointing to
sections of his book To Katanga and Back.42 O’Brien’s conclusions were rejected
categorically by the Irish delegation and with even more acrimonious language.
Cremin was particularly acerbic and described the articles ‘as a slovenly and
superficial piece of work’ and lacking in the appropriate levels of ‘scholarship’ or
‘objectivity’ for such an esteemed academic.43 Although equally exasperated, Aiken
was more restrained and refuted O’Brien’s arguments in the Dáil and in the Irish
35 Irish Times, 29 October 1969, p. 1. 36 O’Brien, Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10; O’Brien, Irish Times, 4 June 1968, p. 10. 37 O’Brien, Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10. 38 Aiken to the Editor of The Irish Times, 23 May 1969, UCDA, FAP, P104/6988. 39 O’Brien, Irish Times, 4 June 1968, p. 10. 40 Cremin to McCann, 3 July 1968, NAI, DFA, 98/2/1. 41 Cremin to McCann, 24 January 1969, NAI, DFA, 2000/14/471. 42 O’Brien, To Katanga and Back. 43 Cremin to McCann, 3 July 1968, NAI, DFA, 98/2/1.
133 media.44 He responded in a letter to the Editor of The Irish Times that he rejected the assertions of O’Brien and he viewed them to be an ‘election gimmick’.45 By this
time, O’Brien had announced his membership of the Labour Party and his intention to
stand for office in the Dáil elections of 1969. Much of his reputation had been built
on his expertise pertaining to the UN and on his role as a critic of Aiken’s policy in
New York, which was again highlighted by his articles.46
O’Brien’s knowledge and expertise on UN matters were considerable and
many of his criticisms were defensible. But for the most part, his denunciation of the
Irish proposals involved frequent misrepresentations of the UN system, misquoting of
the UN Charter, confusion of the issues of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, as
well as the use of contradictory logic (especially with respect to the binding nature of
Aiken’s draft resolution). Although the basis of O’Brien’s criticisms was the French-
Soviet thesis that peacekeeping was the province of the Security Council, he went
further and was much more vitriolic in his criticism than any diplomatic opponent had
been. O’Brien’s extreme language in his summary of the proposals that ‘… the whole
idea bears strong marks of mental incoherence’ and was ‘intellectually dilapidated’ in
no way represented the objections of France, the Soviet Union or any member-state of
the UN.47 Aiken’s assessment of O’Brien’s motivation – a publicity stunt aimed at
furthering his chances of success at the Irish elections – seemed to be accurate.
On numerous occasions and at various sessions in New York, Soviet
diplomats and adherents of the French-Soviet position met with members of the Irish
delegation in an effort to dissuade it from raising Aiken’s proposals and, especially, from producing them in the form of a draft resolution. The high-point of this pressure
44 The Irish Times, 29 October 1969, p. 6. 45 Aiken to the Editor of The Irish Times, 23 May 1969, UCDA, FAP, P104/6988. 46 O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa; O’Brien, Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10; O’Brien, Irish Times, 4 June 1968, p. 10.
134 occurred in early 1967 during the lead up to the convention of the Fifth Special
Session, which had been convened specifically to address the issue of the financing of
peacekeeping, as well as the deteriorating situation in Namibia. The Soviet Union
brought direct pressure to bear on the Irish delegation and accused it of seeking to
‘undermine the Charter’, in an attempt to facilitate ‘the establishment of colonial and
neo-colonial systems in various areas of the world’.48 Furthermore, the Soviet
delegation warned that, if the proposals continued to be pursued, Moscow would
‘review her position in relation to the UN’.49 This rhetoric was typical of Soviet diplomacy at the UN, as Moscow frequently framed its arguments in anti-colonial language in a bid to appeal to the non-aligned states that formed the pivotal voting
bloc in the General Assembly.
Direct pressure, such as that utilised by the Soviets, was unlikely to make an
impression on Aiken, as tenacity was a major feature of his political persona. This
was described in the Irish media as ‘idealistic intransigence in the face of lobbying’.50
He had considerable political experience, which had been fashioned during the struggle for independence and the Civil War, and embodied the distinctive nationalism pervasive in Irish political culture. This era of Irish history produced politicians possessed of ‘idealism… spirit of self-sacrifice… self-righteousness and inability to compromise’.51 Consequently, Aiken’s foreign policy remained dogmatic
and not easily swayed by parochial interests,52 not even by European integration or
the fate of the Irish application for membership of that organisation.
47 O’Brien, Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10. 48 Irish Times, 15 April 1967, p. 11. 49 Cremin to McCann, 31 March 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/286. 50 The Cork Examiner, 27 November 1967, p. 6. 51 T. Garvin, (1997), ‘Reasons for forgetfulness about 1922 events are fundamentally healthy: De Valera and Tories fail to see reality of the Republic’, Irish Times, 10 January 1997, p. 12. 52 L. C. Skinner, (1946), Politicians by Accident, Dublin: Metropolitan Publishing Company, p. 153.
135 While the Soviet Union brought direct pressure to bear on Ireland, France
pursued a more subtle strategy. The French delegation was much more conscious
than the Soviets of avoiding the perception of bullying the UN membership.
Furthermore, the failure of direct pressure to alter Aiken’s position necessitated a
revision of strategy. Considering the antipathy with which it regarded the Irish
proposals, France was made conspicuous by its subdued criticism of them in the UN and the international media. Nevertheless, Dublin was clearly made aware of French opposition by the vehemence of condemnation in authoritative French newspapers.53
The first component of the French strategy in undermining the Irish proposals
was to erode their support base, which was comprised primarily of the large bloc of
small, developing, disempowered and non-aligned nations of the UN. On 27 April
1967, in the midst of the Fifth Special Session but prior to the opening of the debate
on peacekeeping, France announced that it would make a voluntary payment to
peacekeeping expenses to nullify its deficit. It was designed and timed specifically to
undermine the support of the Irish proposals.54 But the announcement was
disingenuous, as it was accompanied by various stipulations that would ensure that
the contribution was never made. The pledge was contingent on a prior contribution
from Washington, but the USA had repeatedly refused to make such a payment until
France and the Soviet Union had cleared their debts. The objective of the French
overture was to reaffirm the validity and reliability of a method of financing based on
voluntary contributions. The French delegation aimed to communicate that the
problem was not the voluntary system, but the recalcitrance of actors within it, most
notably the USA. France also utilised its diplomatic influence to prevent
53 Memorandum on Peacekeeping, 4 October 1967, NAI, DFA, 98/3/287. 54 Cremin to McCann, 8 May 1967, NAI, DFA 417/249/1.
136 Francophone African states, which were inclined to support the Irish proposals, from
doing so.55
France and the Soviet Union were effective in undermining support for the
Irish proposals. The majority of nations at the UN supported the concept of
mandatory assessments, but were reluctant to force a confrontation with the
permanent members of the Security Council. This was because peacekeeping was not
explicitly endorsed by the UN Charter and, therefore, responsibility for its
administration not clearly delegated to a particular UN body. Chapter six referred to
the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ and chapter seven to ‘Action with respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’,56 which both
seemed to exclude peacekeeping.57 Furthermore, it was feared that progress by the
majority, despite the continued opposition of crucial UN member states (notably the
Soviet Union and France), would plunge the organisation into crisis. The reality was
that the UN had managed to function by supporting peacekeeping missions on an ad
hoc basis and this would continue until a crisis emerged of such significance that it
threatened the existence of the UN.58
The permanent representatives to the UN of Egypt, India and Yugoslavia,59 as well as the Chairman of the Committee of 33, Ambassador Cuevas Cancino, attempted to persuade the Irish delegation to drop its proposals, specifically because of the objections of France and the Soviet Union. Cancino even argued that if the
Irish proposals were put to the vote, it would be divisive and, ultimately, ‘harmful’ to
55 Cremin to McCann, 23 February 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/292. 56 Charter of the United Nations, [Web Document]. Available: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ [13 September 2002]. 57 Thus, many commentators have suggested that the authority for peacekeeping lay in “chapter six and a half”. 58 San Francisco Chronicle, 19 February 1967. 59 Cremin to McCann, 31 March 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/286.
137 the UN.60 Cremin’s response was based on instructions from Aiken that ‘an effective
UN [should] settle issues by voting and no harm could be done by a vote expressing
the opinion that a particular financing system should be adopted as an interim
measure’.61
The second element of France’s strategy to defeat the Irish proposals was to
refer them to the UN bureaucracy. This had the effect of providing an illusion of
progress by establishing a committee devoted to the issue, but ensured that its
influence on that committee would perpetuate stagnation. French and Soviet
interventions in the General Assembly indicated that the only proposal that they
would endorse was the continuation of the work of the Committee of 33, and this was
only because it was a means of postponing any definitive decision in the General
Assembly.62 Previous referrals to the Committee of 33 had resulted in a regression,
rather than a progression in achieving a consensus.63
The Irish delegation recognised the effort to refer the discussion of peacekeeping to the Committee of 33 to be aimed at circumventing progress by becoming mired in the details of specific peripheral issues of peacekeeping. Of particular concern to the Irish delegation was the tacit acceptance by the UN membership of the limitation of the committee’s role, to examine only observer missions, rather than its mandate of conducting a comprehensive review of all aspects of peacekeeping operations.64 This was a reflection of the French view of the powers
of the General Assembly on this issue. But the Irish delegation could not muster the
support necessary to successfully oppose the initiative, ensuring the success of the
French stratagem.
60 Background on Peacekeeping, undated, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 61 Ibid. 62 Report on the Fifth Special Session – Peacekeeping, NAI, DFA 417/249/1. 63 Cremin to McCann, 25 April 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/286.
138 Irish pressure maintained the focus of the General Assembly on the work of the Committee of 33. In 1968, the French and Soviet delegates were compelled to
defend the work of the committee from a barrage of attacks led by the Irish
delegation. The French Permanent Representative rejected the complaint that
progress in the Committee of 33 was slow. He argued that the issue was complex
and, in an overt criticism of the Irish proposals, called for a ‘realistic approach [that]
would be most likely to lead to principles accepted by all’.65 The Soviet Union agreed
and argued that complaints about the lack of progress demonstrated ‘an unjustified
impatience’.66 The General Assembly membership was divided between these
responses to the lack of progress in the Committee of 33.67
Whereas, the Irish proposals had enjoyed widespread support at the 20th and
21st General Assembly Sessions in 1965 and 1966, from the Fifth Special Session in
1967, they never commanded such support again. After the Fifth Special Session, the
debates on peacekeeping became increasingly superficial and brief. The debate at the
22nd General Assembly Session in 1967 demonstrated the lack of priority ascribed to
the issue as it was pushed back on the agenda and allocated fewer meetings for discussion. The overwhelming mood of the General Assembly was that there was little hope for progress on the issue of peacekeeping while the Soviet Union and
France remained intransigent on the interpretation of the UN Charter.
Consequently, after exhaustive discussions between Cremin and Aiken, the
Irish delegation decided not to introduce the Irish proposals at the Fifth Special
Session in 1967. Cremin’s lack of enthusiasm and the final decision to cease to press the Irish proposals was made because of an awareness of diminishing support from
64 Report on Peackeeping at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid.
139 the UN membership, coupled with the warnings of open opposition from the US
delegation, not a fear of alienating France. In fact, consideration of the French
position at no time entered into the deliberations of the Irish delegation, despite an
awareness of the stridency of French opposition, not just to the Irish proposals, but to
even a discussion of the financing of peacekeeping.
Despite the stagnation of the debate on peacekeeping, Aiken’s last speech on
the matter at the UN was an indication of his continued commitment to the Irish
proposals and his disregard of French opposition. It came in his explanation of vote
on the perennial resolution referring the matter to the Committee of 33 at the 22nd
General Assembly Session in 1967. It was also the last defiant act of the Irish delegation on the issue, as Aiken’s absence from the UN in 1968 and his retirement from the ministry in 1969 ensured that the Irish proposals were not pressed again. In his last speech on peacekeeping at the UN, the Irish Minister for External Affairs launched an attack on the permanent members of the Security Council, in particular,
France and the Soviet Union. He acknowledged that they were invested with disproportionate rights, but objected to the emerging practice whereby they assumed a monopoly on power in determining the activities of the organisation. He warned the permanent members that if they preserved their effective financial veto by perpetuating voluntary contributions as a system of apportioning expenses, they would nullify the General Assembly’s budgetary rights under Article 17 (which had been confirmed by the International Court), violate the UN Charter, destroy the spirit of cooperation of smaller states, and discourage them from raising further initiatives.68
From 1969, the efforts to achieve entry into the EC and the renewal of
problems in Northern Ireland dominated Irish foreign policy. Consequently, Irish
68 Background on Peacekeeping, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370.
140 diplomacy in New York from 1969 assumed far less significance in Ireland’s foreign policy objectives and became focused on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis in
Biafra (and the crisis in Northern Ireland during the session in 1969), rather than on more contentious political problems, such as the financing of peacekeeping.69 It should be noted that during the period of the negotiations for EC membership, Irish troops continued to serve with the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East.
But Ireland was increasingly unable to provide leadership on any issue at the General
Assembly, especially from 1969 without Frank Aiken. Although the size of the
Department of External Affairs was expanded from 1969, this had been primarily in respect to events at the EC, rather than at the UN. This left the Irish UN delegation under-resourced and was responsible, in many respects, for Ireland withdrawing from its leadership role.70
By the 24th General Assembly Session in 1969, Aiken had been replaced as
Minister for External Affairs by Dr Patrick Hillery. Without Aiken, the Irish delegation did not possess the commitment or wield the influence necessary to counteract the plummeting support for the adoption of his peacekeeping proposals.
At the same time, there was no change in the Irish positions pertaining to the problems of either the financing of peacekeeping or disarmament. There has historically been little change to Irish UN policy with the changing of ministers, although many of them have occasionally developed particular interests that they have pursued more enthusiastically.71 This was the case with Hillery, as he was a new
69 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 242 - 04 November, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs (Resumed): 121. 70 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, p. 164. 71 Interview with John Deady.
141 minister72 and by the time he gained the experience to provide greater direction of UN policy, he was serving in Brussels with the European Commission.73
Ireland’s policy on the financing of peacekeeping was, in many respects, the
final effort at activism of the Irish delegation in the arena of the UN during the decade
of the 1960s. It gradually came to accept the reality and dominance of great power
politics and engaged in less activism for various reasons. Certainly the composition
of the membership had changed, marginalising Ireland’s capacity to make an impact at the UN. After a brief period of apathy in the early 1960s that gave an illusion of success for activism and the role of the “middle powers”, the permanent members of
the Security Council reasserted their control of the UN from the mid-1960s by
paralysing its security procedures. Many of the new small states also confined their objectives to preserving their sovereignty in order to protect their recently won autonomy and limited budgets from the demands of international public servants.
Therefore, nations such as Ireland and other “middle powers”, such as Canada,
downgraded their activism in the late 1960s.74
DISARMAMENT
In the mid to late 1960s, Ireland’s peace policy was also dominated by efforts to
improve disarmament. The multi-lateral pursuit of disarmament had always been an
area of interest for the neutral states of the UN.75 It was an essential contribution to
détente, which was itself a crucial aspect of the security of neutral states, who
remained vulnerable to the superpower blocs. The neutrals were either situated on the
72 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 242 - 04 November, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs (Resumed): 121. 73 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 102. 74 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 25. 75 These included Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland. Switzerland only had observer status at the UN.
142 border of the military blocs of the Cold War or, as in the case of Ireland, were not and could never be sufficiently armed to defend themselves. Their existence outside the bloc groupings and as small and comparatively powerless nations necessitated their
participation in efforts to mediate on such issues.76
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular, had been a
pivotal aspect of Irish UN policy since the early years of its membership of the UN.
Furthermore, the Irish delegation had always provided crucial leadership in the
General Assembly on the matter. Frank Aiken had been instrumental in first raising
the issue at the 13th General Assembly Session in 1958 and driving its momentum
since that session. The Irish proposals for non-proliferation had little support initially,
but over each of the next three sessions, they received increasing support. The joint
statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of September 1961,
between the USA and the Soviet Union, was instrumental in giving impetus to the
Irish non-proliferation agenda. That agreement was followed by the General
Assembly unanimously adopting Resolution 1665 (XVI), of which Ireland was the
sole sponsor, calling for the formulation of a Non-Proliferation Treaty.77
Political relations between the Soviet Union and the USA had been strained
between 1961 and 1967 by the Vietnam War and other Cold War issues, which
delayed action being taken on the Irish non-proliferation resolution of 1961. But, by early 1968, they had agreed on the text for a Non-Proliferation Treaty, which they presented to the resumed 22nd General Assembly Session for its endorsement.78
Whereas the superpowers were both committed to the conclusion of a Non-
76 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 50-54. 77 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 264.
143 Proliferation Treaty, preliminary indications suggested that support for the instrument
among the rest of the UN membership was ‘anything but overwhelming’.79
Significantly for Ireland’s European policy, France was resolutely opposed to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, as were other members of the EC, most notably Italy. The
French delegation insisted that it remained committed to the objective of non- proliferation, but it did not support the formulation of a treaty.80
France was unenthusiastic about the convention of a treaty because of its
efforts to maintain its participation in power politics in the mid-1960s. De Gaulle
objected to the Non-Proliferation Treaty for two major reasons: the way it was
negotiated and its substance. With respect to the former, de Gaulle was frustrated by
the increasing propensity for the USA and the Soviet Union to negotiate arms control
measures on a bilateral level and present their agreements to the other nuclear powers
for endorsement.81 Thus, the other nuclear powers were increasingly disempowered and denied the opportunity of participation in deliberations in international politics,
because of the division of the world into two competing power blocs. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty had been formulated in just such a way. This resentment was a
particular characteristic of de Gaulle’s foreign policy and stemmed from his affront at
France’s exclusion from the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam, which divided Europe
between the Soviet Union and the USA. De Gaulle’s efforts at preserving France’s
independence of action were also specifically due to his perception that Washington
had subjugated Western Europe into satellite states. Therefore, he envisaged the
78 Report on the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 79 Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], Volume XI – Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 231: Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk, 5 April 1968. 80 UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament, p. 77. 81 The nuclear powers at this period of history were the USA, the Soviet Union, the UK, France and the People’s Republic of China.
144 establishment of a loose federation of European states, under French leadership, to act
as a counter-balance to the two superpowers.82
De Gaulle also objected to the Non-Proliferation Treaty because France opposed a system that proscribed horizontal proliferation, but did not address vertical
proliferation.83 In this respect, France was frustrated by the growing gap between the superpowers and the other nuclear powers in terms of their nuclear arsenals. In statements on French television the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, voiced his opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty because it was not a disarmament measure, but what was termed at the time a “collateral measure”.84 He
also indicated that it was unfair to deny small nations nuclear weapons of limited range, when the superpowers possessed nuclear weapons with global reach.85
France had critical support from the People’s Republic of China,86 and the
threshold nuclear powers, which shared France’s concerns about sections of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The threshold states comprised a large and diverse group whose members pursued this agenda to different extents, but it principally included
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa,
Sweden, and from the EC – West Germany and Italy. They were concerned about their exclusion from an established hierarchy of power that was based on the possession of nuclear weapons, the potential for nuclear blackmail, as well as the inequalities of obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear states articulated by
82 Laqueur, Europe in Our Time, pp. 323-325. 83 FRUS, Volume XI – Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 231: Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk, 5 April 1968. 84 “Collateral measures” were those instituted to prevent the escalation of the arms race, rather than aimed at furthering genuine disarmament. 85 Cremin to McCann, 18 January 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/86. 86 Although the People’s Republic of China opposed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it was not directly represented at the UN and, thus, its influence in the debate was limited.
145 the Non-Proliferation Treaty.87 There were also specific, regional concerns as India
was anxious about nuclear blackmail from the People’s Republic of China, Pakistan
about its relations with India, and Egypt about the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
Israel.88 The EC states (especially France, Italy and West Germany) were also concerned about the sections of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would endanger
regional cooperation in the peaceful development of nuclear energy through the
European Atomic Energy Agency.89 This meant that Ireland, as a principal supporter
and lobbyist for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was in conflict with half of the member
states of the EC on the issue.
Paris was also disturbed by the sections of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
concerning security guarantees, which were deemed essential for the support of the
small powers. At this stage, de Gaulle’s strategic policy was premised on the
retention of the nuclear deterrent (force de frappe/force de dissuasion), which was an
essential pre-requisite for his policy of independence and attempts to maintain French
status in the international community. The possession of nuclear weapons was
essential to consolidate France’s role as a permanent member of the Security Council,
ensure its role in deliberations pertaining to war and peace irrespective of the size of
its conventional military, reinforce its regional role and its status in the Atlantic
relationship, and increase its freedom and weight in dealing with the Soviet bloc on
cooperation and development.90 France’s nuclear deterrence strategy was predicated
on its willingness and capacity to act unilaterally, pre-emptively and with nuclear
weapons if it was directly threatened, which it deemed its “critical threshold of
aggressiveness”. De Gaulle doubted the USA’s capacity to lead the defence of
87 Keesing’s Research Report, (1972), Disarmament: Negotiations and Treaties, 1946-1971, New York: Charles Saibner’s Sons, p. 273. 88 Cremin to McCann, 20 April 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/86. 89 UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament, p. 76.
146 Western Europe and was realistic about the fact that the interests of the USA did not
necessarily coincide with the interests of Western Europe.91 The USA’s humiliating
treatment of France and the UK during the Suez crisis and its delay in entering both
world wars was largely responsible for convincing de Gaulle of the necessity of
acquiring nuclear weapons and maintaining the capacity to act unilaterally.92 This
policy of unilateral defence was one of a number of disagreements Paris had with its
NATO partners that had led to the rift in 1966, and in the subsequent withdrawal of
France.93 The inclusion of articles in the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerning
security assurances would open France to a response from the other nuclear powers if it ever used its nuclear weapons in an offensive capacity.
Aiken’s speech to the 22nd General Assembly in 1967 exhorting member-
states to support the resolution endorsing the Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically
targeted these concerns. He did not restrain his language because of the EC
application and his speech was much the same as it had been at previous sessions. He
argued that the possession of nuclear weapons did not increase a nation’s security, but
rather was responsible for increasing international tension and squandering resources
that could be better directed towards enhancing standards of living. The Tánaiste
specifically addressed the French concern that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a
genuine disarmament measure. Aiken admitted that non-proliferation was only a
component of general and complete disarmament, but he argued that general and
complete disarmament was not a realistic immediate objective and would take many
years to achieve.94 By contrast, the conclusion of a Non-Proliferation Treaty was an
90 Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur, p. 194. 91 Laqueur, Europe in Our Time, pp. 324-325. 92 P. Kennedy, (1988), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, London: Fontana Press, pp. 517, 547. 93 Macridis, ‘French Foreign Policy’, in Foreign Policy in World Politics, p. 52. 94 Extracts from Aiken’s Statements at the UN on Non-Proliferation Treaty, UCDA, FAP P104/6930.
147 achievable, immediate objective of the UN and, therefore, the ‘single most important
and urgent disarmament measure facing the United Nations’.95 Aiken also addressed
France’s most significant concern about the Non-Proliferation Treaty – security guarantees. The Tánaiste argued for the necessity of the inclusion of guarantees from the nuclear states to its non-nuclear counterparts for retaliatory action in the event of
attack by other nuclear powers.96 He believed that such guarantees were essential to
enhance international peace and security and increase the appeal of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. In this respect, Aiken proposed the establishment of a two-tiered
UN Guarantor Force to accompany the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was envisaged as
including contingents drawn from non-nuclear States and backed by the nuclear
powers. The existence of the force would facilitate the use of negotiations, rather than
resorting to force, in international disputes with nuclear powers.97 The Irish speech
never had any possibility of engendering an epiphany on the part of the opponents of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and converting them to support the instrument, but it was
aimed at the uncommitted and wavering member-states. It was delivered, however, in
the knowledge that it would alienate France and other members of the EC.
Essentially, the net result of the debates on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was that the UN was divided into two camps on the issue. France, a large group of
African states (Francophone states adhering to French policy, as well as nations intent
on using endorsement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a lever for the two
superpowers to intervene in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia), the EC, and the threshold nuclear states were all opposed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.98 They
95 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the 22nd General Assembly Session of the UN, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300. 96 Report on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 97 Ibid. 98 Cremin to McCann, 11 April 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87.
148 attempted to amend the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have it consigned to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee or referred to the next session of the General
Assembly and hope that it was emasculated by stagnating debate.99 The USA, the
Soviet Union and a large group of small states all supported the treaty. Ireland was
amongst the leaders of the supporters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of its
influence on the issue, and along with Canada, Finland, Iraq, and the authors of the
treaty, was particularly active in the campaign to muster support and signatories for its convention. The conflict of interest for Ireland, which would see a clash between its
UN policy and its EC policy, resulted because its campaign focused boldly on a large group of states that included the nations within France’s sphere of influence –
Francophone African nations, and the member-states of the EC.100
Ireland assumed responsibility for converting the Francophone African nations
to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of the respect it had earned through its UN policy on decolonisation.101 The Irish delegation embraced the task despite the
clear consequence of aggravating the sensitive relationship between Dublin and Paris.
France had maintained cultural and educational links with its former colonies of
Africa and contributed a larger share of its economic resources than any other
European country to aid their development. As a consequence, France maintained
significant diplomatic influence over many of its former colonies.102 Ireland’s
campaign focused on the leader of the Francophone nations opposing the treaty –
Dahomey. The Irish Permanent Representative met with his counterpart from
Dahomey, Ambassador Zollner, on 28 May 1967. At that meeting, Cremin was
99 FRUS, Volume XI – Arms Control and Disarmament, Memorandum for the Record of the 584th Meeting of the National Security Council, 27 March 1968. 100 Cremin to McCann, 1 May 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87. 101 For further information on Ireland’s policy towards decolonisation at the UN, refer to chapter seven. 102 J. Joll, (1990), Europe Since 1870: An International History, London: Penguin [hereafter Joll, Europe Since 1870], p. 475.
149 successful in convincing Zollner to revise his country’s position.103 Zollner’s public justification for the change in position was the introduction of some minor amendments in the General Assembly on 31 May. But, ultimately, Cremin persuaded
the Permanent Representative of Dahomey of the merits of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and, as a consequence, Zollner sought permission from his government to
switch from abstention to support. Although the Irish campaign had differing degrees
of success with different nations, it managed to reverse the voting positions of the
Francophone African nations Dahomey, Togo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Chad.
The Irish delegation also interfered in the other realm of French influence –
the EC – again at significant risk of alienating France. Persuading the members of the
EC to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty was crucial to the viability of the treaty.104
Whilst they were insisting on the preservation of regional cooperation through the
European Atomic Energy Agency, the Soviet Union was threatening to ‘kill it [the
Non-Proliferation Treaty] altogether’ if these demands were satisfied.105 Also, the
members of the Non-Aligned Movement and other supporters of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty were reconsidering their support if a privileged position was
reserved for the European Atomic Energy Agency.106
Thus, with the increasing prospect of a defeat for the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
Ireland’s intervention was crucial. Ireland’s most congenial relations with the
member-states of the EC were with the Netherlands because it was the member-state
most open about expansion, most independent of French influence and most
103 Cremin to McCann, 24 June 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87, National Archives of Ireland 104 FRUS, Volume XI – Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 211: Letter from the Director of the Arms Conrol and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson, Washington, 2 October 1967. 105 FRUS, Volume XI – Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 215: Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, Washington, 7 November 1967.
150 antagonistic to French efforts to impose adherence on the other members. The
Netherlands was also the lone member-state of the EC that supported the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and had been subjected to significant pressure from its colleagues
in the European Atomic Energy Agency.107 Nevertheless, the Irish delegation
managed to convince the Netherlands to approach and persuade the other EC
members to drop their insistence on regional inspection measures and support the
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s provision that inspection be conducted by a broad
international entity, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.108 This tactic
represented a highly effective, indirect method of addressing the concerns of the EC nations through the Netherlands.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was at the vanguard of Ireland’s UN policy from 1957 and, thus, pre-dated its application for membership of the EC in
1961. It was a non-negotiable position for Ireland, as the Irish delegation had invested so much time and so many resources in the efforts to forge the treaty that
neither a change of government, nor the application to join the EC, would have been
likely to reverse Irish support. Consequently, rousing France’s ire was not a sufficient
deterrent for Ireland to cease its interactions with former French colonies in Africa in
a bid to solicit their support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The campaign of the
supporters of the treaty culminated in the UN overwhelmingly supporting a resolution
that annexed the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, endorsed its provisions and
called for widespread adherence at a resumed 22nd General Assembly Session in
106 FRUS, Volume XI – Arms Control and Disarmament, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, undated. 107 FRUS, Volume XI – Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 302: Airgram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, 24 December 1968. 108 Cremin to McCann, 1 May 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87, National Archives of Ireland; Cremin to McCann, 24 June 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87.
151 1968.109 Ireland’s role in the achievement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was
recognised by the international community when Aiken was invited to Moscow in
July 1968 to be the first signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and when Ireland became the first nation to ratify it.
The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
After the Non-Proliferation Treaty was finalized in 1968, the main disarmament issue at subsequent General Assembly Sessions was consideration of the work of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Its purpose was ostensibly
to facilitate the cooperation of the non-nuclear weapon states in ratifying the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.110 Ireland had always opposed the holding of the conference for
fear that it would be hijacked by the threshold nuclear states, which would use it as a
forum to undermine international support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty.111 These fears were realised when the threshold group used the conference to propose possible alternatives to the treaty. These alternatives never translated into international agreements because there was little support from nations outside this group.112 France
and the threshold states remained concerned by the fact that the Non-Proliferation
Treaty did not address vertical proliferation, did not aim to eliminate existing arsenals,
or to redress the inequity of power relations in the international arena with the
existence of the nuclear elite.
At the 23rd General Assembly Session in 1968, French and the threshold
states’ opposition manifested in the form of a Latin American draft resolution,
109 A/ PV.1672, 12 June 1968, pp. 6-7. 110 Official Records of the General Assembly [hereafter ORGA] – 23rd General Assembly Session, Document A/7445, Report of the First Committee, p. 14. 111 Report on General and ENDC Disarmament Questions at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378.
152 engineered by Brazil and Argentina of the threshold group. The draft resolution followed up the report of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon states and called for a convention of the UN Disarmament Commission to deal with the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.113 By referring to the UN Disarmament Commission, rather
than the International Atomic Agency, the objective was to maintain the issue of non-
proliferation on the agenda of the UN and insist that nuclear matters were
disarmament issues, not energy issues. Ultimately, this tactic sought to delay the
Non-Proliferation Treaty coming into force until such time as greater concessions
were obtained from the superpowers.
Ireland remained committed to non-proliferation and, therefore, supported the
efforts of the Finnish group – a group of non-threshold non-nuclear states led by
Finland. They responded to the Latin American initiative with a draft resolution that
sought to have the peaceful uses of nuclear technology discussed by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The emergence of rival draft resolutions continued the
divisions that had emerged over the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with France and Ireland
again as protagonists on opposing sides.
Ireland attempted to nullify this delaying tactic by approaching the Finnish
group to suggest amendments to its draft resolution that would overtly endorse the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and note, without following up, the report from the
Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. This was a direct and unambiguous
rejection of the efforts of France and the threshold group to scuttle the treaty. The
amendments also included a call for the earliest ratification of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the provisions of the
112 Report on General and ENDC Disarmament Questions at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378. 113 ORGA – 23rd General Assembly Session, Document A/7445, Report of the First Committee, pp. 14- 19.
153 Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as other measures contained within that document.
The Finnish group rejected the Irish démarche, specifically because it believed that the Irish amendments would have altered the nature of the draft resolution and detracted from its support by antagonizing France and the threshold group.114
Thus, even after the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ireland
worked to thwart attempts to undermine support for it. The Irish delegation was not
interested in any compromise with France and the threshold states. Clearly Ireland’s
national interests as determined by its EC application would have dictated, at the
least, restraining its delegates and not interfering in the efforts to forge a compromise
with France and the threshold states. A similar situation during the negotiations for a
compromise in the South-Tyrol dispute of 1961 had prompted such an intervention by
the Taoiseach at that time, Sean Lemass.115 This would have been an easy alternative
for the Irish delegation because the compromise resolution had such large support in
the General Assembly, including ardent supporters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
At the same time, it was an option that was categorically rejected by Aiken. He
feared that any compromise, as envisaged by the Finnish group, would result in commencing a pattern, similar to the peacekeeping proposals, whereby the ignoring of the Non-Proliferation Treaty became customary.
Ireland also cosponsored a number of resolutions that arose from the deliberations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States designed to further disarmament. These included resolutions calling for the establishment within the
International Atomic Energy Agency of an international service for nuclear
114 Report on General and ENDC Disarmament Questions at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378. 115 Skelly, ‘National Interests and International Mediation’, in Irish Foreign Policy, p. 306.
154 explosions for peaceful purposes.116 By endorsing the role of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, instead of the UN Disarmament Commission, Ireland and
other nations deliberately opposed France and the threshold group’s attempts to derail the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The second resolution, cosponsored by the Irish delegation, called on the USA and the Soviet Union to enter
into bilateral talks on a limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.117 Again, Ireland’s
advocacy of bilateral discussions between the superpowers was a direct rejection of
France’s agenda of being included in such negotiations.
It is important to note that although France opposed the formulation of these
disarmament resolutions, it was wary about being seen to openly oppose collateral
disarmament measures. Therefore, French delegations abstained in the voting on
these resolutions, as it usually did in such situations that did not address the dominant
position of the superpowers, or that called for bilateral discussions between them that
excluded France.118 When it came to disarmament, abstention was indicative of
disapproval. Nations were reluctant to actively vote against a particular resolution for
fear that it would undermine their image, as it could be perceived as opposition to
disarmament.119
Other Disarmament Issues
In terms of other disarmament issues before the General Assembly, Ireland also supported a neutral and non-aligned resolution calling for all states to adhere to the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, for nuclear states to suspend tests in all environments,
116 ORGA – 23rd General Assembly Session, Document A/7445, Report of the First Committee, pp. 14- 19 117 ORGA – 23rd General Assembly Session, Document A/7445, Report of the First Committee, pp. 14- 19. 118 A/PV.1750, 20 December 1968, pp. 7-8; Report on General and ENDC Disarmament Questions at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378.
155 the exchange of seismic data at international level and the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee120 to deliberate upon formulating a treaty banning
underground tests. The resolution was primarily directed at France and the People’s
Republic of China. Consequently, opposition to the resolution came only from
Albania121 and abstentions from France and former French African colonies.122
These issues were not the only issues concerning UN or milieu approaches to international security that were encompassed in Ireland’s UN policy. But after the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, the Irish delegation had less interest in the agenda items pertaining to disarmament and these issues were viewed as less important than other issues on the UN agenda. After the retirement of Aiken,
Ireland’s delegation continued his interest in disarmament, though with far less active involvement. Ireland co-sponsored five resolutions in 1969 pertaining to nuclear weapons and six such resolutions in 1970. From 1970, the UN’s involvement in real disarmament negotiations had diminished significantly as the bilateral US-Soviet
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks assumed greater significance.123 Other disarmament
issues on the agenda of the General Assembly included efforts to forge a convention
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the objective of general and
complete disarmament, banning the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons and the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa
and Latin America. Nevertheless, Ireland’s UN policy continued to diverge from the
EC states in voting on disarmament issues even after its accession to the EC.124
119 Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 42. 120 Although this body was called the ENDC at this stage, from 1969 it was termed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. 121 At this time, the People’s Republic of China was unrepresented at the UN and Albania acted as its primary mouthpiece. 122 Report on general and complete disarmament at the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 123 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, p. 163. 124 Mackernan, ‘Ireland and Political Cooperation’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, p. 21.
156
Conclusion
Ireland’s neutrality at the UN, as well as its wider foreign policy was premised
on maintaining the stability of the international order, whereas France’s policy of
independence was fundamentally based on a revision of that order. This meant that on many of the peace issues before the UN, Irish and French policy was antithetical.
Furthermore, Ireland had a long history of activism on peace issues at the UN and
France was the most determined of the Security Council members to protect its privileges, which meant that both nations were often leaders of their respective positions. Not only did Ireland pursue a policy adverse to French policy; it was, at times, provocative with respect to French interests. Aiken and the members of the
Irish delegation directly singled out French arguments in their speeches, targeting nations in the French sphere with their diplomacy, suggesting amendments to resolutions that assertively challenged French interests and proposing draft resolutions, which France had indicated it would not accept. As a consequence, despite the clash with French interests and the vulnerability of the Irish application for membership of the EC, Ireland’s UN diplomacy with respect to peace issues did not alter. Indeed, as one observer noted, ‘Continuity was the essential feature of Irish foreign policy during the late nineteen sixties.’125 This was despite the fact that such a
perpetuation of its policy was contrary to Ireland’s national interests.
It has been suggested that Ireland’s activism diminished significantly in 1966,
with the renewal of the application for membership of the EC the following year.126
But 1969 is a more appropriate date, as it signified the retirement of Aiken. The year
1969 also signalled the retirement of de Gaulle and the removal of France’s veto in
125 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 68. 126 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 67.
157 The Hague summit of that year, which allowed the endorsement of European expansion and procedures for intergovernmental European Political Cooperation.
This was also the year that Ireland’s peacekeeping proposals ceased to be raised with the same vigour as had occurred under Aiken, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been formulated and endorsed, and disarmament was relegated to more bilateral avenues for the two superpowers. From 1969, the emphasis of Ireland’s activism was largely transferred from the international arena of the UN to the regional forum of the EC.127
127 Ibid., p. 104.
158 CHAPTER 6: IRELAND AND THE COLD WAR AT THE UN, 1965-1972
Although Irish diplomacy on peace issues was premised on neutrality, its policy on geo- political Cold War issues was formulated within a Western context. This was significant for Ireland’s efforts to accede to membership of the EC because France was increasingly asserting its independence from the West, particularly the USA, on Cold War issues.
Furthermore, Charles de Gaulle was the primary arbiter of the EC applications and was extremely frustrated by Western European nations who, he considered, delineated their foreign policy according to US, rather than Western European interests. His veto of expansion of the EC in 1963 had ostensibly been because the UK and, by association,
Ireland were too closely linked to the USA. Nevertheless, during the period 1965-1972, the Irish delegation in New York was more likely to conform to US policy, rather than
French policy, in the execution of its diplomacy on geo-political Cold War matters.
Many of the issues at the UN during the period 1965-1972 escalated to points of tension during 1968, as a result of the revolutionary impetus that swept Europe during that year. While European society of the early to mid 1960s was characterised by a general acceptance of the status quo, the spirit of revolt and student dissent gathered momentum during the 1960s, escalated in 1967 and exploded in 1968. It was most apparent in France with an expansion in the membership and number of left-wing political groups and, in May and June, the eruption of a general strike and severe rioting.1
The events in France was symptomatic of an intensification of dissent and questioning of capitalism by student groups in other nations, most notably West Germany, Italy, Spain,
1 Goubert, The Course of French History, p. 310; Morse, Foreign Policy and Independence in Gaullist France, p. 95.
159 the UK, Japan and the USA. Popular dissent also spread beyond the Iron Curtain into
Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The major grievance underpinning this dissension was that the social systems of Europe, whether capitalist or communist, were characterised by strong elements of repression. This wave of discord influenced the public and international responses to the events in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia in 1968.2
In many respects, the Vietnam War was a catalyst for this upsurge in dissent in the USA, as democratic freedoms were encroached upon by conscription, which had the added stigma of appearing to exempt the wealthy and the educated.3
Ireland and its Context within Western Policy in the Cold War
Ever since Ireland’s admission to the UN and the speech of the Minister for
External Affairs at the time, Liam Cosgrave, elucidating the three guiding principles of
Irish UN policy, Ireland’s diplomacy on Cold War issues at the General Assembly was characterised by a large degree of sympathy for the West. The third principle was specifically ‘to support wherever possible those powers principally responsible for the defence of the free world in their resistance to the spread of communist power and influence’.4 It has been noted that the struggle for dominance between the second and third principles – neutrality and support for the West – has been the dominant feature of
Irish UN policy.5 The problem with this view is that the two principles were not strictly competing pressures. In terms of Ireland’s peace issues and on matters of decolonisation,
Irish policy could be justifiably termed neutral. But with respect to geo-political Cold
2 G. Barclay, (1971), Revolutions of Our Time: 20th Century Nationalism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 177-178; Laqueur, Europe in Our Time, pp. 352-353. 3 R. Clutterbuck, (1993), International Crisis and Conflict, New York: St Martin’s Press, p. 95. 4 Cited in Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 37.
160 War issues, Ireland’s UN policy was more likely to be formulated within a US orientated
Western context. Although in a speech in the Dáil in 1956 Aiken had pointed out that
Western powers were guilty of regrettable behaviour in international relations, his implicit reference was to decolonisation, not the geo-politics of the Cold War.6
The common view of Irish foreign policy has been that by the mid-1960s, its UN policy was increasingly showing signs of US orientated Western influence.7 There were frequent criticisms of this in the Dáil. For example, in the debate on the conflict in
Vietnam in 1967, the Opposition TD, Frank Cluskey, accused Aiken of ‘following slavishly’ US led Western policy.8 These criticisms stemmed to a large extent from the
Irish Government’s frequent and predictable silences in its explanations of vote and position speeches with respect to what were often controversial and morally questionable
US orientated Western policies, especially when it came to the geo-politics of the Cold
War. But Ireland’s silence in debates on Cold War issues could not dissemble its US orientation,9 as Irish voting often betrayed a support of US interests.
Despite the view that Irish diplomacy in New York had suddenly shifted from the mid-1960s to become more “Westernised”, there were considerable consistencies between Irish policies in the mid-1960s and those from its early years at the UN.
Although the three guiding principles of Ireland’s UN policy were elucidated by a Fine
Gael Minister for External Affairs, and the government in power between 1957 and 1972 was Fianna Fáil, the principles were an articulation of the political culture pervading both
5 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 38. 6 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 48. 7 Kennedy & Skelly, ‘The Study of Irish Foreign Policy from Independence to Internationalism’, in Irish Foreign Policy, p. 24; O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa, p. 3. 8 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 07 November, 1967 - North Vietnam Bombing: 1918. 9 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 206-207; Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 234.
161 the major parties. The relative emphases on those principles varied between the parties, but they were befitting descriptions of the pillars of Irish UN policy. This was due to the fact that the divisions of Ireland’s two major parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – were historically related to a disagreement over the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, rather than the conventional right-left division of other Western political cultures. The right-left division between the two major parties in Irish politics was not clearly defined,10 with often little class differences between politicians on either side.11 As such,
Ireland’s political culture involved bi-partisan support for an anti-communist and pro-US
Western foreign policy orientation. This existed because the Irish electorate was characterized by a sizeable conservative constituency based in rural communities, with parochial interests that were confined largely to their localities and their ties with the large ex-patriot populations, particularly in the UK, the USA and the Antipodes. It was also heavily Catholic, with strict ideological views of the world that engendered a strong affinity for the West, especially the USA, as well as hostility to communism.
Consequently, the influence of Catholicism on Ireland’s foreign policy had an over- arching effect on the political culture in general, and its anti-communist nature in particular, which would then indirectly filter down to influence policy on various specific issues at the UN.12
As one commentator has stated about the context of Irish UN policy and the Cold
War, ‘Ireland was militarily neutral, yet a western democracy not indifferent to its
10 The third party of Irish politics, the Labour Party, was an exception, though it is important to note that it had a much smaller constituency than the two major parties. Labour had a socialist agenda, and considered its two rivals to be right wing parties (Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland, pp. 297-298). 11 R. F. Foster, (1988), Modern Ireland, 1600-1972, London: Penguin, p. 575. 12 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, pp. 164-165.
162 outcome.’13 Frequent statements of this kind, alluding to Ireland’s ideological support for the West in the Cold War, were made by Irish politicians including Sean Lemass, even prior to 1961.14 Ireland’s pro-Western orientation on Cold War issues was determined primarily by its support for the USA, which derived from the similarity of political values, the substantial American economic investments in Ireland (comprising more than a third of all foreign investment in the underdeveloped nation),15 and the large, wealthy and politically active ex-patriot Irish population in the USA. As an indication of
Ireland’s attachment to the USA, its first diplomatic post outside the British Isles was in
Washington and there even existed an Irish-American lobby in Congress.16 Yet, Ireland's relationship with the USA was similar to its relationship with the UK; although US influence over Ireland was significant, Irish influence on the USA was negligible.17
Therefore, the Irish lobby in the USA never really exhibited the kind of influence expected in Ireland though, significantly, there was an undoubted perception of influence.
The USA was also perceived to be a potential mediator with respect to the Northern
Ireland issue and generally in relations between Dublin and London.18
In terms of geo-political Cold War issues, therefore, Ireland’s policy was often determined by the locus of the US position. And it was Dublin’s relationship with
Washington that determined the pro-Western nature of Ireland’s UN policy when it came to Cold War issues. This was because Cold War debates were not only struggles of diplomatic power between East and West; they invariably evolved into, or were inscribed on the agenda for the purpose of allowing condemnation of US foreign policy in general
13 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 15. 14 Ibid., p. 167. 15 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, p. 141. 16 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 95-96.
163 and, in particular from 1965, its intervention in Vietnam. Consequently, Irish UN policy from 1956 involved Ireland’s frequent support for the US led West on clear geo-political confrontations of the Cold War and, in particular, a refusal to support any direct attack at the UN on the USA. In this respect, on 8 October 1967, the Le Monde newspaper in
Paris stated that Frank Aiken ‘has never hidden his unconditional obedience to the United
States’, which was significant considering France’s efforts, at that time, to distance itself from US policy.19 Although the observation was more reflective of media hyperbole than actual Irish policy, it captured the frustration in Paris with what appeared to be Ireland’s subservience to Washington. Clear examples of Irish support for US policy included the
Irish response to the insertion of US and British troops into Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, perennially on the UN presence in Korea since 1956 and support for the USA during the
Bay of Pigs Invasion and Cuban missile crisis of 1962. During the Cuban missile crisis, the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, had used the opportunity to state that Ireland was a Western nation and would align with the West in the event of the Cold War becoming hot and, furthermore, he insisted that both sides were well aware of this fact.20
The hallmark of the independent policies of the other European neutrals (Austria,
Sweden, Finland and Switzerland) was their circumspection with respect to East-West divisions. In contrast, Ireland lay behind a shield of NATO states, which prevented it from being subjected to the diplomatic leverage from Moscow suffered by the other neutrals, which were situated on the border of the opposing blocs. Therefore, it did not have the same exigency to pursue a circumspect impartiality on geo-political Cold War
17 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 5. 18 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 95. 19 J. de Courcey, (1968), ‘Europe and Ireland’, The United Irishman/An t-Eireannach Aontaithe, 22 (8), [hereafter de Courcey, ‘Europe and Ireland’, The United Irishman], p. 10.
164 issues. Consequently, Ireland’s neutrality was not defined by equidistance between the superpower blocs, but was premised on support for decolonisation, disarmament and détente.
Ireland did not establish either significant economic relations or formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until 1976, after its admission to the EC. It has been suggested that this confinement of diplomatic representation to one side demonstrated the questionable neutrality of Ireland when it came to the Cold War.21 But even after diplomatic relations were established, they continued to remain at a low level for a considerable time afterwards. This was in contrast to Ireland’s close bilateral relationship with Washington, which was given impetus by the strong historical links with the large
Irish population in the USA. Therefore, although many nations considered Ireland to be neutral, especially recently decolonised non-aligned states, the Soviet Union was never among them. Moscow perceived Dublin to be unequivocally Western and anti- communist, largely because of its policy on geo-political Cold War issues. This was the reason for the delay in the admission of Ireland to the UN until 1955, as the nation became a pawn in the East-West struggle over the balance of the General Assembly.22
Ireland’s Cold War policy in this respect has been described by one commentator as a pro-NATO policy that merely effaced the term NATO.23 Furthermore, quantitative analyses of Ireland’s voting behaviour demonstrate little difference in Irish voting across
20 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 79. 21 Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, p. 202. 22 Quirke, Irish Foreign Policy, 1945-1955, pp. 295-296. 23 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 47; This view is shared by Quirke, Irish Foreign Policy, 1945-1955, p. 279.
165 a broad range of issues between 1956 and 1970, as well as a general alignment with the
US led West.24
During the high-point of Irish neutrality (1957-1961), the Soviet Union accused
Ireland of acting as a tool of its enemies. In 1960, the Soviets opposed the nomination of
Freddy Boland for the Presidency of the General Assembly, deeming him a candidate of the West and, instead, proposed a nominee from Poland. Also, the Soviets actively discouraged neutral states from seeking membership of the EC, because it considered the policies of neutrality and European integration to be mutually exclusive. But it is interesting that, although Moscow gave such warnings to Austria, Finland, Sweden and
Switzerland, no such note was dispensed to Ireland. The implication here is that the
Soviets obviously did not regard the Irish as neutral, especially with respect to Cold War issues.25 Neutral states were crucial in the balancing of the bi-polar configuration of the
Cold War and preventing their absorption into either rival’s camp was a major pre- occupation of the superpowers. In this respect, the policies of neutral states, especially any that may have suggested a deviation from impartiality, were given a magnified level of scrutiny. But Moscow invested little energy in pressuring Dublin precisely because
Ireland was seen as being of little importance, as it was already clearly in the US led
Western camp.
Aiken’s Proposals for Détente and their Relation to the Cold War
This is not to suggest that Ireland was unwilling to confront or oppose US policies at the UN. Irish diplomacy pertaining to decolonisation, disarmament, peacekeeping and
24 Quantitative analyses are important indicators of voting trends, but in making this point, there are limitations in such analyses if not contextualized; Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, pp. 227, 235.
166 détente were often contrary to US policies and undermining of Washington's interests.
But it should be noted that these were different kinds of issues, with different policy imperatives and objectives. In particular, peacekeeping, disarmament and détente were viewed not so much in the geo-political Cold War context, but rather in respect of the goals of furthering peace and sustaining the capacity of the international milieu to maintain stability. They were regarded as being in the interests of the international community, irrespective of the interests of the superpower blocs.26
Even the major authorities in the field of Irish UN policy have avoided any such explicit declaration that Aiken’s proposals for détente signified a policy of neutrality in the Cold War. One has suggested that they were aimed at ‘pursuing international stability’, and Ireland’s wider neutrality at the UN, but fell short of claiming they demonstrated neutrality in the context of the Cold War.27 Another also was careful to avoid suggesting that Irish policies on these issues specifically indicated neutrality in this context.28 These Irish proposals to advance détente were annexes to questions before the
UN, rather than alternatives to Western policies. Although they irritated Western diplomats at various junctures, they in no way precluded Ireland from supporting
Western policy on geo-political aspects of various questions, or opposing those championed by the Soviet bloc. Aiken’s initiatives in the promotion of détente included his proposals for the neutralization of the Middle East, the step-by-step and reciprocal withdrawal of Soviet and US troops in Europe, and other measures associated with his
Areas of Law proposals.
25 Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, p. 202. 26 For further discussion of this distinction between geo-political Cold War issues and peace policy, refer to chapter one. 27 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 114.
167 Although commonly included in this list of measures advancing détente, it is questionable whether the proposals for the neutralization of the Middle East should be, because the primary objectives of those initiatives were to address the geo-political aspects of the question. Aiken’s initiatives were founded upon the endorsement of the status quo in the region and, therefore, recognition of the state of Israel. This precondition was the perennial defining criteria of the Western position on the situation in the Middle East. Although Security Council Resolution 242 of late 1967 embodied recognition of Israel’s existence, it was not implemented outside the arena of the UN until after Egypt courted ostracism by the Arab community with its recognition of Israel in 1979. Aiken’s acknowledgement of the Palestinian claims was confined largely to addressing the humanitarian aspects of the problem. But even these were pro-Israeli, as they considered a solution involving resettlement of the refugees, whereas the Arab states would only contemplate a solution premised on repatriation or compensation.29
Therefore, Aiken’s initiatives for the neutralization of the Middle East may have represented an attempt to deliver a balanced solution, but they failed to do so and merely succeeded in betraying the undoubtedly Western framework that characterized Ireland’s approach to Cold War issues.30
Aiken’s Areas of Law initiatives and his disengagement proposals could more correctly be viewed as peace policy issues and have been so considered in this thesis
(under the rubric of disarmament), rather than geo-political Cold War issues. This is simply because that was how they were considered by the Irish delegation. As indicated
28 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 113. 29 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 155. 30 For more detailed discussion of Irish policy on the Middle East situation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, refer to chapter one.
168 in discussion of this issue in chapter one, Aiken’s initiatives for disengagement stemmed from his proposals for disarmament in the region. This conclusion is given further weight by one significant treatment of Irish UN policy, where the disengagement proposals were analyzed as a component of disarmament.31 Similarly, the core principle
Aiken was advancing in his Areas of Law proposals was disarmament, as it was a precursor to his initiatives for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.32
The Irish proposals for détente were genuine efforts at lessening tensions, proffered at a time when Ireland was counted amongst a small number of nations who wielded influence because of the balance of the General Assembly. Ireland’s influence was predicated on the perception that it was a neutral state, but this perception was fundamentally confined to issues such as détente, disarmament and decolonisation. From the early 1960s, the balance of the General Assembly altered sufficiently to deny Ireland that influence, as a large number of non-aligned states were admitted to the UN.
Consequently, from the early 1960s, Aiken significantly diminished his references to his
Areas of Law proposals, though he did continue nonetheless, to make some reference to them until his retirement in 1969. Without initiatives, such as the Areas of Law proposals, Irish policy became more obvious as being pro-US and Western from 1961, because the only diplomacy it exhibited in Cold War debates was its pro-US voting positions on geo-political issues. And as Conor Cruise O’Brien stated, voting positions were ‘more eloquent than a speech’ in defining a nation’s policy on various issues.33
31 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 125-135. 32 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the Situation in Vietnam, 1 February 1968, UCDA, FAP P104/6906. 33 O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa, p. 3.
169 Domestic Criticisms of Ireland’s Policy on Cold War Issues
Conor Cruise O’Brien has acknowledged that Irish policy at the UN on Cold War issues closely adhered to US led Western diplomacy, though he insisted that his did not eventuate until after he left the delegation in 1961. The validity of O’Brien’s assertion about Irish UN policy prior to 1961 can be questioned, as it has and will be in this chapter. Nevertheless, his conclusion about the adherence of Irish UN policy to US-
Western interests after that date is more easily substantiated. O’Brien claimed that conformity to Western policy on Cold War issues jeopardized Ireland’s application for membership of the EC, because of de Gaulle’s hostile view of the Atlantic relationship and propensity to view Western Europe’s interests as being quite distinct from those of the USA. O’Brien also pointed out that, in 1967, the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, publicly praised the statesmanship of Aiken, whereas de Gaulle refused to meet the
Taoiseach when passing through Ireland. O’Brien believed Irish UN policy was likely to ensure Ireland’s continued exclusion from the EC, arguing that de Gaulle would be reluctant to support admission for ‘the winner of the Dean Rusk Prize for Statesmanship in 1967’.34 Consequently, he called for the retirement of Frank Aiken and a change in
Irish UN policy, concluding that ‘the United States cannot get Ireland into the [Common]
Market and France, which can, is not likely to be favourably impressed by displays of subservience to America’s supposed interests.’35
O’Brien’s criticisms of Irish foreign policy focused on Aiken’s diplomacy on geo- political Cold War issues, particularly since Ireland’s lodging of its initial application for membership of the EC in 1961. He claimed that, from this time, Irish UN policy became
34 Ibid., p. 12. 35 O’Brien, Ireland in International Affairs’, in Conor Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland, p. 133.
170 predictably Western and increasingly sensitive to influence from the USA and its
Western European, NATO allies – who were also member-states of the EC – due to the precarious nature of Ireland’s application for membership of the Common Market. In support of this claim, O’Brien maintained that an analysis of the voting positions of the
USA and the member-states of the EC “can predict the outcome of a critical vote [by
Ireland] in the General Assembly within a margin of error of about 3 per cent” whereas, prior to 1961 and the initial application for EC membership, Irish policy with respect to such indices had been unpredictable.36 Specifically, O’Brien criticized Ireland’s support for the Two-China Policy, as well as its failure to condemn US intervention in Vietnam, as indicative of a policy at the UN subservient to Washington. With respect to Ireland’s position on the representation of China, he accused the Irish delegation of adhering to the
Two-China Policy, because Beijing would never agree to it and, therefore, it was designed to keep the People’s Republic of China out of the UN.37 O’Brien argued that, on issues such as Vietnam and the representation of China, Ireland’s policy was justified with sophistry designed ‘to dress up in the language of Irish pieties a policy in fact dictated by a supposed need to find a position acceptable to American opinion’.38 So, in
O’Brien’s view, the Irish delegation was conforming to US imperatives, rather than formulating a distinctly Irish policy.
O’Brien’s views have found a certain degree of support from at least one leading commentator on Ireland’s UN affairs, who also has suggested that the EC application induced a shift in policy of the Irish Government.39 A problem with this argument,
36 O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa, p. 3. 37 O’Brien, Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10. 38 O’Brien, Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10. 39 Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 206.
171 however, is that it is based largely on the testimony of O’Brien himself, who had a vested interest in criticizing the performance of the Irish delegation after his departure in 1961.
Moreover, it necessitates a centralized policy-making structure, which is contrary to the view of most scholars in the field of Irish foreign policy about the decision-making processes at that time.40 O’Brien’s criticisms were expressed in public lectures and newspaper columns and, also, formed the basis of an attack he made on Aiken on 28
October 1969 when, as a newly TD for the Labour Party, he raised these matters in the
Dáil. Though Dr Patrick Hillery had replaced Aiken as Minister for External Affairs by this time, the latter defended himself against O’Brien’s accusations from the back-bench by pointing to the overall policy, rather than specific aspects.41 The reason Aiken did not mount a defence against the specific accusations was because some of O’Brien’s allegations were accurate – Ireland did indeed exhibit a clear Western bias on certain matters at the UN, notably geo-political Cold War issues and, to a certain extent, had always done so. Aiken’s primary defence against the accusation of Western bias, therefore, involved citing the Irish delegation’s voting positions on twenty-three issues concerning decolonisation. The only Cold War issue cited by Aiken in this regard was
Ireland’s support for discussion of the representation of China between 1957 and 1961.42
This example, proffered by Aiken as evidence of the neutrality of Ireland’s UN policy, stands as an isolated case in terms of geo-political Cold War issues.43
40 For more information on the fragmentation of Ireland’s foreign policy and its impact on Ireland’s UN policy, refer to chapter four. 41 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 28 October, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs: 1931-1932. 42 Aiken to the Editor of The Irish Times, 23 May 1969, UCDA, FAP, P104/6988. 43 T. Coogan, (1995), De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow, London: Arrow Books, p. 668; B. Halligan, (2000), ‘The Political Perspective in 1972’, in Rory O’Donnell (Ed) Europe: the Irish Experience, Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, [hereafter Halligan, ‘The Political Perspective in 1972’, in Europe], p. 20; Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 65; Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 87. D. Keogh,
172
The Representation of China at the UN
The representation of China had been one of the major Cold War issues considered by the UN since 1950, when it was first addressed. The Soviet Union and the
USA mustered support for their respective positions, with the Soviets seeking the replacement of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, and the USA seeking to maintain the status quo with Taiwan holding the Chinese seat and Communist China being excluded from the UN. Since the communists assumed power on mainland China in 1949, the regime had demanded the expulsion of the nationalists from the UN and their replacement with communist delegates. This was prevented until 1971 by US opposition to the admission of the communist regime to the UN. The USA pursued a policy of isolating China in international affairs because it argued that the communist regime was
‘incurably expansionist, fanatically ideological, and intransigently committed to world revolution’.44
Between 1957 and 1961 (when the USA capitulated to pressure in the General
Assembly and ceased its opposition), Ireland supported the inscription of the discussion of the representation of China on the agenda of the General Assembly. This was evinced both in its declaratory speeches and its voting, despite provoking swift and substantial direct and indirect pressure from the USA. Ireland’s support for the discussion of the representation of China at the UN was a courageous defiance of US policy, as Ireland and the Scandinavian nations (except Iceland) were the only Western supporters of the
(2000), ‘Irish Neutrality and the First Application for Membership of the EEC, 1961-63’, in Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism, Dublin: Four Courts Press, p. 267; Mackernan, ‘Ireland and Political Cooperation’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, p. 18; Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 9.
173 discussion of the issue.45 The stance of the Irish delegation shocked the US Government,
Irish Americans, the Irish media and the Opposition in the Dáil. Consequently,
Washington attempted to involve the Vatican and even managed to solicit the cooperation of Cardinal Spellman of New York in attempting to persuade the Irish delegation to reconsider its position. On 28 November 1957, the Irish vote on the issue of the representation of China prompted a motion of “Disapproval of the Government’s Foreign
Policy” in the Dáil.46 Previous research into Irish UN policy has maintained that the stance of the delegation in New York on the discussion of the representation of China was crucial to its neutrality at the UN.47
It is certainly true that Irish policy on the representation of China was crucial in establishing Ireland’s neutrality at the UN, but at the same time, this does not mean that it demonstrated a general policy trend of neutrality in the Cold War context. Even previous commentators on Irish UN policy are reluctant to make such an explicit claim that Ireland was neutral in the Cold War, preferring instead to acknowledge the contribution of this matter to Ireland’s overall policy of neutrality at the UN, which is more easily substantiated.48 This is largely because a retrospective analysis of Irish UN policy on
Cold War issues betrays the exceptional nature of the stance on the discussion of the representation of China. Ireland’s deviation from US policy on this issue was significant, but it was also anomalous, and a position on one issue does not indicate a trend. The reality was that the illusion of Ireland’s neutrality on issues pertaining to the Cold War
44 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 720. 45 Report on the Representation of China, NAI, DFA 98/3/273. 46 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 206. 47 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 43-53; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 120-121. 48 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, pp. 43-53; Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, pp. 120-121.
174 was always premised on the identification of a very small number of test cases. These included and were confined to Ireland’s vote on the discussion of the representation of
China, its proposals for solving the Middle East crisis and, also, for détente and disengagement in Europe.49 And when the stance on the Middle East is recognized as being framed by Western policy schemas and the proposals for neutralization and disengagement in Europe are considered in the context of disarmament, rather than the geo-political stage of the Cold War, Irish neutrality in the Cold War hinges precariously on one issue – the representation of China. Even during its most active period of neutrality, between 1957 and 1961, Ireland’s voting record on most geo-political Cold
War issues clearly identified it as a Western nation supporting US policy.
In fact, ever since the end of World War II, Ireland pursued a policy that was characterized by a reluctance to criticize US foreign policy, or even disappoint
Washington. The shock and the extreme reactions that followed Ireland’s position on the discussion of the representation of China occurred because Irish policy on the issue was out of character. As one commentator pointed out, Aiken’s criticism of the US effort to suppress discussion on the representation of China ‘stands out in retrospect as the exception to prove the rule’ that Irish policy was a function of US policy when it came to
Cold War matters.50 Another has also argued that Ireland was a “consistent supporter” of the USA at the UN even during the period 1957-1961 on such issues.51 This is not to suggest that Irish Governments invariably and automatically approved of US policy in
49 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, p. 76. 50 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 96. 51 D. Driscoll, D, (1982), ‘Is Ireland Really Neutral?’. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 1 (3), p. 56.
175 this context; it merely means that such concerns were rarely pursued and certainly not in direct public forums such as the UN.52
The USA perceived the discussion of the representation of China to be a Cold
War battleground and attempted to elevate the issue to a test of strength between the superpowers. Nevertheless, until 1961, when it was inscribed on the agenda of the
General Assembly, Ireland took a position on the procedural aspect of the question, not the substantive issue. As has been pointed out by one commentator on UN affairs, the
Irish position on the procedural question in no way revealed its stance on the substantive question of the entry of the People’s Republic of China to the UN.53 Furthermore, because Ireland did not take a position on the substantive issue, it is arguable that the discussion of the representation of China was not even a Cold War issue but, as another commentator has described, an ‘organizational’ issue.54 In the context of this thesis, therefore, it could justifiably have been considered in the context of Ireland’s peace policy and the various issues analysed in chapter five. Thus, the Irish position on the discussion of the representation of China had more in common with Ireland’s policy on the financing of peacekeeping, than with conventional geo-political Cold War issues.
This was because the Irish delegation viewed the issue as a procedural question pertaining to the right to be heard in the forum of the UN, rather than a Cold War rivalry, and this explains the uncharacteristic position of the Irish delegation on the issue. On behalf of Aiken, the Taoiseach at the time, Sean Lemass, indicated in the Dáil that the objective of the vote was to ensure the ability of the UN to maintain international security
52 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 96. 53 Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 46. 54 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 40.
176 by preserving its right to discuss any situation that could endanger international peace.55
At the UN, Aiken argued that Ireland supported inscription of the item because it believed that only open debate would gain the People’s Republic of China’s acceptance of the principles of the UN Charter. Both the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste went to great lengths to emphasize that the question before the General Assembly was not one of whether the People’s Republic of China should be admitted, but whether the question of
Chinese representation should be discussed. They indicated that Ireland had not yet made a decision on the substantive issue of the representation of China.56
The failure of Beijing to have its right to discuss an issue at the UN acknowledged had clear implications for Ireland’s potential to raise the Northern Ireland issue at the
General Assembly. If the USA, as a permanent member of the Security Council and powerful member of the UN, could deny member-states the opportunity to discuss the representation of China, there was little chance that Ireland could succeed in raising partition or related issues against the opposition of the UK. This was a paramount concern as, also during 1957, Conor Cruise O’Brien was circulating proposals for the raising of the Northern Ireland situation at the UN.57 The concern proved to be prophetic as, more than a decade later in 1969, the UK exerted considerable efforts to successfully prevent the Northern Ireland issue from being discussed in both the Security Council and the General Assembly.58 Therefore, Ireland’s deviation from US led Western policy on the discussion of the representation of China occurred because the Irish delegation viewed it as a procedural question, not a Cold War issue. At the same time, it was
55 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 187 - 21 March, 1961 - Government of China: 863. 56 Report on the Representation of China, NAI, DFA 98/3/273. 57 Memorandum on Reasons for not Raising Partition at the United Nations, 16 November 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6971.
177 expedient for Irish diplomats to emphasise their position on the procedural details of the voting in an effort to blur their stand on the substantive issue. But it was undoubtedly the procedural nature of the question in 1957 that facilitated the Irish delegation having such a radical position.59
In fact, Ireland was not compelled to take a position on the substantive issue until
1961. Despite his criticism that Irish policy from the mid-1960s was a reversal of policy from the position taken in 1957,60 Conor Cruise O’Brien unequivocally stated in 1962 that Ireland did not have a policy on the substantive issue back in 1957.61 In 1961 the
Irish delegation was faced with a different question and, despite the arguments of
O’Brien, it was the question that changed not necessarily Irish policy. From 1961, when the issue of Chinese representation was inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly,
Ireland supported a US resolution defining the issue as an important question and opposed the unsuccessful draft resolution calling for the seating of Beijing at the expense of Taiwan. From 1964, the USA began promoting what has become known as the Two-
China’s Policy, which maintained that both Communist China and Taiwan had the right to independent membership of the General Assembly, with Beijing taking control of the seat on the Security Council.62 Irish policy on the representation of China was premised on this position until 1970.63
Ireland’s support for the discussion of the representation of China between 1957 and 1961 was not necessarily inconsistent with its policy from 1961 of opposing the entry
58 For more detailed analysis of these events, refer to chapter six. 59 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 50. 60 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 28 October, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs: 1877. 61 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 182. 62 Report on the Representation of China, NAI, DFA 98/3/273.
178 of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. In fact, it is probable that even back in
1957 Aiken intended to oppose the People’s Republic of China's admission. In his speeches and press statements, he was always careful to avoid pre-empting his decision on that issue. At the same time, Aiken’s support for the discussion of the issue was invariably prefaced with statements indicating that Ireland condemned the ideology of the
People’s Republic of China, its suppression of human rights, its aggressive foreign policy and its interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours. As early as 1959 and in the wake of the Tibetan revolt of 1959, the subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama to asylum in
India, and the raising of the issue at the UN in that year, Aiken indicated that Ireland would probably oppose the admission of the communist regime when he called for the
UN to impose preconditions on its admission. The Tánaiste called for the UN to obtain undertakings from the People’s Republic of China that it would abandon the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy, grant full human rights to its citizens and cease its interference in Korea.64 These preconditions were supported by the Taoiseach, Sean
Lemass, who reiterated them in the Dáil Éireann.65 At the same time, Aiken’s position did not have the universal support of the Irish delegation to the UN. In particular, the qualifications were viewed with disappointment by Conor Cruise O’Brien and other proponents of neutrality within the delegation.66 This was because, although the articulation of the preconditions was promoted as enhancing Ireland’s credibility in providing criticism of oppressive policies, especially with respect to the occupation of
Tibet, this was merely a secondary objective. The promotion of the preconditions was
63 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the 24th General Assembly Session, NAI, DT 2000/6/281, p. 24. 64 Report on the Representation of China, NAI, DFA 98/3/273. 65 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 187 - 21 March, 1961 - Government of China: 863.
179 primarily designed to function as an impediment to the admission of Communist China to the UN. For example, Beijing was unrepentant about its use of military power, the granting of human rights of the nature desired by Aiken was antithetical to the totalitarian communist regime, the People’s Republic of China viewed North Korea to be within its sphere of influence and, like the Soviet Union, it unequivocally rejected the validity of the presence of the UN on the peninsula. Aiken was well aware that Beijing, who demanded unconditional admission to the UN, would never have accepted his pre- conditions.
By the time that Ireland was again reconsidering membership of the EC from
1965 and had renewed its application in 1967, the People’s Republic of China was still not a member of the UN. The Chinese seat in both the General Assembly and the
Security Council was still occupied by the Republic of China (Taiwan). The General
Assembly was essentially divided into two camps on the issue. The first involved those members who advocated the immediate and unconditional replacement of the representatives of Taiwan with those of Communist China. The proponents of this view included Cambodia and Albania, who were Beijing’s primary spokespeople while it was unrepresented at the UN, as well as the Soviet bloc, various Asian and African nations and a small number of Western states. These Western states included the Scandinavian nations (except Iceland) but also, crucially for Ireland’s European policy, the UK and
France. The French delegation was particularly vociferous in its efforts to procure the admission of the People’s Republic of China after it gave the regime formal recognition
66 O’Brien, Ireland in International Affairs’, in Conor Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland, p. 131.
180 in 1964 in a bid to assert France’s independence in Asian affairs.67 The general argument from the supporters of Beijing was that it was the genuine and only government of China and that Taiwan was merely a renegade province sheltered by the US navy. They argued that membership of the UN was open to states, not regimes and, therefore, Beijing was being discriminated against. They also insisted that the People’s Republic of China’s membership of the UN was necessary, due to the size, power and influence that it wielded in international affairs.68
The USA was the principal opponent of this view and marshalled support for its
Two-China Policy. Washington succeeded in perennially undermining its opponents by achieving recognition that the question was an “important question” and, thereby, required a two-thirds majority, rather than a simple majority. It was a procedural ploy that was instrumental in continually denying Beijing admission.69 As an indication of the question’s Cold War significance, most Western states supported the US view, including
Ireland.70 Of the EC nations, the Netherlands remained uncommitted on the issue, but
Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg all supported the US policy. But most importantly for
Ireland, both the UK and France were conspicuous by their support for the seating of the
People’s Republic of China.71 In fact, the Irish delegation took particular note of the
French position, but this was not enough to persuade them to alter a policy at the General
Assembly that they had followed openly since 1961 when it was first introduced.72
67 Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur, p. 140; F. Freidel, (1970), America in the Twentieth Century (4th ed.), New York: Alfred A. Knopf, [hereafter Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century], p. 379. 68 A/PV.1603, p. 7, 21 November 1967; A/PV.1606, p. 7, 23 November 1967. 69 A/PV.1602, pp. 2-4, 21 November 1967. 70 Report on the Representation of China at the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 98/3/273. 71 A/PV.1715, 13 November 1968, p. 1. 72 Memorandum on Irish Policy on the Chinese question, NAI, DFA, 98/3/273.
181 Ireland’s support for the US position continued until 1970, when Hillery instigated a change in policy. Between 1965 and 1969, Ireland avoided making declaratory speeches or explanations of vote because Aiken and the Irish delegation considered that the debate was polemical, that the Irish position had not changed from previous sessions and that it had been adequately explained on those previous occasions.
That position was, of course, that the People’s Republic of China, as the fifth nuclear power, should accede to the Security Council, subject to certain undertakings and provided that both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan were seated in the General
Assembly.73 Aiken’s reticence was designed to dissemble the pro-US orientation of
Ireland’s policy on the issue and this was a tactic he frequently indulged in on issues of a
Cold war nature, in order to avert attention from Irish voting.
In 1966, Ireland’s allegiance to the Two-China Policy led it to support an Italian draft resolution, which sought to have the UN establish a committee to study the situation and make recommendations for ‘an equitable and practical solution to the question’.74
Two years later at the 23rd General Assembly Session, Ireland joined the list of cosponsors, which also included Belgium, Luxembourg and Chile. The proposal was promoted as a means of making progress towards the objective of universality, but it was generally viewed by member-states to have been inspired by the USA. The supporters of the People’s Republic of China categorically rejected the Italian proposal as an initiative aimed at postponing its admission.75 This view was given credence by a letter from the
Belgian Permanent Representative to the President of the General Assembly in 1968. It outlined Belgium’s views on the study to be undertaken by the committee in the event of
73 Report on the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 74 Report on the Representation of China at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378.
182 the draft resolution being adopted and, specifically, its pre-judging of the outcome in favour of a Two-China solution. It is important to note that Ireland refused to co-sponsor the text when it was first produced in 1966 out of a concern that it did not pre-empt a
Two-China solution. Furthermore, the Irish delegation elected to co-sponsor the proposal in 1968 specifically because it envisaged such a solution.76 It was also significant that the
USA supported the Italian draft resolution and, in fact, at the session that Ireland joined the list of cosponsors, the text was replicated from those used at previous sessions precisely because they had US endorsement. Because the proposal was considered as embodying specifically US orientated Western interests, it failed to gain necessary support in 1966, 1967 and 1968. With these failures and diminishing support each year, it was dropped in 1969.77 Nevertheless, Ireland’s co-sponsorship of the Italian draft resolution demonstrated a further consolidation of its pro-US position on the issue.
In 1969, the Irish delegation under the Ministry of External Affairs of Hillery continued to adhere to the policy delineated by Aiken on the representation of China.
This policy was perpetuated by the direction of the Permanent Representative, Cornelius
Cremin. The continuation of this stance caused problems at the Ministerial level, however, as the new the Minister for External Affairs did not agree with the policy of
Aiken or its continuation by the Irish delegation in 1969. Upon being appointed as
Minister for External Affairs, Hillery acknowledged his inexperience in the position and the lack of time available to properly examine the issues on the agenda of the General
Assembly, and granted Cremin and the Irish delegation significant latitude in their decision making. It was not until after the vote in debates at the 24th General Assembly
75 Ibid. 76 Cremin to McCann, 18 November 1969, NAI, DFA 98/3/273.
183 Session in 1969 that Hillery made it clear that the his displeasure known with the Irish position.78 His dissatisfaction was channeled through the Assistant-Secretary of the
Department of External Affairs, Sean Ronan, who passed on his views to Cremin along with a request for greater background information on the debates of the major issues at the UN. Hillery’s change of policy was pre-empted in the Dáil a month before this when he made a very vague and brief reference to the representation of China. He indicated that the isolation of Communist China was a problem in need of a solution, in a speech that crucially effaced any reference to, or defence of, the Two-China Policy. The speech was significant because of the contrast it provided with the custom of his predecessor, which was to explicitly defend the Two-China policy.79 Hillery believed that Ireland needed to change its position, particularly after the Italian proposal ceased to be forwarded. He was also increasingly swayed by the expanding support of Western nations for the replacement of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, especially that of Belgium, Italy and Canada. It was also widely known that these nations were in the process of considering formal recognition of Beijing. Hillery was conscious that
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK and France had already recognized the communist regime and supported its admission, even if it was at the expense of
Taiwan.80 It was clear that the USA and its supporters, including Ireland, were becoming increasingly isolated and fighting a losing battle to promote the Two-China Policy.
Therefore, Hillery was concerned that Ireland’s support for this policy could be interpreted as opposition to the admission of the People’s Republic of China and
77 Report on the Representation of China at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378. 78 Cremin to McCann, 18 November 1969, NAI, DFA 98/3/273. 79 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 28 October, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs: 1877.
184 preferred an abstention on the issue.81 Therefore, in 1970, and in response to the direction of his minister, Cremin announced that Ireland’s position had altered due to a
‘desire for some progress’ on the issue. Ireland continued to support the argument that any alteration in the representation of China that could result in the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN should be deemed an important question. At the same time, Ireland abstained on, rather than opposed, the perennial substantive draft resolution to replace the representatives of Taiwan with those of the People’s Republic of China.82
In 1971, Ireland’s abstention on the draft resolution seeking the replacement of
Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China converted into support. But it should be noted that Ireland decided to support the replacement of Taiwan at the same session that the USA ceased its opposition to the measure and, in fact, the General Assembly approved the proposal. Nevertheless, Hillery rejected the suggestion that Ireland’s policy was influenced by the reversal of policy by the USA.83 The Minister for External Affairs insisted that his change in Ireland’s policy on the representation of China was simply because he ‘saw no logic in the seat for the largest nation in the world being held by
Taiwan’.84 The People’s Republic of China was the largest nation in the world, with one quarter of the world’s population, and was a nuclear power, having tested its first atomic weapon in 1964 and hydrogen bomb three years later. Hillery was sincere about the lack of US influence over Irish policy on that particular issue, as the USA was increasingly impotent to halt the desertion by Ireland and other Western states from the
Two-China Policy. Ever since he was appointed Minister for External Affairs in 1969,
80 Cremin to McCann, 18 November 1969, NAI, DFA 98/3/273. 81 McCann to Cremin, 20 November 1969, NAI, DFA 98/3/273. 82 A/PV.1913, 20 November 1970, p. 11. 83 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 255 - 29 July, 1971 - UN China Seat: 2919.
185 Hillery had sought to reverse Ireland’s stance on the issue and berated the Irish delegation in 1969 when it perpetuated its support for the Two-China Policy. This was two years prior to any indication that the USA would reverse its policy. Washington had unilaterally removed some minor restrictions on travel in and trade with Communist
China in 1969, as well as held discreet talks at a diplomatic level.85 But the first hint of a public reversal of policy at a diplomatic level had come in early 1971 when President
Richard Nixon used the official name, “People’s Republic of China”, instead of usual US terminology – Red China or Communist China – to describe the regime in Beijing. The thaw in relations was confirmed in July of that year, when Nixon also announced that he had received an invitation to visit Beijing, which he intended to accept.86
The UN in Korea
Ireland’s Western credentials were also demonstrated in the debates on the
Korean question, which was one of the oldest Cold War battlegrounds in the First
Committee. The debates were invariably protracted, divisive, antagonistic and polemical.
The perennial objective of the Soviet bloc was to attain the withdrawal of the UN force in
Korea, as well as the dissolution of the UN Commission for the Unification and
Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which had been established in 1950 to facilitate the unification of Korea and the restoration of peaceful relations in the region.87 The objective of the West was invariably to perpetuate and legitimize the UN presence and argue that its withdrawal and the dissolution of UNCURK would jeopardize peace in the
84 Interview on-line with Dr Patrick Hillery, 30 March 2002. 85 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 723. 86 Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century, p. 393. 87 Report on the Korean Question, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370.
186 region.88 The issue had clear Cold War overtones and the division of the General
Assembly was distinctively along East-West lines. On this particular issue, the West was uncharacteristically unified and supported the continuation of the mandate of UNCURK.
This included France, whose recent record at the UN involved attempts to demonstrate independent credentials, especially on Cold War matters. But France had been a permanent member of the Security Council in 1950 and, therefore, had significant responsibility for the insertion of UN troops into the conflict, as well as the establishment of UNCURK. Reasons of consistency of policy and national interests dictated that
France would vote along with the rest of the West on the Korean issue. Thus, the item was a major international issue at the UN, but it was one of the few issues where Western solidarity was assured.
The Republic of Ireland maintained a consistent policy on the issue at every session since it had been a member of the UN and throughout the period 1965 to 1972.
Again, as with the consideration of the representation of China, the invariability of Irish policy on the issue and the polemical nature of debate resulted in the Irish delegation refraining from intervening, as Aiken believed the positions were too polarized.89 The solidarity of the West on the issue, particularly France’s allegiance meant that there was no conflict of interest in Ireland’s pro-Western orientation, but it is a further indication of the Western nature of Ireland’s policy on Cold War issues. Cremin’s view that the communist perception of events on the Korean peninsula ‘sounded like the re-writing of history’ illustrated that this was the case.90
88 A/C./1518, p. 6, 3 November 1967. 89 Report on the Korean Question, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370.
187 The Vietnam War
Irish policy with respect to the conflict in Vietnam was probably the most notable episode of the Irish delegation demonstrating reticence in articulating its UN position.
Although the USA had been supplying aid to South Vietnam since 1954, the Vietnam conflict became a major issue in international relations in 1965 when the USA deployed large numbers of troops to defend the regime in Saigon. Although the USA commenced rapid de-escalation of troops in 1970, its involvement in the Vietnam conflict continued to dominate international relations until 1973, when the involved parties signed a peace agreement and the US Congress passed a Mandate prohibiting further involvement in the region.91
During the period 1965 to 1973, the UN had not taken any formal action on
Vietnam, or even addressed the issue as an agenda item in the General Assembly.
Nevertheless, it was customary for many delegations to refer to the issue in their general debate speeches. For example, at the 22nd General Assembly Session in 1967, 76 of the
122 delegations to the UN referred to the conflict in Vietnam during the general debate, most of them calling for the US to cease its bombing of North Vietnam.92 Although the official position of the Irish Government involved supporting calls for a peaceful solution, the Irish delegation was among the minority of delegations that customarily did not refer to the Vietnam conflict in the general debate. This was despite the fact that US involvement was described as ‘morally ambiguous’ even by US diplomats and provoked
90 Ibid. 91 Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century, pp. 350, 383, 398-400, 448; Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 688- 689. 92 Note on Papal attitude to Vietnam, NAI, DFA 98/3/73.
188 indignant speeches by many Western nations in the General Assembly.93 But, as was pointed out in the Dáil Éireann, Aiken had made more speeches on the subject in the Dáil than at the UN.94 Aiken’s customary justification for silence at the UN was that the Irish
Government could not exercise any influence on the matter until such a time as the permanent members of the Security Council came to an agreement that would remove the division in the General Assembly.95 Whenever Aiken or any member of the Irish delegation did make reference to the conflict, it was in the general context of Southeast
Asia and the necessity for the establishment of an Area of Law.96 Aiken identified
Southeast Asia (including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) as such a region in 1960 and 1966 at the UN, as well as at various times in the Dáil. The statements of the Irish Government were limited to expressions that it envisaged little hope of an end to the war in Vietnam and no hope for a permanent peace until such an eventuation.97 The Irish delegation’s reticence was conspicuous because, as the Soviet
Foreign Minister commented in the General Assembly at the time, ‘the state of international affairs is… largely determined by the situation in Vietnam.’98 Aiken’s justification for frequently omitting any reference to the conflict in Vietnam was that it was not on the agenda of the General Assembly, and all the relevant parties were averse
93 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 700. 94 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 242 - 20 November, 1969 - Vietnam Situation: 1492. 95 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 216 - 09 June, 1965 - Vietnam Situation: 481. 96 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the Situation in Vietnam, 1 February 1968, UCDA, FAP P104/6906. 97 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 230 - 07 November, 1967 - North Vietnam Bombing: 1917; Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the Situation in Vietnam, 1 February 1968, UCDA, FAP P104/6906. 98 A/PV.1679, 3 October 1968, p. 11.
189 to it being inscribed. He also believed that a solution would not be found through multi- lateral discussions, but through direct negotiations of the parties involved.99
Dublin’s reticence on this issue was largely due to the fact that Vietnam so engaged Irish public opinion and media attention, but it also involved a considerable divergence of the positions of the Irish public and the Irish Government. Consequently,
Ireland’s silence on Vietnam was probably the most criticized aspect of Irish UN policy in domestic circles, particularly from Conor Cruise O’Brien. O’Brien argued that, although Ireland had no influence over the policies of the Asian nations concerned, the
Irish Government could exert influence in Washington. He particularly criticized Aiken for not supporting the Secretary-General’s call for an unconditional and immediate cessation of interference in the region by the USA.100 O’Brien characterized the Irish response to the conflict in Vietnam by both Aiken and Lynch as ‘devious reticence’ aimed at providing a policy acceptable to the USA, because the majority of the Western nations in the UN called on the USA to halt the bombing of North Vietnam.101 O’Brien was also critical because he alleged that the Irish delegation prioritized adherence to US policy over its tradition of supporting the office of the Secretary-General. The difference on this occasion, according to O’Brien, was that the nations in conflict with the UN
Secretariat were the USA and its allies.102
There were other calls both internal and external to Ireland for Aiken to openly support the appeals of the Secretary-General and certain Western governments for the
99 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the Situation in Vietnam, 1 February 1968, UCDA, FAP P104/6906. 100 O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa, p. 14. 101 O’Brien, Irish Times, 4 June 1968, p. 9. 102 Ibid., p. 10.
190 USA to unconditionally cease the bombing of North Vietnam.103 The constant attacks in the Dáil alleged that the Irish Government had betrayed its republican roots and its independence to serve American interests.104 For example, in the Dáil on 7 November
1967, the Labour Deputy, Frank Cluskey, asked the Taoiseach to defend the Irish
Government’s refusal to join France, Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark, and call on the USA to halt unconditionally the bombing of North Vietnam. The response of the
Irish Government was typical of its general reply to the question. It argued that Ireland was not submissive to any other nation in its foreign policy and supported a total cessation of hostilities in Vietnam by both sides. But Cluskey went further and his question, which was made not long after Ireland renewed its application for membership of the EC, linked Irish policy on Vietnam to the application. He sarcastically inquired if
Lynch had conveyed his views on Vietnam to de Gaulle as further evidence of Ireland’s fitness to accede to the EC. Lynch responded that the EC negotiations with de Gaulle were constrained to issues directly affecting the Common Market and did not encroach upon UN matters.105 There were also numerous calls from the Fianna Fáil membership, student groups, the Irish Voice for Vietnam, the Irish Pacifist Movement, the Church of
Ireland, as well as mass demonstrations in Dublin in support of an end to the Vietnam
War.106
103 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the Situation in Vietnam, 1 February 1968, UCDA, FAP P104/6906, University College Dublin Archives. 104 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 226 - 08 February, 1967 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45— External Affairs: 891; Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 255 - 28 July, 1971 - Vietnam War: 2702- 2704. 105 Extracts from Parliamentary Debates, 7 November 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6819. 106 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 172; Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the Situation in Vietnam, 1 February 1968, UCDA, FAP P104/6906, University College Dublin Archives; Secretary of Fianna Fáil, Tomas Nolan, to Aiken, 2 October 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6783.
191 Despite all this criticism, the Irish Government’s ‘conspiracy of silence’ on the issue, as some commentators have termed it, was perpetuated by Dr Patrick Hillery after he succeeded Aiken as Minister for External Affairs.107 Hillery defended this policy by insisting that Ireland had very little influence over US policy in Vietnam. He argued that one of the ‘fundamental aspects of international relations’ is that the USA, or any powerful nation, would not be receptive to external advice on such a major diplomatic issue with such vital strategic ramifications. This was particularly the case in Vietnam, where the US was in the process of attempting to withdraw from the conflict with the preservation of as much of its prestige and image as a superpower as was possible.108
When questioned about the details of Ireland’s policy on Vietnam, Hillery merely reiterated Aiken’s view of the pre-requisites for a settlement: agreement on a cease-fire, guarantee of any peace-treaty by the nuclear powers and the UN, and the establishment of an Area of Law.109
The only significant departure from this policy of reticence occurred on 4 May
1970, when Hillery expressed ‘great disappointment’ in the extension of the conflict to
Cambodia and that the Irish Government would ‘deplore’ any action taken to jeopardize the achievement of peace. Although the critics of the Government welcomed the statement, it still remained vague and did not at all specifically mention the USA.110 This was typical of Fianna Fáil statements pertaining to Vietnam, whether by Aiken, Lynch or
Hillery. While other nations, including those of the West, called on the USA as the provider of the largest foreign force and as a superpower, to withdraw from the region,
107 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 28 October, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs: 1958. 108 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 242 - 04 November, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs (Resumed): 69.
192 the Irish Government made only vague references that avoided allocating responsibility, especially to the USA. Furthermore, the speech was made in the domestic arenas of the
Irish press and the Dáil, rather than the international forum of the UN. The Irish
Government’s reticence on the issue resumed after this brief reference of May 1970 and was evinced by Hillery’s refusal to comment on the extension of the conflict into Laos in
1971 by the forces of the Government of South Vietnam and the USA.111
The most controversial aspect of Irish policy on Vietnam was the Government’s decision to pressure Radiò Telifìs Éireann (RTE) into abandoning a visit to Vietnam in
1967. The Taoiseach interceded at Aiken’s behest to prevent the television crew from covering the conflict, allegedly because the government was concerned that it would be held responsible for perceived political bias in any stories by RTE.112 Although the intervention by Lynch and the justifications given by Aiken betrayed Ireland’s sympathy for the USA, the decision of the Irish Government to intercede and prevent RTE from travelling to Vietnam to cover the American involvement had more implications for freedom of the press than for the nature of Irish foreign policy.113
As the UN did not formally address the Vietnam War and, in particular, US involvement, Ireland was not pressed into voting on a resolution. But, despite the lack of any speech clarifying its positions, the Irish Government’s silence on the issue, its support for a total cessation of hostilities, rather than unilaterally by the USA, and its application of pressure on RTE to abandon its trip to Vietnam betrayed that its sympathies lay entirely with the USA.
109 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 242 - 20 November, 1969 - Vietnam Situation: 1493. 110 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 246 - 13 May, 1970 - Invasion of Cambodia: 1382. 111 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 251 - 18 February, 1971 - Vietnam Conflict: 1711. 112 Irish Press, 14 April 1967, p. 4.
193
Czechoslovakia 1968
In the late 1960s, the most dramatic Cold War issue was the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Czechoslovakia had always been the most industrialized nation of Eastern Europe and, with its democratic traditions, the one with closest ties to the West. The Soviet action was in response to the introduction of the
Prague Spring initiatives of the regime of Alexander Dubček, which were designed to enhance political and economic liberties within a communist framework.114 Moscow responded to what it feared was the beginning of the disintegration of the Eastern bloc, with Albania firmly in the Chinese sphere of influence, Yugoslavia leading the Non-
Aligned Movement and Romania also demonstrating an increasing propensity for independence.115 The Soviet bloc had been created in World War II by armed force and the suppression of Czechoslovakia in 1968 demonstrated the continued importance of armed force in its preservation. Consequently, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had a widespread impact on issues of international relations.116 Washington and other NATO capitals were initially concerned that Czechoslovakia would be just the first step in a campaign to enforce greater submissiveness on the more liberal members of the Warsaw
Pact, specifically Romania and Poland.117 There were also concerns that the Soviet
Union could take action against either Austria or Yugoslavia, which could precipitate a
113 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 183. 114 K. Williams, (1997), The Prague Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968-1970, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-26. 115 Laqueur, Europe in Our Time, pp. 355-356. 116 D. Smith, & R. Smith, (1983), The Economics of Militarism, London: Pluto Press, p. 58. 117 Ambassador in the Hague, Eoin MacWhite to McCann, 4 September 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/63, National Archives of Ireland; Charge d’Affaires in Washington to McCann, 26 August 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/63.
194 general war.118 The Soviet action also heightened tension with NATO because it reversed the de-escalation of military forces that had taken place in the preceding years by the deployment of thousands of Soviet troops and armour on the West German border.119
Whilst the Irish Government was silent on US involvement in Vietnam, Dublin immediately responded to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia by condemning
Moscow. In a statement to the press on 21 August 1968, Aiken, who was absent from the
UN session in New York, criticized the Soviet Union for violating the UN Charter and the principles of territorial integrity and political independence. He called for a Security
Council resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and the cessation of their interference in Czechoslovakian internal affairs.120 The Irish
Government was concerned at the potential consequences of the invasion, which it saw as
‘a major setback to efforts to evolve a stable world order’.121 The Taoiseach and various
Irish organizations, including the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Connolly Youth
Movement, Sinn Féin, the Labour Party in Northern Ireland, and various other public bodies joined Aiken in condemning the invasion.122 Lynch took the opportunity to reiterate that Ireland was Western, ‘far from ideologically neutral’, though it still maintained ‘an independent role in international affairs’.123
As a response to the actions of the Warsaw Pact, the Irish Government even contemplated a freeze on relations in general, including the suspension of political,
118 Ambassador in Washington, William Fay, to McCann, 5 November 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/68. 119 Ambassador in the Hague, Eoin MacWhite to McCann, 4 September 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/63. 120 Press Release on the situation in Czechoslovakia, 21 August 1968, UCDA, FAP, P104/6898. 121 McCann to all Irish embassies, 30 August 1968, UCDA, FAP, P104/6899, University College Dublin Archives in Dublin. 122 The Irish Press, 22 August 1968, p. 1; The Irish Press, 23 August 1968, p. 5. 123 Irish Independent, 22 August 1968, p. 8.
195 economic, cultural and tourist links with the Warsaw Pact nations that participated in the intervention. But, at Aiken’s urging, sanctions of this kind were limited to the avoidance of ‘symbolic contacts with political overtones’, such as ministerial visits. Although
Aiken was quick to condemn Moscow, he advocated a policy of continued engagement.
This was because he believed that the isolation of the Soviet bloc ‘could strengthen the
Soviet system, which is vulnerable to free flow of ideas and public discussion, and could drive the East European countries still further under Soviet domination.’ Aiken advocated that engagement was necessary because Eastern Europe, as indicated by the policies of the Dubček regime in Czechoslovakia and greater independence being demonstrated by Romania, was experiencing the inception of ‘a real movement … away from repressive policies’.124 Ultimately, Aiken believed that this movement was gaining greater acceptance, but was restrained by Moscow and the threat, or in the case of
Czechoslovakia the use, of its superior military power. The kind of rhetoric and language employed by Aiken in his response to the Soviet action was indicative of the influence of ideology in the formulation of the Irish position.
Although the Western nations, including Ireland, universally supported omitting the issue of Vietnam from the agenda of both the Security Council and the General
Assembly, they universally supported inscription of the Czechoslovakian issue. The
Security Council met to discuss the issue, but the Soviet veto ensured that it produced no resolution on the Czechoslovakian crisis.125 The issue of Vietnam was not discussed as an agenda item at the UN because there was widespread recognition that debate would not be productive. This was despite the fact that the Vietnam War dominated politics and
124 McCann to all Irish embassies, 30 August 1968, UCDA, FAP, P104/6899, University College Dublin Archives in Dublin.
196 the media in the USA and overseas, especially from 1965 when US troops assumed primary responsibility for waging the war against the Viet Cong and the North
Vietnamese Army.126 This intensified even further with the initiation of the Tet offensive on 30 January 1968, when the US constituency and administration were compelled to confront the reality that the Vietnam conflict would become a protracted war of attrition.127 There was a similar acknowledgement that a debate on Czechoslovakia would also be counterproductive but, nevertheless, the West advocated inscription as a course of action to ensure that the UN exhausted all avenues before admitting failure. It argued that a refusal to refer the matter to the General Assembly would indicate an acceptance of the impotence of the UN.128 But the reality was that the West always accepted the inability of the UN to take any effective action and ‘the primary purpose for involving the UN would be to expose Soviet brutality and catalyze international criticism of the Soviets’.129 Thus, the West was initially eager for the matter to be raised by a sympathetic Eastern European nation, either Romania or Yugoslavia, to emphasize the moral, rather than political motivations for discussing the Czechoslovakian crisis. When this failed, it attempted to persuade a Latin American delegation to take the lead. But in the end, the issue was not inscribed on the General Assembly’s agenda for fear of prejudicing the negotiations being conducted in Moscow between the Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia.130 There was also a realization that Soviet influence in the General
125 Cremin to McCann, 23 August 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/63. 126 K. Ruane, (1998), War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-75, London: UCL Press, p. 71. 127 G. D. Moss, (1990), Vietnam: An American Ordeal, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p. 242; T. Powers, (1984), Vietnam: The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People, 1964-1968, Boston, MA: G K Hall, p. 288. 128 Cremin to McCann, 23 August 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/63, National Archives of Ireland 129 FRUS, Volume XVII – Eastern Europe, Document 66: Paper Prepared in the Department of State on the UN and Czechoslovakia, Washington, 12 July 1968. 130 Cremin to McCann, 27 August 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/63.
197 Assembly was sufficient to ensure the passage of only a weak and vague resolution, with support falling well short of the universality necessary for the moral message that the
West was seeking to send.131
But, before the Latin American bloc rejected the proposal, Ambassador Cancino of Mexico sought Cremin’s opinion on whether the Latin Americans should attempt to inscribe the issue on the agenda of the General Assembly. Cremin indicated that, although the Irish delegation was not optimistic about the prospects of a positive result from the convention of an emergency session of the General Assembly, the delegation supported discussion of the Czechoslovakian crisis to make it clear that it viewed the actions of the Warsaw Pact as intolerable. Cremin informed Cancino that it would be
‘logical’ to convene the General Assembly in the event that the Security Council became deadlocked because the UN had the right to be heard on the matter.132 He also pointed out that in relation to the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the UN Commission’s report had been instrumental in reversing the position of a number of delegates, notably that of India.
Furthermore, he argued that the General Assembly would allow the expression of world opinion, which would encourage the Czechoslovaks to continue their liberalization. The
Irish delegation’s vociferous and open support for the discussion of the Czechoslovakian crisis compared to its silence on Vietnam was further indication of Ireland’s location in the US led Western camp on Cold War issues.
The Irish delegation still voiced its concerns about the situation in Czechoslovakia at the UN when the Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Sean
Ronan, addressed Czechoslovakia in the First Committee during the debate on
131 Cremin to Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Sean Ronan, 30 August 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/63.
198 disarmament.133 Ronan’s speech elaborated on the earlier speeches that Aiken had made in the press. He accused the Soviet Union of violating Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, which obliged member states to refrain from the use of force against other states, as well as various UN resolutions rejecting intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations.
It was pointed out that some of the most important of these resolutions had actually been passed at the instigation of the Soviet Union. The Irish representative also noted Article
103 of the UN Charter, which established the precedence of the UN Charter over other international agreements (specifically the Warsaw Pact), in defending the right of
Czechoslovakia to sovereignty.134 It is important to note that, although Irish policy was related to typical US led Western policy, Cremin refrained from entering the debate in the
Sixth Committee to avoid being associated with the NATO communiqué of the 16th
November 1968 on the issue.135
But Cremin was not merely satisfied with voicing Ireland’s concerns in the multi- lateral forum of the UN, he raised them explicitly and directly with the Soviet delegation.
On 3rd September 1968, Cremin communicated to Mr Oleandrov of the Soviet delegation that Ireland was ‘very disturbed by the action taken’ by the Soviet Union. He cited the statement made by the Tánaiste on 21 August 1968 and criticized the Soviet Government, which he insisted was a stance necessitated by Ireland’s history, its UN policy and its attitude towards the UN Charter. The Irish Permanent Representative argued that the
Soviet action was in violation of the UN Charter, which functioned as the basis for the
132 Ibid. 133 Cremin to McCann, 26 November 1968, NAI, DFA, 98/3/87. 134 Address by Cremin to the UN Association of Scranton, Pensylvania, 24 October 1968. 135 Cremin to McCann, 18 November 1968, NAI, DFA, 98/3/64.
199 conduct of nations in international relations.136 All of these arguments were similar to those raised by other nations, such as France, with respect to US involvement in the
Vietnam conflict.
The contrast between Ireland’s policy on US involvement in Vietnam and the
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrated its pro-US Western policy on Cold
War issues. Whilst the Irish government refused to comment on the situation in Vietnam, it was quick to condemn the Soviet action in Prague. Similarly, the Irish delegation called for the UN to debate the issue of Czechoslovakia, despite the improbability of it having any positive outcome, at the same time as it rejected the suggestion that the UN address the Vietnam War because it would not yield any progress. Although the USA increasingly signalled from 1968 that it was willing to negotiate a peace in the Vietnam conflict, the efficacy of those negotiations was based on their bi-lateral nature. Debate in the UN would not contribute to any positive outcome, as it would merely descend into exchanges of polemical rhetoric. This would be surprising to few diplomats or scholars, both then and now, simply because Irish policy pertaining to Cold War issues was never really neutral and was often orientated towards the USA. The Irish delegation was usually reticent when articulating its policy on Cold War issues because it was concerned about being seen as overtly partisan when it was supposed to be a neutral state. The exceptions were when communist states were guilty of transgressions and in situations where pro-Western Irish denunciation could be justified as not being ideologically driven.
This distinction between Irish diplomacy concerning perceptions of US and communist imperialism could be seen in Irish policy and stances on the Czechoslovakian invasion, as opposed to the Vietnam situation during the late 1960s, but also in other precedents with
136 Cremin to McCann, 5 September 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87.
200 respect to Chinese action in Tibet, compared to that on the insertion of US and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively, a decade earlier. Thus, the Irish delegation almost invariably sided with the US led West and voted in accordance with pro-US trends.
The Middle East
The most ambiguous Cold War policy issue for Ireland was that of the Middle
East. This was a very complex policy concern, as it encompassed various issues including colonization, race relations, regional border disputes, violations of international law and defiance of UN resolutions. The General Assembly was particularly gripped by the explosive situation that ensued from the Six-Day War in 1967. This was a rare case when the substantive political components of the issue, rather than the humanitarian elements, were inscribed as the subject of debate in the General Assembly. The Arab states usually preferred the political aspects to be considered in the Security Council, where collective action on the part of the permanent members could exert considerable influence over Israel, and the General Assembly to confine its discussions to finding a solution to the humanitarian problems.137
The Middle East crisis was also a Cold War issue, as there was a clear exercise of patronage by the superpowers and a clear East-West division characterised voting patterns on the various draft resolutions and the declaratory speeches. This was particularly noticeable in the debates of the Fifth Emergency Special Session. Israeli delegates criticized the militant policies of the Arab states, but also condemned the Soviet
Union for allegedly pursuing policies that aggravated an explosive situation. At this
201 stage the Soviet Union had become the primary arms supplier and technical advisor of
Egypt, Syria and militant Arabic groups. Also, at the UN and other diplomatic forums, the Soviet Union acted as an advocate for the radical extreme of the Arab position on the
Middle East.138 At the Fifth Emergency Special Session in 1967, both the Soviet Union and the USA introduced draft resolutions advancing their positions, which itself revealed the Cold War nature of the issue.139 Similarly, the USA and the Soviet Union both made displays of military power in the Mediterranean as a warning to each other to refrain from intervention in the conflict.140
But more importantly, the issue can be deemed a Cold War issue for Ireland because the Irish voting pattern and position speeches (or lack thereof) conformed to its policy on Cold War issues. Although Ireland did not formally recognize the state of
Israel until 1963,141 the Irish delegation invariably supported the resolutions proposed or supported by the West, but not those of the Arab states and the Soviet Union.
The Irish position at the Fifth Emergency Special Session was typical of Irish policy on the Middle East, but it is also a good case study because it was a rare case of the General Assembly being given the license to consider the substantive political issue.
The crisis of the Six-Day War erupted in 1967 and the convention of the Fifth Emergency
Special Session compelled Ireland to articulate its policy, even though it would have preferred to take a more reserved role. Between 1967 and the outbreak of the Yom
Kippur War in 1973, the political situation in the Middle East was dominated by
137 Cremin to McCann, 21 September 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/86. 138 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 737. 139 A/PV.1526, 19 June 1967, p. 2. 140 Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century, p. 404. 141 Wylie, ‘The Virtual Minimum’: Ireland’s Decision for De Facto Recognition of Israel, 1947-9, in Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66, p. 154.
202 conditions established during the Six-Day War.142 At the General Assembly sessions during this period, debate was largely limited to the humanitarian aspects of the crisis.
There was a failed US peace plan in 1969 and, in 1970, Egypt instigated the “War of
Attrition”, but both situations were a product of the Six-Day War.143 At the Fifth
Emergency Special Session, Irish policy remained unaltered, despite the lodging of the application for membership of the EC and the discrepancy between Irish and French policy on the Middle East. At the same time, the Six-Day War was not of direct significance to France and Ireland’s policy in the debate was clearly identifiable as being in the pro-US Western camp.
At the Fifth Emergency Special Session in 1967, Ireland opposed, along with most of the West, the defeated but pro-Arab Yugoslavian, Soviet, and Albanian draft resolutions144 on the subject. These draft resolutions called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, condemned both Israel and the West, and urged enforcement action against Israel.145 France was one of only three Western states (the others being Greece and Spain), who supported or abstained on these draft resolutions.146 Ireland also supported the defeated Latin American draft resolution, which called for an end to a state of belligerency, as well as an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. The Latin American draft resolution articulated the
Western position and, as a consequence, was opposed by both the Arab states and the
Soviet bloc. Again, France was amongst a very small minority of Western states who
142 Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century, p. 404. 143 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 738. 144 During this period at the UN, Albania was the mouthpiece of the communist People’s Republic of China, which had not yet been given membership of the UN. 145 ORGA – Fifth Emergency Special Session Annexes, Document A/L.519, Soviet draft resolution; ORGA – Fifth Emergency Special Session Annexes, Document A/L.522/Rev.3,Yugoslvian draft resolution. 146 A/PV.1548, 4 July 1967, p. 15.
203 deviated from Western uniformity, this time by abstaining on the Latin American draft resolution.147
Aiken’s intervention in the debate on 27 June emulated the sentiments of the speeches of the Western bloc. He refused to identify Israel as the aggressor or the instigator of the conflict and defended its right of self-defence. The Tánaiste also called for the establishment of a stable and long-term peace in the Middle East, through respect for mutual recognition of various principles. He articulated various necessary conditions, including the withdrawal of Israel’s forces from territories it had occupied, but also the recognition of Israel’s right to exist.148 When Cremin spoke in explanation of Ireland’s votes on the substantive draft resolutions before the General Assembly, he explicitly indicated that he viewed the pro-Arab draft resolutions produced by Yugoslavia, Albania and the Soviet Union to be partisan. He stated that their refusal to address underlying tension in the region would only serve to exacerbate existing tensions and dismissed the
Albanian and Soviet texts as unnecessarily rhetorical and condemnatory.149
Although Ireland’s policy was concordant with conventional Western diplomacy,
France’s deviated considerably. France supported the pro-Arab Yugoslavian and Soviet draft resolutions, but more significantly, abstained on the Albanian draft resolution, as well as various pro-Arab amendments to the draft resolutions. These texts depicted Israel as an unprovoked aggressor in the conflict and characterized it as a colony of Western
Europe, imposing European culture on Arab peoples. But, importantly, they went even further, accusing the USA, the UK (an applicant to the EC) and the EC member-state –
West Germany – of actively participating in the hostilities. In the Security Council
147 Ibid., p. 17. 148 A/PV.1538, 27 June 1967, p. 5.
204 debates on the issue, the French delegate confirmed his support for the Arab position when he justified Arab terrorism as being a legitimate response to illegal occupation and was heavily critical of Israel’s military response.150
The allegations of US, UK and West German involvement were without foundation and the French position was another effort at demonstrating its independence.
De Gaulle had been promoting France as a possible mediator since before the outbreak of hostilities in 1967 and continued to do so afterwards.151 He proposed various initiatives, including a solution formulated with the other three primary permanent members of the
Security Council (the USA, the UK and the Soviet Union) and brought before the parties involved. France’s advocacy of multi-lateral diplomacy to achieve a solution, especially via Security Council involvement was very much a representation of the Arab position and also had the support of the Soviet Union.152 Israel preferred bi-lateral negotiations and, therefore, the USA and the UK were inclined to be more favourably disposed to this means of diplomacy.
Despite de Gaulle’s insistence that the French position manifested ‘absolute neutrality… between the conflicting sides’,153 French policy on the Middle East caused outrage in EC capitals. The West German Government viewed France’s efforts to cultivate better relations in the Middle East with the Arab states, whilst West Germany remained on the embargo list for oil, as ‘extraordinary’.154 Bonn deemed French policy on the Middle East to have put it ‘squarely in the Soviet-Arab camp’.155 France’s
149 A/PV.1546, 3 July 1967, p. 4. 150 Cremin to McCann, 29 March 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87. 151 Cremin to McCann, 20 October 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/86. 152 Cremin to McCann, 28 January 1969, NAI, DFA 2000/14/471. 153 Ambassador in Paris, Sean Commins, to McCann, 7 June 1967, NAI, DFA, 98/3/70. 154 Ambassador in London, Kennedy, to McCann, 7 July 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/76. 155 Ibid.
205 propensity to support the radical members of the Non-Aligned Movement was also noted by the international press and amongst other national governments.156
There was even a similar adverse reaction to French policy in political circles in
Paris. French UN policy at the Fifth Emergency Special Session had the support of only three ministers and was opposed by almost all of the Cabinet. The feeling was that de
Gaulle had gone too far in his reconciliation with the Soviet Union and had violated
France’s efforts to exhibit a more independent line, because it had actually sided with the
Soviet bloc.157 Even the man who would succeed Couve de Murville as France’s Foreign
Minister, Michel Debré, was reportedly ‘disturbed’ by the policy of de Gaulle in the
Middle East.158 The point here is that France’s deviation from Western norms caused significant backlashes in both domestic and international circles. Therefore, French diplomatic efforts were focused on defending its position and pacifying its Western colleagues, not pressuring Ireland to follow suit.
At subsequent UN sessions, under both Aiken and Hillery, Ireland’s voting positions continued to accord with its Western partners, just as its explanations of the vote continued to echo the statements of Western delegations. Ireland’s position speeches involved calls for an effort to promote a definitive solution to the underlying problems affecting the region, which was the standard line of Western delegations.159
Even when addressing the humanitarian aspects of the crisis, Irish representatives urged that the refugee crisis could only be properly addressed through addressing the broader
156 Ibid. 157 Brief notes from the Council of Europe, 15 August 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/70. 158 Cremin to McCann, 16 July 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87. 159 Report on the Palestinian Refugees, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370.
206 political issues and finding a lasting peace.160 Although Aiken came under heavy criticism by Fine Gael for being too receptive to the Arab position by calling for a withdrawal of Israeli troops,161 the linking of this call to recognition of the right of existence was a clear acknowledgement of Israel’s diplomatic position.
This was because, at this time, the call for recognition of Israel’s right to existence was opposed by the Arab states and was the defining feature of the Western position on the issue. The Arab diplomatic position was fundamentally based on the view that the state of Israel was an illegal and illegitimate construction.162 Therefore, UN action should be confined to merely ordering or compelling Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories. This position was seriously challenged by the resounding defeat of the Arab states during the Six-Day War, which would later see a grudging acceptance of the recognition of Israel’s right to existence and the birth of Resolution 242 of 22
November. This resolution called for both the withdrawal of Israeli forces ‘from territories occupied’ in the conflict, as well as an end to the state of belligerency and the recognition of all the states in the region.163
Aiken’s speeches on the Middle East crisis also included concrete peace proposals aimed at lessening tension in the region. He called for the formulation of a peace treaty guaranteed by the UN and all the permanent members of the Security Council. Aiken insisted that this was necessary to avoid repeated outbreaks of violence every few years, avert the escalation of violence into a nuclear arms race and create an environment conducive to a lasting peace. This would involve agreements on the major contentious
160 Report on Palestinian-Arab Refugees at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378. 161 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 229 - 04 July, 1967 - Middle East Dispute: Minister's UN Statement: 1132-1135. 162 A/PV.1573, 28 September 1967, p. 9.
207 issues. These included the division of the waters of the Jordan River, freedom of passage in the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aquaba, air rights for civilian aircraft, access to oil and water pipelines, traffic rights to the Mediterranean for Arab States, the prohibition of inflammatory propaganda, the internationalization of Jerusalem under UN control and guaranteed freedom of access to the Holy places. Aiken also called on the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from facilitating further discord in the Middle
East and formally guarantee his proposed treaty of peace and non-aggression by the
Middle East states.164 Also in his speech, the Irish Minister for External Affairs advocated a settlement of the refugee problem, by resurrecting proposals that he initially raised in 1958, calling for the restoration of property or the payment of reparations by the
UN to those displaced.165 At subsequent sessions Aiken expanded on these proposals.
He advocated that the UN should assist in the repatriation of as many refugees as possible and provide a guarantee of full compensation for those who did not return. The Tánaiste acknowledged that such an exercise would be expensive, but it would be less expensive than maintaining refugees in camps indefinitely and constituted a fraction of that involved in war preparations.166 The Arab states viewed the proposals with mixed interest. The more extreme members of the Arab bloc advocated denouncing the Irish proposals as they implied an acceptance of Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, but others considered the proposal as ‘sincere and disinterested [and] the first real sign of fresh thinking on an apparently intractable problem’.167 But although these proposals were valuable contributions to debate and designed to present an image of balance on a
163 Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, Official Records of the UN Security Council. 164 A/PV.1538, 27 June 1967, p. 4-6. 165 Ibid., p. 5.
208 divisive issue, they were supplementary to the political question and in no way prevented
Ireland from supporting the Western position on the substantive political resolutions.
The UN also faced a perennial draft resolution advocating the Arab solution to the humanitarian crisis, which was co-sponsored by a number of Islamic, non-Arabic nations whose sympathies lay squarely with the Arab cause, but who were not directly involved in the Middle East dispute. It invariably called for the General Assembly to request the
Secretary General to appoint a custodian who would protect, administer and receive the income from Arab property in Israel and report back to the UN.168 The draft resolution was usually rejected because of the heavy Western opposition, which included Ireland.169
Although these nations sympathised with the humanitarian plight and supported the finding of a solution, they disagreed with the solution perennially advocated by the Arab states. The support for the custodian draft resolution came primarily from communist nations and the more radical members of the Afro-Asian bloc.170 Aiken constantly rejected the custodian draft resolution specifically because it sought to isolate one aspect of a more complex problem and ignored the problem of a lack of political recognition of the state of Israel.171
166 A/SPC/SR.590, pp. 282-283, 14 December 1967. 167 Report on the Palestinian Refugees, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 168 ORGA – 22nd General Assembly Session, Document A/7004, Report of the Special Political Committee, pp. 2-4. 169 Ibid., pp. 2-4. 170 ORGA – 22nd General Assembly Session, Document A/7411, pp. 1-4, Report of the Special Political Committee. 171 Report on the Palestinian Refugees, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370.
209 Conclusion
Despite the warnings of Conor Cruise O’Brien that Ireland’s pro-US Western policy on Cold War issues jeopardized its prospects of accession to the EC,172 Irish UN policy in the period 1965-1972 did not change significantly. The separation of Ireland’s
UN policy from interests relating to its EC application was clear by the stark absence of any references to French policy in the formulation of positions by the Irish delegation at the UN. O’Brien’s warnings were based on the fact that, since the early 1960s, France had exhibited increasing frustration with what it perceived to be subservience to US policy by Western European nations, most notably West Germany, the UK and Ireland.
De Gaulle sought to protect France’s status in the international community and resented the emerging hierarchy that subordinated his country below the two superpowers.173
Consequently, France under de Gaulle had led the disintegration of Western unity on a number of issues at the UN, notably Vietnam and the representation of China. In both cases, France led the Western states that were openly critical of US policy. France also detached itself from the Western coalition in voting on the Middle East question. This increasing propensity to adopt policies independent from the rest of the West was indicative of de Gaulle’s efforts to restore French influence in the international community.
Nevertheless, on a range of Cold War issues – Korea, the admission of the
People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, and the Middle East – Ireland's voting was invariably and conventionally Western and used US positions as its locus, despite the fact that they were often adversarial to the French position. In these situations, Ireland clearly
172 O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa, p. 12. 173 Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur, p. 194.
210 voted along with the rest of the US led West and minimized its speeches to avoid drawing attention to itself. On only one significant Cold War issue had there been a shift in Irish policy at the General Assembly during the period of the EC application – the representation of China – and that came at the instigation of Hillery in 1969 and 1970, not Aiken. Hillery’s appointment and the shift in policy on the representation of China were signs that Ireland was increasingly identifying itself more with Europe than with the
USA, but this change in the political culture was a gradual process. For the most part during the period of the application for membership of the EC, Irish policy did not change to be more accommodating to the French position.
The resilience of the Irish delegation in the face of French pressure had been evinced on issues that had been even more sensitive to France and its EC partners, notably peacekeeping and disarmament. But also, unlike the events surrounding
Ireland’s peace policy, there was little opposition from France to Ireland’s positions on
Cold War issues. De Gaulle’s symbolic gestures of independence, such as the withdrawal from SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation) in 1965, his refusal in that year to participate in NATO manoeuvres, and his withdrawal of French forces from
NATO and its officers from NATO command in 1966, resulted in increasing France’s prestige amongst non-aligned states, as well as the nations of the Warsaw Pact.174
Consequently, de Gaulle fashioned himself as the primary proponent of rapprochement between East and West. But in this role, de Gaulle’s primary objective was enhancing personal and national prestige, with détente as a function of that objective. In achieving this, de Gaulle was conscious of France’s deviation from conventional Western policy, but this was designed to redefine France’s relationship with the USA and the Soviet
211 Union, rather than alter Western policy. The French President perceived himself to be the exclusive medium of achieving the thaw in the Cold War and would undermine, rather than facilitate, the attempts of other states in achieving détente, including the efforts of neutral states that had traditionally fulfilled that role. Furthermore, France could only facilitate détente if there was an existing dichotomy and conflict between East and West. Consequently, France did not attempt to pressure other Western members to adhere to its independent position with respect to Cold War issues at the UN. Therefore,
Ireland did not suffer any diplomatic pressure from the EC to abandon its Western orientation and pro-US policies on Cold War issues.175
174 Laqueur, Europe in Our Time, p. 326. 175 Cremin to Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 22 May 1969, NAI, DFA 2000/14/471.
212 CHAPTER 7: IRELAND AND DECOLONISATION AT THE UN, 1965-1972
Ireland’s most significant departure from conventional Western policy in terms of its
neutrality at the UN had always been on issues of decolonisation. Although the
situation in Northern Ireland was complex and comprised various different facets, in
many respects it was the legacy of foreign occupation.1 Ireland had been ruled by the
UK with varying degrees of control for centuries, only gaining its independence in
1921 and its republican status in 1949. Therefore, the Irish Government could
identify with peoples, such as those in Asia and Africa, who struggled against
colonialism for their independence. Furthermore, Ireland’s long history of affiliation with the Third World in the form of missionary activity, provision of education, and administration of schools and hospitals, fuelled its anti-colonial sentiment.2 Ireland’s
reputation for supporting decolonisation was established during the early period of
Irish neutrality at the UN between 1957-1961. But this was a period when the balance
of the General Assembly gave disproportionate weight to the neutral states and, thus,
in the period 1965-1972, Ireland was forced to adopt a more aggressive policy on
decolonisation in order to maintain its impact on these issues in the General
Assembly.
Ireland’s Support for Decolonisation and the Ramifications for its EC Application
The problem for Ireland’s European policy was that its approach to
decolonisation frequently brought it into conflict with Western European nations, who
were the primary colonial powers. France, as one of the last of the colonial powers to
surrender its empire, was constantly in conflict with the anti-colonial movement in the
1 J. M. Lynch, (1972), ‘The Anglo-Irish Problem’, Foreign Affairs, 50 (4), p. 612.
213 General Assembly. Most of France’s former colonial territories had been granted
independence by 1962, but this was done so grudgingly. Before it granted
independence to its colonies, France had been subjected to terrorism on French soil,
fought colonial wars and suppressed uprisings in Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco and
Algeria that were costly both in terms of economics and international reputation.3
These wars damaged France’s prestige with Arab, African and Asian states, which supported the liberation and independence movements of the colonies. France was also sensitive to issues of decolonisation because of the perpetuation of its colonial rule of French Somalia,4 where it had pointedly ignored appeals by the Secretary-
General to cooperate with the UN in bringing about the independence of the territory.5
It is important to note that, while the West did not actively advocate the
perpetuation of colonialism, those states directly involved were reluctant to surrender
the economic benefits arising from the inertia of their earlier period of colonial
exploitation. These ongoing economic relationships, as well as cultural and political
links, deterred the former colonial powers from supporting any General Assembly
resolutions advocating forceful means to eliminate colonialism.6
Like the former colonial nations of Africa and Asia, Ireland had a history
where independence was only achieved after a protracted struggle. Irish republican
traditions dictated affection for the impoverished, former colonies of the Western
European powers in both Asia and Africa. The achievement of independence in 1921
allowed a more outward focus of Irish nationalism and association with democratic,
2 Transcript of Interview by Aiken to John O’Shea of radio station WJRZ, Newark, NJ, 5 September 1966, UCDA, FAP P104/7258. 3 A. Cobban, (1965), A History of Modern France, Volume 3: 1871-1962, London: Penguin, pp. 234- 235; Goubert, The Course of French History, pp. 308-309. 4 Since 1977, French Somalia has been called Djoubiti. 5 Report on the Fourth Committee: Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, NAI, DFA, 2000/14/370. 6 Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, p. 34.
214 revolutionary and republican movements in other parts of the world.7 In the decades
immediately following independence, Ireland’s economic policy was dominated by
efforts to overcome the structural problems of over-reliance on agriculture, high unemployment and comparatively low standards of living for a Western European nation.8 The incipient Irish State that emerged between the wars was also gripped by
the constitutional question of removing the oath of allegiance to the British monarch
and the political objectives of the liberation of foreign (British) bases on its soil (the
Treaty Ports at Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly), and the over-arching objective of
achieving national unity of north and south.9 Consequently, Ireland’s first generation
of political leaders conceived the raison d’être of politics to be national liberation and
political independence, not forging economic and trading relationships. Frank Aiken
was of this generation and it was he who was responsible for formulating Irish UN
policy between 1957 and 1969. Therefore, like the former colonised nations of Africa
and Asia, Ireland exhibited an anti-colonial policy, characterised by protest against,
and reaction to, these elements of Western diplomacy.10
Thus, during the period of the renewal of the application for membership of the EC, Irish UN policy on decolonisation was under strain from two conflicting pressures – the need to conform to Western norms and the perpetuation of its interpretation of neutrality. Some of the decolonisation items on the agenda of the
General Assembly were the most hotly disputed issues before the UN, and they were the issues where Irish diplomacy most clearly and controversially deviated from conventional Western policy. This was particularly problematic for Ireland because it
7 de Courcey, ‘Europe and Ireland’, The United Irishman, p. 10. 8 Sharp, Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, p. 13. 9 R. Fisk, (1983), In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality, 1939-1945, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, p. 40; Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 23. 10 M. Rejai, & C. H. Enloe, (1981), ‘Nation-States and State-Nations’, in M. Smith, R. Little and M. Shackleton (Eds), Perspectives on World Politics, Croom Helm: London, p. 41.
215 was Irish policy on decolonisation that had most clearly caused a conflict with French
interests during its initial application for EC membership. Nevertheless, during the
period, Irish diplomacy on decolonisation maintained its anti-colonial nature despite
external and domestic pressures.
Northern Ireland
Ireland’s radicalised policy on decolonisation had its origins not only in its
struggle for independence from occupation by the UK, but also in the continued incorporation of Northern Ireland within the UK. After World War II, the approach of the Irish Government to Northern Ireland became increasingly cooperative, especially in terms of economic and technical relations, leading to a meeting in 1965
between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Although Dublin remained steadfastly opposed to partition, it was eager to promote amicable relations with the Government in Stormont.11 Also, there were no specific incidents in
Northern Ireland that Dublin viewed as necessitating the raising of partition at the
UN, particularly after its negative experience of raising the issue at the Council of
Europe. This changed in 1969 when the Irish Government was compelled, by
pressures from within the cabinet and throughout the electorate, to be seen to be
acting on the violence that had erupted in August and September 1969.12
Nevertheless, the partition of Ireland was a strong determinant of Irish diplomacy on issues of decolonisation prior to 1969. This was the case in terms of implicit attitudes and especially with respect to principles that were parallel to those in the North.13
Thus, Irish UN policy was particularly sympathetic to the former-colonial states on
11 The Irish position on partition at the UN, undated document from 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6974. 12 The Irish delegation had sporadically referred to the issue in various speeches addressing other subjects. 13 The Irish position on partition at the UN, undated document from 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6974.
216 issues that involved disruptions to historical territorial integrity, such as Gibraltar
(1967); human rights of minority populations, such as with South-Tyrol (1960);
partition as in Cyprus (1959 and 1965); or where dispossession had invested power in
a minority whose position was predicated on ethnic or racial policies, such as
apartheid in Southern Africa (from 1956) and the denial of popular democracy in
Algeria (1957-1960).14
Ireland’s policy on partition resulted in the decision of the Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant, not to propose Freddy Boland as a UN representative in the UN’s efforts to mediate the Cyprus problem in 1968. Although U Thant supported the appointment of Boland, he feared that Turkey would have objected that Boland was automatically opposed to partition. Boland did have a good reputation in Ankara, but the problem was that his membership of Ireland’s delegation to the UN and its clear stance on partition issues resulted in a perception of potential bias.15
The support of the Irish delegation at the UN for anti-colonial policies was
deliberately designed to expand its influence among anti-colonial states in a bid to
further its interests in Northern Ireland. Since 1957, Aiken had openly linked
partition and decolonisation when he indicated that the application of the UN Charter
and the principle of self-determination should be the basis of a solution to the
situation in Northern Ireland. This linkage was also achieved by supporting principles
relevant to the situation in Northern Ireland and Ireland’s anti-partition stance. The
Permanent Representative to the UN in 1957, Freddy Boland, advocated using
existing questions as ‘a peg to hang a criticism of… partition’ and a means of
advancing solutions for such situations, consistent with that envisaged by the Irish
14 Ibid. 15 Circular from Sean Ronan, 13 June 1968, NAI, DFA 98/3/87.
217 Government for Northern Ireland.16 The Irish delegation’s strategy to further its interests in Northern Ireland also involved supporting anti-colonial resolutions even when the Irish delegation was concerned about various clauses or the general nature of these resolutions. This was specifically designed to ‘win friends and influence people – particularly anti-colonial friends and influential people’, rather than necessarily judging situations on their merits.17 This was to be achieved by taking a
deliberately ‘hard… anti-Western line’ on many issues, combined with ‘a suitable
voting pattern and properly emphatic anti-colonial attitudes’ in speeches.18 Therefore,
on issues of decolonisation and related matters such as apartheid, Irish policy more
closely resembled that of a non-aligned, Third World, Afro-Asian nation than that of a
Western state.
Ireland’s cultivation of support from the anti-colonial nations of the UN was
crucial to the possible raising of the Northern Ireland crisis at the UN. This support
was tested when Ireland brought its decolonisation problem – Partition – to the UN in
1969, after the eruption of “the troubles”.19 Although the initial trouble in Northern
Ireland centred around civil rights for the minority nationalist population in the province, the underlying concern of Dublin for those citizens was based on its rejection of the legitimacy of partition. Fianna Fáil was faced with a situation where it had to be seen to be taking action on the problem by the electorate and by members of its own Government. In early 1969 only a very small minority of the Irish electorate considered Northern Ireland to be a priority of national interests,20 but this
changed after the violence of August and September 1969. There were
16 Cited in Manathunga, The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy, p. 31. 17 The Irish position on partition at the UN, undated document from 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6974. 18 Ibid. 19 The troubles erupted after the Governments in Belfast and London refused to respond to the demands of the civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland for equality in public housing, employment practices and the electoral system.
218 demonstrations outside the British embassy in Dublin,21 and various citizens’ action
groups made direct approaches to the Minister for External Affairs, Patrick Hillery, as
well as to other members of the Irish Government calling for intervention.22 The Irish
Government was also vilified in the Dáil by the Labour Party for ignoring the human rights problem in Northern Ireland until the explosion of violence in 1969 in order to serve its agenda of advancing relations with both Belfast and London.23 The situation
in Northern Ireland later ignited division within the Government in Dublin about how
to approach the problem. Later in 1970, the Minister for Finance, Charles Haughey
and the Minister for Agriculture, Neil Blaney, were both dismissed for conspiring to
provide the IRA with arms for use in Northern Ireland. Two other Ministers resigned
over the government’s perceived inaction during the Northern Ireland crisis.24
As a consequence of this build up of pressure, the Irish Government approached the UN to seek the intervention of a peacekeeping force. This recourse was adopted after its approaches to London to support the insertion of either a UN or joint Irish-British force were rebuffed. The Irish Government alleged that a UN force was necessary because ‘the Royal Ulster Constabulary was no longer accepted as an impartial police force’.25 Thus, the démarche to the UN had both pragmatic and
publicity value, as much of its value to Dublin was in allowing the Irish public to see
that action was being taken about the situation in Northern Ireland in the international arena.
20 Halligan, ‘The Political Perspective in 1972’, in Europe, p. 20. 21 R. Fanning, (1983), Independent Ireland, Dublin: Helicon, p. 207. 22 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 272. 23 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 22 October, 1969 - Situation in Six Counties: Motion: 1423. 24 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, pp. 115-116. 25 Official Records of the Security Council – 24th Year, 1969, Document S/9394 – Letter dated 17 August 1969 from the Representative of Ireland to the President of the Security Council Concerning the Situation in Northern Ireland.
219 The dilemma for the Irish Government in bringing the issue to the UN was that the crisis in Northern Ireland in 1969 was a human rights problem, but Dublin
rejected the legitimacy of partition and viewed the situation in Northern Ireland,
fundamentally, to be a problem of decolonisation. The Irish Government viewed the underlying problem as a denial of self-determination, by foreign occupation to a
geographically and historically unified people. The Irish delegation in New York
perceived itself as having only two choices: either raising the issue ‘in full blooded
anti-colonial terms’ or not raising it at all.26 The advantage of raising the colonial
aspect of the question was that the General Assembly was dominated by anti-colonial
states, whose support Ireland had cultivated. The Irish delegation believed that when
issues were inscribed in colonial terms, ‘it might almost be said that debate is over;
rational judgement is suspended and emotional reaction takes over as the determining
force’.27
At the same time, the Irish Permanent Representative to the UN, Cornelius
Cremin, expressed reservations about focusing on the colonial aspects of the Northern
Ireland issue. He feared that the usual supporters of decolonisation would be reluctant
to support Ireland because it was a relatively advanced European nation, with similar
cultural and economic affluence to the UK, and not to the Third World. In the
decades since independence, the Irish economy had overcome many of the problems that resulted from colonial occupation and had the outward appearance of Western affluence, not colonial impoverishment. Also, there was usually a racial basis to colonialism, which did not manifest as overtly in the case of Northern Ireland.
Essentially, Cremin feared that an anti-colonial approach would inevitably result in
26 The Irish position on partition at the UN, undated document from 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6974. 27 Ibid.
220 the alienation of the UK and fail to gain the necessary support from the anti-colonial
states to produce any positive outcome.28
As it turned out, these concerns proved accurate as Ireland failed to gain the support of many of the anti-colonial states and faced the implacable opposition of the
UK to any intervention by the UN. Although Ireland rejected the argument,29 the
British representative on the Security Council, Lord Caradon, was persuasive in his
contention that the UN was precluded from intervention by Article 2.7 of the UN
Charter, which prevented the UN from interfering in matters of ‘domestic
jurisdiction’.30 The Security Council adjourned a decision on the Irish request for
intervention without taking a vote on whether or not to discuss it.31 The Irish
Government was compelled to cease its pursuit of the matter and allow it to ‘wither
away’, as it did not have the sufficient support for inscription on the agenda of the
Security Council.32 Ultimately, all the members of the Security Council were
concerned about the Irish case being a precedent. The Western members were always hesitant to support UN interference in domestic matters. The African and Asian states, which were the most anti-colonial and, therefore, most inclined to support the
Irish request, were also opposed. They were particularly concerned about the raising of the Biafra and Kashmir situations and other internal divisions, especially those where large Muslim minorities had destabilizing effects on existing political regimes.33 They were also concerned that the human rights aspect of the situation
28 Ibid. 29 Press Release SC/3114 – Security Council Take 4, 1503rd meeting, 20 August 1969, United Archives in New York [hereafter UNA], Series 291, Box 15, File 3, Title: Countries – United Kingdom – Request for Peace-Keeping Force by Ireland. 30 Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, Henk, Miss & Endre (Eds), UN Textbook, p. 25. 31 Press Release SC/3114, Regarding the Security Council’s hearing Statements Concerning Requests by Ireland, 20 August 1969, UNA, Series 303, Box 4, File 1, ACC. 86/006, Title: Countries – Ireland – SECCO. 32 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 28 October, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs: 1923. 33 J. Hutchinson, (1994), Modern Nationalism, London: Fontana, p. 93.
221 could give rise to numerous inquiries into the activities of various despotic governments of Africa and Asia where human rights were suppressed, such as
Uganda, Sudan, and Iraq.34
With the failure to have the Northern Ireland situation inscribed on the agenda
of the Security Council, the Irish delegation attempted to raise the matter in the
General Assembly. It had been reluctant to do so at previous UN sessions because the
debate could be perceived as provocative in the North, as an attempt at external
coercion for unification of North and South.35 The Irish Government learned from its experience of raising partition at the Council of Europe in 1950, as the speeches in that forum provoked negative reactions in the Six Counties but failed to have any impact on the political situation in the North.36 Consequently, a proposed draft
resolution by Conor Cruise O’Brien for the raising of Partition in the General
Assembly had been rebuffed in 1958, even though the operative paragraph merely
called for the governments of the UK and Ireland to discuss the problem with the
objective of making progress towards a solution.37 Aiken was concerned that despite
its innocuous nature, the draft would alienate the North and was unlikely to achieve
the expected support from anti-colonial states. In any case, the General Assembly
possessed no enforcement capabilities.38
Nevertheless, the troubles that plagued Northern Ireland in 1969 prompted the
Irish Government to ignore these concerns and raise the issue in the General
Committee. The result was similar to that of its attempt in the Security Council. The
34 Review of the Attitude of Members of the Security Council to the Situation in the Six Counties, 25 August 1969, NAI, DFA 2000/14/471. 35 Notes on the Meeting between Aiken and UN Secretary-General on 23 April 1969, 25 April 1969, UCDA, FAP P104/7004. 36 Summary of the Raising of Partition at the United Nations, 17 May 1969, UCDA, FAP P104/6977. 37 Memorandum on a Resolution to Raise the Northern Ireland Problem, 23 January 1958, UCDA, FAP, P104/6971[11]. 38 Memorandum on Reasons for not Raising Partition at the United Nations, 16 November 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6971.
222 British representative still argued that the UN was circumscribed from debating
Northern Ireland because of Article 2.7 and urged Ireland’s Minister for External
Affairs, Patrick Hillery, to withdraw the request for inscription on the grounds that a debate at the UN would be detrimental to the situation prevailing in the North. US support for the British appeal, coupled with the apparent tacit support of the remainder of the membership of the General Committee, who were eager to avoid a conflict of interests, suggested that the Irish proposal would be defeated. Although
Hillery did not withdraw Ireland’s request to include the matter on the agenda of the
General Assembly, he did allow it to lapse by not pressing it.39
After the escalation of the troubles in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, the
Minister for External Affairs raised the prospect of UN intervention again in early
1972. Hillery met with the Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary-General and attempted to prevail upon the office of the Secretary-General to intercede with the UK to waive its objection to UN intervention under Article 2.7 of the UN Charter. By this stage the
Irish Ambassador in London, Jack Molloy, had succeeded in his campaign to commit the Irish Government to pursuing a solution through bi-lateral negotiations with
London.40 But, the Irish Government was concerned that reforms promised by
London were not being implemented by Stormont and by the recent occurrence of
Bloody Sunday on 30 January, where British paratroopers fired on a civil rights march killing 13 people.41 The Secretary-General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, held a press conference on 7 February 1972 agreeing to intervene in the crisis, but indicated that he would need the prior agreement of both parties because he was circumscribed by
39 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 28 October, 1969 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs: 1923. 40 It was this bi-lateral means of diplomacy that would prove to be more successful, as it was the basis of the Sunningdale Agreements of 1973 and the power-sharing executive of 1974.
223 Article 2.7 of the UN Charter.42 Unfortunately for Ireland, the unreserved opposition
of the Government of the UK prevented the matter from being pursued further.43
Talks between the Irish Government and the office of the Secretary-General about the situation in Northern Ireland recurred sporadically, including after Ireland acceded to the EC in 1973.44
Ireland’s approaches in New York succeeded in bringing the attention of the
UN to the situation in Northern Ireland and impressed upon the UK the concerns of
the Irish Government about the deteriorating situation. At the same time, the Irish
delegation failed to have the crisis in Northern Ireland inscribed on the agenda of
either the General Assembly or the Security Council. As its research indicated a
decade earlier, Ireland’s greatest support came from the undemocratic nations of the
Eastern bloc, not from the non-aligned Afro-Asian nations as may have been
expected. The West would not support Ireland and, although the crisis was presented
as a colonial problem, Ireland’s cultural, racial and economic composition made it a
Western state. Consequently, Ireland failed to attract the necessary support from the
advocates of decolonisation who were inclined to view the crisis as a border dispute,
not a colonial problem. Therefore, Ireland’s tactic of cultivating anti-colonial
sentiment to further its anti-partition campaign failed when the issue of Northern
Ireland was finally raised in 1969. Nevertheless, on issues with comparable
principles, Ireland continued to display a decidedly anti-colonial policy.
41 Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General of the UN, C. V. Narasimhan to the Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, 2 February 1972, UNA, Series 303, Box 3, File 13, ACC. 86/006, Title: Countries – Ireland. 42 Press Conference held by Kurt Waldeim, 7 February 1972, UNA, Series 303, Box 3, File 13, ACC. 86/006, Title: Countries – Ireland. 43 Press Conference held by Kurt Waldeim, 30 February 1972, UNA, Series 303, Box 3, File 13, ACC. 86/006, Title: Countries – Ireland. 44 Notes on Meeting between Ireland’s Minister for External Affairs, Garret FitzGerald, and the Kurt Waldheim, 1 October 1973, 30 February 1972, UNA, Series 303, Box 3, File 13, ACC. 86/006, Title: Countries – Ireland.
224
Gibraltar
During the period of Ireland’s renewal of its application for membership of the
EC, its policy that was most obviously determined by the existence of partition
involved the UK territory of Gibraltar. It had been a British possession for over two hundred and fifty years, but Spain resurrected its claim to Gibraltar in 1939 and brought the issue before the UN in 1963. Relations between Spain and the UK deteriorated in mid-1967 when UN sponsored negotiations between the two nations broke down. Later in 1967 the situation deteriorated further when the residents of
Gibraltar overwhelmingly voted in a referendum to maintain autonomy under British sovereignty, rather than unify with Spain.45
Despite Ireland’s close relationship with the UK that resulted from their
increasing economic interdependence and their applications for membership of the
EC, the Irish delegation was immediately sympathetic to the Spanish position. As
Ireland would do two years later with respect to the troubles in Northern Ireland, the
Spanish representatives emphasised the colonial aspects of the British control of
Gibraltar. In particular, Spain argued that continued British possession of Gibraltar
was in violation of the UN Charter and Resolution 1514 (XV), which embodied the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In
this respect, Spain refuted the validity of the referendum of 1967, because the original
inhabitants of the territory were not consulted, having been displaced centuries
previously. The Irish Government had always made the same argument with respect
to the Northern Ireland situation – that Partition was an artificial cleaving of a
historically undivided nation.46 In a distinct parallel with the situation in Northern
45 Report on Gibraltar at the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 46 The Irish position on partition at the UN, undated document from 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6974.
225 Ireland, the Spanish delegation also argued that Gibraltar had historically and
geographically comprised Spanish territory until seizure by the UK, and had its
Spanish inhabitants displaced and replaced by a plantation of British settlers.47
The anti-colonial policies of the Irish delegation at the UN had been
influenced on a number of issues where the underlying principles accorded with those
in Northern Ireland. For instance, Ireland had a policy of refusing to support
resolutions proposing to partition territories and had argued this vehemently when the
General Assembly considered the case of Cyprus in 1959 and 1965. With respect to
the situation in Gibraltar, the speeches of the Irish delegation affirmed the parallels
with Northern Ireland. Although the Irish representative on the Fourth Committee,
Patrick Power, acknowledged that the UK appeared to be acting according to the
wishes of the inhabitants, he called for the restoration of Gibraltar to Spain, because of the geographic and historical claim of Spain to the territory.48 Similarly, Power
conceded the validity of the result of the referendum of 1967, but questioned
London’s rationale for holding it. Ultimately, the Irish delegation believed that
Gibraltar should be returned to Spain even if it was against the wishes of the majority
of citizens, because Ireland considered the majority to have been artificially produced
by colonial dispossession. In this respect, the Irish delegation ‘regretted’ the holding
of the referendum because it established the potential for an antagonistic relationship
between the citizens of Gibraltar, who sought to remain a part of the UK, and the UN,
which supported incorporation within Spain.49
The parallels between the situation in Gibraltar and Northern Ireland were
clear, particularly because the UK was the governing body in both instances. Because
the Northern Irish issue was not raised at the UN until 1969, the issue of Gibraltar
47 Report on Gibraltar at the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 48 Ibid.
226 gave Ireland a clear opportunity to make a statement on the principles that it
considered were applicable to the Northern Ireland problem. Therefore, irrespective
of how the West voted on the issue of Gibraltar, as in the previous example of Cyprus,
core Irish principles were at stake and the Irish delegation was prepared to distance itself from the rest of the West. Consequently, the Irish delegation supported the pro-
Spanish Latin American resolution on Gibraltar, which was adopted by the General
Assembly. It deplored the holding of the referendum of 1967 and called on both
nations to resume negotiations with the objective of ending the colonial situation in
Gibraltar.50 The language demonstrated Ireland’s notable pro-Spanish disposition, as
did its repudiation of the referendum and its total disregard of UK concerns about
coercion from Spain. At this stage, Spain was a pariah in the Western world because
of its fascist political culture. There was significant opposition to the resolution from
Western states and Italy was the only key Western State, other than Ireland, to support
the text. Nevertheless, Power described the resolution as ‘balanced’ and voted in
favour of it.51
Although the delegation of the UK was disappointed with the position of the
Irish delegation, it was particularly incensed with Power’s speech. The UK resented
its closest neighbour so publicly opposing its position, especially with such
uncompromising anti-colonial language. In fact, the Government of the UK viewed
the speech of the Irish delegate to have involved ‘provocative’ rhetoric.52 It was
particularly noted that Ireland supported the pro-Spanish Latin American resolution,
despite the existence of a compromise text, which had been tabled by Norway.53 The
49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 A/C.4/SR.1753, 15 December 1967, p. 547. 52 Background Note on Gibraltar, 9 February 1968, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, PRO, FCO 62/92. 53 ORGA – 22nd General Assembly Session Annexes, Agenda Item 23 – Gibraltar, pp. 12-14.
227 UK expected that Ireland would support this compromise draft resolution and abstain on the pro-Spanish resolution, because the British delegation did not believe that
Ireland would ignore its concerns about Spain’s use of coercion against Gibraltar.54 It
was clear that Ireland’s position was motivated by its views on partition and this was
recognised by the British media, as well as by the British Government. An article in
New Statesman even described the Irish vote as a ‘protest against the behaviour of
Oliver Cromwell… [and] William of Orange’.55 The British delegation labelled the
General Assembly resolution as a ‘disgrace to the committee’ and accused the
delegates of voting according to extraneous agendas of anti-colonialism, rather than
the merits of the particular situation.56 Although it was true that Aiken had
specifically directed the Irish UN delegation to support anti-colonial resolutions
irrespective of their merits,57 there were also obvious parallels between the situations in Gibraltar and Northern Ireland that determined Ireland’s policy on the issue.
Irish diplomacy towards Gibraltar remained consistent at subsequent sessions, but its voting position on the pro-Spanish Latin American resolution altered in 1968,
due to changes in that text. The Irish Government still accepted the arguments of
Madrid that Gibraltar should be returned to Spain because of its geographic and
historical claim to the territory, and that the original inhabitants of Gibraltar were
dislocated by immigrants and denied self-determination. Therefore, despite pressure
from the British Government, Aiken’s instructions to the Irish delegation at the 23rd
General Assembly Session were to vote the same way that it had in 1967.58 But
Ireland altered its voting position when the pro-Spanish Latin American resolution was strengthened in response to a lack of progress in negotiations between Spain and
54 Ibid. 55 Cremin to McCann, 15 January 1968, NAI, DFA, 98/3/87. 56 A/C.4/SR.1753, 15 December 1967, p. 547. 57 The Irish position on partition at the UN, undated document from 1967, UCDA, FAP P104/6974.
228 the UK. The UK refused to enter into negotiations with Spain to return the territory
while Spain continued its coercive efforts to isolate the territory and, in fact,
continued negotiations with the authorities of Gibraltar for a new constitution.
Consequently, the pro-Spanish resolution at the 23rd General Assembly Session was
significantly stronger than Resolution 2353 (XXII) of the previous session, including
clauses blaming London for the failure of negotiations between the UK and Spain,
and articulating a dead-line for the transfer of the territory. Aiken was prepared to
support the inclusion of the clause attributing responsibility for the failure of
negotiations to the UK, but he objected to the deadline included in the text. Thus, the
Irish delegation abstained in the voting on the resolution, specifically because of the refusal of the cosponsors to delete the clause containing the deadline, not because
Irish policy had changed. In his explanation of the vote the Irish delegate advocated the restoration of Gibraltar to Spain, but insisted that the deadline was counterproductive to progress on the issue.59 The Irish concerns about the text were validated by the fact that Italy, the only other Western State to support the pro-
Spanish resolution at the previous session, joined Ireland in abstention at the 23rd
General Assembly Session.
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Southern Africa was plagued by a number of decolonisation problems, notably the existence of apartheid in South Africa, the illegal minority white regime in Southern
Rhodesia, the perpetuation of Portuguese colonial control over Guinea, Angola and
Mozambique, as well as South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia. Western nations were eager to maintain economic advantages that accrued from trading with
58 Report on Fourth Committee at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA, 2000/14/378. 59 A/C.4/SR.1814, 16 December 1968, p. 12.
229 the minority regimes of Southern Africa, such as access to valuable mineral resources
and the export market that they provided for steel, agriculture, industrial equipment
and armaments.60 South Africa produced more than 50% of the world’s gold,
marketed 80% of the world’s diamonds and supplied large amounts of uranium to the
NATO nuclear powers under long-term contracts.61 The USA was further circumscribed by its strategic relationship with Pretoria. South Africa housed a large
proportion of the USA’s complex of space and missile tracking installations, provided
an alternate sea route between the Indian and Atlantic Oceans to bypass the unstable
Suez, air and naval facilities for US forces and a crucial pro-Western presence in
Africa.62 The issues plaguing Southern Africa were some of the most vociferously debated items on the UN agenda, nevertheless, on these issues Irish policy
conspicuously departed from conventional Western policy.
Ireland had historically exhibited a more assertive position than most other
Western nations on the issues plaguing Southern Africa and its name was associated with Afro-Asian nations as a supporter and co-sponsor of resolutions and efforts to achieve the inscription of items. The Irish delegation had often been instrumental in bringing issues such as apartheid to the attention of the General Assembly. This activism as a Western European nation was unusual and a hallmark of Irish neutrality at the UN. It was justified by citing the association between the historical colonial experiences of the Irish and African peoples.63 For example, parallels were drawn in
60 Joll, Europe Since 1870, p. 475. 61 FRUS, Volume XXIV – Africa, Document 600: National Policy Paper – South Africa, Washington, 18 January 1965. 62 FRUS, Volume XXIV – Africa, Document 403: Letter from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to Secretary of State Rusk, New York, 29 October 1965; Document 600: National Policy Paper – South Africa, Washington, 18 January 1965. 63 O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa, p. 4.
230 the Dáil between the discrimination employed by apartheid and that perpetrated in
Northern Ireland.64
Ireland’s diplomacy on Southern Africa was identifiably distinct from other
Western States because it involved support for the referral of such issues to the
Security Council. In this respect, Ireland recommended the implementation of
sanctions or the use of force against Western states, such as Portugal, South Africa,
and the minority white regime in Southern Rhodesia. Ireland’s policy of advocating a
multilateral means of settling disputes through the UN, rather than bilateral means
was symptomatic of the position taken by disempowered states, such as those of the
Third World. In contrast, Western states conventionally opposed the referral of issues to the Security Council because of the protection granted against UN interference in matters of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ by Article 2.7 of the UN Charter.65 Article 2.7 was
the common protection used by powerful states, notably those of the First and Second
Worlds, against interference by the UN. The West generally opposed measures as
advocated by Ireland and believed ‘Much more realism needs to be injected into UN
consideration of possible enforcement action’.66 Nevertheless, Ireland rejected these arguments. Ireland had often envisaged UN peacekeepers being inserted into
Northern Ireland to assume many responsibilities of the British Army, but the clear and unequivocal opposition of the UK to such an action by citing Article 2.7 meant that it was never a realistic possibility. Consequently, Irish policy on the issues pertaining to Southern Africa clearly was in opposition to that of most of the states of the West and, in particular, the USA, the UK and those of the EC, especially France.
64 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 23 October, 1969 - Trade with South Africa: 1750. 65 Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, Henk, Miss & Endre (Eds), UN Textbook, p. 25. 66 FRUS, Volume XXIV – Africa, Document 600: National Policy Paper – South Africa, Washington, 18 January 1965.
231 Namibia
The deteriorating situation in Namibia was considered by the Irish delegation to be the most pressing decolonization issue in Southern Africa. Namibia had been a
German colony that was administered by the League of Nations after the Great War and from 1919 by South Africa. In 1966, and in response to the extension of apartheid to the territory, the UN terminated South Africa’s mandate of administration over Namibia with the passage of Resolution 2145 (XXI).67 Pretoria rejected the resolution as contrary to the UN Charter68 and the rulings of the International Court of
Justice,69 and refused to terminate its control over Namibia.70 This was made even
more problematic because neither France nor the UK supported Resolution 2145
(XXI) and, therefore, the right of the UN to even discuss the matter. Furthermore,
France openly defied the UN embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa.
Under Aiken, the Irish delegation advocated pragmatic and effective action on
the issue to terminate South Africa’s control. Aiken did not consider either the Afro-
Asian or Western proposals to end Pretoria’s grip on the territory as meeting those criteria. The Afro-Asian bloc argued for the establishment of a UN Council for
Namibia to assume administration of the territory and oversee the withdrawal of
South African security forces, but failed to address the issue of Pretoria’s recalcitrance in relinquishing control. The Western bloc proposed the appointment of
a Special Representative for Namibia, to be nominated by the Secretary-General, who
would study the situation and report back to the General Assembly. Whatever the
findings of the study, Western delegates categorically rejected the use of coercion to
67 Report on Fifth Special Session – Namibia, NAI, DFA 2000/14/267. 68 South Africa regarded the resolution to be in violation of Article 10 and associated articles of the UN Charter, which limited the powers of the General Assembly to discussion and recommendations. 69 In 1966 the International Court of Justice had ruled that the termination of a mandate by the League of Nations required bilateral agreement between the UN and the administering power, which in the latter case had not been given.
232 compel South Africa to surrender its mandate.71 Aiken was concerned that Resolution
2145 (XXI) did not have mandatory force and, therefore, relied on either South
African capitulation or Security Council enforcement measures. Pretoria rejected the legality of Resolution 2145 (XXI) and refused to terminate its control of Namibia, which meant that the resolution would only be effective if enforced by the Security
Council. Despite the passage of a resolution establishing authority over the territory, the General Assembly was never in the position to ensure that its decisions were implemented. It was inevitable that the South African Government would reject any overture from the General Assembly, especially if it only had the support of the smaller states.
Therefore, Aiken advocated that the Security Council was the appropriate UN organ to approach Pretoria. He believed that, in the event that Pretoria refused to cooperate with the UN, the Security Council should consider enforcement action to secure compliance.72 This was because Aiken considered South Africa’s refusal to terminate its administration as representing ‘a clear case of aggression by a would-be colonial Power against a weak neighbouring people’73 and an effort at ‘territorial expansion’.74 He also viewed South Africa’s recalcitrance to be a direct challenge to the UN and, specifically, to the great powers. He described Namibia as a ‘test case’ for the UN, as the failure to implement Resolution 2145 (XXI) ‘would be a crippling if not a fatal blow’ to the UN’s capacity to take collective action to suppress international aggression.75
70 South African Memorandum on Namibia, April 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/266. 71 Report on Fifth Special Session – Namibia, NAI, DFA 2000/14/267. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., p. 5. 74 Summary of Fifth Special Session – Namibia, NAI, DFA 2000/14/267. 75 Report on Fifth Special Session – Namibia, NAI, DFA 2000/14/267.
233 As a result, Aiken met with Ambassador Anderson of the US delegation and
urged her to amend a Western draft resolution on Namibia to substitute references to the General Assembly with references to the Security Council. Furthermore, he
indicated that unless she did so, Ireland would not support the Western text.76
Because he was unsuccessful, Aiken met with the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Goldberg, four days later and attempted to convince him of the necessity for the amendments. He argued that South Africa’s intransigence constituted international aggression and, therefore, the Security Council should intervene, as it was the only body competent to take the necessary action to ensure progress towards independence. Aiken added that he did not believe that South
Africa would fight to keep Namibia, particularly because the majority of the white population in Namibia was German (rather than South African) and the capital investment was primarily foreign. Despite his efforts, Aiken could not persuade the
USA to support his amendments.77
On 16 May 1967, Aiken met with a contact group78 for a proposed
compromise draft resolution and again urged the inclusion of a clause referring the
matter to the Security Council. On behalf of the co-sponsors, Chief Adebo of Nigeria
indicated that he agreed with Aiken, but could not include such a clause because of
the opposition it would engender from the West.79 For this reason the Irish Press
described Aiken’s policy as ‘taking a stronger line than the Africans themselves’.80
The Irish efforts to strengthen the resolution before the General Assembly
failed when a compromise draft resolution was produced on the Namibian situation.
76 Cremin to McCann, 25 May 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/266. 77 Ibid. 78 The contact group comprised Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Chile and Mexico. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden were also in attendance at the meeting. 79 Cremin to McCann, 18 May 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/266. 80 Irish Press, 12 December 1967, p. 3.
234 The resolution established a Council for Namibia to administer the territory until it
achieved independence and to report on its work, with no provision for South African
intransigence and no reference to the Security Council. Because of this omission,
Ireland refused to support the text, because the resolution failed ‘to take full account of the obduracy of the Government of South Africa and of their determination to never withdraw from their illegal occupation of the territory of Namibia’.81 He stated
that Ireland could never support a text that did not clearly imbue the Security Council
with the primary responsibility for implementing Resolution 2145 (XXI), because no
resolution passed by the General Assembly could induce a change in the situation of
Namibia. The rest of the West also abstained but, unlike the Irish, these states
opposed any action being taken other than dialogue.82
At subsequent sessions of the General Assembly Aiken continued to call for
the Security Council to be imbued with the responsibility for implementing
Resolution 2145 (XXI), terminating South Africa’s mandate. By the convention of
the 22nd General Assembly Session later in 1967, continued intransigence from
Pretoria resulted in increasingly vocal calls from African and Asian representatives
for the UN to take action against South Africa under Chapter Seven of the UN
Charter. It was argued that such action was necessary to enable the Council for
Namibia to discharge its responsibilities.83 At the same time, Western states,
especially France, were similarly vociferous in their opposition to the employment of coercive instruments against Southern Africa, including both military intervention and economic sanctions.84
81 Report on Fifth Special Session – Namibia, NAI, DFA 2000/14/267. 82 Report on the 22nd General Assembly Session of the UN, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 83 Ibid. 84 A/PV.1663, 27 May 1968, pp. 5-8; A/PV.1671, 12 June 1968, pp. 1-2.
235 At the 22nd General Assembly Session in 1967, the African Group was persuaded by Aiken’s arguments and introduced a text that was adopted on 16
December 1967 as Resolution 2325 (XXII). The text of this resolution corresponded closely with the text of the resolution adopted on the subject at the previous session, except for the addition of a paragraph, requesting the Security Council take steps to enable the UN to fulfil its responsibilities of administration.85 The Western states
strenuously objected to the inclusion of paragraph seven and its reference to Chapter
Seven of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, Ireland supported the resolution. Cremin’s
explanation of vote referred to previous speeches by the Tánaiste and reiterated that
Ireland believed that no General Assembly resolution could satisfy the criteria of
‘effectiveness and practicability’ necessary for any UN resolution.86
Although support for the resolution was overwhelming, there was an adverse
reaction from the West. The abstentions came almost exclusively from Western
states, including all present EC members-states, the UK and the USA.87 Western
states minimised their participation in the debate, but the speech of the US delegate
made it clear that Washington would only support ‘peaceful and practical means’ to
end Pretoria’s administration of Namibia. This speech and those of previous sessions
indicated that Western states objected to the referral of the matter to the Security
Council and opposed the inclusion of a clause with any such reference. The
representative of the UK stated that such a resolution was unrealistic and, therefore,
‘devalued the currency of the United Nations action’.88 France had an even more
extreme position, endorsing South Africa’s rejection of the right of the UN to discuss
85 ORGA – 22nd General Assembly Session, Documents A/L.540 and Add.1 and 2*, Somalian draft resolution, pp. 25-26. 86 A/PV.1742, 16 December 1968, p. 5. 87 The exception was Spain who was a pariah in Western circles, due to the nature of its government, and who frequently deviated from conventional Western policy. During this period, Spain more commonly voted with the Latin American bloc and the Arab states than with the West.
236 the matter because the mandate to administer Namibia was granted by the League of
Nations, rather than the UN.89 Ireland was predominantly responsible for the inclusion of the clause in the resolution of the 22nd General Assembly that so incensed
Western nations.
Ireland’s policy on Namibia assumed even greater significance because of the efforts of various Western states to ensure a common Western position on the issue.
In 1966 and 1967, various members of the Western European and Others (WEO)
Group90 attempted to persuade the group to present a unified front on the issue of
Namibia. Their objective was to prevent the General Assembly from recommending any intervention by the Security Council against South Africa for its refusal to relinquish its control of the territory. This attempt to politicise the group was objected to by the representatives of Finland and France, who argued that their neutrality and independence, respectively, would be prejudiced.91
Despite some dissent to the idea, the delegations of the EC members-states, the Netherlands and Belgium, pursued the matter further. Notwithstanding his initial opposition to the politicisation of the group, Ambassador Seydoux of France agreed to attend sub-group meetings to discuss political issues before the UN. In addition to
France, the UK, Canada, Belgium, Spain and Sweden attended the meetings. Sweden and France had agreed to participate provided that no delegate would claim to speak on behalf of the entire group and that the delegations of the participating nations would be free to reject any decisions.92
88 A/PV.1693, p. 9, 14 October 1968. 89 Report on Namibia at the 23rd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378. 90 The WEO Group was a group that comprised Western Europe (including the EC) and new world Western states of similar political, historical and cultural characteristics, such as the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Its only formal function involved elections to UN offices and organs, to ensure shared or proportional regional representation. But because of the correspondence of political, cultural, economic and strategic interests, the WEO Group usually voted along similar lines. 91 Cremin to McCann, 20 January 1967, NAI, DFA 98/3/86. 92 Ibid.
237 In January 1967, Ambassador de Beus of the Netherlands approached
Ireland’s Permanent Representative to the UN to gauge the Irish reaction to the
evolution of the WEO Group. Ireland’s Permanent Representative to the UN,
Cornelius Cremin, and Frank Aiken were both conscious that the Irish delegation
would be advantaged by the exchange of information in such sessions, but were
concerned that the consultations could function, or be perceived, to limit the
sovereignty of each member. Cremin’s response to de Beus was delineated by
Ireland’s neutrality at the UN. He indicated that, in view of Ireland’s UN record, the
Irish delegation could not support the politicisation of the WEO Group, and would
‘endeavour above all’ to ensure that any consultations were limited to information
exchanges and not impinge on the freedom of action of members.93 As a result of
opposition, such as provided by the Irish delegation, the proposal to politicise the
WEO Group was dropped on 20 March 1967.
But the proposal was resurrected in 1968 during the deliberations on Namibia, as many Western nations again sought to avoid any reference to the Security Council or advocacy of the use of force in the dispute.94 The UK diplomat, Sir Leslie Glass,
argued that because it was not politicised, ‘the Group does not carry its proper weight
…which is most unfortunate’.95 The meeting of the WEO Group to discuss its
politicisation adjourned with many nations agreeing to oppose initiatives pertaining to
Namibia, such as the Irish proposal to refer the matter to the Security Council, but
there was no agreement on a definitive framework for political cooperation.
The incident was a crucial opportunity for the Irish delegation and the Irish
Minister for External Affairs to deliberate on the degree to which Irish UN policy
93 Ibid. 94 Cremin to McCann, 22 January 1968, NAI, DFA, 98/3/87. 95 Member of the Permanent Mission to the UN, Noel Dorr, to Cremin, 2 December 1968, NAI, DFA 305/94/5.
238 would be sacrificed to further Western interests. The primary support for the politicisation of the WEO Group came from member-states of the EC, seeking to expand the influence of the group. Therefore, despite the paramount objective of the
Irish Government being to promote its application for membership of the EC, and its efforts to convince the EC member-states of its commitment to Western European interests, the formulation of UN policy remained insulated from these pressures.
Irish diplomacy with respect to other issues in Southern Africa was significantly related to its policy on Namibia. Ireland's diplomacy in the debates on apartheid in South Africa, the Portuguese territories, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the status of Southern
Rhodesia reflected this.
Apartheid in South Africa
Irish policy in the debates on apartheid in South Africa was an example of its
radical position on decolonisation and its support for the intervention of the Security
Council. This was not surprising considering the fact that Ireland’s Anti-apartheid
Movement was quite a powerful influence on government policy. Its strength was founded upon the organisation’s substantial Catholic missionary influences and anti- colonial sentiments as a result of Ireland’s colonial history. The Irish Anti-apartheid
Movement demonstrated its strength by organising mass demonstrations in Dublin against apartheid in South Africa. The most notable example of the movement’s influence occurred during the South African rugby tour of 1969-1970, where there were large demonstrations, picketing of football grounds and players’ hotels, the
239 threat of trade union action and the uncharacteristic absence of any government
representatives from the principal match.96
In 1966, for the first time, Ireland supported the General Assembly resolution
labeling apartheid ‘a crime against humanity’ and calling for the implementation of
universal, mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. The Irish delegation
signalled that it believed enforcement action was necessary to ensure the compliance of Pretoria in ending apartheid, which was becoming increasingly necessary due to the rapidly deteriorating situation in South Africa.97 Ireland supported the resolution
despite the fact that the Irish position was contrary to conventional Western policy,
which opposed or abstained on resolutions pertaining to apartheid.98 Although almost
every member of the UN, except South Africa and Portugal, claimed to be opposed to
the principle and practice of apartheid, Western nations usually did not translate
rhetoric into action.99 Ireland supported the resolution as a whole despite having
reservations about various clauses and, due to these concerns, abstained on various
paragraphs when put to separate votes, including that which deemed apartheid to
constitute a threat to international peace and security. The Irish delegation supported sanctions as the first step, and a peaceful measure, in ensuring compliance but was opposed to collective action of a military nature at this stage.100 An example of
Ireland’s commitment to the resolution on apartheid and the implementation of
sanctions against South Africa occurred in 1968. During the General Assembly
Session of that year, the USA moved an amendment to Resolution 2396 (XXIII) on
apartheid in South Africa that would have resulted in the deletion of operative
96 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, p. 283-284. 97 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the 22nd General Assembly Session of the UN, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300. 98 Report on apartheid at the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 99 Ibid.
240 paragraph four, recommending the implementation of mandatory comprehensive
sanctions. The amendment was supported by the majority of Western nations,
nevertheless, Ireland voted against the amendment, which was overwhelmingly defeated, and supported the recommendation of sanctions.101
In the resolutions passed on Southern Africa, Ireland’s support for
decolonisation was characterised not only by the resort to action under Chapter Seven,
but also resolutions that included clauses condemning the trading partners of the racist
minority regimes. Although these trading partners were left unnamed, it was widely
recognised that they were primarily wealthy Western states,102 including the USA and
the former colonial powers of Western Europe, such as France and the UK.103
Clauses condemning these states posed direct challenges to Ireland’s European policy.
The Western states objected to the resolutions on apartheid largely because they included paragraphs condemning the major trading partners of South Africa. At the same time, they were reluctant to oppose the resolutions openly because that would have led to even more vehement accusations that they provided support or sanction to the policy of apartheid.104 The Western states concerned made no effort to deny
accusations that they had increased trade with the minority states of Southern Africa,
only intervening in debates to defend themselves against accusations that they were
not committed to ending apartheid or to denounce efforts to impose sanctions and
100 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the 22nd General Assembly Session of the UN, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300. 101 ORGA – 23rd General Assembly Session, Document A/7348, Report of the Special Political Committee, pp. 7-11. 102 Ireland also had to defend the accusation from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that it was one of South Africa’s major trading partners. Ireland had expanded its trade significantly with South Africa in the mid-1960s and the Irish Government was concerned about the effect this had on Ireland’s international image. Nevertheless, the Irish Government rejected the validity of the IMF’s trade statistics, as they included commodities that arrived at Shannon Free Airport and were dispatched to other nations. (Dorr to Holmes, 4 December 1969, NAI, DFA 96/3/95, National Archives of Ireland; Notes for the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations for 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 96/3/95, National Archives of Ireland). 103 ORGA – 24th General Assembly Session, Document A/7348, Report of the Fourth Committee, pp. 7- 11.
241 disrupt their trading relations.105 Most Western states minimised their participation in
these debates because they opposed UN action or, as in the case of French policy with
respect to Namibia, refused to accept the validity of the UN debates.106
Aiken instructed the Irish delegation to support the 1966 General Assembly
resolution on apartheid, despite his reservations about various clauses, most notably
the paragraph condemning the trading partners of South Africa for encouraging the
perpetuation of apartheid. Nevertheless, these reservations were not sufficient to
prevent Aiken from instructing the Irish delegation to support the resolution because
of his concern with the deteriorating situation in South Africa and the persistent
recalcitrance of Pretoria.107 From 1967, the Irish delegation shifted its policy further
from the Western mainstream when it supported all the paragraphs of the resolution
on apartheid when put to separate votes, including that condemning South Africa’s major trading partners, in addition to the resolution as a whole. Frank Aiken feared that the situation was rapidly deteriorating in Southern Africa as a result of South
Africa’s actions in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia, as well as with respect to the application of apartheid.108 He was also concerned that the situation in Southern
Africa as a whole was becoming ‘more explosive’ and was on the brink of descending
into racial war, with the increasing unity of South Africa, Portugal and Southern
Rhodesia to suppress their opponents.109 As a consequence, Aiken believed that since
the 21st General Assembly Session, ‘South Africa had shown an attitude of greater
contempt for resolutions of the United Nations’.110 Ireland also supported the
104 Report on apartheid at the 24th General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 96/3/95. 105 A/SPC/SR.564, p. 75, 10 November 1967. 106 ORGA – 22nd General Assembly Session, Document A/6914, Report of the Special Political Committee, pp. 53-55. 107 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the 22nd General Assembly Session of the UN, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300. 108 Report on apartheid at the 22nd General Assembly Session, NAI, DFA 2000/14/370. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid.
242 paragraph condemning South Africa’s trading partners specifically because it believed
that various member states and financial interests had encouraged South Africa to
perpetuate its policies. Certain member states, most notably France, had sold arms to
South Africa during 1967, despite the existence of a Security Council arms embargo.
Furthermore, South Africa’s purchases of military equipment had been increasing as
the race relations in the country deteriorated. For similar reasons, Ireland supported
the operative paragraphs requesting that the major trading partners of South Africa, as
well as the World Bank, take measures towards disengagement and more effective
cooperation in helping to eliminate apartheid.111
Ultimately, Ireland’s position on apartheid was, in part, determined by its
policy on South Africa’s illegal control of Namibia. Aiken would not support UN enforcement action against South Africa for its use of apartheid, until after the
Security Council sanctioned such involvement on the issue of Namibia. He
considered Pretoria’s actions in the latter instance to constitute a stronger case, under
the UN Charter, for such intervention.112
The Portuguese Territories in Africa
The Republic of Ireland also supported the resolutions passed on the
Portuguese territories for similar reasons to those on apartheid and Pretoria’s control
of Namibia. This included resolutions that contained operative paragraphs, which
‘deplores’ those foreign financial interests that obstructed independence to the
indigenous populations.113 The Irish Government supported these resolutions, despite
its reservations about this paragraph. In his explanation of vote, the Irish delegate at
111 ORGA – 22nd General Assembly Session, Document A/6914, Report of the Special Political Committee, pp. 53-55. 112 Background Note on Namibia, NAI, DFA 2000/14/266.
243 the 24th General Assembly Session in 1969 made it clear that he believed that this
clause should only be interpreted as pertaining to those financial interests that
impeded progress towards independence, not all foreign investment. Dublin was
conscious of the benefits of foreign investment to the Irish economy and was in the
process of attempting to attract more.114 But Ireland had no such reservations about
the inclusion of the operative paragraph ‘deploring’ the aid that Portugal received
from NATO.115 As in the case with South Africa, Portugal’s acquisition of war
materials and arms accelerated as its repression of the indigenous population intensified.
As it supported punitive action against South Africa, from 1966 Ireland had
supported recommendations that the Security Council implement mandatory sanctions
against Portugal.116 Lisbon defied all pressure on it to relinquish its colonies in
Mozambique, Guinea and Tanzania, which it considered to comprise part of
“Metropolitan Portugal”. At the 21st General Assembly Session in 1966, Ireland had
been the lone Western nation supporting the resolution passed on the issue of the
Portuguese territories in Africa, which labeled the situation a threat to international
security and called for the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions. At the
same time, the Irish Government did not intend to sever diplomatic relations with
Portugal until obliged by Security Council resolutions. The overt justification for this
was that the communication of disapproval about colonial practices was impossible
without open diplomatic channels.117
113 ORGA – 24th General Assembly Session, Document A/7352**, Report of the Fourth Committee, pp. 1-4. 114 Report on Fourth Committee, NAI, DFA, 2000/14/378. 115 ORGA – 24th General Assembly Session, Document A/7352**, Report of the Fourth Committee, pp. 1-4. 116 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 226 - 14 December, 1966 - Diplomatic Relations with Portugal: 373. 117 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 28 October, 1969 - Diplomatic Links with Portugal: 1866.
244 Aside from Ireland and the Scandinavian nations, economic sanctions against
Portugal and South Africa were vociferously opposed by most Western states. The
Western states minimised their participation in the debates on decolonisation, but interjected when it came to protecting their trading interests, arguing that the maintenance of relations was essential to exert influence over the policies of the minority regimes of Southern Africa.
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
Ireland was similarly unconcerned by the anti-Western inclination of the
resolution governing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples in 1968. Although Ireland registered a negative vote along
with many other Western nations, its justification was conspicuously distinct. On that
particular resolution the West abstained or opposed the text because they specifically
objected to the anti-Western ‘tone’.118 In contrast, Ireland was unconcerned by this
aspect of the resolution. The Irish delegation opposed the resolution because they
believed that it raised crucial legal and constitutional matters, but the time allocated
for consideration was insufficient and denied the delegation the opportunity for
reasonable deliberation. A new operative paragraph pertaining to mercenaries, which
the Irish delegation believed could be contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, had been introduced at the last minute. The Irish delegate indicated that
Ireland rejected the use of mercenaries, particularly because it had combated them
during its own struggle for independence, but the delegation required more time to
consider the legal and constitutional ramifications of the clause. When Ireland was
not granted the time necessary for such consideration, it opposed the resolution as a
118 Report on Colonialism at the 23rd General Assembly Session, p. 3-4, NAI, DFA 2000/14/378, National Archives of Ireland
245 whole out of principle.119 But Ireland’s opposition to the resolution was clearly a
result of the inclusion of the clause pertaining to mercenaries, not the resolution’s anti-Western sentiments.
Southern Rhodesia
Ireland supported the use of force by the Security Council to wrest control of
Namibia from South Africa, but it did not support the calls for the use of force to end
the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.120 Ireland abstained in the voting on the
resolution pertaining to Southern Rhodesia, specifically because it contained operative
paragraphs, which called for the use of force. But, unlike other Western nations, who
categorically opposed the use of force in Southern Africa, Ireland’s opposition to the
use of force against Southern Rhodesia was more qualified. Ireland’s justification
was that it preferred that the UN focus on further efforts to achieve a solution through
negotiations, because it did not consider that this avenue had been sufficiently
exhausted. Aiken was conscious that Southern Rhodesia was a British colony and
was reluctant to advocate a course of action unless endorsed by the UK. This was
because, although the unilateral declaration of independence had consequences for the
region as a whole, action against Southern Rhodesia was technically circumscribed by
Article 2.7 of the UN Charter preventing UN involvement in the internal politics of
nations. The case of Southern Rhodesia involved a widely acknowledged application
of Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, as it incorporated a unilateral secession from
administration by the UK and had no foreign involvement. This had been recognised
119 A/PV.1751, 20 December 1968, p. 13. 120 Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) had been a British colony, which gained self-government in 1923. In 1962 the white supremacist party, the Rhodesian Front, won power from the United Federal Party, who had been attempting to expand the rights of the African population, and began negotiations with the UK for independence. Those negotiations collapsed in 1965 and the leader of the Rhodesian Front, Ian Smith, responded with a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).
246 by the General Assembly as the initial resolution passed on the situation in 1966
called on London to take the necessary measures to end the illegal regime.121 The
General Assembly only sought direct intervention by the Security Council when it
decided that the UK was not acting with sufficient alacrity. The relevance of Article
2.7 was also recognised by the UK, which had made concerted attempts from 1964 to
persuade the Government of Ian Smith to introduce constitutional reforms giving rights to indigenous Africans. London was reluctant to resort to the use of force, because of the opposition of the British electorate and the political instability in the
UK that military intervention in Southern Rhodesia would have engendered.122
Ireland had implemented sanctions against Southern Rhodesia when they were voluntary and when they were made mandatory, specifically because they had been urged by the UK.
Ireland’s View of Voluntary and Mandatory Sanctions
It should also be noted that, although Ireland supported resolutions calling for the Security Council to implement mandatory comprehensive economic sanctions against various regimes of Southern Africa, this support was qualified. In the particular case of South Africa, Ireland supported the call for comprehensive mandatory sanctions, but was reluctant to implement any sanctions unless endorsed by Pretoria’s major trading partners and the Security Council. The Tánaiste did not support the principle of voluntary sanctions, which he considered to be futile.123
Nevertheless, Ireland supported the imposition of voluntary sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia implemented by the Security Council in November 1965 after a
121 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the 22nd General Assembly Session, p. 10, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300. 122 Joll, Europe Since 1870, p. 474. 123 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 233 - 03 April, 1968 - South African Apartheid: 1638.
247 request from London, as well as the mandatory selective sanctions of December
1966.124 Aiken was dubious about the efficacy of sanctions without universal support,
but the situation in Southern Rhodesia was unique. It was considered an internal situation for London and the imposition of voluntary sanctions had been at the urging of the UK.125 Aiken’s fear was that, without the participation of crucial trading partners and the Security Council, economic sanctions would be ineffective; would only impact negatively on the victims of apartheid; and diminish the authority and prestige of the UN.126 Furthermore, the Irish Government was concerned that
supporting voluntary sanctions would result in Irish exporters and workers losing jobs
to nations not participating, who would use the opportunity to expand their trade.127
Aiken also believed that sanctions encouraged obstinacy in minority regimes by entrenching an antagonistic relationship with the UN or nations that could exert influence over its policies. He feared that they also had a disparate effect on participating nations.128 But it was clear that the Irish Government supported the
imposition of mandatory universal sanctions by the Security Council against both
Portugal and South Africa and would support such sanctions if called for by that body.129 It was because of their mandatory and comprehensive nature that Ireland had
supported the arms embargo against South Africa embodied in Security Council
124 The decision of the Irish Government to apply sanctions against Southern Rhodesia was a rare case where considerations for the EC application encroached into the area of UN policy. The Economic Division of the Department of External affairs favoured the imposition of selective sanctions, rather than a comprehensive embargo. The former was adopted by all six members of the EC and the latter by the UK. The Economic Division was concerned that the imposition of comprehensive sanctions would be interpreted in Common Market capitals as evidence that Ireland remained adherent to UK policy (Economic Division to Ronan, 16 August 1967, NAI, DFA, 2000/14/52, National Archives of Ireland). 125 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 226 - 15 February, 1967 - Trade with Rhodesia and South Africa: 1176-177. 126 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the 22nd General Assembly Session of the UN, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300. 127 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 23 October, 1969 - Trade with South Africa: 1750- 1751. 128 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 226 - 09 February, 1967 - Committee on Finance. - Vote 45—External Affairs (Resumed): 980.
248 Resolutions 181 and 182 of 1963 and Resolution 191 of 1964.130 Ireland also complied with Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.131
Western Influences on Ireland’s Policy on Decolonisation
Ireland’s policy on decolonisation resembled that of a non-aligned Afro-Asian
state, rather than a Western nation, but this did not mean that it supported all anti-
colonial resolutions at the UN. This had been demonstrated in the Irish delegation’s
refusal to support military action against Portugal until its efficacy had been
demonstrated against South Africa on the Namibian issue. Many Western diplomats
had long been critical of Afro-Asian states for calling for unrealistic action on the part
of the UN. Aiken had emphasised the criteria of ‘effectiveness and practicability’ in
all action by the UN to avoid undermining its efficacy and prestige.132 At the same time, the bulk of the Afro-Asian members of the UN had long been frustrated with the inequitable distribution of power amongst the UN organs and were not averse to passing resolutions in the General Assembly that assumed greater authority than that body wielded. It was not uncommon and manifested a clear difference between the
Irish interpretation of neutrality and the policy of non-alignment. The Irish delegation was more conscious of acting within the boundaries delineated by the UN Charter.
An indication of Ireland’s caution towards such extreme proposals of the Non-
Aligned Movement was its opposition to the efforts of the Afro-Asian bloc to expel
South Africa from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). At the second UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi in March 1968, the UNCTAD
129 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 241 - 23 October, 1969 - Trade with South Africa: 1751. 130 Debates of the Dáil Éireann - Volume 232 - 27 February, 1968 - South African Apartheid: 1769. 131 Memorandum for the Government on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 253 (1968), 18 February 1969, NAI, DT 2000/6/609.
249 membership, led by its Afro-Asian delegates, voted to expel South Africa from the
body until such time as it abolished apartheid. While African nations were leading an
initiative in the General Assembly to legitimise this decision, Western states opposed
the effort and considered it to be one of the most serious crises faced by the UN in
recent years. The entire WEO group opposed the move and it was viewed to be
sufficiently serious that the USA and the UK indicated that they would consider
withdrawing from UNCTAD if South Africa was expelled. Canada was also similarly
concerned and was reconsidering its foreign aid contribution to multi-lateral bodies,
such as UNCTAD.133 Although Western opposition was not sufficient to prevent the
Second (Economic and Financial) Committee passing the resolution to expel South
Africa from UNCTAD until it desisted with the policy of apartheid, the resolution did
not attract the necessary two-thirds support to pass in the plenary. Ireland, all of the
Western states present, and most of the Latin Americans opposed the resolution.134
Irish support for the Western position on this issue could not justifiably be
considered a betrayal of its policies on decolonisation or a reversal from its
commitment to ending apartheid. The Irish Government believed that Pretoria’s
presence in these forums would better allow the effective use of public opinion and moral condemnation against the South African Government.135 As one of the West’s
most vocal critics of apartheid in South Africa, Ireland wanted the opportunity to
make its position clear. But more importantly, Dublin was concerned about the
constitutional validity of the expulsion effort. In the opinion of the legal counsel of
the UN, Constantine Stavroupoulos, the move was contrary to Articles five and six of
the UN Charter, which specified that such an action could only be contemplated after
132 A/PV.1742, 16 December 1968, p. 5. 133 Dorr to Cremin, 2 December 1968, NAI, DFA 305/94/5. 134 A/PV.1741, 13 December 1968, p. 13.
250 a recommendation of the Security Council. Stavroupoulos’s legal opinion was that
membership of UNCTAD was a right involved in membership of the UN and, therefore, expulsion would be an ‘abuse’ of power by the General Assembly.136 The constitutional aspects of the question were clearly contentious because the Soviet bloc, who usually took every opportunity to rally behind the Afro-Asian anti-colonial cause, also refused to support the attempted expulsion of South Africa.137
Ireland’s position speeches and explanations of vote demonstrated that Irish
policy was a combination of Western and non-aligned influences. Although Ireland
was a relatively recently decolonised nation and Northern Ireland still remained
incorporated in the UK, by 1968 Ireland had been an independent state for more than
forty years and a member of the UN for more than a decade. Thus, Ireland had
undergone somewhat of a Westernisation of its foreign policy, whereby, many of its
principles were still framed by broad moral principles (especially with respect to its
policy on decolonisation), but its rhetoric was not. Therefore, while Ireland continued to argue and vote in support of decolonisation in terms of moral principles much like the Afro-Asian nations of the Non-Aligned Movement, its language remained restrained like the nations of the West. The reasons for this were cultural, but clearly marked Ireland’s identification of itself as a Western state and the impact of its
Western heritage on the diplomatic culture within the Irish delegation. Ireland’s diplomacy, in this respect, also recognized that the best means of brokering its position to the West was through the use of such phlegmatic language.
Unlike most of the other Western states, which minimised their participation, representatives of Ireland frequently spoke in the debates on decolonisation. In fact,
135 Memorandum for the Information of the Government on the 22nd General Assembly Session of the UN, 30 August 1967, NAI, DFA 2000/14/300. 136 Dorr to Cremin, 2 December 1968, NAI, DFA 305/94/5. 137 A/PV.1741, 13 December 1968, p. 13.
251 in the debate on apartheid in 1968, the Irish delegate stated that, although the UN had not engendered a change in policy in Pretoria, participation in the debates was essential to encourage the opponents of apartheid and to ensure that world attention
remained on the issue.138 During the debate on apartheid in 1968, the Irish delegate
on the Special Political Committee, Noel Dorr, had decided that Ireland’s position on
the issue was clear and that there was no need for a position speech. Nevertheless,
Aiken instructed Dorr to make a speech in order to add to the pressure mounting on
South Africa.139 The Irish delegation customarily outlined its position in declaratory
speeches or explanations of vote on the major issues of decolonisation. In these cases,
Ireland and other decolonised states defended their decolonisation policies with the
articulation of broad anti-colonial and moral principles. Appeals to moral principles
were often the resort of historically disempowered states, such as those that were subjected to colonisation. Ireland’s policy in this respect was in contrast to the majority of Western nations, who were reluctant to participate in debate and only did so to issue very general condemnations of racially based policies, without addressing the specifics of those issues.
Criticisms of Ireland’s Policy on Decolonisation
Although Irish UN policy on the issues of Southern Africa departed markedly
from Western policy, it still came under criticism from its perennial and ubiquitous
critic, Conor Cruise O’Brien. O’Brien was very critical of Irish diplomacy with
respect to Southern Africa. He argued that it changed from 1965 to become more
anti-colonial, but only in accordance with a general shift in Western policy,
particularly as a response to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern
138 A/SPC/SR.610, November 1968, pp. 4-8. 139 Dorr to Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 28 October 1969, NAI, DFA 96/3/95.
252 Rhodesia. O’Brien asserted that, between 1961 and 1965, Ireland adhered to Western interests in refusing to sanction any alteration to the status quo in Southern Africa.140
O’Brien’s criticism of Irish UN policy had a degree of foundation. Ireland had historically supported anti-colonialism at the UN, but this changed from about 1961.
In the early 1960s, the UN experienced to a large influx of recently decolonised states and, as a consequence, resolutions on decolonisation became more aggressive and militant. This caused the Irish delegation to reassess its positions and conform to a more Western policy. But this changed from the mid-1960s when the situation in
Southern Africa deteriorated rapidly and many nations, including those of the West, increasingly viewed the situation as more serious. Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence occurred in 1965, and in 1966 South Africa defied
Resolution 2145 (XXI) terminating its administrative mandate of Namibia and began to intensify its repressive measures to enforce apartheid. These events also focused international attention on the national liberation movements battling for independence in the Portuguese African territories. Therefore, it was true that the Irish delegation was increasingly concerned that the situation in Southern Africa was becoming more explosive and threatening to erupt into racial war, particularly because ostracism from the international community forced a closer relationship between South Africa,
Portugal and Southern Rhodesia.
Although O’Brien was correct that the mid-1960s saw a shift in Irish diplomacy, his interpretation of the reasons for that shift was not valid. According to
O’Brien, Ireland’s policy shifted as a result of Western concern with Southern
Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. This action by the Smith regime involved an unauthorised secession from the control of a Western state – the UK. But
140 O’Brien, Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa, p. 6.
253 the correspondence of the Irish UN delegation and its diplomacy in that forum clearly
indicated that Ireland’s concern about the situation in Southern Africa was primarily a
result of Pretoria’s refusal to cede control of Namibia and, therefore, was quite independent of the shift in conventional Western policy. Also, while the West was increasingly apprehensive about the situation in Southern Africa, this concern was
confined largely to empty rhetoric, as it continued to oppose or abstain on the resolutions passed on the issues in the region. In contrast, the Irish delegation was
increasingly eager for the UN to take more forceful action on the situations and supported the resolutions on Southern Africa, including the calls for both military
intervention and the implementation of economic sanctions by the Security Council.
The Irish delegation considered the situation in Namibia to be far more serious than
Southern Rhodesia’s independence and to be the first case that required the use of
force. The Irish Government was actually reluctant to support UN action against
Southern Rhodesia without British approval because it was a rogue colony for which,
ultimately, the UK was responsible.
Analysis of Ireland’s diplomacy on the issue of apartheid in South Africa
bolsters the interpretation that Irish policy shifted in 1966 from an independent
assessment of the situation, and not in 1965 in conformity to Western policy. In 1961,
1962, 1963 and 1965 Ireland had voted against clauses in the resolution on apartheid
calling for either the severing of diplomatic relations with South Africa and the
imposition of trade sanctions, or the expulsion of South Africa from the UN. It was in
1966 that Ireland supported the resolution condemning apartheid for the first time and
from 1967, Ireland supported all the clauses, as well as the resolution as a whole.141
Also, it was from 1966 that Ireland’s speeches pertaining to Southern Africa became
141 Note for the Minister’s Information – Ireland’s Attitude toward the Aparthaid Policies of South Africa’s Government, NAI, DFA 96/3/95.
254 conspicuously critical of the actions of the Pretoria. The year 1966 accords with Irish
concern over South Africa’s defiant and continued control of Namibia, rather than
reaction to the unilateral declaration of independence as asserted by O’Brien.
Furthermore, the Irish speeches on Southern Africa clearly highlighted Pretoria’s control of Namibia as providing the impetus to Ireland’s policy on Southern Africa, not the situation in Southern Rhodesia. This suggests that Ireland’s shift back to more actively supporting anti-colonial polices in the mid-1960s was independently determined, not a function of Western policy as asserted by Conor Cruise O’Brien.
Patrick Hillery and Ireland’s Policy on Decolonisation
By the time Hillery assumed the position of Minister for External Affairs in
1969, the issues plaguing Southern Africa stagnated and the UN was resigned to reiterating past resolutions. Hillery supported Aiken’s policy on decolonisation and, consequently, in 1970, 1971 and 1972, Ireland continued to support the resolutions on
Southern Africa and maintained its sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. At the same time, Hillery was extremely uncomfortable about the expansion in Irish trade with
South Africa that had occurred since the UN became pre-occupied with the issue in
1962.142 Consequently, he instituted a review of the trade links with South Africa,
which prompted his intervention in 1970 to prevent the state export board, Córas
Tráchtála, from sending a proposed trade delegation to Pretoria. Hillery also
continued other policies of Aiken aimed at assisting the victims of apartheid, such as
subscribing to the Trust Fund for South Africa and the South African Education and
Training Fund.143
142 Dorr to Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 12 November 1969, NAI, DFA 96/3/95. 143 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, p. 175.
255 Conclusion
In the early 1960s, during Ireland’s first application for membership of the EC,
France had criticised Ireland for exhibiting a UN policy that was more associated with
non-alignment than with conventional Western diplomacy. It was particularly aimed
at Ireland’s policy on decolonisation because Irish diplomacy on such issues
invariably brought it into conflict with the member-states of the EC, the USA, the UK
and other key Western nations. These nations were either former colonial powers, or
those who had trading interests that brought them into conflict with the advocates of
decolonisation. Although Irish policy pertaining to issues of decolonisation caused
most consternation in the European capitals, it was the most unyielding aspect of Irish
diplomacy because it was intertwined with Ireland’s national identity and historical
experience. Therefore, in the late 1960s and early 1970s as Ireland’s renewed
application for membership of the EC was being pressed, Ireland’s policy on
decolonisation remained in clear conflict with French interests and the policies of
other member-states of the EC and the West.
This was not only because the Irish Government identified itself with the
colonial struggles of African and Asian states, but also due to Ireland’s continued
objection to Partition in Northern Ireland. The decision to support policies of decolonisation was a deliberate decision on the part of the Irish Government because of its position with respect to Northern Ireland. In the advancing of this objective, the
Irish delegation was given definite instructions to support policies of decolonisation, irrespective of any reservations about their content, both to cultivate the support of anti-colonial nations and to advance the principles consistent with ending partition.
This was most apparent from 1966 and on issues such as Gibraltar, where there were clear parallels with the situation in Northern Ireland, as well as the
256 numerous issues of Southern Africa. The voting records and declaratory speeches of the Irish delegation reveal that Ireland’s policy shifted discernibly from 1966 to be more supportive of decolonisation than it had been in the preceding three or four years. This decision came at the same time that the Irish Government was preparing to press for reconsideration of its application for membership of the EC. As the Irish
Government’s primary objective was to secure membership of the EC, Irish UN policy was reinforcing the concerns that France had exhibited during its first application that Ireland was not suitable for membership of the EC because its policy did not represent Western interests.
257 CONCLUSION
By the time that Sean Lemass became Taoiseach in 1959, Ireland’s national interests had been re-evaluated. Matters pertaining to external economic relations were increasingly prioritised over the political and security aspects of foreign policy. Economic prosperity became the primary objective of the Fianna Fáil Government and its policies focused on the various means of achieving this objective. This utilitarian approach to government was considered to be ‘almost heresy’ in Ireland’s political culture and a significant departure from the idealistic policy of Lemass’ predecessors, who believed that material advantages would stem from virtuous government.1 Lemass implemented the First
Program for Economic Expansion, which he had launched in 1958 as Minister for
Industry and Commerce. In the international arena, it resulted in Ireland’s first application for membership of the EC in 1961 and, following the veto by Charles de
Gaulle of that application two years later, the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade
Area Agreement in 1965. Lemass was succeeded by Jack Lynch in 1966, who continued his predecessor’s economic philosophies and renewed Ireland’s application for membership of the EC in 1967. The frequent visits and tours of the EC capitals by Lynch and various ministers were evidence of Ireland’s increasing commitment to integration with the EC.
Ireland’s application for membership of the EC was an acknowledgement of the interdependence of the Irish economy and those of Western Europe. In the post World
War II environment of Western Europe, nation states had long ceased to be independent
1 Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 243.
258 economic units.2 This increasing recognition of interdependence was characterised by more frequent and intrusive multi-lateral consultations, which threatened nations’ sovereignty.3 Although integration is usually a process whereby states voluntarily surrender certain sovereign powers and mutually develop greater cooperation in addressing various problems, the EC applicant states of 1967 were in a much more vulnerable position. This was because the onus had been put on them to demonstrate their ‘mutual responsiveness’ and express compatible values and interests with the existing member-states.4
Ireland was particularly susceptible to this pressure because accession was a matter of economic survival. The UK was also seeking membership of the EC and
Ireland’s trade relations with the UK necessitated simultaneous admission. The Irish economy had a disproportionate percentage of its trade with the UK and the singular admission of that country, which was a very real possibility, would have put Ireland in an extremely precarious economic position. By contrast, Ireland’s admission to the EC would have given it the opportunity not only to have guaranteed access to the British market in the immediate future but also, in the long term, to diversify its trade and reduce its dependence on the UK.
But, while the application for membership of the EC was an acknowledgement of the interdependence of the Irish economy, accession posed a dilemma for Ireland’s policy of neutrality, which was premised on independence from bloc influence or regional interests. Although in 1967 integration was only at the economic stage, the Treaty of
2 Lerche & Said, Concepts of International Politics, pp. 284-288. 3 J. Bayliss and S. Smith, (2001), The Globalization of World Politics (2nd ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 22-26.
259 Rome envisaged eventual political union. The members of the EC and the applicant states, other than Ireland, were all members of both the NATO and the Western European
Union security alliances. Furthermore, although they may have disagreed about the form of political cooperation, these states were also advocates of a greater concordance of foreign policies to promote their influence through the institution of the EC. This was demonstrated by the immediate and dramatic increase in the consultations and cooperation in political matters amongst the nine member-states from 1973.5 The interdependence and loss of sovereignty entailed in accession, as well as the re-alignment of interests towards Western Europe involved in the application for membership, were at conflict with Ireland’s previous policy of independence and neutrality. Ireland was the first of the European neutrals to accede to the EC and the only one to do so during the
Cold War. Austria, Sweden and Finland had made overtures for membership in the early
1960s but, ultimately, rejected it as a violation of their neutrality policies.
Since Ireland’s admission to the UN in the late 1950s and especially from the reinstatement of Frank Aiken as Minister for External Affairs in 1957, the diplomatic component of Irish neutrality was defined largely by its UN policy.6 During the late
1950s and the early 1960s, the UN delegation under Aiken developed a reputation for having a policy of “maverick neutrality”, where Ireland initiated and/or supported proposals for détente, disarmament and decolonisation. In many cases Ireland was alone
4 M. Hodges, (1978), ‘Integration Theory’, in Trevor Taylor (Ed), Approaches and Theory in International Relations, London: Longman, p. 243. 5 Correspondence to all Irish ambassadors from the Deputy Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 15 January 1974, NAI, DFA, 98/3/85. 6 In the military context, Ireland’s neutrality was defined by non-membership of alliances, especially NATO.
260 amongst Western nations in doing so and its policy came to take on many parallels with those of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Ireland’s policy of neutrality caused frustration in the capitals of the EC, especially in Paris. The French President, Charles de Gaulle, had vetoed the UK’s,
Denmark’s and Ireland’s EC applications in 1963 for political reasons. He doubted their commitment to the political ideals of the EC and feared that they would promote US or other objectives inside the group, rather than Western European interests. Ireland’s continued policy of neutrality was perceived to be an impediment to enhanced political integration. In particular, France was frustrated with Ireland’s support for decolonisation, when the key states of the EC were former colonial powers and nations whose trading interests brought them into conflict with the anti-colonial movement.
Thus, the renewed application for membership of the EC in 1967 was made under the shadow of another veto from de Gaulle and with the realization that Ireland was expected to demonstrate greater “Western Europeanization” than it had during its initial application.
When the application for EC membership was made in 1961 and renewed in
1967, Irish political figures went to great lengths to argue Ireland’s suitability for accession. They took an ambiguous approach, which was designed to satisfy both the opponents and the supporters of integration. To the former, the Irish Government argued that accession involved no defence or military responsibilities and that Ireland considered itself only to be bound by economic obligations. To the latter, Dublin emphasised that
Ireland was not a traditional or permanent neutral in the manner of other European neutrals and, therefore, would abandon neutrality if political integration evolved to that
261 degree, or in the event of a war if a member of the EC was attacked. Of course, this latter argument did not prove to be accurate, as Ireland declared neutrality in the Falklands conflict in 1983, despite the fact that the EC imposed economic sanctions against
Argentina for its aggression against the UK which, along with Ireland, was a member- state at this stage. Ultimately, the Irish position on the longevity of its neutrality was dependent upon the purpose and audience of the speech. When addressing integral role of Irish neutrality in the nation’s political culture, Ireland’s continued sovereignty over decision making was accentuated. But, when discussing the implications of EC membership, the political obligations were emphasised. Therefore, actual policy positions at the UN were more reliable in assessing the impact on Ireland’s foreign policy of the application for EC membership than the politically expedient declaratory speeches emanating from Dublin.
The activism of Irish neutrality did diminish during the early 1960s, as a result of the changing balance of the General Assembly. During the high-point of Irish neutrality
(1957-1961), Ireland was among a small number of neutral and middle-power states that held the balance of power and could wield considerable influence over various issues. In the early 1960s, however, there was a huge influx of non-aligned and newly independent
African and Asian nations, which altered that balance and undermined Ireland’s ability to maintain an active UN policy. From the mid-1960s, though, Ireland recaptured a semblance of its activism, due to the deterioration of various issues on the UN agenda.
Aiken was especially concerned by the failure of peacekeeping, growing opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the degeneration of the situation in Southern Africa, and again sought to exert influence over the UN’s response to these events. Therefore,
262 despite the pressure on the Irish Government to demonstrate its Western credentials, and statements indicating that its neutrality was flexible and subordinate to its objective of integration, Ireland’s neutral UN policy displayed considerable resilience. During the period 1965-1972, the policy on peace issues, the Cold War and decolonisation continued to manifest characteristics of the Irish conception of neutrality and or opposition to the interests of various member-states of the EC.
Ireland’s peace policy was most active under Frank Aiken, but even during the time of his successor, Patrick Hillery, the Irish delegation at the UN was a strong advocate of disarmament initiatives and a return to reliable financing of peacekeeping missions. On peace policy issues such as these, the General Assembly was divided along lines of power, especially between the permanent members of the Security Council and the small states. France and the Soviet Union were the foremost of the great powers that sought to preserve their hierarchical position in the UN. Despite the precarious position of the Irish application for membership of the EC and the sensitivity of relations with
France, Ireland’s UN delegation was one of the most prominent advocates of the rights of small states and of the authority of the General Assembly. Ireland’s policy was brought into direct conflict with French interests because the Irish delegation frequently adopted positions adversarial to France and, also, because it was responsible for initiating many of these positions. In this way, Irish peace policy at the UN continued to be in direct conflict with Ireland’s primary national objective – convincing France of its shared interests in a bid to forward the EC membership application.
Ireland formulated proposals for a reform of the financing of peacekeeping, which would have resulted in the restoration of a mandatory system of funding peacekeeping
263 operations as allocated by the General Assembly. Although the proposals had initial widespread support in the General Assembly, they were antithetical to France’s policy that all issues pertaining to peacekeeping should be decided in the Security Council. As a result, French and Soviet diplomatic lobbying eroded Ireland’s support and effectively emasculated the proposals. Nevertheless, despite France’s adamant opposition, the Irish delegation had formulated the proposals, advocated their implementation and fervently lobbied for their adoption.
Ireland’s peace policy had always involved strong support for disarmament, especially for the formulation of a non-proliferation treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty that was eventually presented to the General Assembly in 1967 was primarily formulated in bi-partisan negotiations between the USA and the Soviet Union. Therefore, although it had the support of the two superpowers and many small states, it was resolutely opposed by the threshold and nuclear powers excluded from the negotiation process, notably France. Nevertheless, Ireland continued to be heavily involved in the lobbying for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including negotiating with nations in France’s sphere of influence – in the EC and Francophone African states. Furthermore, the Irish delegation was prominently involved in opposing later efforts by France and the threshold group to undermine the treaty in the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Ireland was also instrumental in co-sponsoring other supplementary disarmament measures openly rejected by the French delegation at the UN.
The vulnerability of the Irish application for EC membership did not alter the peace policy aspect of Ireland’s UN policy, despite the adversarial nature of French and
Irish diplomacy on these issues. Ireland’s peace policy at the UN was not only contrary
264 to French policy, it was at times provocative, singling out France and French arguments in its speeches, targeting nations in the French sphere with its diplomacy, suggesting amendments to resolutions that directly challenged French interests and proposing draft resolutions, which France had indicated it would not accept. This verified the clear insulation of Ireland’s UN delegation from the policy imperatives dictated by the EC application. Whilst Dublin perceived Irish interests to be furthered by coordinating policy with France, the delegation in New York saw those interests to be served by a conflict with French policy on peace issues.
There has been considerable commentary in the literature on Irish foreign policy about the conflict between the second and third principles elucidated by Liam Cosgrave, the Minister for External Affairs, at Ireland’s first UN session in 1956. The second principle was to adopt a policy of independence, or neutrality, and avoid association with blocs and groups. The third principle was to express solidarity with the West in ‘the great ideological conflict which divides the world’.7 There is an apparent overt conflict between these two principles and the common view of the literature has been of the two principles struggling for ascendancy in determining the formulation of Irish policy. It is true that different Ministers for External Affairs placed different emphasis on each of these principles. At the same time though, the reality was that the two principles were not mutually exclusive and were satisfied by different aspects of Ireland’s UN policy. As indicated by Cosgrave, Ireland associated itself with the West on issues that had clear geo-political Cold War overtones. But, on the other hand, Ireland’s peace policy and its stance on decolonisation were clearly independently formulated.
7 Cited in Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, p. 37.
265 Ireland’s policy with respect to geo-political Cold War issues, where there were clear divisions of East and West, was often associated with US policy. Conor Cruise
O’Brien had even warned that this could prejudice the prospects of Ireland’s effort to achieve membership of the EC, because de Gaulle’s primary concern with expansion of this group was that the applicant states would be advocates of US interests if they were admitted. In the period 1965-1972 this continued to be the case, as Ireland’s voting record on a range of geo-political Cold War issues followed the policy formulated in
Washington and was often adversarial to the French position. Ireland’s policy on the divisive issues of the UN presence in Korea, the conflict in Vietnam, the crisis in the
Middle East and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia all showed signs of adherence to the USA. By contrast, during the mid-1960s, France had increasingly distanced itself from conventional US led Western policy on many issues of the Cold War in a bid to assert its status as a world power. France led a small group of Western states, which openly criticised US policy on a number of Cold War issues, most notably Vietnam, the representation of China at the UN, and the Middle East situation.
Nevertheless, the Irish delegation continued perennially to adhere to US policy.
Ireland supported the continued UN presence on the Korean peninsula and argued that its withdrawal would jeopardize peace in the region. The Korean situation was a rare case of Western solidarity, but Ireland voted conspicuously as a Western state, and not as a neutral. Ireland’s approach to the Vietnam conflict, both inside and outside the UN, was similarly aligned with US interests. The Irish delegation managed repeatedly to avoid references to the Vietnam conflict at the UN and, on the few occasions that it did address the issue, was careful to avoid any criticism being directed at Washington. But, while
266 Ireland was silent on the role of Washington in the Vietnam conflict, it was openly critical of Moscow over its intervention in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of
1968. Similarly, the Irish delegation opposed the inscription of Vietnam on the General
Assembly agenda, but was extremely vocal about the necessity of inscribing the Soviet
Union’s repression of the Dubček Government. With respect to the situation in the
Middle East, Ireland’s position was premised on a comprehensive settlement that included the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories. But, the fact that the Irish delegation did not call for the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of these forces betrayed its pro-Western orientation.
On these politically divisive Cold War issues, Ireland’s policy came into conflict with that of France. But in these cases, it was the French delegation that deviated from
Western norms and there was little pressure on Ireland to distance itself from US policy.
At the same time, Ireland’s adherence to the USA on Cold War issues was conspicuous and could have undermined the EC application, with Irish interests perceived as being associated more with the USA than with Western Europe.
Irish policy during this period changed on only one Cold War issue – the representation of China. From 1961, when the admission of Communist China became a possibility, Ireland supported US policy, which was to perpetuate Taiwan’s admission at the expense of the People’s Republic of China. Aiken had always supported the right of
Beijing to argue its case and have its representation discussed, but he had also advocated the imposition of various preconditions, as well as the continued representation of
Taiwan and further study of the situation, before Communist China was admitted to the
UN. Beijing viewed preconditions as discriminatory, refused to be seated alongside
267 Taiwan, which it considered a “rebel province” protected by the US Navy, and rejected further study of the situation as designed to postpone or impede its admission. Irish policy on the issue of the representation of China underwent significant changes in 1969 and 1970 at the direction of Patrick Hillery, who was Minister for External Affairs at the time, in line with a growing international acceptance of Beijing’s right to admission to the UN. In 1970, Ireland abstained on the resolution to replace the delegates of Taiwan with those from Communist China for the first time and then, in 1971, moved to support this solution. Hillery’s appointment as Aiken’s successor, and the shift in policy on the representation of China, were signs that Ireland was increasingly identifying itself more with Western Europe than with the USA.
Much of France’s frustration with Ireland’s UN policy pertained to the Irish delegation’s stance on decolonisation. Ireland had a history of struggle for independence from colonial occupation and regarded the separation of the Six Counties of Northern
Ireland from the Republic to be a continuation of such occupation. Consequently, Dublin was a strong advocate of decolonisation and UN intervention in such matters. In contrast, the EC member states were former colonial powers and maintained strong trading links with the colonial states of Southern Africa. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, as Ireland’s renewed application for membership of the EC was being pressed,
Irish policy on decolonisation remained in clear conflict with that of France and the member-states of the EC.
Ireland’s support for decolonisation was aimed at cultivating support amongst the anti-colonial nations of Africa and Asia to further its position on Northern Ireland, as well as the general principles of decolonisation consistent with ending partition. The
268 Minister for External Affairs, Patrick Hillery, brought the Northern Ireland problem directly to the UN after the eruption of the troubles in 1969, seeking the intervention of a peacekeeping force. But this initiative did not receive the support Hillery expected from other anti-colonial states and, also, met with a clear veto on the part of the UK. When the
USA supported the UK and urged Ireland to reconsider its position, the issue was allowed to die.
Nevertheless, on issues with comparable principles, Ireland continued to display a decidedly anti-colonial policy. This was most obvious with respect to the situation in
Gibraltar, which the Irish delegation argued involved parallel principles to those in
Northern Ireland and, in doing so, was almost alone amongst Western States. Ireland supported the Spanish claim to the territory, even though that claim was made against
Ireland’s nearest neighbour and most important trading partner – the UK.
Despite Ireland’s renewed lobbying for accession to the EC in the mid-1960s, from 1966 Irish policy on decolonisation became more active. This was primarily in response to a deterioration of the situation in Southern Africa, which was threatening to descend into racial war. Ireland supported the referral of issues pertaining to this situation to the Security Council and recommended the use of force against South Africa for its refusal to terminate its control of Namibia, as well as the imposition of sanctions against both Portugal and South Africa for their use of apartheid. The Irish delegation not only supported resolutions articulating these courses of action, Frank Aiken was also primarily responsible for the inclusion of the clause calling for the use of force against
South Africa in the case of Namibia. Ireland also implemented the voluntary and mandatory sanctions requested by the UK and the UN against Southern Rhodesia for its
269 unilateral declaration of independence and policy of apartheid. The Irish delegation also supported various resolutions that condemned Western states for their continuing trade with the minority regimes of Southern Africa and their obstruction of decolonisation.
Irish delegates frequently made speeches deploring apartheid and other colonial practices, whilst most Western delegates minimized their participation in debates.
Despite these fervent anti-colonial policies, Ireland’s UN policy was characterised by significantly greater moderation than those of the nations of the Non-Aligned Movement.
In many respects this was the product of cultural difference as, in line with Western conventions, Irish speeches remained devoid of indignant rhetoric and Ireland also refused to support Afro-Asian attempts to expel South Africa from UNCTAD.
The primary reason that Ireland’s UN policy continued to manifest positions unpalatable and hostile to France and other EC member-states, at the same time as
Ireland’s national interests were orientated towards appeasing these nations, was the fragmentation of decision-making in the formulation of foreign policy. Irish foreign policy in this era was distinguished by the clear separation of decision-making in issues of politics and security on the one hand, and economic treaties and the application for membership of the EC, on the other. From the early 1960s, the pursuit of economic advantages in the international arena was the driving impetus in the formulation of Irish foreign policy, but it did not encroach upon policy formulation of security concerns or
UN policy.
Ireland’s diplomacy in New York remained the province of the Department of
External Affairs, whilst policy pertaining to external economic relations was governed by the economic departments. Thus, whilst the Minister for External Affairs was the
270 Chairman of the Irish delegation to the UN in New York, the most prominent negotiators in Ireland’s application for membership of the EC were the Taoiseach and the Ministers for Industry and Commerce, Finance, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Labour. An indication of this compartmentalisation of Ireland’s foreign policy can be seen in the fact that Ireland’s application for membership of the EC was renewed in 1967 by the Irish
Ambassador to the EC, Sean Morrissey, because the Minister for External Affairs was attending the Fifth Special Session of the UN in New York.
The dichotomy of Irish foreign policy allowed contradictory objectives to be pursued and facilitated the insulation of UN policy from the efforts to integrate with the
EC. The separation of decision-making in determining high and low politics allowed
Irish foreign policy to appear ambiguous in order to satisfy two competing foreign policy pressures. Ireland could pursue prosperity through economic interdependence and
European integration, but also satisfy the nation’s cultural and ideological pressures for prestige, status and independence in the international community, which were associated with neutrality and Ireland’s UN policy.
In Paris, Ireland was considered to be a prodigal Western European nation because of its UN policy. There was seldom any reference by the Irish UN delegation to events in Europe, the EC or Ireland’s EC application, in either the formulation or explanation of its UN policy. The Irish delegation did monitor the policies of the EC member-states, but this was in the context of a wider scrutiny of Western policy.
Concerns on the part of these states about Ireland’s foreign policy were not usually raised with Ireland’s UN delegation but, rather, with Irish diplomats and political figures involved in deliberations concerning EC membership, or through indirect channels, such
271 as in editorials and public statements by European politicians. In these communications, the message was invariably that there was an onus on Ireland to prove its Western
European credentials. Nevertheless, the dichotomization of Irish foreign policy explains why Ireland was able to maintain a UN policy often patently hostile to French interests, while at the same time delegations visited Paris from Dublin to press the Irish application and attest that Ireland shared the objectives of France and the other EC member-states.
The fragmentation of foreign policy was the approach favoured by both Sean
Lemass and Jack Lynch, whilst Frank Aiken was the Minister for External Affairs.
Aiken had been the architect of Ireland’s neutrality at the UN under de Valera and he continued this role subsequently with full sovereignty over policy decisions on matters pertaining to security and UN policy. This was soon recognized as a cumbersome approach to foreign policy, however, and an impediment to the objectives of the pro-
European elements of the Irish Government. Thus, the appointment of Patrick Hillery, with his experience in the economic portfolios, was intended to centralize decision- making in foreign policy under the Minister for External Affairs. But, even though
Hillery took greater control over the low politics of foreign policy, he deferred much of the responsibility for UN policy to the Permanent Representative in New York.
Consequently, even after Hillery’s appointment in 1969, Ireland’s UN delegation still perpetuated most of the policies of the Aiken era.
On 1 January 1973, Ireland became the first neutral to join the EC, when it acceded along with the UK and Denmark. Accession immediately brought involvement in the process of European political cooperation and Ireland participated in frequent meetings at various levels, as well as at least four ministerial meetings per year and
272 periodic summit meetings, in addition to more numerous bi-lateral contacts. As a consequence, Ireland did vote increasingly in accordance with the other member-states of the EC from 1973 and, in 1976, even abstained on a resolution calling for an arms embargo against South Africa because the preamble included allegations about an un- named Western European nation.8 Furthermore, although it did withdraw from the EC sanctions against Argentina, the Irish Government initially participated at the request of the UK.9
Nevertheless, throughout Ireland’s membership of the EC, neutrality has been a sacrosanct aspect of Irish nationalism’s perception of Ireland’s historical experience and, increasingly in recent years, prompted by participation in the Euro and the prospect of eastward expansion of the European Union, questions have been raised about those aspects of culture and sovereignty that have been sacrificed.10 In 1973, the Minister for
External Affairs, Garret FitzGerald, announced that Ireland would continue to follow a neutral line in the UN despite its participation in European political cooperation. Even after accession, Ireland continued to promote decolonisation, disarmament and peacekeeping, irrespective of the opposition of its EC partners. It was on these issues that were most closely associated with Ireland’s application of neutrality at the UN, that
European political cooperation was weakest.11 Furthermore, Ireland removed itself from the sanctions applied by the EC against Argentina during the Falklands War on the basis that it was a neutral state. In this respect, when the Government of Ireland deposited the ratification for the Single European Act of the European Community in June 1987, it
8 Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, pp. 165-175. 9 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 1. 10 Irish Times, 23 September 2000, pp. 10, 11, 14. 11 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 87.
273 simultaneously deposited a declaration referring to Ireland’s policy of military neutrality.12 Nevertheless, despite these indications of neutrality, Ireland participated in the Western European Union with observer status from 1994 and membership of the
Partnership for Peace13 in 2000.
The ambiguous approach of the Irish Government to neutrality and European integration had its origin in its application for membership in 1961 and its renewal in
1967. When the government made those applications, it also made contradictory announcements about the continuation of the policy of neutrality. During the period
1965-1972, the Irish UN delegation continued many of the policies that had been associated with neutrality, even whilst Irish politicians in Brussels were arguing Ireland’s suitability for membership of the EC. It was a situation that had its inception in a fragmented approach to the formulation of foreign policy, but which has proven to be prolonged because both neutrality and membership of the European Union have become ingrained in Irish conceptions of national identity.
12 Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, p. 5. 13 The Partnership for Peace was NATO’s avenue for collaborating with the neutral and non-aligned states of Europe, as well as those of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), though it contains no security guarantees. The NACC was established in December 1991 as a forum for discussion between NATO states, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.
274 APPENDIX 1: STRUCTURE OF THE IRISH DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
[This chart is not available online. Please consult the hardcopy thesis available from the QUT Library.]
- 275 - APPENDIX 2: THE ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
[This chart is not available online. Please consult the hardcopy thesis available from the QUT Library.]
- 276 - APPENDIX 3: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES
[This chart is not available online. Please consult the hardcopy thesis available from the QUT Library.]
- 277 - APPENDIX 4: THE IRISH PEACEKEEPING PROPOSALS OF 1966
Formulated in the Special Political Committee in the debate on Agenda item 33 – Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.
Originally circulated as draft resolution A/SPC/L.129 and later A/SPC/L.129/Add.1 and 2, the Irish proposals were included as Resolution A in the recommendations of the Special Political Committee.
“The General Assembly,
“Recalling the determination of the peoples of the United Nations, expressed in the Preamble to the Charter, to united their strength to maintain international peace and security and to promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples,
“Recognizing that the United Nations must have a reliable system for financing the measures duly decided upon by its organs to achieve the purposes of the Organization as set forth in Article 1 of the Charter,
“Convinced that if mandatory assessments are not retained to guarantee the financing of peace-keeping operations they will disappear for all other purposes of the United Nations as well,
“Recalling Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which provides that the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly,
“1. Expresses the opinion that, pending the adoption of an alternative system for financing peace-keeping operations: “(a) Peace-keeping expenditure of up to $100 million in any one year which is not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements or by items in the regular budget should be apportioned as follows: “(i) As to 5 per cent, among the group of economically less developed Member States; “(ii) As to 25 per cent, among the group of economically developed Member States, other than the permanent members of the Security Council; “(iii) As to 70 per cent, among the group of permanent members of the Security Council, to be assessed only on those permanent members which vote in favour of the operation provided, however, that no members shall be assessed for more than 50 per cent of the net cost of the operation and that any balance unassessed by reason of this proviso shall be added to the sum apportioned on the group of Members specified in sub-paragraph (ii) above; “(b) Expenditure in excess of $100 million in any one year should be assessed pro rata on the groups specified in sub-paragraphs (a) (ii) and (a) (iii) above; “(c) Within each group the amount to be paid by each Member State shall be in proportion to its capacity to contribute relative to the other members of the group as determined by the scale of assessments for the regular budget;
- 278 - “(d) Any State Member of the United Nations or other State or organization may make voluntary subscriptions to reduce the amount to be assessed on any or all of the groups; “2. Considers that the comprehensive review of the whole question of peace- keeping operations in all their aspects should be continued and completed as soon as possible.”
- 279 - BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. PRIMARY SOURCES
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280
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98/3/308: EEC – Legal Implications
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2000/14/320: Press Comments on Irish Proposals for Authorising and Financing UN Peace-keeping Operations
2000/14/322: Peace-Keeping: Notes and Documents on Peacekeeping
2000/14/370: Preparation and Circulation of Confidential Report on 22nd Session of U.N. General Assembly
2000/14/378: Preparation and Circulation of Confidential Report on 23rd Session of U.N. General Assembly
2000/14/415: Ireland and EEC
2000/14/465: Confidential Reports from Washington – 1969
2000/14/471: Confidential Reports from PMUN in New York – 1969
2000/14/472: Circulation of Political Reports – 1969
283 Department of the Prime Minister (Taoiseach).
2000/6/228: Atlantic Nations: Questions of Ireland’s Participation in Anti- Communist or Neutrality Pacts; NATO
2000/6/266: Department of External Affairs: Extents of its Functions in Ireland’s Economic Relations with other Countries
2000/6/281: United Nations: general; agenda and reports for meeting of regular sessions, 1969
2000/6/282: Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, New York and Geneva
2000/6/287: Israeli Invasion of Egypt, October 1956: Anglo-French Intervention: Arab-Israeli War, 1967
2000/6/355: Republic of Vietnam War 1968-
2000/6/386: European Economic Community + Free Trade Association
2000/6/462: General de Gaulle: Ex President of French: Visit to Ireland, May/June 1969
2000/6/463: Republic of China: Trade with Ireland
2000/6/558: Cyprus: Fight for Freedom
2000/6/609: Southern Rhodesia: Independence
Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Rathmines.
General Files on Neutrality
Public Record Office, London.
Records Created or Inherited by the Dominions Office & of the Commonwealth Relations & Foreign & Commonwealth Offices (DO)
DO 99/37: Republic of Ireland Parliamentary Papers, 1961-1965 (1)
DO 165/69: Briefings for the Ministerial Visits to Commonwealth Countries to Discuss the Problems of the United Kingdom Joining the European Economic Community, June/July 1961
284
DO 189/47: Anglo/Irish Economic Committee Meetings in Dublin, December 1960
DO 189/48: United Kingdom Economic Relations with the Irish Republic
DO 189/49: United Kingdom Economic Relations with the Irish Republic
DO 189/53: Anglo/Irish Economic Committee Meeting 1963
DO 215/20: Ireland and the EEC
DO 215/39: Attitude of the C/Wealth Countries to UK Membership of the EEC
DO 215/40: EEC, Official Committee on Europe
DO 215/41: Official Committee on Europe: British Membership of the European Economic Community
DO 215/42: Official Committee on Europe: British Membership of the EEC
DO 215/43: Official Committee on Approach to Europe: Eur(o) Papers
DO 215/44: Official Committee on Approach to Europe: Eur(o) Papers
DO 215/47: Future Relations Between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community
DO 215/48: Future Relations Between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community
DO 215/49: Future Relations Between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community
DO 215/59: European Economic Community: Method of Negotiation
Records of the Department of Economic Affairs (EW)
EW 5/3: Relations with Europe – Long Term Policy
EW 5/6: European Economic Community – Commonwealth Reactions to Possible United Kingdom Accession
EW 5/7: European Economic Community: Attitude of the Commission Towards British Entry
285
EW 5/8: European Committee
EW 5/33: Relations with the EEC - Publicity
Records of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Predecessors (FCO)
FCO 20/99: Irish Republic: External: Anglo/Irish Economic Committee 1967
FCO 20/101: Irish Republic: External: Anglo/Irish Economic Committee 1967: Briefs
FCO 30/29: E.F.T.A.: Relations with other International Organisations: E.F.T.A.: and the E.E.C.: Sweden and the E.E.C.
FCO 30/30: E.F.T.A.: Relations with other International Organisations: Sweden and the E.E.C.
FCO 33/412: Europe General: Political Affairs External Bilateral; British relatins with the European Community
FCO 33/754: Irish Republic: Political Affairs: Relations with France
FCO 33/755/1: Irish Republic: Political Affairs (External): Anglo-Irish Relations: Meetings Between Mr Lynch and P.M.
FCO 33/759/1: Irish Republic: Political Affairs (External): Anglo-Irish Relations
FCO 33/760/1: Irish Republic: Political Affairs (External): Relations with U.K.
FCO 33/772: Irish Republic: Political Affairs (External): Bilateral: Northern Ireland and the United Nations (Including the Human rights Issue)
FCO 33/773: Irish Republic: Political Affairs External: Northern Ireland and the U.N.
FCO 33/776: Irish Republic: Economic Affairs (External): Anglo-Irish Relations
FCO 62/7: European Economic Community: Western European Union Council: Meetings of
FCO 62/23: European Economic Community: Possible UK Membership of: Assessment of C/Wealth Relations
FCO 62/31: European Economic Community: The Irish Republic
286
FCO 62/32: EEC: the Irish Republic
FCO 62/91: Irish Republic: European Economic Community
FCO 62/92: EEC: Irish Republic: Proposed Visit to U.K.: of Taoiseach
FCO 62/94: Irish Republic: Visit: Lord Chalfont: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
FCO 2096: Irish Republic: Internal: Economic Situation
University College Dublin Archives
FRANK AIKEN PAPERS
Minister for External Affairs Files:
Council of Europe
European Economic Community
North Atlantic Pact
United Nations Organization General Assembly
UN Other Matters
General External Affairs Policy
Diplomatic Relations
Visits Abroad and to Ireland
Northern Ireland
United Nations Archives, United Nations Secretariat, New York.
S-0309: Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) – Subject Files 01/01/1964 – 31/12/1985
Series 79, Box 1, File 7, ACC: CY.B.07 – Ireland
287
Series 173, Box 11, File 1, ACC. 79/55: Ireland, Jan 1972-Dec 1973
Series 223, Box 3, File 10, ACC. RR 80/38: Special Representative – Recent developments – APR 1971
Series 223, Box 6, File 7, ACC. 69/208: Weekly press summaries March 1968
Series 223, Box 8, File 6, ACC. 69/208: Weekly press summaries – Feb 1968
Series 223, Box 9, File 7, ACC. 30/38: General – Notes on meetings with leaders, August 1971
Series 223, Box 9, File 8. ACC. RR 80/38: General – Draft Interim Report, September 1971
Series 225, Box 9, File 4, ACC. RR 80/70: Foreign – Ireland, March 1964 – December 1967
Series 225, Box 9, File 5, ACC. RR 80/70: Foreign –Ireland – Jan 1968 – Dec 1972
Series 226, Box 1, File 17, ACC. RR 80/38: General – Economic and Social issues – Jan 1969-MAY 1973
Series 226, Box 2, File 8, ACC.RR 80/70: General – Press Release and summaries – Jan 1964 – OCT 1970
Series 271, Box 3, File 10, ACC: Northern Ireland
Series 291, Box 10, File 4, ACC. 74/74: Countries – Ireland – Correspondence – August-September 1969
Series 291, Box 15, File 3, ACC: Countries – Untied Kingdom – Request for Peacekeeping force by Ireland
Series 303, Box 3, File 13, ACC. 86/006: Countries – Ireland
Series 303, Box 3, File 14K, ACC. 86/006: Countries – Ireland – Communication from individuals
Series 303, Box 4, File 1, ACC. 86/006: Countries – Ireland – Security Council
Series 309, Box 32, File 4, ACC. 87/005: Military Assistance – Ireland (04/01/1967-10/2/1968)
288 Series 374, Box 4, File 2, ACC: Personnel administration, appointment and movement of personnel, military observers – Ireland.
1.2 INTERVIEWS
Aiken, Frank (Junior) & Eileen, Greenvale Mill, Cappocksgreen, Ardee, County Louth, IRELAND, 31 August 2000.
Deady, John, Permanent Mission to the United Nations of Ireland, 1 Dag Hammarskjold Place, New York, 26 September 2000.
Hillery, Dr Patrick, On-line interview, 30 March 2002.
O’Brien, Richard, Irish Ambassador to Australia, Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia, 27 April 2000.
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2.2 ARTICLES
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Liska, G. (1969). “The ‘Third Party’: The Rationale of Nonalignment”. In L. W. Martin (Ed), Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
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Lynch. J. M. (1972). ‘The Anglo-Irish Problem’. Foreign Affairs, 50 (4), 601-617.
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Mackernan, P. (1984). ‘Ireland and Political Cooperation’. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 1 (4), 15-26.
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Manathunga, C. (1997). ‘The Evolution of Irish Disarmament Initiatives at the United Nations, 1957-1961’. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 7, 97-113.
Mansergh, M. (1989), ‘Ireland and Europe – A new balance’. In D. Keogh (Ed.), Ireland and the Challenge of European Integration, Hibernian University Press.
Marshall, C. B. (1969). ‘On Understanding the Unaligned’. In L. W. Martin (Ed), Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
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Morse, E. L. (1981). ‘The Transformation of Foreign Policies’. In Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (Eds), Perspectives on World Politics. Croom Helm: London.
Mulkeen, T. (1973). ‘Ireland at the UN’. Eire-Ireland, VIII (1), 3-12.
Murphy, G. (2000). “‘A Wider Perspective’: Ireland’s View of Western Europe in the 1950s”. In Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (Eds), Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism. Dublin: Four Courts Press.
Neuhold, H. (1979). ‘Permanent Neutrality and Non-Alignment: Similarities and Differences’. India Quarterly, XXXV (3), 285-308.
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‘Neutrality in the Nineties’. (1993). Contemporary Review, 262, 252-257.
O’Brien, C. C. (1967). Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa. Public Lecture delivered in Dublin on 20 July 1967. Published by the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement, September 1967.
O’Brien, C. C. (1968). ‘Ireland at the U.N. – 1’. Irish Times, 3 June 1968, p. 10.
O’Brien, C. C. (1968). ‘Ireland at the U.N. – 2’. Irish Times, 4 June 1968, p. 10.
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O’Grady, J. P. (1989). ‘Ireland’. In S. V. Papacosma and M. R. Rubin (Eds), Europe’s Neutral and Nonaligned States: Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources.
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Porevuo, M. (1988). ‘Finnish Neutrality and European Integration’. Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 16, 18-22.
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Pentland, C. (1981). ‘International Organizations and their Roles’. In Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (Eds), Perspectives on World Politics. Croom Helm: London.
Petrochilos, G. C. (1998). ‘The Relevance of the Concepts of War and Armed Conflict to the Law of Neutrality’. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 31, 1-31.
Prasad, B. (1969). ‘The General Experience of Non-alignment and its Prospects for the Future’. In L. Acimovic (Ed.), Non-alignment in the World of Today. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics.
Raymond, R. J. (1983). ‘Irish Neutrality: Ideology or Pragmatism’. International Affairs, 60 (1), 31-40.
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Skelly, J. M. (2000). ‘National Interests and International Mediation: Ireland’s South Tyrol Initiative at the Untied Nations, 1960-1’. In Michael Kennedy and Joseph
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Wilcox, F. O. (1969). ‘The Nonaligned States and the United Nations’. In L. W. Martin (Ed), Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
Wylie, P. (2000). ‘The Virtual Minimum’: Ireland’s Decision for De Facto Recognition of Israel, 1947-9. In Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (Eds), Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism. Dublin: Four Courts Press.
303 2.3 WEB SITES
Boylan, H. (1998). Ireland’s Millennium People, History and Politics: Sean Francis Lemass. [Web Document]. Available: http://wwa.rte.ie/millennia/people/lemasssean.html [22 November 2002]. Radio Teilifis Éireann.
Boylan, H. (1998). Ireland’s Millennium People, Public Figures: Cornelius Christopher (Con) Cremin. [Web Document]. Available: http://wwa.rte.ie/millennia/people/cremincon.html [22 November 2002]. Radio Teilifis Éireann.
Cain Web Services (2001). The Key Events of the Civil Rights Campaign (1964-1972). [Web Document]. Available: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/crights.htm [21 November 2001]. van Capelleveen, B. F. (2000). Sean Lemass. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.absolutefacts.com/data/lemass.htm [20 August 2002]. Absolute Figures.
Clark, J. & Ropp, A. (undated) Tet Offensive. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.kingsley.k12.mi.us/vietnam/tet.htm [17 September 2002]. Author.
Columbia Encyclopedia. (1995). De Valera, Eamon. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.slider.com/enc/15000/De_Valera_Eamon.htm [20 August 2002].
Department of Foreign Affairs, An Roinn Gnothal Eachtracha. (1999). Ireland in the World. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/facts/irelandintheworld.htm [30 August 1999].
Europa (2000). The History of the European Union. [Web Document]. Available: http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm [17 April 2000].
Europa (2001). The Member States of the European Union. [Web Document]. Available: http://europa.eu.int/abc/eu_members/index_en.htm [15 July 2001].
Europa (2001). The Treaties of the European Union. [Web Document]. Available: http://europa.eu.int/abc/treaties_en.htm [15 July 2001].
Government of Ireland. (2001). Houses of the Oireachtas Parliamentary Debates. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/. [18 January 2001]. Parliament of Ireland.
Government of the United States of America. (2001). The World Factbook 2001. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. [12 February 2002]. Central Intelligence Agency.
304 Internet Africa. (1997). Djibouti – Homepage. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.africanet.com/africanet/country/djibouti/. [31 March 2002]. Africanet.
Luby, Danian. (2002). People of Ireland. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.iol.ie/~dluby/index.htm [20 August 2002]. Ireland on the Net.
McRedmond, Louis. (1996). Ireland’s Millennium People, History & Politics: Conor Cruise O’Brien. [Web Document]. Available: http://wwa.rte.ie/millennia/people/ obrienconorcruise.html [23 November 2002]. Radio Teilifis Éireann.
McRedmond, Louis. (1996). Ireland’s Millennium People, History & Politics: Jack Lynch. [Web Document]. Available: http://wwa.rte.ie/millennia/people/lynchjack.html [30 August 2002]. Radio Teilifis Éireann.
Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia. (2000). Dahomey, Kingdom of. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.encarta.msn.com/index/conciseindex/24/ 02466000.htm?z=1&pg=2&br=1 [12 February 2001]. Microsoft Corporation.
National Archives of Ireland. (1999). Guide to Sources Relating to European Unity. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.nationalarchives.ie/eec.html [20 July 1999].
News America Digital Publishing. (1999). Timeline: The Road to the Euro. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.foxmarketwire.com/background/euro/timeline2.sml [27 May 1999]. Foxmarketwire.
Sublette, Carey. (2001). Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.fas.org/nuke/hew/Nwfaq/Nfaq7.html [20 February 2002].
United Nations Organisation (2003). Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945- 2003. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm [16 July 2003].
United Nations Information Technology Section, Department of Public Information. (2001). Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, Official Records of the UN Security Council. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/ scres67.htm [17 September 2002]. United Nations.
University of Lincolnshire and Humberside. (1999). History of the European Union. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.ulh.ac.uk/ls/staff/jeb/hist1.htm [27 May 1999].
Weiler, Joseph. (1997). Trading in and with Europe: the Law of the European Union. [Web Document]. Available: http://www.law.nyu.edu./weilerj/unit5/UnitV07.htm [16 August 2002].
305 2.4 NEWSPAPERS
Cork Examiner
Daily Telegraph
The Economist
Globe and Mail
Herald Tribune
Irish Anti-Apartheid News
Irish Independent
Irish News
Irish Press
Irish Times
New York Times
San Francisco Chronicle
San Francisco Examiner
2.5 UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
FitzGerald, G. (1992), Irish Neutrality and European Defence. Paper delivered to the Military History Society of Ireland.
Kearsley, H. I. (1993). The Evolution and cost effectiveness of peace-keeping: the Republic of Ireland as a Case Study. Conference Paper for Southeastern Lousiana University.
Manathunga, C. E. (1995). The Evolution of Irish United Nations Policy 1957-61: “Maverick” Diplomacy and the Interaction of “Possession” and International “Milieu” Goals. PhD thesis, University of Queensland.
O’Laoire, D. (1981). A European Defence Community; Prospects and Problems. Discussion Paper held at the Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Rathmines.
306 Quirke, N. (1990). Irish Foreign Policy, 1945-1955: The Relationship Between Neutrality and Sovereignty in a Changing Domestic and International Environment. PhD thesis, University of Queensland.
Scott, D. (undated). The European Parliament, European Security and European Union: The relevance for Ireland, Manuscript held at the Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Rathmines.
Spelman, G. T. (1998). The Viability of Neutrality as a National Policy in Time of War: A Comparative Study of Irish and American Neutrality in World War II, 1937-1945. Unpublished dissertation, Queensland University of Technology.
307