National Disaster Risk Assessment

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

Gregorčičeva 20–25, 1000 Ljubljana T: +386 1 478 1000 F: +386 1 478 1607 E: [email protected] http://www.vlada.si

Number: 84000-3/2016/3 Date: 7 December 2016

NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT

Version 1.1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction ...... 3 1.1 Introduction ...... 3 1.2 Disaster risk assessment as a novelty in disaster Investigation ...... 3 1.3 Organisational aspects of the development od disaster risk assessments ...... 5 2 Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters, and disaster risk matrices . 10 2.1 Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters ...... 10 2.1.1 Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people ...... 10 2.1.2 Criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage ....11 2.1.3 The criteria for the assessment of political and social risk impacts ...... 12 2.1.3.1 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the operation of state bodies…………………………………………...……13 2.1.3.2 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts of the functioning of major infrastructure systems …………….……...... 14 2.1.3.3 The criteria for the assessment of the psychosocial risk impact ……….…...…………………………………………...……...... 15 2.1.3.4 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal policitcal stability…………………………………………………...... 16 2.1.3.5 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability ……………..…………………………………...…………….17 2.1.3.6 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy or international stability..………….…….………..……...... 19 2.1.3.7 The final value and level of political or social risk impacts……………………………...…………………………………………...…20 2.1.4 Criteria for the assessment of likelihood of disasters ...... 21 2.2 Disaster risk matrices ...... 21 3 Disaster tisk and climate change ...... 26 4 Disaster risk assessment and critical infrastructure ...... 31 5 Summaries and conclusions of risk assessments for indiviudal disasters…………………………………..33 5.1 Risk Assessment for Earthquake ...... 34 5.2 Risk Assessment for Drought ...... 51 5.3 Risk Assessment for Floods ...... 64 5.4 Risk Assessment for Hazards of Biological, Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin for Human Health ...... 91 5.5 Risk Assessment for Highly contagious Animal Diseases ...... 105 5.6 Risk Assessment for Nuclear or Radological Accidents ...... 125 5.7 Risk Assessment for Railway Accidents ...... 139 5.8 Risk Assessment for Aircraft Accidents ...... 148 5.9 Risk Assessment for Large Wildfires ...... 161 5.10 Risk Assessment for Terrorism ...... 179 5.11 Risk Assessment for Ice Storms ...... 186 5.12 Risk Assessment for Accidents involving Dangerous Substances ...... 197 6 Joint Disaster Risk Assessment ...... 212 7 Overview of selected risk scenarios and risk analyses ...... 228 8 Conclusions ...... 229 9 Explanations and Abbreviations ...... 231 10 Sources ...... 233 11 Annexes ...... 235 11.1 Annex 1: Risk scenario: Earthquake in the Central Part of Slovenia ...... 236 11.2 Annex 2: Risk scenario: Major and catastrophic floods ...... 256 11.3 Annex 3: Risk scenario: The Occurrence of Foot-and-Mouth Disease ...... 293 11.4 Annex 4: Risk scenario: Aircraft Accident in a Populated Area...... 317 11.5 Annex 5: Risk scenario: Large wildfire Šumka-Železna vrata-Trstelj ...... 346 11.6 Annex 6: Risk scenario: Ice storm in February 2014 ...... 370 11.7 Annex 7: Risk scenario: Ice storm in February 2014 and Excessive Growth of Bark Beetle Populations after 2014 .429 12 Amendments and updates ...... 462

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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Based on Article 5(2a) of the Decree Implementing the Decision on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 62/14) the National Disaster Risk Assessment was prepared by the Administration Civil Protection and Disaster Relief of the Republic of Slovenia for (ACPDR), at the Ministry of Defence, as the National Coordinating Body for Disaster Risk Assessment in cooperation and in agreement with the authorities which are competent and responsible for the preparation of risk assessments for individual disasters. The Decree was adopted by Government Decision.

The Decree Implementing the Decision on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism transposed the content of Article 6(a) of the Decision No. 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (Official Journal, No. 347 of 20 December 2013, p. 924) into Slovenian legislation.

The National Disaster Risk Assessment is published on the public website of the ACPDR.

1.2 Disaster risk assessments as a novelty in disaster Investigation

Natural and other disasters present a constant threat to mankind. Since progress and welfare introduce greater vulnerability to the society as a whole, disasters nowadays result in increasingly greater damage and consequences. For this reason, disaster risk assessments are gaining in importance. The European Commission (EC) also devotes great attention to activities which refer to the content and the preparation of disaster risk assessments. To this end, the EC issued guidelines at the end of 2010 entitled ‘The Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management’, SEC (2010) 1626 final of 21 December 2010 (hereinafter ‘European Guidelines’), on the content and conceptual arrangement of the assessment and presentation of risks in risk management. Under these guidelines, the member states mutually coordinated the manner of production and the content of disaster risk assessments. By doing so, the EC wanted to encourage the member states to strive towards a more intense and coordinated work in this field, despite the different premises of individual states, through the use of similar methods and content of disaster risk assessments. The results of disaster risk assessments of the individual states would thus be more comparable, which would, in the end, allow the EC to prepare a unified overview of the risk of natural and other disasters in the European area.

As mentioned above, the legal bases for the development of disaster risk assessments is the Decision No. 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (Official Journal No. 347 of 20 December 2013, p. 924) (hereinafter ‘Decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism’), together with a number of other important documents (Council Conclusions on a Community Framework on Disaster Prevention within the EU, No. 15394/09, of 12 November 2009, Council Conclusions on Further Developing Risk Assessments for Disaster Management within the

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EU, No. 8068/11, of 25 March 2011). Among other things, Article 6 of the Decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, with effect from 1 January 2014, stipulates the deadlines for the development of risk assessments and the deadlines for reporting to the EC.

The ex-ante conditionality in the framework of the Partnership Agreement between Slovenia and the European Commission for the absorption of funds from the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) for the period 2014-2020 also falls in the category of additional and important challenges. An adequately developed National Disaster Risk Assessment for disasters, which occurred by the end of 2016, is one of the ex-ante conditionalities for the absorption of the EU funds in the framework of thematic area 5 of the Partnership Agreement between Slovenia and the European Commission (Adaptation to Climate change and Disaster Risk Management). The National Disaster Risk Assessment should be produced in compliance with European Guidelines and in compliance with the processes for the production of disaster risk assessments, as stated in ISO 31010 (especially the interministerial approach, cooperation of experts, scientists and the interested public, the public nature of disaster risk assessments, and taking climate change into account). The fulfilment of the ex-ante conditionalities in the field is one of the preconditions for the absorption of European funds. For investments in thematic area 5 (Adaptation to Climate change and Disaster Risk Management) in the period 2014-2020, the Republic of Slovenia (RS) expects to absorb approximately EUR 83 million from the European Structural and Investment Funds. These resources are predominantly intended for anti-flood construction measures in the competence of the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning.

Due to the nature and the scope of the contents, disaster risk assessments can, in compliance with the European Guidelines, serve as the basis for a number of activities in a number of different fields, in particular for:

 the planning of risk management for the purpose of prevention and preparedness;  the implementation of the appropriate risk prevention and preparedness measures;  the development of threat assessments and disaster response plans;  the development of financial strategies for measures aimed at preventing or reducing the possibility of the occurrence of disasters, responding to them, providing relief, and mitigating their consequences (the financial bases for disaster risk management);  the identification of priority investments to reduce the possibility of disasters or their consequences;  spatial planning;  planning of public investments;  planning of social protection;  identification of gaps in protection, rescue and relief forces and assets, and the planning of the augmentation of protection, rescue and relief forces and resources.

The first version of the assessment was developed in December 2015. In comparison to the 1.0 version, the 1.1 version includes new contents linked, in particular, to climate change and the future impact of climate change on the frequency, consequences and likelihood of individual natural and other disasters.

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A unified and coordinated approach to disaster risk assessment in the RS is an important foundation for the understanding of disasters as a phenomenon, especially from the aspect of assessing the scope of their impact and likelihood.

1.3 Organisational aspects of the development of disaster risk assessments

For the purposes of the implementation of tasks related to disaster risk assessments, the Government of the RS adopted the Decree Implementing the Decision on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 62/14, hereinafter the Decree) in August 2014. The Decree defined the types and the content of disaster risk assessments, the process of development of risk assessments for individual disasters, and the National Disaster Risk Assessment or the manner of amending disaster risk assessments with content related to climate change, and the adjustments to these changes. The Decree further defines the different types of disaster risk assessments, their competent authorities, and the competent authorities' responsibilities, their production processes, the methods available for their development, their content, and the manner of adopting and amending disaster risk assessments with emphasis on the introduction of content related to climate change. The Decree also defines the National Coordinating Body for Disaster Risk Assessments.

With the adoption and the implementation of this Decree, Slovenia began to fulfil part of the ex-ante conditionalities of the Partnership Agreement between Slovenia and the European Commission for the absorption of funds from the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) for the period 2014-2020, namely, for the absorption of financial assets from the European Structural and Investment Funds in thematic area 5 (Adaptation to Climate change and Disaster Risk Management), which must be met by the end of 2016 and which refer to the development of disaster risk assessments.

The Decree defined 12 disasters for which national risk assessments were developed for individual disasters at the national level in 2015, and their competent or responsible authorities. The overview of these disasters is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Competence for the development of risk assessments for individual disasters

RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR INDIVIDUAL Competent authorities DISASTERS Earthquake Ministry responsible for the environment Flood Ministry responsible for the environment Hazard to human health of biological, Ministry responsible for health chemical, environmental or unknown origin Highly contagious animal diseases Ministry responsible for agriculture Nuclear or radiological accident Ministry responsible for the environment Railway accident Ministry responsible for transport Aircraft accident Ministry responsible for transport Large wildfire Ministry responsible for agriculture

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RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR INDIVIDUAL Competent authorities DISASTERS Terrorism Ministry responsible for the interior Drought Ministry responsible for the environment Ice storm Ministry responsible for the Protection Against Natural And Other Disasters Accidents involving dangerous substances Ministry responsible for the environment

The Decree determined the deadline for the production of threat assessments for individual disasters: 1 June 2015. For purposes of meeting the different deadlines, frameworks were defined, and various supporting content and documents required for the preparation of the content and development of disaster risk assessments were prepared. Moreover, the National Coordinating Body for Disaster Risk Assessments and other competent and participating authorities which engage in the development of disaster risk assessments were appointed. To a large extent, the solutions, defined in the Decree, derive from the European Guidelines.

Risk assessments for individual disasters have the following Contents:

1. Introduction; 2. Description of the methods and techniques used in the development of disaster risk assessments; 3. Identification of disaster risks (description of disaster characteristics, risk scenarios); 4. Risk analyses on the basis of various scenarios (effects on people, economic and environmental impacts, impacts on the cultural heritage, political and social impacts, assessment of the level of reliability of data, and the likelihood of the results of the risk analyses); 5. Evaluation of disaster risk (criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters, a comparison of the results of risk analyses with risk criteria, disaster risk matrices, risk categorisation (geographic distribution of risks)); 6. Summary of the risk assessment; 7. Conclusion; 8. Explanation of terms, acronyms and abbreviations; 9. Bibliography; 10. Appendices; 11. Record of amendments and updates.

Based on the Decree, risk assessments for individual disasters which are directly or indirectly affected by climate change, and particularly the analysis and evaluation of these risks, shall also include content related to climate change, the assessment of risks posed by climate change, and the action plan for adapting to climate change. This content shall always be provided and coordinated by the authority responsible for of the adaptation to climate change.

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Risk assessments for individual disasters may also include proposals for preventive and other measures for the prevention or reduction of the possibility of disasters, proposals for disaster risk management, measures for the mitigation of the impact of risk, and proposals for measures for the systemic regulation of risk management on the basis of current policies, regulations and strategic documents in the area of specific risk, as well as other content determined by specific risk-related regulations.

The Decree further defines the development of the National Disaster Risk Assessment, which comprises summaries and a synthesis of the content and findings of individual disaster risk assessments.

The National Disaster Risk Assessment consists of the following Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters; 3. Summaries and conclusions of risk assessments for individual disasters, and the comparison of the results of disaster risk analyses from the risk assessments for individual disasters with the criteria of the risks, including the risk matrices for individual disasters; 4. Overall disaster risk assessment based on the results from the previous point, and the overall disaster risk matrices addressed in the National Disaster Risk Assessment; 5. Review of the selected scenarios of individual risks and the scenarios of several possible risks, as well as the analysis of these risks; 6. Review of the selected scenarios defining the course of several possible independent disasters in the same field, and the analysis of these risks; 7. Conclusion; 8. Explanation of terms, acronyms and abbreviations; 9. Bibliography; 10. Annexes; 11. Record of amendments and updates.

The National Disaster Risk Assessment shall also include the available content from the climate change risk assessment, provided by the ministry responsible for climate change. In addition, the content from existing national risk assessments for individual or other disaster may also be included in the assessment.

The Decree introduces numerous changes in the development of risk assessments for individual disasters, such as active inter-ministerial cooperation in the development of assessments, inclusion of experts and scientists, public involvement in the development of risk assessments, the publishing of the adopted threat assessments for individual disasters, and the coordination of individual content with the neighbouring states, among others.

Since risk assessments in individual fields are produced by different ministries, the Decree stipulated the establishment of a National Coordinating Body for Disaster Risk Assessments. The tasks of the National Coordinating Body for Disaster Risk Assessments are predominantly oriented towards the coordination and the provision of support and assistance to ministries in the development of risk assessments for individual disasters; information to the Government of the RS and the Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Disaster Risk

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Assessments on the activities and the progress achieved in the development of disaster risk assessments; reporting to the EC in line with commitments deriving from the Decision on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and the development of the National Disaster Risk Assessment. In the RS, these functions are carried out by the ACPDR.

At the end of 2014, an Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Disaster Risk Assessments was established. The Group is kept informed of the activities and the progress in the development of disaster risk assessments by the National Coordinating Body for Disaster Risk Assessments. The Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Disaster Risk Assessments includes representatives from all ministries. The group's main task is to disseminate the information on the situation regarding the development of disaster risk assessments, and the provision and coordination of the implementation of the planned or required activities carried out for purposes of the development of individual risk assessments within the ministries whose representatives are members of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Disaster Risk Assessments.

The National Coordinating Body for Disaster Risk Assessments periodically informs the Government of the RS of the topics and current issues related to disaster risk assessments. In respect thereof, the Government of the RS adopts individual decisions and documents. Among other things, the Government of the RS adopted the National Disaster Risk Assessment and the Report on the Development of Disaster Risk Assessments in the Republic of Slovenia for the European Commission.

The date set in the Decision on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, 22 December 2015, defined the date by which the EC member states were to submit the summary of important elements of their national disaster risk assessments. By producing the first version of the National Disaster Risk Assessment, and reporting to the EC on the preparation and development of disaster risk assessments, the RS met its commitment on time.

The development of the disaster risk assessments for individual disasters in 2015 which are included in the first version of the National Disaster Risk Assessment was carried out at a time when activities for the development of the assessment of the impact of climate change, and the development of the action plan for the adjustment to these changes, were already in place at the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, and are to be finished by the end of 2016 or later. Because of this, the climate content has for the most part not yet been included in disaster risk assessments for individual disasters affected by climate change which were developed in 2015. From this aspect, individual disaster risk assessments were amended in 2016 (Risk Assessment for Floods, Risk Assessment for Drought, Risk Assessment for Large Wildfires, and to a lesser extent the Risk Assessment for Highly contagious animal diseases and the Risk Assessment for the Hazards to Human Health of Biological, Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin). In line with the Decree, the ministry responsible for climate change is in charge of the provision of this content and the coordination of the use of all this content in the stated risk assessments for individual disasters. The Risk Assessment for Ice Storm was also amended, even though future climate change will most likely not have a negative or an additional impact on the occurrence of an ice storm. All significant amendments of the listed risk assessments for individual disasters are also reflected in the National Disaster Risk Assessment, Version 1.1.

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Risk assessments for individual disasters, with the exception of the Risk Assessment for Terrorism, are publically available at the websites of the relevant ministries (competent authorities) which prepared the assessments.

With the risk assessments for individual disasters developed in 2015, the amended risk assessments for individual disasters which also include the impact of climate change, and the developed Version 1.1 of the National Disaster Risk Assessment, which includes all the amendments, the RS meets the ex-ante conditionalities for the absorption of the European Structural and Investment Funds in the field of disaster risk assessments. The fulfilment of these conditionalities provides for investment in thematic field 5 (Adaptation to Climate change and Disaster Risk Management) of the Partnership Agreement between Slovenia and the European Commission for the absorption of funds from the European Structural and Investment Funds for the period 2014-2020, which should be met by the end of 2016.

The National Disaster Risk Assessment shall be amended and updated every three years; for the first time in 2018, with Version 1.0 of the Assessment serving as a basis. The amendments shall include the findings of risk assessments for individual disasters which will be developed after the year 2015, and later also amendments to the existing risk assessments for individual disasters which were initially developed in 2015.

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2 Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters, and disaster risk matrices

2.1 Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters

In order to establish the severity or the significance of individual risks, criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disaster occurrence had to be established for individual disasters prior to the preparation of risk assessments. These criteria can be used to compare the consequences or impact of different disasters and their likelihood or frequency. In compliance with the European Guidelines and the Decree, risk impacts are divided into impacts on people, economic and environmental impacts, and impacts on cultural heritage, including political and social impacts. In the spring of 2015, the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters were coordinated and adopted by the ACPDR, as the National Coordinating Body for Disaster Risk Assessments, at working meetings with different ministries which had developed risk assessments for individual disasters or participated in their development. Since the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters are uniform for all risks, not only a comparison of the results of the analyses of a number of different risk scenarios in the context of one risk is possible, but also the comparison of impacts or consequences and the likelihood of disaster occurrence for an individual risk with other risks. The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disaster occurrence are divided into five levels, which define the level of impacts or the likelihood as:

1 – very low 2 – low 3 – medium 4 – high 5 – very high

There follows the description of individual criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters.

2.1.1 Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people

The risk impacts on people in relation to the type of risk can predominantly refer to the number of deaths, the number of injured or sick, the number of permanently evacuated people, the number of people living and working in the areas which are affected by the disaster, and others (e.g. impacts on vulnerable population groups, such as children, the elderly and the socially disadvantaged). For disasters with possible long-term impacts (such as accidents involving dangerous substances and nuclear or radiological accidents), these impacts are used or determined based on the number of fatalities and injured or sick people during the period of 10 years following the disaster. The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people, however, are expressed in the number of the dead, injured, sick or permanently evacuated people, as shown in Table 2.

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Included in the number of casualties are the possible dead and injured members of the protection, rescue and relief (PRR) forces involved in PRR emergency response operations, and the number of policemen, Slovenian Armed Forces members and emergency response teams of different services (the emergency medical services, teams from electrical companies, public utilities companies and others) who have died or were injured, either during the execution of emergency measures within their competence or during the initial restoration activities, but not longer than one year after the disaster. Included in the risk matrices are the highest values of impact in reference to the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people.

Table 2: Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people

Criteria for the assessment of 1 2 3 4 5 risk impacts on people

Number of fatalities Up to 5 5-10 10-50 50-200 More than 200 Number of fatalities (10 years)* Up to 5 5-10 10-50 50-100 More than 100 Number of injured or sick people Up to 10 10-50 50-200 200-1000 More than 1000 Number of injured or sick people Up to 10 10-50 50-200 200-500 More (10 years)** than 500 Number of evacuated people Up to 20 20-50 50-200 200-500 More (permanent measure) than 500 1-5: Level of impact. *For disasters with possible long-lasting impacts (e.g. up to 10 years), such as disasters involving dangerous substances and nuclear or radiological disasters, the long term values for fatalities and the injured or sick people (10 years) can be defined separately or applied as stated above, if necessary. ** The injured or sick people also include people who were exposed to radiation contamination or poisoning. In risk analyses, such people can be addressed separately in the case of individual risks.

2.1.2 Criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage

The following impacts can be included in the economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage in reference to risks: the number, the consequence and the amount of damage to facilities; expenses for the operation of ministries and bodies which carry out activities within their competence in restrictive situations; the scope and the amount of damage to agricultural and forest land, to facilities or to cultural heritage areas; expenses for restrictions on the use of food and long-term expenses in the food supply chain; the scope and the amount of damage to bodies of water; the number of damaged or destroyed vehicles and damage resulting in connection thereto; the number, damage and expenses due to dead or sick domestic or wild animals, and animals which require treatment or which have to be put to sleep; expenses for medical care of people; damage due to the termination of an economic activity; social and other similar expenses; investment expenses and other possible international assistance; expenses for the comprehensive long-term renovation (restoration) of facilities and equipment; expenses for the comprehensive and long-term

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The criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and the impacts of risk on cultural heritage are expressed through the amount of expenses and damage caused by an individual risk. The line between the level of risk of the second and the third classes out of five is set at 0.6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is the basis for the establishment of limit values for the remaining classes. To a large extent, this baseline value refers to the value of 0.6% of Gross National Product (GNP). If the damage exceeds the value of 0.6% of GNP due to a disaster, the RS may request the EU for non-refundable funds from the EU Solidarity Fund. In the RS, the values of GNP and GDP are similar (GNP is slightly lower), and for this reason, GDP is also used for the assessment of risk impacts for an individual disaster. In 2014, GDP stood at approximately EUR 36.2 billion, while the value of 0.6% of GDP was rounded up to EUR 220 million. These values were used for all risk assessments for individual disasters which were produced in 2015 and also for risk assessments for individual disasters which were amended in 2016. These values will change each year, based on the growth in GDP.

Table 3: Criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on the cultural heritage

1 2 3 4 5 Up to 0.3% GDP Between 0.3% Between 0.6% Between 1.2% More than 2.4% of and 0.6% of and 1.2% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP GDP GDP

Up to EUR 100 EUR 100-220 EUR 220-440 EUR 440-880 More than EUR million million million million 880 million 1-5: Levels of impact.

2.1.3 The criteria for the assessment of political and social risk impacts

The political and social risk impacts may, in reference to risk, include categories such as risk impact on the operation of state bodies; the impact of the non-functioning of important infrastructural systems on everyday life; psycho-social impacts; the internal political stability and its impact on law and order; financial stability; and the foreign political or international stability (situation) of the country. The criteria for the assessment of political and social risk impacts are partly qualitative. In comparison to the former impact groups, for which concrete data and numbers were available, this group of impacts refers to the assessment of the order of grandeur of the impacts concerned.

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The final value or the level of political and social risk impacts are defined by adding up the final values or the values of all groups of political and social risk impacts and dividing this number by the number of all impacts, as a rule by 6. The risk impacts which were not assessed are not taken into consideration.

2.1.3.1 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the operation of state bodies

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of state authorities are presented in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 4: The ability of state authorities (the Government, ministries, constituent bodies, administrative units) to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility in the affected area. Duration Limited Strongly impaired Disabled

Up to 2 days 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 1 2 Up to 15 days 2 2 3 Up to 30 days 2 3 4 More than 30 days 3 4 5 1-5: Levels of impact. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Table 5: The number of people affected by hindered or disrupted provision of services of state authorities (either physically or functionally)

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5000 More than people/duration and 5000 and 50,000 50,000

Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 days 4 5 5 5 1-5: Levels of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). In addition, the impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The final level or value of risk impacts on the operation of state bodies is defined by dividing the sum of individual values from Tables 4 and 5 by the number of impacts taken into account. The value may be a whole number or a decimal.

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2.1.3.2 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems are presented in Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6: Lack of or difficult access to drinking water, food and energy products (electricity, heating, fuel)

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5000 More than people/duration and 5000 and 50,000 50,000

Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 days 4 5 5 5 1-5: Levels of impact. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If a variety of contents has the same level of impact, the impact which affects the most people is used. If, in a minimum of two cases, the same numbers of people are affected, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). In addition, the impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Table 7: The highly limited or disabled use of the internet and telecommunication systems, arrival to work in educational institutions, use of public services (access to the media, medical services, banking services etc.), use of public transport, and the provision or purchase of life essentials.

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5000 More than people/duration and 5000 and 50,000 50,000

Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 days 4 5 5 5 1-5: Levels of impact. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If a variety of contents has the same level of impact, the impact which affects the most people is used. If, in a minimum of two cases, the same numbers of people are affected, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration. If the impacts of a disaster are not included in the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). In addition, the impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The final level or value of risk impacts on the operation of important infrastructure systems is defined by dividing the sum of the values from the previous two tables with the number of impacts taken into account. The value of this group of impacts may be a whole number or a decimal.

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2.1.3.3 The criteria for the assessment of the psychosocial risk impact

The criteria for the assessment of the psychosocial risk impact can be found in Tables 8, 9 and 10.

Table 8: The number of people showing an unusual or undesired behavioural reaction to the disaster, such as avoiding attending school or kindergarten, deliberate absence from work; deliberate avoidance of public transport; desire to move to another location, irrational financial operations (mass cash withdrawals, etc.); accumulation and appropriation of stocks of basic necessities; and similar reactions.

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5000 More than people/duration and 5000 and 50,000 50,000

Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 days 4 5 5 5 1-5: Levels of impact. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If a variety of contents has the same level of impact, the impact which affects the most people and lasts the longer is used. If the impacts of a disaster are not included in the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). In addition, the impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Table 9: Social impacts

Types of social impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 The poorest segments of the population find themselves in severe social distress; the number of applications for extraordinary social 2 assistance benefits in cash is increasing. The consequences of the disaster are also felt by the middle-class population, which is reflected in the increased number of 3 applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash. The consequences of the disaster are felt by the majority of the population, which is reflected in a large increase in the number of 4 applications for social assistance benefits. The consequences are felt by the entire population, which is reflected mainly in new applications for social assistance benefits 5 and renewed applications for the allocation of assistance. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

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Table 10: Psychological impacts

Types of psychological impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of fear among the population owing to the lack of 2 information regarding the causes for the disaster and its characteristics and consequences. Increased level of fear among the population, especially of a new 3 disaster and its consequences. The population fear for their lives; decreased confidence in the 4 responsible authorities regarding their response and mitigation and elimination of disaster consequences; increased desire to relocate. Owing to the negative events or consequences of a disaster, the 5 majority of people cease to believe that life in the affected area could return to a normal state; mass relocation is taking place. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The final level or value of psychosocial impacts is defined by dividing the sum of the values from Tables 8, 9 and 10 by the number of impacts taken into account. The value of this group of impacts may be a whole number or a decimal.

2.1.3.4 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal political stability

Table 11: Risk impacts on internal political stability and law and order

Types of impacts Level of impact

Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of public expression of disagreement with the actions 2 of the responsible institutions; or individual disruptions in the functioning of political institutions (the Government, the Parliament, etc.); individual occurrences of hostile campaigns. Individual cases of violation of law and order and criminal offences 3 resulting from the disaster; observed expressions of fear for one’s own safety and property; individuals or groups are trying to undermine the internal political situation; reduced trust of the population in the functioning of political institutions. Increased number of violations of law and order and organised 4 criminal offences; increased fear among the population; political parties and other interest groups are trying to undermine internal political stability and obtain political benefits by "imposing" their own

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Types of impacts Level of impact programmes for improving the situation; reduced trust in the functioning of state institutions. Massive violations of law and order including violent demonstrations; 5 significant increase in the number of criminal offences; the internal security of the country is at risk. The internal political stability of the country is undermined; the basic rights provided for in the Constitution are undermined and at risk. If it is estimated that the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, the impact of such a disaster is not evaluated in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts may only be a whole number.

2.1.3.5 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability are presented in Tables 12, 13 and 14.

Table 12: Impact on legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to a payment system failures

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more than one business day. 1-5: Level of impact. *Disruptions at the end of the business day, even if they only last a short time, can cause a one day delay in the settlement of payments.If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Table 13: Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to lack of cash

Number of affected Up to 5000 Up to 50,000 More than 50,000 people/duration

Up to 2 days 1 2 3 From 2 to 7 days 2 3 4 More than 7 days 3 4 5 If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). In addition, the impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Legend: 1 – No or small impact. 2 – Legal and natural persons have difficulties accessing cash in their place of residence. 3 – Legal and natural persons can access cash in neighbouring areas. 4 – Legal and natural persons can access cash in bigger cities or in individual areas. 5 – Cash cannot be accessed.

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Table 14: Changes in GDP growth owing to a disaster in the year of the disaster or in the following year

Changes in GDP growth Level of impact

No impact because disaster impacts do not refer to the contents/no Not assessed (NA) consequences Between 0 and -0.5 percentage points 1 Up to -1 percentage point 2 Up to -1.5 percentage points 3 Up to -2 percentage points 4 Over -2 percentage points 5 If it is estimated that a disaster will not have a negative impact on the growth in GDP, or if the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, the levels of impacts are not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

The final level or value of risk impacts on financial stability is determined by dividing the sum of the individual values from Tables 12, 13 and 14 by the number of impacts taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal.

2.1.3.6 The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy or international stability

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy and international stability are presented in Table 15.

Table 15: Foreign policy (international) risk impacts

Type of foreign policy or international impact Level of impact

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Type of foreign policy or international impact Level of impact

A part of the international community (countries, international organisations) is responding to the event by expressing support or 4 concerns about the situation. The RS is receiving international assistance, especially in equipment and human resources. Despite the international assistance, Slovenia remains a stable country. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the RS are advising their citizens against travelling to certain areas of the RS. A large part of the international community is responding strongly to the events in the country, since the events are strongly 5 impacting the security of other countries. The RS is receiving significant international assistance (equipment, money, human resources). The RS urgently needs assistance to ensure a normal functioning of the entire system. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the RS are advising their citizens against travelling to the RS and are decreasing or increasing the number of staff at these missions and posts owing to the situation in the country. International events, whose main topic is the position of or the situation in the RS. If it is estimated that the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, the impact of such a disaster is not evaluated in reference to this content (NA). In addition, the impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can only be a whole number.

2.1.3.7 The final value and level of political or social risk impacts

The final value and level of political and social risk impacts is determined by adding up the final values or the values of all groups of political and social risk impacts and dividing this number by the number of all impacts, i.e. by 6. If a certain group of political or social risk impacts was not assessed, because these risk impacts do not refer to the assessed content (NA), this group is not taken into account in the final calculation. In addition, the impacts which refer to the contents assessed but which were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The final calculation of the value of political and social risk impacts may be a decimal number between 1 and 5. In this case, the final level of political and social risk impacts is calculated based on Table 16. The final level must be a whole number.

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Table 16: The conversion of the value of political and social impacts into the level of political and social risk impacts

The average value of political and social The level of political and social risk risk impacts impacts

1.00-1.49 1 1.50-2.49 2 2.50-3.49 3 3.50-4.49 4 4.50-5.00 5

2.1.4 Criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of disasters

The likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster can be defined in numbers, percentages or described, which is evident from Table 17.

Table 17: Criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of a disaster

1 2 3 4 5

Once in more Once every Once every 25 to Once every 5 to Once in or more than every 250 100 to 250 100 years 25 years often than every years years 5 years

(Annual (Annual (Annual likelihood (Annual (Annual likelihood of up likelihood of of between 1 and likelihood of likelihood of to 0.4%) between 0.4 4%) between 4 and more than 20%) and 1%) 20%)

Hardly any risk Possible but Possible risk General risk Specific and (threat) less likely risk (threat) (threat) imminent (threat) (permanent) risk (threat) The descriptive definition is used especially for disasters which do not follow a natural cycle of occurrence, or for intentional acts which cannot be predicted (e.g. terrorism) due to the specifics of their occurrence. For other disasters, the time periods listed in the upper part of the table are taken into account.

2.2 Disaster risk matrices

The disaster risk matrices are used for the graphic display of the size of impacts established in risk assessment analyses for individual disasters, and the likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster or the likelihood of individual risk scenarios, if only one risk is addressed. Disaster

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 22/464 ______risk matrices were one of the main objectives of the preparation of individual disaster risk assessments; the same applies to the National Disaster Risk Assessment.

Disaster risk matrices consist of five fields on the ordinate (y) axis for the demonstration of the risk impacts, and five fields on the abscissa (x) axis for the demonstration of the level of the likelihood of risk. The fields are coloured in shades from red to green; the levels of impacts and likelihood increase from green to yellow and from orange to red. The colour of the fields changes more rapidly on the ordinate axis than on the abscissa axis, which means that risk matrices put greater emphasis on risk impacts than on the likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster. The matrix has 25 fields altogether, in which, based on the content of the matrix, individual risk (or individual risk impacts) can be placed in reference to the relationship between the size of the impacts identified in the risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of disaster risks. The same applies to the likelihood of the risks. In disaster risk matrices, the combinations of likelihood and impacts are depicted by four levels, specifically:

 low risk with green fields;  medium risk with yellow fields;  high risk with orange fields;  very high risk with red fields.

There are two types of disaster risk matrices:

 Disaster risk matrices with separate risk impacts (the matrix of the risk impact on people, the matrix of economic and environmental risk impacts, the matrix of risk impacts on cultural heritage, and the matrix of political and social risk impacts), each with its own type of risk impact and with a unified likelihood;  Disaster risk matrices with a merged representation of risk impacts (a risk matrix representing an average of all three risk impacts and a unified likelihood).

Both types of disaster risk matrices include risk analyses prepared on the basis of all risk scenarios, and an individual depiction of representative risk analysis (based on a representative risk scenario), which presents risks in comparison to other risks or as depicted in the national disaster risk matrices. As a rule, disaster risk assessment for an individual disaster includes four risk matrices. The representative scenario and the risk assessment are written in italics in disaster risk matrices. In the national risk matrices all risks included in the National Disaster Risk Assessment are depicted, either through representative scenarios or risk analyses. As a rule, representative risk scenarios are defined as the worst still- acceptable risk scenarios, and at the same time do not equal the worst possible risk scenarios. The scope of risk impacts for the worst possible risk scenarios is usually much greater than for the impacts described in representative risk scenarios; however, they are less likely to occur. Given the relatively low likelihood of the occurrence of the worst possible risk scenarios, the majority of European countries invest their efforts in the management of disasters where the worst still-acceptable risk scenarios would come true.

The level of the overall or average impact is calculated by dividing the sum of the level of risk impacts on people, the impact of economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage, including political and social impacts, by three, or less if one or more of the

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Table 18: The conversion of the overall (average) level of risk impacts to be inserted into the disaster risk matrices fields with the overall presentation of risk impacts

The calculated value of all The level of risk impacts in disaster risk matrices three impact types showing the overall value of risk impacts

1.00-1.49 1 1.50-2.49 2 2.50-3.49 3 3.50-4.49 4 4.50-5.00 5

By using the data from this table, the final table may be completed with all the data required for the calculation of the levels of impact in the matrix with the overall presentation of risk impacts. Two columns in a table are of darker shade. These columns are used for a disaster risk matrix with an overall presentation of impacts of individual risks.

In disaster risk matrices, the record of the scenario or the analyses of an individual risk, in reference to the reliability of the analyses of the risk impact, is marked with three different colours as depicted in the table. No quantitative criteria have been prepared to this end. On the contrary, each responsible body assesses the reliability of risk scenarios or risk analysis based on their knowledge of the phenomena. The reliability of risk analysis depends primarily on the frequency of occurrence of the disasters concerned and their realistic nature, as well as on the scope, adequacy and quality of the data used in the risk analyses.

Table 19: Reliability of risk analyses

Reliability of a risk analysis The colour or symbol of the entry in the risk matrix Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Table 20: Example of the calculation of the average risk impacts for risk matrices with a separate presentation of risk impacts and matrices showing an overall presentation of risk impacts

Risk Level of Level of Level of Calculated Level of Risk Reliability scenario impacts economic political value of overall likely- of the risk on and environ- and overall (average) hood analysis people mental risk social (average) risk impacts and impacts impacts impacts impacts on the cultural heritage Risk Scenario 2 2 1 1.67 2 3 Relatively No. 1 (S1) unreliable Risk Scenario 2 1 1 1.33 1 4 Moderately No. 2 (S2) reliable Risk Scenario 3 4 3 3.33 3 2 Relatively No. 3 (S3) reliable Represe- ntative 3 4 3 3.33 3 2 Relatively scenario reliable and risk analysis (S3)

If the level of average impacts of individual risks or the risk analyses stands at one or two levels lower than the assessed level of impacts on people, the average level increases in such a way that the difference between the average level and the level of impacts is two levels. On an exceptional basis, this ensures that the level of risk impacts on people carries the greatest weight of the estimated impacts.

In Chapter 6 of the National Disaster Risk Assessment, the national matrices for disaster risk assessments are presented in the form of a separate or merged presentation. The characteristics of these matrices are the same as the characteristics of the risk matrices for individual disasters. The only difference lies in the fact that instead of different risk scenarios or analyses of individual risk, as applies to risk matrices in risk assessments for individual disasters, the latter include risk scenarios or risk analyses of all the risks addressed in the National Disaster Risk Assessment. The matrices which include all the risks included in the National Disaster Risk Assessment always include only representative scenarios and risk analyses for individual disasters.

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Figure 1: Disaster Risk Matrix

MPACT I 2

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN THE RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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3 Disaster risk and climate change

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges for humanity in the 21st century. Despite exceptional technological progress or perhaps, because of it, climate change represents a serious threat for humanity to face in the next decades or even centuries. Taking into account the fact that climate change is a reality, and that it is essentially a consequence of anthropogenic factors, the only possible way to address this issue is via a systematic approach, which comprises a set of three groups of activities:

- Monitoring and examination of all aspects of the reasons for and the consequences of climate changes; - Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (i.e. climate change mitigation); - Adaptation to climate change.

Despite considerable success in the restriction of their growth, the level of greenhouse gas emissions has not yet started to decrease on a global scale. It is likely that the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere will continue to grow due to their long life cycle, which will lead to further and more pronounced climate change in future decades. A clear answer to the future level of global warming lies in the future characteristics and amount of greenhouse gas emissions, and in the amount by which the world population will be able to decrease the level of global warming at the global scale and at lower levels. The realisation is slowly dawning that humanity will have to adapt to the consequences of climate change, for it can no longer be prevented. It is only their undesirable effects which can be mitigated by means of appropriate adaptation measures. However, not all impacts of future climate change and its consequences will have a negative effect on humanity (Slovenia, for example, will have a smaller consumption of heating fuels, higher consumption of solar energy, higher hydrological potential of water bodies for the production of electrical energy in the cold part of the year, a longer summer tourist season, etc.). Therefore, some of these changes and impacts can be taken as a challenge or as an opportunity.

The term "adaptation to climate change" is used to define planned adaptations to the known and expected impacts of climate change, with a view to mitigating risks and damage caused by the current and future effects of climate change in a cost-effective manner by exploiting the given potentials. The aim of adaptation to climate change is therefore to reduce exposure and vulnerability to climate change, and to exploit all possible opportunities and increase the resilience of society and its ability to adapt. Autonomous or unscheduled adaptations to climate change impacts are automatic and often also the most expensive and not the most optimal possibilities. On the other hand, planned and coordinated adaptations require that the highest risks identified are addressed first and that synergies are exploited. It further prevents any contradictory efforts and provides for a comprehensive development of assessments of the new threats, including global threats. The different approaches to this type of adaptation, and to the planned presentation of adaptation politics and measures, already vary greatly among the European states.

Planned adaptations to climate change comprise a number of activities which are already under development in Slovenia. Since climate change affects almost all areas of life and almost all social activities, adjustments have to be made in all areas. Certain sectors have

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 27/464 ______already initiated activities for adaptation to the known, specific impacts of climate change. The comprehensive management of risks and opportunities introduced by climate change calls for the integration, coordination and promotion of these activities. To this end, activities for the development and preparation of the national strategy for climate change adaptation, under the coordination of the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, are already well under way.

The latest findings on the anticipated global climate changes (with emphasis on the 21st century) are collected in the 5th report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC). The alterations in the field are the new scenarios for greenhouse gas emission timelines, and the accompanying changes in land cover and in the concentration of the different foreign matter in the air (greenhouse gases, various pollutants and other foreign matter). Since these scenarios are more than mere deductions about the final concentration of greenhouse gases by the end of the 21st century, they are called Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP). The report addresses four different scenarios of four representative pathways of greenhouse gases, marked as RCP8.5, RCP6, RCP4.5 and RCP2.6. The names were determined on the basis of the net radiative forcing of long-wave radiation on the Earth's surface, which is a consequence of the increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The most pessimistic is the RCP8.5 scenario, depicting a Representative Concentration Pathway of greenhouse gases which envisages constant growth in the concentration of greenhouse gases throughout the 21st century and also in the following century. At the end of the 21st century, the net radiative forcing of long-wave radiation would stand at 8.5 W/m2, which, according to calculations carried out in line with global climate models, indicates an increase in the average temperature on the Earth's surface by approximately 3.7 degrees Celsius in relation to the 1986-2005 reference period (due to the uncertainty in the calculation, it is more appropriate to state an interval between 2.6 and 4.8 degrees Celsius). Next are two representative concentration pathways of greenhouse gases which envisage a halt in the growth of emissions and stabilisation of the concentration of greenhouse gases during the 21st century, due to technological developments and the concerted action of the majority of the world’s countries. The RCP6 Representative Concentration Pathway of greenhouse gases envisages stabilisation at a net radiative forcing of long-wave radiation of 6 W/m2, and the RCP4.5 Representative Concentration Pathway of greenhouse gases at 4.5 W/m2. According to calculations, the Representative Concentration Pathway of greenhouse gases RCP6 would lead to an average rise in temperature of 2.2 degrees Celsius (or in the range between 1.4 and 3.1 degrees Celsius) by the end of the 21st century, and the Representative Concentration Pathway of the greenhouse gases RCP4.5 to an average rise in temperature of 1.8 degrees Celsius (or in the range between 1.1 to 2.6 degrees Celsius). The most optimistic Representative Concentration Pathway is the RCP2.6, which envisages that the net radiative forcing of long-wave radiation would increase to 3 W/m2 in the first half of the 21st century and then start to decrease. By the end of the 21st century, it would drop to 2.6 W/m2, which would result in a rise of the average temperature of about one degree Celsius (or in the range between 0.3 and 1.7 degrees Celsius). For events to evolve according to the most optimistic Representative Concentration Pathway of greenhouse gases, the RCP2.6, full cooperation of all the countries in the world, and an overall reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases of up to at least 70% would be required. This

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information has already been included in the amendment of the Drought Risk Assessment (in particular the RCP 4.5 and 8.5), and to a limited extent also in the amendment of the Large Wildfires Risk Assessment (RCP6), but not yet in other risk assessments, which were amended in 2016.

Within the framework of the project “Climate change in Slovenia in the period 1961-2011”, the Slovenian Environment Agency studied the changes in individual climate variables across Slovenia in the previous fifty years. The study showed significant trends in the changes in air temperature, the amount of precipitation and other variables. Slovenia belongs to those areas where the warming of the atmosphere is more pronounced. Based on an analysis of long-term sequences of meteorological measurements, the atmosphere in Slovenia warmed by 1.7 degrees Celsius between 1961 and 2011, mostly in the far east of the country. According to the seasons, the warming of the atmosphere is most pronounced in summer and spring, and to a lesser extent in winter and autumn. The number of warm (with the highest daytime temperature above 25 degrees Celsius) and hot days (with the highest temperature above 30 degrees Celsius) is increasing, while the number of cool (days with the lowest temperature below freezing point), cold days (days with the lowest temperature below –10 degrees Celsius) and ice-cold days (days when the daytime temperature does not rise above freezing) is decreasing. With regard to precipitation, a trend of reduction in precipitation can be perceived. However, this is more evident in the western than in the eastern part of the country. The decline in the amount of precipitation in the eastern part of the country is, in general, lower than 4% per decade. In the western part of the country, this number is, in general, higher. In terms of the seasons, the image is most unified in the spring, when the amount of precipitation is decreasing in most areas. In the summer, the amount of precipitation is reducing, predominantly in the south-eastern parts of the country. However, there was even a slight increase towards the northern and the north-eastern part of the country. In autumn, the amount of precipitation is reducing in the western, north-western, southern and north-eastern parts of the country, while the amount of precipitation in the central and eastern part of the country is increasing slightly. In the winter months, the amount of precipitation usually slightly decreases in the northern part of the country, and slightly increases in the southern part. In almost all areas the amount of snow precipitation or the total height of the snow cover is decreasing, on average, by 1.5% per year. The changes are relatively high, and statistically characteristic, for both the total depth of newly fallen snow in the snow season and for the depth of the snow cover. The changes are most significant in the highland stations, where a significant proportion of rainwater was collected in the past. This proportion presented the supply of rainwater for the late spring and early summer days. Significant changes in the water supply is affecting the flow regime of some Slovenian rivers, as the impact of snow on the river flow regime is constantly decreasing. Based on calculations, a considerable increase in the evapotranspiration (evaporation of water from the soil and vegetation) was also identified. In the period between 1971 and 2012, the latter increased by an average pace of 3-6% per decade. Solar radiation is also increasing, especially in spring and summer, when it reaches as much as a 4% increase per decade (Dolinar et al., 2014). The trend of the warming of the atmosphere can no longer be completely stopped. It can only be mitigated and adapted to.

In 2014, the Slovenian Environment Agency prepared the first information on the future climate. Based on different case runs and climate scenarios, indicating climate change in the

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 29/464 ______area of Slovenia in future decades, it can be anticipated that the temperature of the atmosphere will continue to increase. Consequently, the temperature of the atmosphere will rise by another 1-2.5 degrees Celsius between 2021 and 2050, the least in the spring months and the most in the winter and summer months. Climate scenarios for precipitation are much less certain than temperature climate scenarios. The annual amount of precipitation is likely to remain more or less unchanged. All changes will most likely fall within the −5 to +5% intervals. In winter, an increase in the amount of precipitation is likely, while in the summer, the amount of precipitation, at least in the southern part of the country, is most likely to decrease.

The uncertainty of the scenarios of the changes of extreme weather events, which are still in preparation, is slightly higher than the uncertainty regarding the changes in the average values (Dolinar et al., 2014). In the context of a new project entitled the Assessment of Climate change by the end of the 21st century, the Slovenian Environment Agency has been conducting a detailed study on the impacts of future climate change on extreme weather events. The project addresses the preparation of the assessment of future climate change and its impact on incidents such as heat waves, droughts, extraordinary rainfall events, frosts, high waters, etc. The first results will be available by the end of 2016. The project will continue in 2017, with additional analyses and preparations of data sets and all necessary adaptations of climate data for users of these services; among others, to authorities preparing individual disaster risk assessments. In the light of the findings known so far, we can expect greater heat in the summer, higher temperatures and precipitation during the summer, more intense rainfall events, higher evaporation or evapotranspiration, more frequent severe floods, more frequent droughts during the summer, and a likely increase in the number of days with favourable conditions for the development of summer storms (Dolinar et al., 2014).

According to the results of global models and research, including a large amount of research which already includes a more detailed analysis, the climate will change considerably by the end of the 21st century. Winters could become 3-5 and summers 4-6 degrees Celsius warmer, or even more, in comparison to the present situation. The amount of summer precipitation could thus decrease by up to 20% or even more, while the amount of winter precipitation might increase by up to 10% or more, especially in the mountainous parts of the western and eastern part of the country. Taking into account the predictions on the warming of the atmosphere, there will eventually be no more snow in the lowlands. Slightly more rain would most likely fall in spring, while the situation would remain more or less the same in autumn (summarised after Bergant, 2015).

Some specific information on the issue of future climate change is published in the abstract of the Risk Assessment for Drought and in the abstract of the Risk Assessment for Floods.

The list of variables to facilitate the definition of climate change and the characteristics of the future climate, which will take into account the most important relief characteristics of specific areas, will most likely increase through improvements in climate scenarios. Predictions on the future climate will thus become more reliable, which applies both to predictions by 2050 and to predictions by the end of this century. A number of comprehensive scientific analyses on those social areas where climate change will have the greatest positive or negative

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 30/464 ______impact, including the ways in which this climate change will impact the frequency and intensity of and changes in the local occurrence of accidents will become available.

It is essential to identify to what degree climate change has already been included in the 2015 individual disasters risk assessments and in the National Disaster Risk Assessment. Past and current changes have already been included in those risk assessments for individual disasters, through risk scenarios recapitulating real-life events from the last two or three decades which have already been significantly impacted by disasters (accidents such as drought, floods, large wildfires, and to a lesser extent, the ice storm). Naturally, the climate change which has already occurred and future climate change impacts even those phenomena and disasters which have not yet been addressed by individual disaster risk assessments.

Certain individual disaster risk assessments produced in 2015 (i.e. disasters which will, according to our current knowledge and the data available, be most impacted by climate change), were updated through the introduction of the “climate content” in 2016. This refers specifically to the Risk Assessment for Drought, Risk Assessment for Floods, Risk Assessment for Large Wildfires, and to a lesser extent to the Risk Assessment for Highly contagious animal diseases and the Risk Assessment for Hazards to Human Health of Biological, Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin. The amended risk assessments for individual disasters, in which the impacts of climate change are included by means of the available expert groundwork prepared by the Slovenian Environment Agency by the end of October 2016, are already the first in line of the more comprehensive expert analyses on the ways in which climate change will impact the frequency and the intensity of disasters in the future and the changes regarding the local occurrence of these disasters. The new National Disaster Risk Assessment, Version 1.1, has already been updated accordingly with the new content on these disasters.

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4 Disaster risk assessment and critical infrastructure

In the Republic of Slovenia, critical infrastructure of national importance includes assets and services, which are of special importance for the state, and the disruption or destruction of which could have a negative impact on national security, economy, essential social functions, health, security and protection, and social welfare.

With the Resolution No. 80200-2/2014/8 of April 2014, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia identified the Republic of Slovenia's critical infrastructure.

On this basis and in line with the basic and sector-related criteria used for identifying critical infrastructure of national importance in the Republic of Slovenia, the ministries and the Bank of Slovenia, through coordination in the Interministerial Coordination Group for the Coordination of Preparations for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia headed by the Ministry of Defence, identified and provided justification for the existing critical infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia by sectors of critical infrastructure, which was submitted to the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for consideration and approval. By means of the aforementioned resolution, the Government imposed an obligation on the authorities responsible for the critical infrastructure of national importance to prepare measures for its protection, and an obligation on the Interministerial Coordination Group for the Coordination of Preparations for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia to prepare a draft normative legal act regulating critical infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia. The Ministry of Defence in the role of coordinator of the preparations for the protection of critical infrastructure of national importance, prepared a methodology for the preparation of measures for the protection of critical infrastructure of national importance.

The legislation and the legal documents regulating the area of critical infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia:

– Resolution on National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (ReSNV, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 27/10); – Decree on European Critical Infrastructure (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 35/11); – Resolutions of the Government, Nos. 01203-17/2012/3 of 27 September 2012 and 01203-6/2014/2014/3 of 24 July 2014 on the Establishment of the Interministerial Coordination Group for the Coordination of Preparations for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia; – Resolution of the Government, No. 80000-2/2010/3 of 19 April 2010 on the Definition of the Critical Infrastructure; – Resolution of the Government, No. 80200-1/2012/5 of 17 October 2012 on the Basic and Sector Criteria for the Identification of Critical Infrastructure of National Importance in the Republic of Slovenia; – Resolution of the Government, No. 80200-2/2013/3 of 9 January, 2014, on Amendments to the Basic and Sector Criteria, the Identification of Interministerial Impacts on the Sensitivity of Operation of Critical Infrastructure and the Determining of the Priorities for the Critical Infrastructure;

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– Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 80200-2/2014/8 of 10 April 2014 on the Decision on the Identification of Critical Infrastructure of National Importance in the Republic of Slovenia; – Methodology for the Formation of Measures for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure of National Importance, Defence Directorate at the Ministry of Defence, No. 8011- 2/2014-236 of 3 December 2014.

The Critical Infrastructure Act, which will provide a comprehensive arrangement of the area as an umbrella document, is under preparation. In addition, the national coordinator for the field of critical infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia was also appointed.

Despite the taking into account of any additional impact of the future climate change, natural and other disasters may have a considerable impact on the functioning of the critical infrastructure which may, as a result, have a significant impact on the everyday life. This is one of the reasons why the European Commission strongly supports and encourages the member states in the integration of the area of the critical infrastructure and the disaster risk assessment.

In most of the individual disaster risk assessments, critical infrastructure is more or less equally addressed in the context of other contents included in these risk analyses. This applies in particular to the Risk Assessment for Terrorism.

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5 Summaries and conclusions of risk assessments for individual disasters

Summaries of Risk Assessments for Individual Disasters prepared in 2015 make up a large part of the National Disaster Risk Assessment. They contain the most important information on the authority that produced the assessment, the methods and techniques applied, the basic findings related to the phenomenon, and the risk scenarios and analyses (impacts and likelihood of disasters). Moreover, the summaries contain completed risk matrices for individual disasters.

Risk Assessments for Individual Disasters are public documents published on the websites of the ministries that developed them. The only exception is Risk Assessment for Terrorism, which is classified as RESTRICTED and is therefore not publicly available. The latter shall be available for consultation at the Ministry for Internal Affairs.

The National Disaster Risk Assessment is available for the public both at the seat of the ACPDR/National Coordinating Body and the ACPDR website.

The contents of all summaries of Individual Disaster Risk Assessments are taken from the appropriate risk assessment for an individual disaster, unless stated otherwise.

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5.1 Risk Assessment for Earthquake

The Risk Assessment for Earthquake, Version 1.0, was prepared by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning (Spatial Planning, Construction and Housing Directorate – Construction Division, Slovenian Environment Agency – Seismology and Geology Office) in 2015.

Resources used in the preparation of the Earthquake Risk Assessment are expertise, relevant national and foreign literature, records on earthquakes in the Republic of Slovenia and in other parts of the world. Due to insufficient data on facilities and the number of people in the areas under inspection in this literature, additional data was collected, to the extent possible, through direct personal and written contact with the bodies competent for industrial and infrastructure facilities, facilities in the field of health care, public administration, education and judicial administration, and for cultural heritage facilities.

The Ministry for the Environment and Spatial Planning acquired all input data, required for the preparation of the assessment, in cooperation with the Ministry of Infrastructure (Energy Directorate, Slovenian Infrastructure Agency), the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology, the Slovenian Environmental Agency and the Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia. It also used data from the following research projects: the POTROG Project on the seismic hazard in Slovenia for the needs of Civil Protection (Slovenian National Building and Civil Engineering Institute, Slovenian Environment Agency and the Institute for Water of the Republic of Slovenia) and the VODPREG Project on earth and concrete water barriers of strategic importance for the Republic of Slovenia (Slovenian National Building and Civil Engineering Institute). The Seismic Threat Assessment includes a comprehensive presentation of the earthquakes in Slovenia and a collection of specific data on earthquakes elsewhere around the world. A considerable part of the 2013 Seismic Threat Assessment in the Republic of Slovenia was also used for the needs of this assessment.

An earthquake is a natural phenomenon during which the accumulated elastic stress in the Earth’s interior is suddenly released, causing the released energy to dissipate in the form of seismic waves. When the waves reach the surface with sufficient energy to cause adverse effects on people, buildings or nature, the earthquake is treated as a natural disaster.

The majority of earthquakes, even the strongest ones, occur as a result of the internal dynamics deep below the surface of the Earth (tectonic earthquakes). Tectonic plates move slowly, which causes the collisions of these plates and the resulting deformations. The consequence is the accumulation of the tension which is occasionally instantaneously released in the form of an earthquake.

Earthquakes originate in the Earth's interior, in a place called hypocentre. In tectonic earthquakes this, as a rule, occurs close to the existing but not necessarily known fractures. A point from which seismic waves spread in all directions is called the earthquake's hypocentre (or earthquake's focus in a narrow sense of the word). The epicentre is a point on the Earth's surface which is located directly above the hypocentre.

The most frequent side effects of the most severe earthquakes, realised through a series of chain disasters, are predominantly fires, explosions, accidents involving dangerous

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 35/464 ______substances, landslides, collapses and floods, human and animal diseases, interruptions or cuts of electricity or water supply, as well as nuclear accidents and the destruction of high water barriers and like elsewhere in the world.

An earthquake cannot be predicted. Modern science does not yet possess any tools, and will most likely not possess them any time soon, for the identification of the location, size and time of the earthquake with an accuracy of any practical significance. Each, even the smallest mistake in the prediction of any of these elements, might have an adverse effect or even catastrophic consequences.

An earthquake is one of the natural phenomena which cannot be controlled. Hence earthquakes are always accompanied by a high level of surprise and uncertainty, for they can occur in an unexpected and unpredictable way. However, they can be effectively measured.

Procedures have been developed to determine areas where earthquakes may occur. It is possible to assess the maximum magnitude expected and the extent of damage an earthquake may cause in a certain area.

Figure 2: Seismic hazard in Slovenia – design ground acceleration

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In the Republic of Slovenia and in the majority of other countries, the emphasis lies on the assessment of seismic risk, which serves as a basis for seismic design. Seismic hazard is assessed on the basis of the data on the past earthquakes and the geological characteristics of the territory. Seismic hazard maps are prepared on this basis. The maps show that the entire territory of the state falls under a seismic area, certain areas being more at risk than others. The maps show the intensity of earthquakes and the effects to be expected in a certain area, but offer no information on the time and the intensity of such earthquakes.

In accordance with the Rules on the Mechanical Resistance and Stability of Construction Works (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 101/05) the Design Ground Acceleration map has to be used for designing purposes, and the ground factor and the importance of facilities taken into account. Ground acceleration is a physical quantity, measurable with instruments, which enables a direct calculation of seismic forces or burdens.

More appropriate for the system of protection against natural and other disasters and for the wider public is the seismic intensity map, as it provides a written assessment of the earthquake's effects on people, objects, buildings and nature.

Figure 3: Seismic intensity map for a 475-year return period

Slovenia is a country of moderate seismic hazard. Although earthquake magnitudes do not reach very high values, their effects may be great due to relatively shallow hypocentres. Hypocentres originate throughout the territory. In the 20th century alone, there occurred 15

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 37/464 ______earthquakes with the intensity of VII or more on the EMS scale in Slovenia. Earthquakes with the intensity of Vll on the EMS scale, cause moderate damage to the buildings. The seismological history of the territory within the present-day borders of the Republic of Slovenia testifies that such earthquakes occurred at least fifty times since the beginning of the 16th century.

The largest earthquake ever recorded in the present-time territory of Slovenia occurred in Idria in 1511 and had a magnitude of 6.8. The public is more familiar with the Ljubljana earthquake, which occurred in 1895 and had a magnitude of 6.1. Another reputed earthquake was the Kozjansko earthquake, which occurred in 1974 and had a magnitude of 4.8. The last strongest earthquakes with the magnitudes of 5.7 and 4.9 respectively, occurred in the Bovec area in 1998 and 2004.

The belt of the major seismic hazard (Vlll EMS) runs through the central part of the country, from northwest to south and southeast. By moving away from this belt, the seismic hazard reduces to Vll EMS. The extreme northeast and southwest parts are estimated at VI EMS. However, this does not imply that an earthquake with effects greater than that of an earthquake of magnitude Vlll on the EMS scale is not likely to occur in the territory of Slovenia, due to either the local situation (site effects) or the intensity of the earthquake. The effects of earthquakes on facilities, naturally, also depend on the seismic resistance or vulnerability of such facilities.

Figure 4: Earthquakes with the intensity of V EMS or more in the epicentre area, which occurred by the year 2013

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Three different risk scenarios at three different sites in Slovenia were prepared for the assessment. For purposes of including the different geographical characteristics of these areas, hypothetical earthquakes are placed in the Zgornje Posočje region (Bovec), the central Slovenia (Ljubljana) and the Spodnje Posavje region (Brežice). The intensity of all three earthquakes was set at Vll–Vlll EMS.

The areas which would be affected by hypothetical earthquakes in individual locations were identified by means of the POTROG Application for quick response in the event of an earthquake published at the ACPDR website.

Figure 4: Area affected in the event of an earthquake in the Zgornje Posočje Region (the Bovec area)

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Figure 5: Area affected in the event of an earthquake in Central Slovenia

Figure 6: Area affected by the earthquake in the Spodnje Posavje Region (the Brežice area)

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The damaged buildings are the most pronounced consequence of these earthquakes. The hypothetical earthquake with the epicentre in the area of the Zgornje Posočje region and with the intensity of Vll–Vlll EMS would affect the following municipalities: Bohinj, Bovec, Gorje, Kanal, Kobarid, Kranjska Gora and Tolmin. As much as 37.537 people and 20.438 residential buildings would be exposed to the earthquake. The number of flats most resistant to earthquakes (flats built after the year 1981) is 4.561. These flats are occupied by 7.895 people. The number of flats most vulnerable to earthquakes (flats built before 1964) is 9.338. These flats are occupied by 17.611 people.

The energy infrastructure facilities also fall among the facilities which are most at risk. There are 13 transmission lines, five distribution substations and five hydroelectric power plants in the area of the hypothetical earthquake in the Zgornje Posavje region. There are also 975 cultural heritage facilities in this area, which comprise buildings, buildings with parks and gardens, other facilities and appliances, including individual memorial sites and buildings. Of the aforementioned cultural heritage facilities, 948 facilities were built before 1975.

The second hypothetical earthquake is to occur in the wider Ljubljana area. Due to the density of the population, high number of daily commuters, large number of state and economic institutions (medical, educational and cultural institutions, ministries, the Government, commerce, banks, services, logistics, etc.), traffic intersections (roads, railways) and energy infrastructures (pipelines, transmission lines) the hypothetical earthquake in Ljubljana would be the worst possible scenario for Slovenia. It would affect the following municipalities: Bloke, Borovnica, Brezovica, Cerklje na Gorenjskem, Cerknica, Dobrepolje, Dobrova – Polhov Gradec, Dol pri Ljubljani, Domžale, Gorenja vas – Poljane, Grosuplje, Horjul, Ig, Ivančna Gorica, Kamnik, Komenda, Kranj, Litija, Ljubljana, Log – Dragomelj, Logatec, Lukovica, Medvode, Mengeš, Moravče, Šenčur, Škofja Loka, Škofljica, Šmartno pri Litiji, Trzin, Velike Lašče, Vodice, Vrhnika and Žiri (a total of 34 municipalities). Here, as much as 595.939 people and 258.171 residential buildings would be exposed to the earthquake. The number of flats which are most resistant to earthquakes (flats constructed after the year 1981) is 77.296. These flats are occupied by 181.276 people. The number of flats most vulnerable to earthquakes (flats which were constructed before the year 1964) is 86.207. These flats are occupied by 198.149 people.

The energy infrastructure facilities also fall among the facilities which are most at risk. There are 87 transmission lines, 20 distribution substations, 2 hydroelectric power plants, one thermal power plant and 14 main and 12 regional pipelines in the area of the hypothetical earthquake in Ljubljana. Based on the available data on the number of cultural heritage facilities, there are 4.951 cultural heritage facilities in this area, which comprise buildings, buildings with parks and gardens, other facilities and appliances, including individual memorial sites and buildings. Of the mentioned cultural heritage facilities, 4.731 of them were built before 1975.

The third hypothetical earthquake of intensity Vll–Vlll EMS with the epicentre in the Spodnje Posavje region would affect the following municipalities: Bistrica ob Sotli, Brežice, Kostanjevica ob Krki, Kozje, Krško, Podčetrtek, Sevnica, Šentjernej, Šentjur, Škocjan and Šmarješke Toplice. The hypothetical earthquake in Posavje would affect 46.965 residential buildings and 105.663 people. The number of flats most resistant to earthquakes (flats built after the year 1981) is 13.696. These flats are occupied by 30.820 people. The number of

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The energy infrastructure facilities also fall among the facilities which are most at risk. There are 25 transmission lines, four distribution substations, one hydroelectric power plant, eight main and six regional pipelines in the area of the hypothetical earthquake in the Posavje region. The Krško Nuclear Power Plant is also located in this area. However, the power plant should not suffer any consequences due to the earthquake of intensity Vll-Vlll EMS. A stationary low risk source of dangerous substances, specifically a gas power plant in Brestanica is also located in this area.

Based on the data available on the number of cultural heritage facilities, there are 1.555 cultural heritage facilities in this area, which comprise buildings, buildings with parks and gardens, other facilities and appliances, including individual memorial sites and buildings. Of the mentioned cultural heritage facilities, 1,545 were built before the year 1975.

The impacts of and the likelihood of a disaster are assessed in line with the criteria for the assessment of a disaster risk assessment. The findings are presented in relevant tables:

Based on the intensity of hypothetical earthquakes (Vll–Vlll EMS) the annual likelihood of the earthquake in the studied risk scenarios is, as follows:

 Zgornje Posočje Region (Bovec): 0.71% or a 140-year return period;  Central Slovenia (Ljubljana): 0.53%, or a 189-year return period;  Spodnje Posavje Region (Brežice): 0.78% or a 128-year return period.

The annual likelihood of an earthquake in all three hypothetical scenarios of earthquakes with the intensity Vll–Vlll EMS is somewhere between 0.4 to 1%, which signifies the level 2 likelihood – a possible but fairly unlikely threat.

Table 21: The likelihood of the occurrence of earthquakes from risk scenarios

Risk Likelihood Level scenario

Once per every 100 to 250 years – a possible, but fairly Bovec 2 unlikely risk

Once per every 100 to 250 years – a possible, but fairly Ljubljana 2 unlikely risk Once per every 100 to 250 years – a possible, but fairly Brežice 2 unlikely risk

The risk assessment clearly indicates that four people might die in case of an earthquake in the Zgornje Posočje region, 11 in the Zgornje Posavje region and 60 in the central part of Slovenia. The number of the injured could amount to up to 50 in the Zgornje Posočje region, up to 110 in the Spodje Posavje region and 600 in the central part of Slovenia. During this last earthquake, however, almost 600.000 could be endangered. None of these data include

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 42/464 ______daily commutes, which can be especially important for Ljubljana to which a large number of people come to work or study on a daily basis.

Based on the findings from the assessment, it is evident that as much as 1.204 people would have to be temporarily and two people permanently relocated in case the hypothetical scenario of the earthquake in the Zgornje Posočje region would come true. This number is slightly higher for the Spodnje Posavje region, where a total of 1.633 people would have to be temporarily and 90 permanently relocated. In the wider Ljubljana area, these numbers would be much higher: 60.395 would have to be temporarily and 5.188 permanently relocated. The data on the number of people who would have to be permanently relocated are also included in the risk matrix, depicting the impact on people.

The calculations, however, do not include any possible chain disasters, but only the direct consequences of an earthquake, such as demolition and damage to residential buildings.

As far as the impact on residential buildings is concerned, four buildings would have to be demolished in case of an earthquake in the Zgornje Posočje region, and 713 residential buildings would have to be thoroughly renovated. In case of an earthquake in the Spodnje Posavje region, 10 residential buildings would have to be demolished and 459 residential buildings would have to undergo earthquake-resistant reconstruction. In the area of the earthquake in the central part of Slovenia, these numbers would be, as expected, higher: 106 buildings would have to be demolished and 5.754 would have to be thoroughly renovated. In both cases, the buildings in concern have a large number of flats. The majority of these buildings are located in the municipality of Ljubljana.

The Republic of Slovenia has no data on the level of risk and threat to industrial and infrastructure facilities. It is also difficult to predict the impact of consequence of an earthquake on community, traffic and other infrastructure. The Republic of Slovenia is becoming more and more developed, which according to the experience of the recent earthquakes in the developed world signifies, that the consequences of the construction fond may be extremely severe in this segment. The same measures for the mitigation of seismic risk, as apply for other facilities at risk, must also apply for infrastructure. In the urban area, the earthquakes of intensity Vll–Vlll on the EMS could cause the breaking of pipes in the water distribution system, which could further result in the flooding of certain town streets, and the breaking of pipes and damage to other community infrastructure (sewerage, water distribution system, pipelines, etc.).

In the case of an earthquake of intensity Vll–Vlll on the EMS, interruptions of and disturbances in electricity would be possible, as well as the disturbances in the functioning of the communication systems. Based on the ELES data, taken from the Seismic Threat Assessment for the Republic of Slovenia, the earthquakes present a much greater threat to substations and civic buildings than to transmission lines (there is practically no possibility of collapse for high-voltage transmission lines).

Based on the data of the Ministry of Infrastructure, the motorway network is not supposed to be affected by the consequences of the earthquake with the intensity Vll–Vlll on the EMS. The Slovenian Infrastructure Agency managing the national roads (highways, main roads and regional roads), does not have any data on the level of damage the road infrastructure

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(bridges, tunnels, overpasses, etc.) facilities would suffer in the event of an earthquake and weather certain road sections would be at risk due to the sliding of the soil and the falling of the rocks.

The more in-detail analyses and surveys of the seismic vulnerability of cultural heritage facilities, included among which, besides individual buildings, are old urban and rural centres, show that the resistance to earthquakes is inadequate in most of this buildings. Cultural heritage facilities which are the most at risk are old castles, palaces, old urban and rural centres, old urban and peasant buildings, religious facilities and old industrial and traffic facilities, and their equipment. The most important of the all listed types of monuments are declared cultural monuments. These are several centuries old buildings, some of which were renovated and statically reinforced in the last twenty years in the context of the programme for the renovation and revitalisation of cultural monuments.

In this assessment, the economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage were demonstrated exclusively through the assessment of the value of the possible ruined and damaged buildings fond in the larger municipalities, which could be affected by a hypothetical earthquake, and not also by taking into account any other damage and expenses (e.g. the value of the damaged or destroyed cultural heritage, the value of buildings in terms of cultural heritage, the expenses incurred due to disturbances in the economy, the expenses incurred through the damaged infrastructure, the expenses of the emergency response of the system of protection against natural and other disasters, social costs, costs of the medical care provided to the injured, etc.). Already without all of these non-assessed contents, the level of the economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage in the event of an earthquake in the central part of Slovenia amounts to over three billion Euros, while the level of impacts of the remaining two earthquake scenarios is considerably lower; the damage incurred in case of the Bovec earthquake would amount to a good EUR 22 million and to a good EUR 14 million in case of the earthquake in the Spodnje Posavje region. The risk matrix graphically demonstrating the economic and environmental impacts and the impacts of the earthquake on cultural heritage, places the earthquakes in the Spodnje Posavje region and the Zgornje Posočje region at the first level of impacts and the earthquake in the central Slovenia at the highest, fifth level of this impacts. Even if we would take all the affected municipalities and all economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage, which were not addressed in this assessment into consideration, the position of risk scenarios in risk matrices would most likely not change, however the absolute size of impacts would most likely increase.

The assessment also includes the assessments of political and social impacts of earthquakes. In all three cases, these impacts are significant. The highest assessed impacts would occur in case of an earthquake in the central part of Slovenia, and would, as a whole, be assessed as significant (level four out of five). Among the aforementioned impacts, the most important ones are the foreign policy stability, the functioning of the state bodies and important infrastructure systems and, in particular in case of an earthquake in the central part of the country, psychosocial impacts and the impacts on financial stability.

In the Seismic Risk Matrix with an overall presentation of impacts, presenting all three risk scenarios, all three types of impacts and the likelihood, an earthquake in the central part of Slovenia signifies a large level of risk, especially due to the size of impacts and less so due

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The earthquake in the central part of the country was selected as a representative scenario, as it is, based on the findings, likely to cause the most severe consequences. In the risk matrices, this earthquake or this risk scenario is described in italics.

All risk scenario analyses of all three hypothetical earthquakes are assessed as moderately reliable, the data on the earthquake as a phenomenon being more reliable as the data of risk scenarios, especially due to inadequate or insufficient data available for risk scenarios.

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Figure 7: SEISMIC RISK MATRIX – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

5 Ljubljana

Bovec

3 Brežice

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN THE RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 8: SEISMIC RISK MATRIX – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

5 Ljubljana

IMPACT

Bovec 1 Brežice

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 9: SEISMIC RISK MATRIX – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

4 Ljubljana

Bovec

3 Brežice

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN THE RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 10: SEISMIC RISK MATRIX WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

5 Ljubljana

IMPACT

Bovec

2 Brežice

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Risk assessment also includes the internal categorisation of risk or the geographic distribution of seismic risk, which summarises the findings of the Seismic Threat Assessment of the Republic of Slovenia in the part which refers to the seismic risk to municipalities and the ACPDR Regional Offices. The main criteria for the definition of risk are the seismic hazard in the area of the municipality and the number of people living in the areas with different intensities according to the EMS.

The Map of internal categorisation of the seismic hazard:

1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – moderate, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 11: The Map of Seismic Hazard in Municipalities

The above map shows that there are 100 municipalities in the Republic of Slovenia which are classified as municipalities with seismic risk Class 4 and 5. These are municipalities which, to a large extent or completely, lie in the area of intensity Vlll on the EMS. The municipalities lying partially or completely in the area of seismic intensity Vll on the EMS and are classified as municipalities of class 3 stand at 96% (the municipality of Ankaran is not yet included in this calculation, but would fall in this class). A total of 15 municipalities fall to the risk class no. 2 – these are the municipalities the territory of which falls completely within intensity VI on the EMS. No municipality belongs to the lowest risk class.

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Earthquakes have been and always will be. Every now and then, the state will be shaken by such earthquakes as addressed in the Seismic risk assessment. It is important to know that earthquakes fall within our natural geographic framework and that their effects are not to be underestimated. Earthquakes cannot be prevented; however a lot can be done for the mitigation of the vulnerability of our living space. A more appropriate construction of facilities, taking into account the regulations of the earthquake resistant construction of facilities, and the implementation of seismic rehabilitation of facilities, which at present do not provide the appropriate level of safety, is therefore of crucial importance. This applies in particular to those areas which are more at risk due to earthquakes and at which earthquakes present considerable risk, especially in terms of impacts.

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5.2 Risk Assessment for Drought

The Risk Assessment for Drought was prepared by the Slovenian Environment Agency at the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning in 2015. The methodology used for the preparation of the assessment is based on the agro-meteorological practice used for the calculation of the meteorological hydrologic balance: This same practice has already been used and documented on a number of individual occurrences of drought. In September 2016, the assessment was supplemented with the anticipated impacts of climate change in the 21st century.

The definition of drought is problematic, as it is a much more complex phenomenon that the mere lack of precipitation. There are various definitions of drought, which try to encompass the level of the drought's impact on the living and economic conditions. The first in the long line of the reasons for the confusion in the formation of an objective definition, are the different names for drought among the experts, which vary according to their field of expertise (meteorology, hydrology, water resources, the economy, agriculture, etc.). The second problem lies in the close bond between the definition of drought and the geographical, hydrological, geological, historical and cultural characteristics of a given area. As with the third problem, the issue lies in the changing of the current terminology hand in hand with the findings and recommendations of modern research, which seems to be rather strenuous. Despite all of this, the analysis of the amount of precipitation is the most important data in the assessment of the magnitude of drought. The amount of precipitation is measured in the unit of fluid which falls on a unit of surface that is in litres per square metre l/m2. However, both in terms of numbers and physicality, the unit l/m2 equals to the height on the rain gauge, expressed in millimetres. To this end, this summary (as well as most of the expert literature) used millimetres for expressing the amount of precipitation. Millimetres are also used for expressing the amount of water "lost" on the surface of the earth due to evaporation and the "breathing" of the plants - evapotranspiration.

The natural and human systems are predominantly adapted to the available water resources and their spatial and temporal distribution. Lack of water reaches the drought borderline value when the impacts on the adapted life processes are already evident and when considerable damage appears. The extent and the duration of the harmful deviation from the water availability depend on the coincidence of processes in that period, the period of the year and the geographical position. All of these differing variables prevent an exact determination of the definition of drought.

In terms of the length of the period without precipitation, three main aspects can be assessed for drought:

- Meteorological, which is described as the extended period of the lack of precipitation and is often defined as the reduction in the number of days with precipitation in comparison to the "normal" reference period;

- Hydrological, which is described as the reduction in the number of water in rivers, lakes and the decrease of the ground-water level;

- Agricultural, which presents the insufficient amount of water in the ground; this water is required for the normal development of crops. Whenever drought occurs in the time of

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 52/464 ______intense growth or development of crops, there are fewer crops or they can also be completely destroyed.

A relatively frequent occurrence of drought, the escalation of the intensity and the frequency of drought, the frequency of drought in the recent decades and a considerably accurate data on the total damage due to drought, enable a fairly accurate assessment of risk.

Given the past experience, it has been established that drought causes the most damage in agriculture. Agricultural drought refers specifically to problems with the dried out soil and the consequent drought stress in crops. In practice, the so-called surface water balance (also meteorological water balance) is used as an indicator for the difference between the amount of precipitation in a given period and the potential loss of water from the surface due to the evaporation and "breathing" of plants – potential evapotranspiration. The meteorological water balance is used for a relatively frequent but objective identification of a drought period, which is a good basis for the initial assessment of the agricultural drought. The most important are the distribution of precipitation and the relationship between the amount of precipitation and the amount of evaporated water. If a standard vegetation period (period between April 1 and September 30) is used, it is most often possible to demonstrate the relationship between the precipitation and all the water evaporated in a vegetation season. The meteorological water balance assesses the amount of the net inflow and outflow of water in the soil surface in a given area in an exact time period. The cumulative water balance can be used to identify the beginning, the course and the end of the agricultural drought at different locations in a chosen vegetation period. The years-long sets of data on meteorological water balance help identify the magnitude of the drought by means of statistical methods and statistical thresholds.

In the recent fifty years (1963–2013), drought caused damage of different sizes to agricultural production plants on 18 occasions, specifically in 1967, 1971, 1976, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. In these years, the average cumulative water shortage (negative water balance) for crops in the summer period from June to the end of July amounted to over 100 mm in the affected areas. Such shortage was the most common in the Primorska region, where it occurred 43-times, followed by 15-times in the Prekmurje region, 11-times in the Podravje and the Goričko regions and between six to eight times in other areas. In 2013, the equally high shortage appeared also in the Koroška region, which was not frequent in the past. Great damage occurred on twelve occasions after the year 1990, altogether nine times after the year 2000. The year 2003 was the worst, for over 60% of the Slovenian territory was affected by drought. Characteristic of agricultural droughts is that they have been more frequent and more intense in the last ten years. The frequency, both in terms of time and space differs from year to year. It is a fact that drought, besides the most vulnerable regions of the northeast and southwest of the state, also affects other areas. Droughts in the years 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2012 and 2013 reached the dimensions of a natural disaster. The estimated direct damage exceeded 0.3 permille of the planned incomes of the national budget with which the prescribed threshold for assistance in accordance with the Natural Disaster Recovery Act (ZOPNN, Official Gazette of the RS, No. 75/03, 114/05 – UPB, 90/07, 102/07, 40/12 – ZUJF and 14/14) was reached. The damage assessed in this case is also the main source of information on the impacts of drought as a natural phenomenon.

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The risk assessment included three basic risk scenarios for drought. Two scenarios cover the most typical characteristics of the described drought phenomenon, while one scenario addresses a hypothetical extremely powerful drought phenomenon.

Risk Scenario No. 1 presents drought which causes damage in agriculture only in individual regions and not in the territory of the entire country. This damage is limited both in terms of the total surface of agricultural land as well as the joint financial and economic damage in agriculture, which, as a rule, does not reach EUR 50 million. Real-life cases of such scenario are the droughts that occurred in the years 2001, 2006 and 2007. The analysis of return periods, prepared on the basis of more than 50 years of archival meteorological data, showed that the return period of such events is shorter than 25 years. Given the criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of a disaster, this risk scenario falls in the likelihood level 4 (the return period of up to 25 years).

Risk Scenario No. 2 presents a drought phenomenon which affects the larger part of the country and causes great material damage in agriculture, surpassing EUR 100 million. Real- life cases of such scenarios are droughts which occurred in the years 2003 and 2013. Even though such an event occurred on two occasions in the last ten years, the statistical analysis showed a return period of approximately 100 years. The assessment was prepared on the basis of an over 50 years old archive. However, it should be stressed once again that the time trends within the period under consideration were not taken into account.

Risk Scenario No. 3 is a scenario of a hypothetical drought, which has not yet occurred in the last 70 years (and most likely not even earlier). Based on this scenario, at least half of the agricultural production would be destroyed and the damage would exceed 1% of GDP. The consequences of this drought would be evident also in other sectors of the economic and social life.

As far as the reliability of scenarios is concerned, it can be assessed that the first two are highly reliable. Not only because such events have already occurred in the past, but because they have occurred on several occasions, which consequently helps in the assessment of the likelihood or the frequency of the phenomenon, not only its consequence. For similar reasons, Risk Scenario No. 3 is much less reliable and less well described, for it cannot be supported by a real-life example, which could serve as a basis for the assessment of the consequences. Much more reliable is the likelihood of the phenomenon based on the Risk Scenario No. 3, for we can fairly easily determine that its return period exceeds 200 years.

The scope of consequences of all three scenarios was compared to the criteria, which are the same for all disasters, in order to assess risk impacts and the likelihood of a disaster. The consequences and the likelihood of all three risk scenarios are presented in individual risk matrices with a separate presentation of impacts and in the risk matrix with an average presentation of impacts by the size of the impacts in comparison to the criteria. Risk matrices are a graphic display of the size of impacts and the likelihood of all addressed risk scenarios, which are based on the criteria for the assessment of the risk impacts and the likelihoods of a disaster. Four possible risk levels can be identified based on different combinations of the levels of impacts in risk matrices, at which the impacts have the greatest value.

There is no risk matrix for drought with the assessment of impacts on people or it remained uncompleted, for there is no direct impact on people (the dead, injured or relocated

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 54/464 ______inhabitants in the sense of a permanent measure) in the case of drought. The political and social impacts are also neglectable, with the exception of the Risk Scenario No. 3 at which the impact on GDP in the year of the accident and in the following year has to be taken into account. In case of immense damage in agriculture, it can be expected that the income from agriculture will be considerably reduced also in the year to come, which might cause a drop of GDP for approximately 1%. Therefore Risk Scenario No. 3 can be attributed the second level of impacts in the light of political and social impacts.

The most important drought impact is the direct damage in agriculture. The damage can be assessed on the basis of past events (Risk Scenarios No. 1 and 2) or with lower reliability for the hypothetical Risk Scenario No. 3 Based on the data on the damage caused by droughts which served as a basis for Risk Scenarios No. 1 and 2 (droughts in the year 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2013), the economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage for Risk Scenario 1 are categorised as scenarios with level one impacts and the Risk Scenario 2 as scenarios with level two impacts. The economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage for Risk Scenario No. 3 are classified as level three with their medium level of reliability.

Figure 12: Withered sugar beet during the 2003 drought.

The assessment also addresses the impact of the future climate changes on the drought phenomenon. The newest findings on the anticipated global climate changes (with emphasis

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 55/464 ______on the 21st century) are collected in the 5th Report of the IPCC. The novelty in this report are the new scenarios of the time course of the greenhouse gas emissions, the accompanying changes of land cover and the concentration of different foreign matter in the air (greenhouse gases, different pollutants and other foreign matters). Since this is not a mere assumption of the end concentration of the greenhouse gases by the end of the 21st century, these scenarios are called Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP). The report addresses four different scenarios of characteristic pathways of greenhouse gases marked by RCP8.5, RCP6, RCP4.5 and RCP2.6. The names have been determined based on the radioactive forcing of the net long-wave radiation on the surface of the Earth, which is a consequence of the increased concentration of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The most pessimistic is the Representative Concentration Pathway for greenhouse gases RCP8.5, which envisages a constant growth of the concentration of the greenhouse gases emission throughout the entire 21st century and the century to come. At the end of the 21st century, the radioactive forcing of the net long-wave radiation would stand at 8.5 W/m2, which, based on the calculations produced with the help of global climate models, indicates the elevation of the average temperature on the Earth's surface for approximately 3.7 degrees Celsius based on the 1986–2005 reference period (due to the uncertainty in the calculation, it is more appropriate to indicate the interval between 2.6 and 4.8°C). Follow two representative concentration pathways of the greenhouse gases, which envisage the halt in the growth of emissions and the stabilisation of the greenhouse gases concentrations due to technological development and the coordinated functioning of politics of the majority of world countries. The representative concentration pathways of greenhouse gases RCP6 anticipates stabilisation at radioactive forcing of the net long-wave radiation 6 W/m2, and the representative concentration pathways of greenhouse gases RCP4.5 at 4.5 W/m2. Based on calculations the representative concentration pathways of greenhouse gases RCP6 plans an average elevation of temperature for 2.2°C by the end of the 21st century (or between 1.4 and 3.1°C), and the representative concentration pathways of greenhouse gases RCP4.5 an average elevation of temperature for 1.8 °C (or between 1.1 and 2.6°C). The most optimistic Representative Concentration Pathway RCP2.6 envisages growth of the radioactive forcing in the first half of the 21st century for up to 3 W/m2, followed by a decrease. By the end of the 21st century radioactive forcing would drop to 2.6 W/m2, which would then cause the elevation of the average temperature for approximately 1°C (or between 0.3 and 1.7°C). In order to ensure the course of events based on the most optimistic representative concentration pathway, RCP2.6, full engagement of all world countries will be required and a joint reduction of the greenhouse gases for a good 70%.

In order to assess climate changes in an area as small as Slovenia, global climate changes have to be adapted for use in a more detailed spatial scale. In the first phase, the adaptation to the spatial scale was carried out by a consortium selected in the European EURO- CORDEX Project. In the second phase, however, even more detailed calculations for Slovenia will be prepared by the Slovenian Environmental Agency, which launched the project titled the Assessment of Climate change by the End of the 21st Century in 2016. The project addresses the preparation of the assessment of future climate changes and their impact on emergencies, such as heat waves, droughts, extraordinary rainfall events, frosts, high water conditions and similar. To this end, a collection of the climate models data presenting a daily timescale for the period 2005-2100 has already been established for the

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lowest and the highest daily air temperature, average relative humidity, average wind speed, solar radiation energy and the amount of precipitation. The data is based on the results of the EURO-CORDEX Project for two of the representative concentration pathways: the moderately optimistic Representative Concentration Pathway of greenhouse gases, RCP4.5 (which limits the global increase of the temperature to approximately two degrees Celsius) and the pessimistic representative concentration pathway, which does not envisage the stabilisation in the concentration of the greenhouse gases.

Based on the model results for air temperature, relative air humidity, speed of wind, solar radiation energy and precipitation, the Slovenian Environmental Agency assessed the potential future evapotranspiration and the return periods for the 60-day water shortage for the assessment of agricultural drought using the same methodology as was used for the preparation of risk assessment for agricultural drought on the basis of the archival measurement data. Used in this risk assessment for the occurrence of drought under the changed climatic conditions were the model results of the regional model CCLM4, inserted in the global model MPI-M-MPI-ESM-LR. Based on a variety of match indexes, the latter has proved to be the best; all results of the model situations were verified for the annual daily air temperature and the daily amount of precipitation variables in six Slovenian regions. The regions were defined by means of a selected statistical method of grouping based on the average monthly values of the main meteorological variables in the model network for the period 1981–2010 and the seasonal trends of these variables for the period 1961–2011. The results of the model simulations on the daily time scale for the verification period 1989–2005 were initially aggregated by individual regions and later by months. The aggregate values for the supplementation of the three original risk scenarios were obtained in the same manner as for the original three risk scenarios prepared on the basis of the archival measurement data – the daily timelines were recorded for eight locations, which equal meteorological stations, and joined in a unified timeline with the calculation of the amount of average concentration.

In addition to the basic three scenarios, another six risk scenarios for drought are included in risk matrices for drought, depicted in pictures 13-16. These risk scenarios are actually the original Risk Scenarios for Drought No. 1, 2 and 3, which were reassessed through the anticipated climate changes. For purposes of assessing the impact of climate changes on drought, the following two representative concentration pathways of greenhouse gases were selected – the moderately optimistic Representative Concentration Pathway for greenhouse gases RCP4.5 (Risk Scenarios Nos. 4, 5 and 6) and the Representative Concentration Pathway for greenhouse gases RCP8.5 (Risk Scenarios Nos. 7, 8 and 9). The presumption that vulnerability and the exposure of the society to drought (or in this assessment to agriculture) in the Republic of Slovenia will remain at the same level also in the 21st century and that similar droughts will cause similar consequences as in the years 2003, 2006, 2012 and 2013 was taken into account. This is the main reason why the impacts in risk matrices for drought remain within the same frameworks in the Risk Scenarios for Drought Nos. 4 to 9 as in the original three risk scenarios. All changes in relation to the original risk scenarios for drought which occurred during the new assessment are horizontal, i.e. focused on the greater likelihood of occurrence.

The assessment of the likelihood of occurrence for Risk Scenario 1 and Risk Scenario 2 does not change even in the event of the changed atmosphere and the Representative

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Concentration Pathway of the greenhouse gases RCP4.5. The uncertainties (95% border of the trust interval) do not indicate that droughts with a return period of 10 years would occur any more often than every five years. Even in case of a longer return period the data analysis showed that the upper limit of the trust interval remains in the proximity of 100-year return period, which does not justify the movement in the direction of greater likelihood. The assessment of the likelihood of the phenomenon for the Risk Assessment No. 3 will increase for one level, as this indicated the return period of less than 100 years. The upper level of the interval of trust will also stay at the level of approximately 100 years, which justifies the movement towards greater likelihood for one class. These three risk scenarios, which take into account the Representative Concentration Pathway for greenhouse gases RCP4.5, are marked as Risk Scenarios No. 4, 5 and 6 in the drought risk matrices.

Taking into account the pessimistic Representative Concentration Pathway RCP8.5, the risk assessment for Risk Scenario No. 1 increases for one class, since all assessments of the increase of the 10-year return period (including the measurements of the trust interval) are below five years. The assessment of likelihood for the Risk Scenario No. 2 can also increase for one class; the calculations indicate the drop of the return period considerably under threshold of 25 years. The highest level of the trust interval is also at approximately the same level of 25 years. The assessment of likelihood for the Risk Scenario No. 3 increases for as much as two classes. The 250-year return period dropped to the return period between 20 and 25 years with the upper trust interval under 100 years. These three risk scenarios are included in the risk matrices as Risk Scenarios No. 7, 8 and 9.

It should be stressed that all the assessments of changes of additional or amended risk scenarios for the changed climate conditions are highly unreliable in comparison to the authenticity of the original Risk Scenarios No. 1, 2 and 3, which were prepared on the basis of the archive of the measurements, specifically for the past and the current climate. Risk Scenarios Nos. 4 to 9, which also include the climate changes, are coloured in light grey.

Based on the available data, it is still not possible to predict the future climate changes in terms of regional or temporal occurrence of the drought in detail due to the future climate changes. In general, the likelihood of drought will most likely increase in the southern part of the state (especially in the south-eastern part) and in the warm part of the year.

The theoretically worst possible still likely risk scenario is selected as representative risk scenario, which immediately excludes Risk Scenario No. 3 Risk Scenario No. 1 was also not appropriate, even though it came true on a number of occasions (which means that it occurs frequently) and given that it causes no great consequences. Hence, the second risk scenario was selected as the representative risk scenario for drought. In risk matrices for drought the representative risk scenario is written in italics. The Risk Scenario No. 2, assessed through additional impacts due to the climate changes in line with the optimistic Representative Concentration Pathway scenario for greenhouse gases RCP4.5 (i.e. Risk Scenario No. 5) could also be selected. This is something to think about in the future. However, we have not decided to do so in the future, as the risk scenario itself and the analysis of this risk scenario are still highly unreliable. It is also true that the position of the Risk Scenario in the risk matrices for drought is the same as the position of the original Risk Scenario No. 2.

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Figure 13: RISK MATRIX FOR DROUGHT – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

3 IMPACT

1 1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACTS AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 14: RISK MATRIX FOR DROUGHT – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND THE IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

Scenario No. 3 Scenario No. 6 Scenario No. 9

CT 3

IMPA

Scenario No. 5

Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 8

Scenario No. 4

Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 7 1 1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACTS AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 15: RISK MATRIX FOR DROUGHT – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

3 IMPACT

Scenario No. 3 Scenario No. 6 Scenario No. 9

1 1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACTS AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 16: RISK MATRIX FOR DROUGHT WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

Scenario No. 3 Scenario No. 6 Scenario No. 9 3

IMPACT

Scenario No. 5

2 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 8

Scenario No. 4 1 Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 7

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACTS AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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The internal categorisation of drought risk by individual spatial units, specifically by municipalities, was also prepared. In respect to the size of the risk, the five-level categorisation may be used also for the purposes of internal categorisation. The categorisation may serve as a basis for different activities and decisions related to the type of risk. The criteria for the internal categorisation or the geographic distribution of risk are specific for each individual disaster and are not mutually comparable, for they must be adapted to the disasters. The future climate changes are not taken into account in this categorisation.

The internal categorisation of the drought risk was composed of the combination of three components. The first two components are natural factors; the meteorological water balance and the predominant characteristics of soil on rural surfaces in a municipality (water in the ground accessible to plants). For purposes of categorisation by municipalities, both data have to be united at the level of individual municipality.

In addition to natural factors, empirical data on the damage caused by drought must also be taken into account. The comparison of damage due to drought with the incomes of the inhabitants in an individual municipality is especially interesting. The product of the number of active population and the average net salary in 2013 presents the joint income of the population in an individual municipality. The data by itself is naturally not complete, as it does not take into account the migrations (the earnings of the inhabitants in the neighbouring municipalities, larger urban centres and the neighbouring states) and does not reflect the real standard of the population living in the region. Nonetheless, it does present the picture on the general economic activity in an individual municipality. The comparison or the proportion between the total damage caused by drought in the 2007–2013 period and the joint brute income of the population shows in which municipalities the droughts are so big that after three large droughts in the mentioned period, they completely nullified the incomes of the population in the local economy. In individual municipalities in the northeast part of the country, this proportion even exceeds 2, which means that the damage due to drought in the period 2007–2013 is in fact twice as big as the annual income of the population in the local economy. In addition to these two natural components, this proportion is the third social component with a considerably larger weight and taken into account in the internal risk categorisation.

Figure 17 presents an internal risk categorisation for drought, made on the basis of the mentioned components of the spatial distribution of risk. As expected, the picture shows a larger level of risk in the northeast part of the country, the majority of sub-Mediterranean parts of the state and partially to the southeast part of the state.

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Figure 17: The categorisation of the risk of drought by municipalities prepared on the basis of meteorological data, the data on the soil and the data on the damage due to drought in the period 2007–2013 (from dark green (very small level) to dark red (very high level))

Based on the Representative Risk Scenario for Drought, that is Risk Scenario No. 2, the established risk level for drought is medium, which also applies to a more hypothetical and less likely Risk Scenario No. 3, which can change considerably quickly due to the climate change, as demonstrated by the mentioned risk scenario (Risk Scenario No. 9), which was amended based on the pessimistic Representative Concentration Pathway of the greenhouse gases RCP8.5.

Despite the fact that in comparison to other disasters, risk presented by drought is not as pronounced or is moderately pronounced the mitigation of the vulnerability of the society and the economy has to be addressed due to the drought's frequency. Taking into account the recent damage, the thing that needs to be reduced is the vulnerability of the agriculture to the heat wave phenomena and the lack of precipitation, especially in the summer months. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food promotes a more intense watering (which is in comparison to, in particular, Mediterranean countries still underdeveloped) and the distribution of production of the crops more vulnerable for drought based on the natural situation.

More information on the risk of drought, including the data on the impact of droughts on the future climate changes, can be found in the Risk Assessment for drought publish at the internet pages of the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning.

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5.3 Risk Assessment for Floods

The Risk Assessment for Floods is prepared by the Water Directorate of Ministry of environment and spatial planning.

Floods, which are frequent in the Republic of Slovenia, often cause extensive damage. They are probably the most frequent natural disaster causing damage. About 300.000 hectares of the territory, which is approximately 15% of the total surface of the state, are prone to flooding (out of that more than 200.000 hectares of the territory are threatened by torrential floods). The floods occur throughout the year, but are most frequent during autumn and during the heavy and long-lasting rain. Summer floods are connected to storms, and are mostly of local and torrential character.

The floods may result in fatalities, economic losses, social and environmental damage. The damage on the flood prone areas is usually relatively large, and includes damage to residential buildings, economic public infrastructure, commercial and industrial companies, crops on agricultural surfaces, and so on. The damage also causes frequent interruptions of the social and economic processes. During floods, the natural environment may be threatened by dangerous substances, which are released when facilities, in which they are stored or processed, are damaged or destroyed.

The natural phenomena, described by extent, magnitude and frequency at a specific area, are perceived as natural hazards, while social, economic and environmental risk and harmful consequences of the natural phenomena are primarily defined by the presence, distribution and the characteristics of the damage potential. The hazard potential of the flood events is expected to increase in the future, both due to climatic changes and the inadequate management of river basins and the land cover. The damage potential resulting as a consequence of a natural hazard (floods) are defined by factors, such as exposure, extent, vulnerability, value and the time of restoration.

Floods are a complex phenomenon with a number of intertwined factors, the most dominant of which is the increased flow of water in watercourses. The increased flow of water in watercourses is a result of a precipitation event focused on a specific river basin. The amount of water, reaching the watercourse, depends on a number of conditions, such as vegetation, and the associated evapotranspiration process, vaporisation, the filtration capacity and soil saturation, the level or the presence of underground water, the water retention areas (e.g. depression), the size of river basins, inclination of the terrain and the land cover.

When an unsaturated area is saturated with water, the subsurface flow additionally increases the river flow. The subsurface flow is that part of precipitation which does not drop all the way to the ground water, but continues to flow over the upper underground surfaces towards the watercourse. A part of the subsurface drain reaches the river bed immediately, while the rest of the flow requires more time.

Very important factors for the occurrence of floods are snow melting and the prior saturation of the soil, the characteristic temporal and spatial precipitation and wind patterns in combination with the vegetation conditions (especially in autumn, but also in spring). In

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 65/464 ______addition to the intense erosion processes in and along the watercourse beds, frequent landslides and less common debris floods, are also likely to occur during floods. Therefore, the likelihood of the occurrence of chain disasters is relatively high, as are considerable consequences.

The augmentation of the damage potential due to the increase of the land development areas, greater vulnerability of facilities (non-existence of anti-flood construction standards) and their exposure (inadequate warning, raising of awareness and readiness for events), as well as the storing of valuable possessions in these facilities, can be expected to occur simultaneously with the increase of the scope of the areas at risk and the level of risk at these areas, which should, naturally, be taken into account in the planning of water management.

The damage outcome on the areas at risk depends on the amount time in a specific period, during which the inhabitants and other constituent elements of the environment are actually located on this area, on their number, susceptibility to damage and their commercial and social value. The duration of the hazard is a factor, which is less important in Slovenia in comparison to other places, where flood water stays on the surface for longer periods of time. The time required for the restoration after floods is a much more important factor, as it signifies a rapidly renewable constituent element of the space and consequently also smaller damage potential.

For purposes of reduction of flood danger or the level of risk for floods, the entire cycle of the flood risk management should be encompassed with measures (both construction and non- construction):

- Prevention of activities for the reduction of flood hazard and the promotion of adequate use of land, the management of agricultural land and forests; - Protection: Activities for the reduction of the likelihood of floods and the reduction of the impact of floods on a specific location, and the increase of resistance to floods; - Awareness: Information of the inhabitants on flood hazard and the appropriate measures to be taken in case of an emergency; - Readiness: Activities carried out in case of an emergency, and - Restoration: Restoration of the situation, as soon as possible, to a state before the emergency, the implementation of analysis and the application of new findings.

Individual measures should be carried out in reference to the issue and the specific characteristics of the river basins from the flooding prone areas, to the existing situation and in the objectives set in the context of the reduction of the flood hazard.

All these factors determine the size of the damage in case of a potential dangerous event. Based on the available data, the flood hazard analysis shall be limited on the following parameters for the assessment of risk: the existence of a considerable possibility of floods; their extent; the exposure and vulnerability of constituent elements of the space.

The combination of the mentioned natural factors defines the different types of floods, which cause different types of damage. The damage in the event of floods, when the flood water rises slowly, is much smaller and psychologically less stressful than the damage caused by instantaneous and forceful floods.

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Based on the main characteristics and their extent, floods are divided into:

- Torrent floods: short-lasting, forceful floods, caused by intense and short-lasting precipitation; - Lowland floods: Appear in the lower end of the watercourse, when the watercourse bed moves to the flatland area; - Floods on the Karst fields: Due to specific hydrological characteristics of the Karst waters, long-lasting precipitation, snow melting and even ice storms, the waters in the ordinary impoundments of the Karst fields increase or start flooding the settlements along the Karst fields; - Sea floods: Occur due to the elevation of the sea level, which is a consequence of the high tide, the low air pressure and the southern wind; - Urban floods: Floods in cities occur due to a failure to drain the required amount of precipitation waters through the systems for the drainage of rain waters; - Technical floods: Occur due to inadequate functioning or collapse of the water infrastructure facilities;

As already mentioned, floods are a common phenomenon which affects smaller or larger areas of the state to a lesser or greater extent. The below table shows in how many statistical regions after the year 2007, the floods caused damage. It shows that all statistical regions were affected during the four major flood events in 2014.

Table 22: Overview of cumulative floods by statistical regions

Statistical regions in the RS 2007 2009 2010 2012 2014

Pomurska Region x Podravska Region x x x x Koroška Region x x x Savinjska Region x x x x x Zasavska Region x x x x x Spodnjeposavska Region x x x x Southeastern Region x x Central Slovenia x x x x x Gorenjska Region x x x x x Notranjsko–Kraška Region (from 1 January 2015 onwards x x x x the Primorsko–Notranjska region) Goriška Region x x x x x Obalno-kraška Region x x x Cumulative scope of floods by statistical region in a specific 7/12 7/12 9/12 year 11/12 12/12

Floods in 1990 were the largest floods so far. Calculated in the current currency, these floods caused EUR 551 million damage. They covered 70% of Slovenia's territory, with the exception of the areas of the Mura River and the coastal area around Koper. There were 240.000 people in the influential risk area, of which 237 people were relocated, 2.600 people evacuated, 90 facilities destroyed, 5.231 facilities flooded, 398 industrial power plants

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 67/464 ______flooded, 96 bridges demolished, 280 bridges damaged, 2.683 kilometres of roads destroyed, 20 kilometres of railway destroyed, 480 landslides triggered, 2.000 slides of land and rocks registered. The greatest damage was caused to the economy (28% of damage). The largest share of damage (62%) by area can be found in the area of the Savinja and Sotla Rivers' river basins. The 1990-2014 period falls among the periods with more frequent flood events. It is also a period of greater damage in comparison to other periods, mainly due to higher damage potential on the flood prone areas and a considerable reduction of the resources and personnel in the field of water management. Severe floods after 1990 occurred in the years 1994, 1998, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2014. The majority of these events caused more than EUR 100 million of direct damage, some of them even more than EUR 200 million.

Floods also often cause fatalities, which are a lot less numerous in the recent decade than, for example, during floods in the first half of the previous century (floods in 1926, 1933 and 1954). This can be attributed to greater awareness and better information of the population.

Two risk scenarios were prepared based on the analyses of the recent floods for the Risk Assessment for Floods.

A large-scale flood event was selected for the first risk scenario, at which the floods covered from one third to one half of the state's territory. The scenario is based on the presumptions that the intensity of precipitation is high and that they last between one to three days. Floods comparable to the following scenarios are the 2007, 2009 and 2010 floods and the September 2014 floods. In this case, we can talk about major floods. For the Risk Scenario No. 1, the likelihood of the flood event ranks between five to twenty-five years.

Risk Scenario No. 2 is based on the presumption that over half of Slovenia's territory is flooded. This is a case of the so-called catastrophic floods, comparable to the floods of 1990 and 2012. Floods from 1990 can only be compared to the 1933 floods. The scenario is based on a presumption that the precipitation last for more than three days. The assessed likelihood of occurrence for this risk scenario was between 25 and 100 years.

The flood surfaces for both risk scenarios are limited to the known or specified surfaces with a potential flood hazard.

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Figure 18: The flood hazard potential from 2012

Based on Risk Scenario No. 1, the number of the dead and the injured is lower than for the Risk Scenario No. 2, which is understandable due to the fact that the floods envisaged by the Risk Scenario No. 2 are larger and stronger. In both cases, the predominant impact is the number of the injured people, which taking into account the consequences of the recent floods and the fact that the life-cycle of a lot of the anti-flood facilities is coming to an end and that their functionality in the future may be questionable, classifies the Risk Scenario No. 1 as the third level of impacts of people and the Risk Scenario No. 2 as the second level of impacts.

The economic and environmental impacts on cultural heritage are a level higher in the Risk Scenario No. 2, based on the presumption that a much larger area of Slovenia's territory was flooded than in the Risk Scenario No. 1. The anticipated damage for the Risk Scenario No. 2 is higher than EUR 440 million. For comparison purposes: the largest floods so far, the floods of November 1990, together with other phenomena (landslides etc.) caused for EUR 551 million direct damage, calculated in EUR.

For the Risk Scenario No. 1, the value of political and other social impacts is, as expected, lower (2.72) than for the Risk Scenario No. 2 (3.86). For this reason, the Risk Scenario No. 1 is placed at the third level, and the Risk Scenario No. 2 at the fourth level of political and social impacts.

Based on the analyses of the Prior threat assessment for floods in the Republic of Slovenia, it has been established that the majority of floods occur in the return period between two to five hundred years, out of which most floods have the return period of one hundred years.

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The Risk Scenario No. 1 is based on the analysis of the flood events from 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2014. These floods are mutually comparable in respect to the anticipated threshold conditions of the set scenario. A return period of five to twenty-five years was set for the Risk Scenario No. 1 and assessed with the likelihood level no. 4. The Risk Scenario No. 2 is based on the analyses of the flood events in 1990 (comparable to the floods of 1933) and the floods of 2012. Both flood events are mutually comparable in reference to the anticipated threshold conditions of the set scenario. For Risk Scenario No. 2, the return period was set between 25 to 100 years and the level of likelihood at level 3.

Risk Scenario No. 2 is the representative risk scenario for floods. This decision was noted already in the first version of the Risk Assessment for Floods in 2015. The floods of the same, similar or comparable scope, as presented by the Risk Scenario No. 2, occurred three times in the early eighties of the previous century. The floods included in the Risk Scenario No. 1 and comparable floods hence signify a very high risk, while Risk Scenario No. 1, addressing great floods, only signifies high risk.

In 2016, the Risk Assessment for Floods was amended with certain data related to climate change. Moreover, the general analysis of the impact of climate change on the flood hazard was also produced.

The analysis of the future climate parameters (already detailed in the special chapter of this assessment, which in general addresses the issue of climate changes, and in the abstract of the Risk assessment for Drought), may currently be assessed only through the existing climate models. The Slovenian Environment Agency currently disposes with models which analyse the monthly values of climate parameters. These models provide assessments with a specific level of accuracy.

Climate scenarios were produced on the basis of these models. The assessment of the impact of climate changes on the changing of the risk of floods is provided on the basis of the results of these climate scenarios.

Based on the existing climate scenarios, we can also come to a general conclusion that the amount of precipitation is likely to increase, at least during winter, which points at the increased likelihood for floods or at floods of greater intensity in the winter time. This same presumption was used for the amendment of the Risk Assessment for Floods by taking into account the impact of climate changes.

The current process of the analysis of the climate change and of the planned activities is presented in Figure 19.

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Figure 19: The process for the preparation of the risk assessment for floods, taking into account the climate changes. The activities, already carried out, are written in blue squares and the activities, planned for the future, in green squares.

In the future decades, air temperature will rise in accordance with predictions. Due to the rise of the temperatures, it is assessed, that the amount of precipitation in the lowlands during winter would be smaller in the form of snow and larger in the form of rain. Based on the climate scenarios, it is assessed that there will be much more rain during the winter, at list in the lowlands, and a lot less snow, which could have a negative effect on the flood safety in the cold part of the year. Given the above-stated, it can be anticipated that the cumulative impact of the large amounts of rain and the smaller amounts of snow will, together with the absolute amount of precipitation in winter, affect both the frequency and the intensity of the future flood events, especially during winter.

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Figure 20: The increase of the average annual temperature in the period 2021–2050 calculated based on a model in reference to the period 1961–1990 in the degrees Celsius. Sprememba letne povprečne temperature 2021–2050 =Changes in the average annual temperature in the period 2021–2050 *Odstopanje povprečne temperature obdobja 2021–2050 v primerjavi s povprečjem obdobja 1961–1990 = Deviation of the average temperature in the period 2021–2050 from the average temperature in the period 1961– 1990

Figure 21: The changes regarding the amount of precipitation by season, assessed based on a model for the period 2021–2050 in reference to the period 1961–1990, expressed in percentage. zima = winter, pomlad = spring, poletje = summer, jesen = autumn * Odstopanje povprečnih padavin obdobja 2021–2050 v primerjavi s povprečjem obdobja 1961–1990 = Deviation of the average amount of precipitation in the period 2021–2050 from the average amount of precipitation in the period 1961–1990

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To achieve greater accuracy, models with the analyses of the daily climatological parameters (they are currently still under preparation and are expected to be finished by October 2016) should be produced. The results of these climatological models can be used for the production of more accurate climate scenarios, and as input data for hydrological models.

The preparation of hydrological models based on the new climatological models (the analysis of climatological data on an hourly basis) was envisaged already for 2016. Based on this models and the taking into account the results of the new climatological models, we will be able to provide an assessment on the extent of the change of hydrological conditions due to the climate changes. We will be able to offer a more trustworthy assessment of climate changes and their impact on the risk of floods than the ones currently available and used in the Risk Assessment for Floods, at the end of this process. With the production and preparation of hydrological models and by taking into account the input data from hydrological and climatological models with a daily analysis of parameters, an assessment can be made on the increase or decrease of the rates of flow of individual river basins or even watercourses. Consequently, a more accurate assessment of the risk for floods can be made.

The amendment of the Risk Assessment for Floods with the impacts of the climate changes was based on two premises. The optimistic premise does not anticipate changes regarding the likelihood of the flood phenomenon, while the other, pessimistic premise, anticipated that the likelihood of floods will be much higher, than it currently is, due to the climate changes. Both premises could be linked to the future changes of the greenhouse gases concentrations in the atmosphere, specifically to the content of the RCP4.5 (the optimistic scenario) and the RCP8.5 (the pessimistic scenario which anticipates the constant growth of the greenhouse gases emissions in this and in the future century - more on this subject was already written in the summary of the Risk Assessment for Drought and in the chapter addressing the climate changes in reference to the assessment of disaster risks in general) scenarios. As these are entirely new contents, they have not yet been included in the assessment of the impact of climate changes on the risk of floods, which is still founded on older data or the IPCC Reports. The conversions of the original Risk Scenario No. 1 and No. 2 were prepared on the basis of the two premises.

The optimistic assessment for the flood Risk Scenarios No. 1 and 2 with the climate changes included is marked as follows:

Risk Scenario (S1҉O) – major floods by taking into account the climate changes and the optimistic premise,

Risk Scenario (S2҉O) – catastrophic floods by taking into account the climate changes and the optimistic premise,

҉…taking into account the impacts of climate changes,

O…optimistic premise.

For purposes of the easier recording of these two risk scenarios, the scenarios will be marked as Risk Scenario No. 3 and Risk Scenario No. 4.

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The pessimistic assessment for the original flood Risk Scenarios No. 1 and 2, including the climate changes, is marked as follows:

Risk Scenario (S1҉P): – major floods, taking into account the climate changes and the pessimistic premise,

Risk Scenario – (S2҉P): catastrophic floods, taking into account the climate changes and the pessimistic premise,

҉…taking into account the impacts of climate changes,

P…pessimistic premise.

For purposes of easier recording of these two scenarios, they are hereinafter referred to as Risk Scenario No. 5 and Risk Scenario No. 6. The latter risk scenario and the relevant analysis could also be characterised as the worst possible risk scenario for floods, in particular in terms of the size of the economic and environmental impacts, and impacts on cultural heritage, as well as the impacts on people.

Based on the analysis of the flood hazard and the assessment of parameters in accordance with the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of a disaster, the impacts and the likelihood of scenarios addressed, are as follows:

Table 23: The calculation of risk impacts for floods with a separate and an average presentation of risk impacts

Risk Level of Level of Level of Calculated Level of Risk Reliability scenario impacts economic and political value of overall likelihood of the risk on environmental and overall (average) analysis people impacts and social (average) risk impacts on impacts impacts impacts cultural heritage

Risk 3 3 3 3 3 4 relatively Scenario reliable No. 1 Risk 4 4 4 4 4 3 relatively Scenario reliable No. 2 moderately Risk Scenario reliable 3 3 3 3 3 4 No. 3 (S1҉O)

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moderately Risk Scenario reliable 4 4 4 4 4 3 No. 4 (S2҉O) Risk relatively Scenario 4 4 3 unreliable No. 5 3.67 4 5 (S1҉P)

relatively Risk Scenario unreliable 4 5 4 4.33 4 4 No. 6 (S2҉P)

It has been assessed that the level of reliability of the results of the risk analysis for the Risk Scenarios No. 3 and 4, which are based on the Risk Scenarios No. 1 and 2, and for which only a minor increase of the impacts of floods due to the climate changes (which based on the original Risk Scenarios No. 1 and 2 do not influence their position in the risk matrices for floods) is expected, is moderately unreliable (dark grey colour). However, it is assessed that the "pessimistic" Risk Scenarios No. 5 and 6, which are also based on the original Risk Scenarios No. 1 and 2, could cause greater impacts of floods due to the climate changes. In addition, their likelihood is also higher. As there are not enough model tools with which a more accurate assessment could be produced available, the reliability of their results is currently assessed as relatively unreliable (light grey colour).

The reliability of the risk analyses of the six risk scenarios for floods is presented in the following table:

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Table 24: The reliability of the risk analyses for floods in reference to specific risk scenarios

Reliability Reliability Reliability Joint assessment of the reliability of risk analysis Level of impacts Level of economic The level of political results on people and environmental and social impacts impacts and impacts on cultural

heritage Risk scenario Risk Risk Relatively Relatively reliable Relatively Relatively reliable Scenario reliable unreliable No. 1 Risk Relatively Relatively reliable Relatively Relatively reliable Scenario reliable unreliable No. 2 Risk Moderately Moderately Relatively Moderately reliable Scenario reliable reliable unreliable No. 3 (S1҉O)

Risk Moderately Moderately Relatively Moderately reliable Scenario reliable reliable unreliable No. 4 (S1҉O)

Risk Relatively Relatively Relatively Relatively unreliable Scenario unreliable unreliable unreliable No. 5 (S1҉P)

Risk Relatively Relatively Relatively Relatively unreliable Scenario unreliable unreliable unreliable No. 6 (S2҉P)

The assessment of the impacts of the Risk Scenarios No. 1 and 2 on people is relatively reliable, as are the economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage. The assessment of political and social impacts is, however, based on the level of reliability, relatively unreliable. The joint assessment of reliability of the impacts based on the assessed level of impacts is nonetheless assessed as relatively reliable. The reliability of other risk scenarios is, as evident from the above table, considerably smaller. The assessment of the likelihood of all new risk scenarios (Risk Assessment from 3 to 6) is also relatively unreliable.

Even after the amendment of the Risk Assessment for Floods, the Risk Scenario No. 2 remained the representative risk scenario for floods, although it would be, in the long-term, wiser to select one of the risk scenarios, which includes the impacts of climate changes, as a representative risk scenario due to a larger number of impacts (which are not necessarily/always demonstrated through the identified levels of impacts) and the higher level of likelihood. One of the main concerns to this end is the level of reliability of these risk scenarios, which is, at its best, only moderately reliable.

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Figure 22: RISK MATRIX FOR FLOODS – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

Scenario No. 4

4 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 6 Scenario No. 5

Scenario No. 3 3 Scenario No. 1

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 23: RISK MATRIX FOR FLOODS – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND THE IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

5 Scenario No. 6

Scenario No. 4

4 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 5

Scenario No. 3

3 Scenario No. 1

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 24: RISK MATRIX FOR FLOODS – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

Scenario No. 4

4 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 6

Scenario No. 3 Scenario No. 5

Scenario No. 1 3

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 25: RISK MATRIX FOR FLOODS WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

Scenario No. 4

4 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 6 Scenario No. 5

Scenario No. 3

3 Scenario No.1

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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The internal categorisation of the risk of floods, which does not take into account their major impacts due to the influence of the future climate changes, as presented in the risk analyses of some of the new risk scenarios, was in the past years identified primarily on the basis of the Prior Flood Threat Assessment for the Republic of Slovenia and the identification of the flood areas, including the identification of the Areas of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP) among the latter. The so-called flood directive serves as a basis for these activities.

For purposes of the assessment of the risk of floods, vector grids with square cells, the length of one side being 75 metres, were used at the national border training range. The choice of the size of the cell is important for the improvement of the quality of the generalisation of the training range, while the starting point impacts the end results of the spatial analyses.

Figure 26: Vector grid with a cell size of 75 x 75 meters: (above) the Municipality of Ljubljana, (below) the Areas of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP) of Ljubljana south.

For each cell, a prior flood threat assessment was made at the national level in accordance with the implementing regulations and based on the methodology, which takes into account the flood risk and the assessment of the possible harmful consequences of future floods due to:

 The impact on people (the number of permanent and temporary residents);  The economic and non-economic activities (the size, vulnerability and the value of business entities);  Cultural heritage (the vulnerability and the value of units of the immovable cultural heritage);  The natural environment (the vulnerability and the value of the Natura 2000 Areas, the water protection areas and the bathing water areas, which could be polluted by the operators subject to IPPC and SEVESO Directives in the event of floods), and

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 Sensitive facilities (schools, kindergartens; hospitals, health resorts, old people's homes; archives, museums, libraries; transportation, water and telecommunication infrastructure; critical infrastructure; disaster response services - emergency medical assistance, firefighters, civil protection, mountain rescue service).

Following the spatial analysis carried out at the cell level, the methodology presented in the below diagram was used for the definition of the Areas of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP).

statistično-fizikalni parametri - verjetnost nastopa - jakost dogodka - trajanje nevarnosti

NEVARNOSTNI POTENCIAL naravnih pojavov

OG ROŽEN OST T VEG A TVEGA gradnik ov NOST gradnikov NOST prosto ra

ekonomski parametri psihološko- - tržna vrednost sociološki - zavarovanost parametri - dobičkonosnost - družbena - čas odprave vrednost ŠKODNI škod oz. obnove - zavedanje možnih škodnih POTENCIAL posledic gradnikov - zaznava prostora nevarnosti

- obveščenost in ozaveščenost statistično -fizikalni parametri - izpostavljenost - razsežnost - prostorska razporeditev - ranljivost oz. odpornost

Figure 27: Risk factors based on natural hazards

The hazard and damage potential are composed of the following three groups of parameters: The findings of the analyses have shown that there is a total of 1190 relevant areas, which are potentially at risk due to floods in the Republic of Slovenia, and located on which is a total of 43.649 buildings, 26.425 business entities and 5.038 cultural heritage facilities. By means of additional analysis and a public discussion, 61 Areas of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP) were determined in the Republic of Slovenia.

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Figure 28: Areas of Significant Impact of Floods (OPVP) in the Republic of Slovenia

The combined impact of floods (health of people, the economy, cultural heritage and the environment) was defined and addressed from the spatial aspect in the context of the Prior Flood Threat Assessment for the Republic of Slovenia, as depicted in the following Figure.

Figure 29: The combined impact of floods

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The following table provides the descriptions of some important data related to the Areas of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP) in the Republic of Slovenia, especially the quantitative overview of the impacts on different vulnerable elements in the environment, such as:

- The surface of the flood areas; - The number of permanent and temporary inhabitants; - The number of buildings with a house number; - The number of units of cultural heritage; - The number of cultural monuments of national importance; - The number of business entities; - The assessed number of employees, - The surface of a potentially endangered protected area (pollution); - The number of companies subject to the IPPC and SEVESO Directives; - The length of the more important line infrastructure; - The number of significant social infrastructure facilities of national importance.

Table 24: The Areas of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP) and the impact on these areas during floods

AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPACT OF FLOODS IN THE RS

icantimpact of

infrastructure

usiness entities

HGO2 name The of the area of signif floods surface The the of area (km2) number The of permanent andtemporary inhabitants number The of buildings with a house number number The of cultural heritage units number The of cultural monuments of national importance number The of b number The of employees surface The the of potentially endangered protected area (pollution) number The of companies subject to the IPPC andSEVESO directives length The of more important line infrastructure(km) number The of significant facilitiesof special importance for defence

Tržič 1.15 4784 549 72 39 370 2112 0.00 1 12 18

Kropa 0.13 387 101 48 7 21 50 0.00 0 1 4

Kamna Gorica 0.10 293 80 33 3 23 35 0.00 0 0 1

Begunje na Gorenjskem 0.09 304 77 21 2 24 33 0.00 0 1 1 The upper The Sava river

Železniki 0.75 2358 490 76 62 200 2238 0.00 1 9 12

Sora

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AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPACT OF FLOODS IN THE RS

icantimpact of

infrastructure

usiness entities

Škofja Loka 0.66 2120 433 86 63 202 601 0.00 1 3 13

Ljubljana-northeast 1.10 2142 545 3 0 219 519 0.31 0 12 2

Zalog - Podgrad - Videm 1.10 1461 304 17 2 92 257 0.00 0 15 3

Medvode - Tacen 0.67 618 155 10 0 97 235 0.00 2 15 3 n n theLjubljana area

Gameljne 0.51 832 211 11 2 69 126 0.19 0 1 0 Sava Sava riveri

Ljubljana-jug 10.42 32489 5978 73 12 4398 20660 0.00 0 109 48

Dobrova - Brezje pri Dobrovi 1.18 335 72 9 1 50 271 0.00 0 29 5

Vevče - paper factory 0.01 0 1 0 0 1 375 0.00 1 0 0

Ljubljanicawith the Gradaščica river

Stahovica - Kamnik 1.08 1885 342 41 9 206 1989 0.00 4 8 3

Komenda - Moste - Suhadole 0.83 1899 535 24 1 206 418 0.00 0 8 4

Domžale 0.83 2429 551 8 0 257 657 0.00 0 9 7

Nožice 0.25 462 119 7 2 28 45 0.13 0 1 0

Ihan - farme 0.01 0 1 0 0 8 129 0.00 2 0 0 KamniškaBistrica

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AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPACT OF FLOODS IN THE RS

icantimpact of

infrastructure

usiness entities

Hrastnik 1.26 2548 311 17 2 242 1897 0.00 4 39 9

Trbovlje 1.09 4569 505 37 7 449 2232 0.00 3 12 11

Kresnice 0.38 46 17 5 1 2 2 0.00 1 6 0

Zagorje ob Savi 0.32 2187 168 4 0 150 725 0.00 0 0 5

Litija 0.30 1055 90 5 2 88 264 0.00 0 4 5

Kisovec 0.24 1401 168 3 0 84 176 0.00 0 0 3

Sava river 0.20 66 22 6 2 8 18 0.00 0 4 0 The middle The Sava river

Celje 5.94 18786 2321 239 43 2525 16182 0.10 8 133 96

Laško 1.45 2589 403 58 5 273 902 0.00 1 38 9

Nazarje 0.33 638 89 8 5 109 1840 0.00 0 2 6

Rimske Toplice 0.25 300 58 5 2 16 59 0.00 0 5 0

Vransko 0.15 372 102 54 10 73 339 0.00 0 1 5

Gornji Grad 0.12 142 58 22 5 29 80 0.00 0 1 2

Mozirje 0.08 268 83 31 2 87 247 0.00 0 0 4 Savinja

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AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPACT OF FLOODS IN THE RS

icantimpact of

infrastructure

usiness entities

Vojnik 0.07 311 52 34 4 40 86 0.00 0 0 0

Hrastovec - explosives warehouse 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 2 0 0

Rožno-Brestanica-Krško 1.07 1207 236 35 14 249 684 0.00 0 20 7 LowerSava river

Krška vas 0.33 485 154 11 3 37 64 0.00 0 0 1

Kostanjevica na Krki 0.19 223 76 20 12 38 82 0.00 0 1 2

Grosuplje 0.65 2401 422 9 1 303 1044 0.00 0 4 3

Ortnek - commodity reserves warehouse 0.01 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 0

Krka

Mihalovec 0.17 322 106 2 1 14 22 0.00 0 0 1

Rogatec 0.08 244 50 36 4 25 85 0.00 0 0 3

Rogaška Slatina - glasswork 0.01 0 1 0 0 11 774 0.00 2 0 0 Sotla

Prevalje - Ravne na Koroškem 1.61 4068 644 24 21 426 1641 0.02 3 27 16

Dravograd 1.20 1586 262 19 11 194 1347 0.00 0 21 9

Mežariver with Mislinja

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AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPACT OF FLOODS IN THE RS

icantimpact of

infrastructure

usiness entities

Črna na Koroškem - Žerjav 0.62 1750 269 18 15 104 523 0.00 2 4 5

Spodnji Duplek 0.48 981 255 0 0 96 178 0.00 0 2 2

Ptuj 0.08 147 30 28 16 40 100 0.00 0 0 1 PtujskaDrava

Gornja Radgona 0.01 5 11 9 8 5 16 0.00 0 0 0

Sladki Vrh - paper factory 0.01 0 1 0 0 12 835 0.00 1 0 0 Mura Mura river

Lendava 0.85 1115 230 11 8 175 1200 0.00 0 18 11

Odranci 0.50 950 250 1 0 49 145 0.00 0 3 3

Ledavawith the Velika stream Krka

Idrija 0.99 3184 494 64 20 471 2962 0.00 0 13 23

Cerkno 0.35 1174 245 9 5 140 289 0.00 0 5 6 Idrijcariver

Vrtojba - Šempeter pri Gorici 1.21 3578 940 14 2 471 2206 0.00 1 6 8

Nova Gorica 0.71 1722 337 11 2 342 1909 0.00 1 13 13

Miren 0.44 760 214 10 1 87 778 0.00 0 0 3

Vipava 0.30 1041 195 22 6 116 286 0.00 0 2 1 Vipava

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AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPACT OF FLOODS IN THE RS

icantimpact of

infrastructure

usiness entities

Podnanos 0.11 219 73 24 7 29 71 0.00 0 0 3

Koper 1.61 7009 1607 42 34 2125 10565 0.00 2 10 23

Izola 0.18 1783 367 28 11 277 873 0.00 0 0 0

Piran 0.17 2924 708 51 43 510 1088 0.00 0 1 17 Slovenian coast

The following three pictures present the social elements in the Areas of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP), which are exposed to flood risk at different levels of likelihood of the flood event with a return period (Q10, Q100 and Q500). The maps provide the information on the risk presented to the elements in the environment in reference to the likelihood of the occurrence of the hazard potential.

Figure 30: Social elements in the Area of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP), which are exposed to the risk at the likelihood of the occurrence of the event with a 10-year return period (Q10)

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Figure 31: Social elements in the Area of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP), which are exposed to the risk of the likelihood of occurrence of the event with a 100-years return period (Q100)

Figure 32: Social elements in the Area of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP), which are exposed to the risk of the likelihood of occurrence of an event with a 500 years return period (Q500)

The flood directive demands that all EU members redirect their thinking regarding emergency response from the provision of flood safety towards the awareness that floods are and will remain a natural phenomenon, which cannot be prevented, but which can be controlled to a

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 90/464 ______certain extent and prepared for effectively. Successful endeavours to this end do not include only the implementation of construction measures, such as the construction of the water management or anti-flood arrangements or facilities, but also the implementation of the so- called non-construction measures, where possible. Such measures include the active encouragement of the endangered population to protect their property against this types of threats or to ensure a more active safeguarding of the flood prone areas and the limitation of the additional damage potential input to the flood prone areas during the spatial planning process, the integration of facilities in the environment and the construction of facilities.

For purposes of resolution or reduction of the flood hazard at the Area of Significant Flood Impact (OPVP), the RS prepared the draft Plan for the reduction of the flood risk:

More information on the risk of floods, including the climate changes' impact on the risk of floods, can be found in the Threat Assessment for Floods, published on the internet pages of the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning.

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5.4 Risk Assessment for Hazards of Biological, Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin for Human Health

The Risk Assessment for Hazards of Biological, Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin for Human Health was prepared in 2015 and supplemented in 2016 by the Public Health Directorate at the Ministry of Health.

Professional materials and documents of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and articles and papers written by experts on communicable disease, which among other things predict the likelihood of the occurrence of new pandemics in the near future, were used for purposes of risk identification. Another additional method, used for risk assessment, were the studies of the countries, including Slovenia, and the analyses of those events which resulted in the highest numbers of the ill and the dead, and which consequently paralyzed the functioning of the state (e.g. the 1918 flu pandemic). The main emphasis in the assessment lies on the pandemic influenza, which is associated with high morbidity and a possible increased mortality of patients. Due to its characteristics, the pandemic influenza could lead to an emergency situation in the highly developed industrial and post-industrial societies. To this end, a timely and adequate planning is essential for its effective prevention and management.

Communicable diseases are caused by pathogenic organisms (microbes), such as bacteria, viruses, parasites, fungi and mould. They lead to the formation and development of a disease in animals and humans. Communicable diseases can be transmitted by air, food and water as well as through direct contact or indirectly by way of objects and surfaces. They are transmitted from person to person or from animals to humans. A communicable disease is the result of an interaction between a biological agent, host and the environment. Conditions for the start of the process are an adequate exposure to the infectious agent, a combination of factors in the environment enabling the development of the disease, and a susceptible host. The possibility of a communicable disease spreading among the population depends on the likelihood of transmission between an infected and susceptible person, the frequency of contacts within the population, the duration of the infectivity and the proportion of persons in the population who are susceptible to the infection.

Infection and disease are not synonymous. An infection is the result of contact of a susceptible host with a potential pathogenic microorganism. The source of the majority of infections for humans is another human being or an animal (brucellosis, anthrax, plague, tularaemia, rabies and the West Nile virus), and even the abiotic environment (earth, water). This means that the exposure of a susceptible individual to an infected human or animal or environment is the most important factor impacting the occurrence of an infection. There can be mass occurrences of infections, that is, in the form of outbreaks, clusters, epidemics or pandemics. There exists a possibility that a person is infected, but the disease does not develop. The disease is one of the possible results of the infection, and its development is dependent both on the virulence of the agent and the susceptibility of the host.

Communicable diseases can be transmitted:

 Directly between people or  Indirectly through infected objects, polluted environment and vectors.

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Communicable diseases can be divided in the following groups:

 HIV infections, others communicable sexual diseases: gonorrhoea, genital herpes, Chlamydial infection, syphilis and infections with the hepatitis B and C virus;  Diseases prevented with vaccination: diphtheria, influenza, invasive infections caused by Hib - infection caused by a haemophilus influenzae type b, cervical cancer (and other rare varieties of cancer) and genital warts, which are caused by the infection with the HPV virus (Human papillomavirus), meningococcal meningitis, mumps, chickenpox, pertussis, measles, poliomyelitis), pneumococcal infections, rubella, tetanus, shingles (herpes zoster);  Diseases transmitted or caused by arthropods: Lyme disease, Chikungunya, dengue fever, Central European encephalitis (tick-borne encephalitis), Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, plague, visceral leishmaniasis, yellow fever, West Nile virus, malaria, scabies, lice  Water and food infections and zoonoses: amebiasis, botulism, brucellosis, echinococcosis, toxoplasmosis, hepatitis A, campylobacteriosis, cholera, legionellosis, leptospirosis, microsporum, norovirus infection and rotavirus infection, salmonellosis, rabies , shigellosis, typhus/paratyphus, tularemia;  Re-emerging diseases: anthrax, smallpox (variola), hemorrhagic fevers (e.g. Ebola, Lassa and Marburg), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) (caused by: MERS- CoV), SARS, Zika virus infection.

With regard to the infectious agent and the route of transmission, communicable diseases are divided into the following groups:

. Intestinal diseases; . Respiratory diseases; . Zoonoses; . Skin and mucous membrane diseases; . Vector; . Blood-Transmitted Diseases.

Communicable Intestinal Diseases

Communicable intestinal diseases include food borne infections or poisonings, dysentery, hepatitis A (infectious jaundice), abdominal typhus, paratyphoid fever, poliomyelitis (polio), cholera and infections with intestinal parasites. Humans can be infected by the faeces of a patient or agent carrier, who does not display any symptoms, as well as by water, food, animals, insects and objects or through contaminated surfaces. The transmission occurs through the faecal-oral route; agents enter the digestive tract through the mouth and cause abnormalities in various organs. The majority of notified cases of communicable intestinal diseases, approximately 70%, are illnesses of unknown etiology, each year amounting to approximately 20,000 cases. Rotavirus and campylobacter are the most common infectious agents identified. Common infectious agents are also rotaviruses and caliciviruses which occasionally cause outbreaks of communicable intestinal diseases.

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Communicable Respiratory Diseases

This category of diseases, which are mainly spread by droplets, includes angina, influenza, pneumonia, meningitis caused by pneumococci, meningococci and H. influenzae (meningitis with negative coliform bacteria is, according to Gram, not a respiratory infection), scarlet fever, mumps, rubella, pertussis and diphtheria. Such diseases are triggered by bacteria or viruses that are passed on from patients or healthy carriers by air, above all via droplets from the mouth, while an infected person is talking, sneezing, coughing and slavering. Such infectious agents are transmitted at different rates cause disease in many persons at the same time, and lead to an outbreak or epidemic.

The most frequently notified cases are communicable respiratory diseases, which annually make up approximately half of all notified diseases. Communicable respiratory diseases most commonly occur in the preschool and school age. In particular, chickenpox, scarlet fever and acute tonsillitis also emerge in outbreaks. The greatest decrease in the number of cases was among the vaccine-preventable diseases. Certain diseases are prevented by vaccines which are also used in Slovenia for children and adults (diphtheria, petrussis, measles, mumps, rubella, chickenpox, meningococcal, pneumococcal and H. influenzae meningitis and the vaccination against invasive infections caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae).

Another respiratory infection is influenza. In the past, the constant alternations of the influenza viruses resulted in the occurrence of epidemics and pandemics. The last pandemic of the previous millennium appeared in 1968. The last pandemic in the new millennium appeared in 2009. It was brought on by the A(H1N1)pdm virus. The new influenza A (H1N1)pdm virus contained a combination of genes of the North American classical swine H1N1 virus, North American avian influenza H1N1 virus, human H3N2 virus, and the new Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine influenza virus. Due to its effective transmission between humans, it was able to cause a pandemic. Fortunately, the 2009 pandemic was relatively mild, and the mortality, particularly in the developed world, was not high. Older people already had antibodies (most likely due to contact with the influenza virus which circulated after 1918) and were less likely to become ill. In the last pandemic, people with a greatly increased body mass index, neurological disorders, as well as pregnant women without previous chronic diseases proved to be at high risk of influenza complications.

Influenza pandemic is triggered by a new influenza virus, which significantly differs from other viruses that have been circulating among the population until then and is able to spread rapidly. Since the resistance to this virus is low or even non-existent, a large proportion of the world's population can become infected. The pandemic influenza virus spreads in the same way as the virus of the ordinary seasonal influenza. The only difference is that humans are not immune to it, and hence a higher percentage of the population becomes ill. Also, the clinical picture is usually more difficult. It is possible that between 25 and 45% of people fall ill, which may lead to a wider social problem. The influenza virus is transmitted by infectious droplets, which are produced while a person is coughing, sneezing and talking, as well as by direct close contact with the infected person, such as by kissing or hugging, and by indirect contact through contaminated surfaces and objects, for example door handles, telephone headsets, dining cutlery and glasses. According to the estimations of the National Institute of Public Health (NIJZ), the mortality resulting from influenza pandemics could be considerably

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Zoonoses – Diseases Transmitted from Animals

Zoonoses are communicable diseases that spread between animals, and are also passed on, indirectly or directly, to humans. They are transmitted from animals to humans in different ways: by touch, bite, slavering, licking, consuming contaminated meat, milk and dairy products, and through faeces through the mouth, nose, skin and mucous membranes as well as through contact with objects made of animal parts.

The most known diseases in Slovenia are the rabies, microsporum, diseases caused by parasites (toxocariosis, tapeworm infection), mouth disease, anthrax, salmonellosis, campylobacteriosis and yersiniosis. The symptoms vary from mild to severe; some diseases (rabies) may result in death. However, some zoonoses ceased to exist, as they have been systematically eradicated by veterinary service measures (brucellosis, anthrax, trichinellosis and tuberculosis, which are transmitted through milk and milk products).

Skin and mucous membrane diseases

Some diseases of the skin and mucous membranes are infectious and are passed on from person to person through direct contact and contact with objects, the surface of which is contaminated with fungi, bacteria or viruses. Common diseases are scabies, herpes, purulent skin infections and fungal infections of skin and nails.

These diseases also include sexually transmitted infections caused by bacteria and viruses. Syphilis and gonorrhoea have been known since long ago.

Diseases Transmitted by Arthropods

Lice, ticks, fleas, mosquitoes and other arthropods are disease-carrying pests, transmitting diseases such as spotted fever, recurrent fever, yellow fever, dengue fever, malaria and Central European encephalitis (tick-borne encephalitis). Some diseases are associated with poor hygiene conditions (spotted fever, recurrent fever). The most frequent diseases transmitted by arthropods are the Central European encephalitis (tick-borne encephalitis) and Lyme disease. In Slovenia, the appearance of these diseases is associated with natural sources of infection, such as the alpine and the Dinaric types of landscape, covering two thirds of the Slovenian territory.

The Lyme disease is the most common tick-borne illnesses in Slovenia, and is also one of the most frequently notified communicable diseases. Both above-mentioned diseases, the tick-borne encephalitis and the Lyme disease, are associated with outdoor activities and are characterised by seasonal transmission. The Lyme disease occurs throughout the year. However, its highest risk period is, as with the tick-borne encephalitis, in the summer months. Since the symptoms or the individual stages of the disease may occur several months after the infection, cases also occur out of seasonal activity of ticks. Notified cases of communicable diseases passed on by arthropods in Slovenia also include some imported cases of malaria and dengue fever. The number of patients with dengue is increasing worldwide.

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Blood-Transmitted Diseases

Blood and other body secretions contain infectious agents causing serious communicable diseases that can be transmitted through the puncture of sharp objects, such as needles, scissors, knives, razors or toothbrushes, which contain remains of infectious blood. Most known are AIDS, hepatitis B and hepatitis C diseases.

The susceptibility of the host to a communicable disease depends on:

. Genetic factors; . Age; . Sex; . Specific immunity; . Lifestyle; . The person's physical condition.

Given the number of cases within a certain period of time and area, communicable diseases in humans can occur:

- Sporadically – one person falls ill;

- In an outbreak – the occurrence of more cases of communicable diseases than expected in a specific area, given time period and particular group of people;

- In the form of a cluster; the occurrence of a limited number of cases of communicable diseases or infections that may pose a risk to public health;

- In the form of an epidemic, the occurrence of a communicable disease which, due to the number of cases and the size of the affected area, significantly exceeds the normal situation and poses a risk to the major part of the population and requires immediate action;

- In the form of a pandemic, the outbreak of a communicable disease spreading across continents. A pandemic occurs when a new agent emerges in an environment and causes communicable diseases which humans have not been exposed to before and to which they are thus more susceptible. The agent has a great capacity to spread through human populations and is therefore affecting a large number of people. A pandemic usually occurs in several waves which can completely differ from each other in their characteristics.

Influenza characteristically occurs as an epidemic which can affect a large number of people. Epidemics result from constant changes in the influenza virus, against which the population of a certain area is not resistant. An epidemic breaks out unexpectedly, culminates in two to three weeks and does not last longer than five to six weeks. The number of cases with typical influenza symptoms and the number of patients sent to hospital due to pneumonia, progression of lung, heart and other diseases increases. The disease poses a risk to the entire state, although there are slight differences in the risk of rapid transmission, depending on the number of inhabitants and the population density.

Based on the expert assessment and the analysis of the current events, the Ministry of health adopted a decision to produce a risk scenario for the influenza pandemics in the field of the hazards of biological, chemical, environmental and unknown origin to human health.

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The influenza pandemic presents a transboundary hazard to the health of the inhabitants of the Republic of Slovenia and is considered a mass phenomenon as it may cause a large number of people to get ill, the virus of influenza being highly contagious.

The risk scenario and the risk analysis are moderately reliable, especially since they do not describe an accident that actually occurred, but a possible accident. The pandemic stray of the influenza virus occurred for the last time in 2009 but at the time the illness emerged in a much milder form than in the past, when the world was "surprised" by the 1918 flu pandemic (1918), the Asian flu of 1957 (1957) and 1968 flu pandemic (1968). The occurrence of the influenza pandemic would most strongly affect the people, for as much as 25% of the population would get ill, 0.5% would require hospital treatment and as much as 0.37 would die. Based on the risk scenario and the adjacent risk analysis, it can be established, that up to 1.850 people could die in the RS in case of the influenza pandemic, while at least one million would get ill. These consequences put the influenza pandemic among the disasters with the greatest impact on people, which fall into the highest, i.e. fifth level of the impacts on people. The economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage were estimated in the scope between EUR 100 and 220 million, which includes mainly the costs of medical care and not also other damage and expenses which fall under the mentioned impacts. Consequently, these impacts were classified as the second level of economic and environmental risk impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage. With higher impact on the political and in particular social situation, these impacts would be classified as the third level of impacts. The influenza pandemic could last more than nine months. The reality of the analyses was assessed on the basis of previous experience and the knowledge on the phenomena of the influenza pandemic. The envisaged risk scenario is relatively rare and assessed as a scenario of medium likelihood (the third level likelihood). The experts anticipate the occurrence of the flu pandemic every one hundred or fifty years. All mentioned results are also presented in the risk matrices.

The impact of climate changes on the occurrence of communicable diseases

In the global scale, certain projections of the impact of the climate changes predict the increase and the spreading of individual communicable diseases. The qualification for a rapid response and the pre-prepared approaches for the management of the public and health risks in the field of communicable diseases is a key factor placing Slovenia, and the other states with an established system for the detection and monitoring of the occurrence of a communicable disease, among the countries with the lowest risk level. The anticipated changes in the occurrence and distribution of communicable diseases due to climate changes refer in particular to communicable diseases passed on by vectors (specifically mosquito), the zoonoses and the diseases connected to food and water.

The increase in the temperature and the changes in the amount and the distribution of precipitation impact the occurrence of diseases passed on by mosquitoes. Hence the tiger mosquito, which is the vector of the dengue fever, the Chikungunya virus and the Zika virus in the tropical and subtropical zone, has in the last 15 years appeared also in Slovenia. The natural conditions in Slovenia are favourable for the existence of the Culex spp mosquitoes and the vector of the West Nile fever. Based on the data obtained from the neighbouring

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 97/464 ______countries, there seems to be a possibility that this disease will also appear in Slovenia. The expected rise of the temperature could increase the numbers of the vector population and the level of reproduction of the virus in the vector. Due to the latter, it is particularly important that an organised system for the monitoring of the foreign mosquitoes, which would establish control over the different mosquito species and their potential infection with the agents causing the disease.

The mild climate or weather conditions are favourable for the reproduction of rodents, while the harsh or extreme weather conditions, such as heat waves, increase the likelihood of their contact with people. The climate change could add to the increase in the number of rodents in Slovenia, which could theoretically present greater risk for the transmission of the disease they carry. However, the occurrence of these diseases is also influenced by a number of other factors, such as rodent control, the way the land is used, human activity, hygiene conditions and other. Due to the heating of the atmosphere, the occurrence of certain zoonosis, such as haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome could increase. The latter occurs more often in case of increased temperatures in the summer and autumn months and/or in case of increased precipitation.

The climate changes also impact the diseases connected to food and water, as the increase of the outside temperature and/or humidity may influence the survivability of certain agents of communicable intestinal diseases. In the long term, the number of communicable diseases, caused by agents, such as salmonella, Campylobacter and some viruses, whose reproductive process increases during daily temperatures, would increase,

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Figure 33: RISK MATRIX FOR HAZARDS OF BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND UNKNOWN ORIGIN TO HUMAN HELATH – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

5 influenza pandemic

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 34: RISK MATRIX FOR HAZARDS OF BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND UNKNOWN ORIGIN TO HUMAN HEALTH – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND THE IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

IMPACT influenza pandemic 2

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 35: RISK MATRIX FOR HAZARDS OF BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND UNKNOWN ORIGIN TO HUMAN HEALTH – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

influenza

pandemic 3

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 36: RISK MATRIX FOR HAZARDS OF BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND UNKNOWN ORIGIN TO HUMAN HEALTH WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

influenza

pandemic 3

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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The internal categorisation of risk for the occurrence of communicable diseases in the risk assessment is adopted from the National Threat Assessment for the Occurrence of Communicable Diseases in Humans. The internal categorisation of risk for the occurrence of communicable diseases in the risk assessment is adopted from the National Threat Assessment for the Occurrence of Communicable Diseases in Humans. Figures 28 and 29 depict the general threats to municipalities and regions due to the occurrence of communicable diseases in humans. Based on the NIJZ and the Ministry of Health, the level of threat was easily defined, as the actual level of threat is assessed for each actual occurrence of an actual communicable disease in humans individually. Of course, the level of threat depends on the type of the disease, but it can also be different, based on different factors, for several different occurrences of the same disease. All municipalities in Slovenia are placed directly in the third threat class and all the regions (which equal the ACPDR Regional Offices) in the fourth threat class.

1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 37: Risk posed to municipalities by the occurrence of communicable diseases in humans

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1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 38: Risk posed to regions by the occurrence of communicable diseases in humans

Communicable diseases occupy an important position among acute hazards posed to the health of the population in Slovenia. In addition to communicable diseases which have been relatively well-known for centuries, new diseases are emerging and already known diseases are re-emerging in a new, altered and more harmful form. Studies indicate that communicable diseases will remain constant companions of mankind also in the future. The nature of communicable diseases, when a single case can trigger an outbreak, epidemic or even pandemic and the fact that communicable diseases spread across the state borders and to all continents, requires a prudent planning of measures which prevent the spread of and control individual communicable diseases, outbreaks and epidemics, and consequently minimize the negative impact posed by such diseases.

By reason of lifestyle, changes in the environment and several other factors, communicable diseases in humans are one of the significant factors which can threaten the health of all age groups in Slovenia.

The protection of the population against communicable diseases comprises a system of social, group and individual activities and measures for their prevention, control and treatment, and mitigation of consequences. The protection of the population against the introduction of communicable diseases from other countries also includes measures imposed by the Contagious Diseases Act (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 69/95, 119/05), the

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International Health Regulations (IHR), international health and sanitary conventions and other international treaties concluded or ratified by the Republic of Slovenia.

The successful prevention and control of communicable diseases are based on an effective system of epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in humans, as well as coordinated action at all levels of public health and administrative bodies in the area of health care and veterinary medicine. A concrete threat assessment and appropriate action upon the emergence of communicable diseases are of key importance, particularly in the event of communicable diseases, which can be effectively prevented with vaccination and diseases which occur in outbreaks, clusters and epidemics.

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5.5 Risk Assessment for Highly contagious Animal Diseases

The Risk Assessment for Highly contagious animal diseases was produced in 2015 and supplemented by the Administration for Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection (UVHVVR) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food in 2016.

The diseases, which are defined as Highly contagious animal diseases in the Rules on Animal Diseases (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 81/07 and 24/10 – Annex 8) are listed in the below table.

Table 25: Highly contagious animal diseases (Source: ACPDR, 2015) Disease Disease name Year of outbreak code

A010 Foot-and-mouth disease (1968)

A020 Vesicular stomatitis Never determined

A030 Swine vesicular disease Never determined

A040 Cattle plague (1883)

A050 Small cattle plague Never determined

A060 Lung plague in cattle Never determined

A070 Digital dermatitis Never determined

A080 Rift Valley fever (RVF) Never determined

A090 Bluetongue disease (BTV8) Never determined

A100 Goat pox and sheep pox Never determined

A110 African horse sickness Never determined

A120 African swine fever Never determined

A130 Classical swine fever 1992, 1996

A150 Avian influenza (AI) 2006 (only wild birds)

A160 Newcastle disease 1991

Most of these diseases, with the exception of the foot-and-mouth disease, cattle plague, classical swine fever, avian influenza and the Newcastle disease have not yet occurred in the Republic of Slovenia.

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Animal diseases are caused by biological agents, which are directly or indirectly passed from the sick or infected animal to a healthy animal and even to people (zoonoses). These diseases include numerous diseases with very different symptoms, which are usually specific to the virulence of the agent (the ability of the agent to cause disease). An epidemic signifies a phenomenon of a large number of cases of the disease in a certain time period. An epidemic can turn into a pandemic which is the occurrence of the disease on a global level e.g. on two continents), including a large part of the population. Risk Scenarios enable a better knowledge of the disasters, the consequences of which are determined by means of risk analyses. Their consequences manifest through the impacts on people, the economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage, as well as political and social impacts. Three risk scenarios for the occurrence of Highly contagious animal diseases are presented in the risk assessment.

For purposes of learning about the dynamic of the spread of the disease, we need the appropriate data on the population or the density of the agricultural (holding) types of animals (cattle, small cattle, pigs and poultry). The below figure presents an example of the distribution or density of cattle in Slovenia, which is proportionally distributed all across its territory, with a slightly bigger density in the north-east part of the country, Ljubljana’s surroundings and in the Gorenjska Region. Similar density distribution applies to small cattle and pigs.

Figure 39: Cattle density in Slovenia

Risk Assessment for Highly contagious animal diseases includes three risk scenarios; for the occurrence of the foot-and-mouth disease, avian influenza and the classical swine fever.

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Risk Scenario No. 1 includes the description of the outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease in the north-east part of the state, where the number of cloven-hoofed animals is larger. The foot-and -mouth disease is a highly contagious viral infection of the cloven-hoofed animals, sheep, goats, pigs and a number of cloven-hoofed game animals (deer, wild boar). The disease is caused by the virus from the picornavirus family, which has seven subtypes. The most important subtypes are O, A and C. The high mortality can occur among young animals, in particular in lamb and pigs. Mortality of adult animals is rare. The disease causes large economic damage, which does not refer to indirect loss due to the mortality of the animals (2-5%), but to indirect loses, such as long lasting and a considerable reduction of milk production, abortions, birth only to indirect damage (measures for the infected economy, the infected and endangered area) but also to a big problem of the prohibition of trade. Moreover, environmental problems might also occur as a consequence of the removal of the corpses of the executed and the deceased animals. In accordance with the provisions of the Animal Health Code of the International Office for Epizooties (OIE), the Republic of Slovenia is a country free of foot-and-mouth disease (of non-vital animals, weight loss and others. As this refers mainly to an economic disease, it refers not the last outbreak dates back to 1968).

The characteristic signs of the disease are high temperature, accompanied by depression, anorexia and the instant drop of the milk yield from cattle. Afterwards, bubbles start to appear on the tongue, mouth, gums, dental plate, nostrils, on the skin above and between the hooves, and on udders. They usually burst within the next 24 hours, leaving painful ulcers behind. In more severe cases of infections, the exfoliation of the oral mucosa is also possible. The ulcers in the mouth lead to increased secretion of saliva, squelching and difficulties with feeding. Injuries on the hoofs lead to acute lameness, the rejection of movement, while the secondary infections could lead to serious damage of the deep tissue of the hoofs. The injury also soon leads to the loss of the body weight. The injuries on the udders can lead to infection.

The risk scenario describes the outbreak of the disease in the beginning of summer on a holding with intensive cattle farming. In the beginning of July, the owner of the holding, breeding 655 heads of cattle, six pigs and seven heads of small cattle, bought 45 calves from Bulgaria. Two days after the animals were put in a barn, they started showing the clinical signs of the disease. The measures of the local veterinarian who suspected the foot-and- mouth disease, among other things include the prohibition of the transportation of the animals and the products from suspicious holdings or to the suspicious holdings, the limitation of movement of the people and the animals and the prohibition for the removal of animal corpses. Up until the arrival of the expert team, activated by the National Disease Control Centre (DSNB) the veterinarian remained at the holding. The epizootiological survey showed that a couple of calves originate from Turkey, where this disease is endemic. Three calves, not yet showing the signs of the disease, were brought to Burgas (Bolgaria) with an illegal ship from Turkey. They were put in the barn together with the other animals from Bulgaria which, were being collected for further transportation across the EU. Based on the data, the truck driver from Bulgaria brought 50 animals to Slovenia; 45 of which he delivered to the mentioned holding, and two other shipments to two different holdings (the contact holding).

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Figure 40: Occurrence of the foot-and-mouth disease in the area of the Pomurje Region and Hungary

There are three outbreak sites (outbreaks) in Slovenia. The first outbreak is marked as Outbreak 1, followed by two other simultaneous outbreaks (Outbreak 2 and Outbreak 3) on two other holdings. Samples were collected at all three holdings and sent to the laboratory of the National Veterinary Institute (NVI) Ljubljana. The disease was confirmed, which lead to the introduction of appropriate measures. In the perimeter of the mentioned holdings, the infected area (of an at least three kilometre radius) and the endangered area (at least ten kilometre radius) were also determined. There are 406 holdings on the infected area and 3.081 holdings on the endangered area. At altogether 3.487 holdings there are 11.006 heads of cattle, 44.173 pigs and 1.805 small cattle animals. In addition to other measures, the Rules on the measures for the detection, prevention and eradication of foot and mouth disease additionally prescribes the careful removal of cadavers of the dead and the executed animals.

Since the confirmation of the transboundary animal disease (the foot-and-mouth disease), the measures for the prevention of the spread of the disease and the eradication measures, should be carried out for at least 30 days from the confirmation of the disease. There are altogether 690 heads of cattle at the affected holdings, which have to be euthanised and removed in a non-harmful way, at a processing plant. After the outbreak of the disease and after adopting all required measures (cleaning, disinfection, disinfection barriers, and control) Slovenia has to once again obtain the status of a disease-free country, which lasts at least 12 months after the last occurrence of the disease.

The foot-and-mouth disease did not appear in the Republic of Slovenia for quite some time now. Administration for Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection (UVHVVR) has prepared a Plan of measures to be taken during the occurrence of the foot-and-mouth disease. Examples for comparison purposes in order to understand the disease, which occurs in the naive population (where all animals are susceptible to the disease), should be searched for in the occurrence of the foot-and-mouth disease in England and in the Netherlands in 2001.

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Risk Scenario No. 2 describes the outbreak of avian influenza. The presumption of the scenario is that the disease occurred among the poultry on the Pohorje Mountains. The avian influenza is caused by type A viruses, which belong in the Orthomyxoviridae family. There are three types of viruses in this family: A, B and C. However, birds can get infected only with the A type virus. Based on their virulence they are divided into highly (highly pathogenic avian influenza) and low virulent viruses (low pathogenic avian influenza). The infected animals excrete the virus through nostrils, the oral or beak cavity, conjunctiva and the cloaca even before the occurrence of clinical signs or in cases of the infections of the water poultry even if they are only the virus carriers. The viruses are carried passed on through direct contact among susceptible species or through contaminated surfaces or food. The vertical transfer is possible only when an eggshell and the egg content are contaminated. The theory is that the wild birds transfer the low pathogenic strains on domestic poultry which can become more pathogenic or even highly pathogenic and cause the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Human is an important factor in the transfer of the HPAI viruses, as the virus can be disseminate already due to sheer negligence, through clothes, shoes, fodder or vehicles (non-compliance of the biosafety measures). The viruses are usually spread between the same or related species, but can be also passed from birds to mammals and even to people and vice-versa. The disease takes on an acute form and most of the animals die quickly, while the animals that survive, have to be euthanised and destroyed in a harmless way, which causes great losses for the poultry farmers. The indirect consequences are reflected in the losses caused by the prohibition of trade, reduced demand for poultry meat and meat products, limited tourism and other things.

Clinical signs of avian influenza vary, and can affect the respiratory, digestive, reproduction and the nervous systems. The most obvious sign is a great number of deaths, even up to 100%. In the acute form, the nervous signs, which can appear at animals, include ataxia, tremors of the head and the neck, torticollis, difficulties standing, inactiveness and less noise. Additional symptoms are depression, anorexia and lower water consumption, the egg yield, as well as the edema of the head subcutaneous head tissue, the cyanosis of the skin on the head and legs, sneezing, coughing, nasal discharge, conjunctivitis and sinus infection.

During the systematic control of the disease among the wild birds, the disease was identified in the north-east of the country, in the area covered by the Ptuj and Maribor regional units of the UVHVVR. This is a densely populated poultry area. The disease first appeared during winter among the deceased swans in the Drava river basin. In accordance with the situation in the field and given the high tendency of the spread of the disease, the UVHVVR issued instructions for the breeders in the area of high risk on the prevention of the input of the infection in the animal breeding process. Hence the breeders had to secure pristine drinking water and fodder, an appropriate level of hygiene and limit the unnecessary contacts between animals and people.

Despite the latter, the occurrence of the disease in other areas cannot be excluded, such as e.g. in the risk scenario, based on which the outbreak of the disease occurred among the poultry on the Pohorje Mountains (Lovrenc na Pohorju, see picture). The poultry from the holding, at which the phenomenon was confirmed, came in contact with the wild birds. All poultry (15 animals) was euthanised and carefully destroyed on the sixth day after the first case was confirmed. After which preliminary cleaning and disinfection of the infected holding was carried out. The measures were suspended 30 days after the cleaning and disinfection

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 110/464 ______of the infected holding was completed, which is on the 40th day since the occurrence. At the infected (3 km radius) and the endangered area (a 10 km radius), 178 poultry holdings with altogether 54.366 animals had to be covered.

Figure 41: The occurrence of the avian influenza in the north-east part of the country

Administration for Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection (UVHVVR) has prepared a Plan of measures to be taken during the occurrence of the avian influenza. The provision of the biosafety measures at the holdings and the compliance with regulations for import and trade.

In literature, the notions avian influenza appeared for the first time already in 1878. Its initial name was the Newcastle disease, which was later changed to the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). The disease outbreaks in the recent period, when the virus spread across the entire Asia and a part of Europe, Africa and North America and affected over 60 states, caused the loss of several hundreds of birds. The role of wild birds in the spread of the disease was often limited; however, it is true that domestic poultry influences the spread of the disease. Given the nature of the disease and the fact that this might be a potential zoonosis, the occurrence of the avian influenza in reference to the size of the impacts and the likelihood signifies a medium level risk.

The third risk scenario refers to the phenomenon of the classical swine fever. It refers to a viral transboundary animal disease which affects domestic pigs and wild boars. The classical swine fever is caused by a virus that belongs to the pestiviruses from the Flaviviridae family. The pigs excrete the virus with all their excretions, especially saliva, urine and faeces. The different strays of the virus take different amounts of time to spread. As a rule, the more virulent strays spread faster and cause higher morbidity. The mortality could reach up to 90%. The viruses spread among the breeds on four different types. The most common is the purchase of pigs in incubation or permanently infected pigs. The transfer with pig meat, meat

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 111/464 ______products and slops is also important. The disease can also be transferred by people, especially farmers and veterinarians, with their clothes, footwear and equipment. The virus can also be transferred by bloodsucking insects and the wing, which is less common. The wild boars can also be a source of infection for the domestic pigs. In accordance with the provisions of the Animal Health Code of the International Office for Epizooties (OIE), the Republic of Slovenia is a country free of classic swine fever (the last outbreak dates back to 1996).

The pigs can die already in the pre-acute phase, without having any classical signs; however the most common is the acute form. The affected pigs are depressed, do not eat and do not like to move. If they are forced to move, they sway in the last part and lie close together, as if they are cold. The first symptom is high temperature. In the initial phases, occurs constipation, followed by diarrhea and vomiting. The next symptom to appear is the diffuse hyperemia and the pink lesions over the skin of the abdomen. Conjunctivitis occurs. Eyelids are sometimes adhered due to dried purulent discharge. Nervous symptoms are common also in the early stages of the disease. The most common are movement in a circle, shaking of muscles and spasms. Usually, death occurs 7 to 15 days after the onset of the disease. With the low virulent strains, the signs are less dramatic. In the chronic form, the incubation is longer, skin lesions occur in the form of alopecia, dermatitis, and pink lesions over the skin of the abdomen. Pregnant sows may have a rise in temperature, abortions, small litters, stillbirths and abnormalities in piglets.

Risk Scenario No. 3 describes the occurrence of the classics swine fever in domestic pigs in the territory of the neighbouring state. In 2007, the outbreak of the classic swine disease was recorded in Croatia in a place called Puščione, which is located approximately six kilometres from the Slovenian border. The endangered ten kilometre zone also covered some Slovenian settlements. Among other cases of this disease across the world, there are also the outbreak in the Netherlands (January 1997) and in the east part of England (August 2000).

The measures for the control over and the limitation of the spread of the disease, also cover the south-east part of the state. Following the outbreak of the disease on the affected holding, the infected and the endangered areas are defined, as well as the measures to be applied at all these areas. In the mentioned situation (the outbreak of the disease in the neighbouring state), the infected and the endangered areas are determined in the Republic of Slovenia. In this case, however, the outbreak of the classical swine disease is considered as a low risk. Due to the nature of the disease and the tendency of the spread of the disease, this is a very dangerous disease, causing economic and political damage. In the area of the south-western part of Slovenia, the pig breeding is not the most important livestock industry, nonetheless, the consequence of the imposed measured are very high. If diseases cannot be confined, outbreaks can occur also in other parts of the state, as this disease has a high tendency to spread further. The following figure presents the infected and the endangered areas. There are 34.610 pigs bred at a total of 2.011 holdings.

In order to determine the cause, an epidemiological analysis has to be carried out. Early detection of the disease with the identification of the index case is very important. The incubation period, which lasts from five to ten days (the possible range is from two to thirty days) follows by the occurrence of the clinical signs of the disease. The identification of this period is the key for the detection of the course of the disease. In the pre-acute phase, death

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 112/464 ______occurs within four to eight days following the infection. In the acute phase, death occurs within nine to nineteen days and with chronic forms, between 30 to 95 days. The pigs excrete the virus already during the incubation period, when they do not yet show clinical signs and the clinically ill animals and pigs which are congenitally infected. When pigs get specific antibodies after the infection, they usually do not excrete the virus anymore. The animals that fall ill spread the virus continuously or intermittently. The virus can be spread continuously by seemingly healthy pigs, which show no clinical signs or do not have any specific antibodies (intrauterine-infected piglets).

Figure 42: The occurrence of the classical swine fever in Croatia and in the Bela krajina Region

Sumljivo gospodarstvo = Suspected holding Gospodarstva s prašiči = Swine holdings KPK sumljiv DP = CSF-suspected domestic pig 3 km okužen pas Hrvašaka = 3k of protection zone strip in Croatia 3 km okužen pas Slovenija = 3 km of protected zone strip in Slovenia 10 km pas = 10 km strip Scenarij 3 = Scenario 3

Administration for Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection (UVHVVR) prepared a Plan of Measures to be taken during the outbreak of the classical swine fever. The provision of the biosafety measures at the holdings and the compliance with regulations for import and trade.

Based on all three risk scenarios, a risk analysis was produced and the impacts on people, the economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage, including political and social impacts assessed. For purposes of assessment of political and social impacts, the impacts on the functioning of state authorities, the impacts on the functioning of important infrastructure systems, the psychosocial impacts and financial stability, were also assessed or taken into account.

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Risk Scenario No. 1, which does not include the foot-and-mouth disease phenomenon, was chosen for the representative scenario. The latter, in case of occurrence, presents the highest financial burden for the state. In risk matrices, this scenario is written in italics. Based on the calculation of expenses and in reference to the content of the risk scenario, the restriction and the rehabilitation of the outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease would cause approximately EUR 3 million damage.

The likelihood of occurrence of all three risk scenarios between the next five to twenty-five years was determined. In relation to the criteria for the assessment of disaster likelihood, this corresponds to the likelihood of level four. For two risk scenarios (foot-and-mouth disease and classical swine fever) no impact on people was identified in reference to the amount of political and social impacts, as all three risk scenarios have been placed in level two, which does not present any concerns. With regard to the level of economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage, it has been determined that the damage and the expenses are not even close to surpassing EUR 100 million, which puts the three risk scenarios in the lowest, i.e. first level of impacts.

All three risk scenarios and analyses were assessed as moderately reliable.

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Figure 43: RISK MATRIX FOR HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS ANIMAL DISEASES – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

IMPACT

Scenario No. 2

IMPACT 1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD RISK LEVELS 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSIS THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 44: RISK MATRIX FOR HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS ANIMAL DISEASES – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

IMPACT 2

Scenario No. 1 1 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 3

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 45: RISK MATRIX FOR HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS ANIMAL DISEASES – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

IMPACT Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 3 2

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 46: RISK MATRIX FOR HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS ANIMAL DISEASES WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

IMPACT Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 3 2

Scenario No. 2 1

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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As already mentioned and as it derives from the matrix with the overall presentation of risk, two risk scenarios (Risk Scenario No. 1 and 3) signify the medium risk level, while Risk Scenario No. 2 refers to the low level of risk. In all three risk scenarios, the likelihood is much more expressed than the size of the impacts.

The purpose of the internal risk categorisation was to establish or determine the classes or the levels of risk for Highly contagious animal diseases also at the level of regions and in particular, municipalities. For this case as well a five-level categorisation of the areas in reference to the size of the risk, which can serve as a basis for different activities and decisions, has been prepared. The premise for the preparation of the internal categorisation of risk presents the number of the reared animals in the RS. The holdings, municipalities and the regions where divided into three classes of internal risk categorisation based on the number or the share of the animals (cattle, pigs, small cattle, poultry). A large number of animals, focused on a specific area, usually means greater risk for the outbreak and the spread of a disease.

The below picture presents the internal categorisations of risk, at the level of municipalities, due to the occurrence of Highly contagious animal diseases.

Risk level: 1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 47: The categorisation of municipalities based on risk due to Highly contagious animal diseases

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Fourteen municipalities (mostly in the north-eastern part of the state, in the Pomurje and the Podravje regions, in particular due to a large number of poultry and pigs in this area) that fall into the highest, fifth class of internal categorisation. The fourth class consists of 34 municipalities, especially in the Pomurje, Zahodnoštajerska, Podravje and Dolenjska regions. The two highest classes of the internal risk categorisation consist of 48 municipalities. The third threat class consists of 80 municipalities, the second of 50, and the third of 26 municipalities.

When talking about animal husbandry, the animal husbandry systems and Highly contagious animal diseases we cannot neglect their connection to the atmosphere and the climate changes. The animal husbandry systems, the climate changes and the health of the animals are interconnected into complex mechanisms. E.g. animal husbandry impacts the extent of the greenhouse gases emissions, such as e.g. methane and nitric oxide, while the agricultural activity, including the production of animals, presents between 10 and 12% of the world greenhouse gases emissions. In addition to the carbon oxide, emissions of methane and nitric oxide should also be mentioned, as they appear in particular during animal husbandry, on rice fields and during the use of the nitrogenous fertilizer.

Even though both methane and the nitric oxide have a strong impact on the occurrence of the greenhouse effect they are not released into the atmosphere in the same amounts as the carbon oxide, which also has a longer biological half-life in comparison to the mentioned gases.

The climate changes are reflected in the quality of water, air and food and also in the changes of the ecosystems, agriculture, industry and settlements. As a consequences animal health can be affected due to the extreme conditions and the occurrence of the new or the recurrence of the old transboundary diseases at which some of these diseases are be transferred by vectors (e.g. insects and other carriers of the disease) which are strongly dependent on the weather conditions.

This calls for measures and the adjustment to be taken and applied by all institutions related to agriculture, in particular the veterinarian services, which have to adjust to greater risk connected to the climate changes. The animal production plants will also have to adjust to the climate changes, that is depending on their location and the impact of climate changes in specific areas.

Animal husbandry is an important element of the agricultural sector and an important source of food supply (milk, eggs and meat). The global demand for food is growing in correlation with the number of inhabitants. For some people the domestic animals are the only source of income or survival. It is assessed that approximately one billion of people depend on animal husbandry. The ruminants play a key role in the preservation of pastures all across the world. It also helps preserve the ecosystems which play an important role in the preservation or the increase of the carbon reserves, the production of organic fertilizers, which leads to the savings in chemical fertilizers, the improvement of water quality and the preservation of the high level of biotic diversity of animals and plants.

The animal production has an important impact on climate changes, especially the ruminants who contribute to larger quantities of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by releasing methane and nitric oxide. On the other hand, the climate changes impact the production and

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 120/464 ______the health of the reared animals and the production of animal fodder. The agricultural sector, as already mentioned, contributes between 10 and 12% of the global emission of the greenhouse gases in the form of carbon dioxide. It also contributes 40 % of the total methane emissions (from the intestine fermentation, the dissolution of manure and the flooding of rice fields) and 65% of the total amount of nitric oxide (from agricultural lands, due to the use of nitrogenous fertilizers, fertilisation and biomass combustion). In addition, animal husbandry has an important effect on the use of land, as the surfaces intended for animal husbandry increase with the reduction of forests and the creation of pastures and fields.

The impact of important changes on animal husbandry or the health of animals is reflected in different forms. Above all, the changes in temperature, the availability of the drinking water and the changes in the productivity of the ecosystems should also be addressed. These factors are strongly dependent on the geographical area and may have negative consequences for biotic diversity, and the goods and services, such as food production and the demand for water.

The primary factors, linking the climate changes and the productivity of animals (the fertility, health and diseases of the animals) and animal husbandry as an agricultural branch (the production of meat, milk, eggs, wool and other products) are as follows:

- The changes in the samples, the intensity and the distribution of precipitation throughout the year (the changed precipitation regime); - The average and the highest temperature and heat waves, which impact the cattle with the heat stress, and the plants in the sensitive phase of their life cycle with an increased evapotranspiration from the crops and the evaporation of water from the soil and water reservoirs; - The later or more intense extreme weather events (floods, storms, strong wind, droughts etc.), which do not cause an increased mortality of animals, greater likelihood for the damage to the animal accommodation premises, an enhanced encumbrance of sanitarian services for the removal of the deceased animals and higher demand for animal shelter.

The secondary factors of the climate changes manifested as the consequences of primary events are:

- More disease and parasite illnesses; - Low appetite and the digestion of the fodder at animals; - New insects and diseases spreading from warm places and other arthropods (Arthropoda); - Decreased growth and the general well-being of animals (e.g. decreased milk production); - Higher mortality and morbidity of the older animals and the offspring; - The increased number of individual diseases transferred by water; - The lack of food and drinking water for animals; - The impact on the quality and the size of the animal's habitat due to the frequent floods and forest fires and other wildfires;

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- An increased number of pests, less frequent stress caused by cold for the cattle, an increased number of parasites, more intense attacks of parasites or mosquitoes due to milder winters.

The climate changes impact the health of animals in a variety of different ways. Always when it comes to greater fluctuation of the weather variables it can also come to greater biological changes, both in the health of animals or the occurrence of disease at animals and in the animal population dynamics, the distribution and the availability of the pathogens in the environment. There is constant fluctuation present during the process of the changes in health or the occurrence of a disease, which is reflected in the changes of the balance between the three elements of the ecological triad: the mediators, the hosts and the environment. In this way, the pathogens in the environment may occur in greater density can be more aggressive and can impact the fluctuation of the immune system of the host species. The environment impacts the health system of the animals and constantly changes, while the animal's health system is not immune to such changes.

The changes in the weather patterns change the spatial distribution of the disease carriers or vectors, such as insects, ectoparasites and endoparasites (e.g. mosquitos, ticks and other anthropoids). Since anthropoids are highly susceptible to the changes in the environment (especially to temperature changes), this also influences the spread and the transfer of the disease, which depend on vectors. In this way, the diseases such as the bluetongue disease, the West Nile Fever, the African swine fever, the Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, the Lyme disease, the yellow fever and the visceral leishmaniasis, remain limited to the distribution of vectors and to a large extent depend on the presence of the vector itself. The emergence of new diseases in a specific area and the occurrence of the old diseases disseminated through vectors clearly demonstrates that there is a correlation between the climate changes and the impacts on the health of animals and indirectly also on people. The more frequent occurrence of extreme weather events will also lead to the increase in the number of fatalities related to climate changes and the dissemination of animal and human diseases.

It can be expected that there will be a number of new or recurring phenomenon of specific animal diseases, which are directly linked to the climate changes in the region, within the next five to ten years also in Slovenia. The burdening of the environment with pathogens is most evident in the case of faecal – oral transfer paths, which is related to the transfer with water. These diseases include the avian influenza and the atypical Newcastle disease at wild birds which move based on the season. The natural cycle of the avian influenza at wild ducks, which are the most common natural hosts of the virus, includes the consumption of water infected with the avian influenza virus. The replication of the virus is mainly carried out in the end part of the duck's intestinal tract. The virus, which is later deposited in the higher latitudes can be stored in permafrost in the subarctic conditions where they can survive for several centuries. It is known and proven that wild ducks are the collectors or the catalysts of different pathogens, including the West Nile Virus where the birds are a natural host in which the virus can reproduce. In addition, the anaerobic anthrax bacteria may survive in the soil in the form of spores for several decades.

The disease transferred by anthropoids form a similar but separate category. The indirect transfer of pathogens is conducted through different types of thicks. The type of soft ticks, for

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 122/464 ______example, feeds on the warthog which plays an important role in the transfer of the African swine fever. The agent causing the virus of the African swine fever can survive up to eight years in a thick. There is also a number of midges and mosquito which can transfer the disease and contain the so-called "level of sleeping" pathogens. Hence the so-called virus of the Rift Valley fever (RVF) can survive several years in the eggs of mosquito until longer periods of precipitation do not provide the conditions for the further development of the mosquito from the Aedes species, which later feeds on ruminants, thus bringing to life the RVF cycle, which leads to the outbreak of the disease in ruminants. The infected ruminants which are in contact in people in densely populated areas can transfer the disease through mosquitoes to people and thus further contribute to the spreading of the RVF among people. The spreading of insects on longer distances and wider geographical areas is also possible by means of wind. An example of such spreading is the 2006 case from Great Britain, where the virus of the bluetongue disease (BTV8), spread by midges, came from Belgium. It is highly likely that the outbreak of the Schmallenberg virus in Great Britain in the beginning of 2012 is also a consequence of infected midgets, which were brought by wind from the inland Europe.

The listed examples demonstrate that the consequences of climate changes are highly complex and can manifest in different forms even in animal health. In addition, the transfer of the disease can also change. The African swine fever virus circulates in the sylvatic form (forest form) of at least 22 different genotypes at the warthog in South African forests. In 2007, the genotype no. 2 was transferred from the Georgia Black Sea harbour to central Europe. It is believed that the origin of the disease were the contaminated meat products from Mozambique or Madagascar, which contained the African swine fever virus, and which were later confiscated in Georgia and fed to domestic pigs. At present time, the African swine fever is slowly spreading to the area of Eastern Europe, especially through the transfer of contaminated pork meat products and the transportation of pigs. The wild boar, also a carrier of the disease, is an important source of the spread of the disease.

The combat against, or better, the adjustment to the negative consequences of the climate changes, must be based on the strategy of adjusting the animal husbandry, mutual cooperation of different institutions and services and the education and training of people to the consequences. The main pillars of this strategy are:

a) The introduction of changes in the management, the technology and infrastructure, such as: - The protection of pastures and their biotic diversity against the decline; - The preparation of the system for the rapid response to danger and the health of animals and plants; - The application of the good practice for the use of land in order to reduce the risk of erosion; - The increase of the accessibility in terms of the quantity and the quality of water for livestock; - The use of genotypes with greater resistance to drought and greater pressures of the disease vectors; - The preparation of fodder reserves for emergencies. b) To strengthen the research, development and the transfer of new technologies;

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c) Develop new information and support systems for assistance in the decision-making process in the public and private sector (with the use of quality meteorological data, including the early warning systems and the use of mathematical models for the anticipation of events and their consequences); d) To develop and spread the use of agricultural insurance appropriate for climate risks; e) To improve spatial planning, to protect the ecosystems, the functioning of river basins and the biotic diversity; f) To develop adequate institutionalised capabilities for adaptation and coordination at the national and local level; this means the adjustment of organisations and standards and the creation of new capabilities for greater effectiveness in the resolution of the consequences of climate changes.

The strengthening of institutions and the training are a big step in this direction. The slogan "One Health" signifies the unification of the common risk factors, which are active at the level of the natural and agricultural landscape, in slaughterhouses, in the processing industry and the distribution channels. "One Health" is bringing together health experts, veterinarians and food inspectors, workers employed in fishery, forestry and in the field of plant protection, the management of natural resources, the food industry and in the public health sector. The proactive approach is of key importance for the management of climate risks. The climate conditions and the socio-economic impacts of these changes call for the updated control strategies for the veterinarian service in reference to the establishment and the anticipation of the occurrence of diseases related to climate changes. The research and proposals of preventive measures (solutions or the appropriate response) at the local and regional levels, which require the support of different international organisations for research and education, are of key importance. These measures contribute to unambiguous economic, environmental and social benefits, as they are used to obtain potential effects and reduce the hazard to ecosystems and the health of people and animals, which are connected to climate changes.

Healthy animals are of key importance for the provision of health of people and animals and the safe food. It is important to have an effective system for the early detection of communicable diseases, as well as rapid response at the national level and in the wider European environment. The consequences of the occurrence of a disease in animals may manifest as the loss of income at the level of an individual or the economy (the deaths and the euthanisation of animals) and at the levels of the municipality and the state (limitations in the trade or the import, the lack of raw materials for the industry and other things).

Due to the extensive trade with animals and their products, the changes in the environment, large concentrations of animals in certain areas and other factors, Highly contagious animal diseases signify an especially dangerous threat to the health of animals in Slovenia, which calls for the preparation and the planning of measures to be taken in case of the occurrence of Highly contagious animal diseases. New diseases, in addition to those already known for decades and centuries, are starting to appear or the old diseases appear in a different form. Moreover, the diseases are starting to spread in areas where they were not present in the past, especially due to the changed climate conditions and the adaptation of disease agents.

The protection of the animals against transboundary diseases comprises a system of social, group and individual activities and measures for their prevention, control and suppression, and mitigation of their consequences. The successful prevention and control of Highly

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 124/464 ______contagious animal diseases is based on an effective monitoring system and the coordinated operation of the veterinarian and other services. The most important are the fast and effective measures to be taken in case of diseases, especially those which occur in the form of epizootic.

In addition to the functioning of the veterinarian services, the owners of the animals may also contribute to the prevention of the input and the spreading of the disease, in particular by:

- The provision of medically appropriate fodder and drinking water; - The provision and the maintenance of the prescribed sanitarian conditions in the facilities for animal production and other premises where the animals are located and the premises with appliances; - The provision of hygiene during deliveries and milking; - The provision of veterinarian order in the public places, where animals gather, in the means for the transportation of animals, products, raw materials, foodstuff, wastes and fodder, in stables, pastures and facilities for the collection and the slaughtering of animals, the processing and storing the raw materials, products, foodstuff, waste and fodder; - The provision of the safety of the foodstuff and the meeting of the veterinarian conditions and their production and traffic; - The prevention of the input of disease agents in the animal production process; - The implementation of veterinarian measures in animal production plants; - The management of animal corpses and other waste, effluents, animal faeces and urine in a prescribed way; - The provision of preventive disinfection and deratisation in facilities, public surfaces and in transportation means; - Other emergency measures.

All of this reflects how important it is to have an effective system for early identification of communicable diseases, as well as rapid response at the national level and in the wider European environment.

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5.6 Risk Assessment for Nuclear or Radiological Accidents

The Risk Assessment for Nuclear or Radiological Accidents, 2nd Edition, was prepared in 2015 by the Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Nuclear Safety at the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning.

Nuclear or radiological accidents can occur in nuclear and radiation facilities, when radioactive sources are used, radioactive material is transported, when radiation sources are found in waste metal or elsewhere, or owing to terrorist acts or a fall of a satellite containing a radioactive substance.

Typical of nuclear and radiological accidents is that they are not common. The likelihood of the occurrence of such accidents is low. On the other hand, their consequences can be highly varied; after a serious accident in a nuclear power plant, they can leave a vast and lasting impact.

In this risk assessment, a nuclear or a radiological accident is an incident in which radioactive substances are released in the environment or where there is a potential risk of such release in the extent in which the limits laid down in the Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 67/02, 24/03, 50/03 – Official Consolidated Version 1, 46/04, 102/04 – Official Consolidated Version 2, 60/11, 74/15) or in regulations prescribed by this Act, are or will be exceeded considerably.

Nuclear accidents can occur in nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants, research nuclear reactors, reprocessing and enrichment plants, nuclear fuel fabrication plants, plants for reprocessing and disposal of nuclear fuel, and facilities designed for storage, reprocessing, treatment and disposal of radioactive waste. Besides nuclear facilities, there are also radiation facilities which do not contain nuclear material and can therefore not cause a nuclear chain reaction. In such facilities, radiological accidents can occur.

In the Republic of Slovenia, nuclear or radiological accidents could occur in the following facilities:

- Krško Nuclear Power Plant, - TRIGA Mark II research reactor in the settlement of Brinje near Ljubljana, - Central storage facility for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste in Brinje, - Tailings disposal site at the former uranium mine in the settlement of Žirovski vrh.

Typical of nuclear facilities is that the locations contain large amounts of nuclear and radioactive materials. In the operating reactor of the nuclear power plant, the chain reaction releases heat required for the generation of electricity. Radioactive materials in the reactor (core) are under high pressure and temperatures. Owing to the nature of radioactive materials, the heat is also released when the reactor does not operate, i.e. when the chain reaction is stopped. The quantity of such heat is significantly lower than during the operation, yet it still has to be drawn off. The reactor core must be cooled during the operation and also for a long period of time after that. If cooling is not possible for whatever reason, the core can heat up to the point of melting (core damage). This could result in a serious accident involving radioactive releases into the environment.

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During a nuclear accident, radioactive materials (radioactive gases and particles) are mostly released into the atmosphere and spread in the form of a radioactive cloud into the wider environment. The level of risk resulting from radioactive contamination of the environment depends on the type and quantity of released individual groups of radionuclides (noble gases, radioactive isotopes of iodine, particles with long-lived fission and activation products) and the existing meteorological conditions. The released radioactive materials move from the accident site along the prevailing direction of winds. Their dispersion depends on the weather situation and the local topography. During air transport, radioactive particles settle on the ground surface (dry deposition) or are washed down through precipitation (wet deposition).

Radiological accidents can occur in radiation facilities, during the use of radiation sources, the transport of radioactive materials, when radiation sources are found in waste metal or elsewhere, or owing to terrorist acts or a fall of a satellite containing a radioactive matter.

Characteristic of radioactive accidents is that they can occur anywhere. Even a traffic accident during the transportation of radioactive substances can occur anywhere along the route. If transportation involves highly radioactive materials, adequate protection and transportation packaging are provided as a rule, so the likelihood of an accident with lasting consequences for the environment is low. Similar is true for the uncontrolled radiation sources. The public can find a radioactive source anywhere in the environment. However, in well-regulated countries, where radiation sources are controlled, the likelihood of such events is low. A radiological accident can also occur in a nuclear facility in which, as a rule, radioactive matter is dealt with on a daily basis, although the likelihood of an accident is low due to qualified personnel.

In the case of radiological accidents, we are not dealing with a chain reaction, but rather with a radioactive substance used for different purposes as a source of ionizing radiation which, in the event of an accident, poses a risk to the employees, the environment, and in more serious cases also the population. In most cases, it causes excessive radiation of the employees who manage the radiation device. If a source is not controlled, the population can also be exposed to excessive radiation and contamination. This mostly refers to individuals who come in contact with an abandoned, lost or stolen radioactive source. In the event of a radiological accident, a radioactive cloud can be formed, contaminating a wider area. This can happen if a radioactive source finds its way among waste metals and is unknowingly melted in ironworks. Therefore, adequate surveillance of waste metals prior to their processing is very important.

Harmful ionising radiation caused by radioactive pollution in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident can reach people in the following ways:

- Inhalation of radioactive air particles, - Ingestion of contaminated food, milk and potable water, - Direct external radiation from a radioactive cloud and contaminated ground, - Contamination of skin and clothing, - Inadvertent ingestion (eating food with contaminated hands, smoking, children playing on contaminated ground) and - In the event of injuries, radioactive materials can also enter the body through open wounds.

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Studies are prepared for nuclear facilities, classifying causes of disasters by initial events. The causes of an accident can also be related to failures of technological systems or components, or to human error. In the case of the Krško NPP, individual scenarios (sequences of events potentially leading to core melting), are divided into several groups initiated by a characteristic initial event.

A single failure cannot lead to an accident, as essential systems in nuclear facilities are doubled and only several failures and errors would generate a sequence of events resulting in damage of a reactor core. In addition to defects in the facility (internal initial events), there are also external initial events, such as fire, flood, earthquake, and fall of an aircraft, which can result in an accident. Sabotage and terrorist acts are also classified as initial events potentially leading to the damage of the core.

In addressing accidents, human errors should not be ignored. They can occur at every stage of an accident and can trigger off an accident or contribute to the deterioration of the situation during an accident.

The likelihood of an accident in a nuclear power plant is assessed with the methodology of probabilistic safety assessments (PSA). The PSA is a procedure used for obtaining a numeric assessment of risk posed to the nearby area and the population owing to the operation of various technological facilities or presence of different activities and processes. The PSA is based on the identification of possible initial events and determination of event sequence which can be initiated by each initial event, including its consequences. It includes three levels:

- Level 1 - calculated likelihood of core damage owing to internal events (loss of entire alternate power supply, rupture of the primary system tube, etc.) and external events (fire, earthquake, flood, etc.). - Level 2 - calculated likelihood and quantity of radioactive release, time course of events in the containment for various forms and quantities of released radioactive materials into the environment resulting from the failure of barriers and containment systems. - Level 3 - calculated expected consequences for the population and the environment owing to radioactive releases defined at level 2. The meteorological, topographic and demographic characteristics of the site are also taken into account.

The main results of the PSA are the likelihood of core damage and the likelihood, quantity and time course of radioactive release resulting from containment failure.

The analysis of a nuclear accident based on the PSA begins with an initial event which activates various response measures of the power plant and hence the course of the accident. The situation at the power plant at the time of the accident, the availability and reliability of components, and human errors all play an important role. All of them impact the course of the accident. The PSAs show that a group of dominant scenarios can be singled out among all possible accident scenarios. The sum of the likelihood of all possible courses of an accident indicates the overall likelihood of the occurrence of core damage.

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Owing to uncertain input data, the analysis results should not be regarded as absolute values indicating the likelihood of an accident. The analysis shows the most probable scenarios and those components and human activities which have the biggest impact on the course of an accident and the level of their importance. The calculated expected frequency of damage to the core for the Krško Nuclear Power Plant is 4.85 10-5 per year, indicating core damage once every 20,000 years, which is comparable to the nuclear power plants of similar type and age elsewhere across the globe. This value entails internal initial events, events resulting from fire, flood, earthquake and other external events, including the fall of an aircraft, external floods, weather disasters, etc. The containment reduces the likelihood of the release of radioactive material into the environment in the event of a nuclear accident by 10 to 50 times. At the same time, the time leading to a potential release is prolonged. This enables a more effective response after an accident. Consequently, the anticipated frequency of releases into the environment is 1.92 10-6 per year or once every 500,000 years.

There have been very few major nuclear accidents across the world so far. Out of approximately 430 operating reactors (the number changed throughout the years) two accidents with catastrophic consequences for the environment happened. The worst nuclear accidents occurred in Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986, and in Fokushima, Japan, in 2011. In both cases, the reactors were completely destroyed owing to the melting of the core followed by an immense release of radioactive substances into the environment. The consequences of both releases were enormous.

Figure 48: The nuclear power plant in Chernobyl after the April 1986 accident.

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The medical impacts of such accidents are divided into acute medical effects (death, severe medical damage) and late medical (cancer) and psychological effects which can affect the health. In Chernobyl, the power plant personnel and the people who provided emergency response (firefighters, emergency medical assistance and immediate cleaning) were affected by acute medical effects. 31 people died as a result of the consequences of the accident. Approximately 140 people were affected by different levels of radiation disease. In Fokushima, there were no cases of acute medical effects, and the late medical effects were not likely since all the population was evacuated from the area surrounding the power plant in a timely manner. The increase in the frequency of cancer can be considered as a late medical effect. In the decade following the Chernobyl disaster, there was a significant increase in the occurrence of the thyroid cancer in children who lived in the contaminated areas in the former Soviet Union, especially in those places where the intake of contaminated milk was not restricted. In Chernobyl, the area with a radius of 30 kilometres around the power plant was permanently evacuated (the restriction is still in force). In Fokushima, the population living in the radius of up to 20 kilometres was evacuated and later, based on the measurements of radioactivity, also an additional tongue-shaped area stretching towards the northeast (downwind in the time of release) from the power plant up to the distance of 45 kilometres. In both cases, the costs of rehabilitation and protective measures were enormous and measured in tens or even hundreds of billions of Euros. The cost of the new Chernobyl "sarcophagus" itself - a large steel shell on tracks located above the destroyed power plant - amounted to approximately one billion of Euros. Characteristic of both accidents is that their impact on agriculture, the production and the consumption of food and other factors is always much greater than the direct impact on the health of people.

Nuclear accidents which also had a significant impact on the development of the nuclear technology and were also caused by the melting of the core or fire and the destruction of the reactor are as follows: the accident in the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, the United States of America (1979), and the Windscale nuclear accident, Great Britain (1957). However, these two accidents caused no major consequences to the environment. Among the fires that caused serious damage to nuclear power plants is the fire in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant, the United States of America (1975), and the fire in the Vandellos nuclear power plant, Spain (1989), where the secondary part of the power plant was completely destroyed.

The world's largest radiological accident so far occurred in Goiânia, Brazil, in 1987, when scrap collectors found an abandoned therapeutic source (a capsule of water-soluble caesium chloride, a substance with extremely high specific activity). When moving the hospital, the source was forgotten and left in the abandoned building. The finders did not know what they were dealing with; they caused extensive contamination, since they broke the source and even applied it to their bodies. Four people died from the consequences of the accident, and 20 were treated owing to burns caused by the radiation. Almost 300 people were contaminated, and over 100,000 people were examined for contamination. 3500 m3 of radioactive waste was generated (in the Krško NPP, approximately 2300 m3 was generated after 30 years of operation).

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Accidents with radioactive sources have occurred almost everywhere in the world. Some of them are: accident owing to irradiation during the misuse of irradiators in El Salvador (Salvador) and Sorequ (Israel), accidents owing to sources found in Tammiku (Estonia), Iran and Chile, accidents as a result of stolen sources in Sudan, India and Mexico, accidents in medical institutions in Panama and Poland, and accidents with melted sources in ironworks, where the contamination of products was discovered later on. These and similar accidents have been addressed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its publications. For each such event, a special booklet is available, describing the course of the event, the analysis of causes, the course of rehabilitation and lessons to prevent such events from happening again. These are just a few examples from different countries around the world, although every year, some tens of cases are detected (reported). In the Republic of Slovenia, the biggest radiological accident happened in the 1960s at the Institute of Oncology Ljubljana, when a medical technician unconsciously scattered the contents of the radium needle (2 mg of radium) that was used for therapeutic purposes and caused the contamination of the premises. There were no medical consequences. The methods of decontamination which were used at that time produced about 30 radioactive waste barrels which were originally stored in an abandoned Italian military border post near the settlement of Zavratec above the municipality of Idrija. In the 1990s, they were transferred to the Central storage facility for radioactive waste in Brinje.

Other types of accidents should also be considered, for example, those happening during the transport of radioactive materials, the fall of a satellite with radioactive substances, terrorist acts and sabotage, or accidents in research reactors and radioactive waste storage facilities. Until now, there has been no accident in the world which would happen during the transport of radioactive substances and would result in serious consequences. Over the past decades, there have also been no major accidents in research reactors, partly because of their safer design, and partly because of the reduced number of research reactors in the world. No major accident in the radioactive waste storage facilities or dumps has been reported.

In the risk assessment for nuclear or radiological accidents, 10 different accidents with appropriate risk scenarios were addressed:

1. Accident in the Krško NPP with a very low likelihood and very large impacts, medium overall risk and high reliability of the assessment; 2. Accident in the TRIGA reactor with a very low likelihood and very small impacts, low overall risk and high reliability of the assessment; 3. Accident in the Brinje storage facility with a very low likelihood and very small impacts, low overall risk and medium reliability of the assessment; 4. Accident resulting from the use of radioactive sources with medium likelihood and very small impacts, low overall risk and high reliability of the assessment; 5. Accident resulting from a criminal act a with medium likelihood and small impacts, medium overall risk and moderate reliability of the assessment; 6. Accident resulting from the use of uncontrolled radiation sources with a high likelihood and very small impacts, low overall risk and high reliability of the assessment; 7. Accident resulting from the transport of radioactive materials with a medium likelihood and very small impacts, low overall risk and high reliability of the assessment;

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8. Accident resulting from a fall of a satellite with radioactive substances with a very low likelihood and very small impacts, low overall risk and high reliability of the assessment; 9. Accident abroad with a very low likelihood and small impacts, low overall risk and high reliability of the assessment; 10. Damage to tailings disposal site at the former uranium mine with a very low likelihood and very small impacts, low overall risk and moderate reliability of the assessment.

The assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of the scenarios were mostly carried out with regard to uniform criteria for assessing risk impacts and the likelihood of an accident. All these risk scenarios are also shown in risk matrices.

All of these accidents are very different, regardless of the fact that the initial causes are mostly similar. Among all ten different accidents that can happen in accordance with different risk scenarios, two representative scenarios were selected, one for nuclear and one for radiological accidents.

The representative risk scenario for nuclear accidents is an accident in the Krško NPP. Such an accident has a low likelihood, although its impacts are very large. In this risk scenario, the assumption is that the core of the reactor melts, and at the same time, a containment failure occurs, so that radioactive release passes through the system for relieving the containment through a filtered release. Such an accident could only occur if all security systems and staff measures failed, and no planned protective measures for the population were implemented. However, this is an extremely unlikely event that can be completely avoided with proper planning.

Figure 49: Krško Nuclear Power Plant

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In this regard, we can expect a small number of direct victims (up to some ten) as a result of accidents during a large-scale evacuation and during disaster response operations. A consequence of the accident would be a contaminated area of an irregular shape, which could extend some tens of kilometres from the plant where the intervention levels for permanent residence would be exceeded, which would require the relocation of people in the number between some individuals and several thousand people (maybe a few tens of thousands) from that area for several years Restrictions on food production and consumption, together with extensive radiological monitoring in the affected area, should be introduced. Other restrictions would also apply in the restricted area, for example on traffic and movements. Economic consequences, for example owing to the loss earnings and the closing of companies and public institutions, would probably exceed 2.4% of GDP.

Another representative risk scenario for radiological disasters is an accident with radioactive sources. The likelihood of such an event is medium. According to this scenario, irradiation of people can occur and the threshold for acute effects could be exceeded. Such an accident can occur in fixed facilities (for example, research institutes, industrial facilities, hospitals) or in mobile devices (for example, radiographic sources and road moisture-density gauges). The cause of an accident with radioactive materials can only be human error, since radioactive sources are passive devices and as such cannot have failures. Even in the event of mechanism failures (shutter or system for source movement), the cause is a human factor, which means that the operator did not comply with the instructions and check that the device works properly. Only a small number of radiation sources in Slovenia (some ten) have such radioactivity that they could cause a radiological accident of an extent which could pose a risk to a large number of people owing to doses received. On the other hand, almost every source of radiation can cause contamination of the environment and the associated economic damage.

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Figure 50: RISK MATRIX FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

Accident in the Krško NPP 5

Criminal act

IMPACT

Fall of a Accident satellite involving Accident Accident in the sources Uncontrolled abroad CSRAO sources 1 Accident in the storage facility Accident TIGA reactor during Damage to RŽV transport repositories 1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 51: RISK MATRIX FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

Accident in the Krško NPP 5

IMPACT Accident Criminal act Uncontrolled abroad sources 2

Fall of a Accident satellite involving Accident in the sources Accident in the CSRAO 1 TIGA reactor storage facility Accident during Damage to RŽV transport repositories 1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN THE RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 52: RISK MATRIX FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

Accident in the Krško NPP 5

Accident

3 abroad

Accident in the

IMPACT TIGA reactor Accident in the Criminal act 2 CSRAO Fall of a storage facility satellite

Accident involving Damage to RŽV sources Uncontrolled repositories sources 1 Accident during transport

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN THE RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 53: RISK MATRIX FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

Accident in the Krško NPP 5

IMPACT Criminal act 2 Accident abroad

Fall of a Accident satellite involving Accident in the sources Uncontrolled Accident in the CSRAO sources 1 TIGA reactor storage facility Accident during Damage to RŽV transport repositories 1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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For all risk scenarios, internal risk categorisation or geographical distribution of risk was also carried out. The figures below show the internal risk categorisations for both representative risk scenarios.

Risk level: 1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 54: Internal risk categorisation for an accident in the Krško NPP

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Risk level: 1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 55: Internal risk categorisation for an accident involving sources

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5.7 Risk Assessment for Railway Accidents

The Risk Assessment for Railway Accidents, version 1.0, was prepared by the Slovenian Infrastructure Agency of the Ministry of Infrastructure, in cooperation with the Institute of Traffic and Transport Ljubljana l.c.c.

The railway network in the Republic of Slovenia is defined in the Decree on Categorisation of Railway Lines (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 4/09). Considering the volume of traffic, economic significance and the connecting role of railway transport, railway lines are classified as main or regional railway lines.

Figure 56: Public railway infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia

The total length of railway lines in the Republic of Slovenia is 1228 kilometres, of which 898 kilometres are single-track lines and 330 kilometres are double-track lines. All double-track lines are electrified, as are 172 kilometres of single-track lines. Safety and regularity in rail transport is assessed by the number of emergencies and incidents occurring in railway transport and their consequences compared with the previous period.

A serious railway accident means any collision or derailment of trains which results in the death of one or more persons, or serious injuries to five or more persons, or serious damage

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An accident means an unwanted, unintended or unexpected event or a special series of such events that have harmful consequences. Accidents are classified into the following categories: collisions, derailments, accidents at railway crossings, and accidents caused by the rolling stock during movement and in which people, fire and others factors are involved, resulting in at least one of the following consequences:

- Serious injuries suffered by 1 to 4 people,

- Material damage between EUR 5000 and 2,000,000,

- Suspension of rail traffic for more than two hours.

An accident is also any other event that has an obvious impact on ensuring railway safety or on safety management (for example, collision of trains, rear-end, sideswipe and derailment of a train).

Although railway traffic safety is high and railway accidents happen relatively rarely, the consequences can be catastrophic, given that, on average, a passenger train transports 71 passengers, a freight train weighs 907.4 tonnes, and that in the event of an accident during the transport of dangerous substances, such substances can be uncontrollably released into the environment.

In the last 30 years, major emergencies in railway traffic in the Republic of Slovenia were as follows:

In 1984, a freight train rear-ended a standing passenger train at the railway station in the settlement of Divača. 31 people lost their lives in the accident, and 33 suffered minor or major injuries;

In April 1995, two tanks transporting motor gasoline derailed in the settlement of Zalog near Ljubljana and turned over to the sides;

In February 2011, a freight train locomotive, while moving, slid into the Ljubljanica river in Zalog near Ljubljana. Two people suffered minor injuries as a result of the accident. Approximately 800 litres of diesel fuel spilled into the river;

In August 2011, 36 people were injured when a passenger train and a freight train collided in the town of Jesenice. This accident was the basis for one of the risk scenarios;

In October 2012, an approaching international train collided with a standing passenger train in the settlement of Vižmarje, Ljubljana. 29 people were injured.

The statistical and historical methods of research and the forecasting method were used in the preparation of the risk assessment for railway accidents. The data for the risk scenario and risk analysis, in particular data on emergencies in public railway infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia from the previous period, was obtained from the company Slovenian Railways, the operator of the public railway infrastructure and until 2006 the only railway company for passenger and freight transport in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia.

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In the risk assessment for railway accidents, two risk scenarios were prepared. The first risk scenario deals with the collision of trains at a train station, and the second with fire on a train in a railway tunnel.

The risk scenario 1 describes an actual past railway accident. Considering the estimated likelihood of occurrence of a similar accident in the future, it can be a good example for risk assessment. On 26 August 2011 at 2.34 p.m., the international freight train No. 48444 and the passenger train No. 4213 collided on the switch No. 3 at the railway station in the town of Jesenice. The international freight train drove from Ljubljana along the line No. 20, where the traffic on the section Medvode-Slovenski Javornik is run remotely, and moved on the line No. 5. The passenger train started driving from the line No. 4 of the Jesenice railway station, and moved on the line No. 70, in the direction of the town of Sežana. The trains collided head-on on the switch No. 3, which is the crossing point of the routes to the line No. 4 or from it, or to the lines Nos. 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21 and 22 or from them.

Figure 57: The collision of passenger trains at the railway station in Jesenice on 26 August 2011

The risk scenario 2 describes a railway accident including a fire in a railway tunnel. The scenario assumes that during the passing of a passenger train through the Bohinj Tunnel on the railway line Jesenice-Nova Gorica, a fire of an unknown origin occurred in the passenger section of the train.

The risk analysis estimated that the described or similar risk impacts, taking into account risk scenario 1, can occur every 10 to 30 years, and taking into account risk scenario 2, every 30 to 50 years. The reliability of the risk analysis depends largely on the accuracy of the data obtained for each scenario. Given the very limited time frames, it was not possible to achieve a higher quality of risk analyses as part of risk scenarios. However, it can be argued that the analyses in both risk scenarios, and in particular the risk analysis based on risk scenario 1, are relatively reliable. As a representative risk scenario, risk scenario 1 and the associated risk analysis were selected. In the risk matrices, the entry for this scenario is in italics.

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In risk scenario 1, which summarises an actual accident, approximately 50 people were on the passenger train. In risk scenario 1, 33 people were injured, while in risk scenario 2, up to 3 fatalities and up to 15 injured people could be expected. With respect to fatalities, both risk scenarios would be ranked at level 1 of risk to people, and with respect to the number of injured people at level 2 of risk to people. For this risk scenario, the representative figure is thus the number of injured people.

During the event described in risk scenario 1, material damage amounted to EUR 1,577,000, which includes damage to railway infrastructure and to both vehicles. The estimated value of material damage in the second risk scenario is EUR 1,100,000, which also includes damage to railway infrastructure and the train. Owing to these data, both risk scenarios and the associated risk analyses are ranked at level 1 of economic and environmental risk impacts and impacts on cultural heritage.

The political and social impacts in both cases are estimated as relatively insignificant. Some impacts would be non-existent, for example the impacts on the ability of state authorities to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility, impacts on financial stability, while the values or levels of the remaining four groups of impacts within political and social impacts would mostly be very low. Both risk scenarios are thus ranked at level 1 of political and social impacts.

The table below shows the values or levels of risk impacts and the likelihood of the occurrence of the accident for both risk scenarios, which are duly taken into account in risk matrices.

Table 26: Table for the calculation of the average risk impacts for risk matrices with a separate presentation of risk impacts or those showing the overall risk impacts

Risk Level of Level of Level of Calculated Level of Risk Reliability of scenario impacts economic political value of average likelihood risk analysis on people and and social average impacts results environment impacts impacts al impacts and impacts on the cultural heritage Risk Relatively scenario 1 2 1 1 1.33 1 4 reliable Risk Relatively scenario 2 2 1 1 1.33 1 3 reliable Repre- sentative Relatively scenario – 2 1 1 1.33 1 4 reliable risk scenario 1

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Figure 58: RISK MATRIX FOR RAILWAY ACCIDENTS – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

IMPACT Scenario Scenario No. 2 No. 1 2

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 59: RISK MATRIX FOR RAILWAY ACCIDENTS – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

IMPACT

Scenario Scenario No. 2 No. 1 1

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 60: RISK MATRIX FOR RAILWAY ACCIDENTS – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

IMPACT

Scenario Scenario No. 2 No. 1 1

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 61: RISK MATRIX FOR RAILWAY ACCIDENTS WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

IMPACT

Scenario Scenario No. 2 No. 1 1

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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The purpose of the internal risk categorisation in the risk assessment for railway accidents was to determine the risk of railway accidents also at the level of regions, in particular municipalities. Also in this case, as a rule, a five-step categorisation of the areas according to the level of risk is made. Such categorisation can be the basis for various activities and decisions related to a certain risk (spatial planning, preventive measures, prioritisation of investments related to preventive measures (type of measures, location where measures are implemented) and response to disasters). The basis for the assessment was the risk to municipalities and regions which was established in the Risk Assessment for Railway Accidents in the Republic of Slovenia, version 1.1, prepared by the ACPDR in March 2015. The assessment shows the territorial distribution of railway accident risks for all municipalities and for all 13 regions. The term "regions" refers to the ACPDR regional offices. In terms of their territory and coverage of municipalities, regions are identical to the ACPDR regional offices. One assumption used is that the areas with railway lines which also transport dangerous substances and with railway stations which are also intended for handling dangerous substances have a higher likelihood of requirements, as a result of a railway accident, for the protection of people, animals and the environment in these areas. Another assumption is that in areas with railway lines which transport no dangerous substances and with railway stations not intended for handling dangerous substances, there is a likelihood of a large number of fatalities as a result of a railway accident. Taking into account these criteria, municipalities with railway infrastructure were ranked at risk level 2 or 4, and such regions were also ranked at risk level 2 or 4. The remaining municipalities in the area of which there are no railway lines were not assessed according to this assumption and are coloured in white in the map.

1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 62: Risk to municipalities with regard to accidents in railway traffic

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5.8 Risk Assessment for Aircraft Accidents

The Risk Assessment for Aircraft Accidents, version 1.0, was prepared by the Aviation Division of the Ministry of Infrastructure in 2015.

The Republic of Slovenia is one of the countries over which, despite its small size, many airspace overflights with aircraft are performed every day. With three public airports for international air traffic (the Ljubljana Jože Pučnik Airport, the Maribor Edvard Rusjan Airport and the Portorož Airport) and a number of public airfields for domestic air traffic, take-off and landing points or areas, as well as air carriers and other organisations, the Republic of Slovenia has a comprehensive aviation system.

With the technical and technological development of civil aviation and the growth of passenger and freight transport, the likelihood of aircraft accidents is also increasing. In statistical terms, an aircraft is one of the safest means of transport in terms of the number of passengers transported by air traffic. The available data shows that in 1.2 million flights, one aircraft is involved in an airplane accident, but it does not always have tragic consequences for all passengers and crew members and other people on the ground. Owing to numerous flight operations at Slovenian public airports for international air traffic, and numerous aircraft overflights of the Slovenian airspace, the risk of aircraft accidents is high also in Slovenia. In the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, either small-scale or large-scale aircraft accidents are possible. An increased likelihood of a major aircraft accident exists owing to the large number of flight operations, especially at all three international airports for international air traffic, as well as at the public airfield for domestic air traffic in Cerklje ob Krki.

Currently, 16 public airports/airfields and 3 public heliports are registered in Slovenia.

Table 27: Public airports/airfields and heliports in the RS

No. ¤Public airport/airfield Air traffic 1 Civilian Airfield Ajdovščina domestic* 2 Civilian Airfield Bovec domestic 3 Civilian Airfield Celje domestic 4 Civilian Airfield Divača domestic 5 Civilian Airfield Lesce domestic 6 Ljubljana Jože Pučnik Airport international** 7 Maribor Edvard Rusjan Airport international 8 Civilian Airfield Ptuj domestic 9 Military and Civilian Airfiled Cerklje ob Krki domestic 10 Civilian Airfield Murska Sobota domestic 11 Civilian Airfield Novo mesto domestic 12 Portorož Airport international 13 Civilian Airfield Postojna domestic 14 Civilian Airfield Slovenj Gradec domestic 15 Civilian Airfield Šoštanj domestic 16 Civilian Airfield Slovenske Konjice domestic No. Public heliport Air traffic

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1 Heliport of the Ljubljana University Medical Centre domestic 2 Heliport of the General Hospital Jesenice domestic 3 Heliport of the General Hospital Slovenj Gradec domestic Remarks: * Domestic air traffic is traffic in which the departure and destination airports or airfields are located in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia and for which no departure to the airspace of another country is planned. ** International air traffic is traffic in which a departure to the airspace of another country is planned.

In accordance with the provisions of the Aviation Act (Zlet-UPB4, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 81/10 - official consolidated text and 46/16), the airspace of the Republic of Slovenia comprises the airspace over the land territory, coastal sea and inland waters under the sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia.

The Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 923/2012 of 26 September 2012 Laying Down the Common Rules of the Air and Operational Provisions Regarding Services and Procedures in Air Navigation and Amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) No 1794/2006, (EC) No 730/2006, (EC) No 1033/2006 and (EU) No 255/2010 (OJ L No. 281 of 13 October 2012, page 1), SERA.6001, specifies the classification of airspace into classes A, B, C, D, E, F and G. Owing to its small size, the Slovenian airspace is divided into the following classes: C, D, E and G.

In the Slovenian airspace, the number of overflights is increasing from year to year and has exceeded 1350 overflights in one day. Air traffic is markedly season-oriented, which means that in the summer season, there is much more traffic than in the winter season (data for 2014: January – 13,876, August – 33,338, December – 15,976). With regard to the amount of traffic by days in the last three years, both the summer and the winter season record the highest frequency of trips on Saturdays. In average, most traffic takes place between 8.00 and 16.00 UTC (during this period, 54% of daily overflights are carried out). Apart from that, the amount of traffic differs with regard to the day of the week and clock shifts in March and October. In the Slovenian airspace, in 2014, the largest number of overflights in one day was 1353, while the smallest number was 318. The statistical data show slight fluctuations in the transport of passengers, although there is some slow increase, following the trend in the global air transport.

Table 28: Number of passengers transported at public airports in the RS

Year Transported Transported Transported passengers at the passengers at the passengers at the Ljubljana Jože Pučnik Maribor Edvard Rusjan Portorož Airport Airport Airport

2010 1,382,341 20,535 15,382 2011 1,358,792 4624 17,882 2012 1,167,877 3875 14,302 2013 1,265,766 13,929 15,302

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Year Transported Transported Transported passengers at the passengers at the passengers at the Ljubljana Jože Pučnik Maribor Edvard Rusjan Portorož Airport Airport Airport

2014 1,307,128 16,214 20,177

International global passenger transport rose by 6.3% in 2014 compared to 2013. The biggest increase was in the Middle East, followed by Latin America with the Caribbean, Asia with the Pacific, Europe and North America. The smallest increase was in Africa. It is also evident that the number of overflights of the Slovenian airspace is increasing. According to the predictions of the Slovenia control – Slovenian Air Navigation Services, Limited, the same trend can also be expected in the future.

Table 29: Air traffic in the RS airspace on air routes

Number of overflights Year 2010 243,446

2011 267,504

2012 268,037

2013 256,920

2014 271,474

It is characteristic of aviation accidents that they cannot be predicted in advance. Owing to the size of aircraft and catastrophic consequences, an aircraft accident in most cases causes many fatalities. It is also typical that passengers and the population cannot prepare in advance for it.

The appropriate state bodies can prepare for a traffic accident with their instructions, procedures, equipment, experiences and qualified staff, which can carry out all the activities planned in advance to reduce the impacts of an accident, when it occurs.

The majority of aircraft accidents (up to 90%) occur at airports or in their imminent proximity, and during take-offs and landings. Only a small number (up to 10%) occur during the flight.

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Table 30: Percentage of accidents and fatalities in jet aircraft in commercial air transport in relation to the stage of flight

Accidents Fatalities Stage of flight (in %) (in %) On the ground* 10 0 Takeoff 8 7 Initial climb 6 3 Climb (retracted flaps) 8 12 Cruise 10 20 Descent 3 3 Initial approach 8 15 Final approach 22 22 Landing 25 18 * Stage on the ground includes taxing, loading/unloading, parking and towing.

From this it can be inferred that an aircraft accident is most likely to occur in the immediate vicinity of departure/arrival airports, although it can of course also occur below air routes.

Aircraft accidents most often (in 53% of cases) occur owing to pilots' errors. Such accidents are followed by accidents resulting from mechanical faults (20%), weather (12%), sabotage (8%) and other human errors (6%). Aircraft accidents resulting from other reasons (1%) do not represent a significant proportion.

The only major aircraft accident in the Republic of Slovenia happened on 1 September 1966 in the immediate vicinity of Ljubljana. The following table gives data in more detail.

Table 31: Aircraft accident in the RS on 1 September 1966

Data on the accident

Date 1 September 1966

Time 00.47

Location Vicinity of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Operator Britannia Airways

Flight 105

Air route Luton–Ljubljana

Aircraft type Bristol Britannia 102

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Data on the accident

Registration number G-ANBB

Number of persons aboard 117 (passengers:110, crew: 7)

Number of fatalities 98 (passengers: 92, crew: 6)

Number of fatalities on the 0 ground

Summary of the accident During the attempt to land at the Ljubljana Airport, the aircraft crashed into the forest owing to an error of the crew which did not follow the landing procedure. The altimeter was not set correctly. The aircraft captain did not set the altimeter correctly, and the crew did not carry out a cross- check of altimeters.

Taking into account the fact that an aircraft accident can occur in the immediate vicinity of departure/arrival airports/airfields and below air routes, two risk scenarios have been developed for the purposes of the risk assessment for aircraft accidents: Risk scenario 1 – aircraft accident in a populated area, and Risk scenario 2 – aircraft accident outside a populated area.

Taking into account the frequency of aircraft accidents (the last major accident in Slovenia happened 49 years ago) and the fact that air traffic is constantly increasing, it can be stated with certainty that an aircraft accident is also possible in Slovenia.

Both risk scenarios are of moderate reliability. The annual likelihood of both risk scenarios to unfold in practice can range from 1 to 4%, and statistically speaking, such an aircraft accident can happen once every 25 to 100 years.

Risk scenario 1 deals with a major aircraft accident in a populated area. It is an event which, by its nature, also affects other interrelated events (destroyed buildings and traffic routes, electricity and other infrastructure failure, and so on) exerting a negative impact on the local population.

As said before, risk scenario 1 deals with an aircraft accident occurring in a populated place (Ljubljana) located below air routes in the airspace of the Republic of Slovenia and in the immediate vicinity of the takeoff and landing course of the public airport for international air traffic – the Ljubljana Jože Pučnik Airport. It is a densely populated area (100 x 150 meters – 15,000 m2 or 0.015 km2) with a very good transport and other infrastructure, many residential and business buildings, commercial buildings, buildings significant to cultural heritage, and other buildings. The aircraft accident brought about complete destruction of transport infrastructure (road leading to the city centre and adjacent streets) and other infrastructure (public utility lines, electricity grid) and buildings in the area of the disaster (residential and business buildings).

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Risk scenario 2 deals with a major aircraft accident outside a populated area. It is a separate event which, by its nature, has a minimal impact on other interrelated events (no direct access to buildings and traffic routes, minimum failure in electricity and other infrastructure, and so on) exerting a negative impact on the local population.

Figure 63: Anticipated location of an aircraft accident from risk scenario 2

According to the risk scenario, the aircraft accident occurred outside a populated area, in the immediate vicinity of the takeoff and landing course of the Ljubljana Jože Pučnik Airport. The accident occurred in a sparsely populated area (100 x 300 meters – 30,000 m2 or 0.03 km2) with poorly developed transport and other infrastructure and a small number of business and residential buildings, commercial buildings and other facilities in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft accident. The aviation accident caused complete destruction of the surrounding terrain and made it difficult to use the traffic infrastructure (local road) and other infrastructure (utility lines, electricity grid) and residential and commercial buildings in the area of the accident.

Consequences of an aircraft accident can be either direct or indirect. Indirect consequences can be the loss of the aircraft and fatalities in it, while the indirect can be the consequences related to the affected relatives and members of search and rescue teams, damage to the environment, damage to transport, energy and other infrastructure, and so on.

Impacts on people under risk scenario 1 are 150 fatalities on board (passengers and crew members; no one has survived the accident) and 16 people on the ground. The total number of fatalities is 166, and there are no injured people. In the second risk scenario, there are also 150 fatalities including passengers and crew members, while three people have died on the ground, which amounts to 153 fatalities altogether. In both cases, the number of victims is taken into account for the ranking in the appropriate risk matrix, and the risk scenarios are ranked at level 4 of impact on people.

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In both risk scenarios, the extent of the economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage is defined by the content from the two tables below.

Table 32: Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage for risk scenario 1

Costs and damage Value in EUR

Loss of the aircraft 223,370,000.00

Compensation cost 47,058,658.50

Damage to and the repair of road 1,500,000.00 infrastructure

Damage to buildings and rehabilitation 15,583,000.00

Damage to and rehabilitation of 426,880.00 community infrastructure

Damage to and the repair of energy 267,500.00 infrastructure

Aircraft accident investigation cost 720,168.00

Total 288,926,206.50

Table 33: Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage for risk scenario 2

Costs and damage Value in EUR

Loss of the aircraft 223,370,000.00

Compensation cost 47,058,658.50

Damage to and rehabilitation of road 1,500,000.00 infrastructure

Damage to and rehabilitation of buildings /

Damage to and rehabilitation of / community infrastructure

Damage to and repair of energy 100,000.00 infrastructure

Aircraft accident investigation cost 720,168.00

Total 271,248,826.50

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Damage and costs are assessed based on the available data. Both risk scenarios are ranked at level 2 of economic and environmental risk impacts and impacts on cultural heritage. In both cases, the major part of the damage and costs are the cost of or damage to lost - destroyed aircraft.

The identified political and social impacts of risk scenario 1 fall into level 2 and for risk scenario 2 into level 1 of political and social impacts.

The reliability of risk analyses is usually lower especially for those risks that are rare and for those that have not yet occurred on a large scale in Slovenia. The reliability is greater for the analysis of those risk scenarios that are based on real events, especially if they occurred relatively recently. Given the above, based on a subjective and qualitative assessment, the reliability of the risk analysis for both scenarios is estimated as moderate.

Taking into account the most probable location of aircraft accidents, the size of the aircraft, their capacity (number of seats) and occupancy, risk scenario 1 (an air accident in a populated area) was selected as a representative risk scenario or the worst still acceptable risk scenario. It is entered in risk matrices with italics.

The following table shows the individual and total (average) risk impacts for both risk scenarios, which is graphically depicted in risk matrices for the accident.

Table 34: Size of individual and total (average) impacts and likelihood of both risk scenarios

Risk scenario and risk analyses Risk Risk Representative scenario 1 scenario 2 risk scenario and risk analysis (S2)

Level of impacts on people 4 4 4

Level of economic and environmental 3 3 3 impacts and impacts on cultural heritage

Level of political and social impacts 2 1 2

Calculated overall (average) value of impacts 3.00 2.67 3.00

Level of overall (average) risk impacts 3 3 3

Likelihood of a disaster 3 3 3

Reliability of risk analysis results Moderately Moderately Moderately reliable reliable reliable

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Figure 64: RISK MATRIX FOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

Scenario No. 1

4 Scenario No. 2

MPACT I

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 65: RISK MATRIX FOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

Scenario No. 1

3 Scenario No. 2

IMPACT

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 66: RISK MATRIX FOR AIRCRATF ACCIDENTS – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

IMPACT Scenario No. 1

Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 67: RISK MATRIX FOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

Scenario No. 1

Scenario No. 2

3 CT

IMPA

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Internal categorisation of risk or geographic distribution of risk resulting from the aircraft accident was taken from the Threat Assessment for Aircraft Accidents in the Republic of Slovenia, version 1.2, which was prepared in 2013 by the ACPDR. Categorisation was prepared both for municipalities and for regions. "Regions" refer to ACPDR regional offices.

For classification into risk levels, it was assumed that areas of controlled zones of public airports for international air traffic and public airfield for domestic air traffic of the Cerklje ob Krki airfield have a high likelihood of a major aircraft accident. Another assumption is that, due to numerous overflights, a large-scale aircraft accident is possible anywhere in Slovenia. For this reason, no municipality was ranked lower than risk level 3 for an aircraft accident, and the municipalities which include the controlled zones of public airports for international air traffic and the Cerklje ob Krki airfield are ranked at the highest risk level, level 5, for aircraft accidents. This class includes 42 municipalities. All the other municipalities in Slovenia (170) were ranked at risk class 3. The figure below gives a graphic representation of the above information.

Risk level: 1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 68: Internal categorisation of risk of aircraft accidents by municipalities

The risk assessment for aircraft accidents can contribute in particular to the raising of public awareness about preventive measures and to providing information to set up an appropriate database for the preparation of plans, instructions, activation of appropriate facilities and the conduct of appropriate training and procedures for their use in the event of an actual accident.

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5.9 Risk Assessment for Large Wildfires

The Risk Assessment for Large Wildfires was prepared in 2015 and was amended in 2016 by the Forestry, Hunting and Fisheries Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food.

The assessment is based on the situation in the natural environment, experience gathered so far and past wildfires, an analysis of the situation, and a forecast for the future. The assessment also describes the methods of predicting wildfire risk, the methods for assessing the spreading of fires, and the method for determining the areas where, as a rule, firefighting would not take place, since the ratio between the damage in the natural environment and the risk to disaster responders is too high.

Wildfires are a constantly occurring phenomenon. In some areas, they are a part of the natural process of the restoration of forest and the natural environment. In Slovenia, they represent a disruption that causes damage to the natural environment and often returns it back to the phase of pioneer ecosystems and plant communities.

In Slovenia, the share of the forested land is above average, and from 1875 up to now, the forested territory increased from 36.4% to 58.3%. In comparison with some other European countries, especially the Mediterranean, forest fires in Slovenia do not present a serious threat to the entire forest. In spite of the small absolute extent of forest fires, the danger must be taken very seriously, especially in the Kras and the Koper coastal areas. The concern is all the more understandable considering that, 150 years ago, the Kras area was a stony territory, and a lot of work, patience and effort was required to make it green again. At present, as much as 60% of the Kras area is covered with forests. The economic losses in terms of wood mass during forest fires are not large. However, there is large-scale direct damage to ecosystems, since most of the Kras area is included in the Natura 2000 areas. High costs are also incurred during the recovery of fire sites. As a consequence, the main goal is to protect forest areas and to prevent ecological damage.

There are four levels of potential forest fire risk in Slovenia. In the preparation of the assessment of potential forest fire risk, the Slovenia Forest Service (ZGS) took into consideration factors within forests (tree species composition, development phase, etc.) and the factors outside forests (temperature, altitude, etc.). Fire risk levels are the following:

1. Very high fire risk – this level includes forests and forest areas in which constant forest fire risk poses a serious risk to their ecological balance, safety of people and property in those forests and forest areas, or a constant risk of stimulating irreversible degradation processes in forests or forest areas.

2. High fire risk – this level includes forests and forest areas in which occasional forest fire risk poses a serious risk to their ecological balance, safety of people and property in those forests and forest areas, or a risk of stimulating irreversible degradation processes in forests or forest areas.

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3. Medium fire risk – this level includes forests and forest areas in which forest fire risk is neither constant nor occasional, yet it poses a serious risk to forest ecosystems.

4. Low fire risk – this level of risk includes forests and forest areas which are not included in either of the above levels.

Figure 69: Forest fire risk in Slovenia

In Slovenia, wildfires and outdoor fires do not represent significant acute environmental and public health risks. Nevertheless, the possibility of wildfires in Slovenia, especially of the occurrence of a large wildfire, is considered a very serious risk, especially to the sensitive Kras and sub-Mediterranean ecosystems and the life of people and their property. With climate change and the increasing climate extremes, the extending of long periods without rainfall and the rising temperatures of the atmosphere, the likelihood of a wildfire increases, both in traditional areas and in new ones where, owing to climate change, appropriate conditions are created for the occurrence of wildfires and their transformation in major fires.

In Slovenia, the risk of major wildfires is mainly related to the Kras area, the Koper coastal area, and the Goriška region. In the rest of the country, minor wildfires occur; however, they do not represent a significant risk. Experience shows that the causes of major fires in the natural environment are mainly the result of human negligence or planned arson. In addition to the natural environment, settlements, individual facilities, and infrastructural facilities in the natural environment are at risk, above all overhead power lines, water pumping facilities and road infrastructure with the associated facilities. The railway infrastructure faces lower risk, although the railway with its activities is often the cause of wildfires. Risk is also increased by the overgrowing of the natural environment with forests and the increased number of visitors who can cause the occurrence of fire with their activities.

Fire is a natural phenomenon in which organic matter or light metals are oxidised. Three basic conditions are required for combustion: fuel, oxygen and ignition energy. Combustion

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At first, fire spreads in all directions. The shape of the fire site depends on many factors. In the event of combustion on level and windless territory and with homogeneous fuel, the shape of the fire site would be a circle. The shape of the fire site is mostly influenced by the terrain inclination (landform) and the direction of winds. As a result of these factors, the fire site is most often elliptical. The spread of a fire can take place in a parallel manner when the fire spreads evenly in all directions, in a convergent manner when fire is narrowed by obstacles or terrain inclination, or in a divergent manner when it spreads outwards in a number of directions as a result to terrain inclination or wind.

In the event of adverse climatic conditions, strong winds and long terrain inclinations, wildfires can capture large areas. Good knowledge of the terrain, wind movements, and local and micro conditions, are a prerequisite for good planning of preventive measures and management of disaster response in the event of fire. As a rule, air movement during the day has its own patterns. During the day, when the atmosphere becomes warmer, the warm air masses rise and mountain winds are formed, which blow from low regions to high ones. During the night, when the air cools down, cold air masses descend into valleys. Owing to large amounts of energy released during wildfires, the movement of air masses changes. In the event of certain terrain conditions, this energy changes air currents and thus causes the spread of fire or risk to human lives and property.

In the event of fire, a lot of heat is released. Owing to the rise of warm gases, such heat can form an independent movement of the air, depending on the amount of heat released and the landform. This creates strong upward currents that encourage the spread of the fire. At temperatures above 300 degrees Celsius, the radiation or lifting of hot gases can result in self-ignition of flammable and rapidly burning fuels with a low mass and a large surface. This is more common in fires on steep slopes, when flue gases heat fuel far ahead the fire line.

The spread of fire or the speed of fuel ignition depends strongly on the amount of moisture that is bound in the fuel. The amount of moisture in fuel varies with the type of fuel (type of wood, waste, dry fresh plant biomass) and the relative air humidity of the fuel environment. Fresh plant biomass contains plenty of water. With dying, the moisture content first decreases, and when the biomass decomposes, the subsequent stages of decomposition bring the increase in moisture content and in the rate of its transformation. Fuel with a large surface area in relation to its mass (highly flammable fuel) dries faster, and fuel with a small ratio between mass and surface (less-flammable fuel) dries more slowly. As with wind, relative air humidity also changes throughout the day. During the bright part of the day, warm air is capable of bonding a greater amount of moisture. Therefore, the relative air humidity decreases, and the air dries the fuel. At night, the air temperature decreases, the capacity to bond moisture decreases, the relative air humidity increases, and when it reaches 100%, fog is formed, and the fuel binds the air humidity. The same happens in different weather conditions, when the relative air humidity changes independently of the usual daily fluctuations.

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A wildfire can cause especially the following chains of disasters:

- Unexploded ordnance (UXO) explosions, - Ecological disaster, - The spread of fire to inhabited areas, - The spread of fire to infrastructure facilities (power lines, gas pipelines, water pumps, television and radio transmitters, telecommunication connection transmitters, etc.), - Fire in buildings (residential buildings, commercial buildings), - Fire in facilities and in the areas of cultural heritage, - Road accidents (resulting from the spread of smoke, emergency response, etc.), - Risk to the health of people and pets.

Depending on the size of the fire, its consequences for the forest and the wider area and the forces of the rescue and support services necessary to control a wildfire, fires are divided into:

1. Small fires – the fire burns on a surface, having a small- to medium-sized flame; a moderate amount of solid organic fuel is burnt. The fire is not difficult to control; it can be put out with little or moderate effort. The fire can engulf or threaten to engulf settlements in the area, and it can cause communications breakdown and disruptions in the supply of power, gas and water. Such fire typically covers up to 50 hectares. It is extinguished by firefighting units of municipalities in the area of the fire and, if necessary, in cooperation with other protection, rescue and relief forces.

2. Medium-sized fires – the fire burns on a surface, having a medium-sized flame; a moderate amount of solid organic fuel is burnt. The fire is not difficult to control; it can be put out with moderate effort. The fire can engulf or threaten to engulf settlements in the area, and it can cause communications breakdown and disruptions in the supply of power, gas and water. Such fire typically covers the area between 50 and 100 hectares. It is extinguished by firefighting units of municipalities in the area of the fire, or with the assistance of firefighting units of the neighbouring municipalities and units in the region, and in cooperation with other protection, rescue and relief forces.

3. Large fires – in this fire, a lot of organic fuel is burnt, the control of fire is difficult, and a lot of effort and resources, technical equipment and teams must be engaged in firefighting. The fire can engulf or threaten to engulf settlements; it can cause communications breakdown and disruptions in the supply of power, gas and water. As a rule, such fire covers between 100 and 500 hectares, and there can be two or more simultaneous fires covering between 50 and 100 hectares; the fire is fought by all the available local firefighting units. This category includes fire in high mountain regions. The fire can be fought by domestic firefighting units and units from the neighbouring regions, in cooperation with other protection, rescue and relief forces. Firefighting units and protection, rescue and relief forces from distant regions can also be engaged in extinguishing such a large fire.

4. Very large fires – a huge amount of organic fuel is burnt; the fire sets on medium and thick fuel. The fire also spreads over normally humid areas. the control of such fire is very

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 165/464 ______difficult, and a lot of effort and all the available resources must be engaged in firefighting. The fire can engulf or threaten to engulf settlements in the area, it can cause communications breakdown and disruptions in the supply of power, gas and water. Such fire usually covers more than 500 hectares. It is fought by domestic firefighting units and units from several regions, in cooperation with other protection, rescue and relief forces.

Although they do not usually cause major damage, wildfires and also general outdoor fires in Slovenia occur relatively often, especially in the southwestern, sub-Mediterranean part of the country. The annual number of these fires can vary considerably over the course of the year, depending on weather conditions. In Slovenia, there are usually between 1300 and 1800 wildfires and outdoor fires. The highest number of fires occurred in 2003, that is, 2820, and the largest surface area was destroyed in 1998, as many as 3490 hectares. The average fire in the sub-Mediterranean part of the country, including the municipalities of Ankaran, Koper, Izola, Piran, Ilirska Bistrica, Pivka, Postojna, Sežana, Divača, Hrpelje - Kozina, Komen, Vipava, Ajdovščina, Nova Gorica, Kanal, Brda, Miren - Kostanjevica , Renče - Vogrsko and Šempeter - Vrtojba, is significantly larger (two to six times) than the average hinterland fire. This difference is greater in years when more fires occur. Between 1998 and 2004, this number for fires in the sub-Mediterranean part of the country was between 0.7 and 2.9 hectares, and in the hinterland between 0.13 and 0.75 hectares. In the above-mentioned municipalities of the sub-Mediterranean part of the country, between 24 and 50% of all outdoor fires were generated during this period, while with reference to their surface area, their share is larger (between 38 and 82% of all fire-affected areas in the country). Almost every year, some large or hard-to-reach fires have to be extinguished from the air. The highest number of such fires was in 2003 (23), although this number is usually between 4 and 7.

According to the data of the Slovenian Forest Service, in the period between 1995 and 2009, as many as 66% of all wildfires occurred in the Kras forest management area (GGO), and the fire-affected area represented 78% of all fire-affected areas in Slovenia. The Kras forest management area, which covers the Kras area and the Koper coastal area, is considered the area with the highest fire risk in Slovenia. This area is covered by forests of the sub- Mediterranean vegetation and climate zone, where the warm climate and uneven rainfall distribution result in susceptibility to fires, which is further enhanced by the base from carbonate rock that does not hold water and frequent powerful winds, especially the bora. The natural characteristics are combined with a thousand years of the impact of humans on the natural environment, whose activity is reflected mainly in the changed vegetation composition of forests, especially the anthropogenic plantations of black (Pinus nigra) and Scots pine (Pinus sylvestris). In the 15-year period (2000-2014), the total surface area of burned territory was 6585.14 hectares. The surface area of burnt forests and scrubs was 4415.11 hectares. The burnt surface area of high forest, which includes coniferous forests, broad-leaved forests and mixed forests, was 2170.43 hectares, or 49% of the total burned surface area of forests and scrubs. The proportion of the burnt surface area of coniferous forests in relation to the total burnt area of high forest is 56%, for broad-leaved forests 29%, and for mixed forests 15%. The proportion of the burnt surface area of coppice in relation to the burnt surface area of forests and scrubs is 29%, while the share of the burnt surface area of shrubs and shrub forests is 22%. Two forest fires, both in the Kras area, covered a particularly large territory. In 2003, fire covered 1049 hectares of land, of which 958 hectares

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 166/464 ______were forests, and in 2006, it covered 950 hectares of land, of which 707 hectares were forests.

One of the largest wildfires in Slovenia so far, if not the largest, occurred in March 1992 in the wider area of Mt Stol above the village of Breginj in the municipality of Kobarid. At that time, more than 1800 hectares of land, mostly highland meadows and pastures, were burnt. All the remaining largest fires in Slovenia after 1991, of which almost all covered the surface area of more than 500 hectares, except from the one above Bregin, occurred in the sub- Mediterranean part of the country, especially in the Kras region.

250 Štev ilo Pogorela pov ršina (ha) 2.500

200 2.000

150 1.500

100 1.000

50 500

Pogorela površina v ha Pogorela Število požarov gozdnih 0 0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Figure 70: The surface area of fire sites and the number of forest fires in Slovenia in the period 2000-2014 Število gozdnih požarov = Number of forest fires Število = Number Pogorela površina (ha) = Fire site area (ha) Pogorela površina v ha = Fire site area in ha

Figure 71: Map showing centre positions of forest fires in Slovenia for the period 2000-2014 according to the size of fire and forest management areas

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The average surface area of a fire site is an important indicator for analysing the effectiveness of forest protection against fires. Fluctuations of the average surface area upwards are mainly connected to long periods without precipitation and high temperatures when, as a rule, major forest fires occur. In the analysed period, the average surface area of the fire site, calculated in the trendline, fell from five hectares in 2000 to two hectares in 2014, indicating effective prevention and firefighting. Slovenia is a country with a long and rich tradition of firefighting, which is well-equipped and well-trained to carry out protection and rescue tasks, with the emphasis on firefighting. The fire protection system is based primarily on voluntary firefighters, who are organised in 1348 fire brigades, 120 firefighting associations and 17 regions. The entire membership includes almost 160,000 firefighters, of which approximately 50,000 are operational. Professional units are mainly located in large urban settlements and bring together approximately 550 professional firefighters in 13 professional units. This data shows that, compared to other countries in the world, Slovenia is on the top with regard to the proportion of volunteer firefighters in the total number of all operational firefighters.

Risk scenario is one of the key elements of each risk assessment for an individual disaster. It is the basis for carrying out the most important part of each risk assessment, that is, the risk analysis, which attempts to assess or determine the real consequences of an event. Three risk scenarios were prepared for the risk assessment for major wildfires. All these scenarios were prepared on the basis of real fire events and in fact summarise them as far as possible. The most detailed description is in risk scenario 3, that is, the fire on the Šumka hill in the northern part of the Kras area. All risk scenarios deal with large wildfires in the southwestern part of Slovenia, where most wildfires and also major wildfires occur.

Risk scenario 1 describes a fire in the area of the village of Sela in the Kras area between 29 and 31 July 2003. It presents the possibility of the spread of wildfires across the state border and the participation of protection and rescue forces from both sides of the border. In addition to its international character, the characteristic of the major wildfire which is the subject of risk scenario 1 is its occurrence in the area of the former front line from World War I, where there is still a lot of unexploded ordnance, which is a serious threat to emergency responders. Risk scenario 1 describes the risk posed to settlements and infrastructure by the fire. The risk scenario, based on real events, clearly shows that fire spreads from natural to urban environment, especially where both types are closely intertwined. The analysis shows, in addition to risk, the urgency of cooperation of protection and rescue forces across national borders. Good management and cooperation of all participants in the disaster response operation prevented severe consequences that would have occurred if the fire had caught a water pump or a filling station.

The basis for risk scenario 2 is the fire that occurred on 29 August 2001 not far from the village of Jablanec in the Kras area. The response of the disaster response forces was appropriate and quick, but when the fire was already localised, owing to the changing wind and insufficient carefulness at night, it spread quickly as a result of strong wind, and threatened to catch Jablanec. Risk scenario 2 is a good example of how, at any given moment, all forces must focus on saving human lives and property. It indicates the activities that responders have to carry out if an evacuation is necessary, and points to a thin line

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 168/464 ______between timely evacuation and unnecessary disturbance of the population. This risk scenario, owing to good management of the disaster response operations and a good sense for informing the population at risk, can be an example of good practice when dealing with similar cases.

Risk scenario 3 presents the fire which occurred in the area of the Šumka hill on the northern edge of the Kras area between 21 and 24 July 2006. Most of the data for risk analysis of the risk scenario 3 was taken from the report of the Firefighting Association of Slovenia (GZS) and the report of the Slovenian Forest Service (ZGS). The analysis mainly shows logistical problems in receiving and deploying units coming from other parts of the country, and the problems with the supply of water and food for units. It emphasises the extreme importance of good control over the location of each unit on the ground, since, owing to a sudden change in the wind and to the fire jumping up to as much as 100 meters, units can quickly come under risk and become cut off from other units. The analysis also showed an urgent need to increase the density of fire protection roads in the natural environment, together with the associated facilities, such as passing and turning areas and entry platforms, where units intended for departure on the ground are equipped. Good marking of fire protection roads on the ground, which enables orientation, is especially important for units from other parts of the country. It is also important that units are equipped with high-quality maps of the area in which they operate. Cooperation of foresters, hunters and all those who are familiar with the terrain and its characteristics is of paramount importance for a successful and safe management of response.

The described risk scenarios indicated no major consequences or impacts on people, both the population and the responders. There were some minor injuries among the protection, rescue and relief forces, such as bruises and sprains, and some fear for the property among the population. In accordance with risk scenario 2, preparations for the evacuation of the village were carried out. However, all three risk scenarios included realistic possibilities for serious injuries and even deaths among firefighters, as they were dealing with either a demanding terrain, unexploded ordnance, sudden changes in the wind, or the spread of the fire which sometimes prevented the withdrawal, and they were also at the risk of dehydration, heat exhaustion and cardiac failure. In the context of impact on people, risk analyses also consider other possible consequences.

In the context of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, the damage was most evident on agricultural and forestry areas, and in the form of the costs of restoration of these areas and the costs of disaster response. In all three risk scenarios, the greatest fire damage was caused to forests, and much less to agricultural land. The economic damage related to the damaged wood mass was not very high, in contrast to the costs of salvage logging and restoration of burnt areas, and of the construction of routes used for remedial activities. In agriculture, the damage was mostly incurred to grassland within forest areas and to permanent crops within the fire site.

The fire next to the village of Jablanec near the settlement of Komen (risk scenario 2) on 29 and 30 August 2001 covered an area of 117 hectares. In this fire, 115 hectares of forest and 2 hectares of other land were burned. The cost of disaster response operations carried out by firefighters was EUR 46,737, damage to forest resulting from fire was estimated at EUR

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33,300, and the cost of forest restoration, preparation of the recovery plan, and material and other labour costs of the ZGS amounted to EUR 34,800. The total costs and damage resulting from fire, excluding working hours of voluntary firefighters, amounted to EUR 114,837, or EUR 998 per hectare of the burnt forest surface area, or EUR 981 per hectare of the total burnt surface are.

Table 35: Damage and costs resulting from wildfire next to the village of Jablanec near the settlement of Komen

EUR/ Type of damage and cost EUR hectare of the burnt surface area Cost of the response of firefighters 46,737 399.4 ZGS work costs 750 6.4 ZGS material costs 550 4.7 Damage to forests owing to fire 33,300 289 Costs of the preparation of a recovery 850 7.3 plan Restoration costs 32,650 279.1

Fire in the area of the village of Sela na Krasu (risk scenario 1) lasted from 29 to 31 July 2003. The total fire site surface area was 1049 hectares, of which 958 hectares were forest and 91 hectares were other land. The cost of disaster response operations carried out by firefighters was EUR 250,175, damage to forest resulting from fire was estimated at EUR 243,000, and the cost of forest restoration, preparation of the recovery plan, and material and other labour costs of the ZGS amounted to EUR 222,970. The total cost resulting from fire amounted to EUR 716,345, or EUR 748 per hectare of the burnt forest surface area, or EUR 683 per hectare of the total burnt surface are.

Table 36: Damage and costs resulting from the wildfire next to the village of Sela na Krasu

EUR/ Type of cost EUR hectare of the burnt surface area Cost of the response of firefighters 250,375 238.7 ZGS work costs 1500 1.4 ZGS material costs 1200 0.1 Damage to forests owing to fire 243,000 254 Costs of the preparation of a recovery 3000 2.9 plan Restoration costs 217,270 207.1

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Fire between the hill Šumka, the Železna vrata pass and the hill Trstelj (risk scenario 3) lasted from 21 to 24 July 2006. The total fire site surface area was 950 hectares, of which 707 hectares were forest and 243 hectares were other land. The cost of disaster response by firefighters was EUR 200,300, although it should be emphasised that the costs incurred on firefighting vehicles were not included. The damage to forest resulting from fire was estimated at EUR 453,000, and the cost of forest restoration, preparation of the recovery plan, and material and other labour costs of the ZGS amounted to EUR 441,400. The total cost resulting from the fire amounted to EUR 1,094,700, or EUR 1548 per hectare of the burnt forest surface area, or EUR 1153 per hectare of the total burnt surface area.

Table 37: Damage and costs resulting from the fire Šumka-Železna vrata-Trstelj

EUR/ Type of damage and cost EUR hectare of the burnt surface area Cost of the response of firefighters 200,300 210.8 ZGS work costs 2900 3.1 ZGS material costs 2300 2.4 Damage to forests owing to fire 453,000 638 Costs of the preparation of a recovery 4500 4.7 plan Rehabilitation costs 431,700 454.4

None of the risk scenarios took into account the cost of helicopter firefighting, which would increase the total amount of costs and damage to some degree. Even with these costs included, all three risk scenarios would still be ranked at level 1 of economic and environmental impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage. The damage could be considerably larger if the fire captured settlements and destroyed residential and other facilities. In at least two of those risk scenarios, such an outcome was realistically possible.

Owing to the nature of fire as a disaster, political and social impacts are usually not large, as shown in all the three risk scenarios.

Given the frequency of occurrence, the three risk scenarios described above are likely to unfold again, since in the last 15 years, similar fires occurred. It is estimated that such risk scenarios can in fact occur in every less than 5 years or in every 5 to 25 years.

The risk scenario 3, that is, the fire in the area of the Šumka hill in the Kras area that occurred in July 2006, was determined to be the representative or worst-case risk scenario. In the risk matrices, the entry for this scenario is in italics.

The extent of individual impacts and the overall impact, and the likelihood of all three risk scenarios, are also shown in the table below.

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Table 38: The extent of individual and total (average) impacts and the likelihood of all three risk scenarios for major wildfires

Level of economic and Level of Calculated Level of Level of environ- Reliability political overall overall impacts mental Risk of risk Risk scenario and (average) (average) on impacts likelihood analysis social value of risk people and results impacts impacts impacts impacts on cultural heritage Relatively Risk scenario 1 2 1 2 1.67 2 4 reliable Relatively Risk scenario 2 2 1 1 1.33 1 4 reliable Relatively Risk scenario 3 2 1 2 1.67 2 5 reliable Representative scenario and Relatively 2 1 2 1.67 2 5 risk analysis reliable (S3)

Taking into account the reliability of risk scenarios, it can be assessed without major reservations and also without special scientific evaluation that all the risk scenarios and the appropriate risk analyses are relatively reliable, since they are based on past, that is, actual major wildfires. Since just over ten years have passed since the largest major wildfires in Slovenia, and since quality data on the phenomenon and, above all, the consequences of major fires are available, all the three risk scenarios, and also risk analyses, are relatively reliable.

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Figure 72: RISK MATRIX FOR LARGE WILDFIRES – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

IMPACT Scenario No. 1 2 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 3

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 73: RISK MATRIX FOR LARGE WILDFIRES – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

IMPACT 2

Scenario No. 1

1 Scenario No. 2 Scenario No. 3

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 74: RISK MATRIX FOR LARGE WILDFIRES – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

IMPACT

2 Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 3

1 Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 75: RISK MATRIX FOR LARGE WILDFIRES WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

IMPACT

2 Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 3

1 Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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With climate change and the increasing climate extremes, the extending of long periods without rainfall and the rising temperatures of the atmosphere, the likelihood of wildfires increases, both in traditional areas and in new ones where, owing to climate change, appropriate conditions are created for the occurrence of wildfires and their transformation in major fires. The expected climate change (when amending the assessment of risk owing to a major wildfire, a relatively pessimistic assumption of a typical greenhouse gas content Representative Concentration Pathway 6 (RCP6) was taken into account) will affect forests and will cause increased fire risk to forests and other natural environment. Factors, such as higher temperatures, longer drought periods, especially during the summer, increased evapotranspiration, increased number of natural disasters and the resulting increased damage to forests, make trees weaker, so that these are more prone to diseases and pests affecting forest trees. Consequently, there will be greater amounts of highly flammable biomass in the future. In the event of fire, this could result in a faster spread of fire, higher intensity of combustion and difficult firefighting (more firefighting and rescue forces and resources will be necessary, and such fires can also last longer). According to the amendment to the Risk Assessment for Major Wildfires prepared in 2015, it is very likely that, as a result of future climate change, both wildfires and major wildfires, such as those presented in the three risk scenarios for major wildfires, will occur a bit more often than before, and their extent and the resulting damage could also be greater to some extent. The greatest risk of major wildfires will remain limited to the southwestern part of Slovenia (especially the Kras area, the Koper coastal area and the Goriška region), and in other parts only to small areas with certain local characteristics.

Nevertheless, it is estimated that the situation with regard to risk scenarios for major wildfires in the risk matrices for major wildfires would not change even when considering future climate change. It should be noted, however, that the likelihood of major wildfires, even without considering future climate change, is assessed as relatively high, since all the three risk scenarios, from the point of view of the likelihood or frequency of the occurrence, are ranked at level 4 and 5 already in version 1 of this assessment. In spite of the likelihood of higher frequency of the occurrence of major wildfires and to some extend greater impacts, the risk of major wildfires will remain more or less the same in the future, as already established in version 1 of the risk assessment for major wildfires, which means that it will be limited mainly to the southwestern part of Slovenia and will not pose a global risk to the environment and the country.

The internal risk categorisation or classification of municipalities into risk classes with regard to wildfires, as shown in the figure below, was based on potential risk to forests. The southwestern, sub-Mediterranean part of the Slovenia faces a particularly high risk. However, future climate change is not included in this categorisation.

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Figure 76: Level of fire risk to the natural environment with regard to wildfires by municipalities Level of fire risk by municipalities: Zelo velika požarna ogroženost = Very high fire risk Velika požarna ogroženost = High fire risk Srednja požarna ogroženost = Medium fire risk Majhna požarna ogroženost = Low fire risk

The past work related to preventive measures and the construction of fire protection infrastructure in forests, together with the level of equipment, training and organisation of protection, rescue and relief forces, and the manner in which they are managed and integrated, have caused a steady decrease of the average surface area of wildfire, which is the best indicator that the action taken and the planned path are appropriate. With the comprehensive presentation of the problem of wildfires, the risk assessment represents a good basis for further work and improvements in the area of wildfire protection.

Well-planned and consistently implemented preventive measures for protection against wildfires are the most effective defence against fire. Preventive activities must be coordinated with an appropriately organised and equipped public fire service, which is the task and obligation of the local community.

The number of wildfires is primarily influenced by the weather and people with their activities in the natural environment. Distinction must be made between fires caused by negligence and fires that have been set intentionally and are the result of a planned arson. It is difficult for the society to influence the number of fires. However, with good preventive activities and wildfire protection infrastructure, together with equipped and trained protection, rescue and relief forces (especially firefighters) which are able to respond at short notice, further decrease of the average surface area of fire in the long run is possible. A very important

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Measures for preventing wildfires which are implemented by owners or holders of the natural environment, especially of forests and other land, and by local communities, are the following:

- Regular salvage logging of heavily damaged and weakened forest trees, - Regular disposal of dry organic materials on non-forest land, - Maintenance of the passability of transport routes, - Cleaning of fire safety areas and construction of fire walls along railway lines, power lines, gas pipelines etc., - Construction and maintenance of fire breaks, water reservoirs and other technical facilities, - Maintenance of fire safety areas between buildings and forests, - Establishment of helicopter landing grounds and water scooping locations in spatial documents of local communities.

With climate change, the risk of major wildfires in Slovenia, especially in the Kras region, the Koper coastal area and the Goriška region, is also increasing. Therefore, in the following years, we can expect with high certainty the occurrence of several major wildfires, although the levels of risk with regard to major wildfires are not changing or increasing for the time being.

All previous experience and knowledge about the natural environment, together with new knowledge, technology and equipment, and adaptation to climate change, can limit the risks arising from wildfires, both to the natural environment and to people, the economy, human health and political and social situation. The more all those who are responsible for taking care of the natural environment and protecting against wildfires, together with the users of natural environment, are aware of the risks and responsibilities, the lower will be the risk and the consequences of wildfires.

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5.10 Risk Assessment for Terrorism

The Risk Assessment for Terrorism, version 1.0, No. 842-1/ 2015/3, was prepared by the Security Planning Division of the Ministry of the Interior. During the preparation of risk assessment, the Division cooperated with the internal organisational units of the Ministry and the Police, as well as other bodies (ministries) and participants (public institutions, companies, the faculty).

The purpose of preparing the risk assessment was to determine, analyse and assess the risk of terrorist acts.

The Ministry of the Interior classified the risk assessment for terrorist attacks as restricted. Consequently, this summary does not present in detail the findings and conclusions from the assessment. The full version of the assessment is available for view at the Ministry of the Interior.

For the preparation of the risk assessment for terrorist attacks, the methods recommended by the European Guideline were used. The most often used methods were brainstorming, PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis), secondary analysis, case studies and the use of the Threat-Risk Training Tool.

The terrorism phenomenon is very specific, since it has very different forms. Thus, there is no consensus on the definition. National documents define terrorism as one of the sources of threat and risk to national security of the Republic of Slovenia. Terrorism is linked to other security threats, in particular organised crime, illicit activities with regard to weapons of mass destruction and nuclear technology, illegal migrations, and trafficking in human beings, arms and narcotic drugs. Targets of terrorist threats and attacks are critical infrastructure, civilian population, state representatives and institutions, diplomatic missions and consular posts, and members of international forces participating in international operations and missions.

The assessment highlights examples of terrorist attacks by threat levels and examples of some terrorist attacks around the world over the past twenty years that were used as a basis for the preparation of risk scenarios. The analysis of these cases was critical, since until now, there has been no terrorist attack in Slovenia. Thus, there was no real basis for preparing this risk assessment. The most common examples were selected, which have some common features:

– Large number of victims (fatalities and injured people),

– Great material damage,

– Use of means of mass destruction,

– Selected targets.

In order to prepare a risk assessment, 36 possible bases for risk scenarios were prepared, two of which were selected for the production of two risk scenarios. When preparing the content of risk scenarios, disasters that have already occurred abroad and had similar forms were considered. This was the basis for predicting the extent of the disaster and its impacts.

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When risk scenarios were prepared, a risk analysis relating to the impacts of the disaster on people, economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, and political and social impacts was carried out. After that, these impacts were assessed using the criteria for assessing risk impacts and the likelihood of a disaster.

In such risk assessments, the reliability of data and the likelihood of risk analysis results are relatively low owing to a number of reasons that affect the outcome of the assessment. Terrorist attacks can occur in very different forms, with various means which have very different impacts on people, the environment, the economy, social relations, etc. In addition, such an event has not yet happened in Slovenia, which means that it is difficult to make comparisons with events occurring in other environments (historical, social and political, cultural, religious, ethnic and other circumstances are important factors).

Given the very theoretical assumption of risk scenarios that could unfold, the level of reliability of data is moderate. Some data were obtained on the basis of currently applicable price lists of services (such as disaster response costs, treatment costs, material damage for those who are most directly affected, estimation of the cost of termination of an activity, etc.). Certain data could not be obtained from the responsible authorities, and thus the risk analysis of some segments was based more on the analysis of secondary sources or comparison with events abroad.

In assessing the likelihood of an occurrence of an event, the current assessment of risk to Slovenia was considered, from the point of view of international terrorism and current events that have recently occurred in the near or distant environment. The facts that there have been no terrorist attacks in the Republic of Slovenia and that security and other measures were prepared in Slovenia to prevent and detect such events or intentions were taken into account. Given the unpredictability of an event for which the occurrence cycle cannot be determined, it is very difficult to assess the general likelihood of the occurrence of the event. On the basis of all the facts considered, the average likelihood of a terrorist attack was determined for both risk scenarios, with a potential risk or threat occurring once in every 25 to 100 years (annual likelihood of 1 to 4%).

The risk matrices present individual and overall (average) impacts and the assessment of likelihood that such or similar risk scenarios will actually unfold. In risk matrices, the representative or worst-case risk scenario that is still acceptable is indicated in italics.

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Figure 77: RISK MATRIX FOR TERRORISM – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

4 Scenario No. 1

3 Scenario No. 2

IMPACT 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 78: RISK MATRIX FOR TERRORISM – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

IMPACT

2 Scenario No. 1

1 Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 79: RISK MATRIX FOR TERRORISM – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

IMPACT Scenario No. 1

2 Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 80: RISK MATRIX FOR TERRORISM WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

3 Scenario No. 1

IMPACT

Scenario No. 2 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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When risk scenarios were ranked in the risk matrices, a five-level categorisation of the risk of terrorist attacks at the level of municipalities was also made. The categorisation included criteria such as the size of the municipality, and the number of inhabitants and facilities that could be at greater risk.

Given the special characteristics of Slovenian municipalities and owing to the large number of small municipalities, almost three quarters (147) of all municipalities were classified as those for which the risk level is small, very small or zero. The remaining municipalities were ranked at higher risk levels, as appropriate, owing to the presence of one or more factors that could present a risk and could have a certain impact on people, the economy, cultural heritage, the environment, or a social or political impact in the event of a terrorist attack. As expected, the level of risk is the highest in the largest municipalities, especially in the largest cities within these municipalities and in places where some important facilities are located which, due to their intended use, can be a potential target for attackers, and the disabling or non-functioning of which would have a significant impact on people, economic and environmental impacts, impacts on cultural heritage, and political and social impacts. There are 16 such municipalities. Regardless of the findings, it must be considered that the results of the internal categorisation are not necessarily the most appropriate. A terrorist attack can happen anywhere and for any reason. Examples from abroad show that, although some attacks happened in areas that do not pose a significant risk, the impacts were significant (for example, impacts on people). The division is based solely on the assessed vulnerability of municipalities in terms of the existence of potential targets and prediction as to what damage an attack could cause in a certain area.

The assessment of the risk of terrorist attacks is one of the more demanding and less reliable ones, since it involves actions that are unpredictable in several respects. On the basis of the national risk assessment for international terrorism, it is very difficult to determine or assess the risk for Slovenia. In this country, a terrorist attack has never happened, and the assessment of the risk of terrorist attacks for Slovenia was low during the course of preparation of this risk assessment. Considering these assumptions, the assessment of the likelihood of occurrence of such events is a guess based of analyses of events that have taken place abroad. The assessment has lower reliability also because terrorist attacks can have various forms and can be carried out with different means and very different motives, and most often unannounced. This document contains a relatively broad definition of risk assessment, which means that the selected list of elements was very general in order to be able to cover a large number of situations with a common basis: to cause the greatest possible damage that has a significant impact on people, economic and environmental impacts, impacts on cultural heritage, and political and social impacts.

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5.11 Risk Assessment for Ice Storms

The Risk Assessment for Ice Storms was prepared in 2015 and modified in 2016 by the Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief within the Ministry of Defence.

The basic purpose of the assessment was to identify and describe, in a comprehensive manner, the phenomenon and the formation of ice storms and damage, the characteristics of their occurrence in the Republic of Slovenia, and past small-scale or large-scale occurrences of ice storms which caused major damage. The purpose of the assessment is also to determine, based on risk analyses, the consequences of such a disaster and extent to which these can be expected when the selected events occur or risk scenarios unfold in practice. The assessment includes internal categorisation of risk resulting from ice storm, based primarily on the available occurrence maps, thickness and frequency of the occurrence of ice cover in the Republic of Slovenia. Some risk analysis results were compared with the uniform criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters. On this basis, risk matrices for ice storm were produced. They define the intensity of the consequences and the frequency with which the selected or prepared scenarios of the occurrence of ice storm disasters unfold.

During the preparation of the assessment, especially when assessing the extent of risk impacts, methods of brainstorming and good practices were mostly used. A historical method was also used to describe past occurrences of ice storms in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. Moreover, a descriptive method describes the occurrence of ice storms with regard to their origin and the impact of various factors. During the preparation of the risk assessment for ice storms, a number of expert and popular sources were used.

The ice cover is the ice that accumulates either on parts of plants or on objects, buildings and the ground. It is formed** in the cold half of the year (winter), when it rains or dews near the ground at temperatures below freezing point or when liquid precipitation falls on a subcooled basis. The precondition for the formation of the ice cover is that during precipitation, the temperature of the ground level air layer is below freezing point, and above it is a layer of warm air with positive temperatures. A thin ice cover does not cause major damage. The damage, especially on trees, begins when the thickness of ice cover exceeds 20 millimetres. With the increase in thickness, especially over 50 millimetres, the extent and level of damage increases rapidly. The occurrence of ice coating and the extent of consequences or damage, especially in forests, is further influenced by several factors: tree species composition, crown shape and size, crown asymmetry, tree inclination, altitude, wind, exposition, terrain inclination, rock composition, soil moisture and depth, the impact of microrelief or microlocation, and human intervention in forests and forest management. Due to these factors, it is very difficult to assess the exact occurrence and extent of ice coating and the damage caused by it. Fortunately, ice coating itself as a phenomenon is generally relatively predictable.

Ice coating is one of the natural disasters, the consequences of which can be diverse, extensive and very unpleasant. People as a society are completely helpless in preventing the occurrence of this phenomenon. The mitigation and elimination of its consequences, especially in forests and on infrastructure systems, would require a lot of financial,

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 187/464 ______organisational and other efforts, which could not prevent all the consequences, but would only reduce them to some extent. Most of the damage caused by excessive load occurs in forests, and often also on the electricity infrastructure (transmission and, in particular, distribution lines). In addition, ice damage also has a negative impact on traffic flows, which can be considerably slowed, obstructed, and often also interrupted. The prolonged and widespread lack of electricity and reduced passability of transport infrastructure systems can have a significant impact on the daily life and activities of people, the economy and society as a whole.

Figure 81: Photo of ice coating in February 2014, taken on the outskirts of the city of Vrhnika

Ice damage occurs in many places around the world, and Slovenia belongs to those countries which are familiar with this phenomenon. Moreover, there are some regions in Slovenia where the ice coating appears most often (almost every winter) and usually also has the largest consequences. These regions include the area extending from the northwestern to the southern part of the country, which covers the areas of the Idrija Hills, through the Visoki Kras (the plateaus of Trnovski gozd Nanos, Hrušica and Snežnik, the settlement of Javornik) and its peripherial and neighbouring areas (the Cerkno Hills, the settlements of Banjšice and Pivka, the Senožeče hills, the Brkini Hills) to the Croatian border (Mount Slavnik, the Čičarija plateau). Typical for these kinds of landscape is the area called "the ice strip", which is the altitude range where ice coating usually causes the worst consequences. It covers the areas between 600 and 900 meters above sea level, although even in these regions, ice coating usually appears already at least 100 meters below and at least 200 meters above that altitude. Although ice coating can occur almost everywhere in the country except above the altitude of about 1400 metres and in the lowest parts of the

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Vipava valley and the Koper coastal area, it is generally less frequent and less intense outside the ice strip area. However, there have been several severe ice coating events (for example in 1980, 1985, in the winters of 1995/96 and 1996/97 and in 2014) which caused significant consequences also elsewhere in the country, which can also be a sign of changes in the characteristics of the occurrence of ice coating in the last thirty years, perhaps also due to climate change. Nevertheless, this finding can only count as an assumption and is not supported by expert studies. There are some incomplete, but relatively reliable data on ice storm events since 1890. However, most of the available data on such occurrences refers to events which happened in the last almost 50 years, that is, since the mid-1970s. Considering all these data, the greatest ice storms in the area of today's Republic of Slovenia occurred in the last decade of the nineteenth century, precisely in 1933, 1952, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1996, 1997 and 2014. Undoubtedly the worst consequences are those caused by the last ice storm in 2014.

The purpose of risk assessments for individual disasters is also to better understand disasters and their consequences. A better understanding of disasters is ensured by risk scenarios, on the basis of which, through risk analyses, an attempt is made to identify their consequences, reflected in the impacts on people, economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, and political and social impacts. Three different risk scenarios for ice storms were considered, based on real events (ice storms) in the period between 1975 and 2014. Data for all these ice storms, and especially the last one in 2014, are relatively detailed, so these risk scenarios are quite reliable, and the same applies to risk analyses associated with these risk scenarios.

The first risk scenario includes ice storms in 1975, 1980, 1984 and 1985. These affected the typical regions where ice storm appears most often, and the greatest devastation was caused by the ice storm in November 1980, which destroyed nearly half a million m3 of wood mass in the Brkini hills. All the ice storms covered in the first risk scenario destroyed more than 1.1 million m3 of wood mass and caused considerable inconvenience to the electricity infrastructure.

The second risk scenario consists of two groups of events that are not causally related to each other, but they followed each other. These are two episodes of high snow at the end of 1995, followed by two more ice storm episodes at the beginning of 1996. At that time, most of the country was affected by snow and lice, and most of the damage was in forests (680,700 m3 of broken trees) and electricity infrastructure.

The third risk scenario, which is central in this risk assessment for ice storms, includes the ice storm at the end of January and the beginning of February 2014. It was one of the biggest natural disasters in Slovenia, and certainly the biggest ice storm so far, causing destruction in forests. With extensive and prolonged interruptions of electricity supply and major traffic problems, it greatly influenced both the lives of people and the functioning of economy and society as a whole. Owing to ice damage, life was paralysed at many locations, since transport routes were impassable, railway transport was disabled at many points, there was no electricity, etc. The ice storm destroyed 9.3 million m3 of wood mass across 601,900 hectares, which more than ten times exceeds the damage in the worst ice storm by then, and caused damage in forest of over EUR 214 million. A lot of damage was

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 189/464 ______also incurred to the electricity and railway infrastructure and the economy. The total damage amounted to almost EUR 430 million, while the costs of emergency response, the costs of the Slovenian Forest Service and the costs of damage assessment exceeded EUR 46 million. According to estimates, the ice storm killed, directly or indirectly, at least 16 people, and at least 190 were injured. The majority of the injured people were members of firefighting units performing emergency response operations, while the majority of fatalities were caused by accidents during work performed in forests. More than 80,000 members of protection, rescue and relief forces and public services participated in emergency response operations, of which more than 60,000 were firefighters, which is a huge number. Owing to the critical situation regarding electricity supply, the Republic of Slovenia also requested international assistance, through the EU, in the form of power generators. The rapid and effective international emergency response that followed the request and involved mainly firefighters and other rescuers from most of the surrounding countries, was among the more extensive in Europe in recent years. This risk scenario and the related risk analysis for the ice storm in February 2014 are also defined as the representative risk scenario and risk analysis, based on which ice storm is included in the relevant comparisons with other disasters in Chapter 6 of the National Disaster Risk Assessment.

The fourth risk scenario, which is a multiple-risk scenario or, to put it simply, a chain of disasters scenario, includes the entire third risk scenario, together with the largest overexpansion of bark beetle (eight-toothed spruce bark beetle) in forests so far, which is also largely the result of greater vulnerability of forests after the 2014 ice storm. The risk scenario 4 is in fact still unfolding and is expected to continue until 2020. Between the 2014 ice storm and the end of September 2016, the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle already attacked more than 3.6 million m3 of spruce, and according to forecasts for the coming years, this figure could rise to nearly 10 million m3. The characteristic of this risk scenario is that this is the worst possible risk scenario, and at the same time a multiple-risk scenario with two chains of disasters, partly also related to the consequences of climate change so far.

The extent of the consequences of all four risk scenarios was compared to the criteria for evaluating risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters which are common to all disasters. Depending on the size of the impacts compared to the criteria, the consequences and likelihood of all four risk scenarios are presented in three risk matrices with a separate presentation of risk impacts and in a risk matrix showing an overall risk impact. Risk matrices are used for graphic representation of the extent of impacts and likelihood of all risk scenarios under consideration, taking into account the criteria for assessing risk impacts and disaster likelihood.

In terms of the criteria for assessing the impacts of disaster risk, the first two risk scenarios (ice storms in 1974, 1980, 1984 and 1985 in the "ice strip" areas, and high snow and ice coating in the winter of 1995/1996 in most parts of the country) do not stand out with regard to the extent of impacts, and the likelihood of both scenarios is medium or large, since such risk scenarios are similar events, judging by the findings in this assessment, can occur again once in every 30 to 100 years or approximately every 10 to 30 years. A different situation is risk scenario 3, which concerns the ice storm in February 2014. Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage are huge, and the level of impact on people and the level political and social impact are defined as medium. This is also the overall (average)

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level of all three groups of impacts, while the assessed likelihood of a recurrent ice storm is low, which, according to the criteria, means once in more than 100 years.

It is estimated that in absolute terms, risk scenario 4, which would result in the most severe consequences, would have, depending on the results of risk scenario 3, a slightly higher political and social impact, while the level of this impact would still remain medium. Depending on the results of the risk analysis, in absolute terms, the economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage would be considerably higher (the costs could rise from more than EUR 475 million in risk scenario 3 to more than EUR 855 million), although the level of this impact would not increase compared to risk scenario 3 and would remain high. However, the level of impacts on people would increase by one level, especially due to the additional number of the dead and, in particular, the injured people owing to the implementation of measures for the control of bark beetle in forests. Thus, the level of impacts on people would also be high. The overall (average) level of all three impact groups is also high. Nevertheless, the assessed likelihood was similar as in risk scenario 3.

Table 39: Overview of individual impacts and the calculated total (average) risk impacts for the ice storm risk matrix showing the overall risk impact

Risk scenario Level of Level of Level of Calculated Level of Risk Reliability impacts economic and political overall overall likelihood of risk on environmental and social (average) (average) analysis people impacts and impacts value of risk impacts results impacts on impacts cultural heritage Risk Scenario 1 2 1 1 1.33 1 3 Relatively reliable Risk scenario 2 2 1 1 1.33 1 4 Relatively reliable Risk scenario 3 3 4 3 3.33 3 2 Relatively reliable Risk scenario 4 4 4 3 3.67 4 2 Relatively reliable Representative risk scenario 3 4 3 3.33 3 2 Relatively and risk analysis reliable (S3)

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Figure 82: RISK MATRIX FOR ICE STORM – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

4 Scenario No. 4

3 Scenario No. 3

IMPACT

2 Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 83: RISK MATRIX FOR ICE STORMS – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

Scenario No. 4 4 Scenario No. 3

IMPACT 2

1 Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 84: RISK MATRIX FOR ICE STORMS – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

Scenario No. 4

3 Scenario No. 3

IMPACT

1 Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 85: RISK MATRIX FOR ICE STORMS WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

4 Scenario No. 4

3 Scenario No. 3

IMPACT 2

1 Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 2

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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For the purpose of internal categorisation of risk owing to ice storms, which can be used for spatial planning, the specification and implementation of various preventive measures, the identification of priority investments in the field of prevention, and the planning of emergency response, this assessment uses the available maps showing the occurrence or risk of ice storms, especially the last one from 2015. An ice storm risk categorisation was prepared at the level of municipalities and regions (ACPDR regional offices) and statistical regions, including five levels of risk.

Risk level: 1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high

Figure 86: Categorisation of Slovenian municipalities according to ice storm risk

In some municipalities (Izola, Piran, Ankaran, Šempeter - Vrtojba), ice storm almost never occurs, therefore they were ranked at the lowest risk level. The second level of risk includes the municipality of Koper (owing to the high Karstic hinterland of Mount Slavnik, ice storm does not occur by the sea), the municipalities located in the low part of the Kras area (Miren - Kostanjevica, Renče - Vogrsko, Komen), the municipalities located in the hilly and mountainous regions of Northern Slovenia, where ice storm rarely occurs (in the highest regions, it does not occur at all), and several municipalities located in the northeastern part of Slovenia. In these municipalities (68), ice storm does not represent a significant risk. Most of

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 196/464 ______the municipalities (112) are ranked at medium level of risk, mainly the municipalities located in the eastern half of Slovenia. Risk classes or levels 4 and 5 include municipalities located in the "ice-strip" area, where ice coating is the most common, and the thickest and causes the greatest damage. Most of them are ranked at risk class or level 4. They include 24 municipalities, namely Tolmin, Cerkno, Kanal, Nova Gorica, Ajdovščina, Vipava, Škofja Loka, Gorenja vas - Poljane, Žiri, Logatec, Vrhnika, Horjul, Borovnica, Dobrova - Polhov Gradec, Sodražica, Loški potok, Osilnica, Kostel, Kočevje, Cerknica, Bloke, Loška dolina, Hrpelje - Kozina and Divača. Four municipalities (Postojna, Pivka, Ilirska Bistrica and Idrija) were ranked at risk class or level 5. Most regions are ranked at level or class three (the Gorenjska, Ljubljanska, Koroška, Zahodnoštajerska, Podravska Zasavska, Posavska and Dolenjska regions). Risk class or level 4 includes the Severnoprimorska region, while class or level 5, the highest one, includes the Notranjska region. The regions facing the lowest risk are the Vzhodnoštajerska, the Pomurska and, in particular, the coastal Obalna regions.

The risk assessment for ice storms shows that the recurrence of the ice storm such as that in 2014 can represent a very high risk for Slovenia, with the risk impacts being medium or high, depending on the type of impacts, while the likelihood of such a disaster is small. The internal risk categorisation for ice storms reveals that the greatest efforts and attention should be focused on planning, prioritising investments in the area of prevention, implementation of preventive measures and measures for preparedness, and the planning of appropriate response to the disaster, especially in the area of municipalities which are ranked at risk level 4 or higher owing to ice storms. With regard to areas where the above activities should be carried out as priority, the areas of electricity and railway infrastructure and forestry deserve special emphasis.

The 2014 ice storm events, and in the recent period also the overexpansion of bark beetle, have caused serious consequences in Slovenia. On the other hand, however, they provided a number of new and useful data that were available for the risk assessment and would otherwise not exist. This contributed to higher quality and complexity of the assessment.

The risk assessment for ice storms shows that ice storms are one of the disasters with a high level of risk (3 out of 4). Therefore, in future, more attention will have to be paid to this phenomenon in spatial planning and preventive measures, especially in the fields of forestry and electricity and transport infrastructure. It is also necessary to ensure that the response to a potential future ice storm is at least as good as or better than response to the 2014 ice disaster. This is the only way to ensure that the consequences of future ice storms are less intense.

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5.12 Risk Assessment for Accidents Involving Dangerous Substances

The Risk Assessment for Accidents Involving Dangerous Substances was prepared by the Environment Directorate at the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning.

It deals with potential accidents in the industrial plants in the Republic of Slovenia which handle large quantities of dangerous substances and which, in accordance with the Decree on the Prevention of Major Accidents and Mitigation of Their Consequences (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, Nos. 71/08, 105/10 and 36/14), meet the criteria for classification as facilities of high risk for the environment. The assessment deals with emergencies characterised by uncontrolled discharges of large quantities of dangerous substances which pose risk to people, buildings, infrastructure and the environment in Slovenia.

Such risk is a consequence of hazard or the operation of industrial installations handling dangerous substances marked by damage potential. The failure of safe containment of dangerous substances and their release has, owing to the properties of these substances, such as, for example, flammability, explosiveness and toxicity, a potential to adversely affect human health, to damage and demolish buildings and industrial and infrastructural facilities, and to pollute the environment, especially soil and surface water and groundwater.

The history of the operation of such plants in Slovenia and other countries shows that major accidents involving dangerous substances are rare. However, if such an accident occurs, it can have extremely serious consequences for people and the environment, as evidenced by such cases in Europe over the past few decades: explosion in a chemical plant (Flixborough, 1974), release of dioxin chemicals (Seveso, 1976), pollution of the Rhine river in Switzerland with contaminated extinguishing water (1986), pollution of the Danube river owing to the collapse of the barrier at a tailings disposal site (2000), explosion of raw material for chemical fertilizers (Toulouse, 2001), and fire in a storage facility for petroleum derivatives (Buncefield, 2005).

The analyses of major accidents involving dangerous substances that occurred in the past also show similar causes: human, technical and organisational errors; usually, a decisive factor is a combination of human errors (inadequate actions of employees or their failure to act) and a failure of processing or safety equipment. Major accidents involving dangerous substances can also be the result of natural phenomena such as earthquakes or floods or lightning, or can be the result of a deliberate human act.

The risk assessment for accidents involving dangerous substances is prepared using the data obtained by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning in the implementation of regulations in the field of protection against major accidents involving dangerous substances, especially in the procedures for the issuing of environmental permits for the areas of storage and production activities, which are classified as installations with high environmental risk or installations with low environmental risk.

Given the wide range of fields in which dangerous substances are used or dealt with, the harmful consequences of their use or handling can be expected in everyday life, during their transportation, production, storage or disposal of dangerous waste. Therefore, the handling

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In Slovenia, there are separate systems for managing risk during the transport of dangerous goods and for managing the risk of major accidents involving dangerous substances. The risk of major accidents involving dangerous substances means the risk of accidents that are characteristic of a group of stationary industrial installations where large quantities of certain dangerous substances are handled and are therefore considered as installations with a potential for major accidents involving dangerous substances.

This risk assessment covers the risk of major accidents in installations with a potential for major accidents involving dangerous substances in Slovenia. On the basis of the Decree, a group of such installations consists of 58 installations carrying out activities presented in the table below. Based on the quantity and type of dangerous substances in installations, these installations are classified as installations of low and installations of high environmental risk.

Table 40: Activities in installations of high and installations of low environmental risk in the Republic of Slovenia

Type of activity Number of % installations Storage and distribution of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 11 19.0% Storage and transhipment of petroleum derivatives 9 15.5% Energy production 6 10.3% Storage and distribution of industrial gasses 3 5.20% Production of chemicals 4 6.90% Storage and transhipment of other dangerous substances 3 5.20% Storage of explosives 3 5.20% Glass production 2 3.40% Aluminium production 1 1.70% Production of various products 16 27.6% Total: 58 100%

The criteria for identifying installations with a potential for major accidents involving dangerous substances are harmonised and defined in the EU in the Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the Control of Major-Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances (SEVESO Directive III), which amended and subsequently repealed Council Directive 96/82/EC on the Control of Major-Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances (SEVESO Directive II).

On the basis of this Directive, Slovenia has also introduced a system for managing major accident risks, aimed at the establishment and functioning of mechanisms that will contribute to the largest possible degree to the prevention of major accidents and the reduction of their

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In the Republic of Slovenia, the protection against harmful impacts of accidents involving dangerous substances consists of three mechanisms:

- Control of the design of installations from the point of view of using the best techniques to prevent accidents and to reduce their consequences; - Monitoring and control of operations in installations from the point of view of protection against major accidents involving dangerous substances, which are carried out within the procedures for issuing environmental permits for the operation of installations and through inspections; - Ensuring preparedness for response to disasters consisting of the preparedness of installations and the preparedness of the local community in which the installation operates.

The monitoring and control of the operation of installations involve, in particular, the control over whether their operators have identified the risks of major accidents typical of the dangerous substances in the installations and in relation to the type of activities they perform, and whether adequate and sufficient measures have been put in place to prevent uncontrolled discharges of dangerous substances and to prevent a release of a dangerous substance from developing into a major accident.

The analysis and assessment of risks related to major accidents involving dangerous substances require knowledge of the operational characteristics of the operation of industrial installations where large quantities of dangerous substances are handled, possible causes for accidents, the characteristics of accidents in terms of the spread of dangerous substances in the environment and the occurrence of harmful consequences (thermal radiation, overpressure, increased concentration of dangerous substances), and the likelihood that individual events occur in an accident scenario that can lead to harmful consequences for people, buildings and the environment.

The basis for risk assessment for accidents involving dangerous substances are risks arising from the operation of installations of high environmental risk. At the time of the preparation of the risk assessment, there were 32 such installations in Slovenia.

For the purpose of preparing a risk assessment, these installations are divided into three groups according to the dangerous substances which they handle:

- Group 1: installations handling liquid petroleum products, - Group 2: installations handling LPG, - Group 3: other installations.

For each group of installations, a risk scenario was prepared for the risk assessment, with a major accident being a sequence of events that can lead to harmful consequences for people, facilities, infrastructure and the environment. The characteristic of major accidents involving dangerous substances is that discharges of dangerous substances that the employees fail to stop in due time can lead to major fires,

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 200/464 ______explosions and increased concentrations of toxic substances. For this reason, the damage potential of such accidents is also significant in terms of the consequences for the health and life of people, the loss of corporate income and environmental pollution.

When addressing accidents involving dangerous substances, it should also be noted that not every discharge of a dangerous substance is considered a major accident. Thus, a minor fire or explosion that is manageable without major health, environmental or economic consequences is not considered a major accident.

At EU level, a collection of emergency events in installations (MARS - Major Accident Reporting System) is available. It was established in 1986. All EU member states are obliged to contribute data on emergencies in installations which are subject to the SEVESO II Directive and which fulfil the criteria regarding damage, such as, for example, the amount of the dangerous substance during the event, the number of fatalities or injured people and the economic damage in the installation.

In this database, there are about 800 events with releases of dangerous substances in EU installations. These events show that, despite the measures for safe operation taken by operators, uncontrolled releases of dangerous substances still occur. However, in most cases, they are successfully managed in order not to cause harmful consequences outside the area of the installations.

In the Republic of Slovenia, releases of dangerous substances have already happened, although they cannot be considered as major accidents (in installations in the settlements of Ortnek, Rače and Borovnica and in the city of Koper).

The scenarios taken into account for this risk assessment were selected taking into account the following criteria:

- The scenario is the worst likely one with regard to the characteristics of the dangerous substances and the way they are handled; - The scenario with this dangerous substance has already unfolded in the past; - Taking action in the event of an accident with this scenario requires the cooperation of rescue services and administrative authorities at the municipal and state levels; - The extent and types of consequences exceed emergencies or accidents that are managed on a daily basis by rescue services at the municipal level.

For the group of installations handling liquid petroleum products, the risk scenario 1 considered the characteristics of a storage site for petroleum products, where the largest amount of propulsion gasoline in Slovenia is stored, where the capacities of individual storage tanks exceed 50,000 m3, and which is estimated to have a potential, in particular, for large economic or environmental damage. The risk scenario includes a major fire in a storage site for petroleum derivatives or the burning of a 95-octane unleaded gasoline in a large tank, and the transfer and spread of the fire to an adjacent tank of similar capacity, in which the same petroleum derivative is stored.

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For the group of installations handling LPG, the risk scenario 2 considered the characteristics of the storage site for LPG where the largest quantity of LPG in Slovenia is stored and which has a potential for large health and economic damage owing to its proximity to transport infrastructure, industrial installations and residential areas. The risk scenario 2 addresses the occurrence of an LPG explosion, damage to the coating of a tank of great capacity, and the release of the LPG.

For the group of other installations, the risk scenario 3 considered the release of a very toxic gas with the potential for harmful health consequences for people working in the installation or in its surroundings. The risk scenario 3 addresses the discharge of a very toxic gas (chlorine) from the pressure tank in which this gas is stored in the liquid state. The release was the result of damage to the tank, and the employees were reportedly not able to prevent the spread of the gas to the surroundings of the installation, which led to an increased concentration of the highly toxic substance in the vicinity of the installation.

All three risk scenarios are based on the assumption that operators of plants failed to implement measures to prevent the release of dangerous substances and the occurrence of a major accident involving dangerous substances. With responsible actions of installation operators and the awareness of the risks typical of the activity they perform, it is possible to prevent uncontrolled releases of dangerous substances and major accidents.

The likelihood of individual scenarios is estimated based on past accidents, the data on which are collected in the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS). Despite the fact that the use of these data should take into account the manner in which they were collected (on the basis of reports from responsible authorities in EU member states), that the number of installations submitting a report changed in 2000 owing to a change in legislation, and that the number of installations changed again when new members joined the EU, it was estimated that these data are appropriate for use in this risk assessment.

In the years between 2000 and 2011, the MARS collection recorded between 17 and 37 events a year, or on average nearly 27 per year, including the operation of approximately 10,000 plants. On the basis of this data and with the assumption of the same likelihood of discharges of dangerous substances in all installations, it can be estimated that per year, a discharge of a dangerous substance occurs on average in 333 installations in the EU. Based on this assessment, it was estimated that approximately every six years, one event (not a major accident) with an uncontrolled release of a dangerous substance at one of the installations can be expected in Slovenia.

Taking into account the number of major accidents in the MARS system over the past 30 years per 5000 installations of high environmental risk in the EU, and considering that there are 32 such plants in Slovenia, it could be estimated, in a similar manner, that a major accident occurs in one of the installations of high environmental risk in Slovenia with a frequency of 4.3 x 10-4 per year or approximately once in every 2300 years. On the basis of the presentation of statistical data on accidents, it was estimated that in Slovenia, such a scenario can be expected to unfold once in every 250 years or less, and thus, the likelihood, in accordance with the criteria for assessing the likelihood of an accident, is ranked at level 1 (very low likelihood).

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Impacts are assessed taking into account the characteristics of the impacts of releases of dangerous substances and their spread outdoors. After that, they are categorised on the basis of criteria for assessing the accident risk impacts.

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Table 41: Assessment of impacts from risk scenario 1 - a major fire in the storage site for liquid petroleum products

1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of the assessed (very low) (low) (medium) (high) (very high) impact Impacts on people Number of x Up to 5 fatalities Number of the X 10–50 injured people Number of the NA evacuated people (permanent measure) Impacts on X The level of the most favourable people impact is taken into account. Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage Economic and X According to the assessment, the environmental impact could include: impacts and Loss of revenue of the installation, impacts on Rehabilitation of the installation cultural tanks, heritage Suspension of freight railway traffic, Loss of revenue of the neighbouring installations. Political and social impacts Impacts on the NA functioning of state authorities Impacts on the NA functioning of important infrastructure systems Psychosocial X According to the assessment, the impacts impact could include individual incidents of fear among the population owing to the lack of information regarding the reasons for the disaster and its characteristics and consequences. Impacts on X According to the assessment, the internal political impact could include individual stability cases of public expression of disagreement with the actions of the responsible institutions. Impacts on NA financial stability Impact on NA international stability NA: the impact is not assessed, since it is not related to the consequences of the risk scenario.

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Table 42: Assessment of impacts from risk scenario 2 - an explosion and fire in the storage site for liquefied petroleum gas

1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of the assessed (very low) (low) (medium) (high) (very high) impact Impacts on people Number of X Up to 5 fatalities Number of the X EUR 50–200 injured people Number of the NA evacuated people (permanent measure) Impacts on X The level of the most favourable people impact is taken into account. Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage Economic and X According to the assessment, environmental the impact could include: impacts and Loss of revenue of the impacts on installation, cultural heritage Loss of revenue of the neighbouring industrial and other businesses, Temporarily suspended traffic, Damage to industrial installations and equipment, Damaged residential buildings. Political and social impacts Impacts on the NA functioning of state authorities Impacts on the NA functioning of important infrastructure systems Psychosocial X In accordance with the impacts assessment, the impact could include an increased level of fear among the population, fear of a new disaster and fear of disaster consequences. Impacts on X According to the assessment, internal political the impact could include stability individual cases of public expression of disagreement with the actions of the responsible institutions. Impacts on NL financial stability Impact on NA international stability NA: the impact is not assessed, since it is not related to the consequences of the risk scenario. NL: the impact is not assessed owing to the lack of data.

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Table 43: Assessment of impacts from risk scenario 3 - increased concentration of a highly toxic substance

1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of the assessed (very low) (low) (medium) (high) (very high) impact Impacts on people Number of NL fatalities Number of the X More than 1000 injured people Number of the NL evacuated people (permanent measure) Impacts on X people Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage Economic and NL environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage Political and social impacts The assessment NA of impacts on the functioning of state authorities Assessment of NL impacts on the functioning of important infrastructure systems Psychosocial X According to the assessment, the impacts impact could include psychological impacts, namely fear for lives among the population, decreased trust in the responsible authorities and the increasing desire to relocate. Impacts on X According to the assessment, the internal political impact could include individual stability cases of public expression of disagreement with the actions of the responsible institutions. Impacts on NL financial stability Impact on NA international stability NA: the impact is not assessed, since it is not related to the consequences of the risk scenario. NL: the impact is not assessed owing to the lack of data.

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The levels of impacts and likelihood and the data on the reliability of the risk analyses are shown in a concise manner in the table below.

Table 44: Individual and average risk impacts for risk matrices for accidents involving dangerous substances with a separate and a merged presentation of risk impacts

Risk scenario Level of Level of Level of Average Likelihood Reliability of a risk impacts economic and political level level analysis on environmental and of impact people impacts and social impacts on impacts cultural heritage Scenario no. 1 2 1 2 2 1 Relatively reliable Scenario no. 2 3 3 3 3 1 Relatively reliable Scenario no. 3 5 NL 3 4 1 Relatively unreliable Representative scenario - 3 1 2 2 1 Relatively reliable scenario no. 2

As the representative risk scenario, the scenario addressing a major accident at a storage site for LPG was selected (risk scenario 2), since the storage and distribution of LPG are activities which are carried out in approximately 20% of installations in Slovenia. In the risk matrices, this scenario is entered in italics.

The extent of impacts and the likelihood of all three risk scenarios are graphically represented in risk matrices for accidents involving dangerous substances with a separate and overall presentation of risk impacts.

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Figure 87: RISK MATRIX FOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

5 Scenario No. 3

3 Scenario No. 2

IMPACT

2 Scenario No. 1

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 88: RISK MATRIX FOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

3 Scenario No. 2

PACT

Scenario No. 1

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 89: RISK MATRIX FOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

Scenario No. 3

3 Scenario No. 2

IMPACT

2 Scenario No. 1

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 90: RISK MATRIX FOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

4 Scenario No. 3

3 Scenario No. 2

IMPACT

2 Scenario No. 1

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES COLOUR OF ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Risk matrices for accidents involving dangerous substances show that the potential impacts of risk scenarios are larger than their likelihood. Taking into account the combination of potential impacts and likelihood, risk scenarios 2 and 3 represent medium risk and risk scenario 1 represents low risk.

With regard to the internal risk categorisation or the geographical distribution of the risk of accidents involving dangerous substances, in accordance with the criteria for assessing the level of risk which was used in the risk presentation in risk matrices, it could be assessed that for all municipalities in the Republic of Slovenia, the level of risk of accidents involving dangerous substances in installations of high and low environmental risk is small or medium. Given that in Slovenia, there is no methodology for spatial categorisation of risks of accidents involving dangerous substances, during the preparation of this risk assessment, municipalities were categorised only in terms of whether or not they have installations of high or installations of low environmental risk.

In the picture below, municipalities having only installations of low environmental risk are indicated in yellow, and municipalities with at least one installation of high environmental risk are indicated in red.

Figure 91: Municipalities having installations of high environmental risk (red) and municipalities with installations of low environmental risk (orange)

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6 Joint Disaster Risk Assessment

This chapter offers a synthesis and a comparison of all risks addressed in individual disaster risk assessments, for which the same and unified criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters were used, as for the assessment of risks in individual disaster risk assessments.

Disasters included in the National Disaster Risk Assessment differ significantly by their characteristics and impacts. Some of them are short-lasting (e.g. earthquake), while others last longer (the influenza pandemic as a representative illness of biological, chemical, environmental and unknown origin hazardous to human health). In addition, the mitigation of their consequences can also take a lot of time (e.g. in the event of a nuclear accident or an earthquake). Some disasters affect a relatively small area (e.g. large wildfires, railway accidents, aircraft accidents, and radiological accidents), while others affect larger areas of the country (ice storm, earthquakes, floods), the entire country, or an even wider area (e.g. drought, nuclear accident). This may easily contribute to great differences between individual impacts. Disasters which affect reasonably small areas usually cause smaller consequences than disasters that affect large territories. This applies specifically to economic or environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, including political and social impacts. Some disasters are either easily predicted or we might already have enough experience regarding their nature, their prediction and the response to them. For this reason, there have not been many victims in the recent years even during the more intense events (such as floods), regardless of their intensity. Nonetheless, some disasters, such as earthquakes, cannot be predicted. However, the scope of their consequences, especially their economic and environmental impacts and their impact on cultural heritage and people can, in the event of an earthquake with an intensity of Vll or higher on the EMS scale, be considerably reduced with appropriate measures. Based on their risk scenarios (which does not mean that this applies in general), individual disasters may have a number of different impacts (nuclear accident, earthquake) while others, as a rule, have only one distinctive group of impacts e.g. impacts on people (terrorism, aircraft accidents, railway accidents, hazards of biological, chemical environmental or unknown origin to human health), or their impacts may be neglectable or even non-existent (such as drought, which has a perceivable impact only on the economy, environment and cultural heritage, in the context of which it affects almost exclusively only the agricultural surfaces).

The authorities responsible for the production of individual disaster risk assessments selected different methods and techniques to this end. Most of them opted for the best practice method, the brainstorming method, the historical method, the case study method and the anticipation method, the descriptive method, the analysis and synthesis method, the comparative method, the theoretical method, the inductive and the deductive methods, the multiple-criteria analyses, the risk index technique, the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) method and others. To a large part, these methods and techniques stem from the SIST/ISO/IEC/ standard, mentioned also in the European Guidelines.

The responsible authorities included all participating bodies and all other participating entities in the preparation. Despite the financial and temporal limitations, individual responsible bodies also included public institutes, professional and scientific institutions in the cooperation. This is especially important in terms of meeting the ex-ante conditionalities

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 213/464 ______under the Partnership agreement between Slovenia and the European Commission for the absorption of funds from the European structural and investment funds (ESIFs) for the period 2014-2020. The responsible bodies further coordinated the contents of individual disaster risk assessments with the public. The public was mostly included through the invitation to offer comments and suggestions to draft risk assessments for individual disasters published on the website pages of competent ministries. However, the response of the public was not significant. The public participation is important also in terms of meeting the ex-ante conditionalities in the framework of the Partnership agreement between Slovenia and the European Commission for the absorption of funds from the European structural and investment funds (ESIFs) for the period 2014-2020. The public was not included in the preparation of the contents of the Risk Assessment for Terrorism drafted by the Ministry of the Interior, which due to its sensitive content, is completely understandable. In November 2015, risk assessments for individual disasters, including the National Disaster Risk Assessment, were publically presented at the consultation held at the Training Centre for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief in Ig, invited to which were mainly ministries and municipalities.

The development of disaster risk assessments for individual disasters in 2015, which are included in the first version of the National Disaster Risk Assessment, was carried out at the time when activities for the development of the assessment of the impact of climate change and the development of the action plan for the adjustment to these changes were already in place at the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning and were to be finished by the end of 2016 or later. Due to the latter, all contents on climate have, for the most part, not yet been included in risk assessments for individual disasters (prepared in 2015), which will be influenced by future climate change. From this aspect, individual disaster risk assessments were amended in 2016 (Risk Assessment for Floods, Risk Assessment for Drought, Risk Assessment for Large Wildfires, and to a lesser extent the Risk Assessment for Highly contagious animal diseases and the Risk Assessment for the Hazards of Biological, Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin to Human Health). In line with the Decree, the ministry responsible for climate change is in charge for the provision of these contents and the coordination of the use of all these contents in the stated risk assessments for individual disasters. The Risk Assessment for Ice Storm was also supplemented, even though the future climate change will most likely not have a negative or an additional impact on the occurrence of ice storms. All significant amendments of the listed risk assessments for individual disasters are also reflected in the National Disaster Risk Assessment, version 1.1. The chapter addressing climate change was also amended.

Despite of the afore-written, the climate change of the recent decades and the current climate change in certain risk scenarios for individual disasters have, due to realistic risk scenarios, already been taken into account in the first versions of these assessments and in the first version of the National Disaster Risk Assessment. This includes in particular drought, floods, large wildfires, and to a lesser extent ice storms and hazards of biological, chemical, environmental and unknown origin to human health, including Highly contagious animal diseases.

During the preparation of 12 risk assessments for individual disasters in 2015, a total of 37 risk scenarios were prepared. During this year's amendments and supplementations of these risk assessments for individual disasters, their number increased to 48. One new risk

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 214/464 ______scenario for an ice storm, four risk scenarios for floods and six risk scenarios for drought were added. All new risk scenarios (10), which take into account the consequences of the future environmental changes known so far, including their impacts and their level of likelihood, derive from the original risk scenarios prepared in 2015.

Ten general risk scenarios were prepared for nuclear and radiological disasters. Nine risk scenarios are included in the Risk Assessment for Drought and six in the Risk Assessment for Floods. The Risk Assessment for Ice Strom includes four risk scenarios. Four disaster risk assessments for individual disasters include three risk scenarios (risk assessments for earthquakes, Highly contagious animal diseases, accidents involving dangerous substances, large wildfires), three of them include two risk scenarios (the terrorism, aircraft accident and railway accident risk assessments), and one of them only includes one risk scenario (the risk assessment for hazard of biological, chemical, environmental and unknown origin to human health). In the risk assessment for Highly contagious animal diseases, two scenarios address the crossing of the national border (the sale and the transportation of the sick animals from a distant country to the RS, the outbreak of the animal disease in the neighbouring country near the national border). This applies also to one of the realistic risk scenarios for large wildfires (the fire spreading from Italy to the territory of the RS). A nuclear accident in the Krško Nuclear Power Plant, which is defined as a representative risk scenario for a nuclear disaster, would almost certainly have consequences for Croatia as well. All the aforementioned scenarios and risk analyses address only those disasters and their consequences that occur in the territory of the RS.

All risk scenarios for ice storms, large wildfires, two drought scenarios and the representative railway accident scenario sum up real-life events of the last decades. Risk scenarios for other disasters (floods, hazards of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health, Highly contagious animal diseases, nuclear disasters, radiological disasters, terrorism, aircraft accidents, disasters involving dangerous substances, one risk scenario for a railway accident) are based on the occurrence of disasters which are existent and likely. Certain risk scenarios include real-life events; consequences presented in risk analyses, are either real (e.g. at two drought risk scenarios), likely (e.g. all three earthquake risk scenarios), realistic and likely (all risk scenarios for large wildfires, three ice storm scenarios, both main flood risk scenarios). The earthquake risk scenario should be stressed in particular, especially its representative risk scenario. The consequences of an earthquake in the central part of Slovenia in 1895, which occurred in the area addressed by this risk scenario, cannot be simply "applied" to the current situation. Certain risk scenarios and the adjacent risk analyses are completely hypothetical (e.g. both risk scenarios for terrorism, all risk scenarios for a radiological accident and a nuclear accident, one risk scenario for a railway accident, seven risk scenarios for drought and three for floods, etc.).

The following table depicts representative risk scenarios for each of the twelve disasters. Most of the representative risk scenarios for individual disasters are the reasonable worst case scenarios and some of them are the worst case scenarios. None of the eleven new risk scenarios, which were formed alongside this year's amendments to certain risk assessments for individual disasters, were defined as a representative risk scenario for an individual disaster. The reason was mainly in the estimate that the reliability of new risk scenarios, which are in fact hypothetical, is at present assessed as relatively unreliable or, in the best case, as moderately reliable. For this reason, the national disaster risk matrices are

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 215/464 ______assessed in the same way as in the National Disaster Risk Assessment, version 1.0. Most of the eleven new disaster risk scenarios, in comparison to the original risk scenarios, indicate greater impacts and greater likelihood of these disasters.

Table 46: Representative risk scenarios

RISK Representative risk scenarios Status of the representative ASSESSMENTS risk scenario FOR INDIVIDUAL DISASTERS Earthquake The earthquake of level VII-VIII on the EMS The reasonable worst case scenario scale in the central part of the state (Ljubljana) Flood Floods with the return period of 10 to 500 The worst case scenario (perhaps years on the basis of flood events in1990 this risk scenario will be the and 2012 reasonable worst case scenario in the future due to the consequences of climate change and consequently of the impacts and likelihood of floods) Hazard of Influenza pandemic The reasonable worst case scenario biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health Highly contagious The occurrence of the foot-and-mouth The reasonable worst case scenario animal diseases disease in the northeast part of the country Nuclear or Accident in the Krško Nuclear Power Plant The worst case scenario radiological accident Accident involving radioactive sources The reasonable worst case scenario

Railway accident Collision between a freight and a passenger The reasonable worst case scenario train at the Jesenice Railway Station, August 2011 Aircraft accident Aircraft accident in a populated area The reasonable worst case scenario (Ljubljana) Large wildfire Šumka–Železna vrata–Trstelj fire, July The worst case scenario 2006 Terrorism exists* The reasonable worst case scenario Drought Drought in 2003 and 2013 The reasonable worst case scenario Ice storm Ice storm in February 2014 The reasonable worst case scenario Accidents involving Accidents involving liquefied petroleum gas The reasonable worst case scenario dangerous substances *Since risk assessment for terrorism is classified as restricted, the details of the representative risk scenario of a terrorist attack are not published.

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The following data on consequences, collected in these three tables, were established based on the risk analyses of representative risk scenarios:

Table 47: Consequences based on the representative risk scenarios - impact on people

Disaster Number of Number of Number of Level of Likelihood Risk level the dead the injured permanently impacts or sick evacuated persons Earthquake 60 600 5188 5 2 3 (high) Floods 10 to 50 more than 0 4 3 4 EUR 200 (very high) Hazard of 1850 500.000 0 5 3 4 biological, (very high) chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health Highly contagious / / / / / / animal diseases Nuclear accident up to 1000 up to several up to 100.000 5 1 3 thousands (medium) Radiological up to 1 up to 0 1 3 1 accident (low) Railway accident 0 33 0 2 4 2 (medium) Aircraft accident 166 0 4 3 4 (very high) Large wildfires up to 7 up to 40 0 2 5 2 (medium) Terrorism 50 300 0 4 3 4 (very high) Drought / / / / / / Ice storm 16 190 0 3 2 3 (high) Accidents involving up to 5 up to 200 0 3 1 2 dangerous (medium) substances The value written in bold letters presents the representative value of the impact on people and the value included in the risk matrices for the impact on people.

The worst consequences of the impact on people would most likely be caused by the Krško Nuclear Power Plant. The worst effects would be seen in the wider power plant area; up to 1.000 people could die and several thousand could be injured (or in this case, exposed to radiation). Between 40.000 and 100.000 people would have to be permanently relocated. Consequences would also be extremely severe in the event of an influenza pandemic, which represents a hazard of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin. Approximately 1.850 people could die and more than half a million could fall ill (perhaps even up to 45% of inhabitants). The fact that not all people would fall ill or die in a couple of days is the sole positive side of the influenza pandemic, which is most likely to last from a couple of months

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 217/464 ______to almost a year. An earthquake in the central part of the country, where the situation would turn form normal to chaotic in a matter of minutes, could, based on the findings of the analysis, also have serious consequences: 60 dead, 600 injured and 5,000 people to be permanently evacuated. There are a number of other accidents, where the impact of the accident on people could be significant, specifically the aircraft accidents (plane crash), terrorist attacks and floods. Based on their representative risk scenarios, a few accidents would have no impact on people (drought and Highly contagious animal diseases). In terms of likelihood, the most problematic accidents are large wildfires and railway accidents, while nuclear accidents and accidents involving dangerous substances are the least problematic. Taking into account the impacts on people and the level of likelihood, the hazards of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health, aircraft accidents and terrorist attacks present the highest – very high risk, while accidents, such as earthquake, ice storm and floods, present a high risk. From this aspect, nuclear accidents, accidents involving dangerous substances, railway accidents, large wildfires and radiological accidents are far less problematic. The average value of the impacts of all accidents (only those accidents for which representative scenarios state that impacts on people are likely, are included) on people is 3.45.

Table 48: Consequences according to the representative risk scenarios – economic and environmental impacts on cultural heritage

Disaster Amount of damage and Level of Likelihood Risk level expenses in EUR impacts

Earthquake 3,024,575,073 5 2 3 (8.4% of GDP in 2014) (high) Floods 551,000,000 4 3 4 (1.5% of GDP in 2014) (very high) Hazard of Not assessed in detail, but 2 3 2 biological, more than EUR (medium) chemical, 100 million (more than 0,3% environmental or of GDP in 2014) unknown origin to human health Highly contagious 3,023,328 1 4 1 animal diseases (0.008 % of GDP in 2014) (low) Nuclear accident Not assessed in detail, but 5 1 2 more than EUR 880 million (medium) (more than 2.4% of NDP in 2014) Radiological Not assessed in detail, but 1 3 1 accident less than EUR 100 million (low) (less than 0,3% of GDP in 2014) Railway accident 1,577,000 1 4 1 (0.004 % of GDP in 2014) (low) Aircraft accident 288,926,206 3 3 3 (0.8 % of GDP in 2014) (high) Large wildfire 1,004,700 1 5 1 (0.003 % of GDP in 2014) (low) Terrorism 113,154,271 2 3 2 (0.3 % of GDP in 2014) (medium)

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Disaster Amount of damage and Level of Likelihood Risk level expenses in EUR impacts

Drought 128,400,000 2 3 2 (0.4 % of GDP in 2014) (medium) Ice storm 475,601,800 4 2 3 (1.3 % of GDP in 2014) (high) Accidents Not assessed in detail, but 3 1 2 involving more than EUR 220 million (medium) dangerous (more than 0,6% of GDP in substances 2014)

The economic and environmental impacts on cultural heritage encompass a long list of impacts (described in Chapter 2 of this assessment) which are all commonly assessed through the amount of damage and expenses. Given the diversity of the consequences of individual accidents, the quality and the accessibility of the available data and the experience with these accidents, the differences in the quality of data on the damage and expenses, which form part of the economic and environmental impacts, as well as the impacts on cultural heritage, are the greatest among individual risk assessments for individual disasters. Among the mentioned accidents, a nuclear accident in the Krško Nuclear Power Plant would most likely have the greatest impact. However, due to the difficulty to imagine these impacts and their massiveness, they were not adequately assessed. An earthquake in the central part of the country, or in the area of Ljubljana, of intensity between VII and VIII on the EMS, would, including only damage and damage to buildings into assessment, cause more than three billion Euros worth of damage, without taking into account all other impacts, specifically medical costs, costs of the protection, rescue and relief forces’ emergency response, the economic damage due to the interruption in the operation of companies, damage to infrastructure and other facilities, social security costs, etc. The damage caused due to the possible chain-reaction disasters (fires, explosions, etc.), which are likely to occur, is also not included. In terms of impacts, these accidents fall within accidents with the highest level of impacts. A considerable amount of expenses and damage were incurred also by the February 2014 ice storm — almost half a billion Euros. This classifies the ice storm, in addition to floods, where the damage in case of disastrous floods could be even higher, as a disaster with the fourth level of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage. Accidents involving dangerous substances (the damage and the expenses have not been assessed in detail), including aircraft accident, which could cause almost EUR 300 million damage, most due to the loss of aircraft, fall under the accidents with the medium level of impact. A terrorist attack and hazards of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health (influenza pandemic) and drought would cause less damage and expenses. Nonetheless, the damage would still exceed EUR 100 million. The least damage and expenses would be caused by a radiological accident, a railway accident, by Highly contagious animal diseases and wildfires. In some of the aforementioned cases, the damage would only just exceed one million Euros. This applies in particular to accidents that affect smaller areas, such as railway accidents, large wildfires and, perhaps, radiological accidents.

In terms of likelihood or frequency of the treated accidents, certain accidents should be afforded greater attention, specifically accidents, for which the assessment of likelihood is

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 219/464 ______higher. These principally include large wildfires, railway accidents and Highly contagious animal diseases. Taking into account the extent of economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage and their likelihood, only floods present the highest (very high) risk, while a number of other accidents are categorised as high risk accidents (earthquake, ice storm, aircraft accident). Even though the impacts of a nuclear accident are the most pronounced, a nuclear accident is, together with a number of other accidents categorised as a medium risk accident due to the unlikelihood of its occurrence. The following accidents have the lowest level (low level) of risk: radiological accident, railway accident, Highly contagious animal diseases and large wildfires. The likelihood of the last three is relatively pronounced, which applies in particular to large wildfires. The average value of the impacts of all accidents on economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage is 2.62.

Due to their nature, political and social impacts are, however, much more difficult to assess. These impacts are evident from Chapter 2 of this assessment. Certain accidents may cause a variety of political and social impacts: nuclear accident (it would cause impacts difficult to imagine), earthquake, floods and ice storm. Other accidents, on the other hand, may cause only specific groups of impacts or even only specific impacts within different groups of political and social impacts. The analysis of the representative risk scenario for the event of drought did not even detect these impacts.

Table 49: Consequences of the representative risk scenarios — political and social impacts

Disaster Value of impacts Level of impacts Likelihood Risk level

Earthquake 3.67 4 2 3 (high) Floods 3.86 4 3 4 (very high) Hazard of 3.00 3 3 3 biological, (high) chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health Highly contagious 1.58 2 4 2 animal diseases (medium) Nuclear accident were not assessed 5 1 2 in detail (medium) Radiological were not assessed 1 3 1 accident in detail (low) Railway accident 1.00 1 4 1 (low) Aircraft accident 1.90 2 3 2 (medium) Large wildfires 1.58 2 5 2 (medium) Terrorism 2.16 2 3 2 (medium) Drought / / / /

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Disaster Value of impacts Level of impacts Likelihood Risk level

Ice storm 2.64 3 2 3 (high) Accidents 2.50 3 2 2 involving (medium) dangerous substances

As evident from the above table, political and social impacts of accidents are, as a rule, smaller in comparison to the impacts on people, the economic and environmental impacts and the impacts on cultural heritage. The highest possible values and levels of impacts were estimated for nuclear accidents, followed by floods and earthquakes. Four accidents were listed in the second, three in the third and two in the lowest level of impacts (low risk).

In terms of likelihood or frequency of the treated accidents, greater attention should be afforded to individual accidents for which the assessed level of likelihood is higher; specifically to large wildfires, railway accidents and Highly contagious animal diseases, all of which are accidents with indeterminate political and social impacts. Taking into account both the scope of political and social impacts as well as their likelihood, floods present the highest risk (very high), while a few accidents are classified as high risk accidents (earthquake, ice storm, hazards of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health). Even though the impacts of a nuclear accident are the most pronounced, its low likelihood classifies a nuclear accident as a medium risk level accident together with five other accidents, such as e.g. large wildfires, the likelihood of which is the highest in comparison to other accidents. The lowest risk level (low) is attributed to radiological and railway accidents. Based on the values established (without drought, nuclear and radiological accident), the average value of political and social impacts of all accidents stands at 2.39.

Responsible authorities assessed the reliability of both, risk scenarios and risk analyses. No quantitative criteria were prepared to this end. On the contrary, each responsible authority assessed the reliability of risk scenarios or risk analyses subjectively. In principle, risk scenarios are as reliable as risk analyses. However, risk analyses may, due to certain limitations (lack of experience with specific severe accidents, especially those which either have not yet occurred in the Republic of Slovenia or which have not occurred in a long time, and inappropriate or patchy data for risk analyses and like), be less reliable than risk scenarios. The reliability of risk analyses usually depends on the knowledge of accidents, the correctness and reliability of risk scenarios, the frequency of occurrence of the treated accidents, as well as on the scope, relevance and quality of data used in risk analyses. The colour of the accident record in risk matrices depends on the reliability of risk analyses. Responsible authorities attributed the medium level of reliability to six representative risk scenarios and their adjacent risk analyses, and a relatively high level of reliability to six other representative risk scenarios.

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Table 50: Representative risk scenarios — the values and the levels of impact, likelihood, risk and reliability

Disaster Impacts Economic and Political Average Average Likelihood Risk level Reliability of on environmental and social (overall) (overall) the risk people risk impacts impacts value of all level of all analysis and impacts three three on cultural impacts impacts heritage Earthquake 5 5 4 4.33 4 2 3 moderately (high) reliable Floods 4 4 4 4.00 4 3 4 relatively (very high) reliable Hazard of 5 2 3 3.33 3 3 3 moderately biological, (high) reliable chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health Highly / 1 2 1.50 2 4 2 moderately contagious (medium) reliable animal diseases Nuclear 5 5 5 5.00 5 1 2 relatively accident (medium) reliable Radiological 1 1 1 1.00 1 3 1 relatively accident (low) reliable Railway 2 1 1 1.33 1 4 1 relatively accident (low reliable Aircraft 4 3 2 3.00 3 3 3 moderately accident (high) reliable Large wildfires 2 1 2 1.67 2 5 2 relatively (medium) reliable Terrorism 4 2 2 2.67 3 3 3 moderately (high) reliable

Drought / 2 / 2.00 2 3 2 moderately (medium) reliable

Ice storm 3 4 3 3.33 3 2 3 relatively (high) reliable

Accidents 3 3 3 3.00 3 1 2 relatively involving (medium) reliable dangerous substances

All treated accidents, their separate and overall (average) impacts and the likelihood and reliability of the adjacent risk analyses, are graphically presented in four national disaster risk matrices.

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Figure 92: NATIONAL DISASTER RISK MATRIX 2016 – IMPACTS ON PEOPLE

Nuclear accident Earthquake Pandemic 5

Terrorism

Aircraft 4 accident

Floods

Accidents involving dangerous Ice storm 3 substances

IMPACT Railway Large 2 accident wildfires

Radiological 1 accident

1 2 3 4 5 LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 93: NATIONAL DISASTER RISK MATRIX 2016 – ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE

Nuclear accident Earthquake 5

Ice storm Floods 4

Accidents involving Aircraft dangerous accident 3 substances

Pandemic IMPACT

2 Drought

Terrorism

Animal Radiological diseases accident Large Railway Wildfires 1 accident

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN THE RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 94: NATIONAL DISASTER RISK MATRIX 2016 – POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

Nuclear accident 5

Earthquake Floods 4

Accidents involving 3 dangerous Pandemic substances Ice storm

Aircraft

IMPACT accident Animal Large 2 diseases Wildfires Terrorism

Radiological Railway accident accident 1

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK 5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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Figure 95: NATIONAL DISASTER RISK MATRIX 2016 WITH AN OVERALL PRESENTATION OF IMPACTS

Nuclear accident Earthquake 5

Floods 4

Accidents Pandemic involving dangerous Ice storm Aircraft

3 substances accident

Terrorism

IMPACT Animal Large 2 Drought diseases Wildfires

Radiological Railway accident accident 1

1 2 3 4 5

LIKELIHOOD

LEVELS OF IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD LEVELS OF RISK

5 Very high Very high 4 High High 3 Medium Medium 2 Low Low 1 Very low

RELIABILITY OF RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSES THE COLOUR OF THE ENTRY IN RISK MATRIX Relatively reliable Black Moderately reliable Dark grey Relatively unreliable Light grey

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In the previous tables in this chapter, the accidents were listed in the same order as on the list of accidents in Annex 2 of the Decree. However, in the table below, accidents are listed as regards the scope of impacts, their likelihood and the level of risk.

Table 51: The classification of accidents in respect to their level of risk, the values and the levels of impacts, and the likelihood of the accident, by taking into account the representative risk scenarios

Disaster Impacts Economic and Political Average Average Likelihood Risk level Reliability of on environmental and (overall) (overall) the risk people impacts and social value of all level of all analysis impacts on impacts three three cultural impacts impacts heritage Floods 4 4 4 4.00 4 3 4 relatively (very high) reliable Earthquake 5 5 4 4.33 4 2 3 moderately (high) reliable Hazard of 5 2 3 3.33 3 3 3 moderately biological, (high) reliable chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health Aircraft 4 3 2 3.00 3 3 3 moderately accident (high) reliable Terrorism 4 2 2 2.67 3 3 3 moderately (high) reliable Ice storm 3 4 3 3.33 3 2 3 relatively (high) reliable Nuclear 5 5 5 5.00 5 1 2 relatively accident (medium) reliable Accidents 3 3 3 3.00 3 1 2 relatively involving (medium) reliable dangerous substances Large wildfires 2 1 2 1.67 2 5 2 relatively (medium) reliable Highly / 1 2 1.50 2 4 2 moderately contagious (medium) reliable animal diseases Drought / 2 / 2.00 2 3 2 moderately (medium) reliable Railway 2 1 1 1.33 1 4 1 relatively accident (low reliable Radiological 1 1 1 1.00 1 3 1 relatively accident (low) reliable

Based on the national disaster risk matrix with a merged presentation, i.e. the presentation of all impacts and probabilities of all treated accidents, and based on the preceding table, the

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 227/464 ______floods present the highest risk in the Republic of Slovenia. As regards the common and individual impacts and the level of likelihood, floods do not reach the highest, i.e. the fifth level. Nonetheless, the combination of the scope of the impact of floods and their likelihood attributes them a very high risk level, which is marked in the matrix by red fields. The impacts are even greater in the event of a nuclear accident or an earthquake, but the likelihood of their occurrence is much lower, due to which their level of risk is lower than the level of risk for floods. The opposite applies to large wildfires, where the likelihood is high, but the impacts are less expressed, which makes them less threatening than floods.

High risk, depicted by orange fields, applies to accidents, such as the hazards of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health, aircraft accidents and terrorism. The first two accidents are specific accidents, which are difficult to manage and predict. In case of the third accident (terrorism), which in terms of occurrence or likelihood does not follow a natural cycle or for which the likelihood of occurrence depends also on external factors, not much can be done in the terms of preventive measures and the reduction of the likelihood and the scope of the impacts.

The medium risk level, which is marked by yellow fields, refers to accidents, such as nuclear and accidents involving dangerous substances, due to the scope of impacts these accidents might cause. Drought, Highly contagious animal diseases and large wildfires all fall in the same category. In the last two cases, the primary focus lies specifically on the likelihood or the frequency of their occurrence.

The lowest (low) risk was established for a railway and a radiological accident, even though the high level of likelihood of the first one should not be neglected.

Disaster risk assessments are publically available and published on the internet page of the ministry that issued the respective risk assessment. The only exception is the risk assessment for terrorism, which is not publically available, as it is classified as restricted. It is available for inspection only at the Ministry of the Interior.

The National Disaster Risk Assessment is also publically available, both at the seat of the ACPDR/National Coordinating Body as on the ACPDR's website.

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7 Overview of selected risk scenarios and risk analyses

In accordance with the Decree, a part of the National Disaster Risk Assessment are also a chapter containing an overview of selected scenarios for individual risks and scenarios for several possible risks including analyses of these risks, and a chapter containing the overview of selected scenarios defining the course of several possible independent accidents in the same area and the associated analyses of these risks.

Owing to the length of the selected risk scenarios and risk analyses for disasters covered by the National Disaster Risk Assessment, these scenarios are presented in Annex 11 to this assessment.

The Annex includes eight selected risk scenarios and the associated risk analyses. The majority of scenarios deals with individual risks: the risks of floods and ice storms are dealt with in two scenarios each, while earthquakes, Highly contagious animal diseases, aircraft accidents and major wildfires each have one scenario.

The contents of the risk scenarios and the associated risk analyses relate entirely to the respective risk assessments for individual disasters.

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8 Conclusions

The National Disaster Risk Assessment presents and compares the risks of 12 types of disasters (earthquake, flood, risk of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health, transboundary animal disease, nuclear or radiological accident, railway accident, aircraft accident, drought, large wildfire, terrorism, ice storm, accident involving dangerous substances) which were identified in 2015 on the basis of risk assessments for individual disasters. A unified and coordinated approach to disaster risk assessment is an important foundation for the understanding of disasters as a phenomenon, especially with regard to the assessment of the scope of their impacts and likelihood. In 2016, certain risk assessments for individual disasters were amended taking into consideration the impacts of future climate change (Risk Assessment for Floods, Risk Assessment for Drought, Risk Assessment for Large Wildfires, and to a lesser extent, Risk Assessment for the Outbreak of Highly contagious animal diseases and Risk Assessment for the Hazards of Biological, Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin to Human Health). The Risk Assessment for Ice Storm was also amended, even though according to current knowledge in this area, future climate change will most likely have no significant negative or additional impact on the occurrence of ice storms. All these amendments of the above-mentioned risk assessments for individual disasters are also taken into consideration in the National Disaster Risk Assessment, version 1.1.

According to the national disaster risk matrix (which includes a merged presentation, that is, the presentation of all the impacts and the likelihood of the occurrence of all the relevant disasters), floods represent the greatest risk in the RS. Due to the combination of their impact levels and the likelihood of their occurrence, floods constitute a very high risk level, the highest in Slovenia. In the risk matrices, such level is indicated by the red-coloured fields. The relevance of nuclear accidents and earthquakes is also very high due to their impacts, although their likelihood is much lower. Wildfires represent a greater risk than floods, given the likelihood or frequency of their occurrence. However, their impacts are much lower than those of the disasters with the highest impacts.

High risk indicated in risk matrices by the orange-coloured fields refers to disasters such as hazards of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health, aircraft accidents and terrorism. The first two types of disasters are specific and are difficult to manage or predict. With regard to the third type (terrorism), given its frequency or likelihood of its occurrence which lack a natural cycle, not much can be done in the area of preventive measures and the reduction of the likelihood of its occurrence and the scope of its impacts.

The medium-level risk indicated in risk matrices by yellow-coloured fields includes disasters such as nuclear accidents and accidents involving dangerous substances, primarily owing to the scope of the impacts that can result from such accidents. This group of disasters also includes drought, Highly contagious animal diseases, and, in particular, large wildfires. The last two types of disasters have greater significance primarily on account of the likelihood or frequency of their occurrence.

Disasters with the lowest identified risk level are radiological and railway accidents, although the relatively high likelihood of their occurrence, especially for the latter, should not be neglected.

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The process of the development of risk assessments for individual disasters did not come to an end in 2015, but is continuing beyond that year. The National Disaster Risk Assessment is to be amended every three years, with the exception of this year's amendment. This means that the next version of the document is planned for 2018. The amendments shall primarily include the findings of risk assessments for individual disasters developed after 2015 and later also the amendments to the risk assessments for individual disasters first developed in 2015.

In carrying out the activities listed below, the greatest attention should be paid primarily to those disasters which have the highest impacts and likelihood or frequency of the occurrence. They primarily represent very high and high risk and include disasters such as floods, hazards of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin to human health, terrorism, aircraft accidents, ice storms, earthquakes. Attention should also be paid to disasters with either high impacts (which means that when such disasters occur, they cause serious consequences) or high likelihood (that is, such disasters cause frequent damage). These include events such as large wildfires, railway accidents, Highly contagious animal diseases and nuclear accidents. However, this does not mean that the rest of the disasters presented in the National Disaster Risk Assessment, or other disasters which are not included in the assessment, should be neglected. Activities within the above areas should be adapted to each particular disaster, according to its characteristics and consequences caused. This should also take into account the impacts and consequences of current and future climate change.

Risk assessments for disasters can be the basis for a number of activities in several areas, particularly in:

 The planning of risk management for the purpose of prevention and preparedness;  The implementation of appropriate risk prevention and preparedness measures;  The development of threat assessments and disaster response plans;  The development of financial strategies for measures aimed at preventing or reducing the possibility of the occurrence of disasters, responding to them, providing relief and mitigating their consequences (the financial bases for disaster risk management);  The identification of priority investments to reduce the possibility of disasters or their consequences;  Spatial planning;  Public investments planning;  Social protection planning;  The identification of gaps in protection, rescue and relief forces and resources, and the planning of the manning and augmentation of protection, rescue and relief forces.  Risk assessments for individual disasters are public documents and are published on the websites of ministries which developed them. The only exception is Risk Assessment for Terrorism, which is classified as RESTRICTED and is therefore not publicly available. The National Disaster Risk Assessment is available for the public both at the seat of the ACPDR/National Coordinating Body and the ACPDR website.

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9 Explanations of Terms and Abbreviations

The list below includes abbreviations which are most commonly used in this Risk Assessment.

AI Avian influenza AI – HPAI Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses AI – HPAI Low pathogenic avian influenza viruses ASF African swine fever GDP Gross domestic product GNI Gross national income BTV8 Bluetongue disease CP Civil Protection CP RS Civil Protection of the Republic of Slovenia EC European Commission EMS European macroseismic scale EU European Union FGG Faculty of Civil and Geodetic Engineering, University of Ljubljana (Slovenian abbreviation) GGO Forest management area (Slovenian abbreviation) GURS Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia (Slovenian abbreviation) HPAI Highly pathogenic avian influenza IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IHR International Health Regulations IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change IPPC Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control LO Law and order CSF Classical swine fever LPAI Low pathogenic avian influenza MARS Major Accident Reporting System NPP Nuclear power plant OIE World Organisation for Animal Health OPVP Areas of significant impact of floods (Slovenian abbreviation) OU UVHVVR Regional Unit of the Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection (Slovenian abbreviation) POTROG Web application for quick response to earthquakes RNC Regional Notification Centre RCP Representative Concentration Pathways RVF Rift Valley fever RS Republic of Slovenia RŽV Uranium mine in Žirovski vrh, Slovenia (Slovenian abbreviation) SDR Special drawing rights TE Thermal power plant TETO Heat and power plant

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FMD Food and mouth disease SAF Slovenian Armed Forces WHO World Health Organisation LPG Liquefied petroleum gas ACPDR Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief UTC Coordinated Universal time UVHVVR Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection (Slovenian abbreviation) WNV West Nile virus ZARE Radio communications system used within the system of protection against natural and other disasters ZGS Slovenian Forest Service

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10 Sources

1) Billen, W. Pflanzenbeschaustelle, Weil am Rhein, Bugwood.org; available at https://www.forestryimages.org/browse/detail.cfm?imgnum=0746041#collapseseven, as of 13 September 2016. 2) Bergant, K., 2015. Projekcije podnebja v prihodnosti, dostopno na http://www.arso.gov.si/podnebne%20spremembe/Podnebje%20v%20prihodnosti/Projekcij e%20podnebja%20v%20prihodosti.pdf, as of 16 September 2016. 3) Dolinar, M., Vertačnik, G., Bertalanič, R., Dvoršek, D., Nadbath, M., Gartner, D., Klančar, M., Boljka, L., Lanjšček, M., Kolarič, D., 2014. Podnebne spremembe v Sloveniji; podnebne podlage za pripravo ocene tveganj in priložnosti, ki jih podnebne spremembe prinašajo za Slovenijo, 1st report (version 2), Slovenian Environment Agency, 2014. 4) Ocena tveganja za jedrske in radiološke nesreče v Sloveniji, issue 2, 2015. Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, 2015. 5) Ocena tveganja za letalsko nesrečo, version 1.0, 2015. Ministry of Infrastructure, Aviation Division, 2015. 6) Ocena tveganja za nesreče z nevarnimi snovmi, 2015. Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, Environment Directorate, 2015. 7) Ocena tveganja za nevarnosti biološkega, kemičnega, okoljskega in neznanega izvora na zdravje ljudi, version 1.0, 2015. Ministry of Health, 2015. 8) Ocena tveganja za nevarnosti biološkega, kemičnega, okoljskega in neznanega izvora na zdravje ljudi, version 2.0, 2016. Ministry of Health, 2016. 9) Ocena tveganja za poplave, version 1.0, 2015. Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, 2015. 10) Ocena tveganja za poplave, version 2.0, 2016. Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, 2016. 11) Ocena tveganja za posebno nevarne bolezni živali, version 1.0, 2015. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food, Administration of the RS for Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection, 2015. 12) Ocena tveganja za posebno nevarne bolezni živali, version 2.0, 2016. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food, Administration of the RS for Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection, 2016. 13) Ocena tveganja za potres, version 1.0, 2015. Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, Spatial Planning, Construction and Housing Directorate, 2015. 14) Ocena tveganja za sušo, 2015. Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, Slovenian Environment Agency, 2015. 15) Ocena tveganja za sušo, verzija 2.0, 2016. Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, Slovenian Environment Agency, 2016. 16) Ocena tveganja za terorizem, version 1.0, 2015. Ministry of the Interior, 2015. 17) Ocena tveganja za velik požar v naravnem okolju, version 1.0, 2015. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food, Forestry, Hunting and Fisheries Directorate, 2015. 18) Ocena tveganja za velik požar v naravnem okolju, version 2, 2016. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food, Forestry, Hunting and Fisheries Directorate, 2015. 19) Ocena tveganja za železniško nesrečo, version 1.0, 2015. Ministry of Infrastructure, 2015.

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20) Ocena tveganja za žled, version 1.0, 2015. Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Response of the RS, 2015. 21) Ocena tveganja za žled, version 2.0, 2016. Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Response, 2016 of the RS. 22) URSZR, 2015. Državna ocena ogroženosti ob pojavu posebno nevarnih bolezni živali, version 2.0, Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Response of the RS, 2015.

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11 Annexes

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11.1 Annex 1: Risk scenario: Earthquake in the Central Part of Slovenia

RISK SCENARIO

An earthquake is an unpredictable natural phenomenon. The consequences of an earthquake for the safety of the population depend on the earthquake’s intensity, the density and distribution of the population at the earthquake’s location, the time of the earthquake and the geographical and geological characteristics of the earthquake’s location.

With damage caused to buildings (residential and industrial buildings, warehouses, and buildings of general social importance – health care, business and administrative buildings, buildings for education, scientific research, culture, hospitality and tourism, agriculture, etc.), infrastructure (roads, railways, airports, dams, water barriers, communication networks, electrical power lines, gas and oil pipelines), and agricultural and forest areas, earthquakes have extensive impacts on:

- The population (people are dead or injured; in a state of panic and anxiety; in need of hospitalisation or accommodation); - The economy and environment (damage to buildings, obstacles or disruptions in the provision of transport, energy, telecommunications and other relevant services); - Cultural heritage (damage to buildings and areas of cultural heritage, and also movable cultural heritage); - Politics and society (public order and security, weakened stability of the insurance system – insurance payments); - Country's financial policy or situation (managing the consequences of the disaster – emergency response and long-term comprehensive rehabilitation).

The damage is further increased by the entire chain of disasters caused by an earthquake. Depending on its location and intensity, and the type of damage to buildings and the earth's surface, an earthquake can trigger a chain of disasters, such as fires, explosions, spills of hazardous substances, floods, landslides, rockfalls, failures of critical infrastructure, human and animal diseases, and nuclear accidents.

This earthquake risk scenario deals with an earthquake of intensity Vll-Vlll on the EMS scale, occurring in the central part of Slovenia, or in the Ljubljana area.

Because of the possible consequences of the earthquake and the impact on people, we first obtained data on the existing housing stock at that location. The area that would be affected by the potential earthquake at that location was determined using an application, POTROG, for rapid response in the event of an earthquake, which is available on the ACPDR website.

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The area which would be affected by an earthquake in the Ljubljana area (POTROG) Ocenjeno padanje intenzitete izbranega potresa = Assessed decline in intensity of the selected earthquake Prikazana so območja, v katerih so možne poškodbe stavb. = The map shows the areas with possible damage to buildings.

LIKELIHOOD OF RISK SCENARIOS

The intensity of such an earthquake was determined on the basis of an assessment of the likelihood of earthquake scenarios carried out by the Slovenian Environment Agency in March 2015.

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Ljubljana 14.5 46.05 Annual Return Intensity likelihood period IV 44.15% 2 IV-V 29.47% 3 V 17.90% 6 V-VI 9.94% 10 VI 5.12% 20 VI-VII 2.51% 40 VII 1.18% 85 VII-VIII 0.53% 189 VIII 0,22% 450 VIII-IX 0.09% 1163 IX 0.03% 3333 IX-X 0.01% 11,111 X 0.00% 50,000

Annual likelihood over 20% 4% -20% 1% - 4% 0.5% - 1%

Assessment of the likelihood of the earthquake scenario

Data for the assessment of the consequences of the earthquake

The most obvious result of the earthquake is the demolition of and damage to buildings, which represents a serious risk to people and the constructed environment.

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The assessed number of dwellings, presented by age group or the period of validity of regulations on earthquake-resistant construction

Dwellings Population

Average Dwellings Dwellings Dwellings Dwellings Number of number of Dwellings built in the built in the built in the built in the Total people in the people per built until period period period period number of municipality/ housing Municipality 1948 1949-1963 1964–1981 1982–2007 2008–2010 dwellings region unit Bloke 329 86 144 228 16 803 1549 1.93 Borovnica 404 244 493 402 95 1638 3785 2.31 Brezovica 758 465 1247 1223 158 3851 10,075 2.62 Cerklje na Gorenjskem 539 259 767 942 117 2624 6568 2.50 Cerknica 1384 451 1395 1078 95 4403 10,391 2.36 Dobrepolje 496 97 382 504 59 1538 3620 2.35 Dobrova - Polhov Gradec 662 286 810 713 48 2519 6943 2.76 Dol pri Ljubljani 318 202 501 731 134 1886 4997 2.65 Domžale 1786 1658 4402 3387 352 11,585 31,684 2.73 Gorenja vas - Poljane 794 283 631 931 88 2727 7112 2.61 Grosuplje 1027 612 2121 2489 336 6585 17,542 2.66 Horjul 234 87 321 232 10 884 2672 3.02 Ig 428 254 747 963 83 2475 5991 2.42 Ivančna Gorica 1436 613 1858 2060 242 6209 14,422 2.32 Kamnik 2331 1490 3545 2846 356 10,568 27,254 2.58 Komenda 340 206 546 846 203 2141 4772 2.23 Kranj 3527 3327 8229 5720 684 21,487 50,711 2.36 Litija 1526 677 2033 1753 194 6183 14,028 2.27 Ljubljana 24,207 17,428 49,296 27,171 2813 120,915 251,349 2.08 Log – Dragomer 166 96 574 378 40 1254 3510 2.80 Logatec 913 393 1401 1913 314 4934 12,038 2.44 Lukovica 409 194 487 601 57 1748 5114 2.93 Medvode 1094 838 2045 1586 215 5778 14,372 2.49 Mengeš 476 301 811 824 44 2456 6804 2.77 Moravče 370 146 535 588 48 1687 4767 2.83 Šenčur 582 432 792 842 98 2746 7903 2.88 Škofja Loka 1550 1111 3239 2384 237 8521 21,515 2.52 Škofljica 458 234 849 1544 214 3299 8086 2.45 Šmartno pri Litiji 602 237 564 647 46 2096 5058 2.41 Trzin 150 67 482 582 57 1338 3641 2.72 Velike Lašče 636 143 403 498 37 1717 4010 2.34 Vodice 343 176 384 507 80 1490 4262 2.86 Vrhnika 1305 733 1960 1864 285 6147 14,598 2.38 Žiri 490 311 674 419 45 1939 4796 2.47 TOTAL 52,070 34,137 94,668 69,396 7900 258,171 595,939 2.31

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The assessed number of people living in dwellings, presented by the periods of validity of regulations on earthquake-resistant construction

Average number Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of of people people living people living people living people living people living in in dwellings in dwellings in dwellings in dwellings Number of per dwellings built in the built in the built in the built in the people in the housing built until period 1949- period 1964– period 1982– period 2008– municipality/ Municipality unit 1948 1963 1981 2007 2010 region Bloke 1.929 634 166 278 440 31 1549 Borovnica 2.311 933 564 1139 930 219 3785 Brezovica 2.616 1983 1217 3262 3200 413 10,075 Cerklje na Gorenjskem 2.503 1349 648 1920 2358 293 6568 Cerknica 2.360 3266 1065 3292 2544 224 10391 Dobrepolje 2.353 1167 228 899 1186 140 3620 Dobrova - Polhov Gradec 2.756 1825 788 2233 1965 132 6943 Dol pri Ljubljani 2.649 843 535 1327 1937 355 4997 Domžale 2.735 4885 4534 12,039 9263 963 31,684 Gorenja vas - Poljane 2.608 2071 738 1645 2428 230 7112 Grosuplje 2.664 2736 1630 5650 6631 895 17,542 Horjul 3.023 707 263 970 702 30 2672 Ig 2.421 1036 615 1808 2331 201 5991 Ivančna Gorica 2.323 3335 1424 4316 4785 562 14,422 Kamnik 2.579 6011 3843 9142 7340 918 27,254 Komenda 2.229 758 459 1217 1886 452 4772 Kranj 2.360 8324 7852 19,421 13,500 1614 50,711 Litija 2.269 3462 1536 4613 3977 440 14,028 Ljubljana 2.079 50,320 36,228 102,473 56,481 5847 251,349 Log - Dragomer 2.799 464 269 1607 1058 112 3510 Logatec 2.440 2228 959 3418 4667 766 12,038 Lukovica 2.926 1196 567 1426 1758 167 5114 Medvode 2.487 2721 2084 5087 3945 535 14,372 Mengeš 2.770 1318 834 2247 2283 122 6804 Moravče 2.826 1046 412 1512 1661 136 4767 Šenčur 2.878 1675 1243 2279 2424 282 7903 Škofja Loka 2.525 3913 2805 8178 6020 599 21,515 Škofljica 2.451 1123 574 2081 3784 524 8086 Šmartno pri Litiji 2.413 1453 572 1361 1561 111 5058 Trzin 2.721 408 182 1312 1584 155 3641 Velike Lašče 2.335 1485 334 941 1163 87 4010 Vodice 2.860 981 504 1098 1450 229 4262 Vrhnika 2.375 3099 1741 4655 4426 677 14,598 Žiri 2.473 1212 769 1668 1036 111 4796 TOTAL 2.31 119,967 78,182 216,514 162,704 18,572 595,939

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The assessed risk to buildings and people posed by an earthquake of intensity Vll-Vlll on the EMS scale

Buildings Population

Need for Need for Need for Need for Number of permanent temporary Building permanent temporary people in the accommo- accommo- suitable for Unassessed accommo- accommo- municipality/ Municipality dation dation residence buildings dation dation region Bloke 0 0 226 27 0 0 1549 Borovnica 0 3 1920 374 0 95 3785 Brezovica 0 10 5744 861 0 33 10,075 Cerklje na Gorenjskem 0 0 4264 423 0 0 6568 Cerknica 0 1 956 102 0 0 10,391 Dobrepolje 0 2 1132 126 0 0 3620 Dobrova - Polhov Gradec 0 25 4766 569 0 67 6943 Dol pri Ljubljani 0 9 2594 585 0 80 4997 Domžale 0 28 10266 1869 0 853 31,684 Gorenja vas - Poljane 0 0 871 49 0 0 7112 Grosuplje 0 25 8789 1141 0 90 17,542 Horjul 0 5 1759 184 0 4 2672 Ig 0 11 4051 682 0 10 5991 Ivančna Gorica 0 3 3896 711 0 1 14,422 Kamnik 0 13 8212 1202 0 256 27,254 Komenda 0 4 2059 473 0 0 4772 Kranj 0 102 11,127 860 0 3522 50,711 Litija 0 10 3897 437 0 361 14,028 Ljubljana 106 5376 54,153 12,551 5188 52,210 251,349 Log – Dragomer 0 4 1570 177 0 4 3510 Logatec 0 2 2038 299 0 72 12,038 Lukovica 0 2 1915 728 0 7 5114 Medvode 0 28 6683 1068 0 285 14,372 Mengeš 0 9 2173 476 0 123 6804 Moravče 0 0 2817 719 0 0 4767 Šenčur 0 3 3425 253 0 10 7903 Škofja Loka 0 47 7040 712 0 2077 21,515 Škofljica 0 16 4008 1013 0 51 8086 Šmartno pri Litiji 0 0 1809 249 0 0 5058 Trzin 0 1 1132 340 0 2 3641 Velike Lašče 0 0 3087 446 0 0 4010 Vodice 0 0 0 5 0 10 4262 Vrhnika 0 10 6795 985 0 172 14,598 Žiri 0 0 25 2 0 0 4796 TOTAL 106 5754 177,463 30,963 5188 60,395 595,939

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There are no comprehensive data on the seismic vulnerability of, and risk to, industrial buildings and infrastructure facilities in the Republic of Slovenia. It is difficult to predict the extent of the consequences of an earthquake for community, transport and other infrastructures. The Republic of Slovenia is becoming an increasingly developed country. Consequently, judging by the experience of recent earthquakes in the developed world, the consequences of an earthquake can be very serious for this type of infrastructure. The infrastructure must have a level of measures for reducing seismic risk which is at least equal to that of other facilities vulnerable to earthquakes.

In urban areas, an earthquake of intensity Vll-Vlll on the EMS scale could cause fractures in water pipelines, which could lead to the flooding of certain city streets, breakage of pipes and related damage to other community infrastructure (sewage system, heating system, pipelines, etc.).

An earthquake of EMS intensity Vll-Vlll could result in disruptions and interruptions to the electricity supply and malfunctions in communications systems. According to data obtained by the ELES (the operator of the Slovenian electricity transmission network), earthquakes pose a greater risk to substations and administrative buildings than to transmission lines (for high-voltage lines there is almost no risk of collapse).

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List of energy infrastructure facilities in the area affected by an earthquake in the central part of Slovenia

Main gas Regional gas Municipality DV, KB RTP, RP HE TE, TETO, NE pipeline pipeline Bloke 0 0 0 0 0 0 Borovnica 0 0 0 0 0 0 Brezovica 1 0 0 0 0 0 Cerklje na Gorenjskem 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cerknica 2 1 0 0 0 0 Dobrepolje 0 0 0 0 0 0 Dobrova - Polhov Gradec 3 0 0 0 1 0 Dol pri Ljubljani 2 0 0 0 0 0 Domžale 10 1 0 0 2 1 Gorenja vas - Poljane 0 0 0 0 0 0 Grosuplje 2 1 0 0 0 0 Horjul 3 0 0 0 1 0 Ig 1 0 0 0 0 0 Ivančna Gorica 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kamnik 2 1 0 0 1 1 Komenda 0 0 0 0 1 0 Kranj 7 2 1 0 0 1 Litija 4 1 0 0 0 1 Ljubljana 21 9 1 1 1 Log - Dragomer 0 0 0 0 0 0 Logatec 4 1 0 0 1 0 Lukovica 2 0 0 0 1 0 Medvode 4 1 1 0 1 0 Mengeš 2 0 0 0 1 2 Moravče 2 0 0 0 0 1 Šenčur 1 0 0 0 0 1 Škofja Loka 2 0 0 0 0 1 Škofljica 1 0 0 0 0 0 Šmartno pri Litiji 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trzin 4 0 0 0 0 0 Velike Lašče 1 0 0 0 0 0 Vodice 1 0 0 0 2 1 Vrhnika 4 1 0 0 1 1 Žiri 1 1 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 87 20 2 1 14 12

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According to data from the Ministry of Infrastructure, referred to in the Seismic Threat Assessment of the Republic of Slovenia, an earthquake of intensity EMS Vll-Vlll would not in any way affect the Slovenian motorway network. The Slovenian Infrastructure Agency (DRSI), which manages other state roads (expressways, main roads and regional roads), has no information about the consequences of such an earthquake for road network structures (bridges, tunnels, overpasses, etc.) or whether certain sections of those roads would be at risk of damage from landslides, rock slides and rockfalls.

List of structures on state roads

Year of construction Between 1949 and Between 1964 Between 1982 Municipality Until 1948 1963 and 1981 and 2007 After 2008 Total Borovnica 0 0 0 1 0 1 Brezovica 1 0 0 2 0 3 Cerklje na Gorenjskem 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cerknica 3 1 1 0 0 5 Dobrepolje 0 0 1 0 0 1

Dobrova - Polhov Gradec 1 0 1 3 4 9 Dol pri Ljubljani 1 1 5 0 0 7 Domžale 2 2 3 1 0 8 Gorenja vas - Poljane 1 3 1 3 0 8 Grosuplje 2 6 0 1 0 9 Horjul 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ig 0 0 0 5 0 5 Ivančna Gorica 1 0 2 3 0 6 Kamnik 7 3 5 5 0 20 Komenda 1 2 0 1 0 4 Kranj 3 0 9 1 0 13 Litija 1 1 8 4 1 15 Ljubljana 0 2 14 7 0 23 Log – Dragomer 1 0 0 0 0 1 Logatec 1 0 2 3 1 7 Lukovica 0 6 0 3 0 9 Medvode 3 1 1 0 0 5 Mengeš 1 0 0 1 0 2 Moravče 0 1 2 0 0 3 Šenčur 0 0 1 0 0 1 Škofja Loka 0 4 5 1 0 10 Škofljica 0 4 1 1 0 6 Šmartno pri Litiji 0 1 0 1 0 2

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Year of construction Between 1949 and Between 1964 Between 1982 Municipality Until 1948 1963 and 1981 and 2007 After 2008 Total Trzin 0 0 0 1 0 1 Velike Lašče 1 3 1 0 0 5 Vodice 0 0 0 0 0 0 Vrhnika 8 0 2 0 0 10 Žiri 1 1 2 1 0 5 TOTAL 40 42 67 49 6 204

More detailed analyses and research into the seismic vulnerability of facilities belonging to the heritage of cultural history, which, in addition to individual listed buildings, include complete historical urban and rural centres, show inadequate seismic resistance in a considerable proportion of the facilities.

In particular, a potentially damaging earthquake would pose risks to architectural heritage sites such as castles, palaces, historical city centres, old bourgeois and peasant houses, religious buildings, and old industrial and transport facilities and their installations. The most important of the listed types of monuments have been declared cultural monuments. These are centuries-old buildings, some of which have undergone a process of restoration and static reinforcement as part of a programme of renovation and revitalisation of cultural monuments over the last twenty years.

List of cultural heritage facilities

Year of construction

Between 1950 Between 1975 Between 2000 Municipality No data Before 1950 and 1975 and 2000 and 2015 Total Bloke 0 47 3 0 0 50 Borovnica 0 46 0 0 0 46 Brezovica 0 105 7 4 0 116 Cerklje na Gorenjskem 3 156 4 1 0 164 Cerknica 0 110 2 1 0 113 Dobrepolje 0 43 0 7 0 50

Dobrova - Polhov Gradec 0 113 5 2 0 120 Dol pri Ljubljani 0 51 4 0 0 55 Domžale 7 142 4 4 0 157 Gorenja vas - Poljane 0 72 1 1 0 74 Grosuplje 0 134 7 10 0 151

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Year of construction

Between 1950 Between 1975 Between 2000 Municipality No data Before 1950 and 1975 and 2000 and 2015 Total Horjul 0 47 2 0 0 49 Ig 3 66 0 3 0 72 Ivančna Gorica 0 232 9 4 0 245 Kamnik 64 310 12 16 0 402 Komenda 1 58 1 0 0 60 Kranj 2 309 29 6 0 346 Litija 0 95 12 9 0 116 Ljubljana 0 913 58 15 0 986 Log - Dragomer 0 14 1 0 0 15 Logatec 0 126 7 7 0 140 Lukovica 20 133 2 2 0 157 Medvode 0 101 6 3 0 110 Mengeš 4 89 0 1 0 94 Moravče 1 156 4 2 0 163 Šenčur 2 100 5 4 0 111 Škofja Loka 0 280 6 0 0 286 Škofljica 0 63 2 1 0 66 Šmartno pri Litiji 0 39 1 0 0 40 Trzin 2 7 0 0 0 9 Velike Lašče 0 102 3 2 0 107 Vodice 0 28 3 1 0 32 Vrhnika 0 207 1 5 0 213 Žiri 0 36 0 0 0 36 TOTAL 109 4530 201 111 0 4951

The data shown in the above tables can be used as the first approximate data necessary for preparing initial information for an earthquake scenario. The scenario is based on a hypothetical earthquake with an intensity of Vll-Vlll on the EMS scale and an epicentral area covering the wider Ljubljana area.

Owing to Ljubljana's dense population, high levels of daily commuting, and a large number of state and economic institutions (health care, education, culture, ministries, Government, commerce, banks, services, logistics, etc.), transport intersections (roads, railways) and energy infrastructure (gas pipelines, electrical power lines), an earthquake like this in Ljubljana would represent the worst case scenario for Slovenia. It would affect 34 municipalities: Bloke, Borovnica, Brezovica, Cerklje na Gorenjskem, Cerknica, Dobrepolje, Dobrova - Polhov Gradec, Dol pri Ljubljani, Domžale, Gorenja vas - Poljane, Grosuplje, Horjul, Ig, Ivančna Gorica, Kamnik, Komenda, Kranj, Litija, Ljubljana, Log - Dragomelj, Logatec, Lukovica, Medvode, Mengeš, Moravče, Šenčur, Škofja Loka, Škofljica, Šmartno pri Litiji, Trzin, Velike Lašče, Vodice, Vrhnika and Žiri.

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Some data relevant for the assessment of the consequences of an earthquake with EMS intensity Vll-Vlll in the central part of Slovenia

Number of dwellings built until 1948 52,070 Number of dwellings built between 1949 and 1963 34,137 Number of dwellings built between 1964 and 1981 94,668 Number of dwellings built between 1982 and 2007 69,396 Number of dwellings built between 2008 and 2010 7900 Total number of dwellings exposed to risk 258,171 Number of dwellings which are permanently unsuitable for 106 accommodation (need for new permanent accommodation) Number of buildings which are temporarily unsuitable for accommodation 5754 (need for temporary accommodation) Number of people living in dwellings which were built until 1948 119,967 Number of people living in dwellings which were built between 1949 and 78,182 1963 Number of people living in dwellings which were built between 1964 and 216,514 1981 Number of people living in dwellings which were built between 1982 and 162,704 2007 Number of people living in dwellings which were built between 2008 and 18,572 2010 Total number of people exposed to risk 595,939 Number of people in need of new permanent accommodation 5188 Number of people in need of new temporary accommodation 60,395 Number of stationary sources of low-risk dangerous substances 5 (situation as of April 2015) Number of stationary sources of high-risk dangerous substances 6 (situation as of April 2015) Number of electrical power lines – DV, KB (situation as of May 2015) 87 Number of substations – RTP, RP (situation as of May 2015) 20 Number of hydroelectric power plants – HE (situation as of May 2015) 2 Number of thermal power plants – TE, TETO (situation as of May 2015) 1 Number of nuclear power plants – NE (situation as of May 2015) 0 Number of main gas pipelines (situation as of May 2015) 14 Number of regional gas pipelines (situation as of May 2015) 12 Number of facilities on national roads built until 1948 40 Number of facilities on national roads built between 1949 and 1963 42 Number of facilities on national roads built between 1964 and 1981 67 Number of facilities on national roads built between 1982 and 2007 49 Number of facilities on national roads built after 2008 6 Number of cultural heritage facilities (situation as of June 2015) 4951

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A potential earthquake of intensity EMS Vll-Vlll in Central Slovenia, affecting the municipalities of Bloke, Borovnica, Brezovica, Cerklje na Gorenjskem, Cerknica, Dobrepolje, Dobrova - Polhov Gradec, Dol pri Ljubljani, Domžale, Gorenja vas - Poljane, Grosuplje, Horjul, Ig, Ivančna Gorica, Kamnik, Komenda, Kranj, Litija, Ljubljana, Log - Dragomelj, Logatec, Lukovica, Medvode, Mengeš, Moravče, Šenčur, Škofja Loka, Škofljica, Šmartno pri Litiji, Trzin, Velike Lašče, Vodice, Vrhnika and Žiri, would expose 595,939 people and 258,171 dwellings to risk. Buildings with the highest seismic resistance (those built after 1981) include 77,296 dwellings, providing homes for 181,276 people. Buildings with the highest seismic vulnerability (that is, those built before 1964) include 86,207 dwellings, providing homes for 198,149 people.

In the Municipality of Ljubljana alone, such an earthquake would expose 251,349 people living in 120,915 homes to risk, which represents almost 50% of all the dwellings and population in the entire area affected by the earthquake. In the Municipality of Ljubljana, buildings with the highest seismic vulnerability (built until1963) include 41,635 homes housing 86,548 people, while buildings built after 1981 include 29,984 dwellings providing homes to 62,328 people. 49,296 dwellings built in the period between 1964 and 1981 provide homes to 102,473 people.

The estimated number of buildings destroyed or planned for demolition following damage incurred by such an earthquake is 106 dwellings. Those buildings provide homes to 5188 people who would then be in need of new permanent accommodation. The estimated number of buildings in need of thorough restoration to make them suitable for accommodation is 5754. Until that restoration was complete, 60,395 people would need to be provided with temporary accommodation.

The area affected by such an earthquake in the central part of the Republic of Slovenia is also characterised by a considerable number of low-risk and high-risk stationary sources of dangerous substances, representing a total of five low-risk sources (Municipality of Ljubljana: 3, Mengeš: 1, Trzin: 1) and six high-risk sources (municipality of Borovnica: 1, Domžale: 1, Ljubljana: 3, Medvode 1).

The facilities vulnerable to earthquakes include energy infrastructure facilities. The area of the hypothetical earthquake in Ljubljana has 87 electrical power lines, 20 substations, 2 hydroelectric power plants, 1 heat and thermal power plant, 14 main gas pipelines, and 12 regional gas pipelines. The Seismic Threat Assessment for the Municipality of Ljubljana includes a scenario where Ljubljana is divided into four units cut off from each other. Power failures in the event of a major earthquake in Ljubljana could last for a long time owing to the collapse of the electricity transmission system and limited access to places of damage, as well as general panic.

In particular, a potentially damaging earthquake poses risk to architectural heritage sites such as castles, palaces, historical city centres, old bourgeois and peasant houses, religious buildings, and old industrial and transport facilities and their installations. The most important of these types of monuments have been declared cultural monuments. The risk to such facilities is particularly high in the event of an earthquake of EMS intensity VIII or higher. These are centuries-old buildings, some of which have undergone a process of restoration

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 249/464 ______and static reinforcement as part of a programme of renovation and revitalisation of cultural monuments over the last twenty years. However, it is important to take into account that no measures carried out for the purpose of static reinforcement of a facility guarantee its complete security or earthquake resistance. The available data obtained from the Ministry of Culture on the number of immovable cultural heritage facilities reveals that the affected area has 4951 cultural heritage facilities, which include buildings, buildings with parks or gardens, other facilities and installations, and some commemorative facilities and locations. 4731 cultural heritage facilities were built before 1975.

The earthquake scenario does not take into account daily commuting, a potentially higher number of people owing to tourism and related activities, seasonal differences in the number of people present, changes in the distribution of the population throughout the day, and possible chains of disasters and their impacts. Nevertheless, in the "Ljubljana" earthquake, in particular, the daily commuting of pupils, students and the working population could certainly have a significant impact. The scenario is prepared for the event of an earthquake occurring at night.

CHAINS OF DISASTERS RESULTING FROM AN EARTHQUAKE

In addition to damage to or even complete demolition of buildings, possible consequences of an earthquake include damage to infrastructure (roads, railways, airports, dams, water barriers, communication networks, electrical power lines, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, etc.). Earthquakes are often accompanied by many chains of disasters, whose damage typically exceeds the direct damage caused by earthquakes. Along with a failure in the supply of drinking water and electricity and disruption to traffic flows, such disasters can result in the following chains of disasters:

 Fires and explosions;  Accidents involving dangerous substances;  Avalanches, landslides, rockfalls and floods (damage and breach of earth barriers, water reservoirs and hydropower barriers);  Critical infrastructure failures;  Human and animal diseases.

Chains of disasters are not included in the risk assessment and risk analysis.

RISK ANALYSIS BASED ON THE RISK SCENARIO

Assessment of the impacts on the population

In the area affected by such an earthquake in central Slovenia, 5188 people would need new permanent accommodation, and 60,395 people would require temporary accommodation. Owing to the number of people who would need to be evacuated (as a permanent measure), such an earthquake in central Slovenia (Ljubljana) is ranked at risk level 5.

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The number of fatalities resulting from earthquakes depends on the particular circumstances and coincidences, which mainly include the type and quality of constructed facilities. Consequently, the number of such fatalities is difficult to predict. However, it is possible to gain a certain perspective by reviewing and analysing the available data on earthquakes. A report by Professor Robin Spence and Emily So, Estimating Shaking-Induced Casualties and Building Damage for Global Earthquake Events, Cambridge Architectural Research Ltd, describes 11 major earthquakes. It shows huge differences between individual earthquakes. The proportion of fatalities in relation to the total number of residents in the affected area ranges from approximately 0.5% to as much as 19%. Depending on the number of affected residents, the proportion of fatalities ranges from 10% to 30%. The 1895 earthquake in Ljubljana killed seven people. At that time, Ljubljana had a population of 31,000. The proportion of fatalities was 0.02%.

Tabular overview of the assessed impacts on the population

Evacuation (as a Inferred Fatalities Injured/sick permanent measure) level of Level of impact Level of Level of impact Scenario Number impact Number impact Number Ljubljana 60 4 600 4 5188 5 5

The values given in the above table were chosen following the comparison and assessment of the above-mentioned proportions, and considering that the quality of buildings in Ljubljana today is better than it was in 1895. Data on the number of people exposed to earthquake risk (excluding daily migration), the number of people in need of new permanent accommodation, and the number of people in need of new temporary accommodation were also taken into account. In the event of such an earthquake, 595,939 people would be exposed to risk.

Assessment of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on the cultural heritage

During the preparation of the earthquake scenario, the following data on the housing stock were obtained from the web application POTROG: the number of existing buildings, the number of buildings which would be uninhabitable following an earthquake like this, and the number of buildings temporarily unfit for habitation. The Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia (GURS) obtained data on the value of the housing stock in municipalities with the highest residential density, where a large number of buildings would have to be demolished or undergo extensive restoration in the event of an earthquake like this. This information was then used as the basis for the prediction of damage caused to buildings.

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Tabular overview of the assessed economic and environmental impacts and impacts on the cultural heritage

Number of Proportion buildings to of buildings be to be demolished demolished Value of or Total or Value of the damaged extensively number of extensively housing stock buildings in Level of Scenario Municipality restored buildings restored (GURS) in EUR EUR impact Ljubljana 5482 72,186 7.59% 39,254,052,001 2,981,058,835 Kranj 102 12,089 0.84% 4,148,463,847 35,002,342

Škofja Loka 47 7799 0.60% 1,412,763,344 8,513,896

Ljubljana Total 3,024,575,073 5

The evaluation of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage only takes into account the cost of the housing stock, thus excluding the costs of disruptions in the economy, costs related to the damage to infrastructure (demolitions, traffic disruptions), health care costs, the costs of emergency response services, social costs (e.g. costs resulting from the increase in unemployment), the costs of damaged vehicles, and the value of cultural heritage (movable and immovable).

The above table only includes major municipalities in the areas affected by the earthquake from the scenario, with small municipalities being excluded (e.g. Brezovica, Domžale, Kamnik, etc.). If all the municipalities in the potentially affected areas were included, the figures and amounts would be higher. However, the level of impact would remain unchanged. In addition, neither this overview nor the entire analysis takes into account the possible consequences of chains of disasters.

Assessment of the political and social impacts

Assessment of impacts on the functioning of state authorities

The assessment refers to the ability of state institutions to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility (the Government, the ministries, constituent bodies, administrative units) in the affected area. There are a large number of state institutions in the area in question.

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Tabular overview of the assessed impacts on the functioning of state authorities

Operational ability of state authorities in the affected area

Final value of Ability Number of people impact

Level of Number of Level of Scenario Duration Level impact Duration people impact Up to 15 Up to 30 Ljubljana days Limited 2 days 595,939 5 3.5

Assessment of impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems

The assessment of impacts refers to the lack of, or limited access to, drinking water, food and energy products (electricity, heating, fuel) and the impaired functioning of telecommunications, the internet, educational institutions, public services (access to the media, health services, banking services, etc.), and the impaired use of public transport and the supply of basic necessities.

Tabular overview of the assessed impact on the functioning of major infrastructure systems

Functioning of major infrastructure systems Impaired functioning of telecommunications, the internet, educational institutions, public Final services, the use of public transport, level of Drinking water, food, energy products and the supply of basic necessities impact Level of Level of Number of impact Scenario Duration Level impact Duration people Up to 15 Limited Up to 30 Ljubljana days 2 days 595,939 5 3.5

Assessment of psychosocial impacts

The assessment of these impacts considers the social and psychological impacts, since the consequences of the earthquake would be felt by the entire population, resulting in increased levels of fear among the people (fear of a second disaster, fear of the consequences of the disaster) and the need for new applications for assistance.

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Tabular overview of the assessed psychosocial impacts

Assessment of psychosocial impacts Unwanted Social Psychological impacts Inferred Scenario behaviour impacts level of Level of Level of impact Level of impact impact Description of response impact Ljubljana 3 4 Increased levels of fear 4 3.67

Assessment of the impact on internal political stability

As a result of the earthquake, isolated cases of public expression of disagreement with the actions of the responsible institutions could occur. According to risk assessment criteria, this represents the second level of impact.

Tabular overview of the assessed impact on internal political stability

Impact on internal political stability

Level of Scenario Impact impact Individual cases of violation of law and order and criminal offences resulting from the disaster; observed Ljubljana expressions of fear for one's own safety and property. 3

Assessment of the impact on financial stability

The assessment of the impact on financial stability considers the impacts on the solvency of legal entities and natural persons resulting from the failure of the payment system, and such impacts resulting from the lack of cash.

Tabular overview of the assessed impact on financial stability

Final Disruptions in Changes in GDP value of payment transactions Lack of cash growth impact

Level of Level of Number Level of impact Scenario Duration impact of people Duration impact Change Up to –1.5 More than More than 5 595,939 5 percentage 3 4.33 one day 7 days Ljubljana point

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Assessment of the impacts on foreign policy/international stability

Judging from the experience of past earthquakes around the world, it is expected that, in the event of a major earthquake, the Republic of Slovenia would receive international assistance, especially in terms of equipment and rescue teams.

Tabular overview of the assessed impact on foreign policy/international stability

Impact on foreign policy/international stability

Level of Scenario Impact impact International assistance, the state remains stable Ljubljana 4

Joint assessment of political and social impacts

Tabular overview of the joint assessment of political and social impact

Group of political and social impacts Final Final value Scenario level of Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 of impact impact Ljubljana 3.5 3.5 3.67 3 4.33 4 3.67 4

LIKELIHOOD OF DISASTER

Criteria for measuring the likelihood of disaster

Likelihood level

1 2 3 4 5 Once every 250 Once every 100 Once every 25 to 100 Once every 5 to 25 One or more times years to 250 years years years in 5 years (annual (annual (annual likelihood (annual likelihood (annual likelihood likelihood of up likelihood between 1 and 4%) between 4 and of more than 20%) to 0.4%) between 0.4 and 20%) 1%)

Hardly any risk Possible but Possible risk (threat) General risk Special and (threat) less likely risk (threat) imminent (threat) (permanent) risk (threat)

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The annual likelihood of the earthquake in the present scenario is 0.53%, which represents a return period of 189 years. The annual likelihood of the earthquake in the scenario (EMS intensity Vll-Vlll) is in the range between 0.4 and 1% which, according to the criteria for assessing the likelihood of disaster, represents likelihood level 2, which is a possible but less likely risk.

Likelihood of a disaster

Scenario Likelihood Level

Once in a period of between 100 and 250 years – Ljubljana 2 possible but less likely risk

TABLES PRESENTING INDIVIDUAL AND OVERALL IMPACTS OF THE RISK SCENARIO

Impacts on people

Risk scenario and Likelihood analysis Calculated level of impact on people Level of impact level Ljubljana 5 5 2

Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on the cultural heritage

Risk scenario and Calculated level of economic impacts Likelihood analysis and impacts on the cultural heritage Level of impact level Ljubljana 5 5 2

Political and social impacts

Risk scenario and Likelihood analysis Calculated level of impact Level of impact level Ljubljana 3.67 4 2

Calculation of overall (average) risk impacts

Level of economic and environmental Level of Calculated Level of Risk Level of impacts and overall value of overall scenario impacts impacts on the political overall average Reliability of and on cultural and social average risk Risk risk analysis analysis people heritage impacts impacts impacts likelihood results Moderately Ljubljana 5 5 4 4.67 5 2 reliable

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11.2 Annex 2: Risk Scenarios: Major and Catastrophic Floods

RISK SCENARIOS

Floods are a common phenomenon in the Republic of Slovenia, frequently causing considerable damage. Moreover, of all the natural disasters which cause significant damage, floods are probably the most common.

Flooding can occur throughout the year, but is most common in autumn, following abundant and long-lasting rainfall. In the summer, flooding is associated with storms and primarily occurs in the form of local and torrential floods. Flooding results in fatalities, economic loss, and social and environmental damage. The damage in the flooded areas is generally relatively large and includes damage to housing and other facilities, public infrastructure, commercial and industrial companies, and agricultural crops and so on. Social and economic processes are often interrupted. Floods can put the natural environment at risk of environmentally harmful substances, released following damage to or destruction of the facilities where they are processed or stored.

The assessment of flood risk in Slovenia takes into account the fact that floods of different return periods, ranging from 2 to 500 years but predominantly in the range of 5 to 100 years, can occur simultaneously in most watercourses. These likelihood values for flood events were taken into account when preparing the assessment of risk associated with two particular risk scenarios. The first is a risk scenario with a return period ranging from 5 to 25 years (major flooding with a high likelihood of occurrence), and the second is a risk scenario with a return period of between 25 to 100 years (catastrophic flooding with a low likelihood of occurrence).

For the purposes of the risk analysis, two scenarios with different impact intensity and different likelihood of occurrence were selected.

Risk Scenario 1 considers a flood event of major proportions, with the flooded area ranging from one third to one half of the state’s territory. It is based on the assumption of high intensity rainfall of duration between one and three days. This risk scenario is comparable to the floods which occurred in 2007, 2009, 2010, and the floods occurring in September 2014. As mentioned above, the likelihood of the occurrence of the flood event in Risk Scenario 1 ranges between 5 and 25 years.

Scenario 2 assumes that half of the entire national territory is flooded. Such events are classified as catastrophic floods and are comparable to the floods which occurred in 1990 and 2012. The floods occurring in 1990 were comparable to the flooding of 1933. Risk Scenario 2 is based on the assumption that the rainfall lasts more than three days. The likely return period for this scenario has been assessed at between 25 and 100 years.

The floods in 1990 were the greatest floods to date. Nowadays, the damage of such floods would amount to EUR 551 million. The floods covered 70% of the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, with the exception of the areas surrounding the river Mur and the Koper coastal

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 257/464 ______area. The area affected by the floods was home to 240,000 people. A total of 237 people were relocated and 2,600 evacuated; 190 buildings were destroyed; 5231 buildings were flooded, including 398 industrial buildings; 96 bridges were washed away and 280 damaged; 2,683 kilometres of roads were damaged and 20 kilometres of railway track destroyed; 480 landslides were triggered and 2000 landslips and rockfalls were recorded. The greatest damage was to the economy (28% of the total damage). The most affected area was the catchment area of the Savinja and Sotla rivers (62%).

It should be noted that it is impossible to predict all flood event scenarios, particularly in cases of technical floods, which can cause the collapse of a water infrastructure facility like a flood levee or flood-control reservoir. Because of the sudden release of large quantities of water, floods like this are very violent and destructive. In such events, the flood wave could engulf populated areas and cause both economic damage and a large number of fatalities. Neither of the scenarios included developments such as these.

RISK ANALYSES BASED ON RISK SCENARIOS

Floods cannot be entirely prevented; however, it is possible to reduce their potential consequences. The likelihood of their occurrence and their intensity and duration depend on natural factors, and in some cases also on anthropogenic factors (e.g. in the event of technical floods). The period 1990-2014 was one with frequent flood events; furthermore, the damage during that time was high compared to previous periods, particularly owing to the high damage potential in the flood areas, and a significant reduction in resources and personnel involved in water management.

In recent years, far too many financial resources and time were devoted to analyses and studies, which rarely lead to actual solutions on the ground aimed at reducing flood risk. The goal of achieving better flood safety requires an active approach involving concrete actions on the ground, which are either construction (e.g. the construction of flood-control reservoirs, the maintenance of watercourses, etc.) or other measures (e.g. raising public awareness of flood risk, prediction, etc.).

Over the last 25 years, flood events have caused damage which has, on average, amounted to approximately EUR 100 to 150 million each year. It should be noted that direct damage is registered using well-established standard procedures (the application AJDA); however, insufficient attention is paid to indirect damage. In order to avoid such damage, greater emphasis should be given to preventive activities for reducing flood risk.

Flood risk is primarily present in areas with damage potential. This potential is further increased in cases of inadequate planning of the spread of urban areas (e.g. the spread of the southern part of Ljubljana into the flood area along the Gradaščica and Ljubljanica rivers is a typical example of disregarding the principle of sustainable development in practice). The construction of buildings on floodplains, whose purpose should be to support the functioning of natural processes, leads to a reduction in room for the water, causing an increasing number of damage events with increasingly severe consequences. In extreme cases, urban

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 258/464 ______areas extend up to the watercourse channel, or worse still, the watercourse bed, which restricts or even prevents the implementation of measures aimed at reducing flood risk.

By 2008, it was estimated that, "in spite of favourable laws, we have not so far managed to stop the violent pressure on the apparently suitable land on floodplains". Now, however, the estimate is that the change in legislation resulting from the implementation of the Decree on Conditions and Limitations for Constructions and Activities on Flood Risk Areas (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 89/08) has significantly restricted the occurrence of new damage potential on floodplains.

Today, in the 61 areas of significant flood impact (OPVP), which cover a total surface area of 50 km2, the following are potentially at risk: 130,000 people, 23,000 buildings, 540 cultural monuments, 17,000 business entities, 600 kilometres of public infrastructure and 400 sensitive installations.

A major cause of risk potential is frequently public infrastructure facilities, such as bridgings.

Flood risk is further increased by changes in land cover. Precipitation that falls on the ground runs off depending on the characteristics of the ground (inclination, soil characteristics, etc.). The ratio between the water that percolates into the ground and the water that runs off the surface is referred to as the runoff coefficient. A simplified example is the coefficient for urbanised areas, where the surface water runoff ranges between 90 and 100% (from paved surfaces, roofs, etc.).

Changes in the runoff hydrograph of river basins following an increase in urbanisation padavine = precipitation močno urbanizirano povodje = highly urbanised river basin delno urbanizirano povodje = partly urbanised river basin naravno povodje brez vpliva urbanizacije = natural river basin without urbanisation

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The higher the degree of urbanisation, the greater and faster the inflow of rainwater from drainage basins into watercourse beds, causing higher peaks in the flow of watercourses. Consequently, the concurrence of high watercourse discharge and additional quantities from urbanised areas results in the flooding of the area in question. In order to prevent flooding caused by rainwater, water retention should be maximised (rainwater retention structures, recharge structures, etc.).

Further challenges in water management and in the provision of flood safety include the restoration and conservation of natural retention areas (floodplains) and sustainable watercourse management. In the efforts to restore floodplains, the interests of water management are in conflict with other interests in the area (urbanisation, various economic land uses, natural persons, etc.), which often makes it difficult or even impossible to carry out restoration activities. If floodplains are big enough, they help to attenuate flood wave peaks. In accordance with the Water Directive guidelines, watercourses should be managed in a sustainable manner to the maximum possible extent (in order to avoid the deterioration of their ecological status). The biggest problem is the need for higher financial inputs compared to conventional construction (from 10 to 25% due to increased manual labour). Sustainable management of watercourses is particularly challenging in urban areas, where the surface area actually used by watercourses is often reduced to a minimum. In such cases, it is necessary to carry out mitigation measures designed to enable natural ecological processes in the area of watercourses.

Irrespective of the views or approaches to the implementation of flood protection measures, populated areas must be protected from flooding and fatalities must be prevented.

In recent years there has been substantial progress in the development of prognostic models (flood forecasting models). Based on those models, residents at risk can be warned a few days in advance in order to enable them to prepare for the flood event (insurance of property, stockpiling of food and other necessities, sandbags, etc.). However, it should be noted that a 100% reliable forecast and total flood protection are unattainable. As it often turns out in practice, it is not possible to predict all flood events. The year 2014 also witnessed several torrential flood events caused by heavy rainfall (up to 250l/m2 per day). Since these phenomena are particularly local in nature, the exact location of their occurrence is impossible to predict. A slight change in atmospheric pressure or a change in the atmospheric wind flow can move such an event to a location quite different from the prediction.

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Vector grid

The appropriate vector grid, with a square cell size of 75 x 75 metres and covering the territory of Slovenia up to the national border (Meja_SI.tab), was prepared using the MapBasic application Grids.mbx. The selection of cell size is important for improving the

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 260/464 ______quality of the generalisation of the territory, and the selection of the starting point affects the final results of spatial analyses.

The available software and hardware allow the production of a square cell grid for the territory of the entire country, with a cell size of 75 x 75 metres. With these dimensions of the grid cells, spatial analyses can still be carried out within a reasonable time period, taking into account both the time necessary for the launch of the activity and the time necessary for its execution. The main reason why the size of 75 x 75 metres was chosen was to reduce the dependency of the results on the selection of the grid's starting point.

For the analyses of the entire damage potential, only those grid cells were selected which share at least one point with the polygon (Meja_SI.tab; those cells include 3,687,197 buildings for the entire area of the flood risk potential in Slovenia). From the resulting set of cells, those cells which share at least one point with the flood areas (OPKp_2012.tab; those cells include 617,239 buildings) were selected. The obtained data layer was used for the flood risk analyses.

Vector grid with a cell size of 75 x 75 metres. Above, for the Municipality of Ljubljana. Below, the area of significant flood impact (OPVP) South Ljubljana.

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Impacts on people

In the risk assessment, the impacts on people are defined according to the location and the extent of flood risk area, and according to the level of risk.

Map showing the classification of flood-risk areas (human health) at a scale of 1:250,000

According to the risk to human health, the first three classes cover the following areas:

1. Celje: TI (threat index) = 17,684 2. Ljubljana-south: TI = 16,938

3. Ljubljana-southwest: TI = 13,687 4. Trbovlje: TI = 4,455 5. Koper: TI = 3,610 6. Prevalje: TI = 3,282 7. Idrija: TI = 3,102 8. Piran: TI = 2,920

9. Izola: TI = 2,866 10. Tržič: TI = 2,549

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11. Domžale-east: TI = 2,413 12. Grosuplje: TI = 2,363 13. Železniki: TI = 2,341 14. Zagorje ob Savi: TI = 2,178 15. Šalara: TI = 2,110 16. Šempeter pri Gorici: TI = 1,942 17. Velenje-southwest: TI = 1,895 18. Moste: TI = 1,861 19. Črna na Koroškem: TI = 1,729 20. Prebold: TI = 1,603 21. Vrtojba: TI = 1,583 22. Velenje-west: TI = 1,554 23. Lucija: TI = 1,521 24. Nova Gorica-west: TI = 1,472

The implementation of flood protection measures in the first two areas would reduce the overall flood damage potential for human health by 10%, and an improvement in the flood- related situation in six additional areas would bring a further reduction of 10%.

Risk Scenario 1 is based on the available data on the number of fatalities caused by flooding, which were obtained from various sources.

Fatalities caused by flood events (data collected from several sources)

Chronicle of extreme weather events ACPDR FGG in the 20th century 1852 Several fatalities 1872 Some fatalities 1903 Between 10 and 15 fatalities, + 2 fatalities 1910 Fatalities 1924 15 (19 according to estimates) 1925 2 1926 14 + several fatalities in the Savinja river 10 1933 basin 17 1954 25 22 1965 3 1966 Fatalities 1989 3 1990 1 2 1992 1 1 1994 1 1 1995 1 1998 1 2 2000 7 2004 1

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Chronicle of extreme weather events ACPDR FGG in the 20th century 2007 4 6 2010 3 5 2014 2* *Informal data obtained from the media.

Risk Scenario 2 is based on fatalities from 1933, since the floods occurring in that year are comparable to the floods in 1990. Although the time interval between both flood events is 57 years, which coincides with the selected likelihood of occurrence, the data was selected for a different reason. The 1933 flooding was chosen based on the assumption that within a few decades the state of flood protection structures in Slovenia will greatly deteriorate, since at present the structures which are currently still functional are nearing the end of their operating period, and less and less money is being dedicated to their maintenance.

In addition to limiting the damage, the main objective is the protection of human lives. Unfortunately, many fatalities occur when people affected by floods are trying to rescue their movable or immovable property. To this end, the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (on behalf of the Ministry, the Institute for Water of the Republic of Slovenia, IZVRS), in collaboration with local communities, organised a large number of awareness- raising events in the second half of 2015. The purpose of these events was to provide the population and other entities (e.g. business, public and other entities) which are at risk of floods with as much useful and publicly available information and knowledge as possible on how to defend most effectively against the unpleasant consequences of possible future floods. Public awareness activities are a form of non-constructional flood protection measures.

With such activities, the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning thus continues to fulfil its commitment to a more operative and terrain-oriented approach to managing flood risks.

Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage

Environmental impact

In this risk assessment, environmental impacts are defined according to the location and the extent of the flood risk area, and according to the level of risk.

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Map showing the classification of flood risk areas (environment) at a scale of 1:250,000

According to the environmental risk, the first three classes cover the following areas:

1. Homec-Nožice: TI = 1.776 2. Gameljne: TI = 1.047

3. Podtabor: TI = 1.017 4. Ljubljana-Jarše: TI = 0.67

Operators who are subject to the provisions of the SEVESO Directive (12)

OPERATOR DECISION SOURCES Actual* Damage** Grid CINKARNAž METALURŠKO-NO.6 OFLow RISK damage0.5 potential50 cell150 KEMIČNA INDUSTRIJA potential CELJE, D.D., Kidričeva 26, 3001 Celje INTERINA d.o.o., Ljubljana - 10 Low 0.5 50 50 Kotnikova ulica 5, 1000 Ljubljana ISTRABENZ PLINI d.o.o., Sermin 11 Low 0.5 50 50 8a, 6000 Koper ISTRABENZ PLINI d.o.o., Sermin 7 High 1 100 100 8a, 6000 Koper

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OPERATOR DECISION SOURCES Actual* Damage** Grid MINERVOž d.d. Ljubljana, Letališka NO.17 OFLow RISK damage0.5 potential50 cell100 cesta 27a, 1000 Ljubljana potential PETROL Slovenska energetska 16 High 1 100 100 družba, d.d., Koroška cesta 14, 2390 Ravne na Koroškem PROEKS d.o.o., Letališka 27 a, 23 Low 0.5 50 100 1000 Ljubljana Zavod RS za blagovne rezerve, 23 High 1 100 100 Dunajska 106, 1000 Ljubljana STEKLARNA HRASTNIK - D.D., 25 Low 0.5 50 83 Cesta 1.maja 14, 1430 Hrastnik STEKLARNA ROGAŠKA D.D., Ulica 20 High 1 100 133 talcev 1, 3250 Rogaška Slatina TERMOELEKTRARNA TRBOVLJE 27 Low 0.5 50 150 D.O.O., Ob železnici 27, 1420 Trbovlje TKI HRASTNIK, D.D., Za Savo 6, 22 High 1 100 200 1430 Hrastnik * - Actual damage potential; ** Damage potential;

Operators who are subject to the provisions of the IPPC Directive (31)

Decision SEVESO ACTIVITY Hazard Influ- Actual Damage MC OPERATOR no. CODE potential ential damage pote- _r_ potential km ntial Ambrož Martin s.p., Lahovče 121 NO 2.6 1 10 1 100 100 101, 4207 Cerklje na Gorenjskem Cinkarna Celje d.d., Kidričeva 247 YES 4.4 1 20 1 100 150 ulica 26, 3000 Celje COLOR Industrija sintetičnih 161 YES 4.1 h 1 20 1 100 100 smol, barv in lakov d.d., Komandanta Staneta 4, 1215 Medvode Farme Ihan d.d., Breznikova 170 NO 6.6 b, 6.6 c 1.75 5 0.75 75 150 cesta 89, 1230 Domžale COLOR Industrija sintetičnih 217 YES 4.1h 1 20 1 100 100 smol, barv in lakov d.d., Komandanta Staneta 4, 1215 Medvode Hidria Rotomatika d.o.o., 110 NO 2.5 b 2 5 0.67 67 67 Spodnja Kanomlja 23, 5281 Spodnja Idrija ISKRA AVTOELEKTRIKA 222 NO 2.6 1 10 1 100 100 d.d., Polje 15, 5290 Šempeter pri Gorici Jata Emona d.o.o., 244 NO 6.6 a 1.75 5 0.75 75 75 Agrokombinatska cesta 84, 1000 Ljubljana Hedl Jože, Spodnja Vižinga 125 NO 6.6 a 1.75 5 0.75 75 75

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Decision SEVESO ACTIVITY Hazard Influ- Actual Damage MC OPERATOR no. CODE potential ential damage pote- _r_ potential km ntial 14, 2360 Radlje ob Dravi MPI Metalurgija, plastika in 204 NO 5.1, 2.5 a 1 10 1 100 100 inženiring - RECIKLAŽA d.o.o., Žerjav 79, 2393 Črna na Koroškem NIKO d.d., Otoki 16, 4228 26 NO 2.6 1 10 1 100 100 Železniki PALOMA SLADKOGORSKA 149 NO 6.1 b, 1.1 1 10 1 100 100 Tovarna papirja d.d., Sladki Vrh 1, 2214 Sladki Vrh Panvita Prašičereja Nemščak 75 NO 6.6 b, 6.6 c 1.75 5 0.75 75 75 d.o.o., Ižakovci 188, 9231 Beltinci PAPIR SERVIS d.o.o., Pod 237 NO 6.1 b 2 10 0.67 67 67 ježami 3, 1000 Ljubljana Papirnica Vevče d.o.o., 180 NO 1.1, 6.1 b 1 10 1 100 100 Papirniška pot 25, 1261 Ljubljana-Dobrunje Perutnina Ptuj d.d., Potrčeva 89 NO 6.6 a 1.75 5 0.75 75 75 cesta 10, 2250 Ptuj Petrol d.d., Dunajska cesta 229 NO 6.5 2.25 5 0.58 58 58 50, 1527 Ljubljana Petrol Energetika d.o.o., 188 NO 1.1 1 10 1 100 100 Koroška cesta 14, 2390 Ravne na Koroškem Pivovarna Laško d.d., 112 NO 6.4 b 2 1.75 5 0.75 75 75 Trubarjeva ulica 28, 3270 Laško POCINKOVALNICA d.o.o., 46 NO 2.6, 2.3 c 1 10 1 100 100 Bežigrajska cesta 6, 3000 Celje RADEČE PAPIR Proizvodnja, 208 NO 6.1 b 2 10 0.67 67 67 trgovina in storitve d.o.o., Njivice 7, 1433 Radeče Steklarna Hrastnik d.d., PE 210 YES 3.3 3 1 0.33 33 83 Vitrum, Cesta 1. maja 14, 1430 Hrastnik STEKLARNA ROGAŠKA d.d., 242 YES 3.3 3 1 0.33 33 133 Ulica talcev 1, 3250 Rogaška Slatina TAB Tovarna akumulatorskih 199 NO 2.5 b, 4.2 e 2 5 0.67 67 67 baterij d.d., Polena 6, 2392 Mežica TAB Tovarna akumulatorskih 238 NO 2.5 b, 4.2 e 2 5 0.67 67 67 baterij d.d., Polena 6, 2392 Mežica Termoelektrarna Trbovlje 252 YES 1.1, 5.4 1 10 1 100 150 d.o.o., Ob železnici 27, 1420 Trbovlje TITAN d.d., Kovinarska cesta 139 NO 2.6 1 10 1 100 100 28, 1241 Kamnik Tovarna kemičnih izdelkov 137 YES 4.2 a, 4.2 b, 1 20 1 100 200 d.d., Za Savo 6, 1430 4.2 c, 4.2 d Hrastnik Vzreja perutnine Sašo Žaljec 151 NO 6.6 a 1.75 5 0.75 75 150 s.p., Lipova ulica 5, Ihan, 1230 Domžale

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Decision SEVESO ACTIVITY Hazard Influ- Actual Damage MC OPERATOR no. CODE potential ential damage pote- _r_ potential km ntial Paloma Tovarna lepenke 43 6.1 b 2 10 0.67 67 67 Prevalje d.d., Nicina 10, 2391 Prevalje TCG Unitech LTH-ol d.o.o., 140 2.5 b 2 5 0.67 67 67 Vincarje 2, 4220 Škofja Loka

The implementation of flood protection measures in two areas would reduce the overall environmental flood damage potential (protected areas: Natura 2000 + water protection areas + bathing water) by 33%, while the implementation of measures in an additional two areas would bring a further reduction of 33%. Furthermore, the implementation of flood protection measures at an additional 36 locations would reduce the total environmental flood damage potential (operators who are subjects to IPPC and SEVESO Directives) by 50%.

Impact on Economic Activities

In this risk assessment, impacts on economic activities are defined according to the location and the extent of the flood risk area, and according to the level of risk indicated by the index value.

Map showing the classification of flood-risk areas (economic activities) at a scale of 1:250,000

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According to the risk to economic activities, the first four classes cover the following areas:

1. Celje: TI = 3.369 2. Koper: TI = 2.865

3. Ljubljana-Vič: TI = 2.059 4. Idrija: TI = 1.021 5. Šempeter pri Gorici: TI = 1.010

6. Železniki: TI = 0.947 7. Kamnik-Spodnje Perovo: TI = 0.78

8. Štore: TI = 0.770(area_min!) 9. Maribor: TI = 0.770(area_min!) 10. Ljubljana-Studenec(2): TI = 0.684(area_min!) 11. Slovenj Gradec: TI = 0.64

12. Hrastnik: TI = 0.554(area_min!) 13. Ljubljana-Studenec(1): TI = 0.489 14. Nazarje(1): TI = 0.478 15. Koper-Šalara: TI = 0.462 16. Nazarje (2): TI = 0.447(area_min!) 17. Sladki Vrh: TI = 0.445(area_min!) 18. Rogaška Slatina: TI = 0.436(area_min!) 19. Lendava: TI = 0.411 20. Ljubljana-Dolgi most: TI = 0.409 21. Celje: TI = 0.404

The implementation of flood protection measures in two areas would reduce the overall potential of damage to economic activities by 10%. The improvement in the flood-related situation in an additional three areas would bring a further reduction of 10%, and an improvement in 6 + 10 = 16 additional areas would result in a reduction of 20%.

Impact on cultural heritage

In this risk assessment, impacts on cultural heritage are defined according to the location and the extent of the flood risk area, and according to the level of risk indicated by the index value.

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According to the risk to cultural heritage, the first two classes cover the following areas:

1. Celje: TI = 56.51 2. Železniki: TI = 26.27 3. Piran: TI = 18.48 4. Novo mesto: TI = 16.80 5. Vransko: TI = 16.08 6. Kropa: TI = 15.02 7. Koper: TI = 13.84 8. Laško: TI = 13.72 9. Bistrica pri Tržiču: TI = 11.32

10. Škofja Loka: TI = 10.41 11. Rogaška Slatina: TI = 9.92 12. Kamna Gorica: TI = 9.41 13. Vojnik: TI = 9.39 14. Radeče: TI = 8.37 15. Mozirje: TI = 8.02 16. Izola: TI = 7.92 17. Podkoren: TI = 7.70 18. Idrija: TI = 7.62 19. Krško: TI = 7.04 20. Kostanjevica na Krki: TI = 6.95 21. Maribor: TI = 6.64 22. Grajska vas: TI = 6.64 23. Trbovlje: TI = 6.42 24. Podnanos: TI = 6.24 25. Slovenske Konjice: TI = 6.00 26. Gornji Grad: TI = 5.93 27. Preddvor: TI = 5.79 28. Kozje: TI = 5.79 29. Begunje na Gorenjskem: TI = 5.31 30. Vitanje: TI = 5.23 31. Brezje pri Tržiču: TI = 5.21 32. Ptuj: TI = 5.16 33. Radmirje: TI = 5.07 34. Dobrna: TI = 4.95 35. Zgornje Poljčane: TI = 4.87 36. Fram: TI = 4.8.

The implementation of flood protection measures in nine areas would reduce the overall potential for flood damage to cultural heritage by 10%, and an improvement in the flood- related situation in an additional 27 areas would bring a further reduction of 10%.

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Map showing the classification of flood-risk areas (cultural heritage) at a scale of 1:250,000

Based on the analysis as part of the process of preliminary flood risk assessments, indices of impact on cultural heritage were determined. The higher the index, the greater the influence.

An assessment of the impact on people was also carried out based on the risk assessment criteria.

Impact on sensitive installations

In this risk assessment, impacts on sensitive installations are defined according to the location and the extent of the flood risk area, and according to the level of risk.

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Map showing the classification of flood-risk areas (sensitive installations) at a scale of 1:250,000

According to the risk to sensitive installations, the first three classes cover the following areas:

1. Ljubljana-south: TI = 54,985 2. Celje: TI = 32,296

3. Mošenik-Radeče: TI = 27,384 4. Prevalje: TI = 19,311 5. Tremerje-Obrežje: TI = 15,416

6. Dravograd: TI = 12,433 7. Mežica: TI = 8,133 8. Hrušica-Jesenice: TI = 7,331 9. Vransko: TI = 5,766 10. Piran: TI = 5,639 11. Moste: TI = 5,582 12. Brezje pri Dobrovi-Razori: TI = 5,152 13. Maribor-nabrežje: TI = 4,987 14. Idrija: TI = 4,886 15. Vitanje-(Socka): TI = 4,759 16. Brestanica-Krško: TI = 4,400.

The implementation of flood protection measures in two areas would reduce the overall potential of damage to sensitive installations by 10%. The improvement in the flood-related

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Overall impact assessment

On the basis of data from maps showing the classification of flood-risk areas (human health, the environment, cultural heritage, economic activities, and sensitive installations) the combined map shows the first five risk classes consisting of a total of 1+1+4+9+14 = 29 flood risk areas. Of particular importance are those additional areas which, although not considered to be significant for any of the categories at risk, still have a high combined risk index (underlined):

1. Ljubljana-south: TI = 20,047

2. Celje: TI = 13,274

3. Renke-Hrastnik-Radeče: TI = 6,938 4. Rifengozd-Laško-(Zidani Most): TI = 4,860 5. Prevalje-Ravne na Koroškem: TI = 3,290 6. Koper-south: TI = 2,693

7. Idrija: TI = 2,331 8. Tržič: TI = 2,019 9. Železniki: TI = 1,920 10. Vrtojba-Šempeter pri Gorici: TI = 1,826 11. Rožno-Krško: TI = 1,780 12. Komenda-Moste-Suhadole: TI = 1,538 13. Brezje pri Dobrovi-Dobrova: TI = 1,521 14. Litija-Sava: TI = 1,420 15. Domžale-east: TI = 1,368

16. Vransko: TI = 1,353 17. Trbovlje: TI = 1,347 18. Zalog-Podgrad-Videm: TI = 1,330 19. Portorož-Lucija: TI = 1,243 20. Šentjanž pri Dravogradu-Dravograd: TI = 1,229 21. Nova Gorica-west: TI = 1,203 22. Maribor-nabrežje: TI = 1,193 23. Lendava: TI = 1,187 24. Mežica: TI = 1,166 25. Laze pri Dolskem-Kresnice: TI = 1,158 26. Horjul: TI = 1,105 27. Vitanje-(Socka): TI = 1,094 28. Hrušica: TI = 1,058 29. Grosuplje: TI = 1,019

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The implementation of flood protection measures for the areas Ljubljana-south and Celje would reduce the overall flood damage potential by 20%, and measures for 4 + 9 additional areas would bring a further reduction of 20%. A further 14 areas would contribute to an additional 10% reduction in the total damage potential.

Based on the analysis as part of the process of preliminary flood risk assessments, the combined impact indices were determined. The higher the index, the greater is the impact. Given the above, it should be emphasised that during the preparation of this threat assessment individual impact indices were determined (impact on people, the economy, the environment, cultural heritage, and sensitive installations) and also the combination of all the impacts. The exact risk level for a specific element at risk in the area in question, or the aggregate impact, is presented in cartographic layers for a surface unit of 75 x 75 metres, which will be included in the final phase of the flood risk assessment.

On the basis of the five classification maps for flood-risk areas (human health, the environment, economic activities, cultural heritage and sensitive installations), a combined map was prepared, showing the classification of the flood-risk areas. The combined map defines the overall flood risk impacts at the national level, and identifies 1190 relevant potential flood risk areas with a total surface area of 106 km2, 225,063 residents, 43,649 buildings, 26,425 business entities and 5,038 cultural heritage facilities.

Map showing the classification of flood-risk areas in Slovenia at a scale of 1:250,000

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Of the potential risk areas, 61 of them (areas of significant flood impact) together have 50% of the total flood damage potential of the country. The map shows that the areas with highest potential risk or areas with the highest estimated potential risk are the areas Ljubljana-south and Celje.

The aggregated data from the map showing the classification of river basins show that the Srednja Sava river basin has the highest potential risk index, followed by the Savinja and Drava rivers, and then the Zgornja Sava and Spodnja Sava rivers. The Soča and Mura rivers and the basins of the Adriatic rivers with the sea have a slightly lower index, which means that their flood areas have a lower damage potential (people, buildings, cultural monuments, business entities, industrial plants and facilities, major infrastructure, and other sensitive installations).

Flood risk to river basins

Adriatic Upper Middle Lower rivers Mura Drava Savinja Soča Sava Sava Sava with the sea Number of 4 5 9 6 19 8 7 3 OPVP Number of residents per 2,100 8,500 23,000 10,500 56,000 5,000 12,000 12,000 OPVP Number of buildings per 500 1,500 3,200 1,700 10,100 10,000 2,500 27,000 OPVP

LIKELIHOOD AND RELIABILITY OF RISK ANALYSES

On the basis of the preliminary results of the flood risk analysis in the preliminary flood risk assessment, a flood risk assessment was carried out according to the criteria for assessing the risk and likelihood of a disaster. It should be stressed that all the impacts were analysed only in areas identified as areas with flood potential, and other areas were not included.

Likelihood of risk analyses

Floods similar to those in Risk Scenario 1 can occur every five to 25 years, while floods comparable with those in Risk Scenario 2 are assumed to occur every 25 to 100 years.

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Reliability of risk analyses

The analyses conducted to assess the impact on people, the economy, the environment, cultural heritage, and sensitive installations, are relatively reliable. The analysis of political and social impacts has lower reliability, since it is based on a subjective estimation.

COMPARISON BETWEEN RISK IMPACTS AND CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE RISK AND LIKELIHOOD OF DISASTERS

Comparison between the results of risk analyses and criteria for impact assessment

The comparison between the results of risk analyses and the appropriate criteria for assessing the risk impacts and the likelihood of a disaster is one of the most important elements in assessing the risk of a particular disaster. The criteria can be used to assess the severity of a particular disaster and risk impacts, the likelihood of risk, and the significance of various scenarios and risk analyses. Since the criteria for assessing risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters are the same for all risks, they also allow the comparison between impacts or consequences and the likelihood of an individual disaster risk and other risks.

Risk Scenario 1 can be compared to the flood events in 2007, 2009, 2010 and September 2014, while Risk Scenario 2 can be compared to the flood events in 1990 and 2012.

Comparison and analysis of the results of the impacts on people

Impacts on people are assessed primarily based on the number of fatalities, the number of injured or sick people, the number of permanently evacuated people, the number of people who live and work in the areas affected by the disaster, and so on. For disasters with possible long-term impacts (such as accidents involving dangerous substances, and nuclear or radiological accidents), these impacts are used or determined based on the number of fatalities and of injured or sick people during the period of 10 years following the disaster. The criteria for assessing risk impacts on people are expressed in the number of fatalities, injured or sick people, and permanently evacuated people.

On 9 October 1963, during the filling of a reservoir at the hydroelectric power plant Vaiont in Italy, a large landslide fell into the reservoir. The landslide caused the water (more than 50 million cubic metres) to overflow the dam, spilling into the valley in a form of a 250-metre wave. The flood wave destroyed several villages and killed 1,917 people.

In the middle of November 2000, heavy rainfall in the settlement of Log pod Mangartom led to an increase in the volume of the torrential river Mangartski Potok and other smaller tributaries (although it must be stressed that owing to previous rainfall in October and November 2000, when the total amount of rain was 1,872 l/m2, the ground was extremely waterlogged). The water saturated a mass of material which had accumulated from a previous landslide. This mass then collapsed in the upper part of Mangartski Potok and slid

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downwards in the form of a debris flow, speeding towards the very steep bed of Mangartski Potok and continuing along the steep bed of Predelica mountain river to the settlement of Zgornji Log. At that location, it destroyed a bridge and demolished six buildings and damaged others, killing seven people.

In recent years, there has been a rise in fatalities resulting from the victims wanting to save their movable property (cars, etc.) and protect their immovable property (residential buildings, etc.). The level of vulnerability to such events depends heavily on the frequency of the occurrence of floods, and on the activities for raising the awareness of people about the flood risk and recommended actions during the flood event (flood risk awareness). In the autumn of 2015, at least 40 people died in one night during floods in the Cote d'Azur in France near the town of Antibes. The water flooded a nursing home, killing victims in their sleep. Some people died when trying to park their vehicles in a safe place during the storm, and some of them drowned in a car which was stuck in a flooded tunnel.

Up to now, there have been only few cases of flood events with a large number of deaths. However, it is important to be aware of the fact that there are a large number of people at risk due to flooding.

In Slovenia, 1,190 important potential flood risk areas have been identified, with a total area of 106 km2 and 43,649 buildings and 225,063 residents, of which 130,000 people live in 61 areas of significant flood impact. In these areas of significant flood impact, there are 23,000 buildings.

Given the number of people at risk in the area of flood risk potential, the assessment of the impacts on the population in both risk scenarios is realistic, assuming that floods develop over a long period of time (several days) and there are no intense local storms or other unpredictable circumstances.

The assessment of impacts on the population

Criteria for the assessment of risk 1 2 3 4 5 impacts on the population Number of fatalities Up to 5 5-10 10-50 50-200 More than 200 S1 S2

Number of fatalities (10 years)* Up to 5 5-10 10-50 50-100 More than 100 Number of injured or sick people Up to 10 10-50 50-200 200-1000 More than 1000 S1 S2

Number of injured or sick people (10 years) Up to 10 10-50 50-200 200-500 More than 500 Number of evacuated people (permanent Up to 20 20-50 50-200 200-500 More than 500 measure) *For disasters with possible long-term impacts (e.g. up to 10 years), such as disasters involving dangerous substances and nuclear or radiological accidents, the long-term values representing fatalities and injured or sick people (10 years) can be determined separately or additionally, if necessary, as mentioned above. ** Injured or sick people include people who were affected by radiation, contamination or poisoning. In risk analyses with individual risks, these people can be dealt with separately. Their number is added to the number of the injured or sick people.

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Included in the number of fatalities and injured people are the possible dead and injured members of protection, rescue and relief forces involved in emergency response operations, and the number of policemen and members of the armed forces and emergency response teams belonging to different services (e.g. teams from electrical or public utility companies and others) who died or were injured during the implementation of emergency measures under their responsibility, and during the initial restoration activities, but not later than one year after the disaster.

Risk Scenario 1 includes a smaller number of the affected statistical regions than Risk Scenario 2. Both risk scenarios are based on the occurrence of "normal floods" without extraordinary events, such as the collapse of water infrastructure facilities (water reservoirs, levees, etc.) or combined disasters (e.g. ice storms, spills of dangerous substances, etc.).

Depending on the expected extent of a flood event and based on the analysed data of recent floods, it was estimated that with regard to its impact on the population, Risk Scenario 1 falls into level 3. According to the same principle, the impact of Risk Scenario 2 on the population was ranked at level 4.

To determine the impacts of Risk Scenario 1 (major floods), the data from comparable floods in 2007 and 2010 were used. In 2007, floods killed six people, and in the 2010 floods, five people lost their lives. In the event of catastrophic floods (Risk scenario 2), a large number of fatalities would be expected (between 10 and 20; the 1990 flood is comparable to the flood in of 1933). In the case of technical floods (the collapse of a levee or flood-control reservoir) and a combination of circumstances, the number of deaths can be higher than 200.

Assessment of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage

The assessment of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage

1 2 3 4 5 Up to 0.3% Between 0.3% Between 0.6% Between 1.2% Over 2.4% GDP and 0.6% of and 1.2% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP GDP GDP Up to EUR 100 EUR 220-440 EUR 440-880 More than EUR million EUR 100-220 million million 880 million million S1 S2

To assess the economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, the data from past flood events was used. In 2007, one third of the territory of the Republic of Slovenia was under water, and the flood damaged 4,329 residential buildings, 979 business facilities, 61 public institutes, 192 companies, 347 kilometres of national and 1,591 kilometres

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 278/464 ______of municipal roads, 147 bridges, 17 kilometres of water supply network, seven kilometres of electricity grid, and 48 water reservoirs; furthermore, 432 landslides were triggered, threatening 29 buildings. The flood in 2012 was greater in extent, covering three quarters of the statistical regions in Slovenia and causing greater damage than the 2007 floods. Among the affected, flooded or damaged were 3,608 residential buildings, 658 administrative and business facilities and 10 schools, and 397 landslides were registered.

The 2012 floods were more extensive than those of 2007. Around 700 more residential buildings and a larger number of business facilities were flooded.

In total, there are 1,190 important areas which are potentially at risk of flooding, having a total of 43,649 buildings, 26,425 businesses entities and 5,038 cultural heritage facilities. In the 61 areas of significant flood impact, the following are potentially at risk: 23,000 buildings, 540 cultural monuments, 17,000 business entities, 600 kilometres of public infrastructure, and 400 sensitive installations.

Based on the analyses from the preliminary threat assessment in combination with the criteria for assessing disaster risk impacts, Risk Scenario 1 fell into level 3 of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, and Risk Scenario 2 was ranked at level 4.

Each additional flooding increases the damage resulting from incomplete mitigation and elimination of the consequences of previous floods.

Criteria for the assessment of political and social impacts

Criteria for the assessment of impacts on the functioning of state authorities

During a flood event, the functioning of the responsible state authorities is always limited, and in many cases strongly impaired. Depending on the type of the flood, the assessment includes such factors as the length of time water stays on the surface, water runoff, and the consequences of a specific flood.

The ability of state authorities (Government, ministries, constituent bodies, administrative units) to perform functions within their responsibility, in the affected area

Duration Limited Strongly impaired Disabled Up to 2 days 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 1 2 Up to 15 days 2 2 3 Up to 30 days 2 3 S1 4 More than 30 days 3 4 S2 5 *1-5: Level of impact. This assessment has a low reliability level.

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Floods restrict the access both to the flooded areas and to the people at risk. The biggest impact is lack of access to the disaster areas. A combination of two events can prevent access to the affected locations owing to destroyed connecting routes (e.g. Polhov Gradec in August 2014, the collapse of bridges, and the blocking of road infrastructure). Even now some locations are still not accessible following the 2014 ice storm damage (e.g. some hinterlands of watercourses).

The responsible authorities can begin performing their usual functions only after the most urgent emergency response operations have been completed.

The table below shows the assessed impact on the provision of services.

The number of people affected by impaired or disrupted provision of services of public authorities (either physically or functionally)

The assessed parameters in the above table are based on the assumption that emergency response operations, and also part of rehabilitation works, are carried out immediately after the disaster. If not, the time interval of the impact is longer.

Flooding can affect different types of services in flood areas. The duration and extent of possible difficulties in the provision of a particular service depend on the service itself. In certain cases, the consequences can be eliminated within a few days. However, on average, the estimated unwanted impacts are felt for at least two to four weeks.

Criteria for the assessment of impacts on the functioning of important infrastructure systems

The impact of different flood scenarios on the supply of basic raw materials, such as water, electricity and other energy products, was also assessed.

Lack of or reduced access to water, food and electricity

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than people/duration and 5,000 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 S1 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 S2 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days

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The highest risk in the event of floods is access to drinking water, particularly owing to groundwater contamination, while access to other goods is rated as medium risk. The table above also shows the estimated overall assessment of impacts (water, food, electricity) for a particular risk scenario.

The table below shows the assessed disruption in the provision of services resulting from a flood event; such services include the use of the internet and telecommunications systems; getting to work and educational institutions; the use of public services (access to media, health services, banking services); the use of public transport; and the supply/purchase of basic necessities.

Impaired or disabled use of the internet, lateness for work, the use of public services, the use of public transport, etc.

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 More than people/duration and 5,000 and 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 S1 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 S2 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days For the purpose of further work, the impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If the same number of people is affected in at least two cases, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration.

According to the assessment, the impact was the greatest on the use of public services and the use of public transport. The next greatest impact was the inability to get to, or lateness for, work.

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Criteria for the assessment of psychosocial impacts

The number of people showing an unusual or undesirable behavioural reaction, such as avoiding school or kindergarten; deliberate absence from work; deliberate avoidance of public transport; desire to move to another location; irrational financial operations (mass cash withdrawals, etc.); stockpiling and appropriation of basic necessities; and similar reactions.

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than people and 5,000 50,000 50,000 duration Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 S1 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 S2 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days

Following the forecast of an increase in the level of hydrological risk, people, especially those who are frequently affected by floods, begin to prepare for a possible flood event (over a period of between one and five days). In order to protect themselves, they start to prepare stocks of water (owing to the possibility of water contamination), petroleum products (water pumps), sand bags, sand, etc.

In the event of exaggerated forecasts and incorrect media reports on the extent of the forthcoming event, extreme responses of the population can be observed, such as in the case of the forecasts of a catastrophic hurricane in New York in 2015. In panic, people accumulated all sorts of goods. Thus, timely and accurate information for the public is very important.

In 2014, owing to several consecutive floods in the Republic of Slovenia, a large number of purchases of water pumps for private use, sandbags, and items for self-protection against floods, etc., were observed.

In the case of a flood event, all strata of society in the afflicted area (area with flood risk potential) are affected. After the flood, an increase in the number of requests for state aid and damage claims for compensation caused by the floods is observed. Floods often destroy movable property (furniture, cars, etc.) and cause damage to real property (buildings, drying, painting, etc.). Each ingress of water into buildings or structures cause damage which requires rehabilitation.

On the basis of the above information, an assessment of flood impact on this area was made, as shown in the next table.

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Social impacts

Type of impact Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 The poor social classes find themselves in severe social distress; the 2 number of applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash increases. The consequences of the disaster are also felt by the middle class 3 population, which is reflected in an increased number of applications for extraordinary social assistance benefit in cash. The consequences of the disaster are felt by the majority of the 4 S1, S2 population, which is reflected in a considerable increase in the number of social relief applications. The consequences are felt by the entire population, which is reflected 5 mainly in new applications for social relief, and in renewed applications for the allocation of assistance.

All this damage leads to additional pressures on social transfers. Stories are often heard of flood victims who have just recovered from the last flood when a new one occurs. Accordingly, it is estimated that the social impact caused by flooding is large (level 4), particularly on a population with low income.

Floods have a major psychological impact, which can last several months or even years after the flood event. At each occurrence of a major flood, both anger and a sense of helplessness arise, and above all a higher rate of distrust in the responsible authorities.

Psychological impacts

Type of impact Level of impact Disaster impacts cannot interfere with the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual incidents of fear among the population owing to the lack of 2 information regarding the reasons for the disaster and its characteristics and consequences. Increased level of fear among the population; fear of a new disaster 3 and its consequences. The population fear for their lives; decreased trust in the responsible 4 S1, S2 authorities regarding their response and mitigation and elimination of disaster consequences; increasing desire to relocate. Due to the negative events or consequences of a disaster, the 5 majority of people cease to believe that normal life in the affected area would ever again be possible; mass relocation takes place.

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In accordance with the chosen methodology and description of the level, the psychological impact of floods is ranked at level 4. Level 5 would also be realistic, but was not chosen owing to the wording "cease to believe that normal life in the affected area would ever again be possible; mass relocation takes place."

The population in Slovenia is typically reluctant to consider relocating. Considering this, no significant relocation resulting from flood risk can be observed. As a measure to ensure flood safety and reduce vulnerability in Slovenia, relocation is unwanted and therefore difficult to carry out.

Criteria for the assessment of impacts on internal political stability

A major flood is followed by extensive media coverage of the event. Owing to the large number of means of communication, anger and dissatisfaction of people spread more widely and are more intense today than they used to be in the past. As a result of the non- functioning of the state, civil society initiatives are set up after a natural disaster, bringing together large groups of people on their way towards the desired goal. However, no substantial increase in the number of breaches of law and order, or in the number of criminal offences resulting from flooding can be observed. Hence, the assessed impact on internal political stability is moderate.

Impact on internal political stability and law and order

Impact Level of impact Disaster impacts cannot interfere with the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Isolated cases of public expression of disagreement with the 2 S1 action of the responsible institutions. Individual disruptions in the functioning of political institutions (the Government, the Parliament, etc.); individual hostile campaigns. Individual cases of violation of law and order and criminal offences 3 S2 resulting from the disaster; observed expressions of fear for one's own safety and property. Individuals or groups try to undermine the internal political situation; reduced trust of the population in the functioning of political institutions. Increased number of violations of law and order and of organised 4 criminal offences; increased fear among the population. Political parties and/or other stakeholders try to undermine internal political stability and obtain political benefits by "imposing" their own programmes for improving the situation; reduced trust in the functioning of state institutions. Massive violations of law and order including violent demonstrations; 5 significant increase in the number of criminal offences; the internal

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Impact Level of impact security of the state is at risk. The internal political stability of the state is undermined; the basic rights provided for in the Constitution are undermined and at risk.

Criteria for the assessment of impacts on financial stability

Obviously, the solvency of people and entities in the flood area is at least reduced, and in some cases even destroyed. Of course, this is on a case by case basis, since some business entities are more affected than others.

The impact on legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to payment system failures has been assessed, as shown in the table below.

Impact on legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to payment system failures

Settlement Failure to Failure to Failure to Failure to Failure to failure value settle settle settle settle settle Duration of the payments in payments in payments in payments in payments in failure an amount an amount an amount an amount an amount lower than between 10% between 20% between 50% higher than 10% of the and 20% of and 50% of and 80% of 80% of the planned value the planned the planned the planned planned value of the value of the value of the value of the of the payment payment payment payment payment system during system during system during system during system during disturbances disturbances disturbances disturbances disturbances No impact, because disaster Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed impacts cannot (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) interfere with the assessed content. Disturbances in the payment 1 1 2 3 3 system up to 2hrs long Disturbances in the payment 1 2 2 3 4 system up to 4hrs long Disturbances in the payment 2 3 3 4 4 system up to 8hrs long Disturbances in 3 4 4 5 5 the payment system which

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Settlement Failure to Failure to Failure to Failure to Failure to failure value settle settle settle settle settle Duration of the payments in payments in payments in payments in payments in failure an amount an amount an amount an amount an amount lower than between 10% between 20% between 50% higher than 10% of the and 20% of and 50% of and 80% of 80% of the planned value the planned the planned the planned planned value of the value of the value of the value of the of the payment payment payment payment payment system during system during system during system during system during disturbances disturbances disturbances disturbances disturbances last the entire business day and are not eliminated by the end of the business day* Disturbances in the payment 4 5 (S1) 5 (S2) 5 5 system lasting more than one business day

Based on the assessment of the consequences of both risk scenarios, it was assessed that the impacts can be observed for at least one day. The assessed value of failure to settle payments as a proportion of the planned value of the payment system during disturbances is a subjective estimation.

Impact on legal and natural persons' capacity to pay due to lack of cash

Number of affected Up to 5,000 Up to 50,000 More than 50,000 people/duration Up to 2 days 1 2 3 From 2 to 7 days 2 3 4 More than 7 days 3 4 5 Legend: 1 – No or small impact. 2 – Legal and natural persons have difficulties accessing cash in their place of residence. 3 – Legal and natural persons can access cash in neighbouring areas. 4 – Legal and natural persons can access cash in bigger cities or individual areas. 5 – Cash cannot be accessed.

Based on the assessment of the consequences of both risk scenarios, it was assessed that Risk scenarios nos. 1 and 2 would not affect the activities related to the assessed content from the above table.

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Changes in the growth in GDP owing to a disaster in the year of the disaster or the following year

Changes in the growth in GDP Level of impact No impact because disaster impacts do not refer to the Not assessed (NA) content/no consequences From 0 to -0.5 percentage points 1 Up to -1 percentage point 2 S1 Up to -1.5 percentage points 3 Up to -2 percentage points 4 More than -2 percentage points 5 S2

Consequences for the growth in GDP were assessed based on recorded past flood events and their damage. A subjective estimation of losses due to the loss of income and profit was also taken into account.

Criteria for the assessment of impacts on foreign policy and international stability

According to the assessment, no significant direct impact can be observed for Risk Scenario 1. Individual foreign countries follow the developments in the RS. In the case of Risk Scenario 2, it was assessed that Slovenia would need international assistance or at least the assistance of neighbouring countries.

Foreign policy (international) risk impact

Impact Level of impact

Disaster impacts cannot interfere with the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 No great known direct impact on the international perception of the state; individual foreign countries follow the situation in the RS. 2 S1 Individual (neighbouring) countries and individual regional and international organisations respond to the event via diplomatic 3 channels, expressing their support and concern due to the situation. A part of the international community (states, international organisations) responds to the event by expressing their strong 4 S2 support or concern due to the situation. The RS is receiving international assistance, specifically in equipment and human resources. Despite international assistance, Slovenia remains a stable state. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the RS advise their citizens against travel to certain areas of the RS.

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Impact Level of impact

A large part of the international community responds strongly to the events in the country, since these have a strong impact on the 5 security of other states. The RS receives extensive international assistance (equipment, money, human resources). The RS is in urgent need of assistance in order to establish the normal functioning of its road system. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the RS advise their citizens against travel to the RS due to the situation in the country, and reduce or increase the number of staff at these posts. International events, the main topic of which is the position of the RS or the situation in it.

Floods have no regard for national borders. In the 2012 floods, the flood wave spread from Austria to Slovenia and then moved on to Croatia and Serbia. In the case of such events, cross-border or international cooperation between protection, rescue and relief forces is necessary. Although good cross-border cooperation in such cases is crucial, appropriate regulation of water quantity is also important. The affected country must do its best to keep the flood wave on its own territory and thus limit the damage it can cause to the downstream neighbouring country.

Based on these facts, Risk Scenario 2 (catastrophic floods) was ranked at impact level 4, and Risk Scenario 1 (major floods) at impact level 2.

The final value and level of political and social impacts

Based on the assessment of the impacts (six impact groups), the table below shows the calculation of political and social impacts for both risk scenarios (major floods and catastrophic floods).

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Assessment of political and social impacts

Valueof impact group 1 Valueof impact 2 Valueof impact g Valueof impact group 4 Valueof impact group 5 Valueof impact group 6 Totalimpact value Averageimpact value social and political impacts of level The

Riskscenario

roup 3

Scenario 3 2.5 3.33 2 3.5 2 16.33 2.72 3 1 Scenario 4 3.5 3.67 3 5 4 23.17 3.86 4 2

The assessment of political and social impacts is a subjective estimation based on the criteria for the assessment of disaster risk. The assessment process revealed that the most salient consequences are related to cash flows. Large direct damage is recorded, and there is also considerable damage resulting from the loss of profit from activities. In this regard, an increased level of outflows for social assistance is observed (financial assistance, damage compensation, etc.).

Flooding has a very significant psychological impact. The growth of the impact is proportional to the frequency and intensity of flood events. In the population floods cause unrest, fear, and, in the final stages, anger and despair. These consequences can be observed even several years after an event. The functioning of state authorities and various public services is impaired, and people's behaviour is changed or adjusted to floods.

It should be noted that the political and social criteria for assessing the risk also include time classes related to how long a certain impact can be observed. In the case of floods, the assessed duration of a certain impact can only be a subjective estimation, since the normalisation of the situation is highly dependent on the type of the flood event, its location, timely and effective response operations of responsible organisations, and measures to be carried out after the flood (mitigation and elimination of consequences). Based on these variables (others are also possible), the impact of the various categories can vary greatly from one location to another.

For Risk Scenario 1, the final level of political and social impacts is 3, and for Risk Scenario 2, the final level is 4.

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Criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of a disaster

1 2 3 4 5

Once every 250 Once every Once every 25 to Once every 5 to Once or more years 100 to 250 100 years 25 years every 5 years (annual years (annual likelihood (annual (annual likelihood of up (annual between 1 and 4%) likelihood likelihood of to 0.4%) likelihood between 4 and more than 20%) between 0.4 20%) and 1%)

Hardly any risk Possible but Possible risk General risk Special and (threat) less likely risk (threat) (threat) imminent (threat) (permanent) risk (threat) S2 S1

The assessment of flood risk takes into account the fact that floods of different return periods ranging from two to 500 years, but predominantly in the range of 25 to 100 years, occur simultaneously in most watercourses. For the purposes of risk analysis, two scenarios with a different intensity of impact and different levels of likelihood of the occurrence were selected.

For Risk Scenario 1, the likelihood of the occurrence of a flood event ranges between five and 25 years. For Risk Scenario 2, the likelihood of the occurrence of a flood event is between 25 and 100 years. According to these assessments, Risk Scenario 2 is ranked at likelihood level 3, and Risk Scenario 1 at likelihood level 4.

RISK MATRICES

Risk matrices are used to provide a graphic display of the level of flood risk, and its interdependence with impact and likelihood. Disaster risk matrices are one of the main objectives of the preparation of risk assessments for individual disasters.

Disaster risk matrices consist of five fields on the ordinate axis indicating levels of risk impacts, and five fields on the abscissa axis indicating levels of risk likelihood. The fields are coloured in shades from red to green; the levels of impact and likelihood increase from green to yellow to orange to red. The colour of the fields changes more rapidly on the vertical axis than on the horizontal axis, which means that risk matrices put greater emphasis on risk impacts than on the likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster. A matrix has 25 fields altogether, in which, based on the content of the matrix, individual risk (or individual risk

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impacts) can be ranked in reference to the relationship between the size of the impacts identified in the risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of disaster risks. The same applies to the likelihood of the risk. In disaster risk matrices, the combination of likelihood and impacts is depicted by one of the four levels, specifically:

- Low risk with green fields; - Medium risk with yellow fields; - High risk with orange fields; - Very high risk with red fields.

The level of overall or average impact is calculated by dividing the sum of the level of risk impacts on people, the level of economic and environmental impacts, and the level of impacts on cultural heritage, together with political and social impacts, by three. The final calculated value of impacts can also be a decimal number. In this case, the final level of the overall (average) impacts must be determined, and the value must be a whole number.

The conversion of the overall (average) level of risk impacts to be inserted into the fields of the disaster risk matrices showing the overall value of risk impacts

The calculated value of all three The level of risk impacts in disaster risk matrices impact types showing the overall value of risk impacts 1.00-1.49 1 1.50-2.49 2 2.50-3.49 3 3.50-4.49 4 4.50-5.00 5

By using the data in this table, the final table can be completed with all the data required for the calculation of the levels of impacts in the matrix showing the overall value of risk impacts. Two columns in a table are of a darker shade. These columns are used for the disaster risk matrix showing the overall impacts of risk.

Calculation of the average risk impacts for a risk matrix showing the overall risk impacts

Risk scenario Level of Level of Level of Calculated The level Risk Reliability impacts economic and political overall of overall likelihood of risk on environmental and value (average analysis people risk impacts social (average level) of and impacts impacts level) of risk on cultural impacts impacts heritage Risk Scenario 3 3 3 3.00 3 4 Relatively 1 reliable Risk Scenario 4 4 4 4.00 4 3 Relatively 2 reliable

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The level of risk impacts on people is lower in Risk Scenario 1 than in Risk Scenario 2, which is understandable given that the floods in Risk Scenario 2 are more extensive. However, small floods which are more sudden and violent can have a much higher impact on people than those considered in the two risk scenarios. Negative impacts on people can also be reduced by raising the awareness of the population regarding flood risks.

If floods occur in areas which are rarely flooded, people are not aware of the risk they are exposed to. As a result, large numbers of injuries and, in the worst cases, large numbers of fatalities are recorded.

The economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage are one level higher in Risk scenario 2 than in Risk scenario 1, owing to the fact that a larger part of Slovenia is flooded in the former than in the latter scenario. In general, the same applies for the political and economic impacts.

According to the calculated average level of impacts (average impacts on people, economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, and political and social impacts), the estimated overall level of impacts for both risk scenarios was as follows:

- Risk scenario 1: level three overall (average) risk impacts - Risk scenario 2: level four overall (average) risk impacts

Analyses from the threat assessment show that the majority of floods occur in return periods ranging from 2 to 500 years, especially in the return period between 25 and 100 years.

Risk Scenario 1 is based on the analysis of the flood events in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2014. These floods are mutually comparable with regard to the determined boundary conditions of the scenario. It was determined that floods from Risk Scenario 1 can occur in a return period between five and 25 years, with a likelihood level of 4.

Risk Scenario 2 is based on the analysis of the flood events in 1990 (which is comparable to the flood in 1933), and floods in 2012. These floods are mutually comparable with regard to the determined boundary conditions of the scenario. It was determined that floods from Risk Scenario 2 can occur in a return period between 25 and 100 years, with a likelihood level of 3.

According to the analysis carried out in the context of flood risk, the assessment of the impacts on people is relatively reliable (black colour).

According to the analysis carried out in the context of flood risk, the assessment of the impacts on the economy, environment and cultural heritage is relatively reliable (black colour).

According to the analysis of the methodology for risk assessment carried out in the context of the preparation of flood risk assessment, the assessment of the social and economic impacts is relatively reliable (light grey colour).

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As a result, the overall assessment of impacts in relation to the estimated level of impacts is moderately reliable (black colour).

Reliability of the analyses and assessments in the context of determining the risk level

Reliability Reliability Reliability Overall assessment Level of impacts Level of economic Level of political and of reliability of on people and environmental social impacts risk analysis impacts and impacts results

on cultural heritage Risk scenario Risk S1 Relatively Relatively reliable Relatively unreliable Relatively reliable reliable S2 Relatively Relatively reliable Relatively unreliable Relatively reliable reliable

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11.3 Annex 3: Risk scenario: The Occurrence of Foot-and-Mouth Disease

RISK SCENARIO

This Risk scenario deals with one of the transboundary diseases which have already occurred in the Republic of Slovenia, for the last time in 1968.

SCENARIO FRAMEWORK

Time Duration Extent Reference events Beginning of summer 2 months 3 infected holdings The 2001 outbreak in – July Limitations are in Protection zone has United Kingdom and place at least 1 year a radius of 3 km the Netherlands Surveillance zone Other outbreaks has a radius of 10 km around the world

Description of the disease

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease that affects cloven- hoofed animals, especially cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and also some species of cloven-hoofed wild game (deer, wild boar). The disease is caused by the virus of the Picornaviridae family, which has seven subtypes. The most important are the subtypes O, A and C.

High mortality can occur among young animals, in particular in lamb and piglets. Death of adult animals is rare. The disease causes huge economic damage, not so much for direct loss due to deaths (2 to 5%) than for indirect loses, such as long-term and significant decline in milk production, abortions, birth of unviable animals, weight loss, etc. The disease represents a very important obstacle to international trade in animals and their products.

In cattle, the first sign of the disease is high temperature, accompanied by depression, loss of appetite and a sudden drop in milk yield. After that, blisters appear on tongue, lips, gums, dental pad, nostrils, skin above and between hooves, teats, and so on. Within 24 hours, blisters burst and leave behind painful ulcers. With severe infections, the tongue mucosa may exfoliate. Mouth ulcers lead to an increased secretion of saliva, smacking and difficulty in feeding. Damage to the hooves leads to acute lameness and rejection of movement, while secondary infections can cause serious damage to deep tissues of the hooves. Very quickly, weight loss appears. Damage to the teats can lead to mastitis.

In pigs, fever, loss of appetite and resistance to movement appear. The most evident are changes to claws, causing acute lameness and frequent lying, especially when pigs are housed on solid ground. With pigs, blisters on the tongue are very rare and are also very quickly healed. Foot-and-mouth disease in small ruminants appears in the mildest form and is often not identified early enough. Usually, blisters occur on the dental pad and on the upper side of the tongue. They form small lesions which heal very quickly. Foot damage is

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 294/464 ______very difficult to identify, but it most often occurs in the cleft between the claws. In a flock of small ruminants, lameness is most often observed, which has to be distinguished from other forms of lameness. As with other animal species, sudden deaths and high mortality of the young may also occur in small ruminants, mainly due to the damage of the heart muscle.

Risk

Risk scenario comprises the description of the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the north-eastern part of Slovenia, where the number of cloven-hoofed animals is greater. Due to its high tendency to spread, the disease usually affects a large area of the state and may also reach beyond Slovenian borders. Foot-and-mouth disease is primarily an economic disease. In addition to causing direct damage (measures on the infected holdings within the protection and surveillance zones), it also leads to another serious problem, the prohibition of trading. The disposal of carcasses of killed and dead animals leads to environmental problems.

Location of the event and extent of the affected area

The occurrence of FMD at holdings located in the area of the AFSVSPP Regional Unit Murska Sobota Poz_index_farma = Poz_index_farm Izbruh 2 = Outbreak 2 Izbruh 3 = Outbreak 3 Goveja_nad_500 = Cattle_more than_500 Gospodarstva = Holdings Okuženo_izbruh 1 = Protection zone_outbreak 1 Okuženo_izbruh 2 = Protection zone_outbreak 2 Okuženo_izbruh 3 = Protection zone_outbreak 3 Ogroženo območje = Surveillance zone

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The outbreak area covers the area of the AFSVSPP Regional Unit Murska Sobota. The figure below shows holdings which keep more than 500 cattle. FMD occurred at a holding located in the area of the AFSVSPP Regional Unit Murska Sobota (Poz_index_farma – red triangle). The figure below shows a detailed image of the area, indicating the protection and surveillance zones and the holdings located in those zones.

The table below shows the number of holdings with susceptible animals, and the number of animals in the protection and surveillance zones. At altogether 3.487 holdings, there are 11.006 heads of cattle, 44.173 pigs and 1.805 small ruminants.

The population of animals in the area of the FMD occurrence

Area Holding Cattle Pigs Small Total number of ruminants animals Index farm 1 655 6 7 668 Protection zone – 152 776 697 37 1510 outbreak 1 Protection zone – 219 578 3187 29 3794 outbreak 2 Protection zone – 35 124 170 20 314 outbreak 3 Surveillance zone 3081 9528 40,119 1719 51,366 Total 3487 11,006 44,173 1805 56,984

Severity and time frame

Taking into account the nature of the disease, every occurrence of FMD represents a high risk. The disease occurred at the beginning of the summer. It is difficult to determine the time frame. In accordance with the provisions of the Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the Republic of Slovenia is a country recognised as free from FMD (the last outbreak dates back to 1968). It is important to detect the disease early on. Following the outbreak of the disease and all implemented measures, Slovenia has to once again obtain the status of a disease-free country, which takes at least 12 months after the last occurrence of the disease.

Course and development

FMD occurred at a holding in which intensive rearing of cattle takes place. In the beginning of July, the owner of the holding, breeding 655 heads of cattle, six pigs, and seven heads of small ruminants, bought 45 calves from Bulgaria. The calves were transported by a lorry from Burgas, a port located in the eastern part of Bulgaria. Two days after housing the animals, they started showing signs of fever, loss of appetite and fatigue. Soon afterwards, the newly- purchased animals showed clinical signs (increased salivation). For this reason, the holder called a local veterinarian, which, based on the clinical signs, suspected that the animals had

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FMD. The veterinarian gave the holder written instructions on the measures to prevent the spread of FMD:

- Movement of animals and products from and to the suspected holding is forbidden; - Movement of people and animals must be restricted (the holder must protect the facility housing the animals suspected of being infected with FMD, so that other people and animals cannot come in contact with them); - Transport of animal carcases from the holding is forbidden.

The veterinarian called the duty number for reporting suspected cases of Highly contagious animal diseases. Until the arrival of the expert team activated by the National disease control centre (DSNB), the veterinarian remained at the holding. It is crucial to determine the first disease case ("index case", "index farm", "index premises" - "IP"), since the FMD incubation period is two to 15 days (most probably five days). An indicative determination of this period is the key to determining the course of the disease and its spread to other holdings. The epizootiological inquiry showed that some calves originate from Turkey, where the FMD is endemic. Three calves, not yet showing the signs of the disease, were transported to Burgas (Bulgaria) with an illegal shipment from Turkey. They were housed together with other animals from Bulgaria which were being collected for further transportation across the EU. According to the data, the lorry brought in a total of 50 animals from Bulgaria to Slovenia. 45 of them were delivered to the above-mentioned holding, and two consignments were sent to other two holdings (contact holdings), which are also located in the area of the AFSVSPP Regional Unit Murska Sobota. After the inspection of both contact holdings, similar clinical signs were identified in animals. The prescribed measures were introduced. Samples were selected at all three holdings and sent to the laboratory of the National Veterinary Institute (NVI) in Ljubljana. The disease was confirmed, which lead to the introduction of appropriate measures.

Three outbreaks were identified in Slovenia. The first outbreak was marked as outbreak 1, followed by two other simultaneous outbreaks (outbreak 2 and outbreak 3) at two other holdings. The protection and surveillance zones around those holdings were specified.

- Protection zone with the radius of at least three kilometres, - Surveillance zone with the radius of at least ten kilometres.

The protection zone includes 406 holdings, and the surveillance area includes 3.081 holdings.

Notification and warning time

The event is part of the scenario of the worst possible case, since the disease has not occurred in Slovenia for quite some time. To prevent the introduction of diseases, it is important to comply with the rules for importing and trading, and for implementing biological security measures at holdings. According to the law governing veterinary compatibility criteria, anyone who suspects that its animal could be ill or could have died of a disease must notify the veterinarian as soon as possible and, until the arrival of the veterinarian, prevent the access to the diseased or dead animal.

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In accordance with the rules governing animal diseases, the FMD is considered to be one of Highly contagious animal diseases, the suspicion of which must immediately be notified to the AFSVSPP, where the Director-General convenes a national disease control centre. For this reason, it is important to continuously raise the awareness of veterinarians and breeders, which is done by the AFSVSPP through various types of education, for example, simulation exercises. The AFSVSPP has prepared the Contingency Plan for the Occurrence of FMD, which sets out measures to be taken in the event of an occurrence of FMD. The Contingency Plan also includes all the necessary information, for example, telephone numbers, maps, forms, and so on.

Reference events

The last occurrence of FMD in the Republic of Slovenia was in 1968. For this reason, the above-mentioned scenario refers to an imagined occurrence of the disease. In order to understand the development of the disease, which occurs in the naive population (where all animals are susceptible to the disease), the occurrence of FMD in England and in the Netherlands in 2001 was used as a reference event. In the Netherlands, the disease went out of control at the local level and since the disposal of carcasses was insufficient, the vaccination strategy had to be adopted. All the susceptible animals at 1800 farms had to be vaccinated. Although there were "only" 26 outbreaks of the disease, safe destruction of 260,000 animals was carried out.

RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT

At the global level, high-risk epizootics or panzootics with varying magnitudes of risk occur at intervals of 10 to 30 years. Problematic for the spread of the disease are above all uncontrolled movements of animals or the purchase of animals or feed from unverified holdings or plants. People also play a major role in the spread of the disease. This mainly includes travels to foreign destinations, where certain diseases are endemic. Movements of the population, which, at the global level, are increasing, may cause the introduction of agents in the home environment.

However, the uncertainty of the results has to be considered. All the events described above are based on theory, since Slovenia has a very favourable situation regarding animal health status.

Impacts on people

With regard to Risk scenario which includes FMD, there are no impacts on people.

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Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage

The boundary between of the second and third level or class of impact of the disaster on the economy, environment and cultural heritage is set at 0.6% of GDP. This is the basis for the determination of limit values for the remaining classes. If the damage caused by a disaster exceeds 0.6% of GNI, a country is entitled to receive EU assistance after a disaster and can ask for a grant. In accordance with the EU guidelines, for damage above 0.6% of GNI (the expected damage), risk assessments must also be prepared for less likely disasters. In Slovenia, the GNP and GDP values are very similar (GDP is slightly lower). For this reason, GDP is also used for determining the criteria for the assessment of risk. The value of EUR 100 million is used as the boundary between level 1 and level 2 of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, which, in accordance with the guidelines, is one of the criteria for the ranking of risks into the national risk matrices for disasters. In 2014, the GDP was approximately EUR 36,200 million.

Upon the occurrence of certain diseases, the costs of implementing certain measures are partly co-financed by the EU (measures at the infected holding, diagnostics, potential vaccination).

Criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage:

Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage

Level of Very low Low Moderate High Very high impact Value 1 2 3 4 5 Between 0.3% Between 0.6% Between More than Up to 0.3% and 0.6% of and 1.2% of 1.2% and 2.4% GDP of GDP GDP GDP 2.4% of GDP

Criteria

between EUR between EUR between more than up to EUR 100 and 220 220 and 440 EUR 440 and EUR 880 100 million million million 880 million million Scenario 1 no. 1 – FMD

According to predictions, certain costs associated with people working in the food industry (farmers, slaughterhouses, transport) are likely to incur. Regardless of the importance of certain diseases in animals, which, from a veterinary point of view, can be tragic for animal husbandry, the predicted consumption and costs would be significantly lower than EUR 100 million.

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The occurrence of FMD would result in certain costs. Particularly significant are the mitigation and elimination of the disease and the normalisation of the situation after the outbreak.

Costs consist of two parts, those for the protection zone and those for the surveillance zone:

1. The protection zone – Group 1 – calculation of cost for holdings where an outbreak occurs (three outbreaks).

In the area of the AFSVSPP Regional Unit Murska Sobota, FMD occurred at three holdings. In addition to other measures, the Rules on the measures for the detection, prevention and eradication of foot and mouth disease prescribes the safe disposal of carcasses of the dead killed animals. Since the confirmation of the transboundary animal disease (FMD), the measures for the prevention of the spread of the disease and the eradication should be carried out for at least 30 days from the occurrence of the disease.

Measures within Group 1 consist of two parts. Depopulation of animals and their safe destruction is carried out at the infected holdings. At other holdings in the protection zone, clinical examinations of holdings and laboratory testing are carried out, and movement is restricted. Disinfection barriers for movement between areas are also set up.

Number of holdings and animals and measures within Group 1 - protection zone

Total Small number Area Holding Cattle Pigs Measures ruminants of animals Index farma 1 655 6 7 668 Depopulation, – primary disinfection, outbreak disinsection and Outbreak 2 – 1 4 13 1 18 deratisation, clinical farm 2 examination, laboratory Outbreak 3 – 1 4 0 0 4 farm 3 Outbreaks 3 663 19 8 690 Protection 152 776 697 37 1510 Clinical examination, zone – laboratory, disinfection outbreak 1 barriers for zones, Protection 219 578 3187 29 3794 restriction of movement zone – outbreak 2 Protection 35 124 170 20 314 zone – outbreak 3 Total 406 1478 4054 86 5618

The calculation of the indicative costs of compensations for animals is given in the tables below. The costs of labour, laboratory analyses and material resources were evaluated. For

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 300/464 ______the calculation, the average values of three animal species were considered: cattle (EUR 800 – the average value for cows, calves and bulls), pigs (EUR 200) and small ruminants (EUR 80).

Calculation of compensation for euthanised animals: EUR 800 x 668 + EUR 200 x 18 + EUR 80 x 4 = EUR 538,320.

There are a total of 690 heads of cattle at the infected holdings; they must be euthanised and safely disposed at the processing plant. The average weight of 500 kg per animal (the majority of animals in the sample are cattle and fattening pigs) was taken into account. The following criteria for the calculation of the costs for professional staff were determined: In calculating the "labour costs", the actual work done by technical and professional staff at the outbreak was considered, at a price of EUR 24.00 for a veterinarian (specialist) and EUR 16.50 for a technician. These are indicative prices determined by the Veterinary Faculty. However, due to the nature of the work, the amount for an hour of labour had to be increased by at least 70 to 100% (risk to health, working conditions, stress due to the use of special protective equipment, exposure to and work with dangerous substances, the procedures after disinfection, etc.). Taking into account this and previous experiences, an agreement was reached with the Veterinary Chamber of Slovenia that the considered amount for a veterinarian is EUR 34.00, which is used for all calculations for the work professional staff.

Reference calculations were made for a holding with 200 heads of cattle. In accordance with a simulation exercise, organised by the Veterinary faculty in cooperation with other organisations, the mitigation and elimination costs after an outbreak of FMD at a holding with 200 cattle are as follows: activities for the prevention of the spread and mitigation and eradication of FMD take place at least 30 days from the occurrence of the disease. To get a better picture, the costs of labour, laboratory analyses and material resources were evaluated. The estimated costs of the work done by professional and technical personnel at the occurrence of Highly contagious animal diseases include: work done at the outbreak (14 days), the maintenance of two disinfection barriers (30 days), servicing of disinfection barriers (30 days), the work done by specialists and professional staff upon the occurrence (10 days), the work done by specialists and professional staff (30 days), and materiel and depreciation. The evaluated costs amount to approximately EUR 500,000. Naturally, an increasing number of outbreaks over a longer time period would result in a longer duration of measures, causing higher costs.

Since all the areas require similar measures, the numbers will not change significantly. Given the fact that outbreaks occur at three different holdings and three surveillance zones which do not overlap, three separate sets of measures are taken into account, each set applicable to one area that is subject to regulatory measures.

In the protection zones, periodic inspections of all holdings with susceptible animals must be carried out, in order to prevent the spread of the FMD virus which can be present on these holdings. During the inspection, the relevant documentation must be reviewed, especially the inventory of animals at a holding and the measures for preventing the introduction or uncontrolled spread of the FMD virus, which also include clinical examinations or sampling of susceptible animal species. Clinical examination and inspection must also be carried out at

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 301/464 ______all the other holdings in the protection zone (403 holdings). A clinical examination unit is a visit of a veterinarian at the holding in a certain unit of time. On average, a time unit is two hours, intended for the inspection of a holding (protective clothing, disinfection, the process of examination).

CE = veterinary x N holding x time = EUR 34 x 403 x 2

The cleaning and disinfection of holdings also includes materiel (disinfectants, films, barriers), which needs to be added up to the cost of the work done by experts at the outbreak. The manure and the bedding used at an infected holding must be composted to ensure the temperature of at least 70 degrees Celsius throughout the entire heap, preferably by adding 100 kg of granulated burnt lime per 1 m3 of manure. The heap should be sprayed with disinfectant and left for at least 42 days. During this period, the heap should either be covered or repeatedly shifted in order to ensure an even heating of all layers. Slurry and liquid manure should be stored for at least 42 days after the last addition of infective material. If slurry and manure are heavily contaminated or during adverse weather conditions, the official veterinarian can extend this period. If the added disinfectant sufficiently changes the pH of the entire material to ensure the destruction of FMD virus, this period can be reduced.

In the protection zone, there are a total of 5618 animals at 406 holdings. Of this number, depopulation took place at three holdings, and 690 susceptible animals were safely disposed. Sampling within the protection zone must be carried out as follows: In the protection zone where at least 21 days prior to sampling, sheep and goats have not been in direct and close contact with cattle, all holdings must be inspected in accordance with the sampling protocol which determines a 5% prevalence of the disease with at least 95% likelihood. At holdings in protection zones, there are 86 heads of small ruminants. Other holdings with other susceptible animal species should be inspected in the case of suspected presence of FMD virus. At holdings, samples must be taken according to the principle of 5% prevalence and 95% likelihood.

It can be assumed that during inspections and clinical examinations, veterinarians will discover a certain number of suspicious holdings (for example, 5% out of the 406 holdings). Account should also be taken of small ruminants at holdings. Therefore, it can certainly be concluded that samples will have to be taken at additional 20 holdings (sampling according to the principle of 5% prevalence and 95% likelihood).

Characteristics: - The total number of animals in the protection zone = 5618. - The average number of animals per holding in the protection zone = 5618 / 406 = 13.8. - According to the sampling scheme, blood samples must be taken from all susceptible animals at a particular holding. - The cost of a blood test is approximately EUR 18. - The cost of one hour of work performed by a veterinarian is approximately EUR 34. - One blood test takes two hours. - Laboratory testing for FMD costs approximately EUR 41 (Source: NVI) – (ELISA test: EUR 28.86; RT PCR – EUR 65.28).

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Laboratory = 20 holdings x average number of animals x laboratory testing = 20 holdings x 13.8 x 41 x 18.

Work of a veterinarian = 20 holdings x hours for a blood test x work hours x blood tests = 20 holdings x 2 x 34 x 18.

Sampling for 5% x 406 holdings = laboratory + work of a veterinarian = (20 holdings x 13.8 x 41) + (20 holdings x 2 x 34 x 18) = 11.316 + 24.480 = EUR 35,796.

Calculation of costs at a holding

The Cost (in resulting Area of three outbreaks and protection zone Calculation EUR/unit) amount (in EUR) Euthanasia 70 / animal 70 x 690 48,300 Professional staff (specialists, disinfection) Work performed at the outbreak (14 days) – 3 42,000 / 42,000 x 3 126,000 holdings outbreak Maintenance of two disinfection barriers (30 days) – 144,000 / 144,000 x 432,000 protection zone zone 3 Servicing of two disinfection barriers (30 days) – 20,000 / 20,000 x 3 60,000 protection zone zone Work performed by specialists and professional staff 100,000 / 100,000 x 300,000 after an outbreak (10 days) – protection zone zone 3 Work performed by specialists and professional staff 30,000 / 30,000 x 3 90,000 after an outbreak (30 days) – protection zone zone Materiel and depreciation – protection zone 135,000 / 135,000 x 405,000 zone 3 Transport and disposal of carcases – infected 200 / ton 0.5 T x 69,000 holdings 200 x 690 Compensation for animals 538,320 Cleaning and disinfection of a holding, 63,000 / 63,000 x 3 189,000 disinfection of manure, liquid manure and outbreak contaminated bedding Laboratories (sampling – 5% 95 CE) for holdings 35,796 in a protection zone Clinical examination 34 / 34 x 403 x 27,404 veterinary 2 work hour Total costs in a protection zone 2,320,820

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2. Surveillance zone - Group 2 - 4 barriers, clinical examination of 3081 holdings (visit price – clinical examination)

Number of holdings and animals and measures within Group 2 – surveillance zone

Total Small number Zone Holding Cattle Pigs Measures ruminants of animals Surveillance 3081 9528 40,119 1719 51,366 Clinical zone examinations, disinfection barriers for movement between zones

Clinical examination and inspection must be carried out at all holdings in a surveillance zone with susceptible animals (3081 holdings). The cost per one veterinarian is EUR 34; a veterinarian needs approximately two hours to examine one holding (protective clothing, clinical examination, disinfection). The calculation is as follows:

CE = veterinary x N holdings x time = EUR 34 x 3081 x 2 = EUR 209,508

The calculation refers to the maintenance of two barriers in the protection zone for 30 days, which amounts to EUR 144,000. For the surveillance zone, the setting up of 4 barriers is predicted, with the total cost of EUR 288,000. The resources necessary to cover the needs for materiel and depreciation will be distributed evenly throughout the surveillance zone, so that the maintenance costs in the surveillance zone amount to EUR 135,000. The amount of costs for the work of professional staff, which must be taken into account and is the same as in the protection zone, is also distributed evenly throughout the surveillance zone.

Calculation of costs in the surveillance zone

The resulting Measures in the surveillance zone Cost (in EUR/unit) Calculation amount (in EUR) Professional staff (specialists, disinfection) Maintenance of 2 disinfection barriers (30 days) 144,000 / zone 144,000 x 288,000 – surveillance zone 2 Servicing of 2 disinfection barriers (30 days) – 20,000 / zone 20,000 40,000 surveillance zone x 2 Work performed by specialists and professional 30,000 / zone 30,000 30,000 staff (30 days) – surveillance zone Materiel and depreciation – surveillance zone 135,000 / zone 135,000 135,000 Clinical examination (CE) 34 / veterinary 34 x 3081 209,508 work hour x 2 Total costs in a surveillance zone 702,508

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The estimated cost for the implementation of measures is EUR 2,312,760 in the protection zone (Group 1) and EUR 702,508 in the surveillance zone (Group 2). In total, the estimated indicative direct costs (those that can be predicted) in the event of FMB occurrence from risk scenario would amount to at least EUR 3,023,328. This calculation did not include the loss of production (milk, meat), since these costs are not regarded as direct costs/compensation, to which animal holders are entitled and which are paid from the state budget. There are also some costs which were not taken into account but must be considered, namely the costs of the operation of the AFSVSPP and other public services (for example the Police and the Armed Forces), slaughterhouses, plants for the processing of animal by-products, and so on. These costs are not negligible, since the mitigation and elimination of consequences after such an outbreak would need to include a large number of people. However, the costs alone would not exceed EUR 100 million, which is why this risk scenario is ranked at level 1 of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage.

Political and social impacts

Assessment of impacts on the functioning of state authorities

Reduced ability of state authorities (the Government, the ministries, constituent bodies, administrative units) to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility in the affected area

Impact Strongly Limited Disabled impaired duration Up to 2 days 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 1 2 Up to 15 days 2 S1 2 3 Up to 30 days 2 3 4 More than 30 3 4 5 days 1-5: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). Moreover, the impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. S1 – Scenario 1 – FMD

According to the assessment, the impact on the ability of state authorities in the affected area to carry out their functions is limited (this refers only to some state authorities and to a limited extent). This impact could last up to 15 days.

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The number of people affected by hindered or disrupted provision of services of state authorities (either physically or functionally)

Number of people Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than Up to 500 and 5,000 50,000 50,000 duration Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 S1 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days 1-5: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). Moreover, the impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for different reasons are also not taken into account. S1 – Scenario 1 – FMD

The number of people who will possibly be affected by the occurrence of these diseases is very low. The category with up to 500 affected people for all three scenarios and the duration of up to 15 days was selected.

Assessment of impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems

Lack of or difficult access to water, food and energy products

Number of affected Between 500 Between 5,000 More than people Up to 500 and 5,000 and 50,000 50,000 duration Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days 1-5: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). Moreover, the impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for different reasons are also not taken into account. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If, in a minimum of two cases, the same number of people is affected, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration.

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This scenario predicts no impact on the lack of, or difficult access to, water, food and energy products.

Strongly impaired or disabled use of the internet and telecommunications systems; arrival to work and in educational institutions; use of public services (access to the media, health services, banking services etc.); use of public transport; supply or purchase of basic necessities; and the ranking of risk scenarios according to the levels of impact

Number of affected people Between 500 Between 5,000 More than Up to 500 and 5,000 and 50,000 50,000 duration Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days 1-5: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). Moreover, the impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for different reasons are also not taken into account. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If, in a minimum of two cases, the same number of people is affected, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration.

In this case, the impacts of the disaster do not refer to the content assessed and were therefore not evaluated or assessed (NA).

Psychosocial impacts

Only minimum effects are expected, lasting up to seven days and affecting a small number of people. In the case of Highly contagious animal diseases, the link between people's ignorance and the influence of media on the population is very common. In such a case, the impact of the disaster cannot be ignored, since the ignorance of people can cause a certain degree of anxiety within the population due to the possibility of the disease to be transmitted and spillover from animals to humans.

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The number of people showing an unusual or undesired behavioural reaction to the disaster, such as avoiding school or kindergarten; deliberate absence from work; deliberate avoidance of public transport; desire to move to another location; irrational financial operations (mass cash withdrawals, etc.); and accumulation and appropriation of stocks of basic necessities.

Number of affected people Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than Up to 500 and 5,000 50,000 50,000 duration Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 S1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days 1-5: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). Moreover, the impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used, followed by the one which lasts longer. S1 – Scenario 1 – FMD

Social impacts

Impact Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 S1 The poor segments of the population find themselves in severe social 2 distress; the number of applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash is increasing. The consequences of the disaster are also felt by the middle-class 3 population, which is reflected in the increased number of applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash. The consequences of the disaster are felt by the majority of the 4 population, which is reflected in a considerable increase in the number of applications for social assistance benefits. The consequences are felt by the entire population, which is reflected 5 primarily in new applications for social assistance and renewed applications for the allocation of assistance. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for different reasons are not taken into account. S1 – Scenario 1 – FMD

The strictly defined and implemented measures to prevent the spread of the disease referred to in the risk scenario can cause a certain level of discomfort. This is especially true for holdings based primarily on animal husbandry which is their main source of income. In such

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a holding, complete depopulation comes as a shock, and above all, the purchase of animals needed to continue with the business imposes a heavy financial burden.

Psychological impacts

Impact Level of impact Impacts of the disaster do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of fear among the population owing to the lack of 2 S1 information regarding the causes of the disaster and its characteristics and consequences. Increased level of fear among the population; fear of a new disaster 3 and its consequences. The population fear for their lives; decreased confidence in the 4 responsible authorities regarding their response and mitigation and elimination of disaster consequences; increasing desire to relocate. Due to the negative events or consequences of the disaster, the 5 majority of people cease to believe that normal life in the affected area could return to a normal state; mass relocation is taking place. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account. S1 – Scenario 1 – FMD

At the occurrence of the disease, psychological impact on the population cannot be excluded, since the fear of the unknown is always present. The level of impact in this risk scenario for FMD was ranked at level 2. The main task of the AFSVSPP in this case is raising the awareness of the population and regularly informing the public about the disease itself and the measures to be carried out to prevent the spread and to eradicate the disease. In general, social and psychological impacts on all sections of the population are not very significant. However, they do have a major impact on animal holders affected by the outbreak and their families. Animal euthanasia poses a significant psychological and social burden resulting from the loss of income (means of subsistence).

Impacts on internal political stability

Impact on internal political stability and law and order

Impact Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1

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Impact Level of impact Individual cases of public expression of disagreement with the actions 2 taken by the responsible institutions. Individual disruptions in the functioning of political institutions (the Government, the Parliament, etc.); individual occurrences of hostile campaigns. Individual cases of violation of law and order and criminal offences 3 due to the disaster; observed expressions of fear for one's own safety and property. Individuals or groups are trying to undermine the internal political situation; reduced trust of the population in the functioning of political institutions. Increased number of violations of law and order and of organised 4 criminal offences; increased fear among the population. Political parties and/or other stakeholders are trying to undermine the internal political stability and obtain political benefits by "imposing" their own programmes for improving the situation; reduced trust in the functioning of state institutions. Massive violations of law and order including violent demonstrations; 5 significant increase in the number of criminal offences; the internal security of the state is at risk. The internal political stability of the state is undermined; the basic rights provided for in the Constitution are undermined and at risk. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can only be a whole number.

In this case, the impacts of the disasters do not refer to the assessed content and were therefore not evaluated or assessed (NA).

Impacts on financial stability

Here too, the risk scenario does not impact the content assessed, resulting in the not- assessed status (NA).

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Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to payment system failures

Payment Payment Payment Payment Settlement failure settlement Payment settlement settlement settlement value failure in an settlement failure in an failure in an failure in an amount failure in an amount amount amount lower than amount higher between 10% between 20% between 50% 10% of the than 80% of and 20% of the and 50% of the and 80% of the planned the planned planned value planned value planned value value of the value of the of the of the of the payment payment payment payment payment system system during system during system during system during Duration of the during disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions failure disruptions No impact, because disaster Not Not Not Not Not impacts do not assessed assessed assessed assessed assessed refer to the assessed (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) content. Disruptions in the payment system 1 1 2 3 3 up to 2hrs long Disruptions in the payment system 1 2 2 3 4 up to 4hrs long Disruptions in the payment system 2 3 3 4 4 up to 8hrs long Disruptions in the payment system which last the entire business day 3 4 4 5 5 and are not eliminated by the end of the business day* Disruptions in the payment system lasting more than 4 5 5 5 5 one business day *Disruptions at the end of the business day, even if they only last a short time, may cause a one-day delay in the settlement of payments. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

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Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to lack of cash

Number of affected people Up to 5000 Up to 50,000 More than 50,000 duration Up to 2 days 1 2 3 From 2 to 7 days 2 3 4 More than 7 days 3 4 5 1.–5.: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The risk scenario has no impact on this area.

Changes in the growth in GDP owing to consequences of the disaster in the year of the disaster or the following year

Level of change in GDP owing to consequences of the disaster in the year of the disaster or the following year Level of NA Very low Low Moderate High Very high impact Value 0 1 2 3 4 5 Change No impact Between 0 Up to -1 Up to -1.5 Up to -2 Over -2 because and -0.5 percentage percentage percentage percentage disaster percentage point points points points impacts do not points refer to the content/no consequences Scenari o 1 – 1 FMD If it is estimated that the disaster will not have a negative impact on the growth in GDP, or if the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, the level of impacts is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

In extreme cases, disaster impacts (in the case of major and uncontrolled outbreaks) affect the change in GDP. The state must provide funds for mitigation and elimination of disaster consequences and reestablishment of the food supply system. The disaster would affect the food industry, which could result in GDP change in the following years.

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Impact on the foreign policy/international stability

Foreign policy (international) risk impact

Level of Impact impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 No great known direct impact on the international perception of the State. 2 S1 Individual foreign countries are following the developments in the RS. Individual (neighbouring) countries and individual regional and international 3 organisations are responding to the event through diplomatic channels by expressing their support and concerns about to the situation. A part of the international community (countries, international organisations) 4 is responding to the event by expressing strong support or concern about to the situation. The RS is receiving international assistance, especially in equipment and human resources. Despite international assistance, Slovenia remains a stable state. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the RS are advising their citizens against travelling to certain areas of the RS. A major part of the international community is responding strongly to the 5 events in the country, since these have a strong impact on the security of other states. The RS is receiving extensive international assistance (equipment, money, human resources). The RS urgently needs assistance in order to establish the normal functioning of its entire system. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the RS are advising their citizens against travelling to the RS and reducing or increasing the number of staff at these missions and posts owing to the situation in the country. International events whose main topic is the position of or the situation in the RS. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can only be a whole number. S1 – Scenario 1 – FMD

Considering the nature of Highly contagious animal diseases and their tendency to spread, the level of impact was ranked at 2. In the event of the occurrence of the disease from these three scenarios, the AFSVSPP must also inform the neighbouring countries owing to the possibility of transmission of the disease to their territory. It is also mandatory to notify the European Commission and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) of the disease. This ensures that in addition to the EU member states and neighbouring countries, all countries across the world are notified of the disease. Consequently, certain trade restrictions in the event of an outbreak of these diseases need to be considered, since in such situations, limitations to trading apply.

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The overall value and level of political and social impacts

The overview of the value or levels of individual impact groups as part of* political and social risk impacts

Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Sum of Average impact impact impact impact impact impact impact impact group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group 6 values value 2 / 1.33 / 1 2 6.33 1.58

The final calculation of the value of political and social risk impacts can also be a decimal number. In this case, the final level of political and social risk impacts, which must be a whole number, is calculated based on the table below.

Average value of political and social risk Level of political and social risk impacts impacts Between 1.00 and 1.49 1 Between 1.50 and 2.49 2 Between 2.50 and 3.49 3 Between 3.50 and 4.49 4 Between 4.50 and 5.00 5

In this way, levels of political and social risk impacts can be calculated for all three scenarios and risk analyses.

The conversion of the value of political and social impacts of risk scenarios into the level of political and social risk impacts

Risk scenario Average value of political and social risk 1.58 impacts Level of political and social risk impact 2

The overall average value of political and social impacts is 1.58, which means that the level of political and social impacts is 2.

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Assessment of the likelihood

The likelihood of the occurrence of an event can vary to a great extent and depends on several other factors already described above. The table below presents a possible likelihood level with regard to a certain risk scenario. The likelihood here is based on rough estimates and opinions of experts on animal health. With regard to the occurrence of a disease, the period of 5 to 25 years represents a huge timespan, since the biological risk factors adapt quickly and the possibility of the spread is difficult to predict. Considering past events, the estimated likelihood of an outbreak of certain diseases in Slovenia (level 4) is high.

Likelihood levels

Likelihood level for the event and risk criteria Level of NA Very low Low Moderate High Very high impact Value 0 1 2 3 4 5 Time frame Once in more Once every Once every Once every Once every than every 100 to 250 25 to 100 5 to 25 5 years 250 years years years years (annual (annual (annual (annual (annual likelihood of likelihood of likelihood likelihood likelihood more than up to 0.4%) between 0.4 between 1 between 4 20%) and 1%) and 4%) and 20%) Description Hardly any Possible but Possible risk General risk Special and risk (threat) less likely (threat) (threat) imminent risk (threat) (permanent) risk (threat) Scenario 1 4 – FMD

DISASTER RISK MATRICES

Disaster risk matrices are used for the graphic display of the size of impacts established in Chapter 4 and of the likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster, or the likelihood of individual risk scenarios, if only one risk is addressed. They are one of the main objectives of the preparation of individual disaster risk assessments.

Disaster risk matrices consist of five levels (fields) on the vertical axis indicating levels of risk impacts, and five fields on the horizontal axis indicating levels of risk likelihood. The fields are coloured in shades from red to green; the levels of impact and likelihood increase from green to yellow to orange to red. The colour of the fields changes more rapidly on the vertical axis than on the horizontal axis, which means that risk matrices put greater emphasis on risk impacts than on the likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster. A matrix has 25 fields altogether, in which, based on the content of the matrix, individual risk (or individual risk impacts) can be ranked depending on the relationship between the size of the impacts

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- Low risk with green fields; - Medium risk with yellow fields; - High risk with orange fields; - Very high risk with red fields.

Four risk matrices have been prepared for each scenario. There are two types of disaster risk matrices:

Risk matrices with separate risk impacts (three matrices (impacts on people, economic and environmental impacts, the impacts on cultural heritage, and the political and social risk impacts), each with its own type of impact and with a unified likelihood;

Disaster risk matrices with a merged representation of risk impacts (one matrix presenting an average of all three impacts and a unified likelihood).

The level of the overall or average impact is calculated by dividing the sum of the levels of risk impacts on people, the economic and environmental impacts, and the impacts of risk on cultural heritage, including political and social impacts, by three. If the final calculated value of the impacts is a decimal number, the final level of the overall (average) impacts must be determined, and the value must be a whole number, based on the table below.

The conversion of the overall (average) level of risk impacts to be inserted into the fields of the disaster risk matrices showing the overall value of risk impacts

The calculated value of all three The level of risk impact in disaster risk matrices impact types showing the overall value of risk impacts Between 1.00 and 1.49 1 Between 1.50 and 2.49 2 Between 2.50 and 3.49 3 Between 3.50 and 4.49 4 Between 4.50 and 5.00 5

By using the data from this table, the final table can be completed with all the data required for the calculation of the levels of risk impact in the matrix showing the overall risk impacts. Two columns in a table are of a darker shade. These columns are used for the disaster risk matrix showing the overall risk impacts.

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Calculation of the average risk impacts for risk matrices showing the overall risk impacts

Risk Level of Level of Level of Calculated The level Likelihood Reliability scenario impacts economic and political overall of overall of risk on environmental and value (average) analysis people risk impacts social (average risk results and impacts on impacts level) of impacts cultural impacts heritage Risk / 1 2 1.50 2 4 Moderately scenario reliable for FMD

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11.4 Annex 4: Risk Scenario: Aircraft Accident in a Populated Area

RISK SCENARIO

This risk scenario deals with a major aircraft accident in a populated area (number of victims: 150 passengers and crew members and 16 persons on the ground).

The number of victims on the ground (16 victims) is calculated mathematically based on the population density of Ljubljana (1044 inhabitants/km2) and the size of the area of the aircraft accident (0.015 km2).

Risk scenario – aircraft accident in a populated area

RISK SCENARIO – aircraft accident in a populated area PARAMETERS BASIC INFORMATION Risk Risk scenario deals with a major aircraft accident in a populated area (number of victims: 150 passengers and crew members and 16 persons on the ground).

It is a separate event, which, by its nature, also affects other interrelated events (destroyed buildings and traffic routes, collapse of electricity and other infrastructure, and so on) exerting a negative impact on the local population. Place of the accident In accordance with this risk scenario, the aircraft accident occurs in a populated place (Ljubljana), which is located below the air routes crossing the airspace of the Republic of Slovenia and in the immediate vicinity of the takeoff and landing course of the public airport for international air traffic – the Ljubljana Jože Pučnik Airport.

It is a densely populated area with a very good transport and other infrastructure, many residential and business buildings, commercial buildings, buildings significant to cultural heritage, and other buildings. Dimensions of the area The area of the accident covers 100 x 150 metres (15,000 m2 and 0,015 km2) and goes one metre deep. Severity The aircraft accident brought about complete destruction of transport (road leading to the city centre and adjacent streets) and other infrastructure (public utility lines, electricity grid) and buildings in the area of the disaster (residential and business buildings). Time A traffic accident is an unpredictable event. It is more likely to happen in the summer and during the day, when the Slovenian airspace has increased traffic. Duration The direct impacts of aircraft accidents are short-term - up to 15 days (fire, smoke, dust, discharge of fluids, debris, etc.). Other impacts (e.g. psychosocial) are dealt with over a longer period of time - more than 30 days. Course and development In most cases, aircraft accidents occur owing to an error of

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the pilot (53%), followed by accidents owing to mechanical defects (20%), weather (12%), sabotage (8%), other human errors (6%) and other reasons (1%). Do the scenario and Climate change has no impact on aircraft accidents. consequences take into account the impacts of climate change, if possible or sensible? Notification and warning An aircraft accident is an unexpected event. Statistically, it time can occur once every 25 to 100 years (annual likelihood between 1 and 4%).

Airline accidents cannot be predicted, since they can happen anytime and anywhere. People cannot prepare for them.

Only the appropriate state authority can be prepared for them. With its instructions, procedures, equipment, experiences and qualified staff, it can carry out all the activities planned in advance to reduce the impacts of an accident, when it occurs. Is/was it possible to It is impossible to prevent aircraft accidents. prevent the accident? With its measures and activities, also in the framework of international and other organisations, the state implements all the necessary measures to ensure an adequate level of civil aviation safety. Who and what is affected? The aircraft accident affects a densely populated area with a good transport and other infrastructure, many residential and business buildings, commercial buildings, buildings significant to cultural heritage, and other buildings. Reference events The aircraft accident scenario is based on comparable aircraft accident events that have already occurred in the past, for example: Boeing 747 aircraft accident, Pan Am Airlines, flight PA103, on 21 December 1988 in Lockerbie, Scotland, UK, during the flight from London to New York; and Boeing 777 aircraft accident, Malaysia Airlines, flight MH17, on 17 July 2014, in Hrabove in Ukraine, during the flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.

To prepare this risk scenario, certain data from previous aircraft accidents were used. Scenario with multiple This risk scenario does not include any chains of disasters risks or chain of disasters or additional scenarios with several potential risks.

In accordance with the scenario, the aircraft accident affects a densely populated area with a very good transport and other infrastructure, many residential and business buildings, commercial buildings, buildings significant to cultural heritage, and other buildings. Does the scenario take into This risk scenario does not include any impacts of a account the possibility of disaster occurring outside the country.

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the impacts of a disaster happening outside the The risk scenario deals with an aircraft accident occurring Slovenia to extend to the in the Republic of Slovenia. territory of the Republic of Slovenia (for example, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the earthquake in Friuli, pandemics, animal communicable diseases, the 2012 Drava floods)? Assessment of the The annual likelihood of the risk scenario to unfold lies likelihood of an accident between 1% and 4%. from each scenario to occur Statistically, the aircraft accident can occur once every 25 to 100 years. 5 – once or more every 5 years (annual likelihood of 20% or more) 4 – once every 5 to 25 years (annual likelihood of between 4 and 20%) 3 – once every 25 to 100 years (annual likelihood of between 1 and 4%) 2 – once every 100 to 250 years (annual likelihood of between 0.4 and 1%) 1 – once in more than 250 years (annual likelihood of up to 0.4 %) Assessment of the Taking into account the statistical data and comparable reliability aircraft accident events, it is estimated that the reliability of of a particular scenario the risk scenario is relatively high.

During the preparation of The preparation of the risk assessment involved the the scenario and person in charge of preparing the risk scenario, the identification of ACPDR and other relevant state authorities. consequences, did the person in charge also Pursuant to the requirements set out in the Aviation Act include the responsible (Zlet-UPB4, Official Gazette of the RS, no. 81/10), public national authorities, public airports for international air transport, airlines and the air institutions and navigation services were involved in the search for professional and scientific information necessary for preparing the risk scenario, in institutions (universities, the framework of the mandatory statistical reporting. An institutes, research independent authority for the investigation of aircraft institutions, etc.)? If yes, accidents and incidents was also involved. which?

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LIKELIHOOD OF THE RISK SCENARIO

Given the frequency of aircraft accidents and the fact that air traffic is constantly increasing, it can be said with certainty that an aircraft accident in the Republic of Slovenia is possible. A major aircraft accident in Slovenia occurred in 1966.

RELIABILITY OF THE RISK SCENARIO

On the basis of statistical data, it can be estimated, in a subjective manner and with relative reliability, that the risk scenario is moderately reliable. Taking into account the available statistical data, it was observed that aircraft accidents in residential and non-residential areas happen regularly. The annual likelihood of the risk scenario to unfold in practice can range from 1 to 4%, and statistically speaking, such an aircraft accident can happen once every 25 to 100 years.

RISK ANALYSIS

CONSEQUENCES OF THE AIRCRAFT DISASTER

Consequences of an aircraft disaster can be either direct or indirect. Direct consequences can include the loss of the aircraft and victims in the aircraft. Indirect consequences can be related to the affected relatives and members of search and rescue teams, and can also involve damage to the environment and to transport, energy and other infrastructure, and so on.

In reviewing the consequences, data were obtained from: - Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport Directorate, Aviation Division; - Ministry of Infrastructure, Infrastructure Directorate, Roads Division; - Ministry of Infrastructure, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Service; - Ministry of Infrastructure, Energy Directorate, Energy and Mining Division; - Ministry of Finance; - Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities; - AFSVSPP; - Civil Aviation Agency of the Republic of Slovenia (CAA); - Slovenia control – Slovenian Air Navigation Services, Limited; - Javna Razsvetljava, Plc; - Public Corporation Vodovod-Kanalizacija, Limited; and - Other companies (Petre, Limited – tents, halls, platforms and similar).

The following information was obtained:

According to the AFSVSPP, the risk scenario would not result in the deaths of livestock, especially cattle. Consequently, damage to animals does not need to be included in the calculation of costs of the aircraft accident.

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According to the Ministry of Finance, the Risk scenario has no impact on the changes in the growth of GDP in the year of the accident and in the following year, and on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to payment system failures, on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to the lack of cash, or on the functioning of the Ministry.

According to the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, the risk scenario would affect 0.22 people who use the services of a social protection institution. Consequently, this data is not relevant for the calculation of the costs of the aircraft accident.

According to the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, information on the amount of damage to buildings and in them as a result of the accident could not be provided owing to the lack of information regarding the collision force causing a certain level of damage to buildings.

According to the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, it is impossible to calculate the costs of the functioning of the ministries and bodies which carry out the activities of the ministries owing to flat-rate calculations and incomplete data in the risk scenario.

According to the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, it is impossible to predict the damage which would affect the unemployment rate. Ljubljana has 37,796 companies, which is approximately 3.5 companies per 0.015 km2. On average, each company in Ljubljana employs 5.4 persons. An accident like this would result in limited business activities for 3.5 companies, which means that 18.9 posts could be at risk. However, this does not mean that unemployment would actually increase. On the contrary, there is even a possibility of unemployment rate reduction, since for an accident resulting in material damage, mitigation and elimination activities are planned.

According to the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, it is impossible to predict the impact on the functioning of state authorities.

Impacts on people

Considering the size of the aircraft which fly daily within Slovenian airspace, and also their capacity (number of seats) and occupancy, the risk scenario for aircraft accidents foresees fatal consequences for 150 passengers and crew members. Taking into account the population density in Ljubljana and Slovenia, the scenario foresees additional 16 human victims on the ground. These are catastrophic consequences, which would indirectly also affect the rest of the population, search and rescue units, and other parties involved in the investigation into the causes of the accident. The risk scenario does not foresee severe or minor injuries of the population and members of search and rescue units.

In terms of the affected territory, which is 100 x 150 meters, it is a small-scale accident, which means that no need to evacuate the population or additional adverse effects for vulnerable population groups are expected.

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Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the case of an explosion of the aircraft in the air, individual parts of the aircraft would scatter to a much wider area, thus distributing the force and consequently reducing the damage. During the Pan Am Airlines Boeing 747 accident, flight PA103, on 21 December 1988 in Lockerbie in Scotland, aircraft wreckage scattered across the area of 2,000 km2.

Economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage

Taking into account experience of past aircraft accidents, the risk scenario foresees a relatively small extent of the affected area. In the populated area, the aircraft accident would bring about complete destruction of transport infrastructure (roads leading to the city centre and adjacent streets) and other infrastructure (public utility lines, electricity grid) and buildings in the area of the accident (residential and business buildings).

For a maximum of 15 days, between 500 and 5,000 people would suffer from the lack of or limited access to drinking water, food and energy products. That would be the period necessary to complete search and rescue operations, form a team of international investigators of aircraft accidents and incidents, and initiate an investigation of the aircraft accident with all the associated activities (inventory, removal, identification of victims, etc.), until the wreckage is transported to a suitable location for continuing the investigation.

An identical risk scenario is also foreseen for the use of the internet and telecommunication systems, arrival to work and in educational institutions, the use of public services and public transport, and the supply and purchase of basic necessities in the central area of the accident.

The risk scenario for aircraft accidents in a populated area predicts that for up to 7 days, between 500 and 5,000 people would avoid going to school, kindergarten or work, avoid using public transport, or want to relocate owing to stress. It also takes into account the fact that each Slovenian household has approximately 2.5 members, and that some families in the immediate vicinity of the event would also be indirectly affected.

Slovenian households by the number of members and type of household - situation as of 1 January 2011

1 2 3 4 5 6 + Average size of Total member members members members members members households 1 member 266,489 266,489 - - - - - 1.00 Multiple members, no 20,041 - 17,128 2491 320 77 25 2.17 family Multiple members, one 450,262 - 182,747 133,934 106,773 22,011 4797 2.96 family

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1 2 3 4 5 6 + Average size of Total member members members members members members households Multiple members, 38,113 - - 12,719 12,048 10,114 3232 4.13 extended family Multiple members, two 36,047 - - - 8235 11,608 16,204 5.46 or more families Multiple members, two or more 2579 - - - - 510 2069 6.70 families, extended Households - 813,531 266,489 199,875 149,144 127,376 44,320 26,327 2.48 TOTAL

However, no major social consequences (for example, inventory increase, social distress, increase in the number of applications for financial assistance) or psychological consequences (for example, anxiety of the population owing to the ignorance of the causes of the accident, fear of the accident consequences, the increase in the desire to relocate) are expected.

Likewise, it is not likely to expect disagreement of the population with actions of the responsible institutions, hate campaigns, violations of law and order, violent demonstrations, reduced confidence in the functioning of political institutions, threats to internal security of the state, major impact on the ability of legal and natural persons to pay owing to payment system failures and lack of cash, changes in GDP growth, and so on.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect an increased impact on foreign policy (international impact), since a part of the international community and organisations would respond to the event. Due to the lack of professional staff and technical equipment for investigating the causes of the aircraft accident, Slovenia would be forced to request international assistance. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation), the investigation of the aircraft accident would also involve:

- the state of the aircraft operator; - the state of the aircraft producer; - the state in which the aircraft was designed, and - the state in which the aircraft was registered.

In the event of such an aircraft accident, the head of the investigation authority would appoint a commission to investigate the event, consisting of one Slovenian principal investigator, three Slovenian investigators and three foreign investigators. Owing to the international dimensions, the head of the investigating authority would ask for the assistance of four

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 324/464 ______foreign experts in individual fields of work, or foreign aviation experts of civil aviation authorities and other bodies. In order to identify the victims and inform their families about the event and the development of the investigation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be actively involved in the work of the investigating authority.

The text below indicates the estimated costs incurred and damage caused by the aircraft accident in a populated area based on the consequences of an aircraft accident.

Loss of the aircraft

The average value of an aircraft (manufactured by Airbus) is evident from the trends in average prices of Airbus aircraft.

Average price of Airbus aircraft

Type of the (Airbus) aircraft Average value in 2015 (in EUR million) A320 88.5 A321 103.8 A320neo 96.9 A321neo 113,6 A330-200 209 A330-300 231.6 A350-800 246 A350-900 278.2 A350-1000 321.2 A380 390.7 Total 2079.5 Average 207.95 Note: This table includes aircraft with more than 150 seats.

The average value of an aircraft (manufactured by Boeing) is evident from the trends in average prices of Boeing aircraft.

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Average value of Boeing aircraft

Type of the (Boeing) aircraft Average value in 2015 (in EUR million) 737-900ER 93 737 MAX 8 100.4 737 MAX 9 106.4 747-8 345.5 767-300ER 179.9 777-200ER 253.1 777-200LR 286.4 777-300ER 309.9 777-8X 338.7 777-9X 365.1 787-8 205 787-9 241.5 787-10 279.4 Total 3104.3 Average 238.79 Note: This table includes aircraft with more than 150 seats.

The average value of aircraft manufactured by Airbus and Boeing

Type of the (Airbus and Average price in 2015 Boeing) aircraft (in EUR million) 223.37

Accordingly, the value of the loss of the aircraft can amount to EUR 223,370,000.00. The value of a used aircraft is extremely difficult to assess, since it can have completely renewed engines, installations, etc.

Compensation costs

In accordance with the Regulation (EC) No. 785/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Insurance Requirements for Air Carriers and Aircraft Operators (OJ L 138, 30. April 2004, p. 1, with amendments):

- for liability in respect of passengers, the minimum insurance cover is 250,000 special drawing rights (SDRs) per passenger. - for liability in respect of baggage, the minimum insurance cover is 1131 SDRs per passenger.

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The Regulation is consistent with the provisions of the Montreal Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, Regulating Compensations for Victims of Aircraft Accidents), which entered into force in 2003 with the ratification of the 30th member state of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, thus succeeding the Warsaw Convention. The Montreal Convention introduced a new, two-tier liability system:

- The air carrier is liable for death or injury of passengers, regardless of whether the accident was caused by an air carrier error or not; - If there is reason to suspect that an error had been made by the air carrier, the carrier's liability to the victims and their relatives is unlimited.

In addition, the Montreal Convention includes other elements:

- In the event of an accident, air carriers are obliged to pay advance payment of compensation without delay, in order to help the victims' relatives to cover urgent financial expenses. The amounts of such advance payments must be governed by national laws and are deducted from the final amount of compensation; - Air carriers must submit to national aviation authorities the evidence that they maintain adequate insurance, in order to ensure the availability of financial resources for compensations; - Accident victims or their families can arrange to receive compensation for damage without lengthy judicial proceedings; - Compensation requests for death or injury of a passenger can be filed in the country of the passenger's permanent residence at the time of the accident (and not only in the country where the air carrier is seated); and - Documents referring to passengers, baggage and cargo are simplified and updated.

Conversion from SRD to EUR

SDR EUR

1 1.25 1131 1414.17 250,000 312,593.39

Accordingly, the cost of compensations for both risk scenarios is as follows:

- 150 passengers x 312,593.39 EUR/passenger = EUR 46,889,008.50 - 150 passengers x 1131 EUR/passenger = EUR 169,650.00 - TOTAL: EUR 47,058,658.50.

The cost of compensation does not cover the cost of compensation to the victims on the ground who are not air passengers and crew members.

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Damage to and rehabilitation of road infrastructure

In accordance with the data of the Roads Division of the Ministry of Infrastructure, the average cost of one kilometre of the highway built under the national programme in the period 1994-2009 amounts to EUR 11 million for highways and EUR 8.7 million for expressways. For low or middle difficulty terrain, the average cost of the highway construction is EUR 7.29 million per kilometre. Also, based on the realisation of projects, the price per one kilometre of a two-lane national road costs between 0.5 and 1.5 million per kilometre, depending on the difficulty of the terrain and the necessary facilities.

Accordingly, the average cost of the construction of a four-lane road amounts to approximately EUR 8 million/km, and the average cost of the construction of a two-lane road totals in EUR 1 million/km). Since the risk scenario foresees the destruction of one road leading to the city centre and two side roads, the cost of the rehabilitation of road infrastructure stands at:

- 1 x EUR 1,200,000.00 for 150 metres of a four-lane road; - 2 x EUR 150,000,000.00 for 150 metres of a two-lane road. - TOTAL: EUR 1,500,000.00.

Damage to buildings and rehabilitation

Based on the randomly selected location of the aircraft accident in the populated area, as well as on publicly available information ("Prostor" - the spatial data portal of the Republic of Slovenia), the calculated value of the destroyed buildings amounts to EUR 15,883,000.00. Other damage to buildings caused by collisions of small pieces of aircraft are not included in the total amount of cost and damage.

Damage to and rehabilitation of community infrastructure

The cost of community infrastructure consists of the cost of the water supply network and the sewage system.

The aircraft accident in the populated area would cause damage to cast iron pipes: 125 metres of pipes with a diameter of 80 millimetres, 80 metres of pipes with a diameter of 300 millimetres, 150 metres of pipes with a diameter of 400 millimetres. Further damage would include 150 metres of pipes made of nodular iron with a diameter of 150/200 millimetres. After the location of defects and putting the affected water supply pipes out of service, the water from the water supply system would mostly be diverted to other water supply networks within one hour after the accident. The diversion would be done by closing the nearby cocks at the affected water supply networks located outside the area affected by the accident. Depending on the extent of the damaged or demolished residential and commercial buildings, provisional drinking water supply for approximately five buildings would need to be built, which would take approximately 24 hours. In coordination with the reconstruction of

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 328/464 ______roads and other community infrastructure, comprehensive rehabilitation of water supply networks would take place over several months after the accident.

The water supply network would need to be fully reconstructed or rebuilt. Costs of the possible reconstruction of shafts and other water facilities are not included.

The assessment of cost of the water supply network in the amount of EUR 173,130.00 includes the costs of the construction of an alternative network (excluding the cost of the preparation of project documentation), the cost of water losses, the cost of disaster response activities at the site of the event, and any possible costs of setting up makeshift water connections.

In the area of the aircraft accident, the sewage system network is constructed according to a mixed system for the discharge of urban waste water and run-off rain water. The scenario foresees a total destruction of the sewage system. It includes the destruction of concrete tanks: 185 metres of tanks with a width of 400 millimetres, 45 metres of tanks with a width of 600 millimetres, 40 meters of tanks with a width of 800 millimetres, and 100 metres of tanks with a width of 1100 millimetres. In the case of dry weather, the capacity of the existing sewage system network would suffice for several hours. During this period, the waste water would need to be pumped into an intact sewage system outside the area of the disaster. In the case of rainy weather, the pumping of waste water to areas with intact sewerage network would have to be established very quickly. First, the pumping of waste water from the reservoir and large channels would need to be started. Depending on the amount of precipitation, several additional high-power pumps would need to be provided. In coordination with reconstruction of roads and other community infrastructure, comprehensive rehabilitation of channels would take place over several months after the accident. The assessment of the sewage network costs takes into account the costs of the reconstruction of the alternative network (excluding the project documentation), amounting to EUR 253,750.00.

The total value of the rehabilitation of the community infrastructure is EUR 426,880.00.

Damage to and the rehabilitation of energy infrastructure

The costs of energy infrastructure include the costs of basic energy infrastructure and the costs of public lighting.

In the event of the accident, the main medium voltage and the local low voltage electricity infrastructures would be damaged, resulting in one substation outage (substation Potniški center), the failure of 32 transformers and the failure of 5021 metering points. Approximately 296 metres of electric cable duct, 1517 metres of medium-voltage network and 500 metres of low-voltage network would be destroyed.

After the collapse of the power supply, its restoration outside the closed area of the aircraft accident would begin within one hour after determining the location of all the outages. The quickest temporary power supply reconnection of tripped substations is established through

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 329/464 ______switching measures at the neighbouring substations. About 28 switching measures at different locations are foreseen, which would take approximately 21 working hours (45 minutes for a single measure). After the power supply transfers, another 29 metering points would be without power supply until the establishment of a temporary medium voltage cable connection at a distance of approximately 80 meters between the tripped substation and the cable duct in which the cable would be connected to another undamaged middle voltage cable. The shortest possible time for the establishment of this cable connection and temporary supply of substations, as well as 29 metering points, would be 12 hours after the event. The substation Potniški center, for which the power supply reconnection is not possible (no electricity consumer) would remain without supply. For the supply of the consumers on the low-voltage network, only two power supply transfers in connection- metering cabinets at the border of the restricted area would be required. In accordance with the risk scenario, all other facilities within the area are demolished.

The repair of the damaged or destroyed electricity area could only start after allowing access to the closed area. The repair of the damaged electricity grid would require approximately 145 metres of new electric cable ducts and 2237 metres of medium-voltage network. Low- voltage network would need to be rebuilt.

Owing to the accident described in the scenario, the distribution company would not have a significant loss of income, and other businesses and the population would be without electricity for maximum several hours.

The cost of the destruction of the basic electricity infrastructure would amount to approximately EUR 180,000.00.

Public lighting would also be destroyed, including 9 FeZn lampposts in the height of 12 metres with two lamps, 7 FeZn lampposts in the height of 10 metres, and 8 FeZn lampposts in the height of 5 metres. The construction of the foundations of all these lampposts would require the procurement of 33 ARC 150 W lamps, 25 cable duct with a 250 kN cast iron cover, 1200 metres of power and control cables, and 600 metres of triple-tube cable duct with a diameter of 110 millimetres. Together with small parts and connection couplings, the estimated cost of public lighting would total in EUR 87,500.00.

Thus, the total value of the rehabilitation of the electricity infrastructure is EUR 267,500.00.

Aircraft accident investigation cost

The cost of an aircraft accident investigation consists of several individual costs, namely the costs of an independent investigation body and the costs of other responsible state bodies which may arise during the investigation of an aircraft accident and the provision of logistical support.

The cost of the investigation of an aircraft accident with 150 passengers and crew members is based on the fact that the commission would include 1 Slovenian principal investigator and 3 Slovenian investigators, 7 foreign representatives, of which 3 would be foreign

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 330/464 ______investigators and 4 individual experts in their respective fields of work or foreign aviation experts from foreign civil aviation authorities and other foreign bodies.

The cost of equipment includes the cost of personal protective equipment in the amount of EUR 300 per investigator, and the cost of consumables in the amount of EUR 100 EUR per investigator. These costs amount to EUR 400 per investigator x 7 investigators, which is approximately EUR 2,800.00.

The cost of protecting the wreckage covers the cost which is expected to arise the third day after the accident and covers the protection of the wreckage and the site of the accident and so on. For the first two days, the accident site is protected by the Police. The cost is estimated at EUR 10 per hour per security guard x 10 security guards = 100 EUR per hour x 24 hours = EUR 2,400.00 per day x 12 days, which is approximately EUR 28,800.00.

The cost of terrain preparation consists of 20 machine hours x EUR 50 per hour for mowing, felling trees, removal of soil and rocks from the accident site, and so on, which amounts to approximately EUR 1000.00.

The cost of preparing the wreckage, which comprises of 20 machine hours x EUR 50 per hour for emptying the tanks, disconnection of energy sources in the aircraft, the removal of vital parts of the aircraft, the removal of the wings, and so on, is estimated at approximately EUR 1,000.00.

The cost of renting an appropriate room for the accommodation and work of investigators and observers covers the accommodation and food for investigators and observers in the amount of EUR 100 EUR per person per day x 11 persons x 10 days, which is approximately EUR 11,000.00.

The cost of transporting the aircraft wreckage includes special transport (vehicle under escort) in the amount of EUR 2000 per transport x 5 transports in the framework of special logistic support, which covers the activities and measures of logistic support that requires special equipment, training and skills which are normally provided for the performance of tasks related to the Police, defence of the country, and the protection against natural and other disasters. Special logistic support, based on the prior request of the ministry responsible for transport, is provided by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior. The cost is estimated at approximately EUR 10,000.00.

The travel costs for investigators and observers covers air transport of investigators and observers from abroad to Slovenia and back in the amount of EUR 500 per person x 7 persons, and the transport from the airport to the place of accommodation and back in the amount of EUR 10 per person x 7 persons, daily travel from the site of the event and back in the amount of 10 EUR per person per day x 11 persons x 10 days. Altogether, this totals in approximately EUR 4,670.00.

The cost of manipulating the wreckage comprises 20 machine hours x EUR 50 per hour for lifting, loading, handling and unloading the aircraft wreckage, and so on, which is approximately EUR 1,000.

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The cost of storing the wreckage covers the purchase of a movable hangar with aluminium structure and plastic roof and sides. The hangar is produced on the basis of an advance order. The cost of the hangar measuring 60 metres x 50 metres x 12 metres (ridge height), which is approximately 3,000 m2 of floor area, used for storing the wreckage and investigating the aircraft accident, is approximately EUR 299,764.00.

The cost of cleaning covers the cleaning the event site, the means of transport after the transport of the wreckage, the warehouses and so on, amounting to EUR 48 hours x EUR 8 per hour, which totals in EUR 384.00.

The cost of providing assistance to families of victims covers the cost of food, drink and the rental of rooms to accommodate families in the amount of EUR 100 EUR per person per day x 225 people (approximately 2.5 persons per family) x 12 days and the cost of translation service, spiritual care, medical support and so on. This amounts to EUR 100 per person per day x 225 people x 12 days, which is approximately EUR 297,000.00.

The cost of data acquisition includes the cost of the acquisition of data in the state of registration, manufacturer, operator and maintainer of the aircraft, and the state of the supervisory body of the operator. It amounts to approximately EUR 500 a year x 5 flights plus the cost of daily subsistence allowance, which is EUR 50 per day x 5 days, totalling in approximately EUR 2,750.00.

The cost of investigation and analysis covers the estimated cost of transport and examination of the black box, which is the device recording the data on the flight and on the functioning of the engines, and the sounds (conversations) in the cockpit and the passenger compartment, as well as with the air traffic control personnel. The cost is approximately EUR 5,000 per box x 2 boxes plus various investigations and analyses of aviation materials, systems and so on, which amounts to approximately EUR 50,000.00. This cost can rise dramatically, since it depends on the course of the investigation of the aircraft accident and search for its reasons. The estimated cost for this scenario is EUR 60,000.00.

The total estimated cost of the flight accident investigation stands at approximately EUR 720,168.00.

The data on the total damage and costs of the aircraft accident are given in the table below.

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The total damage and costs of the aircraft accident in the populated area

Cost Value (in EUR) Loss of the aircraft 223,370,000.00 Compensation cost 47,058,658.50 Damage to and rehabilitation of road 1,500,000.00 infrastructure Damage to buildings and rehabilitation 15,583,000.00 Damage to and rehabilitation of community 426,880.00 infrastructure Damage to and the repair of energy 267,500.00 infrastructure Total cost of infrastructure 17,777,380.00 Aircraft accident investigation cost 720,168.00 Total 288,926,206.50

LIKELIHOOD OF RISK ANALYSIS

Based on the risk scenario or its likelihood or frequency of occurrence, the described risk impacts can occur every 25 to 100 years (annual likelihood of between 1 and 4%). This value will be duly compared with the criteria for assessing the likelihood of an accident and shown in risk matrices for accidents.

RELIABILITY OF RISK ANALYSIS

Risk analyses are based on risk scenarios. This risk analysis deals with events which were predicted in advance. These events are mostly characterised by the lack of reliable and accurate data. The data are not very relevant, and certain areas are marked by a general lack of information. Owing to the very limited time frames, significant progress or high quality of the risk scenario analysis could not be achieved. Given the above, based on a subjective and qualitative assessment, the risk analysis is estimated as moderately reliable.

DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT

Comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of impact on people

The next table shows the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people.

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Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people and the ranking of the risk scenario

Criteria for the 1 2 3 4 5 assessment of risk impacts on people Number of fatalities Up to 5 5-10 10-50 50-200 More than 200 Number of fatalities (10 Up to 5 5-10 10-50 50-100 More than years)* 100 Number of injured or sick Up to 10 10-50 50-200 200-1000 More than people 1000 Number of injured or sick Up to 10 10-50 50-200 200-500 More than people (10 years)** 500 Number of evacuated people Up to 20 20-50 50-200 200-500 More than (permanent measure) 500 *For disasters with possible long-term impacts (e.g. up to 10 years), such as accidents involving dangerous substances and nuclear or radiological accidents, the long-term values representing fatalities and injured or sick people (10 years) can be determined separately or additionally, if necessary, as mentioned above. ** Injured or sick people include people who were affected by radiation, contamination or poisoning. In analyses of individual risks, such people can be dealt with separately. Their number is added to the number of the injured or sick people. Included in the number of fatalities and the injured people are the possible dead and injured members of protection, rescue and relief forces involved in emergency response operations, and the number of policemen, members of the armed forces and disaster response teams belonging to different services (e.g. emergency medical assistance teams, teams from electrical or public utility companies and others) who died or were injured during the implementation of emergency measures under their responsibility, and during the initial restoration activities, but not later than one year after the disaster.

The assessed number of victims takes into account the size of the aircraft which fly daily in the Slovenian airspace and their capacity (number of seats). The risk scenario for aircraft accidents foresees fatal consequences for the 150 passengers and crew members, and additional 16 people on the ground. Accordingly, with regard to its impact on people, this risk scenario falls into level 4.

Comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage

The boundary between level 2 and level 3 of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage is set at 0.6% of GDP. This is the basis for the establishment of limit values for the remaining classes or levels. If the damage caused by a disaster exceeds 0.6% of GNI, a country is entitled to receive EU assistance after a disaster and can ask for a grant. In accordance with the EU guidelines, for damage above 0.6% of GNI (the expected damage), risk assessments must also be prepared for less likely disasters. In Slovenia, the GNI and GDP values are similar (GNI is slightly lower). For this reason, GDP is used as the criteria for the assessment of risk. The value of EUR 100 million is used as the boundary between level 1 and level 2 of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, which, in accordance with European guidelines, is one of the criteria for the ranking

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 334/464 ______of risks into the national risk matrices for disasters. In 2014, the GDP was approximately EUR 36,200 million.

Criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage and the ranking of the risk scenario

1 2 3 4 5 Up to 0.3% Between 0.3% Between 0.6% Between 1.2% More than 2.4% GDP and 0.6% of and 1.2% of and 2.4% of GDP GDP GDP GDP

Up to EUR 100 EUR 100-220 EUR 220-440 EUR 440-880 Over EUR 880 million million million million million

The assessment of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage is based on the costs of the aircraft accident referred to in the chapter related to the cost of the aircraft, compensation cost, infrastructure cost and cost of aircraft accident investigation in the total amount of EUR 288,926,206.50. In accordance with the criteria and damage, the aircraft accident from this risk scenario is ranked at level 3 of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage.

Comparison between the results of risk analysis and criteria for the assessment of political and social impacts

The text below refers to the comparison between the results of risk analysis and criteria for the assessment of political and social impacts.

Criteria for the assessment of impacts on the functioning of state authorities

The table below shows the criteria for the assessment of risk impact on the functioning of state authorities.

The ability of state authorities (the Government, ministries, constituent bodies, administrative units) to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility, in the affected area and the ranking of the risk scenario

Duration Limited Strongly impaired Disabled Up to 2 days 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 1 2 Up to 15 days 2 2 3 Up to 30 days 2 3 4 More than 30 days 3 4 5 1-5: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account.

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In accordance with the assessment, the ability of state authorities to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility (the Government, the ministries, constituent bodies, administrative units) would be limited for the duration of up to two days. This also takes into account the fact that in practice, no such case has occurred yet on the basis of which the ability to perform functions in the affected area could actually be verified.

The table below shows the number of people affected by the hindered or disrupted provision of services of state authorities (either physically or functionally).

The number of people affected by the hindered or disrupted provision of services of state authorities (either physically or functionally) and the ranking of the risk scenario

In accordance with the assessment, the number of people affected by the hindered or disrupted provision of services of state authorities (either physically or functionally) for up to two days is minimal. There has been no actual example in the affected area which could actually verify the disruptions.

The final level of impact on the functioning of state bodies is determined by dividing the sum of individual values with the number of impacts taken into account. The risk impacts which were not assessed are not taken into consideration. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Criteria for the assessment of impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems

The table below shows the assessed risk impact on the functioning of major infrastructure systems.

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The lack of or difficult access to drinking water, food and energy products (electricity, heating, fuel) and the ranking of the risk scenario

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than people/ and 5,000 50,000 50,000 duration Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days 1-5: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impact is not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. For the purpose of further work, the impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If the same number of people are affected in at least two cases, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration.

The assessment covers the duration and the number of people experiencing lack of or difficult access to drinking water, food and energy products. It takes into account the fact that for the first two days, there would be absolutely no access to the wreckage, and that the investigating authority would then need an additional 12 days for the initial investigation of the reasons for the aircraft accident and transport of the wreckage to the site of storage or site of further work.

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The assessment covers the duration and the number of people experiencing impaired and/or disabled use, arrival, departure, supply and purchase It takes into account the fact that for the first two days, there would be absolutely no access to the wreckage, and that the investigating authority would then need an additional 12 days for the initial investigation of the reasons for the aircraft accident and transport of the wreckage to the site of storage or site of further work.

The value of impact on the functioning of major infrastructure systems is determined by dividing the sum of individual values with the number of impacts taken into account. The risk impacts which were not assessed because they do not refer to the content assessed are not taken into consideration. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Criteria for the assessment of the psychosocial risk impacts

The table below shows the comparison between the results of risk analysis and criteria for the assessment of psychosocial impacts.

The number of people showing an unusual or undesired behavioural reaction, such as avoiding attending school or kindergarten; deliberate absence from work; deliberate avoidance of public transport; desire to move to another location; irrational financial operations (mass cash withdrawals, etc.); accumulation and appropriation of stocks of basic necessities; and similar reactions , and the ranking of the risk scenario

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than people/ and 5,000 50,000 50,000 duration Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 days 4 5 5 5 1-5: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impact is not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. For the purpose of further work, the impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used, followed by the one which lasts longer.

The assessment covers the number of people showing an unusual or undesired behavioural reaction to the disaster. It includes families of aircraft accident victims and the local population.

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The next table shows the social impacts.

Impact Level of impact

Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 The poor segments of the society find themselves in severe social 2 distress; the number of applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash is increasing. The consequences of the disaster are also felt by the middle-class 3 population, which is reflected in the increased number of applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash. The consequences of the disaster are felt by the majority of the 4 population, which is reflected in a considerable increase in the number of applications for social assistance benefits. The consequences are felt by the entire population, which is 5 reflected primarily in new applications for social assistance and renewed applications for the allocation of assistance.

In accordance with the assessment, the aircraft accident would have no impact on social distress and thus the increase of applications for social assistance.

The table below shows the psychological impacts.

Psychological impacts and the ranking of risk scenario

Impact Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of fear among the population owing to the lack of 2 information regarding the causes of the disaster and its characteristics and consequences. Increased level of fear among the population; fear of a new disaster 3 and its consequences. The population fear for their lives; decreased confidence in the 4 responsible authorities regarding their response and mitigation and elimination of disaster consequences; increasing desire to relocate. Owing to the negative events or consequences of the disaster, the 5 majority of people cease to believe that life in the affected area could return to normal state; mass relocation is taking place.

In accordance with the assessment, the aircraft accident would have a small or insignificant psychological impact. After the initial an unusual or undesired behavioural reaction owing to the lack of information regarding the causes of the disaster and its consequences, the situation would quickly become normal.

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The final value of psychosocial impacts is determined by dividing the sum of individual values from the above three tables with the number of impacts taken into account. The risk impacts which were not assessed because they do not refer to the content assessed are not taken into consideration. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal political stability

The table below shows the comparison between the results of risk analysis and criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal political stability.

Impact on internal political stability and law and order and the ranking of risk scenario

Impact Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of public expression of disagreement with the 2 actions taken by the competent institutions; individual disruptions in the functioning of political institutions (the Government, the Parliament, etc.); and individual occurrences of hostile campaigns. Individual cases of violation of law and order and criminal offences 3 resulting from the disaster; observed expressions of fear for one's own safety and property; individuals or groups are trying to undermine the internal political situation; and there is a decrease in the confidence of the population in the functioning of political institutions. Increased number of violations of law and order and of organised 4 criminal offences; increased fear among the population; political parties and/or other stakeholders are trying to undermine internal political stability and obtain political benefits by "imposing" their own programmes for improving the situation; reduced trust in the functioning of state institutions. Massive violations of law and order including violent 5 demonstrations; significant increase in the number of criminal offences; the internal security of the country is at risk; the internal political stability of the state is undermined; the basic rights provided for in the Constitution are undermined and at risk.

In accordance with the assessment, the aircraft accident would have no impact on the internal political stability and law and order.

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Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability

The table below shows the comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability.

Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to payment system failures and the ranking of risk

Settlement Payment Payment Payment Payment Payment failure value settlement settlement settlement settlement settlement failure in an failure in an failure in an failure in an failure in an amount amount amount amount amount lower than between 10% between 20% between 50% higher than 10% of the and 20% of and 50% of and 80% of 80% of the Duration of planned the planned the planned the planned planned the failure value of the value of the value of the value of the value of the payment payment payment payment payment system system system system system during during during during during disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions No impact, because Not Not Not Not Not disaster assessed impacts do assessed assessed assessed assessed (NA) not refer to (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) the assessed content. Disruptions in the payment system up to 1 1 2 3 3 2 hours Disturbances in the payment 1 2 2 3 4 system up to 4 hours Disturbances in the payment 2 3 3 4 4 system up to 8 hours Disturbances in the payment system which last the entire business day 3 4 4 5 5 or disturbances which are not eliminated by the end of the business day*

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Settlement Payment Payment Payment Payment Payment failure value settlement settlement settlement settlement settlement failure in an failure in an failure in an failure in an failure in an amount amount amount amount amount lower than between 10% between 20% between 50% higher than 10% of the and 20% of and 50% of and 80% of 80% of the Duration of planned the planned the planned the planned planned the failure value of the value of the value of the value of the value of the payment payment payment payment payment system system system system system during during during during during disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions Disturbances in the payment system lasting 4 5 5 5 5 more than one business day *Disturbances at the end of the business day, even if they only last a short time, can cause a one-day delay in the settlement of payments. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

In accordance with the assessment, the aircraft accident has no impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to payment system failures.

The table below shows the impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to lack of cash.

Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to lack of cash

Number of affected Up to 5,000 Up to 50,000 More than 50,000 people/duration Up to 2 days 1 2 3 From 2 to 7 days 2 3 4 More than 7 days 3 4 5 1 – No or small impact. 2 – Legal and natural persons have difficulties accessing cash in their place of residence. 3 – Legal and natural persons can access cash in neighbouring areas. 4 – Legal and natural persons can access cash in bigger cities or individual areas. 5 – Cash cannot be accessed. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impact is not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

In accordance with the assessment, legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to lack of cash would be restored after two days, when the investigating authority begins with the transport of the wreckage from the accident site.

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The table below shows the changes in the growth in GDP owing to the disaster consequences in the year of the disaster or the following year.

Changes in GDP growth owing to the disaster consequences in the year of the disaster or the following year and the ranking of risk scenario

Change Level of impact No impact because disaster impacts do not refer to the content/no Not assessed (NA) consequences Between 0 and -0.5 percentage points 1 Up to -1 percentage point 2 Up to -1.5 percentage point 3 Up to -2 percentage points 4 More than -2 percentage points 5 If it is assessed that the disaster would not have a negative impact on the growth in GDP, or if the impacts of the disaster do not refer to the content assessed, the level of impact is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

In accordance with the assessment, the aircraft accident would have no impact on the growth in GDP in the year of the disaster or the following year.

The final value of impacts on financial stability is determined by dividing the sum of individual values from the three tables above with the number of impacts taken into account. The impacts which were not assessed because they do not refer to the content assessed are not taken into consideration (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy and international stability

The table below shows the comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy and international stability.

Impacts on foreign policy and international stability and the ranking of risk scenario

Impact Level of impact

Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 No significant detected direct impact on the international position of 2 the state; individual foreign countries are following the developments in the Republic of Slovenia.

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Impact Level of impact

Individual (neighbouring) countries and some regional and 3 international organisations are responding to the event through diplomatic channels, expressing their support and concern about to the situation. A part of the international community (countries, international 4 organisations) is responding to the event by expressing their strong support or concern about to the situation. The Republic of Slovenia is receiving international assistance, especially in equipment and human resources. Despite international assistance, Slovenia remains a stable state. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the Republic of Slovenia are advising their citizens against travelling to certain areas of the RS. A large part of the international community is responding strongly to 5 the events in the country, since these are greatly impacting the security of other countries. The Republic of Slovenia is receiving extensive international assistance (equipment, money, human resources). The Republic of Slovenia is in urgent need of assistance in order to ensure the normal functioning of its entire system. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts are advising their citizens against travelling to the Republic of Slovenia owing to the situation in Slovenia and are decreasing or increasing the number of staff at these missions posts owing to the situation in the country; and/or international events whose main topic is the position or the situation in the Republic of Slovenia.

In accordance with the assessment, the aircraft accident would have a medium-level impact on foreign policy and international stability. A part of the international community and organisations would respond to the event. Owing to the lack of professional staff and technical equipment for investigating the causes of the aircraft accident, Slovenia would be forced ask for international assistance for the investigation. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation), the investigation of the aircraft accident would also involve the country of the aircraft operator, the country of its manufacturer, the country of its design and the country of its registration.

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Overall political and social impacts

The table below shows the values or levels of individual impacts as part of political and social risk impacts.

The overview of the values or levels of individual impacts as part of political and social risk impacts

Risk scenario

Value of impact group 1 1 Value of impact group 2 3 Value of impact group 3 1.5 Value of impact group 4 0 Value of impact group 5 1 Value of impact group 6 3 Sum of impact group values 9.5 Average value of political and social impacts 1.90

Since the final calculated value of political and social impacts is a decimal number, the conversion of the value is shown in the table below.

The conversion of the value of political and social impacts into the level of political and social risk impacts

Calculated value of Converted value of impacts to be impacts used for the disaster risk matrices 1.00 – 1.49 1 1.50 – 2.49 2 2.50 – 3.49 3 3.50 – 4.49 4 4.50 – 5.00 5

This is the basis for the calculation of the level of political and social risk impacts.

Level of political and social risk impacts

Risk scenario 1 Average value of political and social risk impacts 1.90 The level of political and social risk impact 2

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The resulting level of political and social impacts, together with the determined levels of impacts on people and economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, is used to calculate the average, overall impacts of risk scenario.

Comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of the aircraft accident

The table below shows the assessed likelihood of the aircraft accident risk for the present risk scenario.

Assessment of the likelihood of the accident and the ranking of the risk scenario

1 2 3 4 5

Once in more Once in every Once in every 25 Once in every 5 Once or more in than 250 years 100 to 250 to 100 years to 25 years every 5 years (annual years (annual (annual (annual likelihood of up (annual likelihood likelihood likelihood of to 0.4%) likelihood between 1 and between 4 and more than 20%) between 0.4 4%) 20%) and 1%)

Hardly any risk Possible but Possible risk General risk Special and (threat) less likely risk (threat) (threat) imminent (threat) (permanent) risk (threat) The descriptive definition is used especially for disasters which do not follow a natural cycle of occurrence or for intentional acts which cannot be predicted owing to the specifics of their occurrence (e.g. terrorism). For other disasters, the time periods listed in the upper part of the table are taken into account.

The table shows that the aircraft accident from the risk scenario can occur once in every 25 to 100 years (annual likelihood between 1 and 4%).

Overall (average) impacts of the risk scenario

Risk scenario and risk analyses Level of impact Level of impacts on people 4 Level of economic and environmental impacts and impacts on 3 cultural heritage Level of political and social impacts 2 Calculated level of overall (average) impacts 3.00 The level of overall (average) risk impacts 3 Risk likelihood 3 Reliability of risk analysis results Moderately reliable

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11.5 Annex 5: Risk Scenario: Large Wildfire Šumka-Železna vrata-Trstelj

RISK SCENARIO

This Risk Scenario deals with real-life wildfire in the Kras region in the period of very high wildfire risk. The fire spread in the area between the hill Šumka, Železna vrata pass and the hill Trstelj between 21 and 24 July 2006. The fire was set by an arsonist in the vicinity of the village Pedrovo, next to the local road between the settlements Komen and Branik. Owing to high temperatures and wind, the fire spread very fast.

On Friday, 21 July, 2006, at about 5 p.m., a fire occurred next to the local road between Komen and Branik, approximately four kilometres northeast from Komen and three kilometres southwest from Branik, on the slopes of the hill Veliki hrib. The Nova Gorica regional notification centre was informed about the event at 5.05 p.m. The Dornberk and Komen voluntary fire brigades were activated. Owing to the southwest wind, extremely arid conditions, specific terrain, difficult access and small number of forest roads in the area, the fire spread to the southwest towards the hill Šumka, which is mostly covered with old pine stands and rich midstory of thermophilous broad-leaved trees.

At 5.34 p.m., two units were at the site of fire: the Dornberk and Komen voluntary fire brigades with 23 firefigters and 6 vehicles. In accordance with the immediate assessment, the fire could not be stopped with the available forces. Thus, a request for a firefighting helicopter of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) was issued at 6 p.m. The request was approved. The forces of the Goriška and Nova Gorica Firefighting Associations were activated. 71 firefighters and 22 vehicles were present at the site of fire.

Other activated units also arrived at the site. The reception point from the Branik direction was established. The approved SAF helicopter was cancelled. Since additional firefighting forces were engaged at the Divača and Kozina fire sites, they could not be employed here. 25 firefighters and 35 vehicles were present at the site of the fire. At 9.20 p.m., the units in the right section almost managed to contain the fire on the peak of the

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Veliki hrib hill. In the left section, a line of approximately 300 metres was under the control of firefighting units, and up to the peak, a line of about 150 metres still remained. The situation regarding the fire was critical.

At the same time, speculations about a possible change in wind direction were raised, and during the night, the wind changed its direction (bora). The following firefighting units were sent to the fire front (a forest road – firebreak) in order to stop the fire: the Nova Gorica, the Šempeter, the Dornberk and the Col voluntary fire brigades. In the period between 9.30 p.m. 0.00 p.m., the wind changed its direction (bora). The situation was critical, and a rapid withdrawal of units from the fire front was necessary. The fire spread very quickly to the slope of the Šumka hill. From the Municipality of Nova Gorica, the fire moved to the Municipality of Komen. Only a small number of firefighting units remained at the site to prevent the spread of fire across the road between Komen and Branik towards the village of Pedrovo and into the villages of Rubije and Škrbina.

On 22 July at 5.00 a.m., the fire was approaching the forest road between Škrbina and the settlement of Mihalji at some points. First firefighting activities at the fire front were initiated. At some points, the fire crossed the forest road, but the firefighting forces managed to put it out. The incident commander inspected the fire and concluded that the situation was critical. The majority of the technology and equipment used by the arrived forces was not suitable for the situation on the ground. The formation of replacement teams was slow. There were not enough local firefighters to act as section and team leaders.

The situation at the fire site was examined. It was concluded that it would not be possible to stop the fire at the forest road between Škrbina and Mihajli. 120 firefighters and SAF helicopters were promised for 7.00 a.m. to assist in extinguishing the fire. The meeting point was established. A heliport was set up. The Major and the CP Commander of the Municipality of Komen were notified. The likelihood of risk to a 400 kV transmission line had to be considered, and procedures in the event of its disconnection were checked. An emergency medical assistance team had to be activated, and a communications vehicle of the Municipality of Nova Gorica had to be

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 348/464 ______employed. By 9.00 a.m., approximately 200 firefigters were active on the ground. Forces at the fire front successfully prevented the spread of the fire. Forces of the right section extinguished fire in the area between Škrbina, Rubije and the forest road towards the Komen-Branik road. In the left section, counter-firing was performed. At 11.25 a.m., the disconnection of the 400 kV transmission line was approved. At 11.30 a.m., the SAF helicopters joined in, together with two aircraft from Italy. 230 firefighters and 49 vehicles were present at the site of fire. Firefighting operations on the forest road between Rubije and the road Komen-Branik were not successful, and the fire spread in the direction of the Komenščak area towards the hamlet Jablanec. The units had to be relocated. Air support was successful. The right section was under the control of firefighters. The left section was involved in mitigating the consequences of fire in the fire sites, and individual fires occurred next to the village Rubije. Many problems occurred at the fire front owing to changes in wind direction and force. At the fire front itself, the fire spread. Due to the lack of local personnel, there were problems related to individual section leaders. The following aircraft were engaged: two helicopters of the Slovenian Armed Forces, an Italian Canadair aircraft, and a Sikorsky helicopter for extinguishing forest fires. By the evening, the fire was localised, and it spread over an area of 420 hectares.

On Sunday, 23 July, 432 firefighters were present at the meeting point. The process of deploying and forming units was slow. The fire was divided in five sections. The SAF helicopter unit was not present. Strong units were formed to stop the fire at the front. At around 11 a.m., the unit which was sent to the forest road in the direction of the Železna vrata to prevent the spread of fire towards the road between the villages of Škrbina and Lipa had to withdraw owing to a sudden wind change. The wind, which blew down the slope in the morning, turned up the slope, so that the fire transformed into crown fire and spread over the slopes of the hills Mali Ovčjak and Lipnik over the terrain with no forest roads. By the evening, the fire spread over the Saint Katarina hill and to the foot of the Veliki Ovčjak hill. At about 9.30 p.m., the spreading of fire was so intense that at about 10 p.m., it jumped to the Kačnik hill. The total area on fire was 890 hectares. The units which were deployed on the ground mitigated and eliminated the consequences of fire in individual sections, except at the fire front. When the fire jumped from the Veliki Ovčnjak to the Kačnik hill, it was clear that it would only be possible to stop the fire on the road between the villages Lipa and Dornberk. At night, the fire and its spread were examined. In accordance with the conclusions, the possibility of stopping the fire at the road mentioned before was very small. The involvement

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 349/464 ______of road tankers was requested. Activities took place on the road between Lipa and Dornberk, where vehicles were positioned at appropriate locations and preventive wetting of the ground was performed. Towards morning, the fire spread down the Veliki Ovčjak slope into the valley of Gospodence. Whether the firefighting forces will succeed in stopping the fire on the slope of the Kačnik was still not clear.

On Monday, 24 of July at 6.03 a.m., the fire spread from the Gospodence valley to the slope of the Kačnik hill and reached its peak in only 10 minutes. The units on the road persistently watered the slope. When everybody thought that they succeeded in stopping the fire and that the worst was over, the news came that the fire jumped for the second time, to the Trstelj hill. Owing to strong bora and wind whirls, the fire jumped ahead for more than 300 metres. On the other side of the protected area and the local road Lipa-Dornberk, the fire broke out again at the foot of the northern slope of the Trstelj. All units were sent to the Trstelj hill to stop the spread of the fire as soon as possible. The fire was divided in three sections. The work of the helicopters was hindered by strong tail wind and smoke. Six helicopters were ready for use. By the evening, the fire on the Trstelj hill was under control. In the night from 24 to 25 July, activities in all three sections of the Trstelj hill were carried out. The situation was most critical in the left section. The area was examined with a thermal camera, discovering several underground forest fires. All the fires were extinguished, and during the night, the fire did not start again. All night, units successfully carried out their activities.

On Tuesday, 25 July, units were present over the entire fire site in order to inspect it and clear it. Larger activities took place at the Terstelj hill. At 3.30 p.m., it started to rain, pouring heavily on the Trstelj hill. Lightning stroke on several locations surrounding the hill. The units were relocated to new fire locations. On Wednesday, 26 July, the fire site was divided in four sections. 167 firefighters and 39 vehicles were present on the ground. The situation on the burnt area was calm. Empty packaging was collected. At 12.20 a.m., the police helicopter concluded its overflight with a thermal camera. At 3.20 p.m., it started to rain. At 5.30, disaster response operations were officially over, and the fire watch started. 1936 firefighters and 458 vehicles from all parts of Slovenia were engaged. The labour costs for firefighters and vehicle costs amounted to SIT 100 million, which is approximately EUR 420,000. This amount does not include the cost of food, fuel, extinguishing agents, helicopters and aircraft, and damaged or destroyed equipment.

The fire covered an area of 950 hectares, of which 710 hectares were covered in forests (74%). The majority of them were adult pine forests (56%) mixed with oak (6%) and other thermophilous broad-leaved trees (38%). The crown fire caught approximately 75% of all the forests (510 hectares), and the remaining forests were captured by ground fire. Three municipalities were affected by fire: 203 hectares in the Municipality of Nova Gorica, 46 hectares in the Municipality of Miren-Kostanjevica, and 701 hectares in the Municipality of

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Komen. The entire length of the fire site edge was 18.71 km. The forest were mostly privately-owned (82%, the majority of them had recently been returned to the agriculture community of Škrbina), and the rest were state-owned and municipal forests.

In accordance with the Regional Forest Management Plan for the Kras Forest Management Area, the majority of the forests in the fire area were ranked at level I and II of forest fire risk. Therefore, a lot of attention had been paid to fire prevention in the past. Approximately 3200 meters of fire breaks had been established in the area of the fire. In addition, there are 9300 metres of forest roads, which, together with fire breaks, totals in the average of 13 metres of forest roads per hectare. All these roads enable the access to forest and the possibility of extinguishing fire. The major part of the fire site edge was along the roads, which proves that high density of roads contributes to greater efficiency of fire protection. It also points to the need for more open space, which should reach an average of 20 metres per hectare.

The map of the area burnt by the wildfire Šumka-Železna vrata-Trstelj

Two 400 kV lines and two 110 kV lines which supply the pumping station for the Kras region water distribution system were put at risk by the fire. The disconnection of the 400 kV line took place in cooperation with other electricity distributors in Europe. Water supply to a part of the Kras region, the Koper coastal area and the neighbouring Italy was at risk. If the fire had spread to the Trstelj, it would have posed risk to the television transmitter and the alpine cottage on the Trstelj.

The fire on the Šumka hill occurred during a long hot period without any precipitation. For better understanding of the weather situation which creates the conditions for the occurrence of a major wildfire, the figures below show the ignition site and the synoptic map of the air temperatures on the day of the fire ignition.

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LIKELIHOOD OF THE RISK SCENARIO

Given that risk assessments for individual disasters focus mainly on major disasters of greater significance and not on disasters which occur relatively frequently or even daily, their likelihood or frequency of occurrence is usually not very large. Major disasters almost always have huge, serious and extensive consequences and require greater disaster response, as well as greater extent and longer duration of rehabilitation and reconstruction. In many areas, this can cause considerable human, organisational and financial burdens for the society. In order for the society to be better prepared for them, attention has to be paid to such serious disasters. If we can manage serious disasters, we are more able to successfully and efficiently manage less intensive disasters.

Given the frequency of occurrence, the risk scenario described above is likely to occur again, since the accident from the scenario happened 10 years ago.

RELIABILITY OF RISK SCENARIO

Given the reasonably good quality of data on the occurrence and especially on the consequences of the fire, and taking into account that the fire actually occurred less than 10 years ago, the risk scenario can be assessed as relatively reliable.

RISK ANALYSIS

In part, the analysis is already given in the above description of the fire. The analysis mainly shows the logistical problems in receiving and deploying units coming from other parts of the country, and the problems with the supply of water and food for units. It emphasises the extreme importance of good control over the location of each unit on the ground, since owing to a sudden change in the wind or owing to the fire jumping 100 meters, units can quickly come under risk and become cut off from other units. The analysis also showed a need to increase the density of fire protection roads in the natural environment, together with the associated facilities, such as passing and turning areas and entry platforms, where units on

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 352/464 ______the ground are equipped. Good marking of fire protection roads on the ground which enables orientation is especially important for units from other parts of the country. It is also important that units are equipped with high-quality maps of the area in which they operate. Cooperation of foresters, hunters and all those who are familiar with the terrain and its characteristics is of paramount importance for a successful and safe management of emergency response.

In the period of increased wildfire risk, it is extremely important to ensure a sufficient number of firefighting units by increasing the number of firefighters from other regions, since there is a high likelihood of fire spreading thorough fire jumps. A sufficient number of foresters of the Slovenia Forest Service (ZGS) must be involved, who can help with knowledge of the terrain and maps.

CONSEQUECES FOR PEOPLE

Fortunately, the above-mentioned risk scenarios described had no major consequences for people, neither for the population nor for the responders. There were some minor injuries among the protection, rescue and relief forces, such as bruises and sprains, and some fear for the property among the population. However, there was a real possibility of serious injuries and even fatalities among firefighters. They had to deal either with challenging terrain or with unexploded ordnance, sudden changes in wind and the spread of fire which prevented their withdrawal, and they were at risk of dehydration, heat exhaustion or cardiac failure.

CONSEQUENCES FOR FORESTS AND AGRICULTURE

The greatest fire damage was caused to forests and much less to agricultural land. The economic damage related to the damaged wood volume was not very high, in contrast to the costs of salvage logging and restoration of burnt areas, and of the construction of routes used for remedial activities. In agriculture, damage was mostly incurred to grassland within forest areas and to permanent crops within the fire area.

CONSEQUENCES ON ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE/DISRUPTIONS IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

Forest and forest land include several facilities which are part of electricity infrastructure and are put at risk by wildfires. The wildfire incurred risk to the local electricity grid, as well as to the 110 kV line (which, among other things, provides electricity to the Kras water distribution pumping station), and the 400 kV line (which is a part of the international electricity transmission grid). Through challenging operations and the help of international institutions, the line was safely disconnected from the network. Such procedure can last several hours. In the case of wildfire, electricity infrastructure poses at least two risks: the risk of infrastructure damage owing to the consequences of fire or temperature and the consequent collapse of electricity lines, and the risk of contact of responders with electricity which can result in injury or even death. A further consequence for the wider environment can be the collapse of the

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ROAD TRAFFIC SITUATION

A wildfire can cause disruptions in road traffic, incurring direct risk to roads through flames or even smoke. Roads must be closed owing to disaster response operations, and the stopping of random curious people must be prevented since they pose risk to themselves and to emergency responders and disrupt the course of emergency response. Cooperation between the Incident Commander and the Police, or between the disaster responders and police officers, is of critical importance.

ASSESSMENT OF DIRECT DAMAGE

Damage and costs resulting from the fire Šumka-Železna vrata-Trstelj

Type of cost EUR EUR/ha of burnt area Cost of the emergency response of 200,300 210.8 firefighters ZGS work costs 2900 3.1 ZGS material costs 2300 2.4 Damage to forests owing to fire 453,000 638 Costs of the preparation of a recovery 4500 4.7 plan Rehabilitation costs 431,700 454.4 Total 1,094,700

Description of activities of some authorities

Slovenian Forest Service

From the very beginning of the emergency response, the Slovenian Forest Service (ZGS) was involved in the activities. The service plays an indispensable role in the preparation of maps for the purpose of conducting the emergency response operations, and for the needs of the operational units on the ground. The role of a forester as a consultant or guide who has thorough knowledge of the terrain, its natural characteristics and the situation on the ground is very important, and he can also help in preparing the scenario of the spread of fire. The service also plays an important role in the rehabilitation of the fire sites.

Ministry of the Interior

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In the event of a major wildfire, the Ministry of the Interior, including the Police, monitors the situation and provides assistance in the control of traffic, the closing of roads, the evacuation of the population, and the provision of safety of emergency response operations.

Ministry of Defence and the Slovenian Armed Forces

The Ministry of Defence was predominantly involved with its helicopter units which assist in extinguishing fires, particularly crown fires, and are indispensable for successful emergency response operations. The analysis shows the need for good cooperation between ground and air units, the understanding of each other’s work, especially in technical terms, and good coordination between them. There is an also a need for participation in emergency response operations, especially in the initial phase of a fire and in the morning, and for the involvement of helicopters providing the water for extinguishing operations and fuel on the site. In case of major wildfires, the assistance of air forces of the neighbouring countries is very welcome.

Civil Protection headquarters

The Civil Protection headquarters is responsible for the coordination of all the emergency response operations and plays a key role, especially in the provision of support for the supply to the response forces, and in the coordination with the local community in providing communications for the purpose of emergency response activities.

Ministry of Health

The Ministry of Health, together with organisations providing health care services, ensures the presence of emergency medical services and first aid teams at the site of emergency response operations, particularly emergency medical assistance to the injured responders or the population. In the event of a large number of injured people, it provides triage and a large portion of emergency medical assistance on the ground, as well as the transport of the injured people to hospitals and their accommodation.

Slovenian Firefighting Association (GZS)

The Slovenian Firefighting Association (GZS) brings together volunteer firefighters, who represent the backbone of all the emergency services participating in emergency response during major wildfires. It has a hierarchical structure and, depending on the level of need for the activation of forces employed in extinguishing the fire and in rescue operations, it adapts its management structure to each particular situation and ensures a sufficient number of firefighters.

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Municipalities

Municipalities are responsible for public fire service and civil protection. They cover the costs of emergency response until the activation of the national disaster response plan for major wildfire. The analysis of risk scenarios shows that the municipalities in an area which is potentially at risk must prepare in advance for the possible occurrence of a major wildfire, so that in cases when the fire actually breaks out, there are no delays and problems in the response which they are obliged to provide. The Slovenian Forest Service (ZGS) also prepares fire protection plans for municipalities.

LIKELIHOOD OF RISK ANALYSIS

In accordance with the assessment, such or similar fire is likely to occur one or several times every 5 years.

RELIABILITY OF RISK ANALYSIS

During the preparation of risk analyses, which represent the most complex and the most difficult part of risk assessment of every disaster, there was a lack of reliable and accurate data, some irrelevant data, and a serious lack of data in general. Owing to the very limited time frames, significant progress or high quality of the risk scenario analysis could not be achieved. Accordingly, the risk analysis is based on the current possibilities, representing the area with the biggest scope for future progress. However, the risk scenario can be assessed as relatively reliable.

DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT

CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK IMPACTS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE DISASTER

In order to establish the severity or the significance of risks and also different risk scenarios and analyses for a particular risk, the criteria for the assessment of impacts and the likelihood of disaster occurrence had to be established. These criteria can be used to compare the consequences or the impacts of disasters and their likelihood or frequency. Risk impacts are divided into impacts on people, economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, including political and social impacts. In the spring of 2015, the criteria for risk assessment and the likelihood of disaster occurrence were coordinated and adopted in the framework of the operation of the ACPDR as the national coordinating body for disaster risk assessments, together with the all ministries that prepare, or participate in the preparation of, risk assessments for individual disasters. The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts and the likelihood of disaster occurrence are uniform for all risks and divided into five risk levels, with the level of impact or likelihood being:

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1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – medium, 4 – high, 5 – very high.

Comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people

The risk impacts on people in relation to the type of risk can predominantly refer to the number of fatalities, the number of injured or sick people, the number of permanently evacuated people, the number of people living and working in the areas which are affected by a particular disaster, and others (e.g. impacts on vulnerable population groups, such as children, the elderly and the socially disadvantaged people). For disasters with possible long- term impacts (such as accidents involving dangerous substances, and nuclear or radiological accidents), these impacts are used or determined, if necessary, based on the number of fatalities and of injured or sick people during the period of 10 years following the disaster. The criteria for assessing risk impacts on people are expressed in the number of fatalities, injured or sick people, and permanently evacuated people.

Included in the number of fatalities and the injured people are the possible dead and injured members of protection, rescue and relief forces involved in emergency response operations, and the number of policemen, members of the armed forces and emergency response teams belonging to different services (e.g. emergency medical assistance teams, teams from energy or public utility companies, and others) who died or were injured during the implementation of emergency measures under their realm of responsibility, and during the initial restoration activities, but not later than one year after the disaster. Included in the risk matrices are the highest values of impact in reference to the coordinated criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people

Criteria for the assessment 1 2 3 4 5 of risk impacts on people Between Between 5 10 and Between More than Number of fatalities Up to 5 and 10 50 50 and 200 200 Number of fatalities (10 years)* Up to 5 Between 5 Between Between More than and 10 10 and 50 and 100 100 50 Between Between Number of injured or sick Between 50 and 200 and More than people Up to 10 10 and 50 200 1000 1000 Number of injured or sick Up to 10 Between Between Between More than people (10 years)** 10 and 50 50 and 200 and 500 200 500

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Criteria for the assessment 1 2 3 4 5 of risk impacts on people Between Between Number of evacuated people Between More than Up to 20 50 and 200 and (permanent measure) 20 and 50 500 200 500 1.-5.: Level of impact. *For disasters with possible long-term impacts (e.g. up to 10 years), such as disasters involving dangerous substances and nuclear or radiological accidents, the long-term values representing fatalities and injured or sick people (10 years) are determined separately or additionally, if necessary, as indicated above. ** Injured or sick people include people who were affected by radiation, contamination or poisoning. In analyses of individual risks, such people can be dealt with separately. Their number is added to the number of the injured or sick people.

In accordance with the assessment of the risk of fire from this scenario, the number of fatalities could be up to seven people and the number of the injured up to 40 people. These values rank the risk scenario at the second level of risk impacts on people, both in terms of fatalities and the injured people. The latter figure is also the representative value of the risk scenario as regards the risk impacts on people. There are no permanently evacuated people.

Comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage

The following impacts can be included among the economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage in reference to risks: the number, the consequences and the amount of damage on facilities and in them; the costs of the operation of ministries and bodies which carry out activities within the realm of responsibility of ministries, in difficult situations; the extent and the amount of damage on agricultural and forest surfaces; the costs of the limitation on the use of food and the long-term costs in the food supply chain; the extent and the amount of damage to water bodies; the number of and the damage to the damaged or destroyed means of transport; the number of, and the damage and costs resulting from, the dead or sick domestic or wild animals and animals which need to be treated or killed; the costs of the provision of medical care to people; the damage resulting from the termination of an economic activity; social and other similar costs; the costs of emergency response and other potential international assistance; the costs of comprehensive long-term renovation (restoration) of facilities and equipment; the costs of comprehensive long-term restoration (rehabilitation) of agricultural and forest surfaces; the costs of comprehensive long-term restoration (rehabilitation) of water bodies; the costs of environmental restoration and other environmental damage; and additionally (not included in the calculation of the damage and costs), the extent of the affected area (in square kilometres and the percentage of the country's surface), the height of insurance payments for disasters, the reduction of the GDP, the decrease in the visits of foreign tourists, and the increase of unemployment owing to the disaster.

The criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and the impacts of risk on cultural heritage are expressed through the amount of costs and damage caused by an individual risk. The boundary between class 2 and class 3 out of five is set at 0.6% of

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 358/464 ______the GDP. This is the basis for the establishment of limit values for the remaining classes. To a large extent, this baseline value refers to the value of the 0.6% of the GNI. If the damage resulting from a disaster exceeds the value of 0.6% of the GNP, an EU country may submit a request for grant. In the Republic of Slovenia, the GNI and GDP values are very similar (GNI is slightly lower). For this reason, GDP is used for assessing risk impacts for a disaster. In 2014, the GDP value stood at approximately EUR 36,200 million, while the value of 0.6% of GDP was approximately EUR 220 million.

Criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage

1 2 3 4 5 Between 0.3% Between 0.6% Between 1.2% More than 2.4% Up to 0.3% and 0.6% of and 1.2% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP of GDP GDP GDP

Between EUR Between EUR More than EUR Up to EUR 100 Between EUR 220 and 440 440 and 880 880 million 100 and 220 million million million million 1.-5.: Level of impact.

The analysis shows that the damage would not exceed EUR 100 million, which is why this risk scenario is ranked at level 1 of economic and environmental impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage.

Comparison between the results of risk analysis and criteria for the assessment of political and social risk impacts

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of state authorities

In accordance with the assessment, the risk scenario would have no significant impact on the ability of state authorities to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility. For this reason, the scenario was ranked at impact level 1.

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The ability of state authorities (the Government, ministries, constituent bodies, administrative units) to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility in the affected area

Duration Limited Strongly impaired Disabled Up to 2 days 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 1 2 Up to 15 days 2 2 3 Up to 30 days 2 3 4 More than 30 days 3 4 5 1.-5.: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account.

The number of people affected by hindered or disrupted provision of services of state authorities (either physically or functionally)

In accordance with the assessment, the impact of risk scenario would be ranked at impact level 2.

The final level or value of risk impact on the functioning of state authorities is defined by dividing the sum of individual values from both tables with the number of impacts taken into account. The risk impacts which were not assessed are not taken into consideration. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account, the resulting value of risk impacts on the functioning of state authorities is 1.5.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems

The assessment mostly focuses on the situation regarding the supply of electricity, which is one of the most problematic consequences of fires. The risk scenario was ranked at impact level 2.

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The lack of, or difficult access to, drinking water, food and energy products (electricity, heating, fuel)

Number of Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than Up to 500 people/duration and 5,000 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days 1.-5.: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If the same number of people is affected in at least two cases, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration.

Strongly impaired or disabled use of the internet and telecommunication systems; arrival to work and in educational institutions; use of public services (access to the media, health services, banking services etc.); use of public transport; supply/purchase of basic necessities

In accordance with the assessment, the greatest impact on the ranking of the risk scenario in the above table of risk is the (in)ability to use the internet, telecommunications systems, and the inability to supply electricity and water.

The final level or value of risk impact on the functioning of major infrastructure systems is defined by dividing the sum of values from the above tables with the number of impacts taken into account. The risk impacts which were not assessed because they do not refer to the content assessed are not taken into consideration. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (2), the resulting value of risk impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems is 1.5.

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Criteria for the assessment of the psychosocial risk impacts

In accordance with the assessment, the risk scenario did not or would not have a significant negative impact on the behaviour of people. For this reason, it was ranked at impact level 2.

Social impacts and the ranking of risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Types of social impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 The poor segments of the population find themselves in severe social distress; the number of applications for extraordinary social 2 assistance benefits in cash is increasing. The consequences of the disaster are also felt by the middle-class population, which is reflected in the increased number of 3 applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash. The consequences of the disaster are felt by the majority of the population, which is reflected in a considerable increase in the 4 number of applications for social assistance benefits. The consequences are felt by the entire population, which is reflected primarily in new applications for social assistance and 5 renewed applications for the allocation of assistance. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

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Psychological impacts and the ranking of risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Types of psychological impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of fear among the population owing to the lack of information regarding the causes of the disaster and its 2 characteristics and consequences. Increased level of fear among the population; fear of a new disaster 3 and its consequences. The population fear for their lives; decreased confidence in the responsible authorities regarding their response and mitigation and 4 elimination of disaster consequences; increasing desire to relocate. Owing to the negative events or consequences of the disaster, the majority of people cease to believe that life in the affected area could 5 return to a normal state; mass relocation is taking place. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

The final value of psychosocial risk impacts is determined by dividing the sum of individual values from the three tables above with the number of impacts taken into account. The risk impacts which were not assessed because they do not refer to the content assessed are not taken into consideration. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (3), the resulting value of psychosocial risk impacts is 1.66.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal political stability

Risk impact on internal political stability and law and order and the ranking of risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Individual disruptions in the functioning of political institutions (the 2 Government, the Parliament, etc.); individual occurrences of hostile campaigns. Individual cases of violation of law and order and criminal offences resulting from the disaster; observed expressions of fear for one's 3 own safety and property.

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Types of impacts Level of impact Individuals or groups are trying to undermine the internal political situation; reduced trust of the population in the functioning of political institutions. Increased number of violations of law and order and of organised criminal offences; increased fear among the population. Political parties and/or other stakeholders are trying to undermine the internal political stability and obtain political benefits by "imposing" 4 their own programmes for improving the situation; reduced trust in the functioning of state institutions. Massive violations of law and order including violent demonstrations; significant increase in the number of criminal offences; the internal security of the state is at risk. 5 The internal political stability of the country is undermined; the basic rights provided for in the Constitution are undermined and at risk. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can only be a whole number.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability

In accordance with the assessment of consequences, the risk scenario would not affect the performance of activities related to the assessment content.

Payment Payment Payment Payment Payment settlement Settlement failure settlement settlement settlement settlement failure in value failure in an failure in an failure in an failure in an an amount amount amount amount amount lower than between 10% between 20% between 50% higher than 10% of the and 20% of and 50% of and 80% of 80% of the planned the planned the planned the planned planned value of value of the value of the value of the value of the the payment payment payment payment payment duration of the system system system system system failure during during during during during disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions No impact, because disaster Not Not Not Not Not impacts do not assessed assessed assessed assessed assessed refer to the (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) assessed content. Disruptions in the payment system 1 1 2 3 3 up to 2 hours Disruptions in the payment system 1 2 2 3 4 up to 4 hours Disruptions in the payment system 2 3 3 4 4 up to 8 hours

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Payment Payment Payment Payment Payment settlement Settlement failure settlement settlement settlement settlement failure in value failure in an failure in an failure in an failure in an an amount amount amount amount amount lower than between 10% between 20% between 50% higher than 10% of the and 20% of and 50% of and 80% of 80% of the planned the planned the planned the planned planned value of value of the value of the value of the value of the the payment payment payment payment payment duration of the system system system system system failure during during during during during disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions Disruptions in the payment system which last the entire business day or disruptions 3 4 4 5 5 which are not eliminated by the end of the business day* Disruptions in the payment system 4 5 5 5 5 lasting more than one business day *Disruptions at the end of the business day, even if they only last a short time, may cause a one-day delay in the settlement of payments. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

In accordance with the assessment, the risk scenario would probably have no significant impact on the capacity of legal and natural persons' to pay owing to lack of cash.

Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to lack of cash and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Number of affected Up to 5000 Up to 50,000 More than 50,000 people/duration Up to 2 days 1 2 3 Between 2 and 7 days 2 3 4 More than 7 days 3 4 5 1.-5.: Level of impact. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Legend: 1 No or small impact. 2 Legal and natural persons have difficulties accessing cash in their place of residence. 3 Legal and natural persons can access cash in neighbouring areas. 4 Legal and natural persons can access cash in bigger cities or individual areas. 5 Cash cannot be accessed.

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Changes in the growth of GDP owing to a disaster in the year of the disaster or in the following year and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Changes in GDP growth Level of impact No impact because disaster impacts do not refer to the Not assessed (NA) content/no consequences Between 0 and -0.5 percentage point 1 Up to -1 percentage point 2 Up to -1.5 percentage point 3 Up to -2 percentage points 4 More than -2 percentage points 5 If it is estimated that a disaster will not have a negative impact on the growth in GDP, or if the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, the level of impact is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

In accordance with the assessment, the risk scenario would have no substantial impact on the growth or decrease in GDP.

The final level or likelihood of risk impact on financial stability is determined by dividing the sum of individual values from the three tables above with the number of impacts taken into account. The impacts which were not assessed because they do not refer to the content assessed are not taken into consideration (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (3), the resulting value of risk impacts is 1.33.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy/ international stability

Foreign policy (international) risk impact and the ranking of risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Type of foreign policy or international impact Level of impact

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Type of foreign policy or international impact Level of impact

Part of the international community (countries, international organisations) is responding to the event by expressing strong support or concern about to the situation. The Republic of Slovenia is receiving international assistance, especially in equipment and human resources. Despite international 4 assistance, Slovenia remains a stable state. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the Republic of Slovenia are advising their citizens against travelling to certain areas of the Republic of Slovenia. A major part of the international community is responding strongly to the events in the country, since these events are greatly impacting the security of other countries. The Republic of Slovenia is receiving significant international assistance (equipment, money, human resources). The Republic of Slovenia urgently needs assistance to ensure a normal functioning of its entire system. 5 Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the Republic of Slovenia are advising their citizens against travelling to the Republic of Slovenia and are decreasing or increasing the number of staff at these missions and posts owing to the situation in the country. International events whose main topic is the position of or the situation in the Republic of Slovenia. If it is assessed that the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, the level of impact is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can only be a whole number.

With regard to foreign policy impacts, the risk scenario was ranked at impact level 2 owing to the disconnection of the 400 kV line, which is part of the international power transmission network.

The overall value and level of political and social impacts

The final value or the level of political and social risk impacts is determined by adding together the final values or the levels of all groups of political and social risk impacts and dividing this sum by the number of impact groups, that is, by 6. If a certain group of political or social risk impacts was not assessed because these risk impacts do not refer to the assessed content (NA), this group is not taken into account in the final calculation. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

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The overview of the value or levels of individual impact groups as part of political and social risk impacts

Value Value Value Value Value Value of of Overall Average of of of of impact impact impact impact impact impact impact impact group group value value group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 1 6 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.66 1.33 2.00 9.49 1.58

The final calculation of the value of political and social risk impacts can also be a decimal number. In this case, the final level of political and social risk impacts is to be calculated and must be a whole number. The table below was used to determine the level of political and social risk impacts.

The conversion of the value of political and social impacts into the level of political and social risk impacts

Average value of political and social risk The level of political and social risk impacts impact 1.00-1.49 1 1.50-2.49 2 2.50-3.49 3 3.50-4.49 4 4.50-5.00 5

This is the method for calculating the level of political and social impacts.

The conversion of the value of political and social impacts of risk scenarios into the level of political and social risk impacts

Value or level Average value of political and social risk impacts 1.58 Level of political and social risk impacts 2

Comparison between the results of the risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of the disaster

The likelihood of the occurrence of the disaster can be defined using a number, percentage or description, which is evident from the next table.

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Criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of the disaster and the ranking of risk scenarios according to the levels of impact

1 2 3 4 5 Once in every Once in every Once in every 25 Once in every 5 Once or more in 250 years 100 to 250 years to 100 years to 25 year every 5 years (yearly likelihood (yearly likelihood (yearly likelihood (yearly (yearly likelihood of up to 0.4% of between 0.4 of between 1 to likelihood of of more than and 1%) 4%) between 4 and 20%) 20%)

Hardly any risk Possible but less Possible risk General risk Special and (threat) likely risk (threat) (threat) imminent (threat) (permanent) risk (threat) 1.-5.: Likelihood level

With regard to the assessed occurrence of the risk scenario, which can be once or more in every 5 years, the risk scenario is ranked at level 5, the highest level of likelihood of disaster risk.

DISASTER RISK MATRIX

Disaster risk matrices are used for graphic representation of the extent of the established impacts and likelihood of disaster risk or individual risk scenarios, when only one risk is addressed. The preparation of a disaster risk matrix is one of the main goals in the preparation of risk assessments for individual disasters.

Disaster risk matrices consist of five levels (fields) on the vertical axis indicating levels of risk impacts, and five fields on the horizontal axis indicating levels of risk likelihood. The fields are coloured in shades from green to red; the levels of impact and likelihood increase from green to yellow to orange to red. The colour of the fields changes more rapidly on the vertical axis than on the horizontal axis, which means that disaster risk matrices put greater emphasis on risk impacts than on the likelihood of disaster risk. A risk matrix has 25 fields altogether, in which, based on the content of the matrix, individual risks (or individual risk impacts) can be ranked in reference to the relationship between the extent of the impacts identified in risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of disaster risk. The same applies to the likelihood of risk. In a disaster risk matrix, the combination of likelihood and impacts is depicted by four risk levels, specifically:

- Low risk with green fields; - Medium risk with yellow fields; - High risk with orange fields; - Very high risk with red fields.

There are two types of disaster risk matrices:

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- Disaster risk matrices with separate risk impacts (the matrix of risk impact on people, the matrix of economic and environmental risk impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, and the matrix of political and social risk impacts), each for its own type of impact and with a unified likelihood); - Disaster risk matrices with an overall representation of impacts (one matrix presenting an average of all three risk impacts and a unified likelihood).

The level of overall or average impact is calculated by adding together the levels of risk impacts on people, the economic and environmental impacts and impacts on cultural heritage, and political and social impacts, and dividing the sum by three. The final calculated value of impact can also be a decimal number. In this case, the final level of overall (average) impacts must be determined, and the value must be a whole number. For this calculation, the table below is used.

Conversion of the overall (average) level of risk impacts to be inserted into the fields of the disaster risk matrices showing the overall value

Calculated value of all three impact The level of risk impact in disaster risk types matrices showing the overall value 1.00-1.49 1 1.50-2.49 2 2.50-3.49 3 3.50-4.49 4 4.50-5.00 5

By using the data from the above table, the final table can be completed with all the data required for the calculation of the levels of risk impacts in the matrix showing the overall value of risk impacts. Two columns in the table are of a darker shade. These columns are used for the disaster risk matrix showing the overall risk impact.

Table used for the calculation of the average risk impacts for the risk matrix showing the overall risk impacts

Level of economic and Level of Calculated The level Level of Reliability environmental political overall of overall impacts Risk of risk impacts and and (average) (average) on likelihood analysis impacts on social value of risk people results cultural impacts impacts impacts heritage Relatively 2 1 2 1.67 2 5 reliable

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11.6 Annex 6: Risk Scenario: Ice Storm in February 2014

RISK SCENARIO

This risk scenario deals with the biggest ice storm so far in Slovenia, which occurred between 30 January and 6 February 2014. A single weather event which causes so much damage over such a large area of land as the one described here is rare. This disaster is exceptional in terms of its intensity, the size of the affected area and the type of injuries and damage. With regard to consequences, which are described in more detail in the risk analysis chapter, this meteorological disaster can be defined as the worst ice storm in Slovenia, and also as one of our greatest natural disasters over a long period of time.

Weather map for Europe on 1 February 2014, midday

The description of the weather developments which had a decisive impact on the occurrence of the ice storm and its consequences is based primarily on the data of the Slovenian Environment Agency (ARSO). At the end of January 2014, the weather situation in Europe was characterised by a large difference in the atmospheric pressure between the low pressure area over the eastern Atlantic and partly also over the Mediterranean, and a strong anticyclone centred over Russia. Occasionally, the difference in the atmospheric pressure between the two pressure systems exceeded 100 millibars. Above Slovenia, which was located in the wider area of contact between anticyclone and cyclone, the frontal zone constantly re-emerged; at altitudes above North Africa and the Mediterranean, cold air of polar origin in a thin ground level troposphere met with a strong inflow of warm and humid

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On 4 February, the anticyclone above southeastern Europe began to weaken, the difference in the air pressure between the Adriatic Sea and the Balkans was decreasing, as was the atmospheric inversion above Slovenia. The impact of the extensive Atlantic cyclone intensified, and on 5 February, the southwester blew at some points in the ground level troposphere and raised the temperature above the freezing point. On 6 February, the wind became weaker, and on the following day, a moderate to strong southwester blew through the lowlands and ended the period of cold weather also in in those areas.

Early in the morning on 2 February 2014, vertical probing was carried out above Ljubljana. Below, cold air was still coming from the east, and between 1300 and 1900 metres, there was a layer with a positive air temperature. The temperature inversion was huge; the 400 m altitude difference showed a temperature difference of 9 degrees Celsius.

From 30 January to 6 February 2014, the weather in Slovenia was mostly cloudy; the situation in the lowlands was mostly calm or slightly windy, while at higher altitudes, the wind was stronger. After a period of cold weather between 26 and 30 January, when the air temperature was mostly around zero or below, there was an inflow of warmer air at higher altitudes on 30 January. On that day, above the ground level troposphere, where the temperature was sometimes as low as -5 degrees Celsius, a layer of warmer air with positive temperature returned (at an altitude between 1.200 and 1.900 metres above the sea level), first over the southwestern part of Slovenia, and in the following days over a major part of Slovenia. After 1 February, the temperature at higher altitudes slightly decreased, although a strong temperature inversion persisted until 4 February. Further to the north or northwest of Slovenia, the layer of warm was mostly weaker, and the layer of cold ground level air mostly

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 372/464 ______reached several hundred meters higher. In the low areas of the Primorska region, the temperature was mostly above freezing point all days, while in the Slovenian hinterland, the temperature was predominantly around the freezing point or slightly lower until 5 February.

At the meeting point between the cold and the warm air masses on the ground, mostly at the foot of the Visoki Kras area, a sudden exchange of cold and warm air masses occurred several times. On 31 January, the area of Ilirska Bistrica alone witnessed six air mass exchanges, with a temperature difference between 6 and 8 degrees Celsius. South of the air masses, there was a heavy rain.

In the hinterland areas, the temperature mostly rose as late as on 5 February, and on 6 and 7 February, it was even warmer. On 6 February, the temperature in the Postojna area and at some other locations in the lowlands strongly increased; and on 7 February, the wind finally blew through all the low areas. At 1.500 meters, it was mostly relatively warm all the time, while in the settlement of Rogla, the temperature only increased on 30 January, and on 3 February, a transitional period of significantly colder weather occurred. Another 1.000 meters higher, the weather was also too warm for the beginning of February, especially on 1 and 2 February. When the wind changed to the southwester also at lower altitudes, the normal situation of decreasing temperature with altitude was established in the atmosphere on 5 February, and even more so on 6 and 7 February.

The amount of precipitation between the morning of 30 January and the morning of 3 February 2014

Measuring station The amount of precipitation in l/m2 or in mm Bovec 400 Log pod Mangartom 350 Ilirska Bistrica 309 Lig 293 Kobarid 282 Lokve 239 Logatec 229 Zgornja Radovna 208 Bohinjska Bistrica 196 Rateče 188 Trava 187 Opatje selo 186 Postojna 165 Koprivna 151 Podljubelj 145 Bilje 136 Lesce 130 Kranj 124

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The precipitation started on Thursday, 30 January 2014, in the early morning hours; it first occurred in the west, but in a few hours, it also included the central and then eastern Slovenia. It was most intense on Friday, 31 January, throughout the day. On the morning of 1 February, the precipitation mostly became somewhat less intense and then strong again, and on 2 February, precipitation was abundant, too.

The table above shows the amount of the four-day precipitation throughout Slovenia, and the following figures present the time distribution of precipitation at some meteorological stations. The highest precipitation occurred in the Upper Soča region and in the wider area of Snežnik plateau. In Bovec, as much as 400 litres of precipitation per square metre fell in four days, that is, between 7 am on 30 January 2014 and 7 am on 3 February 2014. In this area, such an amount of precipitation is not unusual (the return period is five years); however, it is highly unusual for the winter. Such quantity of precipitation in Bovec is normal in late spring or autumn. The four-day sum of the amount of precipitation in the western half of Slovenia mostly did not exceed the return period of five years, but in some places, the record for January and February was exceeded. An exception is the town of Ilirska Bistrica, where 309 litres of rain per square meter fell in four days, and probably even more in the hilly hinterland (Snežnik).

Time distribution of the amount of precipitation in Bovec between 30 January and 4 February 2014

Time distribution of the amount of precipitation in Ilirska Bistrica between 30 January and 4 February 2014

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sneg dež s snegom dež dež, ki zmrzuje leden dež 10

4 padavine (mm) padavine 2

0 30. 0h 31. 0h 1. 0h 2. 0h 3. 0h 4. 0h 5. 0h 6. 0h datum in čas Time distribution of the amount of precipitation in Postojna between 30 January and 5 February 2014 The colour of the columns indicates the prevailing type of precipitation. During this period, approximately 120 litres of freezing rain freezing to ice fell per square meter sneg = snow dež s snegom = rain with snow dež = rain dež, ki zmrzuje = freezing rain leden dež = frozen rain

Time distribution of the hourly amount of precipitation in Ljubljana between 30 January and 4 February 2014

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sneg dež s snegom dež dež, ki zmrzuje leden dež 3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0 padavine (mm) padavine

0.5

0.0 30. 0h 31. 0h 1. 0h 2. 0h 3. 0h 4. 0h 5. 0h 6. 0h datum in čas Time distribution of the hourly amount of precipitation in Šmartno pri Slovenj Gradcu between 30 January and 5 February 2014 The colour of the columns indicates the prevailing type of precipitation. During this period, approximately 35 litres of freezing rain freezing to ice fell per square meter. sneg = snow dež s snegom = rain with snow dež = rain dež, ki zmrzuje = freezing rain leden dež = frozen rain

Owing to the inflow of warm air in the layer between approximately 1.200 and 1.900 metres, the temperature was often above the freezing point. The warm layer was stronger in the southwest and east of Slovenia and weaker in the northwest. Snowfall falling through the air layer with a positive temperature melted in the hot air layer mentioned above, so that in the lower layers, it was partially raining. The rain drops became undercooled in the cool ground level troposphere, so that their temperature dropped below the freezing point. Where the rain fell in liquid form all the way to the cold ground with the temperature below freezing point, the rain changed to ice when touching the cold ground surface. In the Slovenian hinterland, this situation occurred practically everywhere, and in the Primorska region, it only occurred at some locations at higher altitudes (for example on the Trnovo Forest and Banjšice Plateau). On 30 January, rain fell over a major part of the Primorska region, the majority in the catchment area of the Reka river, while in the Slovenian hinterland, it mostly snowed. There were up to 25 centimetres of dry snow, and even more at some locations in higher areas and in high mountains. In the area from the Primorska region toward the hinterland, ice storm occurred. Since the morning of 31 January, between 20 and 90 litres of precipitation fell in the area of the ice storm per square metre, most of which turned into ice coating. In the area of the ice storm, the temperature in the warm air layer, that is, above the altitude of about 1.100 meters, was above freezing point, mostly causing rain. On the following day, 31 January, the precipitation continued. By the morning of 1 February, mostly between 30 and 80 litres per square metre fell in the west and in a part of southern and northern Slovenia, while in the central part of Slovenia, the amount of precipitation was lower, and in the eastern part of Slovenia, it was almost zero. By the afternoon of 31 January, almost 200 litres of precipitation per square metre fell in the entire area of Ilirska Bistrica. In an area similar to that of the day before, most of the precipitation turned into ice. In the central Slovenia and towards the east, the snow gradually changed into rain, although there was still no heavy ice storm there, and in some places, the temperature was also above zero. In the night to 1

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February, the weather temporarily cleared up in the east and the morning was cold, with the air temperature up to approximately -5 degrees Celsius. This cooled layer of air persisted also during the day. At higher altitudes, a major part of Slovenia received an inflow of warmer air. New precipitation was mostly rain or freezing rain. Ice storm occurred in almost every part of Slovenia up to the altitude of approximately 1.150 metres; in the east, the amount of precipitation was only some litres per square metre, and there was no heavy ice formation. By the morning of 2 February, there was a lot of precipitation in many other parts: approximately 100 litres per square metre in the Upper Soča Valley, and between 30 and 50 litres per square metre in the major part of the Dinaric mountain barrier and elsewhere in the Julian Alps. Again, a lot of rain fell in the area of Ilirska Bistrica. Precipitation then continued until the morning of 3 February. Before that, in the afternoon and in the evening of 2 February, the warm air layer slightly weakened and at many locations, the snow line dropped to the low areas. In a major part of Slovenia, additional 10-50 litres of precipitation fell per square metre, mostly in western Slovenia, and in many parts of central Slovenia, the amount per square metre was approximately 20 litres. A considerable amount of precipitation turned into freezing rain, except in the Primorska region. On 3 February, precipitation stopped, and during the day it was mostly dry. By the morning of 3 February, in total, most of the areas which witnessed the alternating of snow and freezing rain the day before had between 10 and 30 centimetres of snow; some locations in the Gorenjska region and at higher altitudes had more than 70 centimetres of snow, and the northwest, where there was plenty of snow during most of this period, had even more than 1.5 metres of snow. A day later, occasional slight snow or rain fell in the Slovenian hinterland. A somewhat higher amount of precipitation fell on 5 February, especially in the area of the Dinaric mountain barrier and in the Alps. The east of Slovenia was mostly dry. At some locations, predominantly at somewhat higher altitudes, ice continued to form. Owing to significantly warmer weather on 6 and especially on 7 February, when many parts in the interior of the country warmed to above 5 degrees Celsius, the ice coating finally melted also in the majority of the areas which were most affected. In areas with less intense ice formation, the ice coat mostly melted entirely during that time, and since 10 February there were no further damage resulting from ice.

In the Postojna area, where ice coating was generally the thickest, it reached the thickness of between 50 and 90 millimetres on the ground. During that period (between 30 January and 3 February), approximately 165 litres of fell per square metre fell in Postojna, of which about 120 litres were freezing rain.

As early as in the morning of 31 January, the consequences of the ice storm in the Notranjsko region were relatively severe. Also on 31 January during the day, ice was becoming thicker, and on 1 February, it gradually began to spread towards the interior of the country. On 2 February, the extent of ice coating further increased, while the ice formation intensified and spread over almost the entire country, except the Koper coastal area and the wider hinterland of the Kras area, the Vipava Valley and a part of the Mura Region. The thickest ice coating was formed in the areas of the town of Postojna and the settlement of Pivka, and in the areas of the Trnovo Forest Plateau, the settlements of Banjšice, Kambreško and Vojsko, and the Šentvid Plateau. Its consequences were becoming more and more serious. On 3 and 4 February, there was almost no additional precipitation; however, owing to the temperature inversion, the ice persisted and did not start melting. On 3 February, more problems were caused by the bora wind in the Primorska region, further

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 377/464 ______breaking the trees and electricity and telecommunication lines which were overloaded with ice. The repeated minor precipitation in the night to 5 February, which again mostly had the form of freezing rain, made the situation even worse, especially in the most affected areas. After 5 February, the situation finally started to improve.

Ice-captured vehicle in the Notranjska region

The total amount of precipitation between the morning of 29 January and the morning of 6 February 2014, expressed in l/m2

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The total assessed amount of rain between the morning of 29 January and the morning of 6 February 2014, expressed in l/m2

A special characteristic of the weather events between 30 January and 5 February 2014 is the very unfavourable, long-lasting and intense combination of phenomena or causes that resulted in huge consequences and damage. In addition to ice which presented heavy load for the facilities and electricity and telecommunication lines in a major part of Slovenia, occasional snow caused additional overloads. Only in the wider Postojna and Pivka areas, all the precipitation fell in the form of freezing rain almost all the time. What is interesting about this extraordinary meteorological disaster is that ice did not occur in the area which is otherwise among the areas in Slovenia that are most exposed to ice formation - the Brkini hills.

LIKELIHOOD OF THE RISK SCENARIO

With regard to the frequency or likelihood of the risk scenario, it can be empirically established with reasonable certainty that such ice storm disasters as that of February 2014 occur rarely, probably not more often than once every 100 years. The severity and extent of the ice storm disaster in February 2014 is unprecedented. Naturally, this does not mean that such or even a more serious storm cannot occur in the near future. Owing to the relatively small number of major ice storms, it is difficult to give a reliable assessment of the precise temporal and spatial principles and the frequency of their occurrence.

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RELIABILITY OF RISK SCENARIO

Without any major reservations or any specific scientific assessment, the risk scenario can be described as relatively reliable, since it is based on the recent real and genuine events.

RISK ANALYSIS

The majority of data for risk analysis from the risk scenario was taken from the Report on the Consequences of Floods, High Snow and Ice in the Republic of Slovenia between 30 January and 9 February 2014, prepared by the ACPDR in the second week of February 2014, and from the data and documents collected for the purpose of preparation of the final report on the consequences of the ice storm. The ACPDR obtained these materials from the responsible state authorities and protection, rescue and relief forces between February and June 2014. In this respect, unless otherwise indicated, the regions considered are those determined for the purpose of the system of protection against natural and other disasters, that is, the areas covered by individual ACPDR regional offices.

The consequences of weather events described in the risk scenario were very extensive and diverse. The high areas of the Gorenjska region or the northwestern part of Slovenia experienced major problems resulting from the extremely large quantities of new snow, and there was also a very high risk of avalanches. In the area of Ilirska Bistrica, the river Reka and tributaries flooded twice, and later, on 2 February, ground water flooded the Pivka valley system. Floods in this area lasted until the second half of February, mainly in the areas of the settlements of Bač and Knežak. In other areas (except in the Koper coastal area, the Karst Region and the Vipava Valley, the Brkini Hills, and at some locations in the Mura Region), ice coating combined with snow coating caused huge consequences and damage and at some locations made life much more difficult.

On 30 January, snowfall caused normal traffic problems, and owing to freezing rain, ice coating formed very quickly in the Notranjska region and the high-lying areas of the Northern Primorska region. On 31 January and in the night before 1 February, rainfall in the Ilirska Bistrica area caused flooding of the river Reka with tributaries. On 1 February, the situation at the Reka river improved to some extent. However, owing to the new wave of rain in the area, floods repeated on the night before 2 February, and other watercourses in the Primorska region also increased.

The first emergency response activities in the Notranjska region began already in the night before 31 January. Owing to ice coating, the emergency response activities in the Notranjska region intensified on 1 February, and even more so on 2 February. Since 2 February, formation on the ice coating caused increasing problems also in other parts of Slovenia, especially in the east, resulting in intensified activities at these locations. Snow and ice coating caused the greatest damage to forests, electricity infrastructure systems and, owing to fallen trees, resulted in the closure of a large number of roads. Many electric power lines and poles were damaged, broken or destroyed. Many locations in the Notranjska region and some other areas were without electricity already on 31 January. Since 1 February, the traffic was also increasingly paralysed. In the Notranjska region, railway traffic was stopped, and

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 380/464 ______other areas faced increasing problems in rail transport. Owing to fallen trees, many roads were impassable. In the Gorenjska region, the biggest problems were in the municipality of Jezersko and in the settlement of Sovodenj in the municipality of Gorenja vas - Poljane, where the population was completely cut off from the world, without electricity and other connections for at least four days. There were many such places around the country, mostly in the Notranjska region and in the high-lying parts of the North Primorska region. At many points, it was no longer possible to supply drinking water owing to power failure. Most of such problems were faced by the Notranjska region, and to a greater or lesser extent they occurred almost everywhere in Slovenia, except in areas with rain which had no conditions to turn into freezing rain and consequently caused no problems. By 5 February, there was no significant improvement of the situation. In some areas, ice coating began to melt and become thinner during the day owing to higher temperatures, thus creating new problems, that is, the risk of large pieces of ice, snow and ice candles falling from trees, buildings and other objects. Considering the total number of days, the worst situation was generally observed in the following areas: throughout the Notranjska region, in high-lying areas of the North Primorska region (particularly on the Banjšice and the Gora nad Ajdovščino Plateaus, in the areas of the Vojsko settlement and the towns of Cerkno and Idrija), and in the Gorenjska region in the area of the municipality of Jezersko and the settlement of Sovodenj within the municipality of Gorenja vas - Poljane. In these areas, the ice coating was the thickest. The situation was also serious in the majority of the Ljubljana region, especially in the wider area of the town Logatec and in high-lying areas. At other locations, the greatest problems occurred in the high-lying regions of the West Štajerska, East Štajerska, Zasavska and Koroška regions. On 5 February during the day, at some locations the temperature increased so much that ice coating began to melt. However, with new freezing rain, ice was formed again, causing additional damage to forests, transport and electricity infrastructure, especially, as mentioned above, in some parts of the Notranjska region and in high-lying areas of the North Primorska region. The situation was still at its worst in the Notranjska region, where most of the area was still without reliable supply of electricity and drinking water and telecommunication connections, and traffic, especially rail traffic, was still paralysed. Throughout the country, the situation was gradually normalised, and on 8 and 9 February, it finally improved also in the Notranjska region. Teams of the regional electricity distributor Elektro Primorska fixed a power line between Pivka and Postojna, so that a part of households in Postojna was finally provided with electricity from the electricity grid, while most of the rest were supplied from power generators. The power line coming from the settlement of Razdrto was fixed in the following days. In the area of Postojna, drinking water had to be boiled before use. On 10 February, the schools in Postojna were open again. However, the municipalities of Loška dolina and Cerknica continued to struggle with a number of problems. In Logatec, the situation regarding the supply of electricity also improved considerably, mostly owing to strong power generators. Owing to restored operation of the 110 kV transmission line between Vrhnika and Logatec, electricity supply was further improved in the area of Logatec and Cerknica after 10 February. In the Gorenjska region, the biggest problems were on the road between the settlement of Preddvor and the municipality of Jezersko, where members of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) and other people removed fallen trees and branches for more than a week. The road was open for traffic after almost two weeks. Until then, the SAF armoured vehicles provided the most urgent transportation to the valley and back. In the Gorenjska region, the biggest

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CONSEQUENCES FOR PEOPLE

Several cases of poisoning occurred among the population owing to the incorrect use of power generators, and one person is believed to have died as a result. On 8 February, a 40- year old resident was found dead in a house in the village of Hrastje near Pivka as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning. The most likely cause of death was the use of a power generator indoors. Before that, on 2 February, a resident of the settlement of Bukovje in the municipality of Postojna was poisoned by carbon monoxide owing to the incorrect use of a power generator. On 3 February, the consequences of ice formation injured two people in Ljubljana, and on 4 February, another person was injured by a fallen tree. Also on 3 February, s branch fell on a local in the settlement of Gorenji Novaki in the municipality of Cerkno, causing injuries. On 5 February, a tree fell on a vehicle in the settlement of Boharina in the municipality of Zreče, injuring a resident. On 6 February, one person was poisoned in a dwelling house in Logatec owing to leakage of gas from a gas furnace. Some locals were also injured as a result of falling pieces of ice and large pieces of snow and ice during melting, especially in the Notranjska region.

During the response of the protection, rescue and relief forces and public services, 116 volunteer firefighters and 4 SAF soldiers were injured. On 5 February, one person (a 20- year-old electricity distributor employee) died as a result of an electric shock while repairing a power line failure near the settlement of Veliko Tinje in the Pohorje Hills in the municipality of Slovenska Bistrica. On 2 February, an employee of the road company Cestno podjetje Novo mesto was also injured. In total, more than 120 participants were injured in these response operations, which is probably the highest number related to a one-time occurrence of a certain disaster so far.

Table 4: Recorded fatalities and injured people as a result of the ice storm in 2014

Population Firefighters Members Public Work-related Total and other of the services accidents in protection, Slovenian forests in total/ rescue and Armed with regard to relief forces Forces the average** Number of 1 0 0 1 21/11** 23/13** fatalities Number of 7* 116 4 1 62/40** 190/168** injured people * This number also includes people poisoned with carbon monoxide; however, it does not include people injured after falling on frozen surfaces and owing to fallen ice. ** *** The calculation only takes into consideration the difference between the average number of work-related accidents in forests in the period 1998-2014 and the number of work-related accidents in forests in 2014, in accordance with the available data.

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In 2014, there was a significant increase in the number of work-related accidents in forests, which is mainly due to the much increased volume of urgent and remedial works in forests. Although the information on work-related accidents in forest collected by the ZGS may be incomplete, the figures clearly show that the number of (severely) injured people and fatalities in forests as a result of the works in 2014 compared to the average of 1998-2014 more or less doubled, in spite of intensive training of forest owners in safe work in forests carried out by the Slovenian Forest Service. This analysis took into account the difference between the average number of fatalities and injured people resulting from work accidents in forests in the above-mentioned period and the number for 2014. According to the available data, on average, 10 people died in work-related accidents in forests each year in the period 1998-2014, and as many as 18 in 2014, and in addition also 3 professional foresters, totalling in 21 fatalities. When people suffering severe injuries are included, the situation is similar or even worse. In the above-mentioned period, an average of 22 people were severely injured each year, while as many as 62 people suffered serious injuries in 2014, which is almost three times more.

Thus, it can be concluded that in 2014, the number of fatalities resulting from the ice storm was 13, while the number of injured people (during emergency response, emergency work and remedial activities in forests, poisoning, and injuries caused by fallen branches or trees or falls on ice) was at least 168. Certainly, these numbers are very high. Intense activities in forests related to the elimination of the consequences of the ice storm continued at least in the first half of 2015. During the entire year, 15 people died in work-related accidents and 59 were injured. It is estimated that 3 people died as a result of work-related accidents in forests linked with the removal of the consequences of the ice storm, while approximately 20 people were believed to be injured. If we take into account the estimates for 2015 including work- related forest accidents linked with the elimination of the consequences of the ice storm, the final number (estimates) is 16 fatalities and at least 190 injured people.

Recorded fatalities and injured people as a result of the ice storm in 2014 and the estimated number of fatalities and injured people as a result of the ice storm in 2015 (source: ACPDR, 2014 a, ACPDR, 2014 b, Beguš, 2015, Slovenian Forest Service, 2016)

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Population Firefighters Members of Public Work-related Total and other the services accidents in protection, Slovenian forests in total/ rescue and Armed additional with relief forces Forces regard to the average in the period 1998- 2014**/ ***only owing to ice storm (estimate) 2015 Number of 7* 116 4 1 62/40** 190/168* injured people in 2014 Number of 59/37**/22*** 59/37**/22*** injured people in 2015 * This number also includes people poisoned with carbon monoxide; however, it does not include people injured after falling on frozen surfaces and owing to fallen ice. *** The calculation only takes into consideration the difference between the average number of work-related accidents in forests in the period 1998-2014 and the number of work-related accidents in forests in 2014, in accordance with the available data. *** Since a lot of activities in forests in the second half of 2015 were linked to measures for the control of bark beetle infestations, it is estimated that the data is more realistic if the difference between the absolute number of work-related forest accidents in 2015 and the average number of work-related accidents in forests in the period 1998-2014 is distributed among accidents resulting from the elimination of the consequences of the ice storm and accidents resulting from measures aimed at preventing the spread or control of bark beetle infestations. Numbers marked with *** represent an estimate of the fatalities and injured people during the elimination of the consequences of the ice storm, not their actual number.

In accordance with the available data, no permanent evacuation of people was required as a result of the 2014 ice storm. However, on 5 February 2014, owing to the melting of ice coating falling on the roads in the town of Zagorje ob Savi in the municipality of Zagorje ob Savi, temporary accommodation had to be provided for 125 residents who did not manage to get to their homes located in the high-lying areas of the municipality.

CONSEQUENCES FOR FORESTS AND AGRICULTURE

Consequences for forests

The greatest damage resulting from the ice storm was that caused in forests. Already on 31 January, at least 20,000 hectares of forests in the Notranjska and the North Primorska regions were affected. In accordance with the data of the Slovenian Forest Service, the ice storm damaged 601,900 hectares or 51% of forest sites and forests which had been subject to some form of management.

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Damaged forest surfaces as a result of the ice storm between 30 January and 10 February 2014 in by forest management areas

Damaged forest areas by levels of damage in Forest management hectares area P1 P2 P3 P4 Total 01 TOLMIN 37.495 21,571 6211 1980 67,257 02 BLED 21,914 243 22,157 03 KRANJ 45,960 5643 1213 188 53,004 04 LJUBLJANA 101,530 22,698 1873 71 126,172 05 POSTOJNA 36,004 16,992 4045 2319 59,359 06 KOČEVJE 46,777 1842 230 48,849 07 NOVO MESTO 53,952 16 53,967 08 BREŽICE 21,150 99 21,249 09 CELJE 50,441 739 17 51,197 10 NAZARJE 24,758 157 24,914 11 SLOVENJ GRADEC 28,048 737 28,786 12 MARIBOR 37,400 343 1 37,744 13 MURSKA SOBOTA 2489 2489 14 KRAS 681 1011 1106 1957 4755 SLOVENIA 508,598 72,091 14,697 6515 601,900

P1 - low level of damage. Between 0.1 and 10% of the growing stock of stands have to be felled owing to damage. P2 - medium level of damage Between 11 and 10% of the growing stock of stands have to be felled owing to damage. P2 - high level of damage. Between 31 and 10% of the growing stock of stands have to be felled owing to damage. P4 - very high level of damage. More than 50% of the growing stock of stands has to be felled owing to damage.

The forests in a major part of Slovenia below 1100 metres above sea level were damaged, except in the lower parts of the southwest Slovenia, in the east and extreme northeastern parts of the country, and in some areas of the Lower Sava Valley. The highest locations with ice were those in the forests of the Notranjska region, some of them were even up to 1150 meters above sea level. The worst consequences were felt in the Notranjska region, especially at the transition from the sub-Mediterranean to the continental area, at the southwestern edge of the Ljubljana Basin and in the area of Cerkno and Idrija, at an altitude between 300 and 900 metres. The ice on trees was the thickest in the wider area of Postojna and Pivka, that is, up to 80 millimetres.

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Overview map of damaged areas according to the levels of damage caused by ice in 2014 Poškodovanost gozdov po odsekih = Damage to forests by sections Žledolom, februar 2014 = Ice damage, February 2014 Legenda = Legend Gozdnogospodarsko območje = Forest management area Gozdnogospodarska enota = Forest management unit Potreben sanitarni posek = Necessary salvage logging v deležu nad 50 % lesne zaloge = more than 50% of the growing stock v deležu od 31 do 50 % lesne zaloge = between 31 and 50% of the growing stock v deležu od 11 do 30 % lesne zaloge = between 11 and 30% of the growing stock v deležu od 1 do 10 % lesne zaloge = between 1 and 10% of the growing stock v deležu pod 1 % lesne zaloge =below 1% of the growing stock Zavod za gozdove Slovenije = Slovenian Forest Service

Approximately 9.3 million m3 of wood mass were damaged or destroyed, which is about ten times more than in the worst ice storms happening before 2014. There were different types of tree damage, ranging from individual broken branches or more or less damaged crowns, broken trunks (above the height of more than two metres above the ground), severely tilted trees, to trees which were broken off (up to the height of two metres above the ground), and uprooted trees (trees removed together with their roots). The predominant type in the entire damaged area is damaged crowns, followed by broken trunks. The proportion of uprooted trees was higher than usual for snow and ice damage, which is the result of soggy soil, especially on shallow grounds and steep slopes. Trees often came down like a line of dominoes, triggered by falling trees hitting adjacent trees. This is believed to be the worst natural disaster ever to hit Slovenian forests. The highest amount of damaged wood mass was in the forest management areas of Ljubljana (approximately 2.4 million m3), Postojna (about 2.1 million m3), Tolmin (1.8 million m3) and Kranj (almost 1 million m3). The majority of

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 386/464 ______other forest management areas, especially those of Murska Sobota, Maribor and Kras, the damage was much smaller. The table below shows more detailed data.

Among the damaged trees, one third was conifers (about 3.1 million m3) and the rest (about 6.2 million m3) were broad-leaved trees. The numbers are equal to those of total felling in the Slovenian forests in the last several years. In these areas, the ice storm damaged between 11 and 30% of growing stock, and in the most affected areas even as much as 50% or more of growing stock or trees.

Damage to trees as a result of the ice storm between 30 January and 10 February in 2014 by forest management areas

Damaged trees to be felled Proportion of Forest management (gross volume in m3) trees to be area Broad- felled Coniferous Total leaved % 01 TOLMIN 240,742 1,537,193 1,777,935 19 02 BLED 80,223 56,923 137,146 1 03 KRANJ 377,435 594,223 971,658 10 04 LJUBLJANA 690,959 1,715,599 2,406,558 26 05 POSTOJNA 1,032,833 1,035,308 2,068,141 22 06 KOČEVJE 91,781 208,685 300,466 3 07 NOVO MESTO 55,250 155,450 210,700 2 08 BREŽICE 17,206 69,673 86,879 1 09 CELJE 125,050 203,745 328,795 4 10 NAZARJE 37,150 111,750 148,900 2 11 SLOVENJ GRADEC 170,238 53,389 223,627 2 12 MARIBOR 100,460 171,737 272,197 3 13 MURSKA SOBOTA 4900 6150 11,050 0 14 KRAS 112,895 258,578 371,473 4 TOTAL 3,137,122 6,178,403 9,315,525 100

In other areas, the ice storm mostly destroyed up to 10% of growing stock. The ice storm damaged almost 3800 kilometres of forest roads, which, at many locations, were the only connection between individual farms or hamlets and public roads. It also damaged 35 kilometres of fire breaks. Forest roads were relatively quickly functional again. Restoration of damaged forests (natural and by planting and seeding) is needed on approximately 13,800 hectares (2% of damaged forests). These were forests where the proportion of the necessary salvage logging of the damaged trees exceeds 50% of the growing stock of stands, as well as of the surfaces with a lot of damage on trees at lower levels of damage. 877 hectares of damaged forests will have to be restored by planting or seeding.

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With regard to the thickness of ice coating in the Postojna area, it can be concluded that only a good half of the freezing rain froze immediately, while the remaining precipitation ran off and gradually turned into ice at another point, depending on the contact point with undercooled objects and things. Thus, it can be concluded that the consequences, especially in the forests, would be unimaginably worse if a greater proportion of freezing rain froze immediately and completely. Such great damage, especially in forests, was also the result of previously warm and rainy weather, which made the soil moist and the trees had less support.

According to the ACPDR, fallen trees damaged at least 80 buildings, of which more than are 60 residential buildings, and also at least 15 vehicles. The associated damage is not included in the damage to forests.

Damaged spruce tops owing to heavy ice (photo: Zoran Grecs, Slovenian Forest Service)

Total damage to forests and forest roads amounted to EUR 214,326,536.80. The value of planned works for the rehabilitation of forests amounts to EUR 35,170,312, of which EUR 19,687,110 will have to be provided from budgetary funds. The value of rehabilitation activities is included in the total damage. The rehabilitation encompasses the restoration and nurture (preparation of areas for restoration, restoration with planting and sowing, nurturing of the restored areas and damaged young trees), protection (establishment of forest hygiene, removal of fallen trees from torrential areas and protective forests, prevention and control of insects (bark beetle), protection of young trees on restored surfaces and the establishment of fire breaks), and ensuring passability of forest roads and forest extraction lines and their construction and reconstruction. In accordance with a rough estimate, the skidding of the majority of the damaged trees from state forests will be completed by the end of 2015 for

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 388/464 ______conifers, and by the end of 2016 for broad-leaved trees. The estimate for private forests is by the end of 2016 for conifers and by the end of 2019 for broad-leaved trees.

In Croatia, the ice storm raging during the same period as in Slovenia affected mainly forests in the mountain region of Gorski Kotar, the region of Lika, the Velebit mountain range and other hilly areas. For comparison, the damage caused by ice storm there was estimated at over EUR 900 million, although the large figure is mainly due to a different methodology, which also includes damage related to the generally useful functions of forests.

Damage to forests in the Notranjska region was very severe (source: ACPDR photo archive).

At many locations, fallen trees and broken branches also filled beds of water bodies (mostly small ones), which further reduced their flow and increased the likelihood of additional flooding or secondary damage to road surfaces.

Although forests have a great capacity for self-restoration, the consequences of the 2014 ice storm will still be visible for a long time in the future. Their rehabilitation will take a number of years. In 2014, the consequences of the ice storm alone led to the felling of 2,930,000 m3 of wood mass, with the emphasis on removing damaged conifers as soon as possible. The figure represents just under a third of the destroyed wood mass.

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Areas with the highest levels of damage to forests caused by ice storm and high snow in 2014 by municipalities Območja največje poškodovanosti gozdov po občinah = Areas of highest damage to forests by municipalities Žledolom in snegolom, Februar 2014 = Ice damage and snow damage, February 2014 Stanje na dan 11. 2. 2014 = Situation as of 11 February 2014 Avstrija = Austria Italija = Italy Madžarska = Hungary Hrvaška = Croatia Legenda = Legend Občina = Municipality Stopnje poškodovanosti = Levels of damage Poškodovanost nad 50 % dreves = More than 50% of trees are damaged Poškodovanost 31 do 50 % dreves Between 31 and 50% of trees are damaged Poškodovanost nad 11 do 30 % dreves = Between 11 and 30% of trees are damaged Poškodovanost do 10 % dreves = Up to 10% of trees are damaged Poškodbe ne presegajo običajnih poškodb, ki nastaejo ob vsakem sneženju = Damage does not exceed the usual damage incurred by snowing Zavod za gozdove Slovenije = Slovenian Forest Service

Data on the consequences for agricultural crops were provided by the Chamber of Agriculture and Forestry of Slovenia, which examined the state of agricultural crops (especially fruit trees) on 3 February 2014 in the areas of the Dolenjska region, the Lower Sava Valley, and the Bela Krajina, Notranjska, Primorska, Gorenjska, Štajerska and Mura regions. According to initial estimates, the situation was not critical; by that time, no major damage had been caused in intensive orchards. The quantity of ice coating on branches was equal to that formed by the watering measure used for freeze protection. Considerable damage was found in traditional orchards, especially on those apple and pear trees which had not been nurtured or pruned (in the Dolenjska region, the Upper Sava Valley, the Koroška region, the Pivka Valley and the Tolmin area). A high level of effect of ice coating was also discovered on walnut trees, which were severely damaged or broken. At some locations, damage was caused to farm buildings owing to fallen trees or snow (two

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 390/464 ______greenhouses were destroyed in the areas of Tržič and Križ). On farms, problems were also caused by the interruption of electricity supply and poor passability of roads (problems with milk transport). On many farms, milking was carried out manually or by using a power generator. Damage was also caused on pasture fences, partly by fallen trees, and partly by snow and ice.

Damage to parks, gardens and tree-lined roads considered a cultural heritage

In accordance with the data collected by the Ministry of Culture, the ice storm also caused extremely serious damage to historic parks, gardens and tree-lined roads. No previous records exist of damage to trees in parks, gardens and along tree-lined roads registered as cultural heritage that would be as severe and extensive as that caused in February 2014. More than 45 parks, gardens and tree-lined roads were affected. Damage was also found in castle and city parks (for example the Snežnik Castle park, the Celje city park, the Tivoli city park, and the Dobrna and Topolščica spa parks) and tree-lined roads and gardens next to villas (the lime avenue in Logatec, the garden next to Villa Bled, etc.), as well as city trees and two arboretums (the Volčji Potok Arboretum and the Ljubljana Botanical Garden). The ice storm caused the falling of trees, severe damage to tree canopies, and damage to bushes, lawns, walkways, benches and other park equipment. Some of the fallen or broken trees were even more than 100 years old. Many trees which did not fall during the storm itself had to be felled owing to the extent of damage. As for the trees which survived the storm, the future will show how well they will be able to repair the damage. Replacement planting cannot be done with trees of the same height, which means that in some cases, damage to the heritage is irreparable. Damage to parks, gardens and tree-lined roads considered cultural heritage amounts to EUR 2,655,856.56.

Damage caused by ice storm in Ljubljana Botanical Garden in February 2014 (photo: L. Marjon)

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Damage to electricity infrastructure

The Ministry of Infrastructure, in cooperation with ELES, d. d., prepared an overview of the situation regarding the electricity infrastructure in all electricity companies. The problems with the supply of electricity were caused by broken electrical conductors, overturned support poles and fallen trees on power line routes. When teams worked on the ground to mitigate and eliminate the consequences, conditions like high snow, ice, impassable roads and fallen trees constantly caused difficulties in their work, and more time was needed to complete their activities. Some data on the consequences on the electricity infrastructure are shown in the table below.

In accordance with the data provided by the Ministry of Infrastructure, the ice storm damaged 1643 kilometres of transmission power lines and, in particular, distribution lines. In accordance with other data, 174 kilometres of transmission and 2000 kilometres of distribution lines were damaged; furthermore, 4000 distribution line towers and poles and 94 transmission line towers were damaged or overturned. The load on electrical conductors weighed up to 15 kilograms per conductor metre, and the thickness of ice coating on wires reached up to 150 millimetres, which means that the load on a conductor exceeded the weight of the conductor itself more than ten times. Damage to electricity grid was the greatest in the Notranjska region and in the wider area south from Ljubljana. However, almost the entire Slovenia suffered from a certain degree of electricity grid damage. High- voltage network was also affected. The load on electrical conductors weighed up to 15 kilograms per conductor metre, and the thickness of ice coating on wires reached up to 150 millimetres, which means that the load on a conductor exceeded the weight of the conductor itself by more than ten times. Damage to electricity grid was the greatest in the Notranjska region and in the wider area south from Ljubljana. However, almost the entire Slovenia suffered from a certain degree of damage to electricity grid. High-voltage network was also affected.

Damage to electricity infrastructure

Energy company Damaged power Number of damaged lines towers or poles Ljubljana 418 918 Maribor 370 3809 Celje 400 3857 Gorenjska 55 442 Primorska 348 2655 ELES (transmission network) 52 94 Total 1643 11,775

On 31 January, approximately 10,000 consumers had no electricity supply, mostly in the area of Postojna, Pivka and the municipality of Loška dolina. From 1 February on, the number of people affected by the interrupted electricity supply increased, especially on 2 February, above all in the area of the electricity distributor Elektro Ljubljana. On 3 February,

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 392/464 ______approximately 153,400 households in Slovenia had no electricity supply, in accordance with the data. That corresponds to more than 300,000 people, which is approximately 15% of the population of Slovenia. The largest number of households without electricity, that is 60,000, was in the area of the electricity distributor Elektro Ljubljana, (the area of central Slovenia, Žiri, Poljanska dolina, Kamnik, Logatec and parts of the Notranjska region, the western part of the Dolenjska region and the Bela Krajina region), followed by the area of Elektro Primorska (covering most of the Notranjska and Coastal regions, as well as the Northern Primorska region) with 12,600 households, the area of Elektro Celje (covering the Koroška, Western Štajerska, and the Central and Lower Sava and Dolenjska regions) with 30,000 households, the Gorenjska region with 3800 households, and the area of Elektro Maribor (areas of the northeastern Slovenia) with 47,000 households. On 4 February, the situation improved, partly owing to repairs on electricity distribution systems and partly due to the provision of small and large power generators from electricity distribution companies, municipal and state reserves, the Slovenian Armed Forces and as part of the assistance from abroad. In the evening of 4 February, approximately 42,000 households were still without electricity, most of them in the areas of Elektro Ljubljana (22,000) and Elektro Primorska (9000), and some also in the areas of Elektro Maribor (6500), Elektro Celje (4200) and Elektro Gorenjska (300). On 5 February, the number was reduced to approximately 35,000 households, mainly as a result of improved situation in the area of Elektro Ljubljana. On the following day, additional breakdowns of the already established lines caused the number of consumers without electricity to increase again, with the decrease of the number on 7 February.

Following the repair of the Elektro Ljubljana power line between the settlement of Kleče and the town of Vrhnika, the number of consumers without electricity in the areas of Elektro Ljubljana and Elektro Primorska decreased to approximately 15,000 on 8 February 2014. On 9 February, more than 12,000 consumers in Slovenia still had no electricity (1000 in the Elektro Primorska area, 11,000 in the Elektro Ljubljana area, 164 in the Elektro Celje area and individual consumption points at other locations).

The number of consumers without electricity between 3 and 7 February 2014

Number of consumers without electricity Distributor 3 February 4 February 6 February 7 February Elektro Maribor 47,000 6500 1915 908 Elektro Celje 30,000 4200 1500 613 Elektro Primorska 12,600 9000 4886 4886 Elektro Gorenjska 3800 300 3862 3862 Elektro Ljubljana 60,000 22,000 24,000 13,000 Total 153,400 42,000 36,163 23,269

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At many locations, the electricity infrastructure collapsed under the weight of ice coating

On 10 February 2014, the number of consumers without electricity decreased to 10,000, on 11 February to 6500, on 12 February to 5600, on 13 February to 4500, and on 14 February to 4100 (of which 3500 consumers in the area of Elektro Ljubljana, and the rest in the area of Elektro Primorska). Until 17 February, this number was reduced to just over 1000, and the majority of consumers without electricity was mostly in the area of Elektro Ljubljana, that is, in the wider areas of Logatec, Postojna, Cerknica and Loška dolina, and in some high-lying areas of the North Primorska region (the settlements of Vojsko, Čekovnik, Krnice, Oblakov Vrh and Šebreljski Vrh). In the Gorenjska region, the area of the municipality of Jezersko was connected to the power supply from Austria.

On 24 February 2014, 105 consumers still had no uninterrupted electricity supply, while approximately 500 consumers relied on power generators, in accordance with data of electricity distributors. It was assessed that the repair of individual lines supplying electricity to remote locations would take several months.

The population and, exceptionally, also other users, were assisted with power generators. During the ice storm disaster in Slovenia, the total of approximately 1100 power generators were used, of which 204 were provided by the Slovenian Armed Forces, 147 by the ACPDR, and 172 were received from abroad. The difference between 523 and 1100 was mostly covered by the reserves owned by electricity distributors, fire brigades and municipalities, and by non-governmental organisations (the Slovenian Red Cross, Caritas) and individual citizens, companies, etc. A large number of generators, approximately 420, were connected to drinking water pumps which had no electricity.

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Damage to the electricity infrastructure amounted to EUR 80,512,371.11. This amount also includes the estimated repair costs. It is reasonable to expect that, in the event of future ice storms, damage to electricity grid, especially to high- and medium-voltage networks, and especially in areas where electricity lines were most affected (the Notranjska region) will be lower than the damage caused by the 2014 storm, as it can reasonably be assumed that the power lines were reinforced during the repair and, at certain locations, even installed underground. Although the underground solution is the most expensive, it is also the most effective with regard to damage caused by ice and other meteorological disasters.

Damage to railway infrastructure

On some electrified railway lines, the electric traction of trains was disabled during the most critical days owing to power failure. This was mainly true for the lines Ljubljana-Jesenice and Borovnica-Divača, while the traffic on the non-electrified Grosuplje-Kočevje line was stopped. The worst situation was between the town of Pivka and the settlement of Borovnica, where the first breaking and falling of branches and trees happened, and then also the collapse of poles and catenary line structures. The traffic first stopped on the lines between Postojna and Pivka and between Pivka and Ilirska Bistrica, which happened already on 30 January 2014 in the afternoon. On 31 January, railway traffic often had to be stopped, and trains were frequently stuck owing to ice coating on wires and broken conductors. The electric traction had to be replaced by diesel engine. On 1 February, there was a telecommunications outage owing to a failure of the main optical fibre cable at three locations, and telephone and data connections between the Borovnica-Verd-Rakek-Postojna line and Ljubljana were interrupted. However, as a result of the deteriorating situation, additional falling of trees and the collapse of installations and signalling system, the diesel-engine freight train traffic had to be stopped. Railway stations in the Notranjska region were caught in ice for several days.

The stations were damaged, and some poles and all catenary registration tubes were broken. In the station areas, an additional risk was posed by broken and damaged trees. Occasionally, telecommunications disruptions also occurred at other line sections, as well as disruptions in electricity supply.

Within a few days, situation improved at all locations. On 6 February, a railway connection between Ljubljana and Koper was established, since the teams from the Slovenian Railways company cleared both main tracks under difficult circumstances. On 7 February, after a week of interruption, the line towards Koper was again open for diesel-engine freight trains. Railway transport between Ljubljana and Jesenice with electric locomotives was introduced again. As late as in June 2015, the electrification of one rail line between Borovnica and Divača was carried out again for the use of electric traction trains, and by the end of August, another line was electrified. Until 31 August 2015, all passenger traffic between Borovnica and Divača took place by buses.

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At many locations, rail transport stopped for several days (source: ACPDR photo archive)

Depending on the powers, the ministry responsible for transport and infrastructure adopted a decision on priority rail transport services, according to which, priority during the ice storm and after it was given to: a) For passenger transport: - Basic mobility of the population during peak hours (transport of passengers to and from work, transport of pupils and students); - International connections; b) For freight transport: - Supply of the business sector and key business entities, such as Petrol, Talum, TE- TOL, Cinkarna Celje, Gorenje, Revoz, etc., with petroleum products, coal, raw materials, cereals, cars, spare parts, dangerous substances, etc.; - Delivery and transport of trains for the operation of the Luka Koper (multimodal services); - Transport of container trains and intermodal transport; - Servicing of international freight corridors for the supply of major customers, such as Voest Alpine, Volkswagen, Fiat, US Steel, etc.

In March 2014, the damage to railway infrastructure amounted to EUR 40,873,990.91, in accordance with the data of the responsible ministry.

Consequences for road infrastructure

From 2 to 4 February 2014, a number of state roads were closed as a result of fallen trees and damage to electricity distribution infrastructure. However, in the following days, the majority of them were open again. More than 1000 trees fell on highways and even more on

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 396/464 ______protection zones alongside them. 40 kilometres of guardrails were damaged and numerous signalling and safety devices were destroyed. On 1 February, a 110-kilovolt power line collapsed on the Primorska motorway at the settlement of Zalog in the municipality of Postojna, resulting in a full closure of the motorway. Municipal roads also suffered great damage. The total damage on roads amounted to EUR 8,784,080. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the ice storm had a negative impact on traffic safety situation, especially at locations with the greatest consequences of the ice storm.

Traffic signs on the road near the settlement of Unec in the municipality of Cerknica. At the beginning of February 2014, many roads in Slovenia were equipped with such signs (photo: Jaka Oražem, ACPDR)

Consequences for the economy

In accordance with the data of the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology, the economy also suffered a lot of damage. Most of the damage resulted from the interruption of production owing to disruptions and interruptions in electricity supply, which led to limited functioning of the Slovene economy. Companies which were unable to perform their activities suffered income loss for several days. Damage also occurred on machines, equipment and stocks. The Ministry of Development and Technology collected data on damage from 487 injured parties from the economic sector. In accordance with these data, the income loss amounted to EUR 40,738,191.11. Damage to machinery and equipment was EUR 1,437,557.23, and damage to stocks EUR 537,281.23, totalling in EUR 42,713,030.57.

Situation in the education system

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On 2 February 2014, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport issued a notice to all schools, urging them to consider a possible suspension of classes in the following days, since at many locations, difficult access and power failures prevented lessons to take place. The written part of the winter vocational maturity examination was also cancelled. According to the Ministry, on 3 February 2014, 133 basic schools (40%), 20 upper secondary schools (17%) and 1 kindergarten were closed, while and 30 kindergartens operated to a limited extend. On February 4, about 40% of Slovenian basic schools and 3% of upper secondary schools were closed. 15 kindergarten units operated to a limited extent, and only the Postojna kindergarten was closed. On 5 February, 11 basic schools, 1 upper secondary schools centre, 1 upper secondary school and about 10 kindergarten units were closed. After 5 February, the number of closed educational institutions and kindergartens dropped rapidly. On 10 February, only a small number of branch schools were closed, and pupils were provided lessons in parent schools.

DIRECT DAMAGE

In accordance with data collected by the ACPDR and verified by the National Committee for the Assessment of Damage in the Event of Natural and Other Disasters, the ice storm caused direct damage in the amount of EUR 12,752,088.59 to property and buildings, EUR 42,713,030.57 to the economy, EUR 8,784.080 to national roads, EUR 80,512,371.11 to electricity infrastructure, EUR 2,665,866.56 to cultural heritage, EUR 40,873,990.91 to railway infrastructure, EUR 214,326,536.80 to forests and forest roads, and EUR 26,788.015,63 to watercourses. The total assessed direct damage, excluding VAT, is EUR 429,415,980.17. The damage assessment costs were EUR 15,436. The total amount is not complete, since some entities failed to provide data on damage (for example, the Ministry of Health on the treatment costs for injured persons, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport on costs related to suspension of classes, etc.). This amount also does not include a non-professional assessment of potential damage to forests in the coming years resulting from excessive growth of bark beetle populations, which could amount to approximately EUR 80 to 100 million.

Data on the amount of direct damage caused by the ice storm in 2014

Type of direct damage Total damage in EUR 1 Damage to property and buildings 12,752,088.59 2 Damage to the economy 42,713,030.57 3 Damage to national roads 8,784,080.00 4 Damage to electricity infrastructure 80,512,371.11 5 Damage to railway infrastructure 40,873,990.91 6 Damage to cultural heritage 2,665,866.56 7 Damage to watercourses 26,788,015.36 8 Damage to forests 214,326,536.80 Total: 429,415,980.17

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NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN DISASTER RESPONSE OPERATIONS

In the period between 30 January and 4 February 2014, at least 21,750 firefighters were engaged in the mitigation and elimination of the consequences of the ice storm. In addition, a number of other Civil Protection (CP) members and other protection, rescue and relief forces were involved, together with other regular services (public utility companies, at least 1524 people from electricity companies and their contract partners, at least 1039 road workers responsible for national roads, volunteers, etc.) and 919 members of the Slovenian Armed Forces. Until 13 February, almost 55,000 members of protection, rescue and relief forces and the Slovenian Armed Forces, and workers from public services and companies participated in the elimination of the consequences of the meteorological disaster.

Data on the engagement of protection, rescue and relief forces and other services since the onset of the ice storm until 13 February 2014. These numbers do not include foreign rescue workers.

Date RS Civil Other Civil Firefighters Members Public Others Total Protection Protection of services Headquarters Headquarters the SAF 4 Feb/ 24 157 21,750** 919*** 2563 154 25,567 until 4 Feb* 5 Feb 24 232 3441 681 1854 192 6424 6 Feb 5 350 3890 650 2000 1059 7954 7 Feb 46 293 2663 719 1672 652 6045 8 Feb 43 134 1606 450 875 178 3286 9 Feb 34 95 909 465 611 16 2130 10 Feb 27 76 454 618 611 121 1907 11 Feb 25 105 301 566 397 58 1452 12 Feb 23 88 298 374 418 51 1252 13 Feb 18 54 260 169 348 12 861 Total 269 1584 35,602 5614*** 11,349 2493 54,850 * Until 4 February 2014 ** On 4 February 2014, 1879 firefighters were involved, and up to and including 4 February the total of 21,750 *** On 4 February 2014, 373 soldiers were involved, and up to and including 4 February the total of 919. **** On 14 February 2014, another 373 soldiers were activated.

On February 14, an estimated 800 different other rescuers, members of the Slovenian Armed Forces and members of public services participated in disaster response operations. During the entire period of the meteorological disaster, approximately 4500 policemen and other employees of the Ministry of the Interior were engaged. Between 30 January and 14 February 2014, more than 60,000 rescuers and other personnel participated in disaster response operations. This number does not include public employees working for ministries and other state bodies. In accordance with data of the Firefighting Association of Slovenia

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(GZS), until the end of the disaster response operations, (approximately until the end of February 2014), 62,508 firefighters were activated. In total, more than 80,000 members of the protection, rescue and relief forces and public services were engaged owing to the ice storm, which ranks this meteorological disaster among those events which have so far demanded the greatest involvement of protection, rescue and relief forces and resources and public services.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES AND DISASTER RESPONSE COSTS

In accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 8 of the Protection Against Natural and Other Disasters Act (ZVNDN, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 64/94, 33/00 - Constitutional Court's Decision, 87/01 – Material Obligation Act (ZMatD), 41/04 – Environmental Protection Act (ZVO-1), 28/06, 51/06 - official consolidated text 1 and 97/10), the damage resulting from natural and other disasters, in addition to direct damage, includes the costs of disaster response operations and measures to prevent an increase in the adverse consequences of a disaster (disaster response costs).

Until 20 March 2014, the ACPDR reports on disaster response costs were submitted by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Spatial Planning, the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology, the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, the then Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment (today the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food), the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Culture, the Firefighting Association of Slovenia, the Slovenian Red Cross, the Slovene Speleological Association, the Mountain Rescue Association of Slovenia, the Scout Association of Slovenia, 130 municipalities out of 182 affected municipalities, and the company Telekom Slovenije.

The Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities

As part of urgent tasks related to social care for citizens in this natural disaster, the responsible services performed tasks, such as maintaining direct contacts with socially disadvantaged families and visiting people on the ground, and psychosocial and other forms of support (for example, bringing warm meals, providing temporary accommodation, etc.). All measures and tasks were carried out in cooperation with CP headquarters. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 35,359.

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The Ministry of Economic Development and Technology

Based on the order of the RS CP Commander and the Decision of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, the Agency of the RS for Commodity Reserves provided paraffin stoves, paraffin for heating, petrochemicals for heating, batteries and a 300 kVA power generator. In cooperation with the ACPDR, through a public tender, the Agency purchased seven power generators (two 45 kVA generators, two 80 kVA generators, two 130 kVA generators and one 400 kVA generator) that were put into use to electricity distributors. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 175,957.10.

The Ministry of Infrastructure

The establishment of the passability of national roads included the removal of trees and branches from the roads, the removal of the most damaged trees from the slopes directly above the roads, and the most urgent repairs to the roads. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 2,158,734.83.

On the public railway infrastructure, disaster consequences were eliminated on routes, facilities and locomotives or wagons. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 8,128,349.

The Postojna railway station at the beginning of February 2014 (photo: Jaka Oražem, ACPDR)

On the transmission lines owned by the ELES Company, multiple inspections of power lines were carried out, conductors lying across roads were removed, access roads and static support to towers were repaired, temporary connections were established, and preparations

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In the electricity distribution network, additional teams and external contractors were engaged for the cleaning of routes and the establishment of temporary connections with cable lines and other improvised power supply solutions, in order to ensure power supply.

The largest share of costs resulted from own work, material and transport, and the rent of power generators and their fuel. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 14,671,000. Disaster response costs of the Ministry of Infrastructure were equal to EUR 25,537,982.56.

Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning

On the order of the RS CP Commander, the Slovenian Environment Agency (ARSO) was tasked with the organisation of activities for the elimination of disaster consequences caused by rain, snow and especially ice, and, as a priority, with ensuring the cleaning of watercourses in areas where further precipitation was forecast. In accordance with the situation on watercourses, water land and coastal land, the Slovenian Environment Agency determined the priority order of works. Disaster response measures started on 7 February 2014, when the Agency activated all the available resources and was actively engaged in the coordination and supervision of the works carried out by concession operators. In cooperation with civil protection, major activities were also carried out in areas where the need for cooperation between firefighters and the Slovenian Armed Forces was expressed for the purpose of faster implementation of measures. The most urgent activities were the maintenance of the flow of watercourse beds, the removal of deposits on water infrastructure facilities, the removal of large quantities of deposits from watercourses, and emergency removal of fallen trees. Disaster response activities were also carried out on water infrastructure facilities and on water and coastal land. The purpose of these measures was to limit the damage to water infrastructure facilities and to reduce the consequences of erosion phenomena on coastal and water land. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 944,007.

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food

Slovenian Forest Service

During the ice storm, the Slovenian Forest Service (ZGS) was responsible for urgently ensuring the passability of forest and other roads, and for the coordination of work and cooperation with other services (CP units, protection, rescue and relief forces, SAF members, etc.). Disaster response costs (which were supposedly not covered by the Slovenian Forest Service) amounted to EUR 147,960.

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The Farmland and Forest Fund of the Republic of Slovenia

The Farmland and Forest Fund was tasked with removing broken branches and trees from drainage ditches, as otherwise, the flow of water could be obstructed, and water could stay on agricultural land. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 8,471.68.

Disaster response costs within the framework of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food were equal to EUR 156,431.68.

Ministry of Culture

In the area of the Snežnik Castle park and the Volčji Potok Arboretum, The Ministry of Culture, owing to great tree damage, was responsible for organising arborist works, such as removing fallen trees, felling and removing damaged trees, cutting off broken branches, crown cleaning, collecting and grinding broken branches, and ensuring the passability of paths. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 249,273.84.

The Ministry of the Interior

The Ministry of the Interior, together with the Police, monitored the situation after the storm and organised the performance of tasks within their realm of responsibility. The tasks were carried out within the framework of legal authorisations and in accordance with the needs which arose on individual days of operation during the disaster. The Police regularly informed the public and participants about the activities for the performance of tasks related to the consequences of the ice storm. Activities were regularly coordinated with the members of the RS CP headquarters from the Ministry of the Interior and the Police and with other responsible persons and units. Constant coordination was also carried out with the Administrative Units Service of the Ministry of the Interior, which monitored the functioning of the administrative units in the most affected areas. Throughout the period when disaster response activities were carried out, the public was promptly informed about the situation in the areas at risk, and instructions on self-protection in the event of a disaster were published.

For duties which are directly connected to their mission, the Police activated regular police officers, while in the areas which were most affected, activities were also carried out by officers of a special police unit, which included police officers from the regional police directorate and police officers from police directorates which suffered less damage (Novo mesto and Murska Sobota). Criminal police officers, police officers from traffic police stations, police stations for compensatory measures, service dog handlers with dogs, mounted police, neighbourhood police chiefs and others were sent to the most affected areas.

In the affected areas, the Police carried out its basic mission, namely the protection of life, personal safety and property of people, and prevented, detected and investigated penal acts and minor offences, and maintained public order and regulated traffic. These tasks were carried out with the introduction of an observation and patrol service in the affected areas. In addition, it carried out the control of traffic and closures of non-passable national roads,

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In cooperation with representatives of civil protection and other first responder services, it provided response in the affected areas, especially when the theft of power generators and fuel for the production of electricity and the theft of electricity lines lying on the ground was reported. In the Police Academy in the settlement of Tacen, the General Police Directorate also provided accommodation for police officers, other police employees and people who suffered damage in the disaster.

In addition to ensuring the safety of citizens and their property, much attention was paid to controlling and regulating traffic. Because of the felled trees, many roads were impassable, which means that roadblocks had to be set up. Traffic police officers escorted convoys of international assistance with large power generators and enabled them to drive without obstructions and have priority in traffic.

Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 316,100.80.

Ministry of Defence

Administration of the RS for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief

In the ACPDR and its branches, teams have been introduced to support CP commanders and staffs, and also enhanced shifts in regional notification centres and the ZARE system (installation of mobile repeaters, operation of transmitters/ repeaters). Following the Government's decision, the ACPDR, through the European Union's Civil Protection Mechanism, applied for international assistance and organised reception, accommodation, food, medical support and supply for foreign units. In accordance with the Host Nation Support Rules of Procedure, a team for the support of foreign assistance during the disaster was set up, with the task of regulating all the activities of foreign rescue units in Slovenia. A base was arranged in Logatec for their reception and accommodation, operating continuously until 1 March 2014. Public procurement procedures were carried out for the maintenance and purchase of generators (together with the RS Agency for Commodity Reserves) and mobile repeaters. A lot of attention was paid to regular coordination with the distribution network system operator and all five electricity distributors (especially with regard to the requirements for power generators and their distribution). The ACPDR monitored the situation on the ground, collected information, reports and requests for assistance in the affected regions, distributed national material and commodity reserves, coordinated the assistance of the SAF, maintained contacts with voluntary organisations and associations to coordinate assistance with electricity distributors, responsible ministries and their bodies, and other organisations (the Slovenian Forest Service, the RS Agency for Commodity Reserves, etc.). The main activities at the ACPDR regional offices were collecting information on the needs for power generators and other assistance, looking for available generators within the region, requesting municipalities to check internal reserves in construction and other companies, providing information to municipalities on companies and services willing to assist (with transports, generators, volunteers, etc.), checking and collecting the information

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 404/464 ______on the needs of municipalities for the assistance of the SAF, carrying out the transport of generators to the most affected areas, monitoring international assistance, and monitoring of the situation in municipalities every day through personal contacts (CP commanders, mayors, civil protection specialists). Disaster response costs amounted to EUR 636,866.71, including costs incurred as a result of the arrival of foreign rescue units.

Civil Protection headquarters

In the affected areas, CP commanders and headquarters were activated at all levels (national, regional and municipal), and also individual regional CP units or members and the National Rapid Response Unit. Their tasks were to manage, monitor and coordinate protection, rescue and relief tasks, technical assistance, logistical support and cooperation in eliminating the consequences. Disaster response costs of the CP headquarters and members include the costs of fuel, food, wage compensation and the reimbursement of other costs. The total amount of costs was EUR 21,918.91.

Slovenian Armed Forces

In order to assist the affected population, the SAF carried out various activities. In particular, the SAF members were engaged in removing the fallen trees and branches, cleaning the transport surfaces, distributing various materials, transporting people, supplying basic necessities and power generators, maintaining generators, helicopter transportation, and setting up two military laundries in Postojna and Loška dolina. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 500,770.

The Slovenian Armed Forces were actively involved in helping to eliminate the consequences of the storm disaster

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Real Estate Management Division of the Ministry of Defence

In cooperation with the General Staff of the SAF and ZGS, the Real Estate Management Division carried out urgent works on damaged buildings owing to damaged or broken trees, provided the repair of defects on technical security systems and ensured the conditions for security in the event of power failures. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 30,420.

Ministry of Health

The Ministry of Health, together with health care providers, intensified regular activities of emergency medical services, community nursing service and other activities for the fastest possible restoration of normal functioning of institutions (purchases of emergency equipment, establishment of communications, fuel for power generators, etc.). Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 108,729.51.

Slovenian Firefighting Association

More than 60,000 firefighters were involved in the 2014 ice storm disaster response (source: ACPDR photo archive)

The consequences of snow and especially ice formation required the engagement of a large number of firefighters, fire engines, power generators, chainsaws and other firefighting protective and rescue equipment. Firefighters pumped water from the flooded rooms, filled up sand bags and built anti-flooding embankments. When ice started to form, they removed trees and branches from roads, opened most national and local roads and ensured their passability (in some instances also for motorways), helped to eliminate the consequences of

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 406/464 ______high snow and ice coating (removing ice from electrical cables and installations), temporarily covered damaged buildings and provided power generators. They assisted in avalanche rescue and evacuation, organised the transport of citizens to health services and shops, and provided other urgent support. Disaster response costs, including costs for fuel and damaged and destroyed equipment, were equal to EUR 1,892,094.

Mountain Rescue Association of Slovenia

The members of the Mountain Rescue Association of Slovenia working at its stations helped in the rescue of people at risk and emergency measures to ensure security, care for, and evacuation of, those affected in the disaster, especially the assistance to inhabitants who were cut off from the rest of the world in the valley of the Kokra river and in Jezersko. Disaster response costs, including costs for fuel, food, wage compensation and the reimbursement of costs of damaged and destroyed equipment, were equal to EUR 14,984.55.

Cave Rescue Service

Members of the Cave Rescue Service removed fallen trees and branches on houses and roads, cleared the impassable road sections, took part in the setting up of power line poles, installed consoles on the poles, examined power lines and cleared watercourses. Disaster response costs, including costs for fuel, food, wage compensation and the reimbursement of costs of damaged and destroyed equipment, were equal to EUR 8,645.14.

Slovenian Red Cross

The Slovenian Red Cross, with its professional services and activists, kept a record of families which were at greatest risk and their needs, and provided power generators, heating appliances, blankets, food, foodstuffs and drinking water. Disaster response costs, including costs for fuel, food, drinks, damaged equipment, medical supplies, etc., were equal to EUR 19,500.

Scout Association of Slovenia

The Postojna unit of the Scout Association of Slovenia organised a crisis centre in Postojna. The work included distribution of leaflets, notification and management of the call centre, transport, care for sanitary facilities, kitchen, warehouse and equipment, animation and night watch. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 2,784.

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Municipalities

In accordance with their responsibilities, municipalities ensured the implementation of measures and performance of protection, rescue and relief tasks for mitigating the consequences of the meteorological disaster. They activated the municipal protection, rescue and relief forces, organised emergency response, informed the population about the hazards, conditions and adopted measures, provided assistance to those affected in the disaster, provided accommodation the population at risk, carried out emergency works to ensure the passability of local roads, the operation of water pumps and uninterrupted supply of drinking water, clear watercourse beds, etc. Disaster response costs of municipalities, which include reimbursements, costs of fuel and food, costs of temporary accommodation of people at risk, rental of machinery and equipment, rental, delivery and maintenance of power generators, servicing of equipment, emergency repairs of buildings, construction material, removal of fallen trees and branches, cleaning of water bodies, and repairs to public lighting, were equal to EUR 8,683,754.50. It should be mentioned here that the ACPDR obtained data from 130 municipalities, although the number of municipalities which suffered damage from ice storm and high snow is 182, which is significantly larger. The list of municipalities that provided information on the amount of costs also includes municipalities which had no ice storm in their area (for example, the municipality of Koper), but their firefighting and other units assisted in the affected areas.

Company Telekom Slovenije

In order to ensure the operation of priority telecommunications facilities, the company Telekom Slovenije engaged external contractors, performed disaster response and emergency maintenance work on the telecommunication network, and ensured the operation of generators. Disaster response costs were equal to EUR 720,405.

Total costs of disaster response activities

Naturally, the list of costs of disaster response activities or of the operation of some national institutions in the emergency situation, totalling EUR 40,055,984.30, is not complete, since not all those involved in disaster response activities reported on this and on their disaster response costs.

Disaster response costs resulting from the 2014 ice storm disaster

Ministry/institution/organisa Total damage in Remarks tion EUR Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal 35,359.00 Opportunities Ministry of Economic 175,957.10 Agency of the RS for Commodity Reserves Development and Technology

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Ministry/institution/organisa Total damage in Remarks tion EUR Including the costs of the work of foresters Ministry of Infrastructure 25,537,982.56 on the national road infrastructure Ministry of the Environment 944,007.00 Slovenian Environment Agency Slovenian Environment Agency and Spatial Planning Ministry of Agriculture, 147,960.00 Slovenian Forest Service Forestry and Food Ministry of Agriculture, 8,471.68 Farmland Fund Forestry and Food Ministry of Culture 249,273.84 Ministry of the Interior 316,100.80 Police Ministry of Defence 30,420.00 Logistics Directorate Ministry of Defence 500,770.00 Slovenian Armed Forces Administration of the Republic of Slovenia Ministry of Defence 636,866.71 for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Ministry of Defence 21,918.91 Civil Protection Ministry of Health 108,729.51 Public emergency services 1,892,094 Slovenian Firefighting Association Public emergency services 14,984.55 Mountain Rescue Association of Slovenia Public emergency services 8,645.14 Slovene Speleological Association Public emergency services 19,500.00 Slovenian Red Cross Other emergency services 2,784.00 Scout Association of Slovenia Municipalities of Černomelj, Metlika, Mirna Dolenjska region 54,807.05 Peč, Semič, Straža, Šentjernej in Šmarješke Toplice Municipalities of Bled, Bohinj, Cerklje na Gorenjskem, Gorenja vas-Poljane, Gorje, Jesenice, Jezersko, Kranj, Kranjska Gora, Gorenjska region 1,184,489.33 Naklo, Preddvor, Radovljica, Šenčur, Škofja Loka, Tržič, Železniki, Žiri and Žirovnica Municipalities of Dravograd, Mežica, Mislinja, Muta, Podvelka, Prevalje, Radlje Koroška region 370,627.60 ob Dravi, Ravne na Koroškem, Ribnica na Pohorju, Slovenj Gradec and Vuzenica Municipalities of Ljubljana, Kamnik, Osilnica, Ribnica, Trzin, Loški Potok, Lukovica, Škofljica, Ig, Horjul, Vodice, Ljubljana region 2,340,436.44 Grosuplje, Ivančna Gorica, Litija, Komenda, Dobrepolje, Velike Lašče, Log-Dragomer, Moravče, Mengeš, Šmartno pri Litiji, Logatec, Vrhnika, Medvode and Kostel Municipalities of Bloke, Cerknica, Divača, Notranjska region 2,350,113.98 Ilirska Bistrica, Loška Dolina, Pivka and Postojna Coastal region 14,639.80 Municipality of Koper Municipalities of Destrnik, Majšperk, Videm Podravje region 53,467.86 and Zavrč

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Ministry/institution/organisa Total damage in Remarks tion EUR Municipalities of Apače and Gornja Pomurska region 7,156.39 Radgona Posavska region 20,533.60 Municipality of Sevnica Municipalities of Nova Gorica, Idrija, North Primorska region 854,600.00 Cerkno, Ajdovščina, Tolmin, Kobarid and Kanal Municipalities of Benedikt, Cerkvenjak, Duplek, Hoče-Slivnica, Kungota, Lenart, Lovrenc na Pohorju, Makole, Miklavž na Dravskem polju, Maribor, Oplotnica, East Štajerska region 367,035.48 Pesnica, Poljčane, Rače-Fram, Ruše, Selnica ob Dravi, Slovenska Bistrica, Starše, Sveta Ana, Sveta Trojica v Slovenskih goricah, Sveti Jurij v Slovenskih goricah and Šentilj Municipalities of Celje, Dobrna, Gornji Grad, Ljubno, Mozirje, Rečica ob Savinji, Šmartno ob Paki, Šoštanj, Velenje, Zreče, West Štajerska region 1,000,843.14 Žalec, Šmarje pri Jelšah, Vojnik, Šentjur, Tabor, Luče, Slovenske Konjice, Prebold, Solčava and Braslovče Municipalities of Hrastnik, Trbovlje and Zasavska region 65,003.83 Zagorje ob Savi Telekom Slovenije 720,405.00 Total: 40,055,984.30

In addition, in order to perform its regular duties as the public forestry service, which significantly exceed the normal scope of its duties, and for staff augmentation, the community work programme, and for restoring the passability of forest and some local roads, the Slovenian Forest Service was allocated EUR 6,114,400. In the broader sense, this amount can also be classified as disaster response costs or costs which would not have incurred if the ice storm did not occur.

Total costs and damage

The total amount of damage and costs (direct damage, damage assessment costs, disaster response costs and additional costs of the Slovenian Forest Service) is EUR 475,601,800.47. Although this data are not complete, the full list of costs and damage would bring no significant increase in the final value. This value will be used in the comparison with the criteria for assessing disaster risk and in disaster risk matrices.

Since the direct damage caused by the ice storm exceeded 0.6% of GNI (which was approximately EUR 220 million in 2014), the RS Government ordered the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology to prepare, in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture, Economy and Food and the Ministry of Defence, an application for assistance

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The amount of damage and costs resulting from the 2014 ice storm disaster

Damage In EUR Direct damage 429,415,980.17 Disaster response costs 40,055,984.30 Damage assessment costs 15,436.00 Additional costs of the ZGS 6,114,400.00 Total 475,601,800.47

International assistance in disaster response operations

This ice storm disaster required extensive international assistance. Owing to the large-scale consequences of the ice storm and the worsening situation, the Republic of Slovenia requested international assistance in the form of high-power generators on 2 February 2014 through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre within the framework of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism.

This was the first time that Slovenia requested international assistance in the framework of this mechanism which includes 32 European countries. The response of the European Emergency Response Coordination Centre of the European Commission and the participating countries was fast, coordinated and effective. 100 power generators were requested, and a number of countries responded immediately. One day after the request, the first teams with generators from Austria, Germany and Slovakia arrived in Slovenia. Owing to the slow improvement or even occasionally worsening of the situation in some parts of Slovenia, the country supplemented its request for assistance in the form of additional high- power generators on 5 February.

In addition to the assistance received by Slovenia at the state level through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, solidarity was also demonstrated by numerous border municipalities from Austria and Italy which, in cooperation with Slovenian local communities, provided several low-power generators for individual use. Assistance was also received from non- governmental and other organisations. Slovenia received a total of 172 generators (83 high- power and 89 low-power generators), of which 72 were provided through the EU CP Mechanism and 100 at the bilateral level from 11 countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and the United States).

In terms of the number of participating countries and the number of rescue workers, the international rescue operation in Slovenia was one of the largest in recent years in Europe. It should be pointed out that in most of the contributing countries, questions were raised about their vulnerability in the event of an extensive and prolonged power failure. Over the past years, major disaster response operations within the EU occurred in the event of fires in

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In accordance with the agreement between the ACPDR and the electricity distributors, teams from abroad installed power generators and maintained them in the affected regions in the electricity distribution regions of Primorska, Ljubljana, Gorenjska, Celje and Maribor. In addition to installing the generators and providing assistance in their operation, rescue workers from abroad also provided operational assistance in eliminating the consequences of the ice storm. In total, approximately 650 foreign rescue workers took part in disaster response activities until 14 February 2014. Their number changed every day because some of them, after the installation of their generators, went home, while in most of the teams, rescue workers were replaced every few days.

Rescue workers from Poland with a power generator in the vicinity of Maribor (source: ACPDR photo archive)

The ACPDR provided free accommodation and meals to the foreign teams at the logistic base of the Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Centre in Logatec, which was used as the reception and accommodation base for foreign units. Similarly, in cooperation with responsible authorities, the ACPDR provided other urgent host nation support. Some foreign units were also accommodated at other locations across the country, where local communities helped to provide assistance and meals.

After the situation improved, the first international teams left the country on 14 February, most of them between 19 and 22 February, while the last units from Germany ended their work on 28 February 2014. Some generators from abroad were left in Slovenia owing to needs and in accordance with the agreement with the sending nations. By the end of March

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2014, some power generators from Austria, Serbia and Germany (Bavaria) were thus still in use. Upon the completion of operation and maintenance, they were returned to the owners by the end of May 2014.

International assistance to Slovenia through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism

Country/state, Number of Number of Duration of region generators personnel assistance Austria, Lower Austria 26 generators 334 3-20 February Austria, Salzburg 8 generators 68 3-20 February Austria, Wienna 5 generators 22 7-21 February, 2 generators until 15 April Total for Austria 39 generators 424 Czech Republic 3 generators 28 3-23 February Germany, THW 8 generators 63 3 February–1 March 2014 Germany, Bavaria 4 generators 8 4 February–15 April (personnel 5 February) Germany, Hesse 10 generators 95 5-22 February Total for Germany 22 generators 166 Poland 3 generators 18 5-23 February Hungary 3 generators – 7-19 February Romania 2 generators 4 5-19 February Total 72 generators 640 members of from abroad (69 technical high-power and 3 staff/rescue low-power) workers from abroad

Bilateral assistance to Slovenia

Country/organis Number of Duration of Remark ation generators assistance Croatia (HEP – 3 high-power Bilateral Bilateral assistance (HEP – electricity generators agreement Operator distribucijskog distributor) sustava) Austria 2 high-power Agreement with Bilateral (cross-border) generators local community cooperation with the Carinthia (assistance for the Municipality of Jezersko) Austria 11 generators Agreement with Bilateral (cross-border) local community cooperation with Carinthia (assistance for the Municipality of Solčava) Italy 5 high-power Agreement with Bilateral (cross-border) generators local community cooperation with the Agricultural Association of the Friuli - Venezia Giulia region

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Country/organis Number of Duration of Remark ation generators assistance (assistance for the area of Nova Gorica) Italy 4 generators Donation Italian Union/Unione Italijana Italy 36 high-power Agreement with Civil protection of the generators the municipality of municipalities of Cividale del Bovec Friuli, Marcon, Tarcento (assistance for the area of Idrija and Cerkno) Italian Red Cross 15 generators Agreement with bilateral (cross-border) local community cooperation (assistance for the municipalities of Žužemberg and Idrija) Sovereign order 8 generators Agreement Bilateral cooperation between of Malta between both the Austrian and Slovenian cell cells Serbia 5 high-power Bilateral Bilateral cooperation generators agreement Slovakia 1 high-power 11-23 February Bilateral cooperation generator United States of 10 generators (1 Donation Bilateral cooperation America high-power) Total 100 generators (14 high-power and 86 low-power)

According to the Slovenian Forest Service, foreign workforce was also used for salvage logging in forests. According to estimations, salvage logging would take much longer without the foreign workforce.

LIKELIHOOD OF RISK ANALYSIS

It is estimated that risk impacts described above, and similar impacts, can occur once in more than 100 years.

RELIABILITY OF RISK ANALYSIS

When preparing the analysis, which is the most comprehensive and complex part of the risk assessment for an individual accident, the data acquired is sometimes not sufficiently reliable and accurate, and in some areas also lacking in general. Accordingly, the risk analysis is based on the current possibilities, representing the area with the biggest scope for future progress. However, the risk scenario is relatively reliable.

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DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSIS AND THE CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACTS AND LIKELIHOOD OF A DISASTER

Comparison between the results of risk analyses and the appropriate criteria for assessing the risk impacts and the likelihood of a disaster is one of the most important elements in assessing the risk of a particular disaster. The criteria can be used to assess the severity of a particular disaster and risk impacts, the likelihood of risk, and the likelihood of various scenarios and risk analyses. Since the criteria for assessing risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters are uniform for all risks, they also allow the comparison between impacts or consequences and the likelihood of an individual disaster risk and other risks.

Comparison between the results of the risk analysis and the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people

Criteria for the assessment of risk 1 2 3 4 5 impacts on people Number of fatalities Up to 5-10 10-50 50-200 More Number of fatalities (10 years)* 5 5-10 10-50 50-100 than 200 Up to More 5 than 100 Number of injured or sick people** Up to 10-50 50-200 200-1000 More number of injured or sick people (10 10 10-50 50-200 200-500 than 1000 years)** Up to More 10 than 500 Number of evacuated people Up to Between 50-200 200-500 More (permanent measure) 20 20 and 50 than 500 *For disasters with possible long-lasting impacts (e.g. up to 10 years), such as disasters involving dangerous substances and nuclear or radiological disasters, the long term values for fatalities and the injured or sick people (10 years) can be determined separately or applied as stated above, if necessary. ** The injured or sick people include people who were affected by radiation, contamination or poisoning. In risk analyses, such people can be dealt with separately.

Risk impacts on people in relation to the type of risk can predominantly refer to the number of fatalities, the number of injured or sick people, the number of permanently evacuated people, the number of people living and working in the areas which are affected by the disaster, and others (e.g. impacts on vulnerable population groups, such as children, the elderly and the socially disadvantaged people). For disasters with possible long-term impacts (such as accidents involving dangerous substances, and nuclear or radiological accidents), these impacts are used or determined based on the number of fatalities and of injured or sick people during the period of 10 years following the disaster. The criteria for assessing risk

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 415/464 ______impacts on people are expressed in the number of fatalities, injured or sick people, and permanently evacuated people.

Included in the number of fatalities and the injured people are the possible fatalities and injured people among the members of protection, rescue and relief forces involved in emergency response operations, and the number of police officers, Slovenian Armed Forces members and emergency response teams of different services (emergency medical service, teams from electrical companies, public utility companies, and others) who died or were injured during the implementation of emergency measures in their realm of responsibility and during the initial restoration activities, but not longer than one year after the disaster. Considered for inclusion in the risk matrices are the highest values of impact in reference to the coordinated criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people.

For this risk scenario, relatively accurate data on the number of fatalities and injured people were obtained. If we subtract the average number of people who get injured or die each year at work in the forest, 13 people died and 168 people were injured or poisoned as a result of the 2014 ice storm disaster. These values rank this risk scenario at the third level of risk impacts on people, both in terms of fatalities and the injured people. The latter figure is also the representative value of the risk scenario with regard to the risk impacts on people.

Comparison between the results of the risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage

The following impacts can be included among the economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage: the number, the consequences and the amount of damage on facilities and inside them; the costs for the operation of ministries and bodies which carry out activities in within their realm of responsibility in difficult situations; the scope and the amount of damage on agricultural and forest surfaces or on cultural heritage facilities/areas; the costs for the limitation on the use of food and the long-term costs in the food supply chain; the scope and the amount of damage of water bodies; the number of the damaged or destroyed means of transport and the damage resulting in from that; the number of, and the damage and costs related to the dead or sick domestic or wild animals and animals which require treatment or have to be put to sleep; the costs of medical treatment or care for people; damage owing to the termination of an economic activity; social and other similar costs; costs of investment and other possible international assistance; costs of the comprehensive long-term restoration (rehabilitation) of facilities and equipment; costs of comprehensive and long-term restoration (rehabilitation) of agricultural and forest surfaces and facilities or areas of cultural heritage; costs of comprehensive long-term restoration of water bodies and the environment and other environmental damage; and additionally (not included in the calculation of damage and costs) the extend of the affected area (in square kilometres and percentage of the country's surface); the amount of insurance payments resulting from a disaster; the reduction in GDP; decrease in the number of visits of foreign tourists; and the increase of unemployment owing to a disaster.

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Criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the level of impact

1 2 3 4 5 Up to 0.3% of Between 0.3% Between 0.6% Between 1.2% More than 2.4% of GDP and 0.6% of and 1.2% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP GDP GDP Up to 100 EUR 220-440 EUR 440-880 More than EUR million EUR 100–220 million million 880 million million S3

The criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and the impacts of risk on cultural heritage are expressed as the amount of costs and damage resulting from an individual risk. The boundary between class 2 and class 3 out of five is set at 0.6% of GDP. This is the basis for the establishment of limit values for the remaining classes. To a large extent, this baseline value refers to the value of 0.6% of gross national product (GNP). If the damage resulting from a certain disaster exceeds the value of 0.6% of the GNP, a country can request the EU for a grant from the EU Solidarity Fund. In Slovenia, the values for GNI and GDP are similar (GNI is slightly lower). For this reason, GDP is used for assessing disaster risk impacts. In 2014, GDP stood at approximately EUR 36.2 billion, while the value of the 0.6% of GDP was approximately EUR 220 million.

Comparison between the results of risk analyses and criteria for the assessment of political and social risk impacts

The political and social risk impacts can, in reference to risk, include categories, such as risk impact on the functioning of state authorities, the impact of the non-functioning of important infrastructural systems on everyday life, psychosocial impacts, internal political stability and the impact on law and order, financial stability and foreign political or international stability (situation) of the country. The criteria for the assessment of political and social risk impacts are semi-qualitative. In comparison to the former two impact groups, for which mostly concrete data and numbers were available, this group of impacts refers to the assessment of the order of extent of the considered impacts. The final value or level of political and social risk impacts is determined by dividing the sum of the values of individual impacts by the number of the applied criteria that refer to political and social risk impacts, both within the framework of individual impacts and impact groups. The risk impacts which were not assessed are not taken into consideration. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

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Criteria for the assessment of the impacts of risk on the functioning of state authorities and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of state authorities and comparison with the results of risk analyses are presented in the tables below. In accordance with the assessment, the risk scenario would have no significant impact on the ability of state authorities to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility. For this reason, the scenario was ranked at impact level 2.

The ability of state authorities (Government, ministries, constituent bodies, administrative units) to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility in the affected area, and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Duration Limited Strongly impaired Disabled Up to 2 days 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 1 2 Up to 15 days 2 2 3 Up to 30 days 2 3 4 More than 30 days 3 4 5 The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The number of people affected by hindered or disrupted provision of services of state authorities (either physically or functionally) and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 More than people/duration and 5,000 and 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The final level or value of risk impact on the functioning of state authorities is defined by dividing the sum of individual values from both tables with the number of impacts taken into account. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (2), the resulting value of risk impacts on the functioning of state authorities is 1.50.

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Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems and the comparison with the results of risk analyses are presented in the tables below.

Lack of or difficult access to drinking water, food and energy products (electricity, heating, fuel) and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than people/duration and 5,000 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If, in a minimum of two cases, the same number of people is affected, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

In the example above, the situation regarding the power supply was taken into account, which is one of the most severe consequences of the ice storm. In accordance with the assessment, the impact of this scenario is ranked in level 3.

Strongly impaired or disabled use of the internet and telecommunications systems; arrival to work and in educational institutions; use of public services (access to the media, health services, banking services, etc.); use of public transport; supply or purchase of basic necessities; and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 more than people/duration and 5,000 and 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 days 4 5 5 5 The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If, in a minimum of two cases, the same number of people is affected, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

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The ability to use the internet and telecommunication systems has the greatest impact.

The final level or value of risk impact on the functioning of major infrastructure systems is defined by dividing the sum of values from the previous two tables with the number of impacts taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (2), the resulting value of risk impacts on the functioning of important infrastructure systems is 2.00.

Criteria for the assessment of psychosocial risk impacts and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of psychosocial risk impacts and comparison with the results of risk analysis are defined in the following three tables.

The number of people showing an unusual or undesired behavioural reaction to the disaster, such as avoiding attending school or kindergarten; deliberate absence from work; deliberate avoidance of public transport; desire to move to another location; irrational financial operations (mass cash withdrawals, etc.); accumulation and appropriation of stocks of basic necessities; and similar reactions; and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than people/duration and 5,000 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1 1 1 2 Up to 7 days 1 2 2 3 Up to 15 days 2 3 3 4 Up to 30 days 3 4 4 5 More than 30 4 5 5 5 days The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used, followed by the one which lasts longer. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

In accordance with the assessment, the risk scenario did not or would not have a significant impact on the behaviour of people. For this reason, it was ranked at impact level 1. Social impacts of the disaster (the table below) were ranked at impact level 2.

Social impacts and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Types of social impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1

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Types of social impacts Level of impact The poor segments of the population find themselves in severe social distress; the number of applications for extraordinary social 2 assistance benefits in cash is increasing. The consequences of the disaster are also felt by the middle-class population, which is reflected in the increased number of 3 applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash. The consequences of the disaster are felt by the majority of the population, which is reflected in a large increase in the number of 4 applications for social assistance benefits. The consequences are felt by the entire population, which is reflected mainly in new applications for social assistance benefits 5 and renewed applications for the allocation of assistance. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Psychological impacts and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Types of psychological impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of fear among the population owing to the lack of 2 information regarding the causes of the disaster and its characteristics and consequences. Increased level of fear among the population, especially of a new 3 disaster and its consequences. The population fear for their lives; decreased confidence in the 4 responsible authorities regarding their response and mitigation and elimination of disaster consequences; increased desire to relocate. Due to the negative events or consequences of a disaster, the 5 majority of people cease to believe that life in the affected area could return to a normal state; mass relocation is taking place. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The final level or value of psychosocial risk impacts is defined by dividing the sum of the values from the above three tables with the number of impacts taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (3), the resulting value of psychosocial risk impacts is 2.00.

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Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal political stability and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal political stability and comparison with the results of risk analysis are shown in the table below.

Risk impact on internal political stability and law and order and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Types of impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of public expression of disagreement with the 2 actions of the responsible institutions; individual disruptions in the functioning of political institutions (the Government, the Parliament, etc.); individual occurrences of hostile campaigns. Individual cases of violation of law and order and criminal offences 3 resulting from the disaster; observed expressions of fear for one's own safety and property; individuals or groups try to undermine the internal political situation; reduced trust of the population in the functioning of political institutions. Increased number of violations of law and order and of organised 4 criminal offences; increased fear among the population; political parties and other interest groups are trying to undermine internal political stability and obtain political benefits by "imposing" their own programmes for improving the situation; reduced trust in the functioning of state institutions. Massive violations of law and order including violent demonstrations; 5 significant increase in the number of criminal offences; the internal security of the country is at risk. The internal political stability of the country is undermined; the basic rights provided for in the Constitution are undermined and at risk. If estimated that the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, the level of impact is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can only be a whole number.

According to the Ministry of the Interior, during the ice storm disaster in 2014 referred to in the present risk scenario, cases of criminal offences, such as theft of fuel, generators, wires and other metal objects were recorded, while in the most affected areas, individuals and groups appeared which tried to use the disaster for their own benefit. For this reason, in terms of internal political stability and law and order, the present risk scenario is ranked at impact level 3.

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Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability and comparison with the results of risk analyses are shown in the following three tables.

Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to payment system failures and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Settlement Payment Payment Payment Payment Payment failure value settlement settlement settlement settlement settlement failure in the failure in the failure in an failure in an failure in the amount lower amount amount amount amount higher than between 10% between 20% between 50% than 80% of duration of the 10% of the and 20% of the and 50% of the and 80% of the the planned failure planned value planned value planned value planned value value of the of the of the of the of the payment payment payment payment payment system during system during system during system during system during disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions No impact, because disaster impacts do not Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed refer to the (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) assessed content. Disruptions in the payment system 1 1 2 3 3 lasting up to 2 hours. Disruptions in the payment system 1 2 2 3 4 lasting up to 4 hours. Disruptions in the payment system 2 3 3 4 4 lasting up to 8 hours. Disruptions in the payment system which last the entire business 3 4 4 5 5 day and are not eliminated by the end of the business day.* Disruptions in the payment system 4 5 5 5 5 lasting more than one business day. *Disruptions at the end of a business day, even if they only last a short time, can cause a one-day delay in the settlement of payments. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

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Based on the assessment of the consequences, it was concluded that the risk scenario in question could be ranked at impact level 2.

Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to the lack of cash and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

The present risk scenario, owing to long-term and widespread interruptions in electricity supply and the inability to fill ATMs owing to the poor passability of routes could have an impact primarily on the functioning of banking institutions, and even more on the functioning of ATMs. For this reason, the risk scenario was ranked at level 3 of the assessed impact.

Changes in GDP growth owing to a disaster in the year of the disaster or in the following year and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Changes in GDP growth Level of impact No impact because disaster impacts do not refer to the Not assessed (NA) content/no consequences Between 0 and –0.5 percentage points 1 Up to -1 percentage points 2 Up to –1.5 percentage points 3 Up to –2 percentage point 4 More than –2 percentage points 5 If it is estimated that a disaster will not have a negative impact on the growth in GDP, or if the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, the level of impact is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

According to the opinion of the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the Republic of Slovenia, submitted by the Ministry of Finance, the present risk scenario can have a slightly negative impact on the GDP growth, which is the reason it was ranked at impact level 2.

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The final level or likelihood of risk impact on financial stability is determined by dividing the sum of individual values from the three tables above with the number of impacts taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (3), the resulting value of psychosocial risk impacts is 2.33.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy and international stability and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy and international stability and comparison with the results of risk analysis are shown in the below table.

Foreign policy (international) risk impact and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Type of foreign policy or international impact Level of impact

Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 No significant detected direct impact on the international position of the country; individual foreign countries are following the 2 developments in the RS. Individual (neighbouring) countries and some regional and international organisations are responding to the event through 3 diplomatic channels, expressing their support or concerns about to the situation. A part of the international community (countries, international organisations) is responding to the event by expressing strong 4 support or concerns about the situation. The Republic of Slovenia is receiving international assistance, especially in equipment and human resources. Despite the international assistance, Slovenia remains a stable country. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the RS are advising their citizens against travelling to certain areas of the RS. A major part of the international community is responding strongly to the events in the country, since the events are greatly impacting the 5 security of other countries. The RS is receiving significant international assistance (equipment, money, human resources). The RS urgently needs assistance to ensure a normal functioning of the entire system. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts are advising their citizens against travelling to the RS and are decreasing or increasing the number of staff at the missions and posts owing to the situation in the country. International events, whose main topic is the position of or the

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Type of foreign policy or international impact Level of impact situation in the RS.

If it is assessed that the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, the level of impact is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can only be a whole number.

Owing to the foreign policy impacts, and in particular owing to the extensive involvement of foreign rescue workers, which lasted almost one month, and in certain cases even longer, the present risk scenario was ranked at level 4 of foreign policy impacts. Owing to the scale of the consequences and some insufficient domestic capacities, the Republic of Slovenia was, for the first time in history, forced to apply for international assistance through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism.

Final value or the level of political and social risk impacts

The final value or the level of political and social risk impacts is determined by adding together the final values or the levels of all groups of political and social risk impacts and dividing this sum by the number of impact groups, that is by 6. If a certain group of political or social risk impacts was not assessed because these risk impacts do refer to the assessed content (NA), this group is not taken into account in the final calculation. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Overview of the value or levels of individual impact groups as part of political and social risk impacts

Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Sum of Average impact impact impact impact impact impact impact impact group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group 6 values value 1.50 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.33 4.00 15.83 2.64

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The conversion of the value of political and social impacts into the level of political and social risk impacts

Average value of political and social risk The level of political and social risk impacts impact Between 1.00 and 1.49 1 Between 1.50 and 2.49 2 Between 2.50 and 3.49 3 Between 3.50 and 4.49 4 Between 4.50 and 5.00 5

This is the method for calculating the levels of political and social impacts.

The conversion of the value of political and social impacts of risk scenarios into the level of political and social risk impacts

Level/value Average value of political and social risk 2.64 impacts Level of political and social risk impact 3

Comparison between the results of the risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of a disaster

The likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster can be defined using a number, percentage or description, which is evident from the table below.

Criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of a disaster and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

1 2 3 4 5

Once in more Once every Once every 25 to Once every 5 to Once or more than every 250 100 to 250 100 years (yearly 25 years (yearly every 5 years years (yearly years (yearly likelihood of likelihood of (yearly likelihood likelihood of up likelihood of between 1 and 4%) between 4 and of more than to 0.4% between 0.4 20%) 20%) and 1%)

Hardly any risk Possible but Possible risk General risk Special and (threat) less likely risk (threat) (threat) imminent (threat) (permanent) risk (threat) The descriptive definition is used especially for disasters which do not follow a natural cycle of occurrence or for intentional acts which cannot be predicted due to the specifics of their occurrence (e.g. terrorism). For other disasters, the time periods listed in the upper part of the table are taken into account.

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The described and similar impacts of the present risk scenario can occur once in more than 100 years, which ranks the scenario in level 2 of risk of the disaster.

DISASTER RISK MATRICES

Disaster risk matrices are used for graphic representation of the size of the impacts and likelihood of disaster risk or individual risk scenarios, when only one risk is addressed.

Matrices with a separate presentation of risk impacts show the order of extent of the risk by individual groups of impacts, while the matrix with an overall presentation of risk impact show the total (average) value or risk level of the selected risk scenario.

The level of the overall or average impact is calculated by dividing the sum of the level of risk impacts on people (1), the level of economic and environmental impacts (2), and the level of impacts on cultural heritage together with political and social impacts (3), by three. The final calculated value of impacts can also be a decimal number. In this case, the final level of the overall (average) impacts must be determined, and the value must be a whole number.

The conversion of the overall (average) level of risk impacts to be entered into the fields of the disaster risk matrices showing the overall value of risk impacts

Calculated value of all three The level of risk impact in disaster risk matrices impact types showing the overall value of risk impacts Between 1.00 and 1.49 1 Between 1.50 and 2.49 2 Between 2.50 and 3.49 3 Between 3.50 and 4.49 4 Between 4.50 and 5.00 5

By using the data from this table, the final table can be completed with all the data required for the calculation of the levels of impacts in the matrix showing the overall value of risk impacts. Two columns in the table are of a darker shade. These columns are used for the disaster risk matrix showing the overall impacts of risk.

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Calculation of the average risk impacts for the matrix showing the overall risk impacts

Level of Level of Level of Calculated The level Risk Reliability impacts economic and political overall of overall likelihood of risk on environmental and (average) (average) analysis people impacts and social value of risk results impacts on impacts impacts impacts cultural heritage

3 4 3 3.33 3 2 Relatively reliable

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11.7 Annex 7: Risk Scenario: Ice Storm in 2014 and the Excessive Growth of Bark Beetle Populations after 2014

RISK SCENARIO

The scenario in Annex 11.7 represents the fourth risk scenario for ice storms and is actually a multiple-risk scenario which combines two chains of disasters (the ice storm in 2014 described in a separate risk scenario in Annex 11.6, and the excessive growth of bark beetle populations, in particular the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle). In addition to the fact that there is a significant connection between both disasters, the excessive growth of bark beetle populations is also the result of the already identified climate changes, which facilitate the overexpansion of this insect.

The present risk scenario therefore includes the risk scenario describing the impacts of the ice storm in 2014 and a description of a new disaster, which may even have more catastrophic consequences for forests than the 2014 ice storm. It is the excessive growth of bark beetle populations, specifically of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle, which, with a short (one-year) delay, followed the ice storm in 2014. The huge growth of bark beetle populations already causes extremely large damage to Slovenian forests, and the growth itself can continue for several years.

The present scenario does not repeat the content of the risk scenario from Annex 11.6, it only supplements it with the description of the excessive growth of bark beetle populations.

In Slovenia, there are about 90 species of bark beetle, which mostly populate the conifers. They are small beetles of cylindrical shape, mostly up to half a centimetre long. They make small burrows in the bark of a tree and then build tunnels under the bark. Tunnels are mostly made by adult beetles and larvaes. They are divided into Ipinae, Hyleseninae and Scolytinae. Most bark beetle species feed on dead wood, while some of them inhabit a fungus into the tunnels. For them, the fungus is a source of food and an organism causing additional damage to the tree. Of all the abiotic and biotic factors in recent years, the excessive growth of bark beetle populations is the greatest cause of damage in Slovenian forests, which is why the protection against those insects is one of the important areas of forest protection. At least one third of the salvage logging of forests is carried out owing to insects, of which more than 99% owing to bark beetle. Among the species, by far the greatest share of injuries and damage is caused by the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle (Ips typographus), while to a much smaller extent, damage is also done by the smaller species, the six-toothed spruce bark beetle (Pityogenes chalcographus).

When considering the extensive growth of bark beetle populations, it is also necessary to change the perception and understanding of the phenomenon. It is not a kind of a short-term disaster nor a dramatic phenomenon, since not everything that happens in the forests takes place very noticeably. However, it takes place constantly. With action that is inadequate or too slow, the phenomenon reaches increasingly large and severe proportions. Nevertheless, it should be added that bark beetle is a part of the natural forest ecosystem. In the absence of excessive growth, as a secondary pest, it does not cause significant damage in forests,

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 430/464 ______since it attacks mainly trees that have been weakened owing to diseases, droughts, injuries, natural disasters and smog. Thus, bark beetle sustains a certain natural balance in forests.

An excessive growth of bark beetle, which makes it a primary pest, occurs after large-scale natural disasters with a great number of injured conifers and dispersed injuries, which are all characteristics of the ice storm in 2014. The risk of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle is high for forests with predominantly old conifers growing in sunny sites, especially those facing south and southwest, on river deposits and in low-lying areas, and also for spruce forests growing on sites which are inadequate for them. The species also attacks newly felled trees (logs and thick branches). However, in case of extensive growth, healthy spruces are also attacked. The attacked trees are referred to as the affected trees. The first signs of the attack are small holes on the bark and worm holes, while the trees begin to produce resin. By digging a number of tunnels, spruce bark beetle disconnects xsylems (tubes transferring water and nutrients inside a tree both upwards and downwards) and as a result, the tree starts to weaken. After the attack, especially in spring and early summer, the crown starts to decay, turning the colour into brown. Eventually, the needles begin to fall off, and in the last stage, the tree begins to dry, the cortex begins to peel off and the tree is destroyed. In case of late-summer attack, signs on the trees are often evident only after the end of the winter. Damage can be huge, since spruce stands on large surfaces can be destroyed, especially on sites which are inadequate for them. The wood of the affected trees has a lower economic value than the wood of a healthy spruce. The value and usefulness of the attacked wood are reduced by delaying the felling and increasing injuries on the wood.

Figure 15: Eight-toothed spruce bark beetle (Ips typographus) (photo: W. Billen)

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In normal conditions, the development cycle of one generation of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle lasts from 8 to 10 weeks. In normal weather conditions in low-lying areas, the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle develops two or three generations and one or two sister generations a year, while at higher altitudes, the number of generations is smaller. Adult spruce bark beetles usually hibernate several centimetres deep in the soil near the affected tree, in short corridors in the cortex in the base of the tree, under the bark of the affected tree, in logging residues, in stumps and so on. In the form of larvae or pupae, they hibernate in standing affected trees or in logging residues. Larvae and pupae can withstand temperatures between -13 and -17 degrees Celsius, and adult spruce bark beetles even up to -30 degrees Celsius. During hibernation, mortality rate is about 50%. The flying out of spruce bark beetle from the affected trees and spreading to other trees are prevented by rain and lower temperatures when they stay below 15 degrees Celsius during the day for several consecutive days.

In normal conditions, the development cycle of one generation of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle lasts between 8 and 10 weeks. In normal weather conditions in low-lying areas, the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle develops two or three generations and one or two sister generations a year, while at higher altitudes, the number of generations is smaller. Adult spruce bark beetles usually hibernate several centimetres deep in the soil near the affected tree, in short corridors in the cortex in the base of the tree, under the bark of the affected tree, in logging residues, in stumps and so on. In the form of larvae or pupae, they hibernate in standing affected trees or in logging residues. Larvae and pupae can withstand temperatures between -13 and -17 degrees Celsius, and adult spruce bark beetles even up to -30 degrees Celsius. During hibernation, mortality rate is about 50%. Climate change in recent decades, which is also reflected in raising temperatures, both in summer and in winter, the reduction the amount of precipitation during the vegetation season, and increased frequency of drought periods, also causes faster reproduction and spreading of spruce bark beetle. In the changed climate conditions which are more favourable for that species, the development cycle of the spruce bark beetle is reduced up to half of the original cycle, especially in summer, when daily temperatures are higher than 25 degrees Celsius. This means that, in favourable conditions and hot summers, several generations develop over the same period of time each year. The reproductive potential of spruce bark beetle is therefore extremely high. Owing to milder winters, its mortality rate during hibernation is small. At the same time, the climate change described causes stress for plants, thus weakening their resistance. The resistance of forests is further reduced by frequent meteorological disasters, especially wind and snow damage, as well as ice damage. It is therefore obvious that climate change is one of the important factors for the excessive growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle populations.

Overexpansion of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle often follows natural disasters, especially if areas with damaged or weakened trees have not been restored in good time. The experience of the last but one huge growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle in 2003 showed that the greatest overexpansion after major natural disasters affecting forests occurs in the second and third year after a natural disaster.

A general problem of spruce in Slovenia is that a significant proportion of spruce stands grow on inadequate sites, since in the past, spruce was intensively introduced into low-lying areas

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 432/464 ______owing to economic reasons (spruce grows fast and gives quality wood) and easy maintenance of its stands, although such areas do not provide optimum growing conditions for spruce. This is also the reason why forests at lower altitudes (below 1000 meters) are additionally at high risk of the attack of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle. In particular, these spruce forests are located at sites lower than 500 meters above sea level, and on ground that has poor ability of retaining water, especially on sunny sites on calcareous substrates. Due to climate change, it is expected that in the future, the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle will probably spread more also to areas higher than 1000 meters above sea level. In view of this trend and probably further warming of the climate, our biggest spruce forests on high alpine plateaus (Pokljuka, Jelovica, Mežakla) and elsewhere (Nanos, Trnovski gozd, Snežnik, etc.) can be at great risk also in the future.

A forest affected after an attack by the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle (photo: Veronika Rupnik Ženko)

The last but one extensive and long-lasting excessive growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle populations, which started in a very dry and hot year of 2003, lasted until 2008. However, the current overexpansion of this species after 2014 is not comparable to previous overexpansions with regard to the extent, damage, and costs of their control. It is clear that after 2014, the impacts of all the essential conditions for extensive growth of the eight- toothed spruce bark beetle populations are combined: the excessive proportion of spruce in low-lying forests or at less adequate sites, climate change and weather conditions favourable to fast reproduction and spreading of the species, which at the same time also weaken certain forest trees, and, in particular, large quantities of damaged wood mass after the ice storm in 2014, slow elimination of its consequences, and slow removal of the affected trees.

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A combination of all these conditions and circumstances obviously had a negative impact on the fragile natural balance of forests.

The overexpansion of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle after the catastrophic ice storm in February 2014 was actually expected. In 2014, that is, in the year of the catastrophic ice storm, the conditions for the development and spread of this pest species were unfavourable, especially owing to a relatively wet summer, as rainy weather prevents the beetles from flying out of the affected trees and spreading to the non-affected trees. Therefore, the bark beetle did not spread significantly in 2014. A significant expansion began as a result of very favourable weather conditions in the warm period of 2015. The spread and extensive growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle in 2015 and also in 2016, when it attacked healthy trees, was most severe in the western, central and south-eastern parts of Slovenia. The most affected are spruce forests growing at inadequate sites. The most affected areas are to a great extend coincident with those most affected by the 2014 ice storm. The quantity of wood mass affected by bark beetle in 2015 was several times higher than in 2005, which was a record year until 2015 with regard to the felling of wood mass owing to bark beetle (747,132 m3). Similar numbers also apply for 2016. This means that Slovenia is facing by far the biggest overexpansion of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle on its territory so far. Besides, it should be added that the summer of 2016 was not even among the record warm summers and even less among the record dry ones, otherwise the species would probably expand even further. With appropriate measures, the excessive growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle populations should be limited or stopped only around the year 2020, provided there are no major natural disasters in the following years causing additional damage in forests (drought, damage caused by wind, snow or ice, etc.).

As a result of the 2014 ice storm and the excessive growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle populations after the ice storm, in the 2014-2020 period, the estimated total amount of the annual felled wood mass is equal to about 19 million m3 or even more, including the already felled wood mass and the wood mass planned for felling. Some years ago, such quantity seemed unthinkable.

Appropriate preventive measures must be implemented in forests to prevent the spread of bark beetle. These include the appropriate forest tree structure, the implementation of remedial measures, regular removal of newly attacked trees (which is especially important in the warm period of the year, when the development cycle of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle is faster), the fastest possible transport of the felled timber from the forest, and strict observance of the prescribed forest order. Preventive and active control activities are carried out, such as the use of traps, trapping trees and trunk bands.

Owing to the extremely large extent of the affected areas, the measures taken by the State, the forestry profession and forest owners to control or reduce the consequences of the spread of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle in forests require extensive and long-lasting efforts and activities. Appropriate action or implementation of measures for controlling bark beetles is hindered by a number of problems, such as the low purchase prices of damaged wood, which are further reduced due to the pest, the lack of operators (lumberjacks), a relatively ineffective approach to the control of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle in forests owned by certain or some major owners, the lack of interest and response by owners, the

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 434/464 ______division of forest ownership among a large number of owners, the small size of the forest plots owned by individual owners (often, owners do not even know where precisely their forest is located), and so on.

LIKELIHOOD OF THE RISK SCENARIO

With regard to the frequency or likelihood of the risk scenario, it can be empirically established with reasonable certainty that such ice storm disasters as that of February 2014 occur rarely, probably once every more than 100 years. The severity and extent of the ice storm disaster in February 2014 is unprecedented. Naturally, this does not mean that such or even more serious storm cannot occur in the near future. Owing to the relatively small number of major ice storms, it is difficult to give a reliable assessment of the precise temporal and spatial principles and the frequency of their occurrence.

RELIABILITY OF THE RISK SCENARIO

Without any major reservations or any specific scientific assessment, the risk scenario can be described as relatively reliable, since it is based on the recent and present real and genuine events related to ice storm and excessive growth of bark beetle populations.

RISK ANALYSIS

The analysis of this risk scenario must take into account all previously published data from the risk scenario in Annex 11.6, which will not be repeated much here. The focus of the analysis will be the newly inflicted damage and costs and other consequences resulting from the control or prevention of the spread of bark beetles (particularly the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle) in the period 2014-2020, which are almost entirely related to damage in forests, and the assessment of the impact on people resulting from work done in forests in relation to the control of bark beetles.

In this analysis, the risks of damage and costs in other areas were not assessed, as they probably would not incur at all, or would incur to an irrelevant extent. It is estimated that in the coming years, the overexpansion of bark beetle will not require the engagement of the ACPDR system, or would require only its minimal engagement. Moreover, there should be no additional damage and costs in road and rail transport, and no additional damage and costs in the electricity sector or in the field of transmission and distribution of electricity. However, there will be slightly higher costs in health care. The number of people who already received medical treatment in 2015 and 2016, or will need to be treated in the coming years owing to injuries related to work in forests in relation to the control of the bark beetle, is expected to increase to some extent compared with the number of injured and dead people from the risk analysis covering only ice storm in February 2014. However, these costs are not defined in this risk analysis.

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As already mentioned in this assessment, the largest increase in wood mass felling owing to the overexpansion of bark beetle so far was in the period 2003-2008, which was the result of drought and heat in 2003, with a peak in 2005 (747,132 m3 of felled wood mass). Between 2009 and 2012, the annual amount of felled wood mass was less than 300,000 m3, while in 2013, it amounted to 337,200 m3. In 2014, due to the large amount of precipitation, conditions were not so favourable to their development, therefore the extent of additional damage caused by bark beetle was not significantly increased. 408,500 m3 of wood mass was felled in 2014 owing to bark beetle.

The year 2015 was marked by an extraordinary growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle (Ips typographus), which was expected to occur in the second growing season after the large-scale ice damage in February 2014, since any major natural disaster in which a large quantity of spruce is damaged is followed by the excessive growth of bark beetle populations. However, the extent of damage, predominantly caused by the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle, was larger than expected, mainly owing to the exceptionally warm summer and autumn of 2015, which accelerated its development cycle). In 2015, 1,818,147 m3 of wood mass was felled owing to bark beetle, with the largest proportion at the expense of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle. This is 2.4 times more than the highest recorded annual felling owing to bark beetle in 2005 (747.132 m3).

The amount of felled wood mass owing to bark beetle in the period 1995-2001 (in m3)

From June 2015 onward, priority for activities carried out in forests was no longer salvage logging owing to ice storm damage, but salvage logging owing to the overexpansion of the eight-teethed spruce bark beetle. The conifers which were severely damaged in February 2014 and were not felled until spring 2015 are already dry and no longer present a risk with regard to the overexpansion of bark beetle.

As expected, the overexpansion of the eight-toothed bark beetle was the highest in the areas of spruce stands which suffered the greatest damage resulting from ice storm in 2014 (the forest management areas of Ljubljana, Postojna, Tolmin and Kranj). In the summer of 2015,

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 436/464 ______the outbreaks in these areas spread rapidly, with the largest one reaching several hundred hectares or more than 10,000 m3 of spruce.

Felled wood owing to bark beetle in the period 1995-2015 (presented by individual years) in Slovenia in comparison to the total salvage logging Posek zaradi podlubnikov v m3 = Felling due to bark beetle in m3 Delež poseka zaradi podlubnikov v skupnem poseku = Felling resulting from bark beetle expressed as a proportion of the total felling Leto = Year Žuželke = Insects % od skupnega poseka = % of the total felling Žledolom, snegolom v zimah 1995/96 in 1996/97 = Ice damage and snow damage in the winters of 1995/1996 and 1996/1997 Izredno vroče in sušno leto 2003 = Extremely hot and dry year of 2003 Žledolom v letu 2014 = Ice damage in 2014

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Felling of conifers owing to bark beetle in 2015 in m3 by forest management areas Napad podlubnikov v letu 2015 = Bark beetle attack in 2015 Posekane količine iglavcev za posek zaradi napada podlubnikov v letu 2015 po GGE v m3 = Volume of felled conifers intended for felling owing to the attack of bark beetle in 2015 by forest management units expressed in m3 Italija = Italy Avstrija = Austria Madžarska = Hungary Hrvaška = Croatia Posekana lesna masa iglavcev po GGE v m3 = Felled wood mass for conifers by forest management units expressed in m3 do 200 = up to 200 200 do 500 = between 200 and 500 500 do 1000 = between 500 and 1000 1000 do 3000 = between 1000 and 3000 3000 do 8000 = between 3000 and 8000 8000 in več = 800 and above

Owing to the excessive growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle populations, 2400 hectares of barren areas were created in 2015, of which the majority in the Ljubljana, Postojna, Bled and Kočevje forest management areas.

Over the winter period of 2015/2016, the felling of the trees affected in 2015 by the eight- toothed spruce bark beetle continued intensively. In 2016, the first new attacks of new trees by the hibernating eight-toothed spruce bark beetle in 2016 were identified already at the beginning of April. Owing to the changeable and cold weather, the hatching of the hibernating eight-toothed spruce bark beetle was then repeatedly interrupted, and therefore

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 438/464 ______the development of the new generation was not accelerated. In the summer, owing to high or above average temperatures, its development cycle was again shortened, as in 2015. If the summer was drier in 2016, the growth of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle populations would probably be even more excessive.

Recorded quantities of conifers intended for felling in 2016 owing to bark beetle, presented by forest management areas in m3 - data are valid as of September 30, 2016 Napad podlubnikov v letu 2016 = Bark beetle attack in 2016 Evidentirane količine iglavcev za posek zaradi napada podlubnikov v letu 2016 po GGE v m3 = Recorded volume of conifers intended for felling owing to the attack of bark beetle in 2016 by forest management units expressed in m3 Italija = Italy Avstrija = Austria Madžarska = Hungary Hrvaška = Croatia Evidentirana lesna masa iglavcev po GGE v m3 = Recorded wood mass for conifers by forest management units expressed in m3 do 200 = up to 200 200 do 500 = between 200 and 500 500 do 1000 = between 500 and 1000 1000 do 3000 = between 1000 and 3000 3000 do 8000 = between 3000 and 8000 8000 in več = 800 and above

According to the Slovenian Forest Service, from the point of view of the destruction of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle, the felling of the newly affected trees in 2016 (as of the end of September) was effective, regardless of many problems. In the spring period, approximately 100,000 m3 of wood, mainly spruce, was recorded each month for felling

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 439/464 ______owing to bark beetle, of which 30% was located in state forests. Thus, in 2016, 660,000 m3 of wood mass was cut by 20 June 2016. Over the summer, the volume of the attacked wood mass increased considerably. In September 2016, 373,000 m3 of the affected trees intended for felling were recorded, and 299,000 m3 of attacked wood mass was felled. In comparison, in 2015, the peak was recorded in September, when as much as 500,000 m3 of the affected trees intended for felling were recorded. Immediate felling of those trees would make the situation unmanageable. The highest monthly extent of felling owing to bark beetle in 2015 was also in September, amounting to 370,000 m3.

Trees recorded for felling owing to bark beetle in individual forest management areas presented by six-month periods from the beginning of 2015 to 20 June 2016 and in m3 Volumen lesne mase v bruto m3 = Volume of wood mass in gross m3

The above figure shows that the recorded tree felling owing to bark beetle increased significantly in the second half of 2015, and it can also be seen that the recorded felling in the first half of 2016 was somewhat higher than in the first half of 2015, which implies that this year's actual felling of wood mass owing to bark beetle will be at least the same as in 2015, and probably even higher.

As mentioned above, the year 2015 marked the highest number of trees recorded for felling (2.15 million m3), as well as the highest actual number of felled wood mass (1,818,147 m3). Almost all of that wood mass was felled owing to the attack of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle. As already mentioned, it is expected that in 2016, the extent of damage owing to bark beetle will be at least similar or larger. Still, the largest extent of damage was incurred in spruce forests in the area which suffered the highest level of damage after the ice storm. This area includes the forest management areas of Ljubljana, Postojna, Kranj, Tolmin, as well as Bled and Kočevje. Significant damage is also expected in spruce forests in the Nazarje, Slovenj Gradec and Novo mesto forest management areas. As in 2015, the extent of damage resulting from the attack of bark beetle in 2016 is largely affected by weather

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 440/464 ______conditions, since owing to warm summers, the year 2016 is marked by a faster development cycle of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle. Fortunately, 2016 summer was not very dry, otherwise the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle would expand even more. Nevertheless, in 2016, it also expanded to areas which were less damaged by the 2014 ice storm, and to areas where it had not yet appeared by that year.

Trees recorded for felling owing to bark beetle, and the trees already felled owing to bark beetle between January and 30 September 2016, presented in m3 and by forest management areas (data as of 1 October 2016)

Trees recorded Trees felled in for felling in 2016 owing to The total of Forest 2016 owing to bark beetle (as Trees trees felled in management bark beetle, part of the felled/recorded 2016 owing to area (FMA) expressed in trees recorded in 2016 bark beetle m3 in 2016) (in %) Tolmin 190,132 116,477 61 161,119 Bled 230,786 124,637 54 170,502 Kranj 144,386 102,022 71 137,924 Ljubljana 451,665 276,672 61 416,446 Postojna 235,137 135,216 58 192,294 Kočevje 208,191 112,582 54 129,062 Novo mesto 64,729 38,224 59 48,319 Brežice 18,292 11,015 60 13,610 Celje 22,336 14,912 67 20,014 Nazarje 59,319 44,133 74 49,298 Sl. Gradec 62,233 41,304 66 44,951 Maribor 47,755 9963 21 16,053 M. Sobota 4472 2810 63 2875 KRAS FMA 7387 5380 73 7296 TOTAL 1,746,821 1,035,346 59 1,409,761

The above table shows the current state in 2016 by forest management areas with regard to the recorded (attacked) and already felled trees. By the end of September 2016, 1,746,821 m3 of affected trees were recorded, of which 1,035,346 m3 were felled, which is 59% of the recorded or attacked wood mass in 2016. This means that there is a noticeable shift in the amount of felled wood in relation to the already recorded trees intended for felling. By the end of September 2016, the annual or total amount of felled wood mass amounted to 1,409,761 m3. The difference with 1,035,346 m3 (which is 374,415 m3) is at the expense of the wood mass felled in 2016 and recorded before 2016. The total felling owing to bark beetle from the beginning of 2014 to the end of June 2016 amounts to 2,956,049 m3 of wood mass. By the end of September 2016, this number rose to more than 3.6 million m3 of wood mass.

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Total felling of wood mass owing to bark beetle since 2014 onwards, presented by six-month periods Kumulativni podatki o poseku zaradi poškodb po žledu in podlubnikov po polletjih od 2014 dalje = Total felling owing to damage after the ice storm and bark beetle presented by six-month periods starting in 2014 Lesna masa dreves v bruto m3 = Wood mass in gross m3 Posek PODLUBNIKI = Felling owing to BARK BEETLE Prva polovica 2014 = First half of 2014 Druga polovica 2014 = Second half of 2014 Prva polovica 2015 = First half of 2015 Druga polovica 2015 = Second half of 2015 Prva polovica 2016 (do 30. 6. 2016) = First half of 2016 (until 30 June 2016)

The predictions for the following years are also not very optimistic. The Slovenian Forest Service expects that the current overexpansion of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle will last at least until 2020. The figure below shows the actual and the predicted felling of wood mass for conifers owing to the overexpansion of bark beetle in the period 2014-2020. The data for 2014 and 2015 represent the actual felling of wood, whereas the data for the period 2016-2020 shows the predicted felling.

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The actual/predicted amount of the felled wood mass resulting from the overexpansion of bark beetle after the 2014 ice storm

The peak of the overexpansion of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle will be in 2016 and 2017, when the annual felling should reach 2.2 million m3 and 2 million m3 of wood mass. In accordance with some estimations for 2016, the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle will attack not only 2.2 million but as much as 3 million m3 of wood mass. In addition, it will be physically impossible to fell more than 2.2 million m3 of wood mass per year in Slovenia. This can lead to different, even more pessimistic predictions with regard to the felling of wood mass in the following years.

The felling of wood mass recorded and planned for the period 2014-2020 owing to the overexpansion of bark beetle

Year Felling in m3 Remark 2014 408,500 Recorded felling 2015 1,818,147 Recorded felling 2016 2,200,000¤ Prediction 2017¤ 2,000,000¤ Prediction 2018¤ 1,500,000¤ Prediction 2019¤ 1,000,000¤ Prediction 2020¤ 700,000¤ Prediction Total 9,626,647¤ Prediction

In the period 2014-2020, the amount of the felled wood mass owing to the overexpansion of bark beetle should reach more than 9.6 million m3, which is even more than the wood mass damaged in 2014 by the ice storm (more than 9.3 million m3 of wood mass).

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In accordance with the current estimates, the total quantity of wood mass felled owing to the ice storm in 2014 and the overexpansion of bark beetle in the period 2014-2020 should be approximately 19 million m3, and possibly even more in different, more unfavourable circumstances.

The extent of the attack of the bark beetle and the additional felling will depend on the weather conditions in the following years, and the quantity of newly damaged conifers affected by the development and spread of new generations of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle. This can primarily be the result of major natural disasters which can also influence the situation in forests, such as droughts, heat waves, and also wind, snow and ice damage. In the event that the restorative felling of the affected conifers is too slow, which is currently the case, the amount of felled wood in the following years could be even greater than described.

Owing to the spread of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle and the performance of preventive and pest control activities, additional damage in forests will occur in the future, as well as the costs shown in the following table.

Damage and costs owing to bark beetle in the period 2014-2020

Calculation of Wood of inferior quality, The cost of Total the predicted the estimated loss in silvicultural and damage and terms of growth and protective works in costs felling in EUR EUR year 2014¤ 14,688,180.00¤ 0.00¤ 14,688,180.00¤ 2015¤ 75,600,000.00¤ 3,522,000.00¤ 79,122,000.00¤ 2016¤ 90,125,000.00¤ 3,724,500.00¤ 93,849,500.00¤ 2017¤ 80,500,000.00¤ 2,035,500.00¤ 82,535,500.00¤ 2018¤ 57,750,000.00¤ 1,042,750.00¤ 58,792,750.00¤ 2019¤ 37,625,000.00¤ 728,500.00¤ 38,353,500.00¤ 2020¤ 26,600,000.00¤ 414,250.00¤ 27,014,250.00¤ Total 315,600,000.00¤ 11,467,500.00¤ 379,667,500.00*¤ Data for 2014 represent the actual situation, whereas the data for 2015-2020 represent estimation. * For the purposes of further analyses, the amount is rounded to EUR 380 million.

For wood of inferior quality, the value of lost wood was estimated at EUR 35 per m3 of wood mass, although the value could even be slightly higher. For the figures in the above table, it should again be emphasised that this is the current prediction for the coming years, which does not necessarily reflect the actual amount of felled wood mass. In addition, any possible additional natural disasters that could further aggravate the situation in forests were not taken into account. As a result, it is possible that the actual felling of wood mass in the coming years will be different from what is currently predicted, which can also affect the extent of damage and costs, as well as the fatalities and injuries owing to the increased

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 444/464 ______number of work-related accidents in forests. Nevertheless, we can conclude that the damage and costs owing to the control of bark beetle will largely surpass the damage caused by the ice storm.

Owing to the increase in salvage logging following the expansion of the eight-toothed spruce bark beetle in the affected forests, it is likely that there will be an increased number of work- related accidents in forests also in the coming years. In estimating the number of people injured and fatalities in the period 2015-2020, the data was taken into account, according to which in the period 1998-2014, 10 people a year died in work-related accidents in forest, and 22 were seriously injured. It was also considered that the number of fatalities and injuries owing to work in forests should be more the result of the quantity of the felled wood mass than of the reason for felling. It was also taken into account that on average, at least one person is fatally injured per every 257,000 m3 of felled wood among non-professional workers, and one person per every million m3 of felled wood among professional workers. This leads to the conclusion that per 6.5 million m3 of felled wood, 15 people are fatally injured. In the number of seriously injured, the ratio between the number of fatalities and the number of seriously injured in 2014 and 2015 was taken into account, in relation to the average of 1998-2014, which ranged from one to four in 2014, or from one to seven in 2015.

Assessment of the estimated number of fatalities and injured people in the event of work- related accidents in forests owing to the control and prevention of the spread of bark beetle for the period 2014-2020

Year The actual or the predicted amount of Predicted Predicted number of felled wood mass owing to the control number of serious injuries of bark beetle in m3 fatalities 2014¤ 408,500 (actual) 1 (predicted) 4 (predicted) 2015¤ 1,818,147 (actual) 2 (predicted) 15 (predicted) 2016¤ 2,200,000¤ 5¤ Between 20 and 35 2017¤ 2,000,000¤ 4-5 Between 16 and 35 2018¤ 1,500,000¤ 3-4 Between 12 and 28 2019¤ 1,000,000¤ 2¤ Between 8 and 14 2020¤ 700,000¤ 2¤ Between 8 and 14 Total 9,626,647¤ 21-23 83-145

This assessment does not take into account the number of people with minor injuries as a result of work-related accidents, when such injuries do not require extensive health care and when the Police are not present. Over the period in question, the number of people with minor injuries could be several hundred, perhaps even more than 1000.

On the basis of all the assessments of the consequences of impact on people resulting from the ice storm and the prevention of the spread of bark beetle, the expected total number of fatalities and injured people resulting from the ice storm and the prevention of the spread of bark beetle can be assessed. The assessment is shown in the table below. This data represent a combined impact on people for both disasters. The ice storm in 2014 and the

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 445/464 ______excessive growth of bark beetle populations after 2014, both individually and together, represent the biggest disasters which have ever hit the Slovenian forests.

Estimated number of fatalities and injured people as a result of the ice storm and the control of bark beetle in the period 2014-2020

As a result of the ice As a result of bark beetle Total storm (2014-2015) control (2014-2020) Number of fatalities 16¤ 21-23 37-39 Number of injured 190¤ 83-145 273-335 people

The following tables are based on the information on the damage and costs caused by the ice storm and the overexpansion of bark beetle and represent the total of all the actual and predicted costs and damages.

Data on the amount of direct damage caused by the ice storm in 2014 and the assessment of damage and costs arising from the overexpansion of bark beetle for the period 2014-2020

Type of direct damage Ice storm - Bark beetle - Total damage in EUR damage in EUR Damage to property and 0.00¤ 12,752,088.59¤ 12,752,088.59¤ buildings Damage to the economy 42,713,030.57¤ / 42,713,030.57¤ Damage to national roads 8,784,080.00¤ 0.00¤ 8,784,080.00¤ Damage to electricity 0.00¤ 80,512,371.11¤ 80,512,371.11¤ infrastructure Damage to railway infrastructure 40,873,990.91¤ 0.00¤ 40,873,990.91¤ Damage to cultural heritage 2,665,866.56¤ 0.00¤ 2,665,866.56¤ Damage to watercourses 26,788,015.36¤ 0.00¤ 26,788,015.36¤ Damage to forests 214,326,536.80¤ 380,000,000.00¤ 594,326,536.80¤ Total 429,415,980.17¤ 380,000,000.00¤ 809,415,980.17¤

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Data on the amount of damage and costs as the result of the ice storm in 2014 and the assessed amount of damage and costs as the result of the overexpansion of bark beetle in the period 2014-2020

Damage Ice storm - Overexpansion Total damage and of bark beetle - costs in EUR damage and costs in EUR Direct damage 429,415,980.17¤ 380,000,000.00¤ 809,415,980.17¤ Disaster response costs 40,055,984.30¤ 0.00¤ 40,055,984.30¤ Damage assessment costs 15,436.00¤ 0.00¤ 15,436.00¤ Additional costs of the ZGS 6,114,400.00¤ / 6,114,400.00¤ Total 475,601,800.47¤ 380,000,000.00¤ 855,601,800.47¤

The total damage and costs for both disasters together could thus amount to more than EUR 855 million. Among all the areas, the area of forestry would suffer the greatest damage, totalling in more than EUR 594 million. Within this amount, the share of damage and costs resulting from the overexpansion of bark beetle amounts to EUR 380 million or 64%. From the point of view of the amount of costs and damage resulting from the ice storm and the overexpansion of bark beetle, as compared to other actual and possible natural and other disasters, this risk scenario ranks the ice storm and the overexpansion of bark beetle among accidents with absolutely the highest damage.

LIKELIHOOD OF RISK ANALYSIS

The assessed likelihood of the impacts of such risk scenario is less than once in more than 100 years.

RELIABILITY OF RISK ANALYSIS

The risk analysis was estimated to be relatively reliable, despite some uncertainty about the final quantity of the felled wood mass as well as the amount of damage and costs.

DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE RESULTS OF RISK ANALYSIS AND THE CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACTS AND LIKELIHOOD OF A DISASTER

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 447/464 ______scenarios and risk analyses. Since the criteria for assessing risk impacts and the likelihood of disasters are uniform for all risks, they also allow the comparison between impacts or consequences and the likelihood of an individual disaster risk and other risks.

Comparison between the results of risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people

Risk impacts on people in relation to the type of risk can predominantly refer to the number of fatalities, the number of injured or sick, the number of permanently evacuated people, the number of people living and working in areas which are affected by the disaster, and others (e.g. impacts on vulnerable population groups, such as children, the elderly and the socially disadvantaged people). For disasters with possible long-term impacts (such as accidents involving dangerous substances, and nuclear or radiological accidents), these impacts are used or determined based on the number of fatalities and of injured or sick people during the period of 10 years following the disaster. The criteria for assessing risk impacts on people are expressed in the number of fatalities, injured or sick people, and permanently evacuated people.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people

Criteria for the assessment of risk 1¤ 2¤ 3¤ 4¤ 5¤ impacts on people Number of fatalities Up to 5-10 10-50 50-200 More Number of fatalities (10 years)* 5 5-10 10-50 50-100 than 200 Up to More 5 than 100 Number of injured or sick people** Up to 10-50 50-200 200-1000 More Number of injured or sick people (10 10 10-50 50-200 200-500 than 1000 years)** Up to More 10 than 500 Number of evacuated people Up to Between 50-200 200-500 More (permanent measure) 20 20 and 50 than 500 *For disasters with possible long-lasting impacts (e.g. up to 10 years), such as disasters involving dangerous substances and nuclear or radiological disasters, the long term values for fatalities and the injured or sick people (10 years) can be determined separately or applied as stated above, if necessary. ** The injured or sick people include people who were affected by radiation, contamination or poisoning. In risk analyses, such people can be dealt with separately. Included in the number of fatalities and the injured people are the possible fatalities and injured people among the members of protection, rescue and relief forces involved in emergency response operations, and the number of police officers, Slovenian Armed Forces members and emergency response teams of different services (emergency medical service, teams from electrical companies, public utility companies and others) who died or were injured during the implementation of emergency measures in their realm of responsibility and during the initial restoration activities, but not longer than one year after the disaster. Included in the risk matrices are the highest values of impact in reference to the coordinated criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on people.

In this risk scenario, the risk scenario numbers in Annex 11.6 have been supplemented by the assessed number of fatalities and injured people in the period 2014-2020, for the

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 448/464 ______purpose of implementing measures to control bark beetles in forests. The assessed number of fatalities and injured people is of course higher than in the risk scenario for ice storm in Annex 11.6. It includes at least 37 more fatalities and at least 273 more injured people. Due to the latter value, this risk scenario for ice storm is ranked at level four of risk to people.

Comparison between the results of the risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage

The following impacts can be included among the economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage in reference to risks: the number, the consequences and the amount of damage on facilities and in them; the costs for the operation of ministries and bodies which carry out activities within their realm of responsibility in difficult situations; the scope and the amount of damage on agricultural and forest surfaces, on facilities or in cultural heritage areas; the costs of the limitation on the use of food and the long-term costs in the food supply chain; the scope and the amount of damage to water bodies; the number of the damaged or destroyed means of transport and the damage resulting from that; the number, the damage and the costs owing to the dead or sick domestic or wild animals and animals which require treatment or have to be put to sleep; the costs of treatment of or medical care for people; the damage owing to the termination of an economic activity; social and other similar costs; the costs of disaster response and possible international assistance; the costs of the comprehensive long-term renovation (restoration) of facilities and equipment; the costs of comprehensive and long-term restoration of agricultural and forest surfaces and facilities or areas of cultural heritage; the costs of comprehensive long-term restoration of water bodies and the environment and of other environmental damage; and additionally (not included in the calculation of damage and costs) the extend of the affected area (in square kilometres and percentage of the country's surface); the amount of insurance payments resulting from a disaster; the reduction in GDP; the decrease in the number of visits of foreign tourists; and the increase of unemployment owing to a disaster.

Criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

1¤ 2¤ 3¤ 4¤ 5¤ Up to 0.3% Between 0.3% Between 0.6+% Between 1.2% More than 2.4% of GDP and 0.6% of and 1.2% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP of GDP GDP Up to EUR 100 EUR 220-440 EUR 440-880 More than EUR million EUR 100–220 million million 880 million million S4

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The criteria for the assessment of economic and environmental risk impacts and the impacts of risk on cultural heritage are expressed as the amount of costs and damage resulting from an individual risk. The boundary between class 2 and class 3 out of five is set at 0.6% of the GDP. This is the basis for the establishment of limit values for the remaining classes. To a large extent, this baseline value refers to the value of the 0.6% of gross national product (GNP). If the damage resulting from a disaster exceeds the value of the 0.6% of the GNP, a country can request the EU for grant. In the RS, the GNI and GDP values are similar (GNI is slightly lower). For this reason, the GDP is used for assessing risk impacts for a disaster. In 2014, the predicted GDP stood at approximately EUR 36.2 billion, while the value of the 0.6% of the GDP was approximately EUR 220 million.

The risk scenario analysis, that is, the analysis of the consequences of the ice storm in February 2014, shows that the level of environmental and economic risk impacts and risk impacts on cultural heritage could exceed EUR 855 million, which ranks the scenario and the risk analysis into level 4 out of 5. This value, in which the damage to forests accounts for 64% of the entire damage, is very close to the upper value threshold of this level.

Comparison between the results of risk analyses and criteria for the assessment of political and social risk impacts

The political and social risk impacts can, in reference to risk, include categories, such as risk impact on the functioning of state authorities, the impact of the non-functioning of important infrastructural systems on everyday life, the psychosocial impacts, the internal political stability and the impact on law and order, the financial stability and the foreign political or international stability (situation) of the country. The criteria for the assessment of political and social risk impacts are semi-qualitative. In comparison to the former two impact groups, for which mostly concrete data and numbers were available, this group of impacts refers more to the assessment of the order of extent of the considered impacts. The final value or degree of political and social risk impacts is determined by dividing the sum of the values of individual impacts by the number of the applied criteria that refer to political and social risk impacts, both within the framework of individual impacts and impact groups. The risk impacts which were not assessed are not taken into consideration. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of state authorities and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of state authorities and comparison with the results of risk analyses are presented in the tables below. In accordance with the assessment, the risk scenario would have no significant impact on the ability of state authorities to carry out functions within their realm of responsibility, except on the work of authorities responsible for forests and forestry. For this reason, the scenario was ranked at impact level 3.

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Duration Limited Strongly impaired Disabled Up to 2 days 1¤ 1¤ 2¤ Up to 7 days 1¤ 1¤ 2¤ Up to 15 days 2¤ 2¤ 3¤ Up to 30 days 2¤ 3¤ 4¤ More than 30 days 3¤ 4¤ 5¤ The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 More than people/duration and 5,000 and 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1¤ 1¤ 1¤ 2¤ Up to 7 days 1¤ 2¤ 2¤ 3¤ Up to 15 days 2¤ 3¤ 3¤ 4¤ Up to 30 days 3¤ 4¤ 4¤ 5¤ More than 30 4¤ 5¤ 5¤ 5¤ days If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The final level or value of risk impact on the functioning of state authorities is defined by dividing the sum of individual values from both tables with the number of impacts taken into account. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (2), the resulting value of risk impacts on the functioning of state authorities is 2.5.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on the functioning of major infrastructure systems and comparison with the results of risk analyses are presented in the following tables.

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The lack of or difficult access to drinking water, food and energy products (electricity, heating, fuel) and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than people/duration and 5,000 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1¤ 1¤ 1¤ 2¤ Up to 7 days 1¤ 2¤ 2¤ 3¤ Up to 15 days 2¤ 3¤ 3¤ 4¤ Up to 30 days 3¤ 4¤ 4¤ 5¤ More than 30 4¤ 5¤ 5¤ 5¤ days The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If, in a minimum of two cases, the same number of people is affected, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Strongly impaired or disabled use of the internet and telecommunications systems; arrival to work and in educational institutions; use of public services (access to the media, health services, banking services, etc.); use of public transport; supply or purchase of basic necessities; and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 More than people/duration and 5,000 and 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1¤ 1¤ 1¤ 2¤ Up to 7 days 1¤ 2¤ 2¤ 3¤ Up to 15 days 2¤ 3¤ 3¤ 4¤ Up to 30 days 3¤ 4¤ 4¤ 5¤ More than 30 days 4¤ 5¤ 5¤ 5¤ The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used. If, in a minimum of two cases, the same number of people is affected, the impact which lasts longer is taken into consideration. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The ability to use the internet and telecommunication systems has the greatest impact.

December 2016 NATIONAL DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT, Version 1.1 452/464 ______decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (2), the resulting value of risk impacts on the functioning of important infrastructure systems is 2.00.

Criteria for the assessment of psychosocial risk impacts and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of psychosocial risk impacts and comparison with the results of risk analysis are defined in the following three tables.

Number of Up to 500 Between 500 Between 5,000 and More than people/duration and 5,000 50,000 50,000 Up to 2 days 1¤ 1¤ 1¤ 2¤ Up to 7 days 1¤ 2¤ 2¤ 3¤ Up to 15 days 2¤ 3¤ 3¤ 4¤ Up to 30 days 3¤ 4¤ 4¤ 5¤ More than 30 4¤ 5¤ 5¤ 5¤ days The impact which causes the greatest consequences and lasts the longest is taken into account. If there are several contents with the same level of impact, the one affecting the largest number of people is used, followed by the one which lasts longer. If the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the contents assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Social impacts and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Types of social impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1¤ The poor segments of the population find themselves in severe social distress; the number of applications for extraordinary social 2¤ assistance benefits in cash is increasing. The consequences of the disaster are also felt by the middle-class population, which is reflected in the increased number of 3¤

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Types of social impacts Level of impact applications for extraordinary social assistance benefits in cash. The consequences of the disaster are felt by the majority of the population, which is reflected in a large increase in the number of 4¤ applications for social assistance benefits. The consequences are felt by all residents, which is reflected primarily in new applications for social assistance and renewed 5¤ applications for the allocation of assistance. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Psychological impacts and the ranking of risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Types of psychological impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of fear among the population owing to the lack of 2 information regarding the causes of the disaster and its characteristics and consequences. Increased level of fear among the population, especially the fear of a 3 new disaster and its consequences. The population fear for their lives; decreased confidence in the 4 responsible authorities regarding their response and mitigation and elimination of disaster consequences; increased desire to relocate. Due to the negative events or consequences of a disaster, the 5 majority of people cease to believe that life in the affected area could return to a normal state; mass relocation is taking place. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

The final level or value of psychosocial risk impacts is defined by dividing the sum of the values from the above tables with the number of impacts taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (3), the resulting value of psychosocial risk impacts is 2.00.

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Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal political stability and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on internal political stability and comparison with the results of risk analyses are shown in the table below.

Risk impact on internal political stability and law and order and the ranking of risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Types of impacts Level of impact Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 Individual cases of public expression of disagreement with the 2 actions taken by the responsible institutions; individual disruptions in the functioning of political institutions (the Government, the Parliament, etc.); individual occurrences of hostile campaigns. Individual cases of violation of law and order and criminal offences 3 resulting from the disaster; observed expressions of fear for one's own safety and property; individuals or groups are trying to undermine the internal political situation; reduced trust of the population in the functioning of political institutions. Increased number of violations of law and order and of organised 4 criminal offences; increased fear among the population; political parties and other stakeholders are trying to undermine internal political stability and obtain political benefits by "imposing" their own programmes for improving the situation; reduced trust in the functioning of state institutions. Massive violations of law and order including violent demonstrations; 5 significant increase in the number of criminal offences; the internal security of the country is at risk. The internal political stability of the country is undermined; the basic rights provided for in the Constitution are undermined and at risk. If it is assessed that the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, the level of impact is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can only be a whole number.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability and comparison with the results of risk analysis

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The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on financial stability and comparison with the results of risk analyses are shown in the following three tables.

Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to payment system failures and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Settlement Payment Payment Payment Payment Payment failure value settlement settlement settlement settlement settlement failure in an failure in an failure in an failure in an failure in an amount lower amount amount amount amount higher than between 10% between 20% between 50% than 80% of duration of the 10% of the and 20% of the and 50% of the and 80% of the the planned failure planned value planned value planned value planned value value of the of the of the of the of the payment payment payment payment payment system during system during system during system during system during disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions disruptions No impact, because disaster impacts do not Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed refer to the (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) assessed content.

Disruptions in the payment system 1 1 2 3 3 lasting up to 2 hours. Disruptions in the payment system 1 2 2 3 4 lasting up to 4 hours. Disruptions in the payment system 2 3 3 4 4 lasting up to 8 hours. Disruptions in the payment system lasting the entire business day, or 3 4 4 5 5 disruption which are not eliminated by the end of the business day.* Disruptions in the payment system lasting more than 4 5 5 5 5 one business day.

*Disruptions at the end of a business day, even if they only last a short time, can cause a one-day delay in the settlement of payments. If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the contents assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

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Based on the assessment of the consequences, it was concluded that the risk scenario in question could be ranked at impact level 2.

Impact on the legal and natural persons' capacity to pay owing to the lack of cash and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Number of affected Up to 5000 Up to 50,000 More than 50,000 people/duration Up to 2 days 1 2 3 Between 2 and 7 days 2 3 4 More than 7 days 3 4 5 If the impacts of a disaster are not covered by the content assessed, such impacts are not assessed in reference to this content (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account. Legend: 1 – No or small impact. 2 – Legal and natural persons have difficulties accessing cash in their place of residence. 3 – Legal and natural persons can access cash in neighbouring areas. 4 – Legal and natural persons can access cash in bigger cities or individual areas. 5 – Cash cannot be accessed.

The present risk scenario, owing to long-term and widespread interruptions in electricity supply and the inability to fill ATMs owing to the poor passability of roads could have an impact primarily on the functioning of banking institutions, and even more on the functioning of ATMs. For this reason, the risk scenario was ranked at level 3 of the assessed impact.

Changes in the growth of GDP owing to disaster consequences in the year of the disaster or in the following year and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Change in GDP growth Level of impact No impact because disaster impacts do not refer to the Not assessed (NA) content/no consequences Between 0 and –0.5 percentage points 1 Up to –1 percentage points 2 Up to –1.5 percentage points 3 Up to –2 percentage point 4 More than –2 percentage points 5 If it is estimated that a disaster will not have a negative impact on the GDP growth, or if the impacts of a disaster do not refer to the content assessed, the level of impact is not assessed (NA). The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are not taken into account.

In accordance with the assessment, this risk scenario, even more than the risk scenario in Annex 11.6, has a certain negative impact on GDP growth and is therefore ranked at impact level 2.

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The final level or likelihood of risk impact on financial stability is determined by dividing the sum of individual values from the three tables above with the number of impacts taken into account. The value of this group of impacts can be a whole number or a decimal. When adding together the levels of impacts from this group and dividing the sum by the number of impacts taken into account (3), the resulting value of psychosocial risk impacts is 2.67.

Criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy and international stability and comparison with the results of risk analysis

The criteria for the assessment of risk impacts on foreign policy and international stability and comparison with the results of risk analyses are shown in the below table.

Foreign policy (international) risk impact and the ranking of risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

Type of foreign policy or international impact Level of impact

Disaster impacts do not refer to the assessed content. Not assessed (NA) Small/insignificant impact. 1 No significant detected direct impact on the international position of the country. Individual foreign countries are following the 2 developments in the Republic of Slovenia. Individual (neighbouring) countries and some regional and international organisations are responding to the event through 3 diplomatic channels by expressing their support and concerns about the situation. A part of the international community (countries, international organisations) is responding to the event by expressing strong 4 support or concerns about the situation. The Republic of Slovenia is receiving international assistance, especially in equipment and human resources. Despite the international assistance, Slovenia remains a stable country. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the RS are advising their citizens against travelling to certain areas in the RS. A major part of the international community is responding strongly to the events in the country, since the events are greatly impacting 5 the security of other countries. The RS is receiving significant international assistance (equipment, money, human resources). The RS urgently needs assistance to ensure a normal functioning of the entire system. Foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts are advising their citizens against travelling to the RS and are decreasing or increasing the number of staff at the missions and posts owing to the situation in the country. International events whose main topic is the position of or the

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Type of foreign policy or international impact Level of impact situation in the RS.

Owing to foreign policy impacts, and in particular owing to the extensive involvement of foreign rescue workers which lasted almost one month, and in certain cases even longer, the present risk scenario was ranked at level 4 of foreign policy impacts. Owing to the extent of the consequences and some insufficient domestic capabilities, the Republic of Slovenia was, for the first time in history, forced to apply for international assistance through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism.

Final value or the level of political and social risk impacts

The final value or the level of political and social risk impacts is determined by adding together the final values or levels of all groups of political and social risk impacts and dividing this sum by the number of impact groups, that is, by 6. If a certain group of political or social risk impacts was not assessed because these risk impacts do refer to the assessed content (NA), this group is not taken into account in the final calculation. The impacts which refer to the content assessed but were not assessed for various reasons are also not taken into account.

Overview of the values or levels of individual impact groups as part of political and social risk impacts

The final calculated value of political and social risk impacts can also be a decimal number. In this case, the final level of political and social risk impacts, which must be a whole number, is calculated based on the next table.

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Conversion of the value of political and social impacts into the level of political and social risk impacts

This is the method for calculating the level of political and social impacts.

The conversion of the value of political and social impacts of risk scenarios into the level of political and social risk impacts

Level/value Average value of political and social risk 2.86 impacts Level of political and social risk impact 3

Comparison between the results of the risk analyses and the criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of disasters

The likelihood of the occurrence of a disaster can be defined using a number, percentage or description, which is evident from the table below.

Criteria for the assessment of the likelihood of a disaster and the ranking of the risk scenario in accordance with the levels of impact

1 2 3 4 5

Hardly any risk Possible but Possible risk General risk Special and (threat) less likely risk (threat) (threat) imminent (threat) (permanent) risk (threat) The descriptive definition is used especially for disasters which do not follow a natural cycle of occurrence or for intentional acts which cannot be predicted based on the specifics of their occurrence (e.g. terrorism). For other disasters, the time periods listed in the upper part of the table are taken into account.

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The described and similar impacts of the present risk scenario can occur once in more than 100 years, which ranks the scenario in level 2 of the likelihood of risk of the disaster.

DISASTER RISK MATRICES

Disaster risk matrices are used for graphic representation of the size of the impacts and likelihood of disaster risk or individual risk scenarios, when only one risk is addressed.

The level of overall or average impact is calculated by dividing the sum of the level of risk impacts on people (1), the level of economic and environmental impacts (2) and the level of impacts on cultural heritage together with political and social impacts (3), by three. The final calculated value of impacts can also be a decimal number. In this case, the final level of overall (average) impacts must be determined, and the value must be a whole number.

The conversion of the overall (average) level of risk impacts to be inserted into the fields of the disaster risk matrices showing the overall value of risk impacts

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Calculation of the average risk impacts for the matrix showing the overall risk impacts

Level of Level of Level Calculated Level of Risk Reliability impacts economic and of overall overall likelihood of risk on environmental politic (average) (average) analysis people impacts and al and value of risk impacts results impacts on social impacts cultural impact heritage s

4 4 3 3.67 4 2 Relatively reliable

This risk scenario, which covers the consequences of the ice storm in 2014 and the overexpansion of bark beetle after 2014, is therefore ranked at risk level 4 (high level) and has a low likelihood of the disaster (level two out of five).

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12. Record of amendments and updates

The record of amendments and updates contains significant amendments, corrections and updates made in the Disaster Risk Assessment, version 1.1 in comparison with version 1.0.

No. Amendments and updates (chapter, page) Date Made by

1 The Table of contents was updated according 14 October Slavko Šipec, to the changed or new content in the 2016 Ministry of assessment. Defence, ACPDR 2 Updates to the text in chapter 1, subsection 14 October Slavko Šipec, 1.3, were made, especially concerning the 2016 Ministry of amendments of certain risk assessments for Defence, ACPDR individual disasters and the National Disaster Risk Assessments in 2016 with the impacts of future climate change and the fulfilment of ex- ante conditionalities for the absorption of funds from the European structural and investment funds for investments in the thematic field 5 (Adaptation to climate change and disaster risk management) of the Partnership Agreement between Slovenia and the European Commission for the Absorption of Funds from the European Structural and Investment Funds for the Period 2014-2020. 3 The contents of Chapter 6 in the version 1.0 14 October Slavko Šipec, of the assessment were moved to a new 2016 Ministry of chapter 3, and were updated with the latest Defence, ACPDR, data on climate change. Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, Slovenian Environment Agency 4 A new chapter, chapter 4, was added, 14 October Slavko Šipec, containing information on the links between 2016 Ministry of the assessment of risk of disasters and Defence, ACPDR critical infrastructure. 5 Owing to certain data related to climate Slavko Šipec, change which also relate to some other Ministry of disasters, chapter 5, subchapter 5.2 Defence, ACPDR (Summary of the Risk Assessment for Ministry of the Drought), was placed before all other Environment and summaries of risk assessments for individual Spatial Planning,

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disasters which can be impacted by future Slovenian climate change. The Summary of Risk Environment Assessment for Drought was amended with Agency the findings of the amended Risk Assessment for Drought related to climate change and their impacts on drought. New risk scenarios, which were analysed and evaluated, were added. Risk matrices for drought were amended, and the other summaries of risk assessments for individual disasters in chapter 5 were renumbered, as appropriate. 6 Owing to the amendment to the Risk 14 October Slavko Šipec, Assessment for Floods, chapter 5, 2016 Ministry of subchapter 5.3 (Summary of the Risk Defence, ACPDR, Assessment for Floods) was amended, Ministry of the especially with findings related to climate Environment and change and their impacts on floods. New risk Spatial Planning scenarios, which were analysed and evaluated, were added. Risk matrices for floods were amended. 7 Owing to the amendment to the Risk 14 October Slavko Šipec, Assessment for Hazards of Biological, 2016 Ministry of Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin Defence, ACPDR, for Human Health, chapter 5, subchapter 5.4 Ministry of Health (Summary of the Risk Assessment for Hazards of Biological, Chemical, Environmental or Unknown Origin for Human Health) was amended, especially with findings related to climate change and their impacts on the occurrence of communicable diseases in humans. 8 Owing to the amendment to the Risk 14 October Slavko Šipec, Assessment for Highly contagious animal 2016 Ministry of diseases, chapter 5, subchapter 5.5 Defence, ACPDR, (Summary of the Risk Assessment for Highly Ministry of contagious animal diseases) was amended, Agriculture, especially with findings related to climate Forestry and Food, change and its impact on animal husbandry, AFSVSPP animal husbandry systems and the occurrence of Highly contagious animal diseases. 9 Owing to the amendment to the Risk 14 October Slavko Šipec, Assessment for Major Wildfires, chapter 5, 2016 Ministry of subchapter 5.9 (Summary of the Risk Defence, ACPDR, Assessment for Large Wildfires) was Ministry of amended, especially with findings related to Agriculture,

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climate change and its impacts on wildfires. Forestry and Food 10 Owing to the amendment to the Risk 14 October Slavko Šipec, Assessment for Ice Storms, chapter 5, 2016 Ministry of subchapter 5.11 (Summary of the Risk Defence, ACPDR Assessment for Ice Storms) was amended. New risk scenario, which was analysed and evaluated, was added. Risk matrices for ice storms were amended. 11 Chapter 6 was amended in accordance with 14 October Slavko Šipec, the contents of the amended summaries of 2016 Ministry of risk assessments for disasters. Some tables Defence, ACPDR were amended. 12 Chapter 10 (Sources) was amended with 14 October Slavko Šipec, additional sources used during the 2016 Ministry of preparation of version 1.1 of this assessment. Defence, ACPDR 13 The contents of risk scenario in chapter 11, 14 October Slavko Šipec, subchapter 11.6, which referred to the 2016 Ministry of overexpansion of bark beetle, were deleted Defence, ACPDR and moved, as appropriate, to risk scenario in subchapter 11,7. There are also minor changes in the assessment of impacts on people. 14 A new subchapter was added (subchapter 14 October Slavko Šipec, 11.7), which contains an additional risk 2016 Ministry of scenario (consequences of ice storm in 2014 Defence, ACPDR and the overexpansion of bark beetle after 2014). 15 In accordance with amendments to the 14 October Slavko Šipec, contents of the assessment, all tables and 2016 Ministry of pictures in all chapters and subchapters were Defence, ACPDR renumbered, as appropriate. 16 In accordance with amendments to the 14. October Slavko Šipec, assessment, version 1.1, the Record of 2016 Ministry of amendments and updates was amended, as Defence, ACPDR compared to version 1.0 of the assessment.

December 2016